On 16 February 2018, Dorin Chirtoacă, the mayor of Chişinău, resigned. Three days earlier, Renato Usatîi, the mayor of Bălţi, a city of 100,000 residents and the second-largest city in Moldova (excluding Tiraspol in Transnistria), announced his resignation. The early elections of these mayoral posts will be especially important because they will offer a glimpse of the Moldovan public’s mood ahead of parliamentary elections in autumn.
Why is who controls Chişinău and Bălţi important to Moldova’s foreign policy?
Until recently, Moldova was treated as a success of the EU’s Eastern Partnership. However, the nominally pro-European governments were discredited. The theft of a billion dollars from the banking system and then the de facto takeover of the government by Vlad Plahotniuc, an oligarch and the leader of the Democratic Party (PDM), have disappointed supporters of European integration and strengthened pro-Russian sentiment among Moldovans. One effect was the election of socialist Igor Dodon as president. In Moldovan society, polling shows support of 45% for on European integration but 49% for Eurasian alignment (with Russia). In Chişinău, in contrast to Bălţi, pro-European sympathies prevail over pro-Russian ones. City funds and administrative apparatus play an important role in the creation of nationwide identity policy.
Who was the mayor of Chişinău and why did he resign?
Chirtoacă is the vice-president of the pro-Romania Liberal Party (PL). He was elected mayor of the capital three times since 2007. In January 2016, PL entered into a coalition with PDM as a junior partner. That allowed Plahotniuc to take over actual power in Moldova, which discredited PL even among its hard electorate. In May 2017, the mayor was arrested by anti-corruption services led by PDM and accused of selecting the company to manage a paid parking zone. A court suspended him as mayor until his case was resolved. This in turn led to low support for PL (currently at just 1%). Chirtoacă resigned from his post to shorten the term of the provisional mayor associated with PDM, Silvi Radu, and increase PL’s chances in the parliamentary elections.
Who was the mayor of Bălţi and why did he resign?
Usatîi is the leader of the pro-Russia Our Party and a populist trying to distance himself from the Moldovan political establishment. Thanks to his popularity, especially among Russian-speaking voters, in 2015 he was elected mayor of Bălţi. However, since October 2016 he has remained in Russia—officially on a business trip while continuing to give orders to his deputies in Bălţi via the internet—because he is a fugitive wanted in Moldova on a charge of attempted homicide. Support for Our Party had dropped to 2%. At the turn of the year, Usatîi faced a loss of control over the city, because a trash crisis in Bălţi was resolved only thanks to central government intervention and the forced resignation of two of his deputies. To avoid a provisional mayor introduced by the government and the transfer of the remaining Our Party councillors to PDM, Usatîi resigned.
What is the significance of the early mayoral elections to the autumn parliamentary elections?
The coincidence of Chirtoacă’s and Usatîi’s resignations results from the dates of elections provided under Moldovan law. If early elections do not take place in the spring electoral window, the cities will be managed by provisional mayors, in this case appointed by the PDM government, until autumn. With their resignations, the early election of mayors will take place on 20 May. That will post a general test for the parties before the autumn parliamentary elections. This could change Plahotniuc’s position as the de facto ruler of Moldova and Dodon as his ally. Meanwhile, Dodon’s Party of Socialists could receive as much as 50% of the vote, which would reverse the balance of power between he and Plahotnuic. Therefore, control over the capital and Bălţi, and their administrative apparatus, likely would have helped PDM overcome the Socialists’ advantage.
What is the significance of the mayoral elections on Polish policy related to Moldova?
The election of new mayors will be an important test of public sympathy for European integration. The victory of a Socialist candidate in Chişinău would mean a significant weakening of the current policy officially supported by the PDM government of promoting a pro-European identity among the ambivalent Moldovan society. This policy would be replaced by a more pro-Russia and Eurasian line. If a PMD candidate wins in Bălţi, it would mean most likely a slight weakening of the pro-Russia sentiment prevailing in northern Moldova. That is why both the EU and Poland should focus on the promotion of stronger European standards, such as strengthening the Poland-initiated Information Centre for Local Authorities in Moldova to persuade the country’s residents of the attractiveness of the European development model, even if the pro-Russia Socialists prevail.
