At the start of Xi Jinping’s third term as chairman of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC), a number of challenges to his power overlapped. Among the most important were the intensifying rivalry with the U.S., Russia’s aggression against Ukraine[1], the lingering effects of the coronavirus pandemic[2], and the EU’s increasingly negative attitude towards China[3]. The prevailing conviction in the party became that the “period of strategic opportunity” was over, which meant that the PRC would not benefit any longer from the dynamic and multi-year economic growth offered by, among other things, the opportunities of globalisation. Deep structural problems are now being seen in a slowdown in China’s growth rate. This has prompted the CPC to strengthen the elements of a broad security vision[4] in its domestic and foreign policies. This was a development of the “comprehensive national security” concept implemented since 2014, after it was proposed by Xi and enshrined in the CPC’s charter as part of the “rebirth of the Chinese nation”[5] by 2049 initiative.[6] In the international arena, meanwhile, China sees new opportunities, including strengthening its position in relations with countries unfriendly to the West and those seeking to pursue their own interests amid the Sino-U.S. rivalry and the war in Ukraine.

The Chinese understanding of the term “international community” includes states and multilateral formats and minimising the role of multinational corporations, NGOs, and other similar organisations. Central to the Chinese outlook is the concept of a “community of  shared future for mankind” created back by Hu Jintao, Xi’s predecessor, and incorporated into the CPC statute in 1997. The content of this is now being fulfilled—proposed by Xi at various multilateral forums—by the Global Development Initiative (GDI; announced at the UN General Assembly session in 2021), the Global Security Initiative (GSI, presented at the Boao Forum in 2022) and the Global Civilisation Initiative (announced in 2023). In addition, a new dimension of the BRI initiative was presented at the 3^rd Belt and Road Forum (BRI)[7] in October this year.

Reinforcing the rhetoric about a Chinese alternative to the current international order are documents published by Chinese institutions, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the State Council, that is, the Chinese government, or the Xinhua news agency. They specify the objectives, instruments, and scope of the various initiatives. In February 2023, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (a day before the anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine) published a description of the GSI and a first summary of its effects since 2021.[8] In March, Xi announced details of the GCI,[9] and in September 2023, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a summary of GDI cooperation to date,[10] as well as proposals for global governance reform.[11] In the same month, the State Council adopted a position paper setting out the basic principles on “a community for the future of humanity”.[12] In October 2023, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs also published the outlook on China’s neighbourhood policy.[13] In June, meanwhile, the Chinese parliament amended the Foreign Policy Law codifying and clarifying its previous implementation principles, including, among others, the dominance of party institutions over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Chinese Vision

The Chinese documents mostly present a dichotomous worldview based on the rivalry between the rich West and the group of Global South states seeking to develop and increase its influence. In this rivalry, China sees itself as the oldest civilisation in existence, the largest of the developing countries,[14] geared to cooperate and support the just demands of this group of countries. China does not seek hegemony, advocates inclusiveness, climate protection, international stability, and a greater role for the UN. These demands largely fulfil the content of a “community for the future of humanity”, in line with the narrative presented by the PRC. At the same time, China is announcing far-reaching changes in selected areas of its foreign policy.

Economic Issues

The global economy and development are the most important areas of China’s activity in the international community geared towards changing its operating model, implemented through the GDI as early as 2021, and before that, for example, through the Belt and Road projects. As the PRC understands it, economic development is central and takes priority over other elements of global policy. The GDI makes strong reference to the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In China’s view, international cooperation needs to be more diverse in nature, in opposition to the current North-South divide. The PRC and developing countries cannot therefore accept the current “ideological provocations” of some countries (i.e., the West) regarding, for example, making economic cooperation conditional on respect for human rights, as they slow down the pace of development, which is particularly felt by the Global South. For this reason, any moves to disengage from China (decoupling) or reduce dependence on China (derisking,[15] the Chinese treat the two terms synonymously) and use the West’s economic resources for political struggle are unacceptable. The GDI is also intended to develop technological cooperation and the GSI to regulate cyberspace (both under Chinese leadership).

Regional Policy

China’s primary area of activity is its immediate neighbourhood, namely East and Southeast Asia. Most of the previously mentioned initiatives (and especially the Belt and Road) in their original version referred to partners from these sub-regions. At the same time, political and military control over Southeast Asia, the South China Sea, and the Pacific is crucial to the pursuit of Chinese interests. China stresses that any negative developments in international politics (e.g. the inefficiency of global governance mechanisms, and the rise of protectionism) are strongly felt in Asia, forcing a response from the PRC. It offers far-reaching support to Asian countries within the BRI but also through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation[16] (SCO, especially towards Central Asia[17]). The neighbourhood policy document published by the Chinese Foreign Ministry points to China’s unique position vis-à-vis neighbouring countries. The PRC justifies its close relations with Asian countries by emphasising their systemic and cultural distinctiveness from the West. In this context, ASEAN countries[18] are the main neighbourhood policy partner for the PRC. However, the Chinese approach does not indicate the partnership nature of the relationship. In the text, the PRC explicitly states that it is a condition for its active work for peace and development in the region that these countries maintain the “One China” policy and limit their cooperation with Taiwan.[19] The text does not emphasise the importance of relations with Russia (probably to not unduly alienate possible Asian partners who are sceptical of Russian policy). Russia is described as “one of many partners”, despite the partnership announced in February 2022.

Global Governance and UN Reform

During the November 2023 Politburo session, Xi Jinping emphasised China’s contribution to shaping international law and new regulations of inter-state relations.[20] The proposals for global governance reform put forward by China’s Foreign Ministry last September are limited to working to resolve local conflicts (Syria, Sudan, Libya, and Yemen were mentioned), but without introducing unilateral sanctions, in opposition to the ideas of Western countries. They do not present alternative solutions, only emphasise diplomatic tools. The PRC also intends to use the UN to implement the GDI, GSI, BRI, as well as proposing regulations for activities in space, cyberspace, or towards artificial intelligence (AI), among others. In China’s view, there is a need for a different approach from the West’s vision of human rights, which the Chinese authorities believe is not universal, and that developing countries should have better representation on the UN Human Rights Council.[21] Possible UN reform then should focus on supporting multilateralism by strengthening the voice of the Global South, as well as increasing the competences of UN agencies. The composition of a reformed UNSC should be more inclusive of developing countries, especially from Africa. According to the PRC, better communication and coordination of activities between the United Nations, the G20, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund is also needed. Reform of the World Health Organisation[22] is also needed. On the above issues, however, Chinese MFA did not indicate specific actions.

The Importance of Powers and International Security

Part of the Chinese approach to the international community is a belief in the gradation of the importance of states according to the political, economic, or military potential.[23] Although the GSI conceptual document refers to the UN Charter, including the equality of all states, their sovereignty and territorial integrity, the PRC’s practice (e.g., in the context of Russian aggression against Ukraine, or the PRC’s relations with Pacific states[24]) is already different. According to the GSI, as reiterated by Foreign Minister Wang Yi in January this year, international security depends on the cooperation of the major states, namely China and the U.S.[25] In this context, China emphasises that solving international problems through negotiations should be based on the recognition of the priorities of the superpowers. This should be interpreted as an attempt to limit the importance of certain international organisations or multilateral formats in which the basis of the participants’ relationship is not based on differences in potentials, but on international law. For this reason, China is placing greater emphasis on multilateral formats in which it is the dominant state (BRICS, SCO, the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum, relations with CELAC,[26] the Belt and Road Initiative). Article 4 of the amended Foreign Policy Law indicates that one of the PRC’s objectives is to build a new model of the international community. However, it does not mention that it should be multilateral, suggesting a commitment to a vision of domination by the states with the greatest political and economic power.

According to China, the GSI is characterised by a holistic approach, taking into account the security interests of all states. Their sovereignty and territorial integrity must not be violated, but neither must they deny others the right to look after their own security. The PRC invokes the concept of indivisibility of security in this context, identical to Russia justifying its aggression against Ukraine in this way. China dilutes the responsibility of states to maintain peace. The lack of a concrete declaration as to their duties and rights gives rise in practice to the settlement of disputes based on the use of force rather than international law. Article 31 of the Foreign Policy Law, on the other hand, allows only provisions that do not threaten the PRC’s “public interests” to be implemented in Chinese law. Their lack of definition may facilitate China’s negation of some of its international legal obligations.

According to the GSI, the aim of the international community should be to resolve conflicts by political means, with one of the guiding principles being non-interference in the internal affairs of states. The role of China and other actors should be to support the negotiation process, not to participate in it directly. The Chinese authorities mention in this context the war in Ukraine, the situation in the Middle East[27] and Afghanistan,[28] the conflicts in Africa and even the actions of the Pacific states[29] related to climate change. In each of these, the negotiation process should be initiated and led by the parties directly involved, not external actors.

Implementation of Initiatives and Reactions Worldwide

According to the law amended in July, the setting of PRC foreign policy is the domain of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission in the CPC (Xi is its chairman) and the Foreign Ministry implements it. The task of state organs in foreign relations is primarily to uphold “socialism with Chinese characteristics”. However, the law also provides for the implementation of the GDI, BRI, GSI ,or GCI principles as personal initiatives of chairman Xi Jinping.

The goals in the concept papers are being realised in the form of policy declarations on the war in Ukraine, Israel’s conflict with Hamas, the reform of the World Trade Organisation and the regulation of artificial intelligence, among others. Chinese initiatives are also reflected in Sino-Russian declarations. For example, in the February 2022 document,[30] Russia and China confirmed cooperation on the basis of, among other things, a “community of a shared future for mankind”, or the implementation of the GSI and GDI.

The promotion of the Chinese view of the international community is mainly addressed to the countries of the Global South. The GCI vision was supported in the final document by representatives of Arab states at the Sino-Arab Political Party Dialogue in July 2023.[31] In the same month, at the Forum for Co-Development, PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi, together with politicians from the Solomon Islands, Zimbabwe, Pakistan, Belarus, and others, emphasised their commitment to the GDI.[32] More than 70 countries have pledged to be partners in this initiative at the UN from 2021 onwards, seeking to benefit from Chinese earmarked funding of around $4 billion for, among other things, projects dedicated to poverty reduction or improving public health.[33] China also declared that 28 Asian countries (including Pakistan, Thailand, Uzbekistan, Malaysia, and Kazakhstan) are cooperating in a “community of a shared future for mankind”.[34] 

Part of China’s interaction with developing countries is not only economic cooperation but also the promotion of the Chinese political system and the related training of cadres. An example is an elite training school operating in Tanzania, established in cooperation between the CPC and political parties from Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, among others.[35] Political issues were also an important element of the 3^rd Belt and Road Forum in Beijing in October 2023. Statements that the Chinese authorities published on the occasion of Chairman Xi’s bilateral meetings with the leaders of Thailand, Vietnam, and Uruguay confirmed their support for China’s vision of international relations. Increasingly, wording in support[36] of particular initiatives by the Chinese authorities also has managed to be included in UN resolutions. Since the first use of the formula “community of a shared future for mankind” in 2017, it has been more frequently used in the organisation’s documents,[37] thus causing Chinese initiatives to gradually become part of United Nations policy.

Under the GSI, China pledges to train more than 5,000 people from developing countries on counter-terrorism along the lines of, among others, previous training for Afghans or Pakistanis.[38] China will consult with other countries in security forums, such as the China-Africa Peace and Security Forum, the Middle East Security Forum, the Xianshang Forum, and the China-Horn of Africa Conference. The adoption of the GSI was the main theme of last year’s China-Africa Peace and Security Forum, which was attended by representatives from more than 50 countries, including defence ministers from Senegal, Cameroon, and Gabon. The implementation of the GSI is also expected to take place within the framework of existing multilateral cooperation platforms in which China has a strong presence, that is, the Conference on Cooperation and Confidence Building (CICA), BRICS, or SCO. The expansion of BRICS is, in Xi’s assessment of it at the South Africa Summit in August 2023, expected to work towards the organisation’s greater commitment to international security.

The Chinese initiatives are viewed negatively by the West primarily as attempts to change the current rules of the international community.[39] The GSI has been particularly cited as a signal of the convergence of Chinese and Russian political objectives with regard to the security of Europe or the Asia-Pacific region. With some exceptions (e.g., Greece taking part in GCI meetings or Hungary actively participating in the BRI), EU countries have not engaged with China. They rightly perceive the Chinese proposals as being directed at other actors and aimed at undermining the EU’s position with developing countries. Like the U.S., the EU also sees the Chinese initiatives as a threat to compliance with international law and democratic standards worldwide. 

Conclusions and Outlook

The publication of the series of policy documents, as well as the adoption of the Foreign Policy Law, stems from the PRC’s belief that it needs to have a greater impact on the international community. China is promoting the concept of change in the international community for several important reasons.  First and foremost, it is a form of “running to the front” as part of the PRC authorities’ high priority of enhancing state security, particularly important in the face of faltering economic growth and an impending confrontation with the U.S. from their perspective. China is seeking support for its policies and presenting interested countries with a framework of possible cooperation in order to create more favourable conditions for itself to compete with the United States. New international initiatives are being promoted by Xi, and as such they will remain relevant as long as he is in power. Some of them (e.g., the GCI, or the “community for the future of humanity”) are also adaptations of earlier concepts to the current international situation.

China wants to raise its image in the world, particularly in the countries of the Global South. Hence the vague but positive tone of these documents for developing countries (especially those with authoritarian political systems). The PRC’s vision for the international community is not formulated explicitly, and a fair amount of it is taken up with references to the provisions of the UN Charter, the equality of all states, respect for their political system and their chosen path of development. These vague documents are also critical of the West and democratic values, judged to be one-sided and not taking into account local circumstances. The vision of the international community that emerges from the published documents, notwithstanding the often universalist language about the “global community”, is one based on the construction of a dichotomous world, presenting the Chinese model (of development or in terms of security) as a better offer to states than that of the West. It is an offer oriented towards reinforcing divisions, of polarising the international community into democratic and authoritarian spheres. Chinese initiatives support a model of the international community based on the primacy of state development interests over respect for human rights, loosening the rules on the use of force in international relations, and negating democratic values. They are not infrequently aimed directly at local elites, to whom China offers specific projects, strengthening their power (but no longer the wellbeing of society), and receiving support in international forums in return.

China’s presentation of a picture of the modern world, with dysfunctional global governance caused by the hegemonic drive of the U.S. and its Cold War mentality, is also intended to serve up a sympathetic view of Chinese solutions. References to the UN Charter and the United Nations itself help disguise China’s desire for global domination. The PRC authorities are deeply convinced, for historical reasons and the durability of Chinese civilisation, among others, of their right to create a new model for the functioning of the international community.

An attempt to implement the PRC’s ideas regarding the global community (with their lack of proposals for concrete solutions and their general reference to the UN) could amount to a de facto dismantling of international law and manipulation of the UNSC’s operation. In a situation of international disputes, this would mean, among other things, the impossibility of resolving them legally, as well as politically, according to the current pattern within the Security Council. With the disparity in capabilities between the PRC and the rest of the developing world, China would have the ability to enforce solutions favourable to itself, for example in disputes in the South China Sea.

The willingness of countries to cooperate with China stems both from the desire of authoritarian regimes to assert themselves in their relations with the U.S. and the EU, resentment towards the West, and the hope that the PRC’s actions will increase the subjectivity of developing countries in the international community. To some extent, they are ready to accept Chinese leadership in this kind of cooperation. However, this often depends on the specific situation and the strategic interests of individual states; for example, Saudi Arabia remains interested in security cooperation with the U.S., aware of Chinese limitations in this regard. The situation is similar in Central Asia and Africa, where states are keen to declare closer relations with China, using this as an argument in relations with the EU or the U.S. At the same time, other states (such as India, or Russia) also seek to promote their own ideas about the future of the international system, which is often different from the Chinese outlook. Therefore, countering the implementation of Chinese ideas should especially include the identification of elements that are detrimental to developing countries, but also to the international system based on law. This includes the vocabulary used in the UN that is in line with Chinese rhetoric. It also is not as important that the EU or the U.S. make concessions to the demands of developing countries, but rather that the offer made to them by the West, including the EU, concerning, for example, infrastructure development, is actually fulfilled. This includes, for example, the EU’s Global Gateway programme[40] or its strategy towards Latin America.[41] It would be worthwhile for these proposals to be attractive to local companies, to facilitate their access to new technologies, and to improve transparency in public life, among other things.