What are the motives and goals of the US operations?

The implementation of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the US and Iran is unsatisfactory for President Donald Trump, despite his initial optimism about the expected results of the nuclear talks and terms of transit through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s actions have violated the MoU, and there is no sign it can meet the initial deadline for the final and comprehensive agreement between the two countries, set for 18 August. On 6 July, Iran resumed attacks on tankers in the Strait, with at first only limited retaliation by US forces. However, on 8 July, the US began carrying out systematic airstrikes on selected targets in Iran, mostly concentrated in the southeastern provinces, including logistics hubs, remnants of Iranian naval forces, as well as coastal defence units and some ground troops. The US military priority is to ensure the security of the Strait by neutralising Iran’s still-significant arsenal of drones, missiles, and naval mines. Also supporting these efforts is the reinstatement of the blockade of Iran’s seaports and civilian fleet. These operations are intended by the White House to force political concessions from Iran. According to the media, in the span of two weeks, US aeroplanes, drones, and missile strikes destroyed or damaged over 400 tactical targets—by comparison, during the intense operations in March this year, it delivered 13,000 strikes. So far, and unlike the previous phase of conflict, the US administration has ruled out Israel’s involvement in new operations and carrying out further killings of Iranian decision-makers and negotiators.

What are the options for further US Military operations?

Consultations between Trump and the Pentagon are likely to focus on expanding operations to other targets that may force concessions from Iran. However, most of these will not guarantee the quick results the White House is hoping for, and carry the risk of increasing US military personnel losses and a hardening of Iran’s stance (see details in the Table). In the case of US amphibious assaults on Kharg Island or the islands and coastline around the Strait of Hormuz, Iran would have the advantage in defending them, and then in isolating, harassing, and destroying the US ground forces. An attempt to take back the islands belonging to the UAE that are occupied by Iran would probably result in regional war and draw in other Arab countries. Any heavy bombardment of the Natanz Nuclear Facility’s tunnels (Kolang Gaz-La / “Pickaxe Mountain”, regarded as the primary location for Iran's covert uranium stocks and advanced centrifuge assembly) would make it harder to carry out commando raids to seize the highly enriched uranium stockpiles at this site, as well as in Fordow and Isfahan.

What other limits exist on the US Side?

The US may continue intense strikes on Iran but – regardless of risks for ground troops – a variety of factors limit their capabilities and opportunities. President Trump is now coping with unforeseen and ignored consequences of the war, which was initiated under the strong influence of Israel. The key points of the MoU and Iran’s approach do not offer opportunities for a quick diplomatic solution, and the situation is worsened by the lack of a US professional negotiating team. The war with Iran caused another spike in oil and gasoline prices, inflation, and an unprecedented fall in Trump and the Republican Party’s standings among Americans. Broadening of the US military operations and likely counter-escalation by Iran may demand authorisation of such a war by the US Congress within the statutory 90-day period, and support for this is unclear and doubtful. There are also many structural and technical constraints in the American defence industry. Refilling the expended stockpiles of missiles like JASSM and PrSM will take months, and for the Tomahawk missiles, SM-3, Patriot, and THAAD interceptors, several years of increased production are required. Moreover, deepening Transatlantic frictions have alienated European allies, compounding a broader reality: neither NATO in its entirety nor the majority of its member states possess the willingness and readiness for a sustained war. As a result, European governments remain largely opposed to backing further US-led military operations.

Are comprehensive US-Iran talks still possible?

Despite the US intensified strikes against Iran, the scenario of renewed negotiations in autumn is still possible. The possibility also exists that if there is no progress in bilateral talks, Trump will hand off negotiations on the Strait of Hormuz’s transit conditions to the Arab, European, and Asian countries. Iran, in turn, sees its capabilities to disrupt ship transit in the Strait and the Red Sea (using Yemeni Houthis) as a strong bargaining chip against the US, and treats these on this same level of importance as its nuclear potential, with ship transit fees offering a potential source of additional profits. While interested in continued diplomacy and lifting of the US sanctions, Iran is not willing to give up these strategic advantages quickly and cheaply. Having already survived two wars with the US, the Iranian regime is convinced that it is possible to play for time until it can receive the main concessions outlined in the text of the MoU. At the same time, the acute pre-existing economic problems (and the violent Iranian protests caused by these) are working against the regime in Tehran. These factors all favour resumption of talks with the US, even if full settlement of all disputed issues is now doubtful.