23 July marks the 100^th anniversary of the start of the inaugural Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1921.[1] This day is recognised in China as the symbolic date of the founding of today’s CPC, despite its many subsequent personnel, programmatic, and structural transformations. At the time of the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, most of the participants of the first Congress were already outside the party. Some had joined the Kuomintang (e.g., Li Hanjun[2]), while others (e.g., Chen Gingbo[3]) engaged in collaboration with the Japanese. Some participants of the first Congress, due to an internal rivalry, left the group and emigrated (e.g., Zhang Guotao[4]). However, Chinese propaganda emphasises the continuity of the organisation since that time and its patriotic nature, which is only partially true as the party was founded on the basis of Soviet inspiration. The ties between the CPC and the Bolsheviks were specific—the Chinese took advantage of their support and declared subordination, but in their ideology also referred to national slogans, such as the rejuvenation of China. The political and programmatic foundations of the CPC were formed after 1949, during the years of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, sometimes undergoing transformations, but always declaring faithfulness to the ideals of Marxism-Leninism, especially in the context of the importance of the party as an organisation superior to the state. In this context, the policy implemented since 2012 by Xi Jinping as the secretary general of the CPC is of a peculiar nature.

In 1997, at the 15^th Congress of the CPC, then Secretary General Jiang Zemin announced the concept of “two centennials” (liang ge yi bai nian)[5], which Xi renewed in 2012 and made dominant in the party doctrine. It focuses on the socio-economic development of China and the implementation of the so-called “Chinese dream”[6] in the perspective of the 200^th anniversary of the establishment of the CPC (2021) and the proclamation of the PRC (2049). In this context, this year’s celebrations are an opportunity to announce the closure of the next stage of China’s development and related CPC activities. The political nature of this anniversary also provides an opportunity for the party to strengthen the nationalist sentiment that has long been a major component of its legitimacy in society.[7] It also is an opportunity to test the loyalty of the party apparatus to the ideas propagated by the current leadership of the CPC. Therefore, this year’s celebrations were centrally controlled, covering all aspects of life, including trips to memorial sites and anniversary conferences at workplaces. A summary in triumphant rhetoric, the effectiveness of the party, and the subjugation of society was carefully staged at the main ceremony at Tiananmen Square in Beijing on 1 July, attended by cheering crowds, but without a military parade. It was crowned with a keynote speech by Xi Jinping.[8] The speech did not contain new slogans, nor did it indicate a change in policy, but was above all an expression of appreciation for the CPC and its history. Xi concluded that China had managed to achieve an independent and strong global position. The party is also determined and ready to defend its interests: in one of Xi’s statements, he vividly warned China’s enemies that aggression would meet with a bloody and decisive response from the Chinese nation.

In his speech, Xi also referred to a “modernised” vision of the history of the CPC,[9] in line with the revised, official interpretation of the history of the party published in 2021. This is an important element that defines China’s current policy and the CPC’s perception of reality. Xi emphasised that China managed to achieve the first of the “centennials” (goals)—to build a society with an average wealth that was, for example, double the GDP per capita compared to 2010,[10] and pledged to solve the problem of poverty by 2049.[11] Xi’s speech focused on the positive changes over the last hundred years in China thanks to the adoption of Marxism-Leninism.[12] Xi argued that without the CPC’s efforts, there would not be a People’s Republic of China and its subsequent economic development with its symbolic culmination in the space programme.[13] Xi pointed out that this was achieved despite other countries’ efforts to contain China’s development.

Propaganda and Reality

According to the CPC, its dominant position in the political system of the PRC, emphasised during the anniversary celebrations, is a basic condition for maintaining China’s territorial integrity. This applies to the periods of the civil war of 1945-1949 and after the proclamation of China, when the CPC obtained a large part of its present-day territory by force or as a result of agreements with the USSR. Examples include the area of the Tibetan Autonomous Region, which was conquered by the Chinese in 1950,[14] and the Uyghur Autonomous Region, which was largely ruled by the Uyghurs before annexation by China in 1949.[15] The later merits of the CPC are to include regaining Hong Kong from the UK in 1997 and Macao from Portugal in 1999, and seeking Taiwan’s accession. Due to the cultural, ethnic, and linguistic diversity of individual provinces,[16] strong party power is also intended to overcome separatism and autonomous tendencies in Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, and Inner Mongolia. Chinese propaganda, created by the authorities, analysts, and party media, refers to the experience of the collapse of the USSR.[17] The decision of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to introduce political changes in the 1980s is regarded by the CPC as one of the main reasons for the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In this context, the desire to maintain territorial integrity is not only part of the CPC’s success but also the glue that binds the party to society.

In this rhetoric, the existence of the CPC is not only the main condition for maintaining the present territorial state of China but also ultimately for the unification of historic Chinese lands. China’s historical claims to Tibet, Xinjiang, or the South China Sea stem from often manipulated and even false premises, primarily invented for political reasons. In the Chinese view, questioning Chinese territorial claims, its current territorial shape, or the political system is a de facto attempt to delegitimise the CPC. Therefore, the unfavourable verdict of the international arbitration tribunal on the territorial dispute in the South China Sea, unrecognised by China, was a political, not a legal, issue from the Chinese perspective. Such an approach also applies to Taiwan, where demographic and social changes bring closer the prospect of the island’s declaration of independence.[18] This is rejected by the CPC and translates into an intensification of verbal aggression by China, making it impossible to conduct talks with Taiwan in the current conditions.

An important part of the myth of the CPC’s success is its contribution to China’s economic development to become the world’s second-largest economy, and the increasing prosperity of the Chinese people. The mechanism is the same as for territorial integrity. The actions of the authorities are presented as oriented towards the development of entrepreneurship, innovation, and modern technologies. The disastrous effects of Maoism on the Chinese economy and welfare are ignored. This applies to the “Great Leap Forward” project from 1958-1962 and the Cultural Revolution of 1962-1976, which not only resulted in the death of millions of people[19] but also the economic regression of the country (decrease in production, income, destruction of infrastructure), or in the field of education (as a result of the closure of universities in the 1960s). These events also deprived the society of development opportunities and burdened citizens with the psychological trauma of the victims living among the perpetrators without the crimes being accounted for.

Also, during the period of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms and “opening to the world” from the late 1970s, the CCP focused its attention on maintaining power, which was most explicitly pronounced in the events of June 1989.[20] The party allowed Chinese people to be limited in their economic independence while at the same time developing control mechanisms that resulted from its belief that there was a possible threat to the stability of the state. In recent years, these mechanisms have been strengthened further, putting even greater strain on and making the private sector dependent on the CPC, including the necessity to create party cells in private enterprises. The current structure of the Chinese GDP shows that it is not large state-owned companies (also with easier access to capital) that have the largest share of the growth, but small and medium-sized entities.[21] Their activity is limited, among others, by the existence of the so-called hukou system, or “internal passports”, which affects over 400 million Chinese labour migrants.[22]

The claim by the party authorities that all Chinese have left poverty as part of the achievements of the centennial goal under the leadership of the CPC is also full of manipulation. In the narrative of the authorities, this means crossing the poverty threshold of $2.30 a day. That is below the level set by the World Bank (WB) of $2.90. Additionally, the World Bank points out that China is already a country with a higher middle income, which means that the threshold should be set at $5.50. Using the World Bank methodology, it cannot be concluded that poverty in China has been eradicated.[23] In addition, the economic development of China has brought an uneven distribution of incomes and social inequality (about 600 million Chinese earn just over $150 a month). The CPC, although aware of this state of affairs and seeking to increase the importance of consumption in the economy, fell into its own political trap. Changes would require infringing on the interests of privileged groups (e.g., officials or military) on which the party’s power is based.

The activities of the last 30 years that enable the functioning of entrepreneurs and the enrichment of society are the source of the CPC’s legitimacy and a way to channel possible anti-party sentiment. The end result of this economic policy, which still presupposes the key role of the state sector, has been not so much “socialism with Chinese characteristics” but social inequality or the emergence of privileged groups. As a result of these decisions, the growing middle class, estimated at 700-900 million people, has often become dependent on challenging work (the so-called “996” system[24]), without much prospect of changing their situation. For example, the availability of public services has become more dependent on income, with universal payment for health protection, education (including public education), or transport infrastructure (e.g., expensive high-speed railways). The fruits of economic development have also been largely used to develop mechanisms of repression, security and party apparatus, as well as the armed forces.[25]

Economic growth, combined with top-down technological development, also allows the CPC to emphasise the advantage of its own political model over Western liberal democracies. The economic crisis of 2007-2009, the wave of populism and criticism of democracy, followed by the COVID-19 pandemic, further convinced the CPC that the time was right to change the paradigm, from selective cooperation with Western partners to gradual confrontation and reduction of cooperation. It was clear from Xi’s anniversary speech that he believes that the People’s Republic of China has political and economic solutions that are more effective than the Western world in the context of combating terrorism, state-citizen relations, crisis-management, or infrastructure. The celebration of the anniversary serves to highlight China’s offer to other countries, as opposed to a “hegemonic and confrontational” United States.

A dozen or so years ago, along with China’s opening to the world and the change in its economic situation, the CPC created the appearance of possible cooperation with the U.S. or the EU, within the existing international order, taking advantage of the attitude of these partners seeking economic benefits. After two terms of Xi, the party rejects such reasoning, presenting “socialism with Chinese characteristics” and “Xi thought” as possible to implement by partners, but only those open to acceptance of Chinese measures and ideologies.[26] The partnership with Russia, with which China shares the ideological and political criticism of the West, is used in a pragmatic and cyclical way, but at the same time aimed at binding the Russian elites together by offering them economic benefits. The rhetoric of the CPC also directly refers to the historical community of experiences with other partners, whether as part of the cooperation of non-aligned countries (in the Middle East or Africa) or the communist bloc community (e.g., in Central Europe). However, it ignores the expansiveness of Maoism as a key element of China’s foreign policy in the 1960s and 1970s[27] in the public debate. It included revolution promotion, financial support, military and political training of national liberation movements around the world. Its element was both help for the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, Maoists in Indonesia, India and Peru, but also, among others, Chinese aggression against Vietnam in 1979. The rhetoric of the superiority of the Chinese model included, for example, ignoring the obligations of the PRC resulting from signed (sometimes also ratified) international agreements (also in the context of human rights, for example), or not mentioning the existing economic interdependencies, such as those with Taiwan, South Korea, the EU, or the U.S. The party is also aware, although it will not publicly admit it, that despite the development of China’s military and economic potential, it still needs time to be efficient and capable of competing with the U.S. and its partners, and the changes announced by the CPC to give China a new development impetus depend on meeting many internal challenges and problems.[28]

The Contemporary Face of the Party

The CCP now has more than 90 million members, making it the largest political group in the world. The main goal of the party’s operation is to maintain its unique character in China’s political system. This is not only due to the will to hold power and maintain privileges but also to the real belief that the fate of the CPC is linked to the existence of China. The role of the party as the leading force in the state, enshrined in the constitution of 1982,[29] its control over all aspects of Chinese life, the lack of legal responsibility of its members under the civil legal system, and authority over the military[30] are seen as crucial and impossible to change. The multitude of competences and the specificity of functioning also mean that, paradoxically, the party itself is the greatest threat to the implementation of its own plans. In the period 2003-2012, the CCP’s oligarchisation was already progressing, interest groups were emerging linking party officials with representatives of business and the military, and limiting the powers of the state and party official authorities. Gradually, a discussion in the party apparatus on the importance of the constitution began and rudimentary mechanisms of the election of officials at the lowest ranks of the party by the Chinese were introduced. These processes were partly a response to the expectations of the Chinese, but partly also a signal of real considerations on the professionalisation of the state and party apparatus. The destabilisation within the CPC had already gone so far that before the 2012 Congress, mainly as a result of the shock after the Bo Xilai scandal,[31] senior party members realised that it was necessary to discipline the organisation in order to the able to accelerate China’s development and strengthening of its global position. At the Congress, the Xi Jinping was elected secretary general. He supported this point of view, and his last two terms have been marked by centralisation of power (including the slogan of fighting corruption), eradicating the “internal enemy”, and working to rejuvenate China.

The party is currently undergoing a transformation. Another Congress will take place in 2022 and elect new leadership based, among others, on the new statutory provisions of 2019, providing, among others, a lifting of the limitation of the term of office of the president of the PRC.[32] The Congress will be, above all a test of the party’s confidence in the current leadership and consent to Xi’s further rule in the present political system and, most importantly, in cooperation with his trusted companions. Preparations for this event intensify the rivalry within the party, negatively affecting the administration’s ability to make decisions, an example of which was allowing SARS-CoV-2 to spread. Hence the initiation of a series of disciplinary and educational campaigns in the security and justice apparatus, as well as reports of commenced corruption investigations against low- and medium-level party officials. There are also personnel movements, for example, greater public presence of Deputy Prime Minister Hu Chunhua, an associate of the former Secretary General Hu Jintao. This could indicate that in 2022 he will become a member of the highest party authorities, which would be a gesture by Xi towards the opposing circles in the CPC. The divisions within the party are of a less formal nature and result from family, friends, business, school relationships, or cooperation at various stages of their careers. The key now, however, is acquaintance with Xi Jinping himself (at various points in his career), as well as evidence of a given politician’s loyalty to the political programme of the CPC, which, for example in foreign affairs means offensive rhetoric in diplomacy towards the EU, Australia, U.S., or UK.

Perspectives

In the coming years, the CPC will become more and more uncompromising and convinced of the need to seize the opportunity to achieve for China the dominant position in the world. During the party’s Congress in 2022, Xi will most likely be elected secretary general for the next term (despite many problems, challenges, and internal opposition). At the same time, the group of closest associates (due to their merits and loyalty) will be joined by, among others, the current party leader in Xinjiang, Chen Quanguo, who is subject to U.S. sanctions for persecuting ethnic minorities, mainly Uyghurs. In a situation in which Xi maintains power, new members of the Standing Committee, the main executive body of the CPC, could also be Chen Min`er (currently the head of the CPC in Chongqing) or Cai Qi (the secretary of the CPC in Beijing). This will mean further centralise Xi’s power, tightening discipline in the party apparatus, and subordinating milieus opposed to Xi among some party officials or entrepreneurs (e.g., in the modern technology sector).

Concerns about Xi’s effectiveness (amplified by the COVID-19 pandemic) will persist and may hamper his governance. The challenge for the CPC will be how to respond to problems related to demographics, social inequalities, the lack innovation in the economy, and others. The continuation of Xi’s rule will mean that the party will take over additional powers from the state and will ideologically strengthen the Marxist accent (e.g., the dogma of fighting both internal and external enemies). In this concept, solutions in the field of social supervision, including technological ones, which have been implemented so far in relation to the Uyghurs, Tibetans, and (to a lesser extent) the people of Hong Kong, will be extended to the entire territory of China. In party terms, an innovative feature of this system of control over society will be to help reduce the appearance of responsibility of party officials for unpopular decisions in favour of algorithms and electronic devices. An element of this mechanism is also to complete the social credit system at the national level, currently at the stage of local testing. Within the CPC, nationalism will also grow, with an emphasis on the domination by ethnic Han and the marginalisation of minorities.

These elements translate into Chinese foreign policy, including the growing belief in the uniqueness of China, as well as assertiveness in defending the interests and good name of the CPC. The party will strive to increase China’s economic self-sufficiency (the concept of “dual circulation”[33]) and reduce relations in the event of criticism from other countries, including the U.S., UK, Australia, or somewhat the EU. This will be combined with the increasing cutting off of Chinese to access to information from the world and other countries in favour of reports from China, including by removing correspondents, limiting contacts, and setting visa difficulties for entrepreneurs or students. This, in turn, will mean closer cooperation on the international arena with partners who share the Chinese vision of the international order and recognise the central and positive role of China in it. In this context, the expectations of, for example, Germany, but also of some of the American establishment, are unrealistic as to the possibility of pragmatic cooperation with China in selected areas, such as limiting climate change. The rhetoric of the CPC may emphasise its readiness for international cooperation, and the internal logic may indicate the potential gains related to the stabilisation of the social situation, for example, by reducing environmental pollution and CO2 emissions. However, cooperation will be limited by the political pragmatism of the current leadership of the CPC, related to the sense of power, the need to demonstrate it to the public by rejecting the demands of the West, and the conviction that China has a chance to win in the competition with the U.S. This kind of policy by the CPC during Xi’s third (and possibly subsequent) term will continue until the next anniversary, 100 years after the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China in 2049.