Constitutional Referendum in Turkey

3/2017
18.04.2017
On 16 April, Turks in favour of a constitutional change to a strong-president system carried 51.4% of the announced vote. The opposition is demanding the annulment of the referendum result, claiming it was rigged.

How did the vote go?

In general, the voting process was carried out without major controversy. Problems started during the vote counting phase, though. The most serious controversy was raised by actions by the Supreme Electoral Council (YSK), which on the day of the referendum decided that votes left unstamped by its officials would be counted as valid unless they could be proved fraudulent. It cited the primacy of votes cast above other procedures. However, the YSK chair pointed out that the decision was made after a plea from the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). The number of affected votes has not been clarified, but the opposition claims it exceeds the difference between the “yes” and “no” votes and is the basis for it to claim the vote was fraudulent or at least questionable.

What did the OSCE say about the referendum?

In the OSCE’s first communique after the referendum, its representatives focused on the unlevel playing field for the “yes” and “no” campaigns. They also cited as negative influences on voters the ongoing state of emergency, pro-government media bias, and the violent conflict between the Turkish government and the Kurdistan Workers Party in the country’s southeast. The OSCE also pointed to the YSK’s decision and said it “significantly changed the ballot validity criteria, undermining an important safeguard and contradicting the law.” OSCE said the voting process had proceeded in an orderly and efficient manner in the limited number of polling stations visited by its monitors. However, at the same time, they noted a lack of observers, especially from Turkish civil society. Overall, the OSCE said the referendum did not meet Council of Europe standards. The full OSCE report will be ready in a few weeks.

What’s going to happen in Turkey now?

Turkey will begin a transition period that will aim to prepare it for a presidential system in legal and institutional terms. Full implementation of the new presidential system is supposed to begin in 2019. Early elections are unlikely, given the relatively low support for a change in government and its majorities in Turkey’s biggest cities. Nevertheless, the small difference between the “yes” and “no” votes, in addition to the circumstances in which the referendum was held and controversy surrounding the counting process, may signal another period of instability in Turkey. The opposition has already voiced its intention to question the legality of around three million votes and has demanded the referendum’s annulment. However, this outcome seems unlikely.

What will the consequences be for Turkey’s relations with the EU and NATO?

The tension between Turkey and the EU will intensify. Moreover, Turkey’s strong-president system as currently proposed makes continuing accession negotiations highly improbable. For the EU, this will mean the need to find a new model for its relations with Turkey. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has pointed to the inevitability of reframing Turkey’s political relations with the EU, including renegotiating the 2016 mass-migration deal. Under the revised system, the president will have even more influence on Turkey’s foreign and security policy. The likelihood of tension between Turkey and EU countries may move to the Alliance, too. However, Turkey will remain a key U.S. ally, so the referendum result will not have a decisive influence on their relations.

What are the consequences for Poland?

Poland will participate in developing the new model for EU-Turkey relations. For the Polish government, this will be its chance to voice its own ideas in that area, but the process may mean some limited turbulence in relations between Poland and Turkey. Bigger challenges to Turkish-Polish bilateral relations may arise if Erdoğan insists on putting his country on a collision course with the EU. This may result in pressure from other Member States to take a united stance on Turkey. The prospect of Turkey-EU quarrels projecting into the NATO forum is especially disturbing for Poland. It is in Poland’s interest to diminish the effects of any possible tension so they don’t influence NATO’s deterrence policy towards Russia or affect Alliance solidarity.