What are the U.S. president’s demands?

Trump continues to criticise the JCPOA and back his “de-certification” of the agreement in 2017. He expects the Congress to change legislation introduced under the Obama administration in reference to policy towards Iran and still binding on the Trump administration. A new bill could include the formalisation of the U.S. demand for unlimited access by international inspectors to suspected military sites in Iran. Trump also demanded EU countries recognise the ties between Iran’s nuclear and missile programmes, and to limit the latter in a separate agreement or annex to the JCPOA.

What might Congress do?

Three months since Trump’s “de-certification” of the JCPOA, Congress still has not adopted the expected new Iran bill. However, the president’s new demands are more coordinated by his advisors in close consultation with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the leaders of both parties. These consultations, if followed by a bill sufficient to Trump’s demands, may increase the chances of putting order to the legal basis of U.S. policy towards Iran, including further clarification, expansion, or limitation of presidential prerogative in this area. It should be stressed that current U.S. sanctions are legally fixed by a chain of presidential executive orders and Congressional acts, requiring changes to the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act 2015 (directly connected to JCPOA) for some of the president’s demands to be met.

How are the new U.S. Sanctions related to the JCPOA?

Contrary to the far-reaching declarations by Trump, his executive orders with new sanctions signed on 12 January are mostly symbolic. These sanctions targeting 14 organisations or people in Iran engaged in suppression of the recent protests do not affect its economic pillars or violate the provisions of the JCPOA. Even though Trump stressed he was distancing the U.S. from Obama’s reaction to the “Green Revolution” in Iran in 2009, which Trump characterised as a failure to act, his declarations and the sanctions have not been followed by active use of the potential dissatisfaction among Iranians. Trump’s advisors have not recommended increased U.S. pressure on Iran regarding human rights violations and the issue still seems not to be in his personal interest.

What might the EU-3 do?

The three European signatories to the JCPOA and head of EU diplomacy so far have presented a principled commitment to the deal, even as the U.S. threatens to withdraw from it. In 2017, France signalled its readiness to negotiate an annex to the JCPOA to fix gaps in it and limit Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal, which is similar to the demands of the new U.S. administration. But after Trump’s recent statements, only Germany declared its readiness to listen to more details of his demands. The UK did not respond even with similar diplomatic language, but expectations of a change in the policies of the EU-3 seems unrealistic. Moreover, even though Trump expected the EU and U.S. to hold closer positions, this might not motivate the deal’s other signatories, Russia and China, much less Iran.

How might Iran react?

In line with previous predictions, Iran is threatening negative consequences if the U.S. withdraws from the JCPOA. Nevertheless, a much more likely scenario is that Iran will continue to implement the conditions of the nuclear deal, hoping to further isolate the U.S. among its signatories. Also, Trump’s comments on the protests in Iran were paradoxically helpful for the regime, which presented the statements as another element of an “American-Israeli conspiracy.” On the other hand, the growing uncertainty about the JCPOA’s future and Iran’s worsening economic problems might result in further internal instability, especially if all the American sanctions are reinstated. But even this scenario might not encourage Iran to restore its nuclear programme to the scale seen before 2015, out of concern that it might unite all the JCPOA signatories against it.