At the end of the summer of 2022, Russia had lost the strategic initiative in Ukraine for good. The Ukrainian army went on the offensive on both wings of the front lines of the war against Russia. While in the spring the Kremlin could claim that by withdrawing in the north from near Kyiv and Kharkiv it was making a strategic regrouping of troops and adjusting the war plan to the new situation resulting from the strong Ukrainian resistance on the original lines of advance, after which the Russian offensive resumed in the east and south, by September it was no longer possible to hide from the Russian public that for Russia, the war was beginning to look more and more clearly like a defeat. To counteract the consolidation of this image in the eyes of Russians, Putin ordered a general mobilisation and announced the annexation of captured Ukrainian territories to Russia. Thus, by political methods, he is trying to entrench himself in the occupied territory. The bolstered Russian army, even consisting of poorly trained fresh recruits with rusty rifles, could make it difficult for Ukraine to continue its offensive and liberate the seized territories. Putin’s goal in this phase of the war is to freeze the conflict with some sort of truce that would allow him to gather new forces and prepare another offensive. Putin did not restart the war with Ukraine to seize Sevrodonetsk and Kherson—he wanted to enter Kyiv, Kharkiv and Odesa and will continue to try to do so. In the meantime, he needs a “gingerbread man” that he can present to the Russian public as the success of the “special military operation” and resume the war when he manages to better prepare for it. 

In the Russian strategy, which should ensure the ability to end the conflict on favourable terms, the threat of escalation is most important.1

Russia, which has much greater military potential than Ukraine, including nuclear weapons, is trying to convince the Ukrainian authorities and their allies that defence makes no sense and it is better to accept limited territorial losses than to incur additional costs. This is why it is conducting massive attacks on non-military targets throughout Ukraine, terrorizing the civilian population. It also signals that one of the next levels of escalation could be the use of nuclear weapons.

Since the beginning of the invasion in February of this year, Putin and his entourage have used nuclear threats. Initially, their main goal, consistent with Russian doctrine by the way, was to deter U.S. and NATO involvement in the conflict. They succeeded only partially. Western countries have not sent their troops to help defend Ukraine, and NATO as an organisation does not formally provide significant military support to Ukraine. Such assistance, however, is provided by individual states, providing equipment and armaments on a bilateral basis. Howitzers, tanks, and, above all, the HIMARS rocket artillery systems have significantly increased Ukraine’s military capability to defend itself and then to regain lost territory and inflict high losses on the aggressor.

Seeing that he might lose the war, Putin has begun to step up his nuclear rhetoric. In doing so, he wants to convince the world that the risk of nuclear escalation is increasing. By announcing the annexation of four eastern regions of Ukraine, he has made it clear that Russia will defend its holdings by any means available, including nuclear weapons.

Putin is well aware that Western societies are extremely vulnerable to nuclear threats. During the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was based on the high risk of using nuclear weapons to deter Soviet aggression. War was avoided, but the strategy left a lasting mark on the collective psyche of the free world. Nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence have become taboo topics. Putin is also trying to exploit the widespread aversion in Western societies to the very concept of escalation, with which the credibility of deterrence is linked. In order to discourage an adversary from attacking or escalating, we ourselves must be able to threaten him with costs that make it completely unprofitable for him to fight. In this way, Putin wants to undermine the free world’s ability to conduct deterrence policy, not only in the context of Ukraine but also on NATO’s Eastern Flank.

In many societies in the free world, the Russian threats have reinforced fears of nuclear escalation. These fears were exacerbated by a statement by U.S. President Joe Biden, who said that the world had never been so close to nuclear Armageddon2 since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Voices began to grow that Ukraine should be pressured to accept Russian terms and come to terms with the loss of territory, for the sake of the common good of avoiding a nuclear war.3

The Russian threats have fortunately not had a political effect. Ukraine’s Western partners have announced that they will not change their approach to the Russian aggression and will support Ukraine for “as long as it takes”. At a special G-7 summit, the world’s economically strongest democracies and Ukraine laid out a framework for a future ceasefire that shows no willingness to make concessions to Russia. The so-called “just peace” is to include respecting Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty in accordance with the UN Charter, ensuring that Ukraine has the capacity for self-defence, ensuring its ability to rebuild, including with resources from Russia, and holding Russian perpetrators of war crimes accountable.4 Meanwhile, tNATO defence ministers have taken decisions to enable member states to significantly increase production of equipment and armaments.5 This will make it possible to replenish depleted stocks, provide support to Ukraine for months or even years to come, and have the capacity to defend NATO territory against Russian aggression.

This does not mean that policymakers are not taking Russian threats seriously. The United States has stepped up efforts to convince Russia that using nuclear weapons and breaking the nuclear taboo would come at a gigantic cost to it. Such warnings are conveyed through diplomatic channels, among others, but are also communicated publicly.6

Various scenarios for Russia’s use of nuclear weapons and the possible U.S. response are also being analysed. Most of them indicate that Russia would quickly fall off its escalation ladder. A nuclear explosion conducted over uninhabited territory to cause a psychological shock would not weaken Ukraine’s resolve to defend itself, and would probably not deter the U.S. and other countries from supporting it.

The use of a single nuclear charge against Ukrainian troops or infrastructure would not have a significant impact on the course of military action. Even the bleakest scenario of a nuclear attack on a city, in which tens of thousands of people could be killed, would not guarantee Russia that the Ukrainians would give up the fight. They are defending themselves with fierce determination and are willing to pay huge costs because they know that capitulation means not only the loss of sovereignty, but the extermination of their nation.

At the same time, breaking the nuclear taboo would mean that attempts to influence Russian calculations have failed. It would be in the interest of the U.S. and many other countries to restore the credibility of deterrence, not only to deter Putin from further escalation but also to stabilise the international system.

Once the nuclear taboo is broken, there would be an increasing risk that North Korea, India, or Pakistan would decide to use nuclear weapons in the next war, or China, seeking to take control of Taiwan. Therefore, the response could not be limited to political and economic sanctions. Although the options under consideration focus on conventional actions, they too could be severe. Balancing, strategically and politically, the use of nuclear weapons by conventional means could force the U.S. to launch attacks against Russian forces in Ukraine to a degree that would allow the Ukrainian military to mount an effective counteroffensive and regain the full territorial integrity of the country.

Limiting itself to a conventional response would also give the U.S. moral superiority over Russia, which would translate into greater legitimacy for action. The U.S. would be able to count not only on the support of its own people but also a large part of the international community. Such legitimacy would provide an important escalation advantage over Russia. While a sanction-laden and isolated Russia would be in a dilemma whether to threaten further escalation, for example by attacking NATO territory, the U.S. would have an open path to, for example, launch a pre-emptive, conventional, or nuclear attack against targets in Russia to prevent another such nuclear attack. The huge U.S. capability to conduct precision conventional strikes from long distances strengthens the credibility of such a strike in self-defence. Russia would have to recognise that the risks and costs associated with entering any further level of escalation are too great for it.

Here, however, we come to a key problem related to a possible nuclear overrun by Russia. Theoretical analyses give us an idea of what the dynamics of events could be, but in practice we would be navigating uncharted waters. We cannot rule out that risk calculations would discourage the U.S. from using the threat of an attack on Russian territory to deter an attack on NATO or prevent another use of nuclear weapons. Revealed peacetime fears in Western societies about using the threat of escalation could take the form of mass protests against the war, and policymakers could bow to public pressure. Therefore, all possible measures should be taken to reduce the risk of Russia crossing this threshold as much as possible now.

To this end, the U.S. and NATO should create an additional rung of the escalation ladder. Ukraine, which already has more than 20 HIMARS launchers and sister M270 systems, should be armed with ATACMS missiles, which have a range of more than 300 km. Should Russia decide to use nuclear weapons, Ukraine would have the capability to threaten attacks on Russian territory. It should be remembered that an ATACMS salvo could be as effective as using a nuclear payload of a few kilotons or more. Thus, Ukraine could threaten proportional retaliation, while also retaining the moral high ground and ensuring the legitimacy of such actions, since the response would be conventional. In this way, a credible threat would emerge, which for political reasons the U.S. does not choose to use at this stage of the crisis. Such a decision would strengthen the credibility of deterrence and increase the chances that Putin would fall off his escalation ladder sooner rather than later. In the famous 1980s American science fiction thriller War Games, a supercomputer answers the question of how to win a nuclear strike exchange: “just don’t play”. If we have the opportunity to knock Putin off the ladder by removing the rungs from under his feet ... then we should not hesitate.

1 For an analysis of Russia’s and the U.S. and NATO’s approaches to deterrence and escalation, see: W. Lorenz, Odstraszanie. Strategia i polityka, PISM, 2021.
2 “Remarks by President Biden at Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee Reception,” The White House, 6 October 2022, www.whitehouse.gov.
3 T. Bella, “Kissinger says Ukraine should cede territory to Russia to end war,” The Washington Post, 24 May 2022, www.washingtonpost.com; “Zelensky and Musk in row over Ukraine ‘peace plan poll’,” BBC, 4 October 2022, www.bbc.co.uk.
4 “G7 Statement on Ukraine,” The White House, 11 October 2022, www.whitehouse.gov.
5 “Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the meetings of NATO Defence Ministers,” NATO, 13 October 2022, www.nato.int.
6 “Transcript: National security adviser Jake Sullivan on ‘Face the Nation’,” CBS, 25 September 2022, www.cbsnews.com.