What were the circumstances of the visit?

Tensions between Turkey and the U.S. increased sharply last month after reports that the U.S. planned to establish a border force in northern Syria that would include Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), to which Turkey responded with its operation Olive Branch in Afrin to drive out the Kurdish forces. The operation also has two political aims: first, to encourage the U.S. to withdraw from Manbij, where it has military advisors, and to terminate its cooperation with the YPG, which Turkey treats like the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), considered a terrorist organisation by Turkey, the U.S. and the EU. Ahead of Tillerson’s visit, Çavuşoğlu claimed it would result in a breakthrough. He declared that relations between the allies are at a “critical point” and that they would be either fixed or completely broken.

What were the results?

The most important decision was the establishment of a consultation mechanism for Turkish and U.S. officials to discuss and settle all the problems between the allies. The committee will meet regularly, with the first session to take place in March concerning the situation in Manbij. During Tillerson’s visit, the Turks reportedly offered a solution in which the YPG would leave the city and withdraw east of the Euphrates, leaving the vacated territory under joint Turkish-American control. Turkey’s proposal likely will be discussed first within the U.S. administration and later at the consultation group’s next meeting.

Will the visit lead to normalisation?

The consultation mechanism may help in breaking the crisis of trust in Turkey-U.S. relations. Yet, normalisation will depend on settlement of the most complicated issues. Turks are open about the Manbij issue and that cooperation with the U.S. in Syria is a priority. Regardless of the eventual arrangements on this subject, some other issues related to the 2016 coup attempt will probably remain a burden on their relations, namely Turkey’s request for extradition from the U.S. of Fethullah Gülen, who Turkish authorities accuse of organising the attempted takeover, and the cases of American citizens arrested in Turkey for alleged ties to Gülen. Moreover, other challenges are in play, such as differences between the State Department, which is willing to tone down U.S. tensions with Turkey, and the Defense Department, which wants to continue to cooperation with the YPG, as well as Erdoğan’s use of anti-Americanism in internal Turkish politics.

What are the possible consequences for NATO?

The normalisation of Turkey-U.S. relations would be beneficial to the Alliance. If the process results in the countries cooperating more closely in Syria, this could diminish Turkey’s inclination to take actions that harm NATO unity and deterrence of Russia (e.g., the announcement that Turkey plans to buy the Russian S-400 air-defence system). Better relations with the U.S. would also diminish Turkey’s dependence on Russia in executing its plans in Syria, given the civil war there. However, the most probable result if there is no normalisation would be a deepening of the crisis between Turkey and NATO. The country would be more prone to even closer cooperation with Russia and opinions about Turkey’s membership of the Alliance would gain traction (polls show 70% of Turks consider NATO membership to be obsolete). Russia would make use of all of this to enhance its influence on Turkey and fuel further disputes in the Alliance.