Why did Trump decide to withdraw the U.S. from the Paris agreement?

In his campaign before his election last fall, Trump promised to pull the U.S. out of the 2015 Paris agreement. It can be seen as part of his administration’s goal of liberalising energy regulations, which Trump believes would restore jobs in U.S. industry, including coal mining. During the announcement this week, the president said the Paris accord in its current form impedes U.S. economic growth and costs the country jobs. Contributions declared by parties to the agreement are not binding. The U.S. pledged to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 26–28% by 2025, based on 2005 levels, but media reports state the White House lawyer’s analysis is that energy deregulation will be easier outside the Paris framework.

When will the U.S. fully withdraw from the agreement?

The Paris accord included a withdrawal clause which Trump will probably use. Under it, parties to the agreement may withdraw no sooner than three years after entry into force, so November 2019. If the U.S. files notification by that time, it would become legally binding one year later, that is, by the end of 2020 at the earliest. The withdrawal procedure means that U.S. representatives could be present as parties to the agreement during climate summits in the coming years. In announcing the U.S. withdrawal, the president said he will direct his administration to try to re-negotiate the terms of the Paris agreement or at another accord. With this, Trump is trying to extend the uncertainty over U.S. participation in the global agreement so he can extract political and economic benefits.

What are the political costs of the decision?

The U.S. played an important role in negotiating every global climate agreement—UNFCCC in 1992, the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, and the Paris agreement in 2015. Although U.S. President Bill Clinton signed the Kyoto Protocol, which obliged developed countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, the Senate refused to ratify it, citing a lack of mitigation commitments from developing countries. This resulted in limiting trust in the U.S. negotiators. To not repeat the Kyoto situation, the Paris accord did not include specific commitments. It allowed then-President Barack Obama to ratify the agreement without being obliged to obtain the Senate’s “advice and consent” on the matter. Moreover, all signatories to the climate deal pledged actions individually. The U.S. withdrawal from a ratified agreement undermines its credibility as a negotiator of multilateral agreements.

Will the international regime established by the Paris accord survive?

Although the early ratification of the agreement by the U.S. and others allowed the Paris accord to enter into force quickly, the U.S. withdrawal will not have any bearing on its legal functioning. However, the U.S. intention to re-negotiate the terms or an alternative agreement reduces its significance. The most important part of the agreement was that it envisioned contributions to climate-change mitigation by 195 countries in the world, including the largest emitters—China and the United States. Trump's suspension of climate-related U.S. financing to developing countries vulnerable to the negative effects of climate change poses a big challenge. The U.S. declared the single largest contribution ($3 billion) to the Green Climate Fund, although Obama succeeded in securing only $1 billion by the end of his term.

What are the implications for the European Union?

The White House’s decision may only increase Europe’s ambitions on climate policy. The leaders of France, Germany and Italy seem to have lost patience for further discussion and preclude any possibility to renegotiate the Paris agreement. The EU will take over the U.S. role as China's most important partner, with the first example an almost immediate joint declaration. Any talks with the U.S. on climate matters now will proceed in close cooperation with China and other partners, including Canada. To put more pressure on the U.S., attempts may be made to impose a tax (or duty) on carbon dioxide emissions from products imported from non-parties to the agreement (at the moment, that would be only the U.S., Syria and Nicaragua). Poland, as host of the 2018 Conference of Parties (to be held in Katowice) and a UNFCCC presiding country, will face the challenge of holding talks with the U.S. on this issue.