Who competed for the presidency?

The 2017 constitutional amendments abolished the general election for the presidency and limited the president’s prerogatives. That is why President Giorgi Margvelashvili of GM did not pursue re-election. In the second round, Zurabishvili, supported by GM, ran against Grigol Vashadze from the party United National Movement (UNM). Zurabishvili renounced her French citizenship to take part in the election. After coming to Georgia, she was the foreign affairs minister from 2004 to 2005 and headed the party Georgia’s Way and ran for the mayor of Tbilisi. Vashadze was a Soviet diplomat and entrepreneur in Moscow. He returned to Georgia in 2005, and in 2008–2012 he was the minister of foreign affairs. The campaign was dominated by economic issues, secret recordings that compromised both sides, accusations of operating as agents for Russia, and “bidding” by both candidates to repay loans of 600,000 Georgians.

What challenges in domestic politics will the new president face?

In a recent survey, 62% of Georgians said they believe Georgia is going in the wrong direction, which is the result of several years of recession. Despite 5% GDP growth in 2017, the depreciation of the lari resulted in lower salaries, higher prices, loss of savings, and forced many to take loans to meet current needs. Unemployment and partial unemployment affects about 60% of the population. Zurabishvili’s win is less about her and enthusiasm for GM and more the fear of the return of self-exiled former President Mikheil Saakashvili, for whom Vashadze had announced a pardon. Nevertheless, public dissatisfaction will probably remain and may result in repeated street protests, which will be used by Russia and Turkey to aggravate the situation.

How will Georgia’s foreign policy change?

The constitutional changes reduced the president’s foreign policy prerogatives to more of a representative role. Zurabishvili, however, intends to continue GM’s policy, i.e., seeking integration with NATO and the EU. She will focus her efforts on obtaining a NATO Membership Action Plan for Georgia and to start accession negotiations with the EU. At the same time, she will seek to maintain relations with Russia without raising the problem of the occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (20% of Georgian territory), which would result in Russian armed provocations and further economic sanctions (Russia is the top importer of Georgian goods). One should also expect attempts to implement common projects with the EU, Turkey, and Azerbaijan in the spheres of transport and energy because they allow Georgia to lessen its dependence on Russia.

How will the election result affect NATO, the EU, and Poland?

Georgia is the only one country among those in the South Caucasus that supports integration with the transatlantic community. Although according to the Human Development Index it is a highly developed country, it will not modernise its agrarian-tourist economy and stabilise the tense internal situation without EU assistance. Small businesses lack capital and transport and energy projects, also beneficial for the EU, require the Union’s support. Without EU involvement in development aid and NATO in security, Turkey, Russia, and Azerbaijan will replace them as the key stakeholders. Therefore, it is in Poland’s interest to support Georgia’s membership in NATO and to increase EU support for Georgia, for example, within the framework of the Eastern Partnership. This would improve energy security and connect the EU to communication and transport nodes with Asia.