1. SOMALILAND

Somaliland’s modern history is that of a de facto state structure which has survived for 35 years as an unrecognised but functioning polity. It is relatively stable, conducting regular elections at the central and local levels since 1997, with power peacefully transferred. However, the success story narrative that Somaliland is known for must be re-examined in light of recent setbacks. Selective development and consolidation of clan-based loyalties that equated the pro-independence current with the interests of the dominating Isaaq clan resulted in a progressive alienation of the minorities on its peripheries. This tension led to an uprising in the city of Las Anod. Somaliland’s institutions have been pushed out of large parts of its claimed territory while the Somali state re-entered it.

Despite those shortcomings, in December 2025, after a decade of diplomatic engagement and outreach by Hargeisa, Israel—considering the unique advantages such a move offered in the security area—formally recognised Somaliland.

2. SOUTH YEMEN

South Yemen is unique in its volatility. Historically, the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula was divided along religious, tribal and political lines. This resulted in a deeprooted division between North Yemen, which was known as the Yemen Arab Republic in the 20th century, and South Yemen, which was known as the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) until 1990.

In December 2025, in less than a week, pro-independence Southern Transitional Council fighters seized Hadhramaut (bordering Saudi Arabia) and the eastern Al-Mahra (bordering Oman), claiming control over most of the former PDRY territory. On top of these field developments, the STC’s leader announced the establishment of the State of South Arabia with Aden as its capital, followed by the publication of the Constitutional Declaration. Following a swift Saudi-backed military interventions, the nascent state collapsed and its main foreign backer, the United Arab Emirates, was forced to withdraw from Yemen.

3. SUDAN

Attempts to establish a quasi-state in western Sudan, in territories controlled by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), one of the world’s biggest non-state armed groups that evolved from the Arab militias from the Darfur region that fought Sudan’s government in the 2023 civil war, are shrouded in conflicting narratives, shifting allegiances and evolving ambitions. However, what is certain is that in the fourth year of the Sudanese civil war, Sudan is being steered towards a Libya-like partition by RSF’s continued effort to build a quasi-state on areas under its control.

On 26 July 2025, the RSF-backed Tasis coalition announced the formation of a parallel government based in Nyala and began to set up an alternative administration for its proto-state centred on Darfur.

This state-formation exercise is based on the RSF’s military strength, its tribal policies and loyalties, the co-option of some influential allies from outside the group, and the essential involvement of a foreign actor: the UAE. This ongoing state-formation project has come at the cost of the displacement of approximately nine million people—inhabitants of the region concerned who did not subscribe to the RSF’s vision—and extreme violence bearing the hallmarks of genocide in Geneina and Al Fasher. Nevertheless, the foundation of a proto-state claiming a vast territory is an undeniable reality.

Drivers of Accelerating Separatist Movements

In each of the three cases the social support base for the de facto state institutions and their de facto pro-independence agenda is never universal, even though interested parties prefer to portray it as such.

The convergence between the UAE’s policies and the rise of separatist movements in the region is undeniable. For at least a decade, it has offered military and political support to Southern separatists in Yemen, sponsored a breakaway administration led by Gen. Khalifa Haftar in Libya, established a presence in Somaliland and Puntland, and most controversially, fostered Sudan’s RSF/Tasis. Still, UAE’s approach towards breakaway movements is selective, as visible in the case of Ethiopia, where it supports the central government against regional groupings. For Israel it is similarly contextual.

Partnering with separatist entities offers the UAE and Israel a unique set of advantages. Cultivating these ties helps establish politico-military logistics that are instrumental in exerting pressure on regional adversaries by surrounding them with proxies and client states. Linking up with separatist forces in Somalia and Yemen allowed the expansion of networks helpful in containing the Houthis while consolidating a foothold around the Gulf of Aden and the Bab el-Mandeb. By contrast, Sudan had no such strategic payoff: the UAE’s bet on the RSF/Tasis has effectively blocked its path to the Sudanese section of the Red Sea, and provoked damaging international scrutiny.

Despite spearheading efforts to militarily and politically strengthen separatists in Somaliland, Western Sudan and South Yemen, the UAE itself has refrained from formally recognising their aspirations of statehood. Most notably, and somewhat surprisingly in the case of Somaliland, the UAE chose to remain a discreet backer of the process rather than leading by example.

The extensive regional build-up of UAE’s and Israeli assets elevated the stakes of the ongoing Saudi-Emirati competition prompting the latter to react by seeking to dismantle regional networks supplying UAE-backed separatists. It is hard not to link the signing on August 7, 2026, of the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan to the efforts to curb the Emirati-Israeli inroads, often manifested in the separatist areas.