What is the Russian Energy Security Doctrine?

The doctrine defines the threats and challenges to the security of the Russian fuel and energy sector as well as the goals and tasks of the state authorities tasked to ensure this security. It is general in nature and mainly concerns domestic issues, and it refers, among others, to the country’s 2009 energy strategy or 2018 industrial security policy. As with its national security and economic doctrine, Russia’s cooperation with Asian countries is treated as an opportunity while EU and NATO policies are the sources of threats despite the fact that in 2018 about 74% of Russian gas and about 41% of its oil were exported to EU countries.

What threats does Russia see from the EU and NATO states?

The doctrine does not mention NATO or the EU by name, but portions of it clearly refer to their actions. The document mentions the threat of the impact of the sanctions on Russia’s energy sector. According to the doctrine, a threat is also posed by “discrimination” against Russian companies through regulatory and legislative changes—a reference to amendments to the EU’s gas directive, heavily criticized by Russia. According to the doctrine, this “discrimination” also takes place under the “pretext” of diversification of energy supplies. The document therefore confirms that the sanctions are harmful to the Russian energy sector and, on the other hand, confirms the importance of cooperation with EU and NATO members.

What is the significance of the doctrine for Russian companies?

The doctrine is ambiguous regarding monopolies, which probably results from the lobbying of companies and influential figures in the Russian elite to drop some restrictions (e.g., against Gazprom’s pipeline export monopoly or allowing more companies to conduct offshore works on the Russian shelf). Among the risks is the ineffectiveness of companies to timely recognize this possible discrimination  by other states and their entities. This might be interpreted by Russian companies as encouragement to be more active in avoiding the sanctions and the effects of EU regulations seen as harmful.

What are the directions of international cooperation in the doctrine?

The doctrine reflects the Russian “turn towards Asia” after the annexation of Crimea. It does not mention the EU in the context of cooperation, assuming deepening the integration of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Within the EAEU, the work to create a common market and energy policy is underway. If formed, it would cover 20% of global gas and 7% of oil. It also calls for closer energy ties with the other BRICS countries and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, although real trade concerns only China. In addition, it predicts cooperation with OPEC members and the Gas Exporting Countries Forum, which should be understood as Russia’s desire to maintain higher prices of raw materials.

What are the implications for Poland and its allies?

The doctrine shows Russia’s negative view of initiatives important from Poland’s point of view, including EU legislation and the policy of diversification of energy supplies. The document also confirms that the sanctions on the Russian energy sector (especially technology) are harmful, which suggests they should be maintained and—in case Russia commits further violations of international law—expanded. Highlighting the possibility of stealing resources by transit countries might suggest Russia’s readiness to provoke an energy crisis, for example, in Belarus or Ukraine, which could impact oil and gas supplies and transit disruptions to and through Poland (it cannot be ruled out that the latest crisis in the sector, involving contaminated oil from Russia via the Druzhba pipeline, was not intentional).