Elections in Turkey: Erdoğan’s Double Victory
48/2018
25.06.2018
On 24 June, parliamentary and presidential elections were held in Turkey and, according to unofficial results, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was re-elected president with about 53% of the votes. The majority of parliament was won by the People’s Alliance, consisting of Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the National Movement Party (MHP), which together also gained about 53% of the votes. The turnout was 87%. The result strengthens the conservative-nationalist alliance and means a continuation of current foreign policy.

What is the People’s Alliance?

It is an electoral bloc consisting primarily of the ruling AKP and the nationalist MHP. It was formed as a result of changes in electoral law passed by AKP and MHP jointly in March 2018. The coalition’s aim was to enable MHP to bypass the high electoral threshold, which in Turkey is 10%. In return, the group supported Erdoğan’s presidency and the introduction of an executive presidential system. With a majority of parliament under the People’s Alliance, the president will find it easier to enforce his new powers.

How did the People’s Alliance and Erdoğan succeed?

The surprisingly good result for MHP (it gained about 11% of the votes) turned out to be the main factor for the coalition. The party did not run an active campaign—its leader, Devlet Bahçeli, held only three campaign rallies—and the average of the pre-election polls indicated it could count on about 6.5% of the votes. With MHP’s stronger-than-expected result, the People’s Alliance will have the majority in parliament despite the weaker AKP result (42%). President Erdoğan, who received about 4 million more votes than in 2014, seems to owe his success to two factors: the support of nationalist voters and the smaller-than-expected mobilisation of the electorate by the other candidates. This is especially true for challenger Meral Akşener, who was expected to gain votes from nationalist voters dissatisfied with the MHP-AKP alliance.

How did the opposition handle the elections?

The social-democratic Republican People's Party (CHP), the nationalist Good Party (IP), and the conservative Felicity Party (Saadet) formed the National Alliance. It won about 34% of the votes, but only CHP and DP managed to get enough support to have representation in parliament. The pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP), which was not a part of the bloc, won 12% of votes, moving it into the third-strongest force in parliament after AKP and CHP, which will have the most members. In the presidential vote, CHP’s Muharrem İnce won the most votes (about 31%) among the opposition. In light of the results of the other candidates—Selahattina Demirtaş from HDP (about 8%) and Akşener from IP (about 7%)—this was not enough to achieve the opposition’s goal to force a second round in the presidential elections.

What will be the consequences of the election on Turkish domestic politics?

The main effect will be the introduction of the executive presidential system. With the parliamentary composition, President Erdoğan will be relatively free to take up the new system’s powers. However, this does not mean they are unlimited. MHP’s participation in the coalition, without which the AKP does not have a parliamentary majority, creates an opportunity for the junior partner to push its political ideas. It seems that priority will be given to maintaining the fight against the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and blocking possible pro-Kurdish initiatives. As a result, Turkey will most likely continue to experience political polarisation, affecting the stability of the state. In the short term, the atmosphere may improve if the state of emergency is lifted, which seems likely after the elections.

Are changes expected in Turkish foreign policy?

The country’s foreign policy will continue to be subordinated to President Erdoğan, thus to his political interests and prone to rapid change. One can expect the continuation of Turkish military operations in Syria and Iraq, as well as political manoeuvring between NATO and Russia. The depth of this will depend, in particular, on the ability of Turkey and the U.S. to compromise on issues tied to Syria. Turkish-European relations will remain tense. On the one hand, lifting the state of emergency would eliminate one of the main problems between Turkey and the EU, creating an opportunity for dialogue on such issues as the abolition of visas or reform of the customs union. On the other hand, the issue of accession negotiations may be a continued source of problems since its revival after the introduction of the executive presidential system seems very unlikely.