Robert Pszczel

 

How NATO has changed since 1999. Taking stock

1999 was a landmark year for Poland’s security. It was the year when the country became a member of the North Atlantic Alliance – the best insurance policy available to European countries. The integration process provided a number of important and timely lessons not only for Poland, but also for countries aspiring to NATO membership (including Ukraine).[1]

In the wake of NATO’s 75^th anniversary summit in Washington, it is worth taking stock of the changes that have taken place in the organization over the past 25 years.

NATO 25 years on – the same but different

In terms of Polish interests, changes that have taken place in the Alliance can be divided into three categories. The first includes adaptations and new solutions, which can be judged positively. The second includes mistakes or omissions that could have been avoided (in whole or in part) after 1999. The third refers to transformations on which a clear judgment should be reserved.

More is better

The fact that NATO has grown from 16 members 25 years ago to 32 today is clearly a positive development. This is primarily a testimony to the political success and attractiveness of the Alliance.

With one notable exception (Hungary – more on that later), all members that have joined since 1999 have essentially passed the credibility test as allies. In joining NATO, they have had to accept a greater or lesser price for membership. North Macedonia had to agree to change its name. The countries on the Alliance’s eastern flank (including Poland and the Baltic states) had to accept what they saw as unrealistic political assessments of the prospects for partnership with the Russian Federation at the time, including the provisions of the NATO-Russia Founding Act restricting the Alliance’s defence presence on their territories.

The new members have played an active role in most of NATO’s  missions. Their contributions – from operations in the Balkans and the stabilization mission in Afghanistan, to training mission in Iraq and operations at sea – have added value to the Alliance. Since the beginning of the Russian aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, Poland has become a key country for the security of the eastern flank and the programme of support for Ukraine. Estonia is NATO’s leading expert on cyber defence. The Czech Republic is coordinating a crucial munitions procurement project for Kiev. The Alliance’s newest members, Finland and Sweden, have immediately multiplied NATO’s defense capabilities on the northern flank, particularly in the Baltic Sea.

There are many examples, but the overall conclusion is clear. Anchoring sixteen new countries in NATO has not only significantly improved their security situation, it has made the Alliance bigger and stronger, increasing its ability  to act. This provides it with a greater capacity to respond effectively to the challenges posed by Russia and other to the international order and  security that NATO is defending. Without its new members, it would be an anachronistic organization, lacking in internal dynamism and a mandate to mobilize the Western world in the area of hard security.

NATO as an active guardian of the world order

The clumsy way in which the Alliance ended its stabilization mission in Afghanistan in 2021 is often cited as evidence that NATO’s involvement in a series of expeditionary missions (beyond its territorial mandate) was a strategic mistake. Critics claim that it was just an expensive distraction, and that the organization should only deal with Article 5-related issues.

In my view, this opinion is unjustified. Had NATO not taken up the challenge of stabilizing the Balkans, had it not strongly supported the US’ anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan (where the 9/11 attacks on the United States had actually been prepared), or had it refused to join the fight against terrorism and piracy, the Alliance’s reputation could have been irreparably damaged. This would have undermined the very foundations on which collective defense rests.

At that time, the consensus among NATO member states and within the Alliance’s structures (reiterated in subsequent policy documents like the Strategic Concepts) was that   no serious military threat to the Alliance would emerge in the foreseeable future. Reality seemed to vindicate this diagnosis until the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008. NATO could thus afford to engage in operations in various regions without neglecting the task of protecting its territory.

Public support for the Alliance, in turn, must always be linked to the taxpayers’ conviction that the organization is addressing real challenges. For many years, these were issues such as the conflicts in the Balkans, international terrorism, piracy and the threatening policies of countries such as Iraq and Libya. There was no other organization that could commit itself to solving these problems through military means.

NATO’s involvement in the Balkans brought a bloody conflict to an end. It didn’t transform the region into a Switzerland, nor did it bury all the slumbering demons of the conflict. But it has created conditions for peaceful development in places like Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, not to mention Croatia or North Macedonia, which have been transformed from countries embroiled in war to members of the Alliance.

NATO’s operations and missions (some of which are still ongoing) have effectively tested the Alliance’s organizational and coordination capabilities. This is no small achievement, given that NATO won the confrontation with the Warsaw Pact without firing a shot. The Alliance’s military operations over the past 25 years have provided invaluable training for an entire generation of military personnel from all member states. As it committed forces and resources to expeditionary missions, NATO adapted and perfected its procedures, modified its structures, and mobilized member (and partner) states for action and cooperation. And in 2001, it activated Article 5 of the Washington Treaty with lightning speed – something it hadn’t done even during the Cold War. This is an important added value of recent years.

Saying goodbye to strategic illusions

When Poland joined NATO, the allies at the time seemed to be “living a beautiful moment,” enjoying the dividends of peace following the collapse of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. Cooperative security was to replace a state of confrontation. Most of the energy and political attention was devoted to building relations with Russia, which was seen as a future strategic partner. Faith in this state of contentment was sustained with high hopes for the transformation of international relations through arms control, honest transparency in the sphere of military potential, and even disarmament.

For the new members, especially those bordering Russia, this structural optimism seemed attractive at first. The citizens of the former Warsaw Pact countries also wanted to believe that the potential for mass evil, which had affected non-Western European countries in a particularly bloody way, had already been exhausted.

But this belief in the end of history proved illusory. However, in many capitals on both sides of the Atlantic efforts were made to bend reality, even after Putin had delivered his speech at the NATO-Russia summit in Bucharest, where he described Ukraine as an artificial entity, and in Munich, when he declared his intention to confront the West. He then moved from words to deeds by using military force to attack Georgia. Unfortunately, the reaction he elicited was apathy and efforts to continue the “difficult partnership” at all costs. NATO’s policy, despite its strength and the massive political, economic and military resources at the disposal of its members, began to drift away from reality.

That’s why getting back on the right track required that NATO accepts – gradually but unequivocally – the new, dangerous reality and, most importantly, that it develops, step-by-step, an appropriate response to it. Very quickly after the unprecedented cyber-attacks on Estonia in 2007, NATO adopted a new cyberspace defense strategy. It also showed quick reflexes in diagnosing threats of a hybrid nature. When the situation called for it, the Alliance joined the coalition confronting the terrorists from the Islamic State. With reluctance, but nonetheless, NATO acknowledged the erosion of the regime of arms control agreements – including the CFE and INF treaties, in which so much hope and effort had been invested.

A return to the roots of collective defence

A dramatic change could only take place when NATO shook off the fog of illusion and faced up to real threats. The Alliance then returned to its true roots. The most important element of this move was the breaking of taboos on the basic elements of collective defence. Finally field exercises to test armed attack scenarios against the Alliance have been resumed, the most recent (Steadfast Defender) being the largest since the late 1980s. It is worth recalling that until the middle of the previous decade some allied  capitals had blocked such exercises, seeing them as a potential provocation against Russia.

After years of reductions in the number of US military personnel in Europe, the trend has been reversed – from around 60,000 troops their number has risen to around 100,000. The rotational deployment of allied troops on NATO’s eastern and southern flank has finally begun ( in practice this presence can already be seen as permanent). The intensity of NATO air patrols, including reconnaissance flights, has increased. Earlier reluctance on the part of some countries has been overcome, and at the Vilnius summit in 2023, comprehensive  and detailed regional defence plans were adopted, backed in part by strengthened operational mandate of SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe) . Specific units and battle groups know where they would have to fight to defend other countries, if the need arose. This is the breakthrough that the new member states (many of whom would be the most exposed ones in case of conflict) have been waiting for since 1999.

A friend in need is a friend indeed

The work that Allies have done to foster partnerships, in Europe and far beyond, continues to pay dividends today. As countries such as Russia and China have rendered key international institutions – the UN Security Council and the OSCE – impotent, these relationships have become more significant politically. Such partnerships have increased the number of actors potentially supportive of Alliance policies. The active role played by Finland and Sweden in NATO’s cooperation programmes (that role grew substantially after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014) prepared them for rapid integration into the Alliance once they decided to apply for membership. Individual partnership programmes, tailored to the preferences of Mediterranean and Middle East countries, have helped to coordinate counterterrorist efforts. It is no coincidence that in addition to the NATO members themselves, most of the Alliance’s partners from around the world are participating in efforts to provide military assistance to Ukraine,  under the aegis of the so-called Ramstein Group (led by the United States).

An excellent example of the effectiveness of partnership ties is the growing involvement of the geographically distant Indo-Pacific partners (the so-called AP4, i.e. Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand) in European security. This is illustrated by significant arms contracts, real assistance to Ukraine, and even operational support (including reconnaissance assets) on the eastern flank.

Errors and omissions - the high cost of neglect

The list of positive changes that have taken place in NATO is long, robust and compelling when it comes to assessing the quality of the Alliance. But the list of failures is equally significant. From the Polish standpoint, three problems stand out.

First, although NATO has finally adopted a course in line with real defence priorities, the time lost will not be easy to make up. From the end of the Cold War until the middle of the last decade, the Alliance spent too much of its political energy pursuing the concept of cooperative security at the expense of collective defence. The consumption of the peace dividend continued unabated, defense budgets were slashed to the bone, munitions stocks were depleted, and  little was invested in new equipment. This mistake was made by many European countries, which , in the words of former NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, decided to take a “strategic holiday”.[2] Their naive and shortsighted expectation was that they could indefinitely cede responsibility for security to the United States, outsource industrial production to China and energy supplies to Russia.

Waking up from this dream has been painful. The new policy has shown that while energy supplies can be diversified relatively quickly, restoring production capacity is more difficult and requires considerable effort. And replacing the role that the US plays in the field of Europe’s hard security appears to be gruelingly complicated, if not impossible in the short term.[3]

Changes in the right direction, but too slow

This last criterion of urgency is of fundamental importance. NATO – and the West as a whole – must meet the challenges posed by the two authoritarian nuclear powers (and a group of their supporters) not in the distant future, but here and now. Many key questions remain unanswered today. Here are some of them.

Every week that goes by without sufficient supplies of equipment and ammunition for the Ukrainian front counts (NATO countries furnish 99% of this form of aid). How are they to be provided though when production capacity remains limited and when access to critical elements continues to depend on a supply chain in which the position of NATO countries is weak?

Is the Alliance’s nuclear deterrent in its current form sufficiently credible as a response to the Kremlin’s nuclear blackmail, and more importantly to deter aggression against its territory at a time when dictators seem willing to take ever greater risks?

How to ensure a rapid increase in defense spending to an average of 3% of GDP – a level that was one of the cornerstones of NATO’s success during the Cold War? We are, of course, seeing progress on this issue but the problem is that the threat is growing even faster.[4]

How do European allies imagine replacing the key military and logistical capabilities that the US now provides us with, given that any US administration will be forced to shift a significant proportion of its resources to the Indo-Pacific theater in the event of a conflict over Taiwan?

Finding answers to these questions can no longer be put off, and the NATO summit in Washington did not fully address them.

Problems of discipline

Second, post-1999 NATO has yet to fully faced up to the problem of internal discipline. The required formula for the decision-making process within NATO is consensus, and this allows self-serving tendencies to rise to the surface.

In order to function effectively, the organization needs a high degree of solidarity. Until 1999, Washington played the role of disciplinary authority quite effectively. For some time now, however, the United States has mainly favored soft diplomacy within NATO. This inevitably encourages some countries to ignore the need to implement agreed upon measures and, in extreme cases, to engage in a form of blackmail against other members. It is partly due to the lack of firm pressure from the US that for many years some of the richest G7 countries (such as Italy, Canada, and Germany) have failed to even come close to meeting the defence spending target set in 2014 (2% of GDP). As a result, Europe currently lacks sufficient forces and capabilities to implement agreed defense plans.

US indulgence has indirectly encouraged Turkey to adopt a policy of vetoing various key decisions on an unprecedented scale to force though its preferred outcomes. Ankara has used this tactic to, among other things, block Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s candidacy for Secretary General, hamper the Mediterranean Dialogue (because of a dispute with Israel), and most recently to delay Sweden’s accession. What’s worse is that for some time now, Hungary has been playing the role of the main obstructionist. Once one of the darlings of the enlargement process, Budapest under Orbán has often not only spoken the language of the Kremlin , but has also openly contested and blocked important decisions by the other allies, especially on Ukraine. So far, this problem has not been seriously addressed.

The new countries’ contributions are valued – when it comes to declarations

Third, such disloyal attitudes not only threaten to paralyze the decision-making process and jeopardize much-needed unity within the Alliance. They also undermine the legitimate expectations of the new member states to play a greater role in the organization, both structurally (just look at NATO’s meager civilian and military presence on the eastern flank – for example, the absence of the NATO pipeline system extension to the east or significant presence of operational commands on the eastern flank) and in terms of decision-making posts (the citizens of these countries are still poorly represented in the Alliance’s institutions).

It’s also part of a wider problem – the tendency to ignore countries like Poland during informal consultations, usually conducted within the same narrow circle, on NATO policy towards Russia and Ukraine, on necessary changes to the nuclear posture, or even the selection of a new Secretary General. The proven loyalty of the new allies, their substantial defense spending, and their  superior expertiseon the situation in the east of the continent over the past two decades all too often fail to influence NATO policy. The continued refusal to denounce the aforementioned agreement with Russia is a case in point. A mere pat on the back no longer impresses anyone, only irritates.

And this brings us to those NATO developments, which today, for a variety of reasons, cannot yet be  assessed with clarity. I will focus on two issues.

NATO’s cooperation with the European Union – progress and challenges

This choice may seem somewhat surprising. It is true that there is great added value in developing cooperation between NATO and the EU, the two organizations that are crucial to Europe’s security, stability and prosperity. It has been said for many years that NATO and the EU are meant to complement each other. NATO provides hard, collective security, combining the unique resources and strength of the United States with the diverse potential of the European Allies and Canada in pursuit of common goals and values. Thanks to it, the EU continues to develop its integration project, stabilizing the entire continent and providing the European Allies with the basis for a solid partnership throughout the Euro-Atlantic area.

For a long time, the potential for NATO-EU synergy was used to a limited degree only. In recent years, joint political declarations have led to concrete cooperation – including in the areas of operational support, information sharing, partly in the fight against disinformation (even if this fight still largely comes down to diagnosis rather than effective action) and the analysis of hybrid threats.

What’s more, the EU has for the first time entered with its unique financial instruments (which NATO does not have)  the field where real military capabilities are being shaped – participating in the training the Ukrainian military, creating funds to fill the gaps in equipment supplied to Kiev by member states, and even considering the release of defence bonds. It has also launched a series of new initiatives to contribute directly to crisis management (such as military missions at sea) and to improve the resilience of the infrastructure needed to transport heavy military equipment in Europe. The EU has even initiated a draft common policy to restore the potential of the EU’s defence industry.

All of this is positive, and since most EU countries are also NATO members, this development potentially strengthens the Alliance. But this is only one side of the coin.

Many of the initiatives mentioned above have not yet produced concrete capabilities. They do not seem to have forced an increase in defense budgets (the fact that, according to recent data, many European allies have finally exceeded the agreed ceiling of 2% of GDP spent on defence is due to pressure from within the Alliance itself), or led to a greater availability of forces ready for large-scale war. Declarations often fail to be followed by action – this was particularly evident in the EU’s inability to deliver the promised number of missiles to Ukraine. Ambitious plans – such as the already mentioned proposals on defence industry  – contain unrealistic targets (a required percentage of purchases from European companies, regardless of their actual capacity) or inadequate funding (1.5 billion EUR). Another example: the idea of creating the post of the EU defence commissioner, does not seem to have been fully thought through and, for the time being, generates more  controversy than benefits.[5]

The EU’s lack of success  could have serious consequences for NATO. Since 1999, the EU has de facto taken over part of the Alliance’s mandate. Interesting ideas, such as providing NATO with instruments of economic deterrence (in line with Article 3 of the Washington Treaty),[6] are not very realistic today, as they would require the EU to give up some of its powers. Such a scenario is hard to imagine. The so-called military Schengen, i.e., the ability to move troops and military equipment quickly across the borders of EU countries to implement NATO’s defence plans, is entirely dependent on decisions within the EU’s sphere of competence, and progress to date has been unsatisfactory. To make matters worse, initiatives are emerging (such as the use of the EU’s own military equipment standards) that could violate the existing principles of NATO-EU cooperation, leading to dangerous duplication in a situation where interoperability standards are a key lynchpin of NATO’s defence planning system. NATO-EU relations will therefore be tested in the times ahead.

Ukraine: NATO has put a lot on the line

The choice of the second change – the policy of support for Ukraine – is more obvious. NATO took a truly strategic and unprecedented decision when, after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine  in 2022, it decided to do everything politically possible (short of direct participation in the armed conflict) to prevent Ukraine from losing the war.

Never before in the history of the Alliance have members risked so much for a non-member state. Despite all the constraints, especially the refusal to enter the conflict directly (hence the failure to agree on a no-fly zone over Ukraine, for example), the cost of support is significant – financially, politically and in terms of risks borne by individual Allies. Russia’s war against Ukraine is not a local conflict, a crisis that can be managed: it is part of an open confrontation between a nuclear power (backed by another power, China, and various rogue states) and the West as a whole. The stakes are very high – for the reputation, but also for the existential security of the frontline NATO members.

The shift to a policy of realism, described above, meant that already after the first phase of Russian aggression in 2014, the Alliance got serious about training Ukraine’s armed forces, which were then in a deplorable state. It has also helped to reform other elements of Kyiv’s defence system. This included cyber defence, critical infrastructure protection, logistics, special forces, security services, and even medical and language training.

NATO assistance  was one of the decisive factors (along with Ukrainian heroism and creativity) causing the Russian plan to take Kiev in three days to collapse. And it is the continuation of that assistance that now ensures Ukraine’s chances of survival and perhaps even of overcoming Russian aggression. The package of long-term NATO assistance to Ukraine recently agreed at the Washington Summit is an important step in this direction.

But if Ukrainian success is so important to NATO and its security, why is it so difficult to agree on a common definition of victory? For the countries of our region, it is undoubtedly the defeat of Russia, i.e. its withdrawal from the occupied parts of Ukraine, and its weakening to such an extent that it cannot threaten its neighbors. However, this is not a definition that all allies would be willing to sign up to. Fear of escalation still prevents bolder decisions. This is the reason for the restrictions imposed by some countries on the use of weapons (supplied to Ukraine) on Russian territory. It is also a cause for the lack of current consensus on Ukraine’s admission to NATO. For some, this attitude is a sign of rational caution. For others, it is a mark of strategic incoherence and a costly mistake.

Which approach – the minimalist or the bolder one – will prove correct will be revealed by the developments in this war. That is why, among other things, it is necessary to reserve judgment on the effectiveness of NATO’s approach to the war in Ukraine until it is over.

Conclusion

On balance, the changes that have taken place in NATO since 1999 are objectively favorable to Poland. Under conditions of peace in Europe, these changes would have provided a more than solid security foundation for all Allies. But a major war is underway in Europe (in Ukraine for the time being), and more broadly, a brutal confrontation of a hybrid nature is being conducted against NATO and its members. We are witnessing increasingly spectacular acts of sabotage, destruction of energy infrastructure, border provocations, while direct threats to use nuclear weapons against NATO countries are being repeated at regular intervals. The changes and evolution of the Alliance’s policy to date are merely a good point of departure for further raising of the level of mobilization of collective forces and capabilities. Credible preparation for a possible war is the best way to prevent it. And it is precisely such mobilizing decisions that the citizens of NATO member states have the right to expect.

 

 

Translated by Jean-Jacques Granas