

# Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy

2006



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## Editor's Note

After a break of ten years, the *Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy* has been published again by the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PIIA). This is the way it should have been for this whole time, but shortly after its debut, the previous PIIA was put into liquidation. After a short period in the wilderness, it has returned to its proper and—as one might believe—safe harbour. This happened due to the fact that the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—the previous publisher of the *Yearbook*—now forms part of the Institute. It should be stated here that this publishing instability and the lack of any long-term prospects at times did not affect negatively the content quality of the *Yearbook*. It is known, however, how—in the case of periodicals—important such stability is for the final effect. It gives a chance to prepare each of the volumes in a systematic and comprehensive way, to have a more stable team of authors (analysts of the Institute), better marketing and distribution as well as allowing more attractive forms of communication of knowledge concerning Polish foreign policy to be introduced.

For Polish foreign policy, the so-called interesting times seem to have no end. The year 2005 and early 2006 were not only the time of some international problems, especially in Europe, to become more sharp (like problems with the EU Constitution Treaty and its many various outcomes, the case of the Northern gas pipeline, more assertive tones in the policy of Russia). There have been significant changes in Poland itself (new president, new government, announcements of key changes in different areas of state policy). Some time must pass for the new ruling establishment to become part of the European policy and to develop Poland's bilateral contacts. Irrespective of arguments and polemics at home, Polish foreign policy has enjoyed the privilege of admirable continuation of its major directions. We may find this continuity on the pages of the publication we are honoured to present to our new and current readers of the *Yearbook*.

*Roman Kuźniar*



**I.**

**The Basis of Polish Foreign Policy**



## **Government Information on the Polish Foreign Policy in 2005**

(presented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prof. Adam Daniel Rotfeld,  
at the session of the Sejm on 21st January 2005)

Mister President,  
Mister Prime Minister,  
Mister Speaker,  
Members of the House,

I take the floor with certain anxiety and diffidence. For it is the first time that I stand on this rostrum as the newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. What is more, I am to present to the House the priorities and tenets of Polish foreign policy prepared under your leadership, Mister Speaker, when you were executing the office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs with such success.

My address opens the fourth and last annual debate on foreign policy during this term of the Sejm. We have entered an election year. That is significant, since the clear line formerly separating domestic and international affairs has become blurred in our times. I mention this, because I would like to explain in the beginning that it is not my intention to become involved in any way in the pre-election campaign. The national interest of the Polish State obligate us to treat external policy and its instrument—diplomacy—in a way transcending party lines. I wish to ensure optimum effectiveness of our actions and continuity in all the undertakings initiated by Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski in the autumn of 1989, and advanced over the next 15 years by his successors—Andrzej Olechowski, Władysław Bartoszewski, Dariusz Rosati, Bronisław Geremek and Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz.

Mister Speaker,  
Members of the House,

With those assumptions in mind, I wish to present a list of priorities on the agenda of our foreign policy.

First, we shall continue consolidating our place in the European Union as a responsible state, for which the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defence Policy is a platform, on the one hand, for seeking a balance of interests, and on the other—for overcoming the still existent divisions and preventing new ones. We shall strive for a European Union budget for the years 2007–2013 that meets Poland's interests. It is our goal to ensure the highest possible allocation for the policy of cohesion and agricultural policy for the new member states—so that the new budget

accelerates the levelling of differences in the development of EU states. We shall seek to attain political compromise on the New Financial Perspective in June 2005. That is a difficult task. However, we hope that the negotiations will be marked by good will, without tactical delays and playing for time.

Second, as a member of the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union we shall seek a new opening in the relations of the whole West with Ukraine. The democratic breakthrough that occurred in that country has met with the understanding and support of all responsible political forces in Poland. We shall do everything to ensure that this breakthrough gains the appreciation and recognition of the community of the democratic states of the West. After all, it is an event of historic proportions, comparable to the European “Autumn of the Nations” in 1989. The reforms in Ukraine require support, and its shift towards the Euro-Atlantic structures—reciprocation. Acting bilaterally, we wish to extend the essential assistance to the new president and government of Ukraine, and to share our experiences in developing and consolidating democratic and pro-European transformation. In particular, we shall seek to it that the European Union raises its relations with Ukraine to the level of Strategic Partnership and opens the prospect of integration, while advocating NATO offer of a Membership Action Program.

Third, we shall foster the privileged character of our relations with the United States. A president friendly to the Polish cause will stay in the White House for another four years. The government realizes that the special character of the Polish-American political relations has not been fully translated to all other areas of relations. There has been an improvement on economic issues and military cooperation—and we intend to maintain this trend. But things are not as good when it comes to the waiver of visas for Poles travelling to the United States. It would be irresponsible to promise a rapid breakthrough on this issue. We shall do everything to accelerate the momentum of changes that would meet the expectations of Polish society. As a new member of the European Union and a tested ally of America, we shall strive over the coming weeks and months to revive the spirit of the Transatlantic community, and to erase the memory of the grievances that hindered cooperation on both sides of the Atlantic over the last two years.

Fourth, after the elections in Iraq, we intend to elaborate—with the new government of that state and our allies in the stabilization coalition—a new formula of Polish engagement in Iraq. The elections in Iraq are an indispensable element of normalization, even if the conditions for holding them will not be perfect everywhere. Still, I am confident that they will bring positive changes.

They will enhance the legitimacy and authority of the government, cooperation with Iraq's neighbours will improve, and the internal security structures will be able to assume greater responsibility for the situation in that state. The present Polish Military Contingent will be reduced. The relevant decisions that have been taken will not undermine our capacity to fulfil our tasks. We intend to make further reductions, at the same time facilitating the assumption of responsibility for the security of Iraq—by the Iraqis. But neither we nor anybody else should harbour any illusions: normalization of the situation in Iraq will take years and will require active support by the international community. For many reasons, Poland should not shirk participation in that joint endeavour, though our contribution may take different forms. Our presence in Iraq is likely to be of an increasingly civilian—rather than military—nature. Increasingly, it will be Polish companies—rather than troops—that will facilitate the stabilization of Iraq.

Fifth, our priorities include seeking jointly with the government of the Federal Republic of Germany a future-oriented formula of relations between our states—a formula, that would finally put a closure to the burdens of the past and open qualitatively new prospects for the development of relations between Poland and Germany. In recent months we have managed to realise some significant achievements. Let me recall that the German Chancellor has unambiguously declared a lack of support of the German government for individual property claims that could be made by citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany. The newly-appointed plenipotentiaries of the foreign ministers of Poland and Germany for bilateral cooperation, have initiated their activity. We must take a sober view—free of illusion—of the problems in relations between our states. Such matters are not resolved by a single act, or some magic formula. It is a process. The Polish government is under an obligation to care for the interests of the Polish state and its citizens, mindful not only of the coming months or years, but of future generations—with an awareness of the historic perspective of that task. We shall strive to secure Polish interests, cooperating constructively, in the spirit of European partnership, with the government of Germany.

Sixth, the government shall spare no effort to ensure that Poland as host and organizer of the III Summit of the Council of Europe—an organization that has integrated democratic states of our continent for over fifty years—performs that role well. Let me remind you that the Summit meeting will take place in Warsaw in May of this year. It is our ambition that the Warsaw summit should elaborate the future tasks of that important European institution, becoming an opportunity for deep reflection on the state of the architecture of security and cooperation in Europe, and in Euro-Atlantic relations. Also, we would like the Polish

presidency of the Visegrad Group to revive the sense of joint action, primarily in the framework of the European Union. Finally, we want to leave a good impression of the Polish presidency of the Council of Baltic Sea States. We shall also continue our active involvement in the work on the reform of the United Nations, presenting our vision of a New Political Act of that organization in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Seventh, we want the coming months to change the way we think about Poland's possibilities of action in areas out-of-Europe. The government issued a political signal for such an approach with the adoption last November of a comprehensive strategy addressed at the developing countries. We would like to see the adoption and implementation of a Law on cooperation for development, and the creation of the appropriate organizational structures.

Eighth, Polish foreign policy has the task of attaining objectives serving the Polish economy and Polish companies. The economic transformations, privatisation and significant liberalization of trade require corresponding changes in the structures of Poland's foreign representation. That means continued integration of the resources and instruments of foreign policy in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the diplomatic missions. That goal should also be served by the launching of the planned Polish Agency for Economic Promotion. The economization of Polish policy—despite considerable departmental resistance—is necessary and requires substantial acceleration in 2005, in view of Poland's participation in the common commercial policy of the EU and the need to shape the EU policies in the interest of the Polish economy.

Honourable Members,

The challenges that Polish foreign policy has had to face in recent months, have caused—apparently for the first time—divisions on our political scene. Oftentimes, this Chamber has witnessed heated disputes over such issues as the Constitutional Treaty for Europe, or the Polish presence in Iraq. This indicates, first and foremost, that the development of the international situation poses questions that often do not have one simple and easy answer. However, I do not share a commonplace view that this is supposed to mean the end of national consensus over the main themes and tasks of Polish foreign policy. That claim has been refuted by the conduct of the Polish people and unity of action of Polish politicians over Ukraine. That issue confirmed the truth that when we speak with one voice—we are effective in pursuing our national interests. It would be harmful for our common interests if the fundamental issues of Polish foreign policy were to become entangled in short-term electoral calculations.

It is my ambition to ensure the continuity of all the processes that serve Poland well and were launched by my predecessors. The new political alignment and the new government are likely put their own imprint on foreign policy. However, the issues of fundamental importance to Poland, to its security, should be continued. For this to happen, it is essential to hold a thorough debate on questions that are of fundamental significance to Poland and its foreign policy. Hence, it is necessary to recall some elementary concepts and issues, axioms of sort, to refresh the way they are understood. I believe this debate will mark a substantial contribution to this process.

Members of the House,

On 1 May 2004 Poland became a member of the European Union. It is too early to make a full evaluation of that historic event. Still, one thing is beyond dispute: our entry into the Union has conclusively discredited many false predictions, fears and concerns that were prevalent in Poland and abroad.

It has turned out that the accession of Poland and nine other states did not undermine the political cohesion of the European Union. Poland did not become—as had been claimed—a “Trojan horse,” and we did not need to be taught on how to be good Europeans. The events in Ukraine demonstrated something quite contrary: that there are situations in which it is worthwhile to listen to Poland very closely and that Poland’s actions enhance the prestige of all Europe.

Members of the House,

Our membership in the European Union has become a tangible stimulus of Poland’s development. We have received the first EU funds and more importantly—are making good use of them. No one has lost on our entry into the EU. Everyone has benefited. The best example of that is the improved situation of our farmers—the social group on behalf of which most concerns were expressed in connection with Poland’s EU membership. Our national identity has not been undermined. We still live in our own country, though now it is modernizing faster. There is a natural and quite pronounced need for a frank public debate on the vision of Europe that we desire and our place in it. This is so, because the next few months will bring intensive discussions in all the member states on the vision of Europe, its future development, its boundaries and identity in a globalized world. An inspiration or a catalyst to launch such a debate has been the process of ratification of the Constitutional Treaty, discussion on the New Financial Perspective, the question of Turkey’s future membership, and—what is also, or even more significant from the Polish point

of view—an elaboration of concrete conditions and a date for opening of the accession negotiations with Ukraine.

Our agenda today not only includes the issue of ratification of the Constitutional Treaty, but also ways of boosting public support for our membership in the EU. Ahead of us is the debate preceding the constitutional referendum. The sovereign decision we take will not only have crucial impact on the future development and shape of the European Union. It will constitute a kind of test of Polish aspirations.

Members of the House,

The Constitutional Treaty signed last year is more of a conclusion, systematization and rearrangement of earlier decisions, than a road map to the future. However, rejection of the Treaty by Poland would doom our country to self-isolation, and at best—to revival of the idea of a Europe of “two speeds,” or a Europe of a “hard core” and a periphery. The greatest weakness of the Treaty is its language; a search for a compromise formula is often expressed in a bureaucratic jargon, a lingo of civil servants addressing other civil servants. Treaties written by representatives of 25 states are rarely simple, clear and legible. However, it is a Treaty that despite all its flaws—rooted in its compromise nature—duly takes into account Polish interests.

At the same time, it is the point of departure for defining our vision of Europe’s future. We speak of a Europe that is in solidarity as well as cohesive, efficient and effective. For that reason, implementation of the Lisbon Strategy will be of key importance to Poland—today and tomorrow. It is a project that provides for strengthening Europe’s competitiveness in the process of globalization, first and foremost, through investment in knowledge, new technologies and innovative technical, economic and organizational solutions.

It is in the Polish interest for the European Union to be an important subject of international relations, partner-like in political relations and competitive on the global economic scene. The rivalry on the global stage is on the rise. It poses a strategic challenge to all the European states, including the largest ones. It is ever more difficult for them to compete on their own against such powers as the United States, or China or India, both growing in strength. Only as one can Europe face the new reality effectively. The casting of Europe in a strategic dimension is in accordance with the Polish national interests. From that perspective, further enlargement of the EU eastward is to the advantage of Poland and the European Union as a whole.

Our membership in the European Union has shifted the focus of our diplomatic activity. Increasingly, the most important objective is to promote our interests and win the support of EU partners for our goals. We have demonstrated that we can be tough campaigners in pursuit of our goals, without losing sight of the interests of the entire EU. We have not let any one put us in the corner, nor have we sunk into self-isolation. We neither want to—not should we—move on the margins, or only use the brake, or focus on damage control. The brakeman can only reduce the speed of the joint journey, but he certainly has no influence on its direction. We want to be, and are, an active subject of EU policy, with growing influence of the shape of Union decisions.

Members of the House,

A key question is on the agenda—and it merits serious discussion: with whom and in what way do we want to pursue our interests inside the European Union? Our strategy envisages three basic areas of contacts. First, we cultivate close contacts and collaboration with our strategic partners, mainly Germany and France, and also Great Britain—with which we share the same appreciation of the significance of the Transatlantic relations. Second, we nurture close ties with the states of our region, particularly members of the Visegrad Group. And finally, third—we seek good relations and cooperation with all Union partners, with whom we share interests on specific issues. In other words, we are not inclined to creating durable coalitions within the EU, but define our position on a specific matter and look for allies, whose approach is similar or close to our position. We firmly and unequivocally reject the concept of a “European Directorate” or a “hard core” of Europe. And any way, there is no tendency today to revive those concepts. The spirit of European cooperation is good.

Members of the House,

Our membership in the European Union has induced us to examine our bilateral relations in a new light. This applies in particular to our main European partners—Germany, France, and also Great Britain.

The relations with Germany were in recent months and years the subject of many, occasionally emotional debates—usually in reaction to the activity of various political circles in Germany. It is understandable that Polish-German relations—also today, after the enlargement of the European Union—have significance that transcends bilateral relations, with a dimension that is not only historic and determined by the past. To optimize our policy, we need to answer the following question: how do these relations impact the implementation of our—that is Polish and German—broader aspirations, both in the context of the

whole Europe, and in the Transatlantic dimension. From the Polish point of view, those relations can and should be an instrument and a key lever of our role in Europe. We would like to build a new model of Polish-German relations that would be firmly rooted in the European and Transatlantic context. Close cooperation of Poland and Germany is particularly needed to dynamise the policies of Western and Euro-Atlantic institutions addressed to our neighbours in the East, that is Eastern Europe. A joint Polish-German document, which ministers Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz and Joschka Fischer presented in Luxemburg last year, could become the foundation of new EU policy toward Ukraine. Other areas of Polish-German cooperation include the future of the Transatlantic relations, and also the political and defence identity of Europe.

This cooperation must be based on respect for the equality of the partners. We recognize the role of Germany in the European construction; we hope that on the other side of the Oder River, too, the negative stereotypes of Poland—also in social perception—will be replaced with an image of a friendly and helpful neighbour. Such a future-oriented model will not become the basis of policy unless past problems—which are again introducing elements of distrust, uncertainty and destabilization into Polish-German relations—are closed once and for all. Our relations require explicit declarations and clear decisions by all the main political forces and parties in Germany. The future of the relations between our peoples must not be determined by those who are forever stranded in the past. We believe in the power of our arguments. They are historically justified and have a strong legal basis. We should discard complexes and not be guided by emotions in our policy toward Germany. Our position meets with understanding and a will for cooperation on the part of the Federal President, Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Mister Speaker,  
Members of the House,

The year 2005 marks the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the end of World War II. For us, it also means the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the return of the Western Territories to the Homeland. We have gained sufficient distance and historic perspective to reflect deeply on the responsibility for the war, its consequences and its presence in the contemporary awareness of states and societies. It is the Polish role to safeguard the historic truth, to resist its distortion and falsification.

Allow me, Mister Speaker, to make a short digression at this point. I believe the time is ripe, 60 years after the end of the war, for the elementary truth about what really happened in occupied Poland to come to the awareness of the

representatives of the media in the community of the democratic states—in Europe, the United States and Canada—about who was the aggressor, the occupier, who built the death camps and murdered people there, and who was persecuted, subjugated and subjected to the German, Nazi policy of extermination. It was in Polish territories that the Germans created the largest camps of annihilation, where—alongside the Jewish people—Poles and members of other European nations were murdered on a mass scale. A few days from now, on 27<sup>th</sup> January—marking the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the liberation of the Nazi camp of Auschwitz-Birkenau—the leaders of almost 40 nations will come to attend ceremonies in remembrance of those murdered at the site of that death camp. Today, a few days before the ceremonies that will focus the attention of the whole world, I call on representatives of press organizations, the Association of Polish Journalists and other organizations representing the Polish media, to address—independently of the appeals, corrections and diplomatic representations of the Polish MFA—a letter to their colleagues, and partner organizations of journalists around the world, telling them that the thoughtless or intentional use of the term “Polish death camps” is insulting and shameful. It not only conceals the truth about the perpetrators of that crime, but slanders our nation, which was the first victim of the criminal practices of Nazi Germany.

Mister Speaker,  
Members of the House,

Our relations with France. I do not have to explain what a crucial role in building the European identity has been played by that country. France is a leading foreign investor in Poland. That creates a favourable basis for further development of an enhanced partnership. The climate of our mutual relations has improved perceptibly. The best illustration of this was the recent visit to Poland by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Michel Barnier. Let me put this succinctly: our mutual intentions concerning the future of Europe are much closer than is being presented in the press, commentaries and political debate.

The question occasionally appears whether the Weimar Triangle has not exhausted its political potential. The answer is simple: institutions of this kind have proved themselves and constitute a useful platform of political cooperation and discussion on European problems. We shall particularly count on an active role of France in the development of the EU's relations with our Eastern neighbours.

We put high value on our partnership with Great Britain. We are linked by a community of views on many European and global issues. In the recent period, the British government has been active and imaginative in co-shaping the

mechanisms of European cooperation, particularly including questions of defence policy, security and common foreign policy. That has made it easier for us, as well, to formulate our European policy. British policy illustrates the theory that states have greater impact on shaping the future of Europe when they take positions on issues of key and central significance—than when they distance themselves from important issues, relegating themselves to the periphery of European politics. We hope for tight cooperation with Great Britain, particularly in creating a modern model of the Transatlantic relations—relations between America and Europe—which is of crucial significance to our security.

Members of the House,

The state of the Transatlantic relations—as all relations between states—is not a value granted once and for all. Therefore, those relations must be an object of our constant care and concern. Today, the main issue is to discard any grievances and prejudices left behind by the differences over the intervention in Iraq. I note with satisfaction that there is political will on both sides of the Atlantic to restore a good climate of collaboration. However, the problem does not boil down to the climate and atmosphere of the Transatlantic relations. Joint action is the order of the day.

From the Polish point of view, the new consensus in the Transatlantic relations should concern two strategically important areas. First, we are talking about a joint response of the West to the democratic breakthrough and pro-Western aspirations of Ukraine, and also about a common political line toward the other partners in the East of Europe. Second, we need a closer Transatlantic partnership in the so-called Broader Middle East. That is particularly necessary for reviving the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, assuring international backing for the normalization of the situation in Iraq, and also to attaining lasting and comprehensive resolution of the problem of Iran's nuclear program. Transatlantic collaboration on all these issues would guarantee that appropriate ways and means are applied to effectively resolve these problems. Let me add, that chances for new openings are appearing with regard to all these issues.

When we speak of the Transatlantic relations, we should recognize that differences of view on both sides of the Atlantic are a normal development. However, the new approach signifies that Europe and the United States will seek—in a partner-like way—a common denominator, showing respect for each other's interests. In the context of Iraq, it is possible to ascertain—after two years' experience—that neither is America capable of getting everything done

by itself, nor is the temptation of playing the role of a “counterbalance” to the United States a constructive option for some Europeans for succumbing to. At the same time, we must be ready for a serious debate on the structural model of the Transatlantic relations. That particularly concerns the role and place of NATO.

The engagement of the Alliance in Afghanistan, and also in the training of troops in Iraq, is an expression of a completely new strategic role of the Alliance. We have given backing to this new quality, though it is Poland’s priority to maintain the classic function of the Alliance as an instrument of collective defence. We support the selective globalization of NATO’s stabilization activity, because such a role of the Alliance finds practical use in the modern world. In the view of the United States, it is the key function of NATO as a global force. That is so, because Europe is no longer perceived in America as a potential target of armed aggression on a mass scale, requiring American protection and guarantees, but as a partner of the United States in confronting global threats. NATO must be an instrument of such global partnership. Otherwise, it will wither away, and the interest of the United States in the Alliance will become problematic. That, in turn, would herald the beginning of the end of America’s presence in Europe.

I do not have to add that Poland should be—and is—interested in maintaining the presence of the United States in Europe and its role as a peculiar European power. For, the presence of America in Europe introduces an unquestionable value added. That manifests itself, first and foremost, in Eastern Europe, South Caucasus and Central Asia.

We, in Poland, are aware that our close—even privileged—relations with the United States are not an alternative to our engagement in European integration. We ask ourselves this question: how can we take advantage our particularly close relations with the United States to improve the Atlantic relations overall? Our commitment to improving the Transatlantic relations will not be credible unless it is coupled with an equally strong commitment to the development of European cooperation.

The prestige of Poland in Washington is today higher than at any time in the past. This prestige is our new asset and a priceless value, even if it is a value that cannot be measured. Let us be frank: other countries spend years striving to have such relations though without success. The kind of position that we have in the United States is not gained through lobbying. That prestige has gained in significance since our entry into the European Union. Our relations with the

United States are important primarily because only America is in position to extend security guarantees to Poland—in their most credible version. This factor must not be underestimated even in the present situation, when the horizon is fortunately clear of any threats to our security.

Mister Speaker,  
Members of the House,

The triumph of democracy in Ukraine, attained by peaceful means, is a great achievement of millions of Ukrainians. It is also our Polish success. The mediation of President Aleksander Kwaśniewski—who won the support of European Union representatives for the cause, the engagement of numerous Polish politicians, the activity of Polish parliamentarians above party lines, the involvement of Polish Euro-deputies and thousands of young election observers—these and other actions contributed to an auspicious resolution of the crisis, and constitute an important investment for the future. The mass solidarity of Poles with democratic Ukraine is a good point of departure for a breakthrough in the relations between our societies. Relations at presidential levels are important, but it is the people who will determine the future of our states. In the recent weeks and months, the Ukrainians and Poles have shown utmost political maturity and proper understanding of the *raison d'état*. And because of that, we shall spare no effort to create solid and at the same time practical foundations for the development of mutual relations at the level of societies, so that the change is tangible for millions of the citizens of our states on both sides of the border.

I wish to express the conviction that Ukraine and all Eastern Europe have permanently returned to the agenda of important issues that occupy European and Transatlantic institutions. We must translate this into a positive reevaluation of the present policies of the West toward our neighbours, and in particular—to elaborate a realistic and substantial “opening package” for the reformist team in Kiev. The myth that our Eastern neighbours were incapable of meeting Western standards of democracy and human rights has been debunked. Also, the theory has been challenged that the nations in that part of Europe belonged to the sphere of another civilization and culture, to another “zone of influence.” Finally, the myth has been invalidated that the societies in that part of Europe were mired in apathy, and were incapable of building a civil society on their own. The earlier events in Georgia, and the orange revolution in Ukraine, have forced politicians to reassess their views and opinions based on prejudices and stereotypes.

Members of the House,

The state of affairs in Belarus—with which we share a common border—causes understandable concern in Poland. We support the democratic and pro-European aspirations of that country's society. Together with our European and Transatlantic partners, we are trying to co-shape the policy of the West in such a way so as to ensure full solidarity with the democratic and freedom tendencies in Belarus. We are not forgetting about Moldova, either, and the need for a greater engagement of the West in solving the conflict in Transdnistria.

Members of the House,

Relations with the Russian Federation are of key importance to Polish foreign policy. Let us make this clear: our involvement in what happened in Ukraine was not directed against Russia. Our engagement was motivated by support for fundamental values—and not by a play of interests. It was important for us to make sure that the sovereign will of the people was expressed in Ukraine. No foreign plot was involved. In fact, we deeply believe that what happened in Ukraine is in the interest of Russia. Never in its history, had Russia as many supportive and friendly states on its Western border as it does today. We would like Russia to have the closest and strongest possible ties with Europe, the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. I have in mind not only—and not primarily—ties in the form of networks of oil and gas pipelines, though such links are very important. However, as concerns Poland and Europe—it is the common standards of democracy, freedom of the press and human rights that are the most important factors of consolidation and security, at the same time constituting a common denominator. A stable, prosperous and democratic Russia will be a much more important centre of influence in the whole post-Soviet space than if it followed a policy based on anachronistic concepts of the so-called multipolar “zones of influence” Furthermore, Russia's relations with the democratic Western institutions should not be a zero-sum game either. The modernization of Eastern Europe and the prospective integration of Ukraine, Moldova, and also Belarus, with Euro-Atlantic and European institutions is in the common interest of a democratic Russia and the West.

For Poland, our membership in the European Union also offers an opportunity to build a new platform of bilateral relations with Russia. We shall spare no effort to make progress in resolving many outstanding problems. A certain experienced Finnish politician advised that one should seek enemies who

are far away, and friends who are near. It would be desirable if our two countries were guided by that in their mutual relations.

Members of the House,

A new challenge for Poland is our participation in the joint discussion on a new vision of relations in our immediate region after the enlargement of the European Union. Accordingly, it would also be worthwhile in our internal debate to consider the place and role of regional policy within the overall tasks of foreign policy.

Cooperation in the framework of the Visegrad Group, the Central European Initiative and the Council of Baltic Sea States has enhanced the identity of Central Europe and ensured stability in the whole region. After our accession to the European Union, but even 2 or 3 years before its enlargement, some of our partners expressed doubts as to the point of preserving the sub-regional structures. Our view on this matter is different. What is more, we have managed to use concrete initiatives—including those connected with our current presidency of the Visegrad Group—to define the needed direction of the evolution of cooperation in the region, so that its desirability and usefulness is convincingly manifested. This also concern to the Regional Partnership launched in 2001—which affiliates the states of the Visegrad Group, as well as Austria and Slovenia. Our partners have had an opportunity to become convinced that Poland does not treat the region as a base for its political ambitions at the EU forum. Nor do we make pretensions to playing the role of a regional leader. We have other goals: we want to use our prestige and position in the European and Transatlantic family to promote the interests of the region.

The enlargement of the European Union and NATO, the total change of the geopolitical picture of Europe, and also the emergence of new challenges, has altered the context of action of the whole institutional construction in Europe—and not only of the sub-regional links. These institutions must determine a new sense for their existence. That, too, is a task for our policy.

Members of the House,

We would like the May summit meeting of the states of the Council of Europe in Warsaw to generate a specific vision of the future and place of that organization in the context of other European structures. The point is to ensure that the visions being elaborated by the respective institutions, such as the Council of Europe or the OSCE, are coherent visions. For, those institutions require total reconstruction. It is especially important to eliminate the overlap and duplication of actions, as well as institutional rivalry. We should counteract

the tendency of the respective organizations to focus on their own internal problems. And let us not delude ourselves that one-off solutions or miracle cures are possible.

At the turn of January, Warsaw will host another session of the Warsaw Reflection Group, which affiliates distinguished analysts and researchers from Europe and North America. It will have the task of preparing a report on the complementarity of the European structures. It is most important not to lose any of the normative, political and operational achievements of the institutions functioning in Europe. The matter is urgent. It is the case, because the last OSCE Ministerial Council in Sofia demonstrated how the natural identity crisis of that organization may be exploited for the pursuit of particularistic political goals. This is how we perceive the attempts to restrict the activity of that organization in the human dimension. Such an approach is short-sighted and may lead to effects that are opposite to what was intended. For our part, we are considering a constructive, joint search for new solutions. The appearance of new challenges and asymmetrical threats, such as international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and new phenomena, such as failing or failed states, highlights the need for a redefinition of the global international order. In shaping Polish foreign policy, we act on the assumption that effective multilateralism is the key to ensuring world peace and stability. We shall make every effort to preserve and strengthen the multilateral institutions of global management, particularly the United Nations.

In this context, reform of the UN is the most urgent matter. In autumn of 2002 the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, pointed out the need to restructure the UN. At that time, he put forward the initiative of elaborating a New Political Act for the United Nations for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Changes were necessitated by the fact that while the system of world security is dynamic, the structures remain static. In effect, that leads—first of all—to a conceptual inadequacy of the organization. The UN often lacks the means to counteract new types of threats and resolve new problems. The issue is that for many years now the major conflicts have been emerging inside states, rather than in the relations between them. On the one hand, the international community usually expects the UN to intervene quickly and effectively, and on the other—the Organization does not possess suitable norms, procedures and instruments.

Secondly, it is a case of political inadequacy, which means that the alignment of forces inside of the organization does not reflect the actual balance of power

in the world. Thirdly, there is institutional inadequacy, which causes United Nations bodies and officials to work in an ineffective and outdated way.

The Polish initiative, therefore, was a comprehensive vision of UN reform. We proposed that a draft of the changes be prepared by a Group of Independent Personalities. As known, the Secretary General established such a group over a year ago and it presented its report last December. The year 2005 will test the capacity of the United Nations, and especially its member states, to take action for reform. The scheduled high-level meeting on the anniversary of the Millennium Declaration should bring political consensus on the package of changes. The question is: Will it deliver? The question remains open. There is no simple answer.

In its commitment to changing the UN, Poland does not pursue any hidden goals. We are not demanding a permanent seat on the Security Council, we are not advocating institutional change. We are acting on the assumption that first, you have to identify the problems, define a new mandate of the Organization—and only then deliberate on the institutional changes. Our approach is guided by the interests of the international community; we are moving beyond regional parochialism. Our initiatives primarily comprise an intellectual contribution; it is an attempt at innovative, creative thinking.

Members of the House,

A serious domestic debate should be devoted to the future profile of Poland's political, military and economic engagement in a global set of relations. I am referring to Poland as a state that—through its accession to the European Union—has entered a new system of international relationships, of which the Union is a collective subject. Stanisław Wyspiański wrote with a sense of irony in "The Wedding": "The whole damn world can take up arms, provided Poland's countryside remains at peace with no alarms." That is not and must not be the motto of Polish foreign policy in our times. Security has become truly indivisible, and threats to our national security may originate in exotic and highly remote regions. Therefore, it is the imperative of Polish foreign policy to seek national security in the framework of international security, in cooperation with other states. Our role in Iraq should be examined from precisely that point of view.

The problem is that the demand for such difficult and costly roles to be played by NATO and European Union is not likely to diminish. NATO is militarily engaged in Afghanistan and expects that Poland, among others, will also make active contribution. The European Union is establishing battle groups.

The humanitarian disaster in South-East Asia points to the need for remodelling the concept of such groups, so that they will be able to deliver effective international relief in such crisis situations. The situation in Sudan also indicates the need for such actions. Therefore, we face the need of drafting a sensible doctrine of international engagement of our military forces in similar operations. We are talking mainly about humanitarian interventions. That kind of Polish involvement will require broad public understanding.

Until now, the obvious though relatively recent postulate that we should transform ourselves from a country that was helped by others into a country helping those in greater need, could have sounded as an empty, abstract declaration. The tragedy in Asia has demonstrated how important it is for Poland to join relief efforts and show solidarity. Helping those who are weaker, poorer, afflicted by disease, hunger and disasters should henceforth change our sensitivity and awareness, but it also should have its organizational and financial dimension.

Mister Speaker,  
Members of the House,

Poland's entry into the EU structures and policies necessitates a reassessment of our relations with non-European states and a redefinition of our place in the global system. Europe is increasingly perceived as an entity. We should be influencing the shape of the EU policy toward the non-European regions. We have certain advantages: we have never been a colonial state, we have a developed network of missions, numerous communities of Polish expatriates, as well as a large pool of experts and researchers. Our greatest weakness and restriction are the modest resources at our disposal. You cannot pursue an active policy without adequate funds.

The government's recently-adopted strategy toward the non-European developing states is a signal of political will, and of the need for action. It is an important signal, since it is of a concrete and systematized character. This strategy goes beyond general declarations. It is a task for years to come. The rank, significance and attractiveness of such partners as China, India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, some Arab states, the RSA, Nigeria, Angola, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Mexico and many others, will continue to rise. In order to take advantage of the opportunities provided by Poland's participation in global processes, we must consistently modernize our system of management of foreign policy instruments.

Members of the House,

The fact that many Poles, people with Polish roots live abroad is part of our national identity. Over the past years, we have built a comprehensive government strategy of cooperation with expatriate Polish communities. There is a proven mechanism for the realization of that policy. Some issues here deserve special attention. That particularly applies to the assistance for Poles in the East, who often find themselves in a difficult material situation. That applies to the implementation of the Polish minority postulates in Lithuania. That also applies to the possibility of self-fulfilment of the cultural identity by Poles in Germany. I wish to take this opportunity to express my appreciation and thanks to both houses of parliament for their help, assistance and active work with the Polish expatriate communities.

Mister President,  
Mister Premier,  
Mister Speaker,  
Members of the House,

The balance sheet of foreign policy in recent years has been impressive. The accession to the European Union crowned many years of efforts and opened a new chapter in the history of our state. We have built a strong position in the Transatlantic relationship, and high prestige in Europe. The changes in Ukraine have opened new opportunities for our policy in the East. We have started actively moving into areas outside of Europe.

The international environment in which we operate is exceptionally unpredictable and unstable. The situation is prone to dynamic changes. That sharpens the dilemmas we face and complicates the search for the right responses.

I have attempted today to focus the attention of the Members of the House on these fundamental dilemmas, tasks and priorities. Many states face similar challenges. And in today's world, the only effective response to most international problems is a collective response.

In conclusion, allow me to repeat my conviction that the effectiveness of our foreign policy is largely determined by the following elements: continuity and consistency, and also recognition of the national interest above party lines—which is reflected by the joint or convergent positions of the main political forces on the goals and tasks of foreign policy of fundamental significance to the state and nation.

Thank you for your attention.

## The Uncertain World of 2005

The year 2005 saw continued uncertainty both in global relations and—probably even more so—in European politics. The continuing war in Iraq and the failure of the efforts to stabilize Afghanistan affected the situation throughout the Broader Middle East. While there were no spectacular terrorist acts, which could attest to success in preventing these threats, the doctrine of “long war” against international terrorism proclaimed by the U.S. indicates that a victory on this front is not at hand. All of this had to affect the overall international climate and diverted attention from the genuine, profound international problems, which are already a source of instability of the global order, and are likely to be an even more important source of these problems in the future. The major powers were increasingly confident that military might was central to safeguarding their interests and their spendings on armaments rose accordingly.

At the same time, Poland’s international security environment looked good: the country was secure. A confirmation of this assessment could be found in the fact that “security” was not mentioned among the eight priority goals of Poland’s foreign policy for the year 2005 in the prime minister’s policy speech; this has happened for the first time since 1990. That notwithstanding, international cooperation in solving economic and social problems of the world remained in short supply. The United States, tied up in the Iraq war, could not lead the world nor did it propose any solutions acceptable to others. The situation of Europe, or to be more precise, of the EU, which found itself in an impasse both internally and in relations with the world outside after the referendum failed in the two countries, was hardly better. The evolution of the situation beyond the eastern frontier of the EU met with varying assessments and expectations: from hope (the changes in Ukraine), through lack thereof (Belarus) to uneasiness (Moscow’s growing assertiveness, worsening of its attitude toward Poland). The developments of the year 2005, which reflected broader phenomena and more durable trends, confirmed that nothing is given for ever in

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public life, including international life. One has to earn their position and protect their interests all the time, and realize that every choice one makes has a price. Poland had an opportunity to experience it on several fronts (U.S., Russia, Germany), although there is not much to indicate that the awareness of Polish politicians increased in this regard.

### **Europe Hits an Impasse**

Unexpectedly, the year 2005 (after 2004, which was a success year for the EU, with the enlargement big bang and the adoption of the final text of the Constitutional Treaty) turned out to be a bitter experience for the Union, if not for Europe at large. The reason was the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in the referenda in France and in the Netherlands in late May and early June of 2005. Despite the fact that a number of EU states ratified the Treaty, it had to be ratified by all the member states in order to come into force. However, France and Holland announced that they were not going to repeat the referendum. The outcome of the referenda and such declarations appeared to seal the matter. This was a big setback, all the more so, as the Treaty was widely promoted to be a milestone of the process of European integration, a step that was to guarantee the cohesion of the whole structure for decades to come, and to give the European Union the tools needed to play a significant international role. The blow was all the worse as the Treaty was rejected by the founding fathers of the Community, the countries of the “old Europe,” which traditionally were very committed to the process of building the unity of the continent. The fiasco of the Treaty in those countries sent ripples across Europe, an effect comparable, *mutatis mutandis*, with what happened in the world post-9/11. Similarly as the terrorist strike against New York and the U.S. response to it laid bare the ills and antagonisms present in the world and helped to understand them better, this rejection of the Treaty vividly highlighted problems that had been plaguing Europe for quite some time already. However, for various reasons they were ignored; in particular, they were not mentioned by name. Part of them were actually responsible for the fiasco of the Treaty in France and the Netherlands, notwithstanding the fact that this Treaty had nothing to do with them.

One such problem are the growing doubts about the purpose of European integration at a time when EU states and societies are finding it even harder to cope with difficulties they tried to address precisely by moving away from deeper integration (the Constitutional Treaty symbolised that policy line) and opting for the protection of their interests on a national scale. Such attitudes are sometimes termed—not always accurately—as populism or national egoism,

although frankly, there is no good word to describe this new socio-political trend observed in Europe. The political elites of European states, which readily accuse the so-called Brussels of bureaucratic and technocratic excesses causing an erosion of democracy, contribute in no small measure to the emergence of such attitudes. They urge others at the EU forum to pay attention to the voices, worries and anxieties of the people, but they refuse to follow that very advice in their home countries, arguing that this would be a populist action, or heeding the demands of the masses. The arrogance of the elites consists in the fact that at first they ignore real social fears and problems (unemployment, immigration), and once these problems come to the surface (the emergence of extreme political currents, lost referenda or elections), they caution against populism. But giving in to populists is a no-go: the role of the elites is to lead, not to listen to the “angry masses.” European politicians can also be perfidious in other ways: they blame the introduction of unpopular reforms or the taking of some decisions on EU requirements (pointing the finger at Brussels), which is part of the reason for popular opposition to the Union.

European politics is plagued by the already widely acknowledged crisis of political leadership, understood as the lack of politicians who do not swim with the tide, are attached to their principles, can propose visions that appeal to the people (albeit without unrealistic promises), but who at the same time are able to talk to society (de Gaulle often serves as a good example at this junction). The problem rests not so much with the politicians, who are not what we would like them to be, but with the nature of present-day political life and democracy (where the media play a role, too), which does not provide an opportunity for the emergence of a class of politicians worthy of the name.

The fears surrounding the consequences of European integration (even if they are just alleged consequences), populist moods and egoistic postures, the weakness of political leadership (these, incidentally, appeared the main reasons for the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in the French and Dutch referenda) were among the reasons why it was also possible to sense a lack of certainty regarding the further course of the process in 2005. The doubts also concern the socio-economic model of the united Europe. Some critics have begun to blame that model for the problems some European societies have faced adjusting to the requirements ensuing from globalisation processes. The abandonment of that model does not appear to be easy or justified (after all, it is hard to lower the standard of living to equal the level of less developed countries, in order to be able to compete with them on price). The adjustment processes will have to come. However, given the present state of social consciousness, the inevitability

of these processes triggers a dislike of “Europe” in some people: in some, because these processes are indispensable (the conservative current), and in others, because they defend the costly so-called European social model (the neo-liberal current), as if it really existed. From the economic point of view the European Union countries may not be doing as well as expected, especially when compared to the impressive growth rates posted by China or India or to the U.S. economy, which is again gaining momentum, but the situation does not look nearly as bad as some critics insist when they complain that the European societies are lazy, insufficiently mobile, not ready for sacrifice and only interested in consumption, i.e., in reaping the benefits of the attained level of development. In terms of competitiveness or productivity (the average value of goods produced by one employee during one hour) the European countries continue to place among the world leaders. The economy of the EU was displaying signs of entering a growth phase, albeit at a relatively low level (approximately 2%).

The shock caused by the fiasco of the Treaty and the ensuing erosion of “faith in Europe” was a blow to the theses, advanced for some time, about the EU playing a global role. Over several preceding years, Europe was swept by a tide of conferences and publications whose common denominator was “Europe as a global power/actor.” However, after the constitutional fiasco, this proposal, while legitimate for some reasons and even rightly regarded as a *sine qua non* of Europe’s survival in the new international order, became but a mirage that can be dismissed with a shrug of the shoulders. Another reason why the legitimate international ambitions of the Union will have to wait is the fact that Europe has begun to have problems with its own identity, without which there can be no talk of a “global actor.” The identity problems are rooted in the dispute over the language of the preamble to the Constitutional Treaty. The inclusion of a provision about the Christian legacy of Europe as an important component of that identity was blocked. This was (is) not a barren dispute. The difference between civilisational identity and the identity determined by economic (the market) and political (democracy) parameters is immense and has serious implications, including political ones.

With its huge potential of tension and instability, and regarded as one of the factors responsible for the rejection of the Treaty in both countries precisely because of its fundamental significance for the question of identity, is nowadays the problem of migrations, or indeed mass immigration to EU countries, especially from Africa, the Middle East and Asia. This concerns in particular the influx of Islamic population. Both the scale of this immigration and the inability

of Muslims to accept not only European values, but even the provisions of law which to some extent follow from these values, are beginning to present a serious threat to Europe's cultural identity and, consequently, its social cohesion. The problems with the assimilation of Muslims are connected with the availability of jobs and the susceptibility to fundamentalist and extremist currents, including ones that support terrorism. Finally, they are articulated through the open contestation of the principles and customs in the host country, displayed by a considerable proportion of the immigrant population. The October-November rioting in France was an example of the kind of contestation, which poses a growing threat to the internal security of some European countries. This led to a surge of anti-Islamic sentiment, occasionally articulated in a manner as infantile as the publication of the caricatures of the Prophet in European papers, which inevitably boosted the spiral of distrust and accusations and yet enhanced the potential of the question of Islamic immigration to Europe to generate new conflicts.

All these problems are related to the aggravating demographic crisis in Europe (occasionally referred to as a population catastrophe or demographic suicide of Europe). The maintenance of the present trends will lead to an increasingly rapid depopulation of Europe or, in other words, the replacing of the native European population by immigrants. This could pose a challenge to the survival of Europe in the civilisational sense over the next 100 to 150 years. It is also an economic problem, considered fundamental by some. The objective is to preserve the present level of social security for the aging population of Europe. In these circumstances, only a workforce brought in from outside Europe will be able to secure adequate funds. The reason is that the Europeans, whose life expectancy grows longer, simply do not want to have children who could earn the money for their future pensions. For the time being, Europe is not able to respond to these social problems. Its only reaction is revealed by means of various fears and fearful attitudes affecting the process of European integration. Europe is beginning to feel the consequences of its excessive openness to outsiders in the past, but due to the demographic crisis it can ill afford a radical departure from the practice of accepting all-comers, irrespective of the reasons that drove them here, their readiness and ability to become Europeans, or their true attitude towards Europe.

The question of the identity of Europe (the EU) also manifested itself in 2005 in the marked growth of the disinclination to further expand the European Union. This happened just as the Europeans came almost face to face with the prospect of Turkey's (the announcement of the start of admission negotiations in

October 2005) and Ukraine's admission to the EU. The admission of these countries appeared to exceed the present and imaginable future capability of the organisation to admit more members and to continue the integration process. However, the views on the admission of the two countries to the Union were quite diversified, from strong support to one of the countries and equally strong objections to the other, to support for or opposition to both of them. These views were an additional bone of contention in the European discourse on the state and future of European integration. The Europeans began to realise the consequences of rushing the integration process. The 2004 expansion big bang was not even digested and before long it will be necessary to carry out the excessively optimistic undertakings to admit two more countries in 2007, i.e. Romania and Bulgaria, whose readiness for membership falls visibly short of the desired level, and there are already other countries knocking on the EU door, namely the former Yugoslav republics, which have to be rewarded for having stopped to fight with one another (and invest in their stability in this manner). This was not the logic of the previous enlargements. New members were admitted because they upheld the European values, norms and standards and because they wanted to participate in the community programme of European unity. Membership was not a price nor was it a preventive measure (e.g. against the spread of Islamic fundamentalism or a return to the zone of Russian influence). The emerging meaning of the successive admissions and their implications for the essence of the European process, different than in the past, could not but arouse opposition, or at least provoke a reflexion over the whole European integration. This situation was not always properly understood in Poland. One could ignore it, but this had no impact on that situation. Just the dissonance between the Polish and the West European approach to European integration got worse.

The impasse in which the European Union has found itself adversely affected the development of Poland's bilateral relations with the key member states. After the fiasco of the Constitutional Treaty, the European Council proclaimed the so-called time for reflexion in June 2005. The search for an answer to the question about the future fate of the Treaty also affected relations between the member states. For some governments the Treaty was worth salvaging, while others did not hide their satisfaction with its fiasco, all the more so as it came about thanks to the efforts of the French and the Dutch. The differences of opinion on this matter did not help to improve the climate of Poland's relations with Germany or France. The replacement of Schröder, who was strongly criticised in Poland, by Angela Merkel by no means heralded a

return to the air of trust and cooperation that characterised these relations until the crisis triggered by the war in Iraq. This could hardly be offset by contacts with the United Kingdom for which Poland has never been an important or lasting policy factor. The fact that we allowed the Anglo-Saxons to exploit us in the Iraq war could be a source of satisfaction for the British, but this did not make them feel committed to treat Poland in a serious way. A spectacular proof of it came during the lacklustre British presidency of the EU (second half of 2005), in the closing state of negotiations on the New Financial Perspective (London's proposals were the least favourable from the Polish point of view); one poignant example was the notorious e-mail from the British Ambassador to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which he regarded Poland, with the peculiarly wry British sense of humour, as a former colony of the British Empire. After the change of government in Spain in 2004, Poland had to put to rest its plan to establish a "strategic partnership" with that country, partnership that was to be based on the involvement in the Iraq war, special bonds with the United States and the reluctance to strengthen the EU. The change of government in Italy meant that also that country left the war coalition (Prodi's Italy has announced a "return to Europe"), although it has to be admitted that Berlusconi's Italy was not a good candidate for establishing a "strategic partnership" with Poland either.

### **United States—European Union: No Breakthrough**

The troubled European Union and its quarrelling member states were not able to achieve a breakthrough in their relations with the United States. The other side was not capable of such breakthrough either. Both in the U.S. and in Europe, there was growing awareness of the failure of their policies of the recent years, although it was still not the time for reaching conclusions. The United States suffered a defeat in Iraq, even if it tried to retain military control over that country with immense determination, which could serve a worthier cause. Its defeat consisted in the fact that the mission, which accompanied that military intervention, got compromised. Even if the American people and a part of the international community could live with the falsehood of the original rationale for the war (WMD, terrorism) as it was outweighed by the benefits of ridding Iraq of Saddam Hussein, the destructive and cruel course of the operation, the fact that it is dragging on and on, and the chaos which it let loose, and in particular the absence of any prospects of the establishment of democracy in the disintegrating country or of any impact in the form of the spread of democracy in the so-called Broader Middle East, ultimately stripped that war of any

legitimacy in the eyes of the world, including European, public opinion. The support for the Iraq war also disappeared in the United States. Even so, that war was the centrepiece of the second term of G.W. Bush in the White House, which started in January 2005. The administration focused on the striving to achieve a victory in Iraq, despite the fact that the chances of it were more and more illusory as time went by, and wasted time trying to convince the American public that the war was a just war. Already during the first year of the second term, support for President Bush dropped to a record low level in U.S. history, but the incumbent's sole war strategy amounted to repeating a mantra about the need to "stay the course," because victory is near. Towards the end of 2005, the administration unveiled a peculiar doctrine of a "long war." It was referring to a war against international terrorism, of which the war in Iraq was allegedly a part. The "long war" had no designated time span or geographical limits—it was essentially a perennial and global war. This translated into a continuation of confrontation with the countries or regions perceived by the United States as unfriendly from the point of view of American interests, and an attempt to preserve the polarisation of the international community according to the conformity of its attitude to terrorism with what the U.S. desired, or rather with how the U.S. defined that attitude and tried to propagate it.

The need to concentrate diplomatic efforts, maintain significant military presence and commit major financial resources to the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan, where the situation remained tense, forced the Bush administration to exercise restraint as regards the use of force in other parts of the world or against other countries (even though President Bush repeated that the military option against Iran was "at hand" all the time). However, this involvement in practice prevented the U.S. from having its part in solving other important international problems. Even the activity in an area as important as preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, the means of production of such weapons and delivery systems, was perceived solely as a means of pursuing American interests, not as an effort to further international security. The correctness of such understanding of U.S. actions is confirmed by the question of the transfer of nuclear technology to India, which joined the nuclear weapons league several years earlier over violent opposition on the part of the United States (sanctions), but at present, due to the Chinese factor, is a close partner of the Americans in this area, although this does not stop the U.S. from threatening to use force against other countries, should they try to lay their hands on such weapons.

The absence of American leadership was felt not only in the world, but also in the Atlantic Alliance. Without that leadership, the Alliance was stagnant from the strategic point of view, even if that did not prevent it from discharging of its ongoing responsibilities, the number of which was growing all the time. Despite the unresolved dispute between the advocates of the concept of NATO as the “global cop” and those who supported its traditional role (collective defence, trans-Atlantic community), the Alliance kept widening its role and mission. In addition to the stabilisation mission in Afghanistan, which had to be strengthened rather than being scaled down due to the continued lack of stability in that country, and the training mission in Iraq, there is the humanitarian aid mission in Pakistan, preparations for the operation in Darfur, the discussions on the preservation of peace in the Middle East and efforts to secure the cooperation of the so-called contact countries from other parts of the world (e.g. South Korea, Japan, Australia)—all of which pointed to a crawling globalisation of the Alliance, never mind the position of the traditionalists. Also the transformation of military capacity was done with that in mind; this concerns in particular the development of NATO rapid reaction force. The line of evolution of the Alliance, pushed by the Anglo-Saxons and backed by Poland, has quite a few strategic and political implications, which were not discussed, however, because of the absence of a good political climate in the wake of discord over the war in Iraq. While those other disputes were slowly being forgotten, some distrust and lack of “cordiality” lingered on, despite the goodwill visit paid by President Bush at the NATO Brussels headquarters in February 2005. More important issues, such as the admission of Ukraine to the Alliance or a new strategy concept, will not likely be tackled before 2007. The 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Washington Treaty is approaching. The NATO summit to be held in Riga in 2006, will focus more on technical issues than on strategy.

Both the position taken by Poland with regard to controversial problems of the European Union and the support for the Anglo-Saxon vision of the Alliance, or finally, Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz’s declarations regarding the consent to the installation of components of the US Missile Defence programme (MD) on Polish territory, contributed to the fact that Poland was perceived first of all as a close and unconditionally loyal ally of the United States rather than a state preoccupied with its strategic interests with the European Union. This was not only the outcome of an evolution of the environment in which Poland exists, but also of a Polish contribution to that evolution.

### **Erosion of Central Europe—Differentiation of Eastern Europe**

The same logic appeared to govern the evolution of the situation in the region to which Poland belongs, or at least that part of which that once constituted the post-communist East-Central Europe. After the double enlargement (EU and NATO), the year 2004 saw the end of Central Europe in the geopolitical sense, the Central Europe that was revived—with a Polish contribution, among others—in the early 1990s, with the emergence of the region's nations from the post-communist zone. Even just before the double enlargement, analysts in East-Central European countries argued whether Central Europe could survive as a geopolitical entity, whether the Visegrad Group will not disintegrate, or what role will be assigned to it, and also what was going to happen to the Central European Initiative. At that time, the usefulness of these structures also post-2004 was confirmed, but it was routine confirmation only. However, the situation evolved differently. The countries that got admitted to the EU and NATO quickly became part of the “membership landscape,” the appeal of which consists in the fact that countries search for partners using their interests, not regional location, as the main criterion, unless the two happen to match. However, this does not apply to the countries of the East-Central European region, each of which soon went its own way and if there are any indications of a subregional community of interests, they concern the position vis-à-vis Ukraine or Russia (but even that does not necessarily apply to the Czechs or Hungarians). This is only natural although from the Polish point of view it produces certain consequences. After 1989, Poland worked hard to promote regional cooperation, which in addition to enhancing a sense of its own worth within broader European geopolitics, was also designed to strengthen its international position. Poland felt as a regional leader in a sense, and for a while was treated as such by other countries of the region, all the more so as it sought to take the interests of regional partners into account in its initiatives. This began to change even before 2004, when Poland began to place more and more emphasis on close ties with the United States, while other countries of the region, without ignoring the importance of relations with the U.S., focused on the pursuit of their interests in Europe; they were neither willing nor able to “stabilise” the situation outside Europe, side by side with the Americans. Imperceptibly, Poland ceased to be the leader of the remaining countries of the region. To some extent, it continued to serve as a point of reference for them, but it lost any influence it had over them. The previous partners preferred to pursue their European goals rather than to risk maintaining close ties with a country that evidently took a different view of important issues of European integration.

East of Poland's borders the situation hardly looks better. There, too, Poland was seen more often as a U.S. ally rather than an agent implementing the Union's Eastern policy, assuming, of course, that such thing exists. This was demonstrated in particular by the evolution of the situation in Ukraine. Poland's involvement in Ukrainian affairs was often presented by Polish politicians as acting hand-in-hand with the Americans (and was perceived as such in Moscow). Meanwhile, both the European Union as a whole and individual big EU member states displayed far more caution, which was due not only to a pro-Russian stance, but also to the lack of faith in the long-term survival of the Ukrainian reforms as well as to fears that it would then be necessary to look after Ukraine, even offer it membership, which is something the Union was not ready for, whether politically or mentally. Besides, Ukraine's future remains uncertain and it is to be expected that Russia will be using all forms of past dependence of that country (as a component of the former USSR) to keep in check or reverse the pro-Western orientation of Ukraine, including the "punishing" of the countries which will act to keep alive the policy line which started with the "orange revolution;" needless to add, this applies to Poland in the first place.

Fortunately, the unfavourable—from the Polish point of view—developments in Belarus evoked a more pronounced reaction in the other EU countries. Belarus's slipping from authoritarian to totalitarian rule could not be ignored by Europe. This was not just a question of geopolitics, within the framework of which some countries would be ready to respect Russia's interest, but a question of the emergence of a political dinosaur in the centre of Europe, right next to the EU border, which understandably forced the Union to react to it, even if it lacked effective tools for changing that situation within a short period of time. The advancing "fossilization" of Belarus increases, on the one hand, the likelihood of a generational, pro-European Belarussian revolt in the future, while on the other, it produces a peculiar structural dependence of that country on Russia, the emergence of a situation in which a formally sovereign Belarus will *de facto* be a part of the Russian Federation (similarly as it was part of the USSR once).

In 2005 it was easy to see a "tectonic fault" separating Russia from Europe. Not only did Russia turn out to be a separate geological formation, but with Putin at the helm, it wanted to stay that way and use it as a cornerstone of its international identity. During the last several months, Russia ceased to conceal its authoritarian and nationalist leanings. The curbing of domestic political and economic freedoms was accompanied by growing Russian assertiveness in external relations, both with the European Union and the United States. The most pronounced shift was the chilling off of relations with Poland. The way in

which Russia behaved vis-à-vis Poland was a demonstration: see how a country can be treated if it pursues a policy that Russia regards as being spearheaded against its interests. It did not take long for Russia to issue Poland a bill for its Prometheism. Its Policy towards countries such as Poland caused three kinds of problems at once: historical, geopolitical and energy ones. In the case of Poland, this concerned disputes over the interpretation of World War II, the place of Ukraine and Belarus in Europe, the Baltic pipeline, which under decisions passed in 2005, is to be built by a Russian-German consortium (and is to be an element of an energy supply line linking Russia with the EU countries, but bypassing Poland). The way Moscow handled the energy matters made an impression that Gazprom was taking over the responsibilities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Capitalising on the steep growth of global demand for raw materials and especially fuels, Russia decided to use its resources as an instrument of enforcing respect for its interest both among its closest neighbours and for consolidating its bargaining position vis-à-vis the U.S. and the EU. The Russian politicians' thinking is that this allows them to ignore completely the interests or strivings of smaller countries, which means a return to the vulgar Realpolitik style. Therefore, taking into account the whole set of elements determining the dynamics of the geopolitical situation in Eastern Europe and the objectives of Poland's and Russia's policies, there was nothing in 2005 to herald an early change in Russia's attitude towards Poland and, consequently, an improvement in bilateral relations. This was confirmed by the fact that there were only ephemeral symptoms of a slight thaw in relations when Minister Sergei Yastzhembski, an adviser to President Putin, visited Warsaw in February 2006.

### **Global Issues and UN**

At this junction it is worth pointing to several of the various trends and problems making up the global dimension of the international environment that are particularly interesting from the Polish perspective. Starting with the process that has been wreaking havoc with the international order for close on two decades, meaning globalisation, it can be said that the year 2005 did not see any development that could suggest any changes modifying the essence of that process. In the economic dimension, its development proceeds along the rules adopted in the mid-1990s (the Washington consensus). Despite the fact that for several years, experts as well as many politicians have been emphasising the need of some form of political control over globalisation, no major efforts that could serve the attainment of that goal have appeared. Similarly, it would be

hard to identify any major efforts aimed at slowing down the process of social stratification that accompanies it or any protective actions of global proportions. The inevitability of this process, the impression that it is impossible to influence its course, as well as the undeniable benefits it brings, have eroded somewhat the strength of protests against it, articulated at alter-globalist demonstrations and meetings. This did not, presumably, follow from greater acceptance of the international order that was itself influenced by globalisation processes, but precisely from the need to look for more effective forms of exerting an influence on that order. From this point of view the recent period could be regarded as “pause for thought.” This could also be seen in the lower intensity of that terrorist activity which could be regarded as an extreme form of opposition to Western domination or U.S. hegemony. Terrorist actions proved to be rather ineffective and the countermeasures were increasingly successful; besides—and most importantly—terrorist acts did not meet with the approval of those on whose behalf they were allegedly launched.

The fears of the big boys of the present international order were confirmed by their intensified activity aimed to avert the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons. We witnessed the parallel evolution of two trends in this regard in the recent months. One consisted in actions aimed at closing the loopholes in the existing non-proliferation regimens or the introduction of new, informal and complementary systems. In addition diverse actions were launched with a view to discouraging the potential “latecomers” from acquiring such weapons. A peculiar political and strategic *cordon sanitaire* surrounding North Korea remained in place. Nonetheless, the focus of interest and efforts shifted last year to Iran, which publicly announced that it was not only going to carry on its programme of development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but also intended to enrich uranium to weapons-grade. It was not so much the launch of a nuclear programme by Iran as the nature of its political system that determined the assessment of this decision: its militant and scandalous remarks regarding Israel and anti-US sentiment (since the toppling of the pro-Western Shah Reza Pahlavi in 1979). Iran’s actions elicited not only intensive multilateral diplomatic activity (IAEA, EU), but also overt threats uttered by the United States, which openly declared that it did not rule out the use of military force against Iran.

The second tendency with regard to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is the refusal of the big powers (especially the United States) to take any steps of a disarmament nature, e.g. those envisaged by the NPT of 1968. To add insult to injury, the Americans applied double standards in this regard. I am

of course referring to the 2005 agreement on the provision of nuclear technology signed by the U.S. with India—no coincidence there, to be sure.

This brings us to another important matter, which received more and more attention as the year 2005 grew older, namely, the emergence of a new alignment of forces in Asia. And it is not just the matter of continued growth of China's power, but also the rather unexpected appearance of India on the Asian geopolitical scene and its accession to the globalisation process in perhaps the most spectacular way, namely, in the field of advanced communication technologies and data processing. For the United States this became an opportunity to treat India in the same way it treated China during the Cold War against the Soviet Union, except that this time it is the "Indian card" (a counterbalance to Chinese influence in the region). In this way, the whole Asia has become the venue of more or less intricate Realpolitik pursued at various levels—often with a hidden agenda, too—by such countries as China, India, Russia, Pakistan, Japan, Iran and a motley block of Islamic and Arab states, still with the dominant role of the United States. If one can speak of a hidden agenda of strategy and diplomacy, in the case of Russia this consists on the one hand in carefully planned cooperation with the West (e.g. in the field of combating terrorism, albeit only as far as it constitutes a direct threat to Russia), and on the other, in more or less over juxtaposition of U.S. policies in Asia and the Middle East.

In the context of all these geopolitical jockeying, shortages of raw materials, problems with the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the American "long war" (which, from U.S. perspective, overshadowed all other matters), economic disparity and underdevelopment of many regions (for which there appeared to be no hope), the huge international effort aimed at reforming the United Nations could appear to be but an exercise in diplomacy. However, the year 2005 saw the crowning of these efforts with the final document of the summit meeting held on the occasion of the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the United Nations. The work on the reform (to which a Polish proposal contributed in a significant way) was launched in the autumn of 2003. That was when Kofi Annan appointed the High-Level Panel to prepare its main assumptions. The Panel's report and other documents became the cornerstones of an excellent and truly far-reaching proposal for a reform presented by the UN Secretary General in his March 2005 report. This report, in turn, became the subject of inter-governmental works. Whenever governments are faced with the task of reforming any of their multilateral institutions, they follow the "zero own losses" rule, which means that reforms are welcome so long as they produce no

damage to their own narrow interests, which typically involve just prestige and occasionally also personal interests. This is what happened also on this occasion. The document that was adopted is only half-cooked. Some of its provisions appear to be of fundamental importance, but there are also vital issues that were not even mentioned in it. There are the immensely important decisions on the adoption of the principle of “responsibility for protection” (a principle that is a successor to the humanitarian intervention doctrine), the establishment of the Human Rights Council (despite the opposition of the United States, Israel, Marshall Islands and Palau) or the Peacebuilding Commission, which is to address the problem of the countries that have collapsed or are on the verge of collapsing. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to agree on anything in the field of control over and limitation of armaments (chiefly due to U.S. objections). Similarly, it was not possible to agree on a reform of the Security Council, which is long overdue and indispensable for the credibility and effectiveness of the actions of that body (the opposition of some permanent members to various candidates for a seat on the Council). This was not the first time that the very same countries that have been most vocal and radical in criticising the United Nations, blocked a reform that would streamline the operation of the Organisation. However, the problem is not limited to the question of finding compromise formulas with regard to various aspects of the structure and activities of the United Nations. The main reason is of a more general nature: the factors responsible for the evolution of the present international order diminish the role of states, with decisions concerning global issues being taken increasingly often outside international organisations. The big powers (which reject the idea of democratisation of international relations) are no longer concerned about the effectiveness or credibility of these organisations, and the increasingly powerful non-state entities, which appear to pose as competitors of international institutions, are not interested in it either.

## **Poland in the European Union**

The year 2005 was the first full year of Poland's membership in the European Union. After the first moments of euphoria ending many years of efforts aimed at incorporating Poland into the group of EU members, the time came to undertake activities to ensure Poland's place in the group which would correspond to its political potential. The year was of major importance for Polish society, which in spite of the generally favourable attitude to Poland's membership in the EU, demanded a clear confirmation—as opposed to mere declarations—that benefits from membership were considerable and that Poland would use effectively the opportunities and possibilities offered by the membership.

It was also a very important and difficult time for the whole European Union. Its Member States had to prepare and agree upon financial plans for the years 2007–2013, decide upon further enlargement (with regard to, *inter alia*, commencement of negotiations with Croatia and Turkey), continue the process of ratification of the Constitution Treaty and define actions aimed at increasing the Union's competitiveness and its ability to face the challenge of globalization (the new version of the Lisbon Strategy as well as the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact were to serve the purpose). Moreover, in 2005 the EU had to respond to such events as terrorist attacks in London or phenomena which admittedly took place far beyond its territory, but in a tragic manner concerned citizens of many Member States, e.g. the tsunami disaster.

### **The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe**

After signing of the Constitution Treaty in Rome in October 2004 the process of its ratification began. Most of the Member States assumed it would be ratified by parliaments. However, a large group of states decided to conduct referenda on the issue. Notably, the group included not only those states which

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\* Małgorzata Banat—acting Deputy Director of the European Union Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
Urszula Pałasz—Head of the EU Institutional Development Department.

traditionally used referenda in similar cases, such as Denmark or Ireland, but also France, Luxembourg, Spain, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom, where this form expressing consent for the ratification of institutional changes in the EU had not been used or only very rarely. Among the states which considered using the referendum were also Poland and the Czech Republic.

Originally the ratification process proceeded smoothly. By May 2005, the Treaty had been ratified by Lithuania, Hungary, Slovenia, Italy, Greece, Austria, Germany and Slovakia (in the parliamentary manner) as well as Spain (in a referendum). A breakthrough change took place after the referendum in France on 29 May 2005, in which 54.68% of citizens voted against the Treaty (with a turnout of 69.34%). Such a tendency in French society, resulting primarily from the negative attitude towards the internal situation and the conviction that the decision on the Treaty would adversely affect it, had persisted since March, in spite of efforts undertaken by the French authorities to change this state of affairs. Consequently, the result of the French referendum was not a complete surprise, though until the very end there were hopes that it would be positive. The situation was somewhat different in the Netherlands, where polls had for a very long time indicated the advantage of the Treaty supporters, but finally society rejected the document (over 61% of voters were against it, with the turnout of over 63%). The results of the referenda in the two Community founder states resulted in the stopping of the ratification process and forced the heads of states and governments to take the decision to announce a “period of reflection” for analysing the situation during the session of the European Council on 16–17 June 2005. At the same time, since some of the Member States, including Poland, supported the continuation of the ratification process, the European Council passed a declaration leaving Member States free to decide upon the continuation or suspension of the procedure, emphasizing also that the ratification process should be continued as long as the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was not rejected by more than 5 Member States. The Council decided also that in the first half of 2006 it would reevaluate the process of the Treaty ratification.

After the referenda in France and the Netherlands, by the end of 2005 the ratification procedures had been implemented also in Latvia, Malta, Cyprus and in Luxembourg (referendum). The ratification process also continued in Belgium (voting over the Treaty was held in regional parliaments).

During the summit in Hampton Court on 27 October 2005, heads of states and governments decided that the Union should focus on solving the concrete

problems of its citizens by deepening the cooperation in selected areas. There prevailed an opinion that the problem of the Constitution Treaty could not be solved without changing the atmosphere around European integration, particularly in some of the fifteen Member States.

From the beginning of 2005, the Polish government prepared for the referendum,<sup>1</sup> and until mid-June the public opinion was favourable towards the Treaty, though by no means uncritical.<sup>2</sup> In March, the Council of Ministers adopted a resolution on submitting to the President of Poland the Treaty for ratification and the Prime Minister filed the appropriate motion with the Speaker of the Sejm.<sup>3</sup> On 1 June, a session of the Committee for European Integration chaired by the Prime Minister as well as a consultation meeting attended by the President devoted to the Constitution Treaty took place. A final conclusion was that Poland would wait for decisions of the European Council, before ultimately deciding upon the further ratification procedure (works in the Sejm commissions over the resolution were considerably advanced). A decision to keep on the course towards the Treaty ratification was taken.<sup>4</sup> Another consultation meeting at the residence of the Polish president took place on 14 June. On 21 June, after the session of the European Council, the so-called reflection group, including *inter alia* outstanding personages of the world of science, gathered at the president's seat. After analysing the results of the session of the European

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<sup>1</sup> See also U. Pałłasz, "Końcowa faza negocjacji nad Traktatem Konstytucyjnym—polska perspektywa," *Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny* 2005, No. 5. Most Poles believed that the Treaty might be ratified in the popular vote and that obtaining the necessary support in the parliament would not be possible. Practically all political forces had a favourable attitude towards the idea of the referendum, though the opposition objected to its date proposed by the government. On the other hand, the government pointed out that due to the necessity of obtaining 50% turnout threshold, combining the referendum with the parliamentary or presidential elections was advisable.

<sup>2</sup> The advantage of the Treaty advocates over its opponents decreased after the fiasco of the referenda in France and the Netherlands, though until mid-June 2005 it still amounted to over 20% (among the respondents declaring they would participate in the referendum according to CBOS). It was the turnout that seemed to pose the most significant problem.

<sup>3</sup> Resolution of the government of 8 March 2005. In his letter of 9 March, to the Speaker of the Sejm the Prime Minister indicated Article 90 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and informed the Speaker that in the opinion of the government the most appropriate mode of the Treaty ratification would be a national referendum, which could take place at the same time as the first round of presidential elections, i.e. in the autumn of 2005.

<sup>4</sup> On 10 June, during the meeting of presidents of the Visegrad Group states in Kazimierz Dolny, a joint declaration was agreed upon, stating "All Member States should express themselves on the Treaty. They should proceed with ratification at the pace they consider most appropriate in their individual circumstances."

Council and due to the suspension of the ratification procedures in other states (particularly after the cancellation of the referenda in Denmark and Portugal), the decision was taken to resign from the plan to organize the ratification referendum in the autumn of 2005. Consequently the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of the IV term did not include the item concerning the draft resolution on the constitution referendum in the agenda of the 107<sup>th</sup> plenary session (5–8 July). In 2005 Poland did not use the possibility offered by Article 90 of its Constitution and did not take the procedural decision on the choice of the manner of ratification concerning the Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe.

### **New Financial Perspective for the Years 2007–2013**

In 2005, the most important issue for the European Union was the discussion over the New Financial Perspective. Already its first phase, initiated in February 2004 with a communication of the European Commission, entitled *Building our Common Future: Policy Challenges and Budgetary Means of the Enlarged Union 2007–2013*,<sup>5</sup> showed how difficult it would be to reach a compromise satisfying the interests and postulates of all the EU members. The debate was of particular importance for the new Member States, as they needed the greatest support from the EU budget for their cohesion policies and agriculture. Consequently, from the beginning the negotiations were marked with clear discrepancy between the interests of the net payers to the EU budget, i.e. the group of the signatories of the “Letter of Six,” advocating limitations of spendings from the EU budget, and states belonging to the so-called group of friends of cohesion policy, i.e. the beneficiaries of the resources of the cohesion fund who wanted the potential reductions in this area to be as low as possible. During the Luxembourg presidency, after the first short technical stage, in March 2005 the talks were moved to the political level (sessions of the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council and COREPER II). The works on the technical level resulted in a document which was to be the basis for further negotiations, the so-called Negotiating Box. The main issue of conflict at this stage of the talks was the general amount of funds for commitments in the EU budget for 2007–2013.

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<sup>5</sup> Report of the European Commission for the Council and the European Parliament of 10 February 2004, *Building our Common Future. Policy Challenges and Budgetary Means of the Enlarged Union, 2007–2013*.

Apart from the works in the EU Council, informal bilateral and multilateral consultations on various levels took place (e.g. meetings of ministers of foreign affairs and ministers responsible for NFP). Poland actively participated in them. Important forums of its activity were most of all the Visegrad Group and the group of friends of “cohesion policy.” Following Poland’s initiative, the Visegrad Group presented two non-papers on: maximum financial transfer from the cohesion policy (the Group decided that the limit of 4% defined by the European Commission should become one of the elements of political arrangements) and financing the development of rural areas (the Group proposed returning to the practice according to which Member States could independently decide what part of the cohesion policy allocation they could spend on the Guidance Section and fishing).

Poland’s perspective in the negotiations focused on realizing the goals included in the standpoint of the government on the New Financial Perspective of 10 February 2004.<sup>6</sup>

The final version of the compromise negotiation package the Luxembourg presidency presented during the summit of the heads of states and governments on 17 June 2005. Both the proposed structure of the EU budget and the levels of transfers corresponded to the Polish negotiation priorities. Funds for commitments were decided at the level of 1.06% of GNP (which was lower than the original proposal of the European Commission, but definitely higher than that proposed by the signatories of “the Letter of Six”). The volume of the cuts in the areas of most importance for Poland, i.e. in the cohesion policy and Common Agricultural Policy<sup>7</sup> was limited. In addition, support for the five

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<sup>6</sup> Poland’s strategic goals: protection against the cuts regarding goal 1 of cohesion policy (section 1b) in the poorest regions and Member States of the EU, protection against cuts in agricultural policy (section 2); ensuring that the reform of the own funds system, including the change in the correction mechanisms, should not adversely affect Poland’s long-term net position (both in the years 2007–2013 and after the year 2013). Strategic goals of complementary character: ensuring funds for the protection of the EU external border (section 3); ensuring adequate funds for the cooperation with eastern neighbours of the EU (section 4); introducing into section 1a instruments which comply with the convergence criterion regarding the needs of Member States with lower development level (protection against fund cuts for mobility programmes in education) increasing the level of integration between the new and old EU states; funds for the development of rural areas not being included in the calculation of the 4% limit, of the Fisheries Fund and the financial resources of the ERDF for financing the European neighbourhood policy.

<sup>7</sup> According to the final version of the Negotiating Box Poland was to be allocated funds for commitments at the amount of € 93.6 billion, which made Poland the leading net beneficiary of EU assistance.

poorest Polish voivodships was granted, i.e. for lubelskie, podlaskie, świętokrzyskie, podkarpackie and warmińsko-mazurskie. However, the proposal of the Luxembourg presidency was not accepted. The United Kingdom, Spain, Finland, Sweden and Holland were against, whereas Italy and Denmark abstained from voting.

Consequently, the United Kingdom, chairing the works of the EU in the second half of 2005, faced an enormous challenge. On the one hand, it had to reconcile the various interests of all Member States, and on the other adopt an objective attitude towards the problem which was a bone of discontent between the British and the other Member States, i.e. the British rebate. Regrettably, the first period of the British presidency (during which no formal negotiations on the NFP took place—there were only bilateral negotiations on the issue) saw no significant progress in reaching a compromise. The first draft appeared as late as 5 December 2005, several days before the session of the European Council. It did not comply with the main postulates of Poland. The British proposed a considerable reduction in the funds for new Member States, they did not include the reform of states' own resources, with the British rebate among them. Before the session of the European Council the Polish government took diplomatic steps to convince Member States, the British presidency and the European Commission to adopt its standpoint.

The New Financial Perspective occupied most attention in all talks with the EU partners conducted in this period by the government representatives and the Polish prime minister. On 1 December 2005 in Budapest the meeting of the prime ministers of the Visegrad Group and the British prime minister took place. A draft of the joint letter of the Visegrad Group prime ministers had been prepared in which the importance of the solidarity principle as the basis of the EU operation was emphasized and a postulate was put forward that there should not be questioned the fact that the funds from the EU budget for new Member States are important for the modernization of the whole Union. On 15 December 2005, immediately before the summit of the European Council, a letter of the ministers of foreign affairs of Poland and France was published, presenting the priorities of the two states. The letter definitely contributed to strengthening the position and role of Poland in the last stage of the negotiations conducted during the Council sessions. The arrangements made among the main EU partners did not bring the final solutions in the planned timeframe. Only on the second day, 17 December, a compromise was reached among all Member States. Spendings from the EU budget were decided upon at the level of 1.045% GNP along with limitations regarding the British rebate. Thanks to the high level of allocation

from the cohesion policy, Common Agricultural Policy and other community policies, Poland became the largest beneficiary of the Union budget (it will receive 10.5% of the whole Union budget, i.e. approximately 13 billion euro a year). The Polish government also obtained the consent to maintain a special fund supporting five poorest Polish regions. At the same time, the volume of the assistance increased by over 303 million euros<sup>8</sup> as compared with the decisions of June 2005. In the years 2007–2013 the volume of the funds allocated from the EU budget to the Polish rural areas will amount to approximately 26 billion euros (direct payments, development of rural areas, agricultural pensions). Poland will have easier access to the funds of the cohesion policy. During the first four years of the New Financial Perspective being implemented (2007–2010), the period in which the resources of the Cohesion fund can be used will be prolonged from three to four years. Another significant benefit is the fact that the level of co-financing was raised to 85% of the value of projects from the structural funds, which means that the own contribution of the project leaders can be lower. Moreover, in the cases of beneficiaries who are not VAT payers, the costs of the tax will be refunded from the EU budget, which will decrease the burdens on the Polish national budget and the budgets of territorial self-governments. Poland will also be able to use the resources of the structural funds to support the housing construction industry.

### **Lisbon Strategy**

An important event of 2005 was the mid-term revision of the Strategy made at the session of the European Council on 22–23 March in Brussels. It was based on the reports of the High Level Expert Group for Lisbon Strategy<sup>9</sup> and the European Commission.<sup>10</sup> The Council summed up the debate on the priorities and took decisions regarding the shape of the Strategy in the next several years. Two areas were regarded as priorities: employment policy and economic growth with respect for the principle of sustainable development. A lot of attention was devoted to the issues of knowledge and innovativeness as the main factors of sustainable development. The main goal in the B+R sector remained unchanged:

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<sup>8</sup> Growth from 577 to 880 million euros.

<sup>9</sup> Report of November 2004 *Facing the Challenge. The Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Employment*, prepared by a group of 13 experts chaired by the former prime minister of the Netherlands, Wim Kok; including *inter alia* Professor Dariusz Rosati.

<sup>10</sup> Report of 2 February 2005 *Working Together for Growth and Jobs. A New Start for the Lisbon Strategy*.

reaching the level of expenditure on research and development equal to 3% of GNP. The necessity to increase the role of innovativeness in eco-technology was indicated. Recommendations were made regarding the intensification of the activities which should be taken at the community, national and local levels and the involvement of all the entities which could influence the implementation of the Strategy. The “Youth Pact” proposed by France, Germany, Spain and Sweden was adopted. There was introduced a new mechanism of implementing the Strategy and reporting the progress of the works, based on a three-year cycle, increasing the responsibility of Member States for the achievement of the assumed goals. Appointing national coordinators for the Lisbon Strategy was proposed. From the beginning of the discussion on the Strategy, Poland played an important role in it. The Polish standpoint towards the mid-term review of the Lisbon Strategy, adopted by the government on 15 March 2005, was presented in a coherent manner at the sessions of all the EU bodies. Thanks to that, most of the Polish postulates were included in the conclusions of the European Council. The postulates comprised:

- direct references to the cohesion policy as one of the main instruments of the Strategy implementation;
- starting efforts to make the 7<sup>th</sup> Framework Programme beneficial for all the Member States;
- including all the SMEs, not only high technology enterprises of the sector, in the innovation policy;
- emphasising the key importance of SMEs for accelerating the economic growth and employment in the European Union and increasing the competitiveness of the EU economy against other highly developed economies of the world;
- continuation of the works aimed at simplifying the community law; undertaking activities addressed to persons exposed to social exclusion, including persons with low education, in order to help them find employment.

From the beginning, Poland supported the ideas of reforms to the system of programming the activities taken at the national level in order to implement the Strategy more effectively and better coordinate economic and employment policies. It was also in favour of reporting these issues in a single integrated document. Consequently, it approved of the Integrated Guidelines Package, adopted at the session of the European Council on 16–17 June 2005 and the concept of the three-year National Reform Programmes based on the guidelines packages, but presenting national priorities and strategies of their implementation.

The preliminary Polish draft of the National Reform Programme for the years 2005–2008 was prepared as early as in the summer of 2005 and presented for social consultations (according to the recommendation of the European Council). However, due to the parliamentary elections in Poland, its final version was adopted only on 27 December 2005. After that, the Programme was submitted to the European Commission.

In 2005, the Republic of Poland participated also in the discussion on legislative proposals belonging to the canon of realization of the Lisbon Strategy goals, including the Directive on Services, the REACH system (registration, evaluation, issuing permits and introducing the applicable restrictions regarding chemicals), 7<sup>th</sup> Framework Programme for competitiveness and innovation (CIP 2007–2013).

Poland also actively participated in the discussion on the simplification of the community law and the principles of setting it up including the evaluation of the effects of the regulations and the methodology of measuring the related administrative costs. Consequently it supported the efforts of the subsequent presidencies, particularly the British one, to accelerate the implementation of the Better Regulation initiative. It also supported the agreements included in the conclusions of the Competitiveness Council and the ECOFIN regarding the schedule of works for the next several years as regards the initiative.

The informal session of the European Council in Hampton Court on 27 October was one of the most important events in 2005. Poland actively participated in the debates preceding the summit. The Polish government performed a detailed analysis of the communication of the European Commission<sup>11</sup> and shared the opinion of the Commission concerning the challenges which the EU had to face with regard to globalization in such areas as the power policy, migrations, demography, investment in research and development, scientific cooperation and security in its broad sense. Poland supported the Commission's appeal to the Member States to modernize their social security systems in such a manner so as to effectively motivate citizens to take up employment. However, the fact that the Commission's communication failed to mention the appeal to finish the works on the directive regarding services in the internal market, raised the concern of the Polish government.

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<sup>11</sup> Communication of the European Commission *European Values in the Globalized World—Contribution of the European Commission to the October Meeting of Heads of State and Government*, Brussels, 20 October 2005.

Poland was consistent in its opinion, presented both before and during the summit, that in order to live up to the tasks generated by the progressing globalization, it was necessary to finish the construction of the uniform market and use the opportunities offered by the subsequent stages of EU enlargement.

To sum up, it should be noted that the year 2005 was marked by Poland's intensive activity regarding the realization of the Lisbon Strategy goals. To some extent, it was the product of the political agenda of the EU, but also it largely resulted from the priorities of the subsequent governments not only in the European policy, but also in economy and social issues. Since the specific characteristics of Lisbon Strategy implementation process requires joining the competencies of the national states and the Community, Poland presented a constructive standpoint in the discussion, manifesting both the due care for its own interests and flexibility, which is the fundament of cooperation in the EU.

### **Directive on Services in the EU Internal Market**

In 2005 on the forum of the Competitiveness Council and in working groups there was one of the most important initiatives discussed—the draft of the Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on services in the EU internal market. The Luxembourg presidency focused on the technical matters, whereas the British dealt with the most politically sensitive issues of the directive. The draft of the services directive was the main controversy during the session of the European Council in March 2005, especially due to the position of France, which connected the creation of the internal market of services with the necessity to maintain the European social model (included in the conclusions of the Council). In June 2005, the Council acknowledged the report on the progress of works on the draft and confirmed the intention to continue them. Poland was in the group of states supporting the most liberal draft of the directive and those which presented a negative attitude towards the report of the Euro deputy Evelyne Gebhardt, the rapporteur of the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) in the European Parliament. Evelyne Gebhardt proposed changes in many key provisions, e.g. regarding the country of origin. In Poland's opinion, the changes would make the liberalization of the services market impossible in practice.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> On 24 June 2005 the European Committee of the Council of Ministers adopted the government standpoint on the report of Evelyne Gebhardt.

In November 2005 Poland, concerned with the increasingly polarized positions of the Member States resulting in the slower pace of the works in the EU Council, sent to the British and Austrian presidencies as well as to the European Commission a letter of support for the draft of the directive and an appeal to accelerate the works on it. It also supported a similar initiative of Lithuania.

On 22 November 2005, the voting on the draft of the directive took place during a session of the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection. The deputies voted largely in compliance with the suggestions of the European People's Party Group (EPP-ED). As a result, the Committee decided that the country of origin principle would be maintained, but it would be named "freedom to provide services." Amendments were also introduced in the part regarding the establishment of enterprises and in the provisions concerning administrative cooperation. The following were excluded from the directive: games and betting transactions, healthcare services, audiovisual services, tax services and non-economic services of general interest. Services of general interest of economic nature were left in the directive. The Committee did not vote on Article 23 (healthcare services) as well as on Articles 24 and 25 (issues of administrative burdens connected with delegation of employees) of the directive draft.

The results of the voting in the Committee were gladly accepted by Poland and other states supporting the directive, as its main goals and assumptions had been preserved. The country of origin principle was maintained and the number of services excluded from the directive was limited. Consequently, it was a clear success of the states supporting the liberalization of the services market, with Poland among them.

### **Agricultural Policy**

In 2005, the Common Agricultural Policy was dominated by works on the sugar market reform. The discussion on the changes began in June, after the European Commission presented the legal proposals concerning the reform. Poland took a critical standpoint: the goals of the reform were regarded as right, but the indicated manners of achieving them seemed unacceptable. Under pressure exerted by Poland and other new Member States, the Commission as early as in September presented a draft of amendments thanks to which the states applying the so-called SAPS system could grant sugar compensation payments only to farmers growing sugar beets. Many attempts were taken to develop a

joint, beneficial for Poland, standpoint regarding the reform. This resulted, *inter alia*, in the October letter of ministers of agriculture of 11 states. Ultimately, however, Poland did not support the compromise regarding the changes to the sugar regime, adopted in November.

In 2005, a discussion also took place on negotiations on the WTO forum, regarding in particular agricultural issues. Talks on the EU standpoint presented by the European Commission in the WTO were also conducted among Member States, resulting in a joint letter of 14 Member States on the WTO negotiations. Poland was a signatory of the letter.

In November 2005, the Russian veterinary and phytosanitary authorities imposed a ban on the imports of the Polish animal and plant products. Poland took diplomatic steps, also towards the EU institutions, in order to gain support for starting Polish-Russian negotiations aimed at explaining all the objections of the Russian side and the consequent lifting of the ban on export.

### **Free Movement of People**

In 2005, Poland monitored the situation in the labour markets of the EU Member States. Its diplomatic activities and actions taken on the EU forum focused on promoting positive experiences of the Member States which had opened their labour markets (Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom). In February, the Polish prime minister Marek Belka sent a letter to the President of the European Commission J.M. Barroso, in which he suggested earlier preparation of the Commission report on the temporary solutions applied to the free movement of people. One of the effects of the Polish efforts was the Commission's announcement regarding the publication in January 2006 (even before the shortest, two-year interim period elapsed) a communication containing information helpful for Member States in taking decisions on maintaining or eliminating the limitations. Before that, on the basis of the Communication of the European Commission on Social Agenda of 9 February 2005, a high level group was appointed, consisting of Member States representatives. The task of the group was to evaluate the influence of the EU enlargement on the mobility of the EU citizens and the functioning of the interim periods with regard to free movement of people. The results of the group's works were to be the basis for the Commission communication.

An important issue in terms of access to the labour markets of the EU Member States was the discussion on the draft of the directive of the European

Parliament and the Council on the recognition of professional qualifications.<sup>13</sup> Voting on the adoption of the directive during a session of the Council on Employment, the representative of the Polish government also made a declaration for the record regarding the necessity to return to the discussion on the specific regulations regarding Polish nurses and midwives. Efforts were also taken in the talks with the European Commission to recognize the legal and formal possibility of amending the conditions of recognition of the Polish nurses' and midwives' professional qualifications. Upon deciding that such possibilities were offered by Article 9 of the Accession Treaty, formal consultations with the Commission began. Following the suggestions of the Polish nursing community, the Polish government decided to take action against the directive in the European Court of Justice.

### **Freedom, Security and Justice**

In the area of justice and internal security, the European Union focused on developing its abilities to combat terrorism. In December, the European Council adopted the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy<sup>14</sup> and the strategy of combating radicalisation and recruitment into terrorism,<sup>15</sup> as well as the Action Plan complementing the strategies.

The UE Council also began the implementation of The Hague Programme, adopting on 3 June 2005 an action plan for the next five years.<sup>16</sup> This was supplemented by the EU Action Plan on Drugs for 2005–2008. Moreover, a strategy regarding internal actions in the areas of justice and security, complementing The Hague Programme was adopted. The strategy is to ensure better coordination of the activities taken by the EU towards third states with the activities taken within the EU on such issues as preventing terrorism, combating organized crime or migration movement management.

In the area of migration policy most attention was devoted to the crisis in the Mediterranean basin, resulting from the mass inflow of illegal immigrants. A

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<sup>13</sup> Directive 2005/36/EC of 7 September 2005.

<sup>14</sup> Document 14469/4/05 REV4.

<sup>15</sup> Document 14469/4/05 REV4.

<sup>16</sup> Communication of the European Commission of 10 May 2005 *The Hague Programme: Ten Priorities for the Next Five Years. The Partnership for European Renewal in the Field of Freedom, Security and Justice*, [http://ec.europa.eu/justice\\_home/news/information\\_dossiers/the\\_hague\\_priorities/doc/com\\_2005\\_184\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/information_dossiers/the_hague_priorities/doc/com_2005_184_en.pdf).

strategy of combating illegal immigration on the southern EU border was developed in cooperation with the states of northern Africa. During a session of 15–16 December 2005, the European Council adopted the Commission communication of 30 November entitled *Priority actions for responding to the challenges of migration* and approved a document annexed to the conclusions of the presidency, entitled *Global Approach to Migration: Priority actions focusing on Africa and the Mediterranean*. The positions of Poland, Germany and Lithuania were taken into account regarding the migration being a basic element of the EU relations with many third states, including those in the neighbouring regions of the EU (states of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, which Poland wanted to be included in the group, and the Mediterranean basin). The necessity of allocating appropriate financial resources to the related policies was noted too. The document emphasised that the EU would strengthen cooperation on migration with all those states in the spirit of partnership and would take specific characteristics of those states into account.

In 2005, negotiations with Russia on short-term visas for citizens of Russia and the EU were ended by signing an agreement. The negotiations with Ukraine began regarding a similar understanding.

Poland ended the adaptation process indicated in the Council Regulation (EC) 539/2001. In spite of intense diplomatic efforts, the United States, Canada and Australia were not persuaded to eliminate the visa obligation for citizens of Poland. In 2005, the issue was an important element of the discussion between the EU and Canada. In the joint declaration adopted on 19 June 2005 during the EU-Canada summit in Niagara-on-the-Lake the two sides undertook to continue the dialogue on the subject. Nevertheless, in spite of the high level of activity of Poland and other new Member States as well as the involvement of the European Commission, neither the United States nor Canada decided to lift the visa obligation. Only the Australian authorities—in response to Poland's lifting the visa obligation for Australians—on 1 November 2005 introduced visa arrangements for citizens of new EU Member States. According to the new regulations, persons who have confirmed air travel reservation to another country, do not leave the transit zone and their stay in the airport does not exceed 8 hours are not obliged to have a visa.

A considerable success, resulting from the lobbying action conducted by the Polish authorities, administration and diplomacy, was the EU Council taking the decision in April 2005 to place the seat of the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex) in Warsaw. One of the most important

tasks of the EU is developing uniform standards of protecting the external borders of the Union as soon as possible. Poland intends to play an active role in this project.

### **Common Foreign and Security Policy**

Stronger and more dynamic cooperation with its eastern neighbours was a priority for Poland in 2005. Poland acts to promote the European Neighbourhood Policy, e.g. by making the policies concerning various regions distinct within the Policy. It was most active in discussions on developing the so-called eastern dimension of the Neighbourhood Policy as a mechanism which would coordinate activities within the policy along with manners of using its instruments and platforms of regional cooperation. Poland supported the development of long-term relations between the EU and the states of Eastern Europe with pro-European aspirations, particularly Ukraine and Moldova. It also strove to continue talks on the relations between the EU and Belarus as well as on the perspectives of the development of their mutual relations.

Another very important aspect of the EU relations with its neighbouring states was the discussion on the new European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, which as of 2007 is to replace all the present forms of supporting the states included in the European Neighbourhood Policy and Russia. Poland acted to eliminate the imbalance of support which the EU plans to offer to individual neighbouring regions.

In EU-Russian relations, the most important events of 2005 included finalising (in May) the works on the agreement on the so-called four common spaces of cooperation (and Russia accepted the concept of the spaces being treated as a package) and ending the negotiations on the agreements regarding visa facilitations and readmission (the EU negotiated to have both the agreements enter into force at the same time). In the second half of 2005 the European Union began talks with the Russian Federation on the future of the mutual formal and legal relations after 2007.

Poland actively participated in the process of establishing the strategic partnership of the EU and Russia. Action plans in the “four spaces”: the economy, internal security and freedom, scientific research, education and culture, will be its basis in the near future. The largest importance was attached to having the EU-Russian Federation cooperation based on the common values applied in the Union. An important element of the cooperation was intensifying the dialogue regarding the power sector. Representatives of Poland actively

participated in the discussion on the possibilities of improving the conditions of cooperation between the Kaliningrad Oblast and the EU.

The new authorities of Ukraine elected in December 2004 unanimously declared that Ukraine's membership in the EU was their strategic goal. The Union expressed its support for the foreign policy of that state, indicating at the same time that it intended to cooperate with it mainly in the formula of privileged partnership within the European Neighbourhood Policy. Already at the session of the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 31 January 2005, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana presented proposals regarding cooperation between the EU and Ukraine. The goal of the proposals was to lead to the Action Plan being thoroughly used, to intensify and deepen mutual relations and to send a clear signal on the part of the EU that there was a will to cooperate. Polish representative to the session approved of the proposal of Javier Solana, but he also emphasised that there was a necessity to make the EU offer more specific and that financial resources of the TACIS programme should be allocated to Ukraine. He also appealed for long-term goals to be specified. He expressed an opinion that the offer presented might seem insufficient to the Ukrainian authorities, and consequently it should be developed during the session of the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council already in February, immediately after the next session of the EU ministers of foreign affairs.

On 21 February 2005, during the meeting of the General Affairs and External Relations Council, the following obligations towards Ukraine were undertaken:

- starting consultations on replacing after 10 years the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with a broader accord, based on the priorities of the Action Plan within the European Neighbourhood Policy;
- analysis of the possibilities of starting closer cooperation in foreign policy and security;
- deepening trade and economic relations;
- support for Ukraine's efforts to join the World Trade Organization;
- ensuring Ukraine's status as a market economy state after settling the controversial issues;
- supporting the process of uniformization of law, *inter alia* by technical assistance and twin cooperation.

This was followed by the Cooperation Council adopting a detailed Action Plan thanks to which the general goals included in the conclusions of the General Affairs and External Relations Council could be implemented. Ukraine was obliged to provide regular information on the progress of the Plan. EU and Ukraine will jointly evaluate the progress—for the first time—in September 2005.

At the sessions of ministers of foreign affairs, representatives of Poland drew attention to the fact that general proposals included in the conclusions draft had to be translated into specific projects, as this would be a signal for the Ukrainian society that the EU was open to cooperation. They emphasised the need to develop cooperation at all levels and increase EU technical assistance in the implementation of Ukrainian reforms. On 15 March 2005, Poland presented to Ukraine a rich offer of cooperation and expert assistance. The offer included specific proposals regarding all areas of administration made by the authorities of the individual Polish ministries, ready to provide the assistance of experts and share their knowledge and experience of the time when Poland introduced reforms and prepared itself for membership in the EU. The proposals were received with interest by the Ukrainian side (the cooperation programme is to be made more specific in the process of bilateral contacts). In June 2005 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued its approval to the pool of assistance funds amounting to PLN 2 million within the programmes implemented by NGOs. Poland also initiated cooperation between the states of the Weimar Triangle, Visegrad Group and Ukraine.

Poland's involvement in the resolution of the Ukrainian political conflict clearly helped both the dynamization of the relations between the EU and Ukraine, and strengthened Poland's political position. Many Polish proposals were included in the conclusions of the EU Council. From February to December, when the EU-Ukraine summit took place, almost all decisions included in the conclusions were implemented, i.e. negotiations started on the agreement on visa facilitations and readmission, Ukraine was granted the status of a market economy and the monitoring of borders with Transnistria began.<sup>17</sup>

In 2005, efforts to break the stagnation in EU-Belarusian relations failed. The conclusions of the EU Council, adopted in November, mainly thanks to

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<sup>17</sup> EU BAM Moldova/Ukraine—European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine. On 7 October 2005 the Memorandum of Understanding in the issue was signed. On 1 December 2005 the mission was officially opened.

Poland's initiative did not lead to significant changes in the attitude of Belarus or in the EU policy. The success in this area involved increasing funds to support civil society in Belarus and convincing the EU partners to treat the oncoming presidential elections in this country as an event of special importance. Thanks to the efforts and activity of the Polish minister of foreign affairs, the conclusions of the Council session included a reference to the repressions against the Union of Poles in Belarus, which was a considerable political success. Poland played an important role during the session of the Council in February 2005, strengthening its position as a state with a significant contribution to the shape of the eastern policy of the EU. A positive effect of Poland's activity was the increased EU interest in the situation in Belarus and the start of a debate on activating the EU policy towards that state. Poland unanimously emphasised the need to increase the pressure on the Belarusian authorities (visa sanctions) and the necessity to present an offer of closer cooperation with the EU at the same time (European Neighbourhood Policy, visa facilitations for representatives of the civil society).

The European Commission continued its activities within the European Neighbourhood Policy. The preliminary stage of implementation of the Action Plans in Ukraine and Moldova was positively evaluated. In the second half of the year, the Commission, having the mandate of the Council, began consultations on Action Plans with Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

In relations with Moldova the most important events of 2005 included: the appointment of a special EU representative for Moldova, commencing the EU BAM Moldova/Ukraine operation and Union's participation in five-party negotiations on resolving the conflict in Transnistria.

As regards the EU relations with the Transcaucasia states, starting consultations on Action Plans was of major significance. The problem in the bilateral Cypriot–Azeri relations and the consequent arrangement regarding Action Plans being blocked by Cyprus resulted in the discussion being delayed for several weeks. However, the compromise proposals of Poland helped break the impasse, as they were supported by the EU Member States and resulted in the decision to start the consultations with three states of the region at the same time.

In 2005, the EU intensified its activities towards Central Asia. In the summer, a special EU representative for Central Asia was appointed. The Union took a very decided standpoint towards the events in Andijan, demanding the consent of Uzbekistan for international investigation and introducing visa

sanctions as well as an embargo on deliveries of weapons. The dialogue with Kyrgyzstan developed well. As regards Kazakhstan, Poland raised the issue of including the state in the realization of the projects of Caspian oil deliveries to Europe (via the Odessa–Brody pipeline).

Upon accession, Poland actively joined the EU policy towards Mediterranean states and Middle East. In 2005, the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Barcelona Process was celebrated. Poland's efforts focused on having a comprehensive analysis conducted with regards to the actions taken towards deepening the cooperation of the EU with partners in this part of the world. Poland also supported the idea of developing the EU Action Plans for Mediterranean states included in the European Neighbourhood Policy. However, the November summit in Barcelona did not result in a breakthrough in the EU relations with Mediterranean partners.

Poland actively participated in the EU development policy, contributing to the fulfilment of international obligations of Doha, Monterrey and Johannesburg.

There increased Poland's participation in the EU works undertaken to develop relations with the states of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, *inter alia* under the Cotonou Agreement. Poland supported activities aimed at supporting the cooperation with the states of the African Union and the African subregional organizations such as ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development), SADC (Southern African Development Community) or EAC (East African Community). The cooperation offers Poland a chance to increase its economic growth and security as well as its importance in the international arena.

In the Common European Security and Defence Policy, Poland's challenges of 2005 included its participation in the creation of EU combat groups and attempts to ensure the compatibility of projects involving the groups and NATO Response Forces. Poland actively supported the close cooperation between the EU and NATO already at the early stages of the works in order to promote the possibility of developing joint standards and concepts of development for both units.

In the scope of developing the civilian crisis response capabilities of the EU Poland continued works on increasing its participation in reconnaissance and monitoring missions as well as in large-scale operations.

## EU Enlargement

The year abounded with important events regarding the EU enlargement process by subsequent states. On 25 April, in Luxembourg ministers of foreign affairs of the EU, Bulgaria and Romania signed the Accession Treaty. Thus the negotiations regarding the terms of membership of the two states in the EU were ultimately ended. At the same time the states faced the necessity to prove their full readiness for the membership. This will be controlled by the European Commission on an ongoing basis in regular monitoring reports and with the use of the so-called monitoring tables. The Commission's recommendations will be of primary importance in 2006 when the EU takes a decision on the date of Bulgarian and Romanian accession to the Union. The so-called safeguard clauses introduced to the Accession Treaty are to be an additional element motivating the Candidate Countries to accelerate the adaptation process, particularly in the areas of such importance as justice and home affairs or preparation for the functioning in the EU internal market.<sup>18</sup>

Poland's activity in the area of the EU enlargement in 2005 focused on opening accession negotiations with Turkey and Croatia.

One of the important prerequisites of the decision of the European Council in December 2004 on determining the date to start the accession negotiations with Turkey was the declaration of the latter that it was willing to sign—even before the opening of the negotiations—the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement (in force from 31 December 1995), under which a customs union was to be established between the EU and Turkey. Signing the document was of considerable political importance, as the Republic of Cyprus was also included in it. On 28 March 2005 the Turkish government submitted a letter to the

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<sup>18</sup> The Accession Treaty of Romania and Bulgaria contains four safeguard clauses. Apart from three protective clauses, included also in the Athens Treaty of 2003 (regarding the economic situation, functioning of the internal market as well as justice and internal affairs), Article 39 of the Protocol concerning the Conditions and Arrangements for Admission of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union and Article 39 of the Act concerning the Conditions of Admission of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania and adaptation in the treaties which constitute the basis of the EU, a specific clause was contained under which the date of the accession to the EU of the given state might be postponed by a year in the case of considerable delays in the preparations for adoption and implementation of the *acquis* by one or both of the states and their failing to meet the requirements of membership in a number of important areas on 1 January 2007. The decision to apply the clause may be taken by the Council unanimously on the basis of the recommendation of the European Commission. However, with regard to the Romanian obligations concerning justice and internal affairs as well as competition policy, the clause may be applied pursuant to the Council decision taken by qualified majority.

European Commission in which it declared its intention to sign the Protocol. Turkey finally signed it on 29 July 2005 by exchange of letters. At the same time, Turkey made a declaration to the EU regarding Cyprus. It firmly announced that signing, ratification and implementation of the Protocol were not to mean Turkey's recognizing the Republic of Cyprus in its present shape and did not influence Turkey's rights and obligations following from earlier agreements regarding Cyprus. In response, the EU Member States during an informal meeting of ministers of foreign affairs in Newport on 1–2 September 2005 decided to announce a counter-declaration, which took place on 21 September 2005, during a session of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER II). The counter-declaration contained a provision that recognizing all EU Member States was an indispensable element of the negotiation process. The final decision on starting accession negotiations with Turkey was taken by the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 3 October 2005, after a long discussion, following mainly from objections of Austria, which demanded amendments in the documents specifying terms of the negotiations.

Starting accession negotiations with Turkey matches the Polish vision of EU enlargement, both due to the implications of the further integration process, and to the historic importance of the event. It was clear that the negotiations would be difficult because of the nature of the controversial issues between the Turkish side and the EU, concerning *inter alia* the unsettled Cyprus problem, Greek-Turkish border conflicts, the unsatisfactory situation regarding respect for human rights and the rights of national minorities in Turkey. Poland was against obliging Turkey to satisfy additional requirements before opening the accession negotiations, as it believed that problem issues should also be included in the negotiations.

In compliance with the conclusions of the European Council session of December 2004, accession negotiations with Croatia were to start on 17 March 2005. However, on 16 March the Council of the European Union decided that due to the state's failure to fully cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), conditions to start the negotiations as scheduled were not satisfied. During the session on 22–23 March the European Council took a decision to appoint a task group to monitor the cooperation of Croatia with the Tribunal. On the basis of the opinion of Prosecutor Carla del Ponte, expressed in a letter of 7 June, the EU Council decided in the conclusions of the session of 13 June that the Intergovernmental Conference and accession

negotiations would start under the condition that full cooperation of that state with the Tribunal would be found.

Poland emphasized that the process of Croatia's integration with EU structures would be a factor stabilizing the situation in the West Balkan region and mobilizing neighbouring states of Croatia to strengthen democracy and intensify internal reforms. Poland supported the decision of the Council pursuant to which the accession negotiations with Croatia may be started under the condition of full cooperation of the state with the Tribunal. The actions taken by the Croatian authorities, such as freezing the assets of general A. Gotovina, were regarded as positive. It was also noted that the EU policy pursued so far and its consistence in maintaining the conditionality principle was beginning to bring effects: persons charged with committing war crimes were left at the disposal of The Hague Tribunal or reported to the Tribunal out of their own will. Consequently, maintaining the EU standpoint was regarded as necessary, particularly as the decision taken towards one state would influence the EU relations with the whole of the region, as well as the pace and quality of the changes taking place there with regard to the adoption of the European standards.

Due to the positive evaluation presented on 3 October by Prosecutor del Ponte, the EU Council took the decision to start negotiations with Croatia. Poland supported the decision.

According to the European Security Strategy, the West Balkans remained a priority area of the EU external activities in 2005. In the second half of the year the Union took numerous decisions important for the future of the region: opening accession negotiations with Croatia, granting the status of a Candidate Country to the Republic of Macedonia, starting negotiations on the Stabilization and Association Agreement with Serbia and Montenegro together with Bosnia and Herzegovina. The progress achieved by those states was possible thanks to the mobilization of their reforming efforts, stimulated with the "conditionality policy" pursued by the EU in order to bring the states closer to the European structures.

Poland supported the EU activities leading to the EU integration with West Balkan states (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as well as Serbia and Montenegro), by, *inter alia*, implementing the Action Plans for the states of the region adopted in 2004. Moreover, Poland actively participated in the military and police missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania.

In recognition of its progress in the realization of the Ohrid Agreement and the provisions of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, Macedonia—pursuant to the decision of the European Council of December 2005—obtained the status of an EU Candidate Country. Poland supported the decision, which on the one hand was to encourage Macedonia to continue the political and economic reforms, strengthen its administration and adapt the national law to the EU legislation, and on the other, it was a manifestation of the EU policy towards the West Balkans.

In 2005, Albania continued negotiations regarding the Stabilisation and Association Agreement as well as implementation of reforms according to the recommendations of the European Partnership. In spite of the critical evaluation issued by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) regarding the manner in which parliamentary elections in Albania were conducted in July 2005, at the beginning of 2006 the European Commission decided to recommend to the EU Council that the Agreement with Albania be signed.

The EU was also involved in the affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In December 2005, amendments to the mandate of the special EU representative for these states were introduced.

In the autumn of 2005 Serbia and Montenegro, thanks to the positive opinion of the European Commission, started negotiations regarding the Stabilisation and Association Agreement. The main obstacle on their road to the EU is their insufficient cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The EU is preparing to increase its involvement in Montenegro, which was indicated by the appointment of Ambassador Miroslav Lajčák at the position of the personal representative of Secretary General Javier Solana, the High Representative for Montenegro. The situation in Kosovo, on the other hand, is becoming the most important element of the EU policy towards the West Balkans.

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The year 2005 was a difficult period not only for Poland as a new Member State, but also for the whole European Union. Participation in debates on such vital issues as the New Financial Perspective, the future of the Constitution Treaty or the analysis of the Lisbon Strategy assumptions was an enormous challenge for Poland, but also a confirmation that it is already capable of

deciding on the most important issues of the Union and consequently of influencing the development of the European continent and its well-being.

In the internal dimension the first period of membership should be primarily evaluated in terms of the economic benefits, as they are particularly visible: export has definitely increased along with the level of direct investment, the Polish currency has become stronger and inflation has declined, which was accompanied by an acceleration in the modernization process of Polish companies. The situation improved for farmers and persons who seek and find employment in the states which opened their labour markets for Poland, as well as for students and scientists, who study and conduct research in the most prestigious universities of the Union. The importance of Poland and of the opinions expressed by Poland on the international arena also grew.

The societies of the “old” Member States have a somewhat different opinion on the effects of the enlargement. In 2005, these states experienced serious internal problems, which they often identified with the acceptance of the “new,” less economically developed states. Consequently, the internal debate in the EU had to concentrate on the elements which would ensure its effective functioning in the new, broader group of members. In the discussion on the Lisbon Strategy or the New Financial Perspective the issue of primary importance was realizing one of the fundamental ideas of the European Union—also from Poland’s viewpoint—i.e. the idea of solidarity. The difficult economic situation, particularly in three large Member States: Germany, France and Italy, as well as the recent political instability connected with the pre- and post-electoral periods in several EU Member States did not make the discussion any easier.

Also in international relations the year 2005 was full of events towards which the European Union could not remain passive. Terrorism became stronger, which could be observed after the attacks in Madrid and London, the situation in the Middle East, Iraq and Iran, as well as in Africa, became more serious. The European Union had to face such important problems as the massive inflow of illegal immigrants, particularly from Africa, and fighting with the effects of natural disasters. Nevertheless, it was in external relations that the EU achieved the most, e.g. considerably improved transatlantic relations, successively made the European Security and Defence Policy more operational, increased its involvement in Asia and Africa, and created more effective mechanisms of combating terrorism. Moreover, the EU took its decisions regarding the start of the accession negotiations with Turkey and Croatia, which in the context of the unfavourable atmosphere around the further EU enlargement was a breakthrough event.

The most distinct example of the difficulties which the European Union encountered in 2005 was the rejection of the Constitution Treaty in the referenda in France and the Netherlands. The fact that it occurred in two founder states made the symbolic importance of this event even greater. Such a decision taken by the societies of the two states was not so much an expression of their unfavourable attitude towards the Treaty itself, but a reflection of a number of disadvantageous phenomena connected with the economic situation and the problems in the labour markets. A deepened discussion on the shape of the European integration in the face of globalization proved necessary. The EU leaders initiated the debate during the October summit in Hampton Court.

According to the expectations of Member States, the year 2006 should be marked with the European Union seeking ways to face the challenges of globalization, improve the competitiveness of the EU economy and strengthen its role in the world. Poland will actively participate in the efforts towards achieving these goals, treating the power sector policy and the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy as priorities. Due to the increasing scepticism regarding further EU enlargement, Polish foreign policy will face the difficult task of defending the pro-enlargement direction of the EU in the general debate on the pace of the enlargement, its terms and the borders of Europe. Stimulating the discussion on the future of the EU in Poland will require considerable effort, particularly after the decision on prolonging the “reflection period” and the formal prolongation of the Constitution treaty ratification.

However, the Polish strategy of the EU membership in 2006 should be based on making the best possible use of the available financial instruments of the Union, and promoting activities which strengthen the EU internal market, with particular attention paid to the necessity of eliminating the existing barriers in the free movement of people and services.

## Major Aspects of Poland's Security Policy

In 2005, the major directions of Polish security policy did not change. In the trans-Atlantic dimension, significant priority continued to be given to cooperation within the structures of NATO and the strengthening of the partnership with the U.S. Thus, the participation of Polish soldiers in alliance and coalition peace operations and in stability missions should be considered from such a point of view. In the European arena, the role of the European Union has been strengthened, and particularly Poland's activity within the European Security and Defence Policy. However, as lengthy trans-Atlantic debates and arguments had a negative impact on the quality of works within NATO and the EU, it was objectively more difficult to carry out our security policy in its institutional aspect. New opportunities for cooperation with our European partners did emerge, however, in particular within the Weimar Triangle, the Visegrad Group and with the Baltic states.

In general, conditions for the implementation of Polish foreign and security policy were favourable. A relatively stable international environment was only troubled by the activities of the Belarus authorities against their own citizens (including the Polish minority) and the growing authoritarian nature of Alexander Lukashenko's rule that made it impossible to democratise the country and open it up to the world. Poland followed closely Russia's foreign and internal policy, including its activities within international organisations. We were concerned in particular by the tough criticism addressed by Moscow toward Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

In late 2005, as the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict came up, the problem of the state's energy security has re-emerged. It has been considered from two different points of view: first, from the economic one (the structure of commodity markets, security of the supply of energy and diversification of its sources), second, from the point of view of cooperation between states (including problems of the security of transit networks, trade routes and storage

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places, as well as the attitude and solidarity of countries when faced with the behaviour of major energy suppliers using their export policy as an instrument of foreign policy). In the global arena, the problem has been exacerbated by the fact that most of the energy sources are controlled by non-democratic states. These reasons, as well as the pursuit of solidarity by our allies in the EU and NATO, were decisive in Poland submitting its concept of settling the area of energy security in Europe. Its details will be developed in 2006.

In 2005, Poland continued to participate in the stability, military and civilian missions of NATO, the EU and the UN, as well as in *ad hoc* coalitions. In this period, however, plans of changing the form of our presence in peace operations and modernising the Polish defence system began to take shape. The Strategic Defence Review continued to be worked on, and it is to be finished in the first half of 2006. Activities aimed at legal settling of crisis management issues were undertaken, including improvements in mechanisms of coordination of operations intended for counteracting threats of various kinds. There has been announced the commencement of works on a new legal act—the act on national security—as well as on updating the Strategy of National Security of the Republic of Poland.

Poland continued to support mechanisms of conventional arms control, coordinating its policy in this respect with its NATO allies. It participated in OSCE activities and emphasised its own security interests within the United Nations. Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remained the subject of our interest. Poland, supporting the traditional set of instruments of non-proliferation within the United Nations system, clearly marked its presence in new initiatives as well, e.g. in the Cracow Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Three years of cooperation strengthened the position of our country as a regional leader in the Initiative.

Autumn 2005 saw presidential and parliamentary elections from which a new government emerged. President Lech Kaczyński as well as the government of Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz announced a general continuation of strategic directions of the Polish security policy, though they prioritised differently. The governmental programme distinguished the following areas as its priority:

- equivalence, interdependence and mutual strengthening of Poland's membership in the EU and NATO with Poland's relations with the United States (also via development of the strategic dialogue),
- support for the NATO ambitions of Ukraine,

- participation of Polish troops in the humanitarian mission in Pakistan, as a test for the newly created rapid reaction forces of NATO,
- maintaining Poland's readiness to participate in the US missile defence system (MD), including demonstrations of interest in the possible inclusion of Poland in the system of radar detection and destruction of the enemy's missiles,
- Poland's participation in shaping the EU's Eastern policy,
- the future of our military presence in Iraq,
- energy security,
- development and modernisation of Polish armed forces, *inter alia* in the aspect of their interoperability,
- preparations for new tasks to be undertaken by Poland in Afghanistan as part of the ISAF mission under command of NATO.<sup>1</sup>

### **The Trans-Atlantic Dimension**

In the trans-Atlantic arena, Polish security policy focused on three major problems.

Firstly, NATO membership. Poland made great efforts in strengthening NATO as an effective instrument for the collective defence of its member states and as a major forum for mutual consultations. Though an improvement in the political climate in trans-Atlantic relations favoured such an effort, the work of the Alliance lacked a deeper reflection on the role of NATO and the international tasks of the organisation in the present security conditions. In the past year, still without a new strategy and adequate resources, without any form of reflection about its cooperation with outside partners and its responsibility for global security, the Alliance was involved in military operations reaching far beyond its area of responsibility. Apart from operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq that have been going on for some time, in 2005 a decision was made to undertake a humanitarian operation in Pakistan and a mission of support for the African Union in Sudan. Poland was one of the participants in all the missions, though in each of them to a varying extent.

There is nothing strange, therefore, that in such conditions more and more countries began to ask openly whose interests and what kind of threat are forcing them to participate in operations of a global scale. These dilemmas also resulted

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<sup>1</sup> *Solidarne państwo. Program działania rządu premiera Kazimierza Marcinkiewicza*, Warsaw, 9 November 2005. Cf. [www.kprm.gov.pl](http://www.kprm.gov.pl).

from the rapidly growing costs of participation in missions on areas distant from NATO territory. In relation to all this, two major strategic visions of NATO's development were running through the discussions in the Alliance:

a global vision, according to which NATO is supposed to be a tool that would promote stability, democracy and freedom outside the Euro-Atlantic area (supported primarily by the US and the UK), and

a traditional vision, in which NATO is perceived as an organisation focused on its present geographic area and, first of all, on missions of a military character, which from the perspective of France and some other European followers of this vision constitute a platform for constructive trans-Atlantic cooperation. These countries would like to leave activities aimed at fostering development and those related to so-called soft aspects of security, to the European Union cooperating with the United States.

Poland also had those doubts. It shared the American vision of NATO—though in a slightly more selective approach, considering costs and its own limitations—as it had a similar perception of threats. When it comes to principle, however, Poland did not see any necessity of limiting the scope of the mission of the Alliance, seeing the source of their legitimisation in the decisions of the UN Security Council or (in cases justified by requirements of collective defence) by the North Atlantic Council. An agreement among allies sets out NATO's operational capabilities and it guarantees the joint implementation of their decisions, without the necessity of using the organisation as a “toolbox” by narrower “coalitions of the willing parties.” The option of using the Alliance preferred by Poland is related to loyal, collective action. This is why the Polish standpoint contains an appeal to deepen the cooperation of NATO with other institutional partners, first of all the European Union. The purpose would be to divide tasks better and to better harmonise modernisation efforts, necessary to face the present security challenges.

On the other hand, the understanding that NATO does not have to have a monopoly on all types of operations carried out without geographical limitations, made our standpoint closer to those who contest the new vision of NATO. The selection of areas of involvement and of the type of tasks undertaken should be done through political discussion of interested states, a rational division of tasks between other actors of the international stage and the will to cooperate with external partners.

It does not seem highly probable that NATO would soon reflect on its new strategic position. Objectively, the meetings of heads of states and governments

planned for 2006 and 2008 could be a good opportunity for such a reflection. Both of the meetings are intended to focus on key issues concerning the future of the Alliance. The topic of the first of them will focus on the transformation and operations undertaken, and of the second one—on the external relations and partnership. At both summits, basic conditions for a more decisive entrance of NATO into the domain of more broadly defined policy and strategy should be outlined. The most important practical achievements of the organisation should also be summed up, which is perceived by the opponents of a prompt commencement of the strategic debate as a necessary condition to agree upon a new strategy concept. The second NATO summit will fall at the end of terms of the presidents of France and the U.S., the two major protagonists of the trans-Atlantic dispute. It will also fall on the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the establishment of NATO, which should be an occasion for summaries, specifying plans for the future and active public diplomacy. Thus, the upcoming events encourage constructive thinking of a new strategy.

A major part of Poland's activities within NATO was strengthening ties with Ukraine. As a result, thanks to Poland's efforts, to a large extent, the decision on the commencement of an Intensified Dialogue with Ukraine for its membership in the Alliance, was announced in April 2005. Such a dialogue precedes the signing of the so-called Membership Action Plan (MAP) by Ukraine. There is a chance that the relevant decision would be made in 2006 (after the March parliamentary elections). This would mean in practice that Ukraine would be granted a candidate status for NATO membership. The signing of the MAP depends, first of all, on the consistent implementation of political reforms by the new Ukrainian government and the will to continue and further develop its present cooperation with the Alliance. Decisions made by the Foreign Ministers of the NATO states on December 2005 confirm (though conditionally) the plausibility of the sequence of events outlined above. Poland believes that if the pro-Western direction of the Ukrainian politics is sustained, it will be possible to invite Ukraine to become a member as early as on the NATO summit in Lisbon in 2008.

A second aspect of the Polish trans-Atlantic security policy is its involvement in the global anti-terrorist campaign, in which the most important task was Poland's participation in efforts for the stabilisation of Iraq and in operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan carried out under NATO auspices. Poland continued to maintain its armed forces in Iraq and to command a multinational division. A decrease in size of our contingent in Iraq at the turn of 2005 was due to improvement of security situation in the Polish sector and the

government's decision on changing the profile of Polish military presence in the country. In the following months, a number of tasks related to the training of local security forces will grow, and the number of traditional military tasks will decrease. In 2006, strategic decisions on the scale of the Polish presence in Iraq and on its character should be expected.

The operation of ISAF force in Afghanistan is considered to be a priority mission of the Alliance and its major contribution to the anti-terrorist campaign. In 2005, the scope of the mission was broadened to the Southern provinces of the country. Poland maintained its symbolic share in ISAF (officers delegated to operating the Kabul airport) and in a parallel coalition operation "Enduring Freedom" (100-person engineering troops). Poland's involvement in Afghanistan will increase in 2007, when the takeover of command over ISAF force by the command (which will be Polish at that time) of Multinational Corps Northeast from Szczecin is planned. According to the primary plans, the Polish mission in Afghanistan was to last 6 months, and around 700 of our soldiers were to participate. At the end of 2005, however, the structure of this mission was questioned as a result of a discussion on a new concept of command over the Alliance forces. As a result, plans to increase the Polish presence in the country remain in force, but the size of our contingent will change (decrease) and, probably, the scope of its tasks as well.

In line with the decision of the Alliance, a part of the NATO Response Force (NRF) was sent to tackle the effects of an earthquake in Pakistan on October 8, 2005. A Polish engineering company (139 soldiers) joined the Force. Its tasks were the reconstruction of road and social infrastructure and providing assistance to civilians. This mission had an innovative character and brought experience that would prove important for NATO's military transformation. It demonstrated that there are new capabilities that stability mission troops should possess, as well as broad opportunities for the use of the Alliance's Response Force. Moreover, it demonstrated that there exists a need for the Alliance—of vital importance for Poland as well—to decide on how to finance such kinds of activities. The approach that has been applied so far, the so-called "costs lie where they fall" formula, means that costs should be incurred exclusively by the countries, whose troops participate in the operations. Thus, there is a need to create mechanisms of reimbursement of expenses for NATO operational needs.

A more general issue emerges from this background: the concept of the future use of the NRF. In the opinion of some member states, including Poland, the NATO Response Force should be treated as elite troops and be used solely in complex large-scale anti-crisis operations. One-off humanitarian operations,

such as the one in Pakistan, should be carried out in a different manner. The troops, trained and prepared with a lot of effort and resources, should not be divided and directed to participate in lesser-scale activities on an ad hoc basis solely for the reason of being "at hand." The paradox of the situation lies in NRF being the sole NATO force able to be moved rapidly and to undertake operational tasks. Under the time-pressure, with the prospect of a humanitarian disaster and human suffering and in case of expectations of the activity of the Alliance, calculations in terms of expenditure and benefits are of lesser importance. There is no doubt that a lack of decision on the above-mentioned issues may lower the political readiness of member states to participate in further rotations of the NRF.

The third aspect of Polish Atlantic security policy is the development of strategic relations in this respect with the U.S. Apart from Polish participation in operations in Iraq, these relations included: regular political and military consultations (among others, being a part of the strategic dialogue at the higher level), the use of American models, advice and assistance funds in the modernisation of the Polish armed forces and the dialogue on the American missile defence project. In the latter case, no binding decision, neither in Warsaw nor in Washington, was made in 2005. Though there have appeared some signals that demonstrate the will to make a final decision on the issue of deployment of this new element of the MD system in Europe by the end of 2006. They spurred a public debate in Poland on the possible benefits and problems resulting from Polish-American cooperation in this domain. A new area of systematic cooperation with the U.S. is the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The initiatives, dispersed so far, have been brought together within an action plan created under the auspices of a special group composed of experts from both countries.

### **Other Institutional Aspects of Polish Security Policy**

Within the European Security and Defence Policy, issues that had a significant priority for Poland were: an improvement in military and civilian abilities in crisis response, involvement in the Balkans, EU-NATO relations and the dialogue with Eastern Europe states (including with Ukraine).

2005 was the first full year of Poland's EU membership, and thus in the European debate on the EU's role in international security policy. Most of the topics mentioned above have been underway since 2004, when relevant decisions were made. Issues of vital importance were the preparations to create a

Polish-German-Slovak-Latvian Battle Group and the building of an institutional and legal base for a more extensive participation of our country in the EU's civilian anti-crisis operations. Much attention was paid by Poland to cooperation between NATO and the EU—both in the institutional dimension (political dialogue and consultations) and in respect of harmonisation of efforts by the two organisations in the development of anti-crisis response capabilities—both civilian and military.

2005 saw little developments in the latter issue. That has been the case since the EU took over the Alliance SFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the formal sense, this resulted from the veto of Turkey against the participation of Cyprus and Malta in joint meetings of NATO and the EU which, officially, was related to the fact that both countries did not conclude an agreement on the protection of confidential information with the Alliance. That resulted in a situation where full members of the EU could not participate in the meetings of the two organisations. The real problem is deeper, though, and is related to the interests of some of the European states, hostile to the idea of extending the cooperation with NATO beyond the “Berlin plus” mechanism (at least until the EU's abilities in the domain of security and defence become established). Numerous attempts to break the above-mentioned stalemate, undertaken in the recent months, have failed.

The NATO-EU operational cooperation in the Balkans, on the other hand, where as part of the EU operation, Poland maintains a 250-strong military contingent, is going smoothly.

The harmonisation of the development of defence abilities of NATO and the EU within the programmes they carried out in parallel, was supervised by the joint Defence Capability Group. In 2005, works on the establishment of the EU liaison office with the European NATO headquarters and an Alliance liaison unit with the EU Military Staff, were finished.

The cohesive and conflict-free implementation of the concept of EU Battle Groups and the NATO Response Force will be of vital importance for their future operational cooperation. This cooperation is also needed due to the existence of similar problems of the two military structures, for example, in respect of, the decision-making process on new operations or their financing.

A natural domain of the cooperation between NATO and the EU is civil-military cooperation limited, however, by the above-mentioned formal and political problems. Breaking the institutional stalemate in the mutual relations of

the Alliance and the EU is being called for by Poland, which is not interested in any form of competition between these two organisations.

Poland invariably perceives the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe as an important centre of preventive diplomacy, of conflict-resolution and stabilisation in the Euro-Atlantic area. Thus, it was traditionally active in all the three operational dimensions of this organisation (political-military, economic and human).

In 2005, a basic shape of the process called "the OSCE reform" was outlined. Not all the participating countries, however, identified it with the strengthening of the operation of this organisation. Poland actively participated in programme discussions (including Warsaw hosting the members of the so-called high-level panel, working on guiding recommendations that preceded the December decisions of Foreign Ministers). An important place where Poland sought support for its standpoint in the OSCE case was the European Union. The core of Polish activities was to maintain the achievements of OSCE and strengthen its operations in the so-called human dimension, comprising a broad scope of undertakings related to giving support to the processes of democratisation, promoting civic freedoms and the rule of law on the territory of the OSCE countries. Poland cares about the autonomy of major OSCE mechanisms and institutions being maintained, first of all of the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (and maintaining its operating centre in Warsaw). It also tried to prevent the fact that the policy of budget savings, in line with the proposals of more centralised operations of the organisation (which is to be a less expensive solution than the present one) and contradictory demands of member states in this respect, worsen the organisation's ability to act.

The strengthening of the role of OSCE in the system of European security institutions was also subject of particular concern for Poland in the previous year. This issue constituted a main topic of discussion in one of the segments of the May summit of the Council of Europe, held in Warsaw and dedicated to the issue of improvement in relations between OSCE and the Council of Europe.

### **Major Functional Aspects of Polish Security Policy**

A traditionally important element of the Polish security policy in 2005 constitutes our involvement in integrally related processes of conventional arms control and disarmament and the development of confidence and security building measures (CSBMs).

As far as the ratification of the Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) is concerned, the standpoint of our country and other NATO states did not change. It depends on whether Russia fulfils its Istanbul commitments of 1999, related to the withdrawal of its troops and military equipment from the territory of Moldova and Georgia, or negotiates new agreements on this issue with the authorities of these countries. The ratification process has not begun and one should rather not expect a change in this situation until the CFE Review Conference, planned for May 2006.

Major activities undertaken by Poland in the domain of disarmament policy and humanitarian law were:

- completion of the ratification procedure of the Protocol 4, concerning a ban on the use of blinding laser weapons, to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons,
- improvement of norms and standards of implementation of this convention, particularly when it comes to responsibility for the breach of its provisions and handling mines of other types than anti-personnel ones and of the so-called explosive remnants of war,
- announcing its readiness to ratify the Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Anti-Personnel Mines and the commencement of related internal procedures.

In the area of CSBMs, in 2005 Poland carried out its tasks stemming from international agreements in force, first of all the Vienna Document from 1999. It is also significant to note its presence in the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty on Open Skies that provides for the execution of surveillance flights over the territory of the states—parties to the treaty and the exchange of information acquired via these flights.

In the area of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the most important issue for Poland was the further development of international cooperation (particularly on the regional level) comprising, *inter alia*, the exchange of information on threats related to this type of weapons and of experience related to the national mechanisms of exports control. Poland actively participated in all major undertakings in connection with the issues of international organisations (including the UN, NATO, the EU), in new initiatives carried out beyond these organisations and within the framework of special agreements and control regimes.

In the domain of non-proliferation, Poland's priority in 2005 was the development and promotion of the principles of the Cracow Initiative. The role of this initiative should be considered in three aspects. First, due to PSI, Poland

could actively participate in one of the most promising undertakings in the area of combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Second, the Initiative was a significant platform for the development of the strategic partnership with the United States. Third, it gave significant support to the modernisation of national mechanisms of preventing illegal trade in and transit of components for production of weapons of mass destruction. In the previous year, Poland participated in all major works and exercises within the Cracow Initiative.

Besides the initiatives that have been implemented for some time now in bilateral cooperation (*inter alia* an agreement with Libya and Russia on destruction of chemical weapons), there have emerged new ones. In cooperation with Ukraine, we have undertaken activities aimed at launching the project of destruction of the used missile fuel stocked in its territory (with Polish technology used to this end). Poland has undertaken a non-proliferation cooperation with Iraq by signing an adequate agreement with this country, and being the first state to do so.

In the domain of nuclear non-proliferation, the leading role, according to Poland, belonged to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which considered the solution of the problem of Iran's nuclear program to be an issue of vital importance. Poland was a participant at the Review Conference of the on the Non-Proliferation Treaty—NPT (no consensus reached), participated in the activities of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee. It also gave its support to the rapid entry into force of the Comprehensive (nuclear) Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Poland participated in the activities for the ban on production of biological and chemical weapons (*inter alia* in the implementation of the provisions of Convention on the Prohibition of the Biological and Toxin Weapons—BTWC, and Convention on the Prohibition of the Chemical Weapons—CWC), for the strengthening of control over the exports of goods and technologies used for production of biological and chemical weapons within the Australia Group and the control of national measures to monitor activities in the domain of biology and biotechnology as well as for the exchange of good practice in this area. By 1 November 2005, Poland had chaired the Conference of the States Parties of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). At that time, it commenced its two-year term in Executive Council of the OPCW. On the forum of the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Poland sponsored a resolution on the state of implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. It also took part in the activities of Missile Technology

Control Regime (MTCR), consistently supporting the establishment of effective mechanisms to control exports of ballistic missiles and related technologies. It also continued its activities for the implementation of provisions of the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOB).

In the area of controlling the trade in arms and dual-use goods, Poland focused on being active on the European Union stage and in specialised working groups for the issues of effective control over the exports of goods, technologies and services of strategic significance. It is particularly important to mention its participation in the works on the review of the Code of Conduct (UE) in the exports of arms, in monitoring of introduction, observance and cancellation of EU's bans on exports of arms, as well as in coordinating the standpoints of the member states in respect of conventional weapons (in other international organisations). Poland was also active on the forum of the Wassenaar Arrangement, protecting the interests of its own manufacturers and exporters of special equipment.

## **II.**

# **Bilateral Relations**



## **Poland's Relations with the United States**

In 2005, George Bush began his second term as the President of the United States. His presidency has been marked with a clear acceleration in the development of Polish-American relations. The visit of the American President in Warsaw in June 2001, three months prior to the tragic events in New York City, Washington and Pennsylvania, can be considered a symbolic moment of a new political opening, without precedence in the history of bilateral relations of the two states.

Historical links between the two nations that span over many centuries, the fascination of the Americans with the Solidarity ethos, and the Euroatlantic aspirations of Poland, sealed by its membership of NATO constitute factors that encouraged closer bonds between Poland and the U.S. The situation developed after 11 September 2001, when Poland gave its full support to the American war against terrorism through (among others) its participation in the NATO mission in Afghanistan and in Iraq two years later, resulting in Poland becoming one of the closest allies of the U.S. This is confirmed by an unusual intensity of dialogue between the two countries (in the 3.5-year period after the visit in July 2002, President Aleksander Kwaśniewski made visits to the White House five times—twice in 2005).

The February visit of President Kwaśniewski in Washington took place only three weeks after George Bush had been sworn into office for his second term and only two weeks prior to his first foreign visit in the second term. It made for a significant, symbolic emphasis of the importance of bilateral relations and placed Polish-American relations in a wider, trans-Atlantic context. Thus, a major part of the discussion between the two presidents concerned such topics as: effective involvement of Poland in Ukraine in support of the Orange Revolution and the necessity of bringing new life to trans-Atlantic relations after a period of visible circumspection that evolved from different points of view between the U.S. and some European countries on the war in Iraq. Poland has become a visible partner in the trans-Atlantic dialogue, and very good relations

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\* Artur Michalski—Counsellor at the Department of the Americas at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

with the U.S. strengthened its position vis-à-vis the European partners. This new quality of Poland's political standing is obviously a result of close relations with the United States.

### **Political Relations**

In late January, U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney visited Poland on the occasion of the celebrations of the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the liberation of the German concentration camp Auschwitz-Birkenau.

Poland also played a part in the agenda of the first foreign trip of Condoleezza Rice, 66<sup>th</sup> U.S. Secretary of State (on February 5). Rice subsequently visited: London, Berlin, Warsaw, Ankara, Israel, Rome, Paris, Brussels and Luxembourg. The message of this visit was clear: the second term of the presidency of George W. Bush was to make for a new opening in trans-Atlantic relations. This visit was a successful introduction to the European visit of George W. Bush in late February. Commentators on both sides of the Atlantic agreed as to the fact that the European visit of the American President had a significant impact on the warming in trans-Atlantic relations.

On February 9 in Washington, George W. Bush had a meeting with Aleksander Kwaśniewski. Besides the international context (Ukraine, bringing new life to transatlantic relations), the talks concerned the question of the visa requirement for Polish citizens travelling to the U.S. A year earlier, during his visit to the White House (in January 2004), Kwaśniewski firmly raised the issue of the waiver of the visa requirement for Polish citizens. It strengthened the intensity of Polish activities not only during talks with the representatives of the American administration, but also in the Congress. This time, President George W. Bush proposed to develop the so-called road map—a plan of activities that would lead (in the future) to the inclusion of Poland in the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), i.e. its inclusion in the group of states whose citizens may travel to the U.S. without having to obtain a visa for tourist purposes for up to 3 months. The road map, agreed upon between Poland and the United States, became a template for similar documents concerning other countries (new member states of the European Union) that demand the waiver of the visa requirement as well.

On 17–18 March, Jerzy Hausner, Polish Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Economy, paid a visit to the United States. He had a meeting with, among others, the Secretary of Commerce Carlos Gutierrez. The Minister of Finance Mirosław Gronicki and the Minister of Environment Jerzy Swatoń visited the U.S. as well (the former in 13–19 April, the latter in 14–22 April).

On 31 May, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Adam Daniel Rotfeld, had a meeting with Condoleezza Rice in the Department of State and opened the second round of the US-Poland Strategic Dialogue. This form of mutual contact was started in autumn of 2004 in Poland. It provides for an exchange of opinion on international issues of vital importance from the point of view of the two states as well as an analysis of bilateral relations. During this meeting, the Americans put forward information on the implementation of one of the points of the road map—on qualifying the immigration offences of Polish citizens prior to 1989 as null and void (the so-called clean slate).

On 17–19 July, talks were held in the Pentagon with the participation of the Polish Minister of Defence, Jerzy Szmajdziński. President Aleksander Kwaśniewski paid a visit to the U.S. on 11–17 September, where *inter alia*, he had a meeting with California governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. Alongside this, Prime Minister Marek Belka had a meeting in Washington with, among others, Vice President Richard Cheney and Secretary of Commerce Gutierrez (27–28 September). On 12 October, President Kwaśniewski paid his last visit to the White House.

After the presidential elections in Poland, George W. Bush had a telephone conversation with President-Elect Lech Kaczyński and congratulated him on his victory in the elections, inviting him to pay a visit to the White House early in 2006.

In early December, after the establishment of the new government following the autumn parliamentary elections, the Minister of Defence, Radosław Sikorski, paid a visit to the United States and held talks with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. He put forward a series of proposals for the American government aimed at supporting the process of modernisation of the Polish armed forces.

On 18–20 December, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stefan Meller, visited the U.S., where he held talks with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and the representatives of the Congress. He presented to Richard Lugar, a Republican senator from Indiana, a proposal for development of a youth exchange program under the auspices of parliaments of the two countries. Senator Lugar demonstrated a lot of interest in the issue and promised to put forward an adequate project regarding this matter.

On 29 December, President Lech Kaczyński issued a decision—at the request of the Prime Minister—to prolong the Polish military mission in Iraq by 31 December 2006.

## **Military Cooperation**

The military co-operation of Poland with the United States consists first of all in joint operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. For a few years Poland has also been a recipient of American military aid. In 2005, as part of Foreign Military Financing programme (FMF), the U.S. granted Poland the sum of \$65.5 million and \$2 million for military training within the IMET programme (International Military Education and Training).

After the talks with President Kwaśniewski at the White House in February, President Bush promised to establish a Solidarity Fund. One-off payments from such a fund would be an expression of gratitude towards the countries that acceded to the alliance operations in Iraq. According to preliminary calculations, Poland could have benefited by \$100 million. As a result of lawmaking activities in the Congress, the amount proposed by the administration was reduced; in the end, Poland was granted the sum of \$57 million. Subsequently, the administration made efforts to increase the amount by \$11 million from the FMF fund, which was not used by other states.

In total, the U.S. financial aid for the Polish armed forces amounted to almost \$140 million.

## **Economic Cooperation and Trade**

The year 2005 confirmed that Poland's membership in the European Union had a positive impact on trade and economic cooperation between Poland and the United States, creating a better climate for American investments in Poland.

According to the data for the 12 months of 2005, trade volume reached \$4,244.4 million and was 9.5% higher compared to 2004. Polish exports to the U.S. amounted to \$1,839.6 million and were 3.6% higher than in 2004, the same figures for imports being \$2,404.8 million and 13.5%. The trade balance with the U.S. in the relevant period was negative and amounted to \$565.3 million, i.e. worsened in comparison to the relevant period of 2004 by about \$221.4 million.

The following groups of products had a major share in Polish exports to the U.S. in 2005: equipment and machinery (24.8%), base metals and related products (13.5%), furniture (8.7%), consumer food (8.2%) and chemicals (7.0%). The imports were dominated by: equipment and machinery (34.5%), chemicals (16.9%), measuring equipment and tools (9.6%), aircraft and parts (7.8%) and passenger cars (6.6%).

For Poland the United States was—when it comes to trade volume—the 16<sup>th</sup> greatest trade partner in exports and the 10<sup>th</sup> greatest trade partner in imports. For the U.S., Poland was the 56<sup>th</sup> greatest trade partner in exports and the 62<sup>nd</sup> greatest trade partner in imports.<sup>1</sup> Poland, for the first time, became a supplier of the American government. Państwowe Zakłady Lotnicze “Świdnik” began shipments of elements for the F-14 fighter aircraft. Activities of American investors in Poland accelerated. The value of investments exceeded \$10 billion, which gives the U.S. third place, following France and the Netherlands.

Table

### The largest American investments in Poland

| Name of investor                  | Value in million dollars | Industry                      |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Citigroup                         | 1,300                    | banking and finances          |
| Apollo-Rida Poland Lic.           | 1,300                    | construction, real estate     |
| General Motors Corporation        | 1,010                    | means of transport            |
| Enterprise Investor               | 914.5                    | capital funds                 |
| International Paper Company (IPC) | 450.9                    | paper industry                |
| General Electric Corporation      | 400                      | electrical equipment, banking |
| Delphi Automotiv Systems          | 380                      | transport equipment           |

### The Offset Programme

In 2005, the implementation of the offset agreement with Lockheed Martin Corporation (LMC) accelerated. For the period from 18 March 2003 (the date of signing of the Agreement) to 31 December 2005, the Committee for Offset Agreements gave a positive evaluation of performance of the offset obligations for the cumulated amount of \$2,633.09 million. Direct offset obligations (carried out for the benefit of entities from the defence industry) amounted to \$846.59 million, while indirect offset obligations (carried out for the benefit of other entities than the ones classified as industrial defence potential)—amounted to \$1,786.50 million.

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<sup>1</sup> See [www.census.gov](http://www.census.gov).

## Visas Issue

On 9 February 2005 presidents Aleksander Kwaśniewski and George W. Bush reached an agreement on the road map related to gradual facilitation of the movement of persons between Poland and the U.S., which anticipates a prospective inclusion of Poland to the American visa waiver program. The plan provides for:

- activities undertaken by the U.S., leading to deletion from the American statistics of the records on illegal work by Polish citizens on the U.S. territory prior to 1989 (implemented);
- commencement of a media campaign in Poland, aimed at convincing Poles to respect American immigration laws (including leaving U.S. territory before the visa expiry date);
- a review of visa granting criteria used by American consular offices in Poland;
- development in 2006 of the data on the number of Polish citizens that, in 2005, stayed on U.S. territory after the visa expiry date;
- examination of the possibility to extend the Immigration Advisory Program at Warsaw airport to indirect flight passengers as well;
- an annual, joint review of the degree to which Poland fulfils the criteria for membership of the Visa Waiver Program;
- co-operation for the setting up of the criteria of introduction of biometric passports in Poland;
- activities aimed at increasing the number of Polish participants in youth and student exchange programmes.

On 9 November 2005 the Polish-American Consular Task Force Group (CTFG), whose task is to implement in practice the adopted road map, began its activities.

Irrespective of initiatives undertaken in the Congress, some state legislatures have adopted resolutions calling for the inclusion of Poland in the visa waiver programme (copies of such resolutions are sent to the Congress). So far the legislatures of the following states adopted such resolutions: Massachusetts, New Jersey, Vermont, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Maine, Nebraska, Ohio and New York. Many social organisations, such as the American Jewish Committee, expressed their support for the inclusion of Poland in the visa waiver programme.

### The Image of Poland—Promotion Initiatives

Poland has strengthened its image as a trusted, reliable ally of the United States. In relation to the warming of trans-Atlantic relations, results of various opinion polls were given in the media concerning the attitude of selected European nations towards the U.S.<sup>2</sup> Polish society, in spite of a visible, slight decrease in support, continues to be one of the most pro-American nations in the world. Americans have begun to realise this fact.

Such events in 2005 as the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Solidarity movement, the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the liberation of the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp, parliamentary and presidential elections and the death of John Paul II resulted in the increase of interest in Poland among Americans and the presence of Poland in the American media.

While the coverage of the celebrations of the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the liberation of the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp was in general honest and true, there have been a few unpleasant incidents of the use of the term “Polish concentration camp” in the media. In most of the cases, intervention carried out by the Embassy of Poland in Washington DC or the Polish Consulates resulted in a disclaimer being published in the media. The term “Polish concentration camps” continues to be used in the United States, though as a result of intense activity on the part of the Polish diplomatic and consular corps and of the dialogue with the Jewish diaspora in the U.S., the use of this term has become noticeably limited. On the occasion of the liberation of the Auschwitz-Birkenau camp, David Harris, Executive Director of the American Jewish Committee, issued a statement in which he fiercely criticised the use of the term “Polish concentration camps.”

The death of John Paul II was widely covered and commented on in the media in the U.S. as throughout the world. For obvious reasons many Polish themes appeared. The Pope's role in the fall of communism was emphasised. The largest American radio and TV stations, including CNN and Fox News, had live coverage of prayer meetings, marches and other events that conveyed the solemn atmosphere that reigned in Poland in late March and early April. In late 2005, films on the life of John Paul II, produced by famous American television networks ABC and CBS, were aired.

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<sup>2</sup> For more on the attitude of Poles towards the Americans see A.Z. Kamiński, T. Paszewski, “Stany Zjednoczone i Amerykanie w polskiej polityce zagranicznej i sondażach po upadku komunizmu,” *Sprawy Międzynarodowe* 2006, No. 2.

The 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the “Solidarity” movement was an occasion to remember the significant role of this liberation movement not only in changes in Poland, but also in the fall of communism and in altering the shape of Europe. Polish posts in the U.S. organised occasional meetings, with the participation of Lech Wałęsa and others. The American public also saw two exhibitions: Roads to Freedom and Poland on the Front Page.

Over the next year the Embassy of Poland in Washington DC made efforts towards the restitution of works of art. In 2005, a sixteenth-century painting, Portrait of a Courtier, also known as Portrait of Charles VIII by Jan Mostaert, was recovered. The painting, a part of the collection of the Virginia Museum of Fine Arts in Richmond, was handed over to the Czartoryski Museum in Cracow. A second part of the collection of personal belongings of General Juliusz Zulauf, member of the Polish Legions and the defender of the Warsaw Praga in 1939, returned to Poland as well. The personal belongings were handed over to the National Museum in Poznań and to the Warsaw Uprising Museum.

Strategic advantages of close Polish-American relations are more and more visible in the growing role of Poland on the international scene, and particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, within the European Union (mostly in Germany and France) or in its relations with Israel. Such a strengthening of the position of Poland increases its chances for more effective activities aimed at the modernisation of Ukraine, the support for democratic transformation in Belarus and the development of good-neighbourly relations with Russia.

## Poland's Relations with Germany

A review of publications on Polish-German relations in 2005 might give the reviewer an impression that they could only be described as bad. Political relations were mostly dominated by the controversial issues regarding the reconciliation process, the evaluation of the common, difficult history and European policy issues. The divergences were deepened by the election campaigns in both countries. It was supposed to justify a thesis on the increasingly lower “compatibility of aspirations and strategy of both states” and the consequent exhaustion of the format of “common Polish-German interests.”<sup>1</sup> Some of the publicists also represented an opinion on a permanent change in the German standpoint towards Poland. It allegedly took less and less notice of Polish arguments, bringing Poland down to the category of an “inconvenient neighbour.”<sup>2</sup> Without denying the significance of all the differences that occurred in 2005, it should be stated, however, that economic, cultural and military cooperation between the Republic of Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany was being intensively developed. A series of new bilateral agreements were concluded. Common projects concerning EU neighbouring countries were carried out. Both states made a huge effort to improve the climate of the mutual relations, which was fostered by the changes of governments in Germany and in Poland. Thus, it would be unjust to state that relations between the two states are nothing more than a “community of disputes.”

The year 2005—the first calendar year of the common membership of Poland and Germany in the European Union—demonstrated that two factors should be taken into account in an evaluation of the Polish-German relations. First, that it is necessary to realize and accept the fact (particularly in Poland) that—irrespective of the treaty basis and the hitherto achievements in the cooperation, conflicts must exist in Poland's relations with Germany, though

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. P. Buras, “Moment krytyczny i nowe horyzonty. Stan i perspektywy stosunków polsko niemieckich,” in: B. Kerski and W.D. Eberwein (eds.), *Stosunki polsko-niemieckie 1949–2005. Wspólnota wartości i interesów?*, Olsztyn, 2005, p. 267.

<sup>2</sup> Z. Krasnodębski, “Niemcy nie rozumieją polskich racji,” *Dziennik* of 2 May 2006, p. 2.

they will vary in their intensity. They are a natural thing and will be an inherent element in contacts not only between Poland and Germany. There exists a substantial economic asymmetry between the two countries. They have different (and quite often very different) interests both within and outside the EU. Mutual distrust and prejudices are still visible in their societies. Thus, it was an error to expect that after the breakthrough of 1989 and later after Poland's accession to the EU, bilateral relations would be free from conflicts. Conflicts will persist and it seems that their number will grow, though some form of compromise, a necessary condition of the functioning within the EU, should be an effect of these conflicts.

The second factor was that there have been appreciated other dimensions of cooperation beside the political one. Divergences regarding the European policy or problems pertaining to history remain important. They should not, however, have any influence over the current economic, border, cultural or environmental cooperation. The whole of the mutual relations cannot be evaluated solely through political conflicts, if at the regional level the cooperation is going on smoothly and brings advantages to both partners.

### **Political and Economic Relations**

The most important problem in the Polish-German political relations was overcoming the dispute over the solidarity principle and its functioning within the EU. The election campaign additionally exacerbated the dispute. Poland and Germany, with different economic potentials as well as internal problems, took different stands. The government of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder strove to ensure maximum protection of Germany's economic interests in the EU at the expense of new Member States. It collided with Poland's interests, as Poland demanded financial support for itself and other new EU Member States. And thus, when negotiating the New Financial Perspective 2007–2013, Germany rejected the demand to increase its contribution from 1% to 1.24% of GDP. It also demanded a reduction in structural funds for the new Member States. Germany's position was not accepted by the Polish government. This was confirmed during a meeting of the Polish Prime Minister, Marek Belka, and G. Schröder on 24 April 2004.<sup>3</sup> Additionally, the negotiations were made even more difficult by the Germany's position regarding the directives on the free movement of labour and the harmonisation of the tax system within the EU.

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<sup>3</sup> See [www.kprm.gov.pl](http://www.kprm.gov.pl).

These directives were supposed to protect the German labour market through restrictions regarding the right of Polish citizens to perform some professional activities in Germany (artisans, architects, medical staff) and by increasing tax rates to a level that would make it unprofitable to relocate production from Germany abroad (e.g. to Poland). However, as the directives were against the interests of Member States possessing cheaper labour force and more attractive tax rates than Germany, neither the directives were adopted nor an agreement was reached (as effect of Germany's opposition) on the New Financial Perspective during the meeting of the European Council on 17 June 2005.<sup>4</sup>

Besides the European policy, some of the divergences in the Polish-German relations resulted from the German-Russian relations, and their economic aspects in particular. While the fact that a representative of Poland was not invited to the celebrations of the 750<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Kaliningrad in July 2005, held with participation of the President of France J. Chirac, the President of Russia V. Putin and G. Schröder, could only worsen the climate of Polish-Russian political contacts but—as such—it did not directly concern Polish-German relations. However it was the German-Russian economic cooperation that did have some impact on the cooperation between Germany and Poland. On 8 September 2005, in Berlin, representatives of German corporations E.ON and BASF and the Russian company Gazprom signed an agreement on the establishment of a company that would build along the bottom of the Baltic Sea a gas pipeline from Russia to Germany by-passing the countries of Northern and Eastern Europe interested in the transit (Finland, Poland, Estonia).<sup>5</sup>

The construction of the pipeline, which violates Polish economic interests, was described in many publications as complementing the image of the Polish-German relations full of divergences and conflicts. Such an image is only partly true, however. Both on the European policy level and in relations of the two states with EU neighbouring countries, Poland and Germany cooperated on many different platforms. Particular attention should be paid to a common project of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the two states, Adam D. Rotfeld and Joschka Fischer, regarding the support of democratic changes started by the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. A preparatory meeting of the two ministers in Warsaw on 3 March 2005 resulted in their joint visit in Kiev on 21 March 2005.

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<sup>4</sup> Cf. "EU-Mitglieder kämpfen um ihre nationalen Interessen," *Die Welt* of 14 June 2005.

<sup>5</sup> For more see R. Tarnogórski, "Projekt Gazociągu Północnego—kwestie prawne," *Biuletyn PISM*, No. 78(323) of 2 November 2005.

The two politicians presented their idea of establishing a European Union University in that city. An agreement on organisation of a system of training courses for local administration officials was, on the other hand, a real expression of support for the changes in Ukraine.

Joint activities of Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany within the EU proved to be equally important. Both states cooperated to obtain beneficial solutions in the Growth and Stability Pact. Due to these efforts, Germans do not have to include the costs of reunification in their budget deficit, and Poles—the costs of the pension system reform. During the meeting of the leaders of the Weimar Triangle states in Nancy on 19 May 2005, the President of Poland, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, and G. Schröder, jointly rejected the possibility to start new negotiations on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. They also gave their support to the campaign for its adoption in the referendum in France. On the basis of an agreement concluded in 2004, preparatory activities for the EU Battle Group (which would jointly report to EU structures) to be formed by Poland, Germany, Slovakia and—in a longer-term perspective—Lithuania, were commenced in 2005. It is soon to be ready to carry out EU's peace missions. The effectiveness of such undertakings was proved by the fact that in November 2005 a Polish-German-Danish staff of the Corps in Szczecin was awarded a certificate of Full Operational Capability by the NATO headquarters.<sup>6</sup>

Implementation of bilateral political initiatives was fostered by multiple contacts between authorities on the government and parliamentary levels. One of the most noteworthy meetings was—besides the aforementioned meetings in Warsaw (3 March) and Nancy (19 May)—the four-day visit of the delegation of the Polish-German Parliamentary Group in the Bundestag (17 March) and the meeting in Warsaw of the Foreign Affairs Ministers of Poland (A.D. Rotfeld), France (Philippe Douste-Blazy) Germany (J. Fischer) and the British Minister for Europe, Douglas Alexander. The goal of the meeting was to discuss further actions to be taken after the failure of the negotiations over the New Financial Perspective on the June meeting of the European Council (27 June).

The joint Polish-German projects, initiated by the governments of both states before the parliamentary elections in Poland and Germany, indicated that there was a chance to solve the most controversial issues after the elections to the Bundestag and the Sejm. It was quite probable in the light of the fact that

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<sup>6</sup> See [www.mncne.pl](http://www.mncne.pl).

during the election campaign the representatives of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)—the party whose candidate, Angela Merkel, took over as the Chancellor of the new government—called for a change in the policy towards Poland. Admittedly, they did not intend to do it at the expense of German interests. The protection of these interests could not—according to the stand taken by the CDU—be carried out without any proper consideration of the position of neighbouring countries. 2 December 2005 saw an after-election visit that was of key importance to the Polish-German relations. Angela Merkel met with the new Polish Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz and the president-elect Lech Kaczyński. The German Chancellor announced that she would take Polish interests into consideration when negotiating the New Financial Perspective. She also guaranteed that the Baltic pipeline project was “open to all interested parties.”<sup>7</sup>

The statement by the German Chancellor resulted in concrete actions. Both governments established a working group whose aim is to work on the Baltic pipeline issue. Germany also gave its consent to the increase of their EU budget contribution to over 1% of GDP and to €100 million of the assistance funds accorded to Germany and being handed over to Poland. It helped to achieve a compromise regarding the budget on the meeting of the European Council on 17 December 2005.

One of the elements that had an impact on the revival in the Polish-German political contacts was economic cooperation. Germany, troubled by its budget deficit amounting to €31.4 billion, agreed to the Polish proposal of an earlier repayment of Polish debt to its creditors from the “Paris Club,” including the Federal Republic of Germany. By virtue of an agreement concluded on 29 March 2005, the government of Poland paid back to Germany the amount of €1.9 billion, of which €1.7 billion was the amount of debt to the German government, and €0.2 billion was related to earlier liabilities towards German exporters.<sup>8</sup>

In spite of a slight decrease in the basic indicators, in 2005 Germany remained the most important economic partner of Poland. The share of exports to Germany in the total Polish exports amounted to 28.2% (decrease by 1.9%), and of imports—24.7% (increase by 0.3%). The balance of the mutual trade remained positive (€0.3 billion), though it decreased by €0.2 billion as compared

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<sup>7</sup> Cf. [www.bundeskanzlerin.de](http://www.bundeskanzlerin.de).

<sup>8</sup> See [www.bundesfinanzministerium.de](http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de).

to 2004. In 2005, Polish exports to Germany amounted to €20.1 billion, and imports—to €19.8 billion.<sup>9</sup>

In 2005, Germany continued to be the fourth largest foreign investor in Poland. The amount of investments is estimated at \$10.1 billion. Notably, besides 6,000 German companies registered in Poland, 20,000 Polish firms have been registered in Germany since Poland's accession to the EU.<sup>10</sup> Only in 2005 these companies invested over €500 million in Germany. In spite of the limitations regarding the access to the German labour market, in 2005 685,000 Polish citizens could officially work there. At the same time, certain legal regulations of vital importance have been introduced in order to make the mutual contacts more efficient, e.g. the double taxation agreement, which entered into force on 1 January 2005, the protocol on protection of mutual investments concluded on 28 October 2005 or the agreement of 2 February 2005 between the Polish Ministry of the Environment and the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety.<sup>11</sup> In line with this agreement, Germany will fund projects aimed at helping Polish borderline regions comply with the EU norms of cleanliness of air and water.

The economic and political cooperation undoubtedly contributed to the decrease in the number of the controversial issues in the relations between Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany. It is a fact, though, that these controversies remained clearly visible, particularly in the context of the evaluation of the common history of both states.

### **Historical Issues in the Polish-German Relations**

Similarly as in the previous years, in 2005 the climate of the Polish-German relations was influenced by problems pertaining to the assessment of the post-war history of the two neighbouring nations. These problems were mostly expressed by the idea of establishing the Centre Against Expulsions in Berlin and the activities of the "Prussian Claims Society" company.<sup>12</sup>

While efforts made by the governments of both states to continue the difficult task of reconciliation between the two nations should be appreciated, it

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<sup>9</sup> See [www.stat.gov.pl/dane\\_spol-gosp/ceny\\_handel\\_uslugi/index.htm](http://www.stat.gov.pl/dane_spol-gosp/ceny_handel_uslugi/index.htm).

<sup>10</sup> It should be remembered, however, that 80% of these companies are one-man business.

<sup>11</sup> See [www.bmu.de/pressearchiv/15\\_legislaturperiode/pm/7012.php](http://www.bmu.de/pressearchiv/15_legislaturperiode/pm/7012.php).

<sup>12</sup> For more see M. Gniazdowski—below, p. 234.

needs to be stated, however, that the problem of relativisation of history will remain an element negatively influencing the climate of the Polish-German relations. No government, neither Polish nor German, has any right to ban filing property claims in Polish and international courts, irrespective of whether there is any chance of a ruling favourable to the “Prussian Claims Society.” Each such claim will raise apprehension in Poland and will make cultural—and possibly also political—cooperation more difficult. It does not seem possible that the Federation of Expellees should resign from building the Centre Against Expulsions in a shape that would favour their own notions on World War II and the post-war period. This project is a private initiative, it does not infringe upon any binding legal regulations in Germany, and the stand taken by the German government, favourable for Poland, means only that the Centre would not be financed from the federal budget. This will merely slower the construction of the Centre, but will not stop it. Moreover, the expellees’ circles, traditionally linked with CDU, will not resign from fund-raising activities or seeking political support for their project. Consequently, strong support for cultural initiatives that promote reconciliation between the two nations, as in 2005, seems an issue of vital importance.

### **Cooperation in Culture and Science**

The most important event in the cooperation between Poland and Germany in the domain of culture was the inauguration of the celebrations of the Polish-German Year that took place on 30 April 2005 in Berlin. The concept of the undertaking came into being during joint governmental consultations of both states in 2003. The conclusion was drawn at that time that growing divergences related to the Polish support of military operations in Iraq and the activities of the Federation of the Expellees deepened the distrust and mutual prejudices between the two societies. The situation was even more alarming as—with the perspective of Poland’s near accession to the EU—the image of Poland in Germany was mostly the result of unclear statements and stereotypes, strengthened by the lack of sound and accessible information on Poland.<sup>13</sup>

The aim of the Polish-German Year in Germany 2005/2006 was to shape a positive image of Poland and the Polish people in the German society by taking advantage of the Polish accession to the EU, and in particular have the program

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<sup>13</sup> Cf. “Koncepcja projektu promującego Rok Polski w Niemczech i Rok Niemiecki w Polsce 2005/2006,” *Zeszyty Niemcoznawcze* 2006, No. 1.

of the Year reach the circles which know little about Poland or which promote its image based on stereotypes and prejudices. In the Polish-German intergovernmental consultations some major events (i.e. the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the end of World War II and the 15<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the signing of the Treaty on Good-Neighbourly Relations of 1991) and topical areas of the Year (politics, science, culture and the economy) were set out and described in documents as the “driving force” of the project. Nevertheless, the two governments decided to decentralise the programme offer of the Year, thanks to which it would reach the largest possible group of the potential participants. Altogether, over a thousand events were planned in 50 German cities, of which 500 took place in 2005.<sup>14</sup>

Presidents of the Republic of Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany, Aleksander Kwaśniewski and Horst Köhler accepted the patronage of the project. In a joint message issued on the occasion of the beginnings of the celebrations they noted that the Polish-German year should demonstrate cooperation between the two states and nations and make evident the great number of mutual connections binding the societies of the two states. They also expressed their belief that remembrance of the war and its victims must be free from mutual claims and enumeration of emotional harms sustained and that the memory joined us in our efforts to create a strong, peaceful and united Europe.<sup>15</sup>

It is impossible to mention all the events of the celebrations of the Polish-German year, even in the most concise way. The list below must consequently include only those which attracted the most attention: an exhibition in Baden-Baden of collections from various Polish museums organised under the auspices of the former German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt; a countrywide exhibition “Roads to Liberty” about the beginnings of the “Solidarity” trade union; a music festival “Jazz from Poland” held in Leipzig; or “Radio Copernicus,” organised by the University of Wrocław and the Berlin Academy of Arts, which prepared, *inter alia*, an airing of concerts from the “Warsaw Autumn” festival. An exhibition “Fantasy and Reality,” opened on 30 September 2005, presenting the work of three major representatives of the German impressionism, Max Liebermann, Louis Corinth and Max Slevogt, attracted a lot of publicity in Poland.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> A detailed description of all events of the Polish-German year can be found on the following Website: [www.de-pl.info/pl/page.php/category/9](http://www.de-pl.info/pl/page.php/category/9).

<sup>15</sup> *Rok Polsko-Niemiecki. Wspólne przesłanie Prezydenta RP Aleksandra Kwaśniewskiego oraz Prezydenta Federalnego RFN Horsta Köhlera*, [www.pl-de](http://www.pl-de).

<sup>16</sup> Cf. [www.deutsch-polnisches-jahr.de/content-details-de.php?112](http://www.deutsch-polnisches-jahr.de/content-details-de.php?112).

Celebrations of the Polish-German Year were not the only significant event in the Polish-German cooperation in culture and science. Efforts made by governments of the two states to improve the financial situation of the Polish-German university of Viadrina in Słubice and Frankfurt on the Oder, also deserve some attention. A letter of intent, signed by secretaries of state in the Ministries of Education of the two states on 25 July 2005, was to solve the difficult financial situation of the university, attended by 5,000 students, 1,300 of them from Poland. Both governments declared the will to establish a foundation with the capital of €55 million, which is to support the financing of the university. Poland's contribution amounts to €5 million, and the German one—to €50 million. A decision was also made to invite France to the group of the founders.<sup>17</sup>

Cultural events held independently of the Polish-German year were related to a series of anniversaries in the Polish-German reconciliation process that fell in 2005. And thus, on 21 September 2005, in Fulda, the solemn signing of a joint statement by Polish and German bishops took place. The statement referred to the approaching 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the letter of reconciliation of the Polish bishops to their German counterparts. Three days later, on 24 September, this document was signed by the participants of the Plenary Meeting of the Episcopal Conference of Poland in Wrocław. The statement said that the events which had taken place in Poland, particularly the emergence of the independent "Solidarity" movement, contributed to the development of relations between our nations. The bishops, with their will to overcome hatred and hostility between the Polish and German peoples, had their own significant contribution in overcoming the enslavement and division in Europe.

Celebrations of the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the establishment of the Deutsches Polen Institut in Darmstadt, which had made a significant contribution to the reconciliation process, were also a very important event. Presidents of Poland and Germany, representatives of authorities of the states of Hesse and Rheinland-Palatinate as well as representatives of the scientific circles took part in the celebratory meeting on 22 June 2005. President Horst Köhler emphasised that since its very beginning the Institute had been a unique entity, similarly as the persons working for it. The works of Professor Karl Dedecius and Countess Marion Dönhoff, connected with the Institute, for the development of the good neighbourly relations between the two states, were mentioned.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> See <http://presse.euv-frankfurt-o.de/Presseinformationen/Main.html>.

<sup>18</sup> For more see [www.deutsches-polen-institut.de/Institut/Geschichte/25\\_Jahr\\_Feier.php](http://www.deutsches-polen-institut.de/Institut/Geschichte/25_Jahr_Feier.php).

The candidates' contribution to the strengthening of the reconciliation heritage of Poland and Germany was also the criterion for granting an annual Polish-German award. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Poland and Germany presented this award on 27 June 2005 to Professor Anna Wolf-Powęska and Professor Klaus Ziemer for the entirety of activities of the institutes run by them: the Institute for Western Affairs in Poznań and the German Historical Institute in Warsaw.

Symbolically, in terms of bilateral relations, the year 2005 was ended with a session of a 12<sup>th</sup> Polish-German Forum, commenced on 7 December. The talks, organised by the Centre for International Relations and the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), attended by the Polish Prime Minister, Mr Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz, were held on the 35<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the signing the Polish-German Treaty of 1970 on the basis of normalisation of mutual relations. The subject of the forum was "Poland and Germany after the Elections—the Road to an Effective Cooperation." The speakers, among whom were the coordinators for bilateral relations of the Polish and German governments, Ms. Gesine Schwan and Ms. Irena Lipowicz, focused on problems and perspectives of the Polish-German relations, the EU's Eastern policy as well as Polish and German activities aimed at overcoming the crisis that occurred after the rejection of the Constitution Treaty by the referenda held in France and the Netherlands.<sup>19</sup>

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The events that took place after the Forum had ended confirm the thesis on the inevitability of the simultaneous occurrence of divergences and cooperation in the Polish-German relations. Continuation of the celebrations of the Polish-German Year and the cooperation of Poland and Germany on the adoption of the New Financial Perspective did not contribute to the elimination of all the divergences in bilateral relations. This can be illustrated by statements by A. Merkel, who—in January 2006—demonstrated her support for the continuation of the construction of the Baltic pipeline, the will to increase the financing of the federations of expellees from the federal budget as well as her objection to the German labour market being sooner open for Polish citizens.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> *XII Forum Polsko-Niemieckie pt. "Polska i Niemcy po wyborach—droga do skutecznej współpracy,"* [www.pol-niem.pl/index.php](http://www.pol-niem.pl/index.php).

<sup>20</sup> "Berlin nie popiera Warszawy," *Rzeczpospolita* of 6 February 2006 and "Niemiecki rynek pracy jeszcze nie dla Polaków," *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 25 February 2006.

Germany faces serious and socially unpopular internal reforms. Thus, it is impossible to expect further development of Polish-German economic cooperation if it is unfavourable from the perspective of the German interests. Ideological closeness of the CDU and the expellees' circles will also influence their activities, *inter alia* due to a higher funding from the state budget. It does not mean, however, that these divergences must have exclusively negative consequences. An intensive cultural cooperation must bring about changes in mutual perceptions and consequently an understanding of the Polish apprehensions related to historical experience. Moreover, it seems that political divergences, including those related to European policy (the labour market) might be overcome, especially considering the fact that both states expressed their readiness to reach a compromise. It allows for a moderate optimism in assessing the prospective shape of the Polish-German relations.

## **Poland's Relations with France**

As a result of Poland's accession to the European Union and NATO, Polish-French relations are becoming increasingly dynamic and deeply set in the international, primarily European, context. They involve direct contacts between Poland and France, their common goals within the European Union where France is and will remain a key player, Transatlantic relations and the relations of both countries with Russia. European matters and relations with third-party countries also formed the common denominator of several misunderstandings that occurred in bilateral relations, particularly from 2002. Both countries held divergent opinions both on Iraq and on the shape of the European Constitution. Poland considered the French authorities' support for its demands at the EU summit in Copenhagen (December 2002) to be insufficient, whereas France viewed with discontent the Polish authorities' pro-American attitude, spectacularly confirmed by the decision to purchase the F-16 fighter aircraft or the choice of American Boeing aircraft for LOT Polish airlines, which meant a rejection of the French offers.

However, the developments of the last months of 2004, above all, the intergovernmental seminar of 22 November, led to a visible improvement in the atmosphere of mutual relations, which enabled to change the quality of the political dialogue and to undertake pragmatic cooperation with regard to European matters in 2005. The better atmosphere manifested itself not only in political contacts, but also in the French response to the decision to purchase Boeing aircrafts for LOT. Three years earlier, the choice of an American fighter aircraft for the Polish air force provoked resentment among French politicians and "protests" from French society. Poland was then accused of an anti-European attitude and lack of commitment to the European integration process, or even of acting as "America's Trojan horse" in Europe. In 2005, the reactions of the French to the decision to purchase Boeing aircrafts were much more balanced and limited to expressing discontent during high-level political talks.

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\* Mariusz Kazana—acting Deputy Director of the Department of Strategy and Foreign Policy Planning at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Thus, it seems that both in Poland and in France there has been a change of attitude towards the partner and both countries put more emphasis on what they have in common rather than what they are divided by. The French political class gradually realized that Poland was becoming an equal partner. Without Polish cooperation French influences in Central Europe might grow even weaker and result in “a progressive erosion of the importance of France in the entire EU, paradoxically with the concurrent enormous economic commitment and continuing Polish sentimental attachment to French culture.”<sup>1</sup>

Did the change in attitude of the French towards Poland result purely and only from our accession to the European Union? The fact that Poland joined the EU was not as important as Poland's conduct in the first months of our EU membership. We were an active, committed partner with clearly-defined priorities and objectives. This was proved in June 2005 during the session of the European Council in Brussels when Prime Minister Marek Belka expressed Poland's readiness to surrender part of its funds from the new EU budget proposal for 2007–2013, should it bring the member states closer to reaching an agreement. Such a position adopted by the Polish delegation made a huge impression on our European partners, including French President Jacques Chirac. Furthermore, the United Kingdom's criticism of the manner in which the proposal was prepared and presented weakened the conviction held by French politicians and the public that Poland was leaning towards the UK. Thanks to its attitude in the first year of its EU membership, Poland became one of the main European partners of France. The climate of high-level political contacts improved, the dialogue was intensified and new institutional mechanisms of cooperation were established. The two countries entered a period of “discovering each other” as partners in their bilateral relations.

### **The Impact of the Situation in France on Foreign Policy and Bilateral Cooperation**

France is in a state of crisis that manifests itself in economic and social problems. The lack of strong and distinct political leadership can be perceived both in internal affairs and foreign policy. The situation in France in 2005 was specifically marked by the campaign promoting the approval of the Constitutional Treaty and the outcome of the referendum on this issue. At the end of the year, riots in the suburbs of many French cities highlighted problems

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<sup>1</sup> O. Osica, “Czas pozytywistów,” *Tygodnik Powszechny* of 2 November 2005.

existing in the immigrant communities. Those events also exerted a strong impact on the country's activities in the domain of foreign relations, as the image of France and other European states became marred in the Arab world. Hence, France had to strive with an even stronger determination to maintain and develop bilateral cooperation—and above all, within the European Union—the cooperation with southern countries from where the greatest number of emigrants arrives. That took place at the cost of a smaller interest declared for other directions of cooperation, particularly the eastern one, so important for Poland. The expectations held by North African countries with regard to deepening their integration with the European Union also increased. Thus, the countries of the Maghreb remained an important partner of France in its external relations.

The informal commencement of the campaign before the 2007 presidential elections also came into the picture. All those events influenced the level of activity of the French foreign policy. French diplomacy was no longer as active as, for instance, in 2003 when it conducted an effective offensive in the United Nations aimed at rejecting American plans concerning Iraq. When the office of the German Chancellor was assumed by Angela Merkel, strongly convinced about the necessity to defend national interests within the EU, with a more pro-Atlantic attitude and less enthusiastic about Vladimir Putin's Russia, it posed yet another challenge for French foreign policy. French doubts over the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey were also directly linked with the internal situation in France. The French were deeply affected by the fiasco of the Euro-Mediterranean summit in Barcelona and experienced serious problems in Africa, particularly in Ivory Coast. It cannot be forgotten that Paris was beaten by London in the rivalry to organize the 2012 Olympic Games, which must have had an adverse effect on the morale of the society and the political elites.

The events on the internal scene and the challenges faced by French diplomacy may have influenced the French authorities' decision to initiate areas of diplomatic activity that also included Central Europe. That may have been one of the reasons why France became more open to Poland. It is also worth noting that 2005 saw France take actions aimed at allaying the tensions in its relations with the United States and a gradual transition to a pragmatic cooperation, which may have also facilitated contacts with such partners as Poland.

## Political Cooperation

In Polish-French political contacts, the year 2005 began on a very strong note, i.e. a meeting of the Presidents of the two countries on 28 February in Arras. The meeting was organized at the French initiative and modelled on the regular consultations held for many years, at least once a year, between French leaders and the most important partners in the European Union (Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom). It was preceded by a working visit of French Foreign Minister Michel Barnier in Warsaw (13 January) and the participation of French President Jacques Chirac in the ceremony commemorating the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz-Birkenau (27 January). Those two visits confirmed that the direction of the changes in the Polish-French cooperation, initiated in 2004, would be maintained in 2005.

During his stay in Warsaw, Michel Barnier stressed that the aim of his visit was to “arouse a new enthusiasm in Polish-French relations”<sup>2</sup> (the minister returned to Poland to attend the 3<sup>rd</sup> Council of Europe Summit on 15 and 16 May). In his opinion, the cooperation between the two countries should be continuously improved through dialogue and by way of overcoming difficulties that occurred in the past. Among the fields of close cooperation, Minister Barnier mentioned working on the 2007–2013 EU budget, public campaigns for the adoption of the Constitutional Treaty, support for the transformations in Ukraine, the political and economic reconstruction of Iraq and cooperation with regard to combating natural disasters. France’s readiness to give new momentum to Polish-French relations was welcomed by Minister Adam Daniel Rotfeld who confirmed that Poland and France shared their position on key issues concerning bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

In Arras, talks were also held between ministers of foreign affairs, economy, finance, labour, interior, agriculture and infrastructure. The summit was concluded with a joint declaration on bilateral relations, European and international issues, as well as a joint communiqué on Syria and Lebanon. The most important message of the meeting, held under the banner of “finding each other,” was the wish, expressed by both presidents, “to make every effort to solve the arising problems in a spirit of good will and cooperation for building a

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<sup>2</sup> From an interview with M. Barnier, “Dzięki wam Europa będzie bardziej dynamiczna,” *Fakt* of 13 January 2005.

Europe that will develop economically while upholding the principles of social solidarity.”<sup>3</sup>

In the Arras Declaration, “both parties also confirmed their will to give the Polish-French partnership a strategic character,” *inter alia*, by strengthening and enriching the cooperation at the bilateral level as well as within the European Union.<sup>4</sup> They agreed that they would consult each other on key issues concerning European integration, trying to work out similar or common positions and undertaking initiatives. Both parties declared Common Foreign and Security Policy as the best and most effective response that Europe could make to contemporary threats and challenges, and called for “strengthening an effective and balanced partnership with the United States.” France also expressed its recognition of “Poland’s experience and importance” in shaping the European Neighbourhood Policy and appreciated the Polish contribution to the “revolution” in Ukraine. Furthermore, both countries emphasized their “commitment to maintain and appreciate the European model of multifunctional agriculture in line with the interests of agricultural producers and consumers.” With a view to facilitating Poland’s entry to the Schengen zone, they decided to expand cooperation in the field of border security and police training as well as combating terrorism and international organized crime. Poland and France also decided to expand bilateral military cooperation “aimed at achieving the common goal, i.e. the consolidation of initiatives strengthening the European Security and Defence Policy.” France noted with satisfaction Poland’s readiness to join the European Gendarmerie Force. Lastly, both countries agreed that their economic cooperation should be focussed on road infrastructure, road transport, aviation, railways, energy as well as on new communication and information technologies.

The Arras Declaration, unlike several Polish-French documents from previous years, has an extremely balanced character as it mentions issues important to both partners. For Poland, they included emphasizing its role in the peaceful revolution in Ukraine, Poland’s contribution in shaping the EU’s eastern policy and the will, expressed by both parties, to maintain a balanced Transatlantic partnership; whereas issues important to France included Poland’s declaration of its commitment to strengthen the European Security and Defence Policy. It seems that one of the most significant provisions is the declaration

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<sup>3</sup> Excerpt from the statement made by President J. Chirac at the press conference after the conclusion of talks in Arras (28 February)—[www.elysee.fr](http://www.elysee.fr).

<sup>4</sup> The Arras Declaration—[www.msz.gov.pl](http://www.msz.gov.pl).

concerning cooperation on European matters, particularly with regard to consulting each other's positions and joint initiatives. In many fields there can be observed a convergence of Polish and French interests within the process of European integration. In the future, both countries may be further drawn to each other over the EU's agricultural policy. Poland and France, with their strong agricultural sectors, are interested in the continuation of assistance under the Common Agricultural Policy, assuming that its indispensable reform will be conducted. The Arras summit should also be seen as a clear signal confirming the willingness of both parties to make "a new start" in Polish-French relations. One thing seemed certain: the times of chilly relations between the two countries were over.

The outcome of the parliamentary and presidential elections in Poland did not weaken the dynamics in Polish-French relations that had been developing for more than a year. What is more, these bilateral relations could also be seen as inherent in the mainstream of ideas (such as the strongly accentuated public concerns and the need for the authorities to focus on internal affairs, including the defence of the broadly-understood national interest) that sealed the result of the French referendum on the Constitutional Treaty. Paradoxically, despite the criticism of the new Polish government often expressed in French press, the resolute defence of national interests and emphasis of social issues may form the basis of good bilateral relations in the future. Such standpoint is in line with the expectations of voters not only in France, but also across Europe, as evidenced by the outcomes of the recent national referendums and elections.

Assessing the Polish-French political cooperation in 2005, it must be concluded that no watershed event occurred. The atmosphere of high-level political contacts improved and new instruments were introduced into the dialogue between the two countries, above all summits attended by their presidents. However, there was still no foundation for a real broadening of cooperation, i.e. there was a lack of common interests and common vision of what the two countries want to achieve together. The record of differences remained very long. Until the change of government in Poland, both countries held divergent views on the nature of the EU's economic policy: Poland called for the opening up of services and labour markets, which was expressly opposed by the French authorities. Our position in this respect was closer to the United Kingdom, which as a matter of fact, Poland did not try to hide. Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz went on his first foreign trip to London; the choice of this destination did not result only from the fact the UK held the EU Presidency at that time. Ultimately,

however, the “conflict” with the British over the new EU Financial Perspective for 2007–2013 brought Warsaw closer to Paris by the end of 2005.

Although Poland and France were also divided by their attitude to the USA as well as its role in the world and Europe, tensions arising in this regard were lately significantly reduced when the French toned down their anti-American rhetoric as a consequence of George W. Bush’s visit to Brussels (21 February) and the attempt to reconcile the “old” and “new” Europe. Both countries also had a different vision of the future of NATO. Poland, in favour of maintaining NATO’s character of a military guarantor of the allied states’ security, saw the need to adapt it, in the political and military aspect, to contemporary threats and challenges, whereas France wished to reduce NATO’s role only and exclusively to a defensive alliance.

### European Issues

Polish-French cooperation in European affairs can be divided into two decidedly different periods where the presidential and parliamentary elections in Poland mark a turning point. The post-election shift of focus in Poland’s European policy influenced the nature and intensity of cooperation between Poland and France.

As was the case in previous years, European affairs continued to be the focus of discussions between Polish and French politicians. One of the most important issues under debate was the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty. The then Polish authorities (that remained in power until the autumn elections) not only looked at the French referendum with hope, but also supported French politicians in their campaign for the adoption of the Treaty. Bilateral meetings, e.g. the Polish-French summit in Arras, as well as the Weimar Triangle summit in Nancy served that purpose. During the Arras summit, President Aleksander Kwaśniewski spoke about the “particular significance of the outcome of the referendum not only for the Poles, but also for all societies of the European Union.”<sup>5</sup> The French rejection of the Treaty and the ensuing crisis in the EU was met in Poland with a feeling of anxiety over the future of the European integration process. Initially, Poland and France shared the conviction that, after introducing a few indispensable changes, it would be possible to put the Treaty to the vote again or adopt its key provisions in a different form. However, the new Polish authorities were less enthusiastic about supporting the Constitutional

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<sup>5</sup> Press conference of J. Chirac and A. Kwaśniewski following the Arras summit—[www.elysee.fr](http://www.elysee.fr).

Treaty than their predecessors as they believed that the Treaty would excessively limit the sovereignty of the members states. At the same time France rejected the possibility of putting the Treaty to the vote again or even introducing small modifications to it.

Poland and France differed in their approach towards further EU enlargement. Unlike in Poland, there is little public and political support for further enlargement in France. Following the referendum on the Constitutional Treaty, France introduced, at the initiative of President Chirac, a constitutional rule under which a referendum should be held (after admitting Croatia)<sup>6</sup> on each subsequent candidate. Public sentiment and political views that dominated in 2005 practically rule out the possibility of admitting other states to the EU following the accession of Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia. As for Ukraine, a very important partner of Poland, the French side seems to opt for a strengthened partnership with this country rather than its possible EU membership. The question of further EU enlargement may become a moot point in Polish-French relations in the future.

The Poles counted on a favourable decision of the French authorities with regard to opening their labour market and hoped that it would have a positive influence on the attitude represented by other member states. A Polish-French working group for the opening of the labour market to Polish citizens has been active since 2004 (it was established on 22 November); its task has been to search for a solution that would be acceptable to both countries. The issue has regularly been a subject of high-level talks as well. (According to estimates of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, approximately 700 thousand Poles went to France in 2005.)

The pressure, particularly, from France and Germany, obstructing the liberalization of the services market, aroused huge discontent in Poland. We accused France, as well as some other member states, of reverting to economic nationalism. Interestingly enough, after the government change in Poland and its first decisions and actions in the EU forum, Poland found itself among other member states accused of implementing the principles of "economic nationalism" in their policy.

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<sup>6</sup> On 1 March 2005, the French National Assembly passed an amendment to the Constitution of the Republic of France, under which article 88-5 was introduced with the following wording: "Any legislative proposal authorising the ratification of a Treaty pertaining to the accession of a State to the European Union and to the European Communities shall be submitted to referendum by the President of the Republic."

The cooperation in the field of home affairs has developed very well for many years. The year 2005 saw another visit of the French Minister of the Interior in Warsaw (12 September). Nicolas Sarkozy and Minister Ryszard Kalisz discussed, among other issues, the possibility of enlisting Poland in the regular meetings of ministers of the interior of the five largest EU states (currently G-5, G-6 after Poland's accession), problems related to the EU's eastern policy, illegal immigration, terrorism and protection of the population against contemporary threats. Besides, Sarkozy met the leaders of the Civic Platform (*Platforma Obywatelska*—PO) party, which confirmed the developing cooperation between the Union for a Popular Movement, the ruling party in France, and PO. For Sarkozy, the visit in Poland was also an opportunity to “present himself” as one of the most serious candidates for the presidential office in France in the 2007 elections. In this context, Sarkozy's proposal to enlist Poland in the regular meetings of G-5 seems to be even more important; this gesture should be treated not only as acknowledging Poland's role in the EU, but also as readiness to include Poland in the new European “engine” that would be responsible for issues pertaining to the European integration. By the end of the year, however, the French must have been alarmed by statements made by some Polish politicians from the ruling coalition. Their scepticism about the European integration process was reflected in evading the declaration of the Euro adoption date, which meant violation of our obligations under the Accession Treaty. According to many French observers, such signals could be interpreted as the Polish elites' lack of interest in the process of deepening European integration.

In 2005, the positions held by Poland and France on the EU's external relations became more convergent. In Paris, unconditional support for Putin dwindled and the French assessed the situation in Ukraine, Belarus, the Caucasus, Moldova and Central Asia with more subtlety. The French-Ukrainian relations gained particular momentum, which was very well received in Warsaw. Russia, however, remained France's strategic partner in Eastern Europe. France hoped that Russia would continue the process of modernization. The French view the development of their strategic partnership with Russia also as a means to strengthen the position of the EU as a “global player,” also in relation to the USA. From the Polish standpoint, the French-Russian relations lacked a clear and open discussion of such difficult problems as human rights, further development of democracy or Russia's attitude to its closest neighbours. At the same time it must be emphasized that French public opinion demonstrated a higher sensitivity to those issues than it was the case in other European countries.

Nonetheless, France observed our policy towards the EU's eastern neighbours with some unease, and this applied both to our involvement in Ukraine and our bilateral relations with Russia. France was worried that the Polish eastern policy might cross that "thin red line," beyond which lurked the weakened stability of the entire pan-European structure, something which our European partner definitely would not have liked to happen. Thanks to Poland's success in Ukraine, however, we were more frequently perceived by the French as a responsible and reliable partner contributing to the EU's eastern policy.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy continues to pose a serious challenge, but it also offers promising opportunities for Polish-French cooperation within the EU. Poland sought to expand cooperation in this field, calling for more effective actions and more consistent positions of the member states. We supported increasing the CFSP budget and further institutionalization of the cooperation, which was expressed in the proposals of appointing a minister of foreign affairs and the European External Action Service, included in the Constitutional Treaty. This point of view was close to the French standpoint. After the government change, Poland continued to call for more initiative and higher consistency in external relations, particularly with our eastern neighbours. At the same time our enthusiasm for equipping the EU with the indispensable institutional mechanisms became weaker.

After the French rejected the Constitutional Treaty in a referendum, French politicians, not willing to lose the initiative in European affairs, put forward new proposals. They did so for "internal purposes" (the 2007 presidential elections) as well as "external" ones, with a view to influencing the directions of development and the future institutional shape of the EU. President Jacques Chirac presented a concept of a "Europe of projects" that would convince the citizens about the effectiveness of EU policies and actions. These projects would be implemented only by countries that would desire a closer cooperation in the so-called pioneer groups.<sup>7</sup> Nicolas Sarkozy put forward another idea. For several months he has called for the establishment of the "European engine" that would consist of Europe's six largest countries: France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy and Poland. These proposals were met with interest in Poland, and although they did not become a subject of a thorough debate, concerns about maintaining the unity of the EU were voiced.

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<sup>7</sup> *Inter alia*, in an article published in several European dailies (in *Rzeczpospolita* in Poland) on 26 October 2005 and expressed during the traditional New Year Greetings ceremony for the diplomatic corps at the Elysée Palace on 10 January 2006—[www.elysee.fr](http://www.elysee.fr).

Polish-French cooperation with regard to European affairs was crowned by the December Council of Europe summit in Brussels. The debate over the new European Union Financial Perspective for 2007–2013 not only demonstrated that both delegations held convergent views in this field, but also showed the strength and effectiveness of actions taken by Poland and France supported by Germany.

However, the question remains open whether and how long the Polish-French alliance formed during the budget negotiations is going to last; all the more so, because the formation of this alliance was preceded by not very favourable opinions about the new Polish government expressed by the French media and politicians. An answer to this question can be found, above all, in internal debates in Poland and France. Without a clear vision of the EU's future in either country, it will be difficult to define common interests and possibilities of practical cooperation.

### **Economic Cooperation**

Polish-French relations also encompass clear and calculable business profits. France continues to be the largest foreign investor in Poland, with French investments until 2005 reaching €16 billion (including approx. €2 billion in 2005 alone). About 650 branches of French companies operate in Poland, having created approximately 164 thousand jobs.<sup>8</sup> The largest French investors include France Télécome, Vivendi, Casino, Carrefour, Saint Gobin, EDF, Lafarge, Alstom, Thales and Credit Agricole. Investments are mainly concentrated in telecommunications (35%), industrial production and modern technologies (25%), commerce and services (22%), finance and insurance (6%), the construction and hotel industry (5%) as well as farming and the food industry (5%).

Within eleven months in 2005, Polish-French trade increased by 13.2%, in comparison with the analogous period in 2004, and reached €9258.1 million. Poland exported €4413.7 million worth of goods to France, a 21% rise compared to the previous year, whereas French exports to Poland amounted to €4844.4 million, over 7% more than in 2004. The trade balance remained advantageous to France and amounted to approximately €430 million (€1,097 million in 2004), which confirms the downward trend of the Polish trade deficit. It must

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<sup>8</sup> Data based on "Wiele wspólnych interesów," an interview with Pierre Menat, French Ambassador in Poland, *Dziennik Łódzki* of 4 November 2005.

also be noted that Poland's trade with France was growing faster than with other highly developed countries.<sup>9</sup>

### **Cooperation in the Field of Culture, Science and Education**

The death of John Paul II inspired an extraordinary interest in his life, activity and, indirectly, in Poland.

From 1 May to 31 December 2004, the "Nowa Polska" (New Poland) Cultural Season took place in France, the largest undertaking of this kind in the history of the Polish-French cultural cooperation. Thanks to almost 800 cultural events organized in 126 towns and cities in that period, a lot of French people had an opportunity to learn about Polish culture. The results of this project will surely be visible over the next few years. In 2005 the cultural cooperation was not so intensive, however. France witnessed events commemorating the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the establishment of "Solidarity" and the 5<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the death of Jerzy Giedroyc; in Poland, the Royal Castle in Warsaw hosted an exhibition of French painting from 18<sup>th</sup> to the 20<sup>th</sup> c., entitled "Cienie i światła" (Shadows and Lights) and inaugurated by French Minister of Culture Renard Donnadiou de Vabres (19 March).

Despite a relatively broad public response provoked by the Polish cultural season in France, Polish culture is known only by a small section of French society. Nowadays it is associated with just a few names of Polish artists such as Krystian Lupa, Krzysztof Warlikowski, Roman Polański, Andrzej Seweryn or Krzysztof Penderecki.

The development of cooperation can be observed in the field of science and education. As far as the number of Poles studying abroad is concerned, France takes second place in Europe. 83 joint projects have been implemented as part of the scientific and technical cooperation. The Polish-French European Research Group, established in January 2005, is involved in tumour research. Furthermore, talks began in 2005 concerning the mutual recognition of matriculation results for graduates of French secondary schools with a Polish option and of Polish bilingual secondary schools—the so-called Matubac, a binational diploma. In September, there was opened at the prestigious Lycée Montaigne in Paris, the fourth Polish section in France.

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<sup>9</sup> Data of the Economic and Commercial Department of the Polish Embassy in Paris.

### **The Weimar Triangle**

The Weimar Triangle grew out of the Polish-German rapprochement and when France joined in, it became an important and effective instrument for Poland's integration with the European Union. The most momentous event of 2005 was the 6<sup>th</sup> Weimar Triangle summit in Nancy (19 May), attended by Presidents Kwaśniewski and Chirac as well as Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. The agenda of the meeting was heavily influenced by the referendum on the Constitutional Treaty to be held in France. The Polish president and German chancellor gave their support to the French president in his efforts for the adoption of the Treaty. Gerhard Schröder emphasized that "Europe needs France" and, together with Aleksander Kwaśniewski, expressed his belief that the French referendum would bring a positive result. Key issues discussed during the talks in Nancy encompassed the new Financial Perspective for 2007–2013, the future of the Common Agricultural Policy, observing budgetary discipline by EU member states (including the problem of the so-called UK rebate), the European Social Model, the EU's cooperation with Russia and Ukraine, the situation in the Middle East (the peace process, Lebanon, Iraq), as well as preparations for the United Nations summit (the Kyoto Protocol, the reform of the UN, development aid).

A month after the summit (27 June), the Foreign Ministers, Adam Daniel Rotfeld (Poland), Philippe Douste-Blazy (France) and Joschka Fischer (Germany), met in Warsaw. As it was the first meeting of ministers of the Weimar Triangle members after Poland's EU accession, after the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by France and the Netherlands, and after the fiasco of budget negotiations in Brussels, the talks focussed primarily on issues connected with the Constitutional Treaty, the new Financial Perspective and the eastern dimension of the EU's foreign policy. The ministers agreed that the European Union now faced some of the greatest challenges in its history, which resulted from its enlargement and globalization processes. They also indicated a need for joint actions of the Weimar Triangle members towards the EU's eastern partners.

The trilateral, Polish-French-German cooperation represents a real broadening and elaboration of bilateral contacts, an added value for all three partners. In the future, the Weimar Triangle may work towards the creation of an influential "centre of political thought" where Polish-French-German initiatives would be developed with regard to selected EU policies, e.g. the foreign and defence policy or scientific cooperation.

Poland's attachment to the concept of trilateral cooperation is a manifestation of our acknowledgment of the role played by France and Germany in Europe as well as a practical example proving that Poland wishes to join the mainstream of European integration.

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The year 2005 saw an event, the significance of which goes beyond an ordinary courteous gesture for Polish-French relations. Half an hour after the announcement of the tentative results of the presidential elections, the French ambassador handed Lech Kaczyński a letter from Jacques Chirac, congratulating him and inviting him to visit Paris. It was the crowning event of the period of "discovering each other," when both parties made gestures manifesting their will to improve the bilateral cooperation. Thus, Poland and France began 2006 without serious disputes and problems, and more importantly, full of hope for further cooperation on European affairs. The Poles should not expect any breakthrough in the relations with France, but rather a continuation of what has been and is best in them: close and pragmatic cooperation on equal terms and based on mutual liking.

In recent years, when Poland opted for a decidedly liberal approach in its internal policy and was drawn closer to the United Kingdom, it was difficult to imagine the establishment of strong ties with the socially-oriented France. After the presidential and parliamentary elections it seems that close cooperation is more real today than in the past. However, its just one out of many elements making up the extensive and multi-faceted bilateral contacts.

Poland needs an efficient European Union to a much larger extent than France and other member states. France will manage without a consistent and effective CFSP; Poland will not. If we want to influence our neighbours, Ukraine and Belarus, which is in line with our national interest, we need the EU and a common foreign policy. Without French backing, achieving this goal will be very difficult.

Polish-French relations are rich thanks to their diversity. For centuries they have encompassed close historical ties, high hopes, mutual liking and alliances, but also distrust or aversion. The current bilateral relations between Poland and France are predominantly shaped by the membership in the European Union. Two years after its accession to the EU, Poland became a partner that cannot be looked down upon and cannot be told that it "missed a good opportunity to remain silent." French leaders are slowly beginning to appreciate this fact,

whereas in Poland we are aware that France belongs to the narrow circle of EU decision-makers, which should be a sufficiently convincing argument for seeking agreement. Even if French policy continues to be subordinated to France's superpower aspirations, it is worthwhile maintaining good relations with this country, because our influence on the future of the European Union depends on it, both with regard to the EU's internal dimension and external relations.

Over the last few years, we have had legitimate grievances against the French on several occasions, but at the same we have not always pursued a policy that could be defined as optimum with regard to France, i.e. a policy based on an exact definition of our goals, thorough knowledge of the problem and, at the same time, a feeling for French peculiarities. Perhaps just a little more effort would have made the difference to understanding the often irrational opposition and get to know the sources of doubts and distrust. Fortunately, we ought to regard this period as finished.

Foreign Minister Stefan Meller, addressing the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French National Assembly during his visit to Paris (7 December), said that "the current Polish government is the most 'francophone' among all Polish governments after 1989 since half of the ministers can speak fluent French."<sup>10</sup> This is an additional factor that may further improve Polish-French relations in the nearest future. Since great politics consists primarily of direct interpersonal contacts.

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<sup>10</sup> Compte rendu No. 15 of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French National Assembly, 7 December 2005, website: [www.assemblee-nationale.fr](http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr).

## Poland's Relations with Russia

Polish-Russian relations at the turn of 2005 were in a state of visible crisis, standing out even against the background of basically cold relations of both states within the previous 15 years. While Poland's Euro-Atlantic aspirations were the traditional controversial issue in mutual relations, together with other problems left over from the past and a different perception of the issue of human rights, in autumn 2004, at the time of the "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine, new controversial issues emerged with full force that—in the foreseeable future—may have a fundamental significance for the future of mutual neighbouring relations.

The involvement of Polish authorities in the solution of the political conflict in Ukraine was recognised by Russia as an attack on its influence over the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States, which is of priority significance to Russia. This interpretation seems to be confirmed by the words of President Aleksander Kwasniewski in December 2004, who stated that "for every large superpower [meaning the United States—A.E.], Russia without Ukraine is a better solution than Russia with Ukraine."<sup>1</sup> This statement met a disproportionately sharp reaction from President Vladimir Putin, who interpreted it as an attempt to not only limit Russia in its possibilities to develop relations with its neighbours, but even as a call to isolate it. The Russian president did not spare a word of criticism towards Kwaśniewski and assessed the economic situation in Poland with disapproval.<sup>2</sup> The publicising by the Russians of the inappropriate statement of the Polish president explicitly demonstrated that the success of Polish foreign policy in Ukraine at the end of 2004 could have a negative impact on relations with Russia in 2005.

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<sup>1</sup> "Misja kijowska—rozmowa z prezydentem RP o sytuacji na Ukrainie," *Polityka* of 18 December 2004.

<sup>2</sup> "I have the impression this remark was made not by an incumbent president, but by one who is seeking a job because his powers are expiring soon"—in such words Putin commented on the statement of Kwasniewski. He accused the Polish President of the Communist past and called him to focus on solving the problems of Poland, such as unemployment and external debt. See [www.kremlin.ru/appears/2004/12/23/1414\\_type63380type82634\\_81691.shtml](http://www.kremlin.ru/appears/2004/12/23/1414_type63380type82634_81691.shtml).

## Political Relations

Early in the year, the Polish authorities explicitly intended to overcome the circumspection that has grown up in relations with Russia. Foreign Minister Adam D. Rotfeld, in his annual exposé in the Sejm on 21 January 2005 emphasised that relations with Russia have key significance for the Polish foreign policy. “Our involvement in the events in Ukraine was not against Russia. The reason for this involvement was the support of fundamental values, and not a game of interests. (...) Relations of Russia with democratic Western institutions should not be a zero-sum game. Modernisation of Eastern Europe and the prospective integration of Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus with the Euro-Atlantic and European institutions are in the mutual interest of democratic Russia and the West”—he stated.<sup>3</sup>

The visit of Vladimir Putin on the occasion of the celebrations of the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the liberation of the German Auschwitz-Birkenau extermination camp (27 January) was an opportunity for an improvement in Polish-Russian relations. It was planned that a day earlier both presidents would meet in Cracow, and that—according to Rotfeld—“some misunderstandings would be there clarified,” so normal partnership relations between Poland and Russia would be brought back. Eventually, the Russian president came to Poland directly for the celebrations. And though both sides gave assurances that the sole reason for this change was to be sought in very difficult weather conditions at Balice airport, it is difficult to resist the impression that the snow was in fact only a good excuse for the Russians. The two presidents held a short conversation during their joint trip from Cracow to Oświęcim. Contrary to previous announcements, the topic of the Ukrainian election was not discussed, and the politicians managed to discuss the major economic issues only. The hopes for improvement in Polish-Russian relations linked with Putin’s visit to Poland, proved to be vain.

Only two weeks later, tension in the Polish-Russian relations increased regarding the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Yalta conference. On 12 February, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement declaring that “it is a sin to complain about Yalta,” as the Poles do. It criticised the “attempts to distort the results of the Yalta conference” undertaken by the Polish media and emphasised that it was in Yalta that the allied superpowers “confirmed their desire to make Poland strong, free, independent and democratic.” The Russians also indicated

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<sup>3</sup> See above, p. 9.

that it was due to regulations in Yalta and Potsdam that Poland received territorial acquisitions at the expense of Germany, and during the following decades the Soviet Union supported the final recognition of the Polish-German frontier.<sup>4</sup> The Polish Foreign Ministry considered it groundless to issue a special statement in this matter; only the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Sejm expressed its indignation with the Russian statement. Minister Rotfeld, commenting the affair, emphasised that Yalta is a symbol of the division of Europe into spheres of influence, but at the same time he argued that it does not lie in the interests of Poland to exacerbate its relations with Russia, and that a pragmatic and matter-of-fact tone should instead be introduced.<sup>5</sup>

Differences in the interpretation of the Yalta conference became a subject of the first of history-related disputes that took place in Polish-Russian relations in 2005, a year with so many round anniversaries. These historic-related disputes stemmed to a large extent from the fact that the present Russian authorities, having their roots in the Soviet security structures, treat the references to the Soviet period (including the Stalin era) as a vital element of the superpower propaganda, both for internal and international use. This creates a situation in which, paradoxically, no matter how much time has passed, the history of the 20<sup>th</sup> century becomes a more conflict-bearing element of Polish-Russian relations than was the case in the 90s.

The next confirmation of this thesis was the decision of the Russian Chief Military Prosecution, which on 3 March—contrary to its previous declarations and to declarations of President Putin—refused to declassify the part of investigation files of the 1940 Katyn massacre, conducted in Russia from 1990 to 2004. No permission was given to the Polish party to make authorised copies of the declassified documents. In practice, these decisions made it impossible for the Institute of National Remembrance (Instytut Pamięci Narodowej) to carry out an independent investigation, whose aim would be to determine all the perpetrators of the crime.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> See [www.in.mid.ru/Brp\\_4.nsf/arh/314872473059B3E2C3256FA60050BAC4?OpenDocument](http://www.in.mid.ru/Brp_4.nsf/arh/314872473059B3E2C3256FA60050BAC4?OpenDocument).

<sup>5</sup> See <http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/SQL.nsf/Main4?OpenForm&SZA>.

<sup>6</sup> The Russian party consistently refuses to treat the Katyn crime as genocide. Chief Military Prosecutor, General Alexander Savenkov, in his statement to the Polish Press Agency of 24 May 2005 described it as “criminal offence, military official offence, consisting in an illegal giving of an order, which constituted an exceeding of authority by a group of high-ranked officials.” Polish Press Agency, 24 May 2005.

Polish authorities emphasised that they do not understand the premises for the refusal of declassification of the documents related to the crimes of the Soviet institutions of oppression from 65 years ago, even more so, because—considering the passage of time—the case has only symbolic, not legal, significance. “We do not intend to write the history anew, we only want the truth about what happened to be full, and not falsified”—argued Minister Rotfeld.<sup>7</sup> It is worth quoting the opinion of the Marshal of the Sejm, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, who did not exclude the intention to provoke a sharp reaction in Poland and to distort everything that could happen in Polish-Russian relations in the near future, naming in this context the 65<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Katyn massacre and the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the end of World War II.

It is difficult to determine explicitly whether the disputes over the evaluation of the Yalta conference or the declassification of the Katyn files were only a sign of a general trend in the policy of Russia towards history discussed above, or were they in fact provoked to achieve some strictly political objectives. In any case, the result was that the vast majority of the Polish political circles and Polish society questioned the sense of the participation of President Kwasniewski in the celebrations of the end of World War II in Moscow, planned for 9 May.

Though the Polish president had declared his willingness to participate in the celebrations as early as in February, the public debate on this matter in Poland was going on for three more months. Representatives of the government, supported by politicians from mostly leftist circles (SLD, Samoobrona and PSL) argued that the presence of the Polish president would make it possible to emphasise the Polish contribution to the victory over Nazism, and first of all, would be a good opportunity to remind people that the end of the war did not mean restoration of freedom for all countries. It was also emphasised that the absence of the Polish president would not be understood by the international opinion, would make the already difficult relations with Russia even more complicated and would be used by Russia to undermine the image of Poland, or even to isolate it on the international stage.<sup>8</sup> The opponents of the participation of the President in the celebrations, mostly from the rightist parties of the opposition (PiS and—though less categorically—PO and LPR) feared that the

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<sup>7</sup> See [www.msz.gov.pl/file\\_libraries/29/11474/konferencja\\_pras\\_krakow.html](http://www.msz.gov.pl/file_libraries/29/11474/konferencja_pras_krakow.html).

<sup>8</sup> The arguments in support of the participation in the Moscow celebrations: M. Belka, “Jałta–Moskwa–Warszawa,” *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 23 February 2005; “Musimy jechać do Moskwy—wywiad z Ministrem Adamem Danielem Rotfeldem,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 11 March 2005.

celebrations would be used by the Russians to promote a distorted vision of the historical past, and the presence of President Kwasniewski would be understood as an approval of such a distortion.<sup>9</sup> These fears gained in strength after it was made public that Russia also sent its invitation to the last leader of the communist Polish People's Republic, General Wojciech Jaruzelski (as to a war veteran). A part of the Polish political circles understood this action as a provocation, supposing that Jaruzelski was honoured as a symbol of consolidation of the Yalta order in Poland.

The ongoing discussions concerning the participation of the President in the Moscow celebrations were accompanied by further tensions in bilateral relations—this time they were related to the interpretation of the conflict in Chechnya. On 8 March, the Russian authorities gave information about the assassination of Aslan Maskhadov. Minister Rotfeld, giving his comment on this news during his lecture in Collegium Civitas in Warsaw, stated that the assassination of the leader of Chechnya's separatists, who had declared his will to achieve a compromise, is “worse than a crime—it is a political error.”<sup>10</sup> The next day, the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Aleksander Checko, commented on this statement in almost the same words.<sup>11</sup>

Statements of representatives of Polish authorities, standing out explicitly against the background of a toned attitude of other European governments, were received by a lot of the Russian media with indignation.<sup>12</sup> The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov, in his telephone conversation with Minister Rotfeld described the Polish standpoint as anti-Russian, unacceptable and incompatible with basic norms of relations between two states.<sup>13</sup> The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused Poland of having a distorted view of the situation in the Caucasus and emphasised that it was Maskhadov who was

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<sup>9</sup> The arguments against the participation of the Moscow celebrations: T. Merta, “Nie jechać do Moskwy,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 29 March 2005; B. Komorowski, “Wizyta dużego rzyzka,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 12 April 2005.

<sup>10</sup> Polish Press Agency, 9 March 2005.

<sup>11</sup> Polish Press Agency newswire, 10 March 2005.

<sup>12</sup> Though the theses voiced by the Foreign Minister and the Spokesman of the Ministry were almost identical, the Russians focused on criticising the second statement, which—probably by accident—was more publicised by news agencies.

<sup>13</sup> See [www.ln.mid.ru/Brp\\_4.nsf/arh/BA33D8BEE9BE1462C3256FC1005800D2?OpenDocument;www.msz.gov.pl/Rozmowa,telefoniczna,ministrow,spraw,zagranicznych,Polski,i,Federacji,Rosyjskiej,,Adama,Daniela,Rotfelda,i,Sergieja,Lawrowa,,11,marca,2005,779.html](http://www.ln.mid.ru/Brp_4.nsf/arh/BA33D8BEE9BE1462C3256FC1005800D2?OpenDocument;www.msz.gov.pl/Rozmowa,telefoniczna,ministrow,spraw,zagranicznych,Polski,i,Federacji,Rosyjskiej,,Adama,Daniela,Rotfelda,i,Sergieja,Lawrowa,,11,marca,2005,779.html).

directly responsible for terrorist attacks in Russia.<sup>14</sup> The advisor to President Putin, Sergey Yastrzhembsky, further developed this opinion stating that "The Polish political elite often perceives the present times from the angle of the past and historical facts. Historical experience very often distorts the view of the present."<sup>15</sup> Minister Rotfeld, relating to Russian accusations emphasised that his intent was not to justify criminals or to relativise the threat of terrorism, but to indicate the necessity to seek political means to solve the conflict in Chechnya.<sup>16</sup>

The credibility of the words of the Minister was by no means supported by Anti-Russian demonstrations of pro-Chechen circles held in many Polish cities after the assassination of Maskhadov, and particularly by the decision made only one week later, on 17 March, by the Warsaw City Council. Warsaw local government made a decision about naming one of the roundabouts in the capital after Dzhokar Dudayev, the first president of Chechnya, considered by Russians a terrorist. Russian ambassador in Warsaw, Nikolai Afansyevski, regarded this decision as anti-Russian provocation. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also expressed its indignation with the decision of Warsaw authorities. It was considered an insult to the memory of Russians who died in terrorist attacks and an "actual sign of support for international terrorism."<sup>17</sup> The degree of indignation on the part of the Russians was proved by the discussions held in the Moscow Duma about changing the name of the street where the Polish Embassy has its seat, to the name of General Mikhail Muravyov, called "the Hangman," the suppressor of the 1863 Uprising, much hated in Poland. The Polish government tried to minimise the significance of this incident and indicated that it had no influence over the decision of local authorities.

Although further controversies, casting a shadow on Polish-Russian Relations, did not influence President Kwasniewski's change of decision concerning his participation in the celebrations of the end of the war, they made this visit much more difficult, even if there wasn't any—not even the slightest—basis to expect friendly gestures towards Poland from the hosts. At the same time, the Polish debate concerning relations with Russia, dominated by issues of prestige and symbols, fostered such expectations.

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<sup>14</sup> See [www.ln.mid.ru/Brp\\_4.nsf/arh/46832CE2D18F99BAC3256FC00039184A?OpenDocument](http://www.ln.mid.ru/Brp_4.nsf/arh/46832CE2D18F99BAC3256FC00039184A?OpenDocument).

<sup>15</sup> Newswire of RIA Novosti, 12 March 2005. Polish Press Agency, 13 March 2005.

<sup>16</sup> "Musimy jechać do Moskwy—wywiad z ministrem Adamem Danielem Rotfeldem," *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 11 March 2005.

<sup>17</sup> See [www.ln.mid.ru/Brp\\_4.nsf/arh/CDDA7E56FB201A87C3256FCB00533D8B?OpenDocument](http://www.ln.mid.ru/Brp_4.nsf/arh/CDDA7E56FB201A87C3256FCB00533D8B?OpenDocument).

The day before celebrations Aleksander Kwaśniewski emphasised that he “was not going to Moscow to pay homage to those who were arresting Polish patriots, who were transporting them to camps, who were killing them and installed the Stalinist system of terror and enslavement,” but with his presence he wished “to thank all those who were fighting with fascism, and were doing it from the purest of reasons, who sacrificed their lives.”<sup>18</sup> During the visit, apart from participating in the official programme, Kwaśniewski paid homage to victims of the Communist totalitarianism. He visited the Donski Cemetery, the Andrey Sakharov Museum and laid flowers at the Solovki Stone at Lubyanka Square. He also emphasised that historic truth should make the foundation of Polish-Russian agreement.

The presence of the Polish president in Moscow and the gestures he made were not noticed by the Russian media, which were drawn to Gen. Jaruzelski, distinguished *inter alia* by the Russian president with the jubilee Medal for “The 60<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of Victory.” Vladimir Putin, speaking during the ceremony in Red Square, did not relate to the post-war order in Europe and passed over the contribution to the victory of Polish armed forces (the fourth—when it comes to size—army of the anti-Nazi coalition), though he mentioned the activities of German and Italian anti-Fascists. During the ceremony, President Kwasniewski was given a seat in the rear row, which was interpreted by the Polish media as an attempt to humiliate the Polish president.

The celebrations of May 9 were evaluated unambiguously in Poland—the speech of the Russian president was considered an insult towards Poland, an unfriendly, irreverent action. Though Minister Rotfeld appealed not to pay too much attention to the omission of the Polish contribution in the war, he also admitted that the Moscow celebrations led to the worsening in Polish-Russian relations. He stated that Poland was incapable of changing this state of affairs since—as he declared—“the reasons of the cooling are beyond us.”<sup>19</sup> Rotfeld did not exclude the possibility that it was a sign of purposeful activities intended to limit the role of Poland in shaping the Eastern policy of the EU. Aleksander Kwasniewski was also inclined to such an interpretation, while indicating extremely directly the priorities of the Polish policy, “if the cooling in

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<sup>18</sup> Polish Press Agency, 4 May 2005.

<sup>19</sup> Polish Press Agency, 13 May 2005.

Polish-Russian relations is the cost of our involvement in the solving of the Ukrainian crisis, I say this was worth doing it.”<sup>20</sup>

Shortly after the Moscow celebrations it seemed that relations between the two states reached rock bottom, so it could only get better. Within one month, two meetings were held between the two Foreign Ministers, Adam D. Rotfeld and Sergey Lavrov—on 16 May on the occasion of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Summit of the Council of Europe in Warsaw and on 10 June on the occasion of the session of the Council of the Baltic Sea States in Szczecin. The meeting of a bilateral group of experts for difficult situations was held. There was not much information issued on the effects of these meetings, which was explained by the Polish minister as the wish of both parties to “cool down the temperature of emotions, which are partly justified, and partly not.”<sup>21</sup> Such declarations seemed to indicate at least a lack of breakthrough in the Polish-Russian dialogue.

This was confirmed anyway by further controversies which arose in mutual relations. Early in July they concerned the celebrations of the 750<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Kaliningrad (Königsberg, Królewiec), to which Vladimir Putin invited the leaders of France and Germany, Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder. President Aleksander Kwasniewski made an assessment that the decision of not inviting the high representatives of neighbouring Poland and Lithuania was “more than an error,”<sup>22</sup> and Foreign Minister Adam D. Rotfeld considered it a sign of “a certain inferiority complex.”<sup>23</sup> The Russians treated these commentaries as an attempt to impose their own vision of the celebrations of the 750<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Kaliningrad.

Polish reactions towards the fact that Putin hosted in Kaliningrad his “friends, and not neighbours” could be well considered exaggerated, though if one looked at them against the political context of the time, they could be better understood. Only a few days earlier there were commenced the activities for the construction of the Northern Gas Pipeline at the bottom of the Baltic Sea, by Russian and German enterprises and with clear political support of the

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<sup>20</sup> For the sake of clarity, it is worth noting that directly after the ceremony on the Red Square, Aleksander Kwaśniewski evaluated the speech of President Putin as “unusually politically correct, important and balanced occasional statement.” Polish Press Agency, 12 May 2005 and 13 May 2005.

<sup>21</sup> Polish Press Agency, 10 June 2005.

<sup>22</sup> Polish Press Agency, 27 June 2005.

<sup>23</sup> Polish Press Agency, 4 July 2005.

authorities of the two states. The investment, being in fact a more costly alternative to the construction of the second branch of the Yamal gas pipeline anticipated so far, was evaluated in Poland as a political action, directed against its energy safety. The Kaliningrad meeting was thus held at the time of particular sensibility to Russian-German projects that ignored Poland.

The level of tensions in mutual relations is indicated by the escalation of the 31 July incident in Warsaw, when a group of hooligans assaulted and mugged three teenage children of Russian diplomats (and their friend, a Kazakh). Russian authorities reacted surprisingly sharply to this event, not contenting themselves with a note from the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressing "heartfelt regrets" in relation to the incident. The Russian party did reject the Polish thesis on the criminal and coincidental nature of the incident, seeing in it the signs of russophobia, allegedly existing in Poland, and exacerbated by politicians. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs demanded from the Polish party "official apologies" and called the Polish ambassador for a meeting. Even President Putin himself got involved in this matter, describing the incident as an "unfriendly act."<sup>24</sup> A wave of criticism towards Poland ran through the Russian media, and unknown perpetrators even used stronger arguments. Within one week (5–10 August) in the streets of Moscow a Polish diplomat, a technician at the Polish embassy, a correspondent of the *Rzeczpospolita* newspaper and a Russian employed as a driver in the Polish embassy were beaten up.

The reaction of Poland was much more balanced. Though it is difficult to consider the attacks on the Polish citizens as coincidental events, Minister Rotfeld expressly avoided any exceedingly unambiguous evaluation, hiding behind the lack of evidence. He only stated with anxiety that bilateral relations go "from bad to worse" and indicated the discrepancy between the assurances of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the reality, which is apparently being shaped by forces striving to maintain the state of tension.

On 12 August, on the initiative of Poland, a telephone conversation between the two presidents was held. Aleksander Kwasniewski stressed his vital interest in overcoming the existing tensions. His call for "return to normalcy" in the Polish-Russian relations was supported by Vladimir Putin.<sup>25</sup> He condemned the incidents of attack on Polish citizens. The day after, a meeting was held between the Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister, Valery Loshchinin and the Polish

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<sup>24</sup> See [www.kremlin.ru/appears/2005/08/01/1458\\_type63378type63381\\_91962.shtml](http://www.kremlin.ru/appears/2005/08/01/1458_type63378type63381_91962.shtml).

<sup>25</sup> See [www.mid.ru/brp\\_4.nsf/sps/81251E99BADD43D9C325705C00274347](http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/sps/81251E99BADD43D9C325705C00274347).

ambassador in Moscow Stefan Meller. There has, however, occurred one case of friction. The communiqué of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that during the meeting “the hope was expressed that irrespective of the pre-election combat in Poland, the increase of anti-Russian sentiment will be stopped,”<sup>26</sup> while Ambassador Meller declared that the pre-election situation in Poland was not discussed during the meeting at all.

The victory of Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) in the parliamentary elections and of Lech Kaczyński in presidential elections received a cold reception in Russia. In commentaries, the alleged russophobia of the leaders of the Polish right was mentioned. They were reproached for criticising Aleksander Kwaśniewski for his participation in the Victory Day celebrations and for the announcement of undertaking activities aimed at hindering the construction of the Baltic gas pipeline. The Russian media also reproached Lech Kaczyński for being one of the initiators of giving the Warsaw roundabout the name Dudayev.<sup>27</sup> There were, however, some opinions formed, e.g. by the head of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the State Duma, Konstantin Kosachov, that though initially it was probable that the Polish-Russian relations would worsen further, in the long term—paradoxically—the right may prove to be more open than post-Communists to find an understanding with Russia.

The first statements and decisions of the new Polish authorities seemed at the same time to confirm the Russian anxieties and not to cancel the existing hopes. The day after the victory in elections, Lech Kaczyński drew attention to the lack of balance in the mutuality principle in the hitherto meetings of the presidents of Poland and Russia and said—in a very determined way—that he would visit Russia solely on the condition of an earlier visit of Putin in Warsaw. The government of Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz explicitly stated that he would carry out the program of relations with Russia “first of all through the EU structures.”<sup>28</sup> Moreover, there were also some announcements of activities that triggered an undisguised discontent of the Russians—*inter alia*, the intent of

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<sup>26</sup> See [www.mid.ru/brp\\_4.nsf/sps/3A058467DD6EC4D6C325705C002FF54B](http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/sps/3A058467DD6EC4D6C325705C002FF54B).

<sup>27</sup> N. Popova, A. Maksymov, “Prezydentom Polshy stal potchitatel’ Dzhokhara Dudayeva,” *Izvestiya*, 24 October 2005; A. Malgin, “Poklonnik Dudayeva i Vysotskovo vozglavit Polshu,” *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 25 October 2005.

<sup>28</sup> See [www.kprm.gov.pl/\\_i/dokumenty/solidp.pdf](http://www.kprm.gov.pl/_i/dokumenty/solidp.pdf), p. 28.

Poland to participate in the American project of the missile defence system or to declassify the Warsaw Pact files.<sup>29</sup>

At the same time, the president-elect expressed his will to improve relations with Russia. He even voiced an opinion in line with the viewpoint of Russian commentators mentioned above, "It is possible that it is the centre-right side of the political scene that may be a better partner for Russia. We have larger consent to reach a compromise."<sup>30</sup> Next, in his address during the swearing-in ceremony, the new Polish president expressed his opinion that there were no objective reasons for which Poland and Russia could not enjoy good mutual relations. A symbolic gesture of opening towards Russia was the appointment for the Foreign Minister in the new government the hitherto ambassador in the Russian Federation, Stefan Meller, who—two days after he had taken over the new position, on 14 November, paid a visit to Moscow—a good-bye visit in his old role, and a welcome visit in the new one.

### Economic Relations

Taking into account the dynamics of increase in bilateral trade, Polish-Russian economic relations in 2005 must be considered as good. The trade exchange increased from \$9,234 million in 2004 to \$12,927 million (by as much as 40%).<sup>31</sup> The high trade deficit continued to be a permanent feature, unfavourable for Poland—though the percentage increase in the value of exports and imports was on the similar level in 2005. In absolute figures this increase meant a worsening of the negative balance of the trade exchange. It amounted to \$5,032 million, thus constituting as much as 43.5% of the whole Polish trade deficit.

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<sup>29</sup> In his interview for *Gazeta Wyborcza*, the above-mentioned Konstantin Kosachov described the decision of the Ministry of Defence on the declassification of the Warsaw Pact files as "political provocation" and "a next burden in Polish-Russian relations." On the other hand, a possible establishment of missile defence system in Poland could—according to the head of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the State Duma—result in weakening of the Russian nuclear potential, and—consequently—to the return to the arms race. Cf. "A Polacy tylko Katyń, Katyń i Katyń," *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 30 November 2005. See [www.kprm.gov.pl/\\_i/dokumenty/solidp.pdf](http://www.kprm.gov.pl/_i/dokumenty/solidp.pdf), pp. 28, 31.

<sup>30</sup> "To Jarek wygrał wybory," *Newsweek* of 24 October 2005.

<sup>31</sup> See [www.stat.gov.pl/dane\\_spol-gosp/ceny\\_handel\\_uslugi/index.htm](http://www.stat.gov.pl/dane_spol-gosp/ceny_handel_uslugi/index.htm); *Polska 2005. Raport o stanie handlu zagranicznego*, Warszawa, 2005, pp. 24–25. A visible increase in the dynamics of trade exchange, expressed in USD (and in EUR) stemmed partly from appreciation of zloty and ruble in 2005.

Table

**Trade of Poland with Russia**

| Items              | 2005                 |                      |                      |            |       |       | 2004           | 2005 |
|--------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|------------|-------|-------|----------------|------|
|                    | in<br>million<br>PLN | in<br>million<br>USD | in<br>million<br>EUR | 2004 = 100 |       |       | structure in % |      |
|                    |                      |                      |                      | PLN        | USD   | EUR   |                |      |
| Export to Russia   | 12778.4              | 3947.5               | 3160.3               | 122.8      | 138.9 | 137.4 | 3.8            | 4.4  |
| Import from Russia | 29105.9              | 8979.9               | 7211.4               | 123.8      | 140.5 | 139.6 | 7.2            | 8.9  |

Source: *Obroty handlu zagranicznego ogółem i według krajów I–XII 2005 (temporary data)*, Central Statistical Office, [www.stat.gov.pl/dane\\_spol-gosp/ceny\\_handel\\_uslugi/index.htm](http://www.stat.gov.pl/dane_spol-gosp/ceny_handel_uslugi/index.htm)

The imports from Russia amounted in 2005 to \$8,980 million, i.e. 40.5% more than in the previous year. This was mostly a result of the visible increase in energy commodity prices (crude oil and natural gas), which had been dominating in the structure of Polish imports from Russia for years (at the level of 80%). Russia is the second—after Germany—supplier of goods to Poland, and during 2005 its share rose from 7.2 to 8.9%. On the other hand, for Russia the Polish market is ninth in terms of size, making for 3.6% of its exports.<sup>32</sup>

Exports to Russia amounted to \$3,948 million and grew by 38% compared to 2004. Russia is the sixth largest recipient of Polish goods—after Germany, France, Italy, the U.K. and the Czech Republic. The structure by goods of the Polish exports to Russia is diverse. These are chemicals, electric equipment, products of the wood and paper industry, as well as food and agriculture products. Russia's share in Polish exports grew in one year from 3.8 to 4.4%. Imports from Poland still make for a small share in Russian trade balance, amounting to 2.8% and making Poland the 13<sup>th</sup> most important supplier of goods to Russia.

The increase of Polish exports to Russia was fostered by such factors as the increase of Russian consumer demand resulting from increase in real income, a further appreciation of the rouble stemming from the inflow of foreign currencies for the exports of energy commodities and an improved variety of

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<sup>32</sup> See [www.customs.ru/ru/stats/arhiv-stats-new/popup.php?id286=125](http://www.customs.ru/ru/stats/arhiv-stats-new/popup.php?id286=125).

Polish goods (Polish enterprises are investing in Russia, create their own distribution networks, they also export manufacturing components to that market).<sup>33</sup> It should be remembered, however, that before the accession to the EU, a part of Polish exports to Russia went via the Baltic States (mostly Lithuania and Latvia), which maintained simplified trade procedures with Russia. In 2005, such intermediation was pointless.

The increase of Polish exports to Russia was possible in spite of difficulties in the access of Polish food products to the Russian market. In 2005, some of the Polish manufacturers were deprived of the possibility of exporting to Russia as a result of prolonged procedures of issuing Russian veterinary certificates for enterprises from new EU member states. These delays stemmed from the necessity for the Russian veterinary services to undertake controlling activities in Polish dairies, poultry farms as well as meat and fish processing plants that applied for permission to sell on the Russian market. The request to increase the pace of issuing the certificates has been voiced—without much success—both directly by Poland itself (the case was even raised by President Kwasniewski during his short conversation with Vladimir Putin in January during his visit at the celebrations of the liberation of the Auschwitz-Birkenau camp), and indirectly via the EU.

Even greater difficulties emerged in late 2005, when the Russian Ministry of Agriculture introduced a total ban on imports for most of Polish food products. Since 10 November, the ban concerned the imports of meat, and since 14 November also vegetable products. The Russians justified their decision referring to the infringement of Russian veterinary and phytosanitary regulations, being mostly falsifications of export certificates by some Polish exporters. The banned goods made for around 8% of total Polish exports to Russia.

Poland admitted that some irregularities had, in fact, occurred in the exports of food products. At the same time, it expressed its deep surprise both with the decision itself and the way in which it was implemented. The sanctions—according to the Polish Ministry of Agriculture—were disproportionate to the offence, as the cases of falsification of export certificates were only incidental. After having obtained the information about such a practice, the Polish authorities undertook activities aimed at eliminating similar events. Russia notified neither Poland nor the EU about the intent to introduce limitations, which she was obliged to do by the memorandum on veterinary cooperation.

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<sup>33</sup> *Rzeczpospolita* of 14 May 2005.

The date of the introduction of the limitations could indicate its political background, which was also suggested by Foreign Minister, Stefan Meller.<sup>34</sup> The ban on imports of meat from Poland was introduced on the day when the government of Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz asked the Parliament for vote of confidence. The Russian party firmly rejected such an interpretation.

The Polish government appealed repeatedly to the Russian veterinary and phytosanitary services and the Minister of Agriculture to abolish the ban as soon as possible, declaring its readiness to implement the Russian conditions (*inter alia* an introduction of additional control procedures and a decrease in the number of clearance points of exported food). In spite of all this, the dispute went on in 2006. Losses of Polish manufacturers and exporters are evaluated at around \$27–28 million per month.

It seems that Polish-Russian political controversies had some impact at least on the delay in solving the problem, if not on the introduction of export limitations of Polish products itself. The year 2005 did not lack in other symptoms of negative influence of politics on the climate of economic contacts either. Problems with organising the Poland-Russia Economic Forum make a good example. It was initially planned to be held with the participation of presidents from both states in January in Cracow. It was finally cancelled, however. And though during their meeting in January, Aleksander Kwasniewski and Vladimir Putin unanimously proposed that the Forum be held in Petersburg as early as in the first half of the year, the next months lacked in favourable climate in mutual relations to carry out this proposal. During the whole year, contrary to the announcements made by politicians, it proved impossible to organise the first meeting of the Polish-Russian Intergovernmental Commission for Economic Cooperation, appointed on the basis of the agreement of 2 November 2004, with the purpose to support the development of bilateral economic relations. No progress was achieved in the works on the agreement on the support and mutual protection of investments as well as on a new agreement aimed at regulating the maritime transport on the Vistula/Kaliningrad Lagoon. The parties were unable to reach an agreement in other economic issues as well—such as the construction of the second branch of the Yamal-Europe gas pipeline, the participation of Russian companies in the privatisation of the Polish energy industry, the establishment of a railroad terminal in Slawkowo and its

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<sup>34</sup> “Gość ‘Rzeczpospolitej’ Stefan Meller: Potrzebna jest nam spokojna rzeczowość,” *Rzeczpospolita* of 14 November 2005.

linking to the Russian broad-track railroad network as well as the expansion of Elblag-Kaliningrad road.

### Cultural Relations

The major event in the Polish-Russian relations in the domain of culture in 2005 was the Polish Season in Russia—the largest (for many years) presentation of Polish cultural achievements, composed of an eight-month (from March to October) cycle of around 30 events in Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod, Kazan, Yekaterinburg, Irkutsk and Sochi. The Polish Season was preceded by a similar, though carried out more modestly, Russian Season in Poland (November 2004–January 2005). Both events were held based on inter-ministerial agreement, and from Poland they were coordinated by the Adam Mickiewicz Institute.<sup>35</sup>

An exhibition “Warsaw-Moscow/Moscow-Warsaw 1900–2000,” the largest presentation so far of artistic relations between Poland and Russia in the 20<sup>th</sup> century in the form of paintings, installations, posters, photographs and graphic works by both Polish and Russian artists, enjoyed an undeniable success. Over 60 thousand persons visited the exhibition in the Zachęta Gallery in Warsaw. The exhibition also met with the great interest of the Russian spectators, who could see it in the National Centre of Contemporary Art in Moscow—a branch of the Tretyakov Gallery.

As part of the Polish Season in Russia, such events were also held as, *inter alia*, retrospectives of films of Krzysztof Kieślowski and Jacek Bromski, performances of Teatr Narodowy (the National Theatre), ballet performances of Teatr Wielki (the Grand Theatre) from Warsaw and of Teatr Współczesny (the Contemporary Theatre) from Wrocław. In the Vsevolod Meyerhold Centre in Moscow, which is one of the most important centres of avant-garde theatre in Russia, Tadeusz Kantor Days were held and the achievements of the Polish artist were shown. The Russian audience could also see an exhibition—Me, Gombrowicz, dedicated to the work of the writer, and an exhibition—Beyond the Red Horizon, being a broad presentation of works of young artists from

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<sup>35</sup> *Protokół o współpracy między Ministrem Kultury Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej a Federalną Agencją Kultury i Kinematografii Federacji Rosyjskiej na lata 2004–2005*, 17/11/2004. See [www.mk.gov.pl](http://www.mk.gov.pl); *Porozumienie zawarte pomiędzy Ministrem Kultury RP a Federalną Agencją Kultury i Kinematografii FR w sprawie organizacji Dni Kultury Polski w Federacji Rosyjskiej (Sezonu Polskiego w Rosji) w 2005 roku*. See [www.mk.gov.pl](http://www.mk.gov.pl).

Poland and Russia. Krzysztof Penderecki gave a concert in Petersburg, and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Henryk Wieniawski Festival was held.

Polish cultural presence in Russia in 2005 was not limited solely to the events of the Polish Season. Poland offered a lot in the field of literature as well. The country was the honorary guest on the 18<sup>th</sup> International Book Fair (in September) and a special guest on the 7<sup>th</sup> International Non-Fiction Book Fair (in December). The two events are the most important fora of the so-called ambitious book in Russia.

Unfortunately, the general political context of Polish-Russian relations had a negative influence on cultural relations as well. The most visible sign occurred when the performances of the Bolshoi Theatre and The Stanislavsky Theatre Moscow, which were to be given in Warsaw, Olsztyn and Lublin, were called off. As organisers informed, the cause was little interest enjoyed, resulting from “massive returns of tickets” directly after the Moscow Victory Day celebrations. Irrespective of whether the given justification was true (or was just a good pretext for the organisers to withdraw from the project), the incident had a negative impact on the climate in Polish-Russian cultural relations. Polish media even mentioned rumours that the Polish Season in Russia might be closed by the Russian party ahead of schedule.

2005 did not lack in positive gestures, in response to political controversies, mostly on the part of Russian social organisations. The Russian PEN Club, in its letter to Polish writers, expressed its warm feelings towards Poland and criticised anti-Polish statements of Russian politicians as “adding bitterness and consternation to traumas and errors that have accumulated for centuries.”<sup>36</sup> The Memorial organisation, whose aim is to document the crimes of the Communist regime, called the Russian authorities to renew the investigation into the Katyn massacre, and—on the initiative of the President of the Congress of the Russian Intelligentsia, Sergey Filatov—a discussion evening was held in Moscow, dedicated to the Katyn massacre, “Katyn—the great pain not only for Poland, but for Russia as well.” The honouring of Natalia Gorbaniewska, a Russian poet and social activist, and a Polish citizen at the same time, with the prestigious Jerzy Giedroyc Award (granted by the editors of the *Rzeczpospolita* newspaper) for her “many years of devoted activities to build friendship, trust and

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<sup>36</sup> See [www.sdp.pl/220405\\_list.php](http://www.sdp.pl/220405_list.php).

understanding (...) between Poles and Russians,<sup>37</sup> was a particularly symbolic gesture.

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Active cultural contacts and a decidedly visible increase of trade exchange are practically the only positive aspects of Polish-Russian relations in 2005. In the political area, mutual relations were characterised by a state of permanent crisis, caused by the disputes concerning the interpretation of World War II (the Katyn massacre, the Yalta conference, 9 May), the evaluation of the situation in Chechnya, energy-related projects (the second branch of the Yamal gas pipeline versus the Baltic gas pipeline) and the trade issues (veterinary certificates, limitations of Polish imports). The high level of tension in Polish-Russian relations was clearly indicated by the escalation and the political nature of the hooligan incident of the attack on the children of Russian diplomats.

It seems that the high level of conflict in relations with Russia has a permanent nature. Since the fall of Communism (irrespective of the history of more distant ages) mutual relations remain both burdened by different views on history and—much more importantly—contradictory as regards basic political interests, concerning mostly the vision of the future of Central and Eastern Europe. Because of these factors the announcements of a breakthrough (recently voiced by the Polish party after the visit of President Putin in Warsaw in January 2002<sup>38</sup>) did not come to pass. If there were some warm periods in the mutual relations, this change was only temporary.

Nothing seems to indicate any change in the near future. The cause for the new wave of tension in Polish-Russian relations, observed in 2005, was discrepancies of a basic significance for both states. They concerned the issue of the direction of changes in Ukraine. And though there might be some hope that the present circumspection in the relations between Poland and Russia as well as their confrontational nature will give place to a more pragmatic cooperation, and some of the conflicts will ease, it would be difficult to expect that the key controversial problem—one of contradictory visions of the development of the common neighbourhood area—can be overcome.

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<sup>37</sup> “Przyjaciółka Polski,” *Rzeczpospolita* of 10 November 2005; “Poetka i legenda opozycji,” *ibidem*.

<sup>38</sup> See “Bliżej, szybciej, cieplej,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 21 January 2002.

## **Poland's Relations with Ukraine**

Just as the year 2004 was a trial period for Polish-Ukrainian relations, a test to verify the credibility of the policy assumed by The Third Republic of Poland towards Ukraine (a policy that was frequently subjected to criticism due to its declarative character, ineffectiveness and excessive lenience towards the eastern partner), the main task in 2005 was to take advantage of the outcomes of the “Orange Revolution”: to strengthen the democratic transformations in Ukraine, reinforce the strategic Polish-Ukrainian partnership and develop links between the two countries, in multiple dimensions. Unfortunately, this task was accomplished in part only, as a result of both the evolution of Ukraine’s internal situation and the slump in the “revolutionary zeal” that characterized Poland’s policy towards the eastern neighbour in the winter of 2004.

### **The Significance of the “Orange Revolution”**

At the beginning of 2005, Polish-Ukrainian relations could be assessed as very good. Poland took an active part in solving the political crisis that arose in Ukraine after the fraud-ridden election of the 21 November 2004, and undertook actions to secure support of the western, mainly European, partners for its efforts. The effects of the efforts were outstanding. Negotiations with the participation of, among others, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, Polish President, and Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, led to a compromise between the outgoing President Leonid Kuchma, his designated successor Viktor Yanukovych and the leader of the democratic forces Viktor Yushchenko. This resulted in a peaceful resolution of the crisis and the victory of Yushchenko in the repeated second round of the presidential elections held on 26 December 2004. The engagement of Poland and the United States, besides the mobilization of Ukrainian society and the superb organization of the democratic faction, was one of the key factors that allowed the “Orange Revolution” to succeed. Moreover, measures undertaken by Poland strengthened

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its position in the European Union, enhanced the credibility of the EU common foreign policy, and unified the majority of the Polish political class around the common goal (democracy in Ukraine).<sup>1</sup>

Furthermore, it appears important that the Ukrainian crisis triggered a reaction of the Polish society. In December 2004 over a half of the people in Poland discussed the situation in Ukraine.<sup>2</sup> In comparison to 2003, the number of respondents who declared positive feelings towards the Ukrainians rose by 10% (from 19% to 29%).<sup>3</sup> Thanks to the “Orange Revolution,” a completely new picture of Ukraine started to form in Poland. It was based not only on the traditional readings of “With Fire and Sword” by Henryk Sienkiewicz, the memory of the Volhynia Tragedy of 1943 and loathing towards the “Russkies,” but also on the events from Kyiv’s Independence Square and the anthem of the “Orange Revolution,” “Razom nas bahato” (Together we are many). In the winter of 2004, Warsaw, Cracow and other Polish cities witnessed demonstrations in support of Ukrainian democracy almost every day. The repeated second round of the presidential elections was monitored by about 3 thousand observers from Poland.<sup>4</sup> The interest in the developments in Ukraine and the support for the new authorities were substantially proved by the “Man of the Year” award granted to President Viktor Yushchenko by the Polish *Wprost* weekly. Julia Tymoshenko, his ally from the “Orange Revolution” period, who later became Prime Minister, was awarded the title “Person of the Year of Central and Eastern Europe” by the Council of the 15<sup>th</sup> Economic Forum in Krynica.

### The Development of Bilateral Relations

Polish authorities believed that “mass solidarity of the Poles with the democratic Ukraine is a good starting point for a breakthrough in the relations between our nations” and emphasized that the bilateral relations could not be reduced to contacts between the heads of State only. Therefore, they declared

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<sup>1</sup> Disapproval of pro-Ukrainian policy was expressed in particular by the League of Polish Families (LPR).

<sup>2</sup> M. Wenzel, *Reakcje na wydarzenia na Ukrainie. Komunikat z badań*, Warszawa: Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, grudzień 2004, No BS/191/2004, p. 3, www.cbos.pl.

<sup>3</sup> M. Skrzyszewski, *Stosunek do innych narodów. Komunikat z badań*, Warszawa: Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, styczeń 2005, No BS/1/2005, p. 3, www.cbos.pl.

<sup>4</sup> See W. Zajączkowski, “Polish-Ukrainian Relations,” *Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy 2005*, Warsaw, 2005, p. 132.

their willingness to establish solid and, at the same time, practical, foundations for “such a development of bilateral relations at the level of societies that will result in a change tangible to millions of citizens” of Poland and Ukraine.<sup>5</sup>

The relations between the two countries indeed became closer, even if contacts between the two presidents remained a key element in this rapprochement. In January 2005, Aleksander Kwaśniewski participated in the Presidential Oath of Office ceremony of Viktor Yushchenko who soon visited Poland to attend the commemorative events on the sixtieth anniversary of the liberation of the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp. Afterwards, both presidents took part in the summit of NATO leaders held in Brussels, where Yushchenko was the only guest invited (February 2005), and in the funeral ceremony of Pope John Paul II in Rome (April 2005). In April, the Ukrainian President paid the first official visit to Poland, conducted talks with the representatives of Polish authorities, inaugurated, together with his Polish counterpart, the “Year of Ukraine,” and delivered a lecture at the Warsaw University. The latter meeting was in a way an expression of gratitude for the support Yushchenko received from Warsaw-based students during the “Orange Revolution.” During Yushchenko’s visit the talks focused on the question of opening the Polish Military Cemetery in Lviv (“Cmentarz Orłat Lwowskich”), Ukraine’s accession to EU and the future of the Odessa-Brody pipeline. In mid-May Viktor Yushchenko participated in the summit of the Council of Europe held in Warsaw. A month later, Aleksander Kwaśniewski paid a one-day visit to Kyiv, where he met the President of Ukraine and his Georgian counterpart Mikhail Shaakashvili. Several days afterwards, the heads of Poland and Ukraine took part in the opening ceremony of the Polish Military Cemetery and the Memorial of the Ukrainian Galician Army Soldiers in Lviv. Between June and July, two other meetings were held, first in Gdynia at the 8<sup>th</sup> Polish-Ukrainian Economic Summit, and then in Jurata. In August, Yalta hosted a meeting of the Presidents of Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania and Georgia. At the end of the month, Yushchenko participated in the celebrations of the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the August 1980 Events in Gdansk, where he was welcomed with ovations, just like the leader of the Solidarity movement, Lech Walesa, and the hero of the “Velvet Revolution,” Václav Havel. In the second half of November Aleksander Kwaśniewski went on a farewell trip to Kyiv, where he was awarded

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<sup>5</sup> “Government Information on the Polish Foreign Policy in 2005 presented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prof. Adam Daniel Rotfeld, at the session of the Sejm on 21st January 2005,” above pp. 9–26.

an honorary doctorate at the National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy.” Frequent contacts between the presidents of the two countries were supplemented by the meetings of the prime ministers and exceptionally numerous conferences between the ministers of foreign affairs.

The first outcome of the improvement of Polish-Ukrainian relations was the continuation of the process of reconciliation between the two nations. This process was started already during the tenure of President Leonid Kuchma. In July 2003, the ceremony commemorating the sixtieth anniversary of the Volhynia Tragedy was attended by both heads of State. However, the year 2005 witnessed two major events. During his April visit to Warsaw, Viktor Yushchenko promised that the problem of the Polish Military Cemetery in Lviv would be finally solved. For at least ten preceding years, this issue had had a negative impact on the bilateral relations. The major obstacle was the attitude of the local authorities in Lviv, which, who consequently rejected the consecutive designs of the cemetery's appearance. Poland's position during the “Orange Revolution” and the involvement of president Yushchenko, highly valued in Lviv, in the settlement of the cemetery issue weakened the opposition of the Lvivian councillors. In May a compromise was reached. The inscription on the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier was agreed upon: “Here rests unknown Polish soldier who gave life for his country.” The Ukrainians also consented to the renovation of the tombs of the French and American soldiers who fought on the Polish side. However, the councillors rejected the Polish demands concerning the reconstruction of the stone lions and *Szczerbiec*, the Sword of Polish kings, because they were perceived by the Ukrainians as symbols of the Polish expansion.

In June the Lychakiv Cemetery in Lviv witnessed the opening ceremony of the Polish Military Cemetery<sup>6</sup> and the nearby Memorial of Ukrainian Galician Army Soldiers. President Kwaśniewski stated then that the Military Cemetery, in the past a symbol of the conflict between the two nations, “now becomes a symbol of Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation begun with the defeat of the totalitarian system.”<sup>7</sup> His Ukrainian counterpart stressed in turn that “there is no

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<sup>6</sup> It should be underlined that it was only an official opening of the reconstructed cemetery made available to visitors already in the 90s.

<sup>7</sup> “Przemówienie prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej Aleksandra Kwaśniewskiego na Cmentarzu Orłąt Lwowskich,” in: *Uroczystość otwarcia i poświęcenia Cmentarza Orłąt Lwowskich, Lwów, 24 czerwca 2005/Урочистість відкриття й освячення Цвинтаря Львівських Орлят. Львів, 24 червня 2005*, Kyiv, 2005, p. 32.

free Poland without free Ukraine. There is no free Ukraine either without free Poland” and expressed his opinion that “the Ukrainian-Polish reconciliation is becoming now the last stone to build the dome of peace and unity over Europe.”<sup>8</sup>

Also in June, the Greek Catholic bishops of Ukraine and the Roman Catholic bishops of Poland fulfilled the act of mutual forgiveness and reconciliation. The act referred to the 1965 letter of Polish and German bishops. Beyond doubt, this act was also prompted by the death of John Paul II.<sup>9</sup> The letter was read out to the congregations of both Churches during services officiated by Polish and Ukrainian bishops first in Warsaw and then in Lviv.

Both events, the opening of the Polish Military Cemetery and the act of reconciliation, were indubitably important steps toward the rapprochement between the Polish and Ukrainian nations. It is worth pointing out, however, that these events were more significant for Poland, because the historical memory remains an influential factor shaping the attitude of the Polish society towards its eastern neighbours, whereas for the Ukrainian elites, originating mostly from the Central and Eastern Ukraine, the past events in Polish-Ukrainian relations are not particularly essential.

### **Cooperation in the Field of Foreign Policy**

The cooperation in the field of foreign policy was an important element of the Polish-Ukrainian relations. It encompassed mainly the support for Ukraine’s European aspirations and the joint actions towards the countries of the former Soviet Union. Poland supported Ukraine’s integration with the western structures already in the previous years, but it was Poland’s accession to the EU, and especially the “Orange Revolution,” that reinforced the credibility and effectiveness of these actions. This fact was emphasized in January 2005 by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland, Adam D. Rotfeld, in his speech delivered before the Sejm, where he stated that transformations observed in Georgia and Ukraine were bound to force the West to reconsider its policy towards the post-Soviet republics. These transformations in fact denied the stereotype that these countries cannot meet western standards in the field of

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<sup>8</sup> “Przemówienie prezydenta Ukrainy Wiktora Juszczenki w czasie otwarcia Cmentarza Orłat Lwowskich,” in *ibidem*, p. 42.

<sup>9</sup> Pokój między narodami jest możliwy. List biskupów greckokatolickich Ukrainy i rzymskokatolickich Polski z okazji aktu wzajemnego przebaczenia i pojednania, Warszawa–Lwów, 19–26 czerwca 2005 r., [www.episkopat.pl](http://www.episkopat.pl).

democracy and human rights. "We will strive," said the Polish Minister, "so that the European Union raises the status of its relations with Ukraine to the Strategic Partnership level and opens the perspective of integration." According to Minister Rotfeld, it was essential that the EU defined clear conditions and precise date for the commencement of the accession negotiations with Ukraine.<sup>10</sup> In January, with the active participation of the Polish MEPs, the European Parliament adopted a resolution in which it called upon the European Council and the European Commission to redefine the policy towards Ukraine, consider simplified visa procedures for the citizens of this country and immediately grant Ukraine a market economy status. The European Parliament also reminded, perhaps most importantly, that according to Article 49 of the EU Treaty the organization should remain open to all European countries that meet the relevant criteria and requirements, including Ukraine.<sup>11</sup> Poland made efforts to make its European partners, especially Germany and France, interested in the situation in Ukraine. In March, Minister Rotfeld and his German counterpart Joschka Fischer visited together Kyiv; the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Michel Barnier, did not join them. Both ministers promised support for the European aspirations of Ukraine, although they expressed doubts as to whether at that time Ukraine should already raise the question of its EU membership. The initiative of Rotfeld and Fischer, however, did not result in more common Polish-German initiatives towards Ukraine.

Actions taken by the Polish government were supported by non-governmental organizations. One should mention a number of analyses published by the Stefan Batory Foundation within the project "The Enlarged European Union and Ukraine: New Relations"<sup>12</sup> and the fact that the European Schuman Parade, organized annually in Warsaw in May by the Polish Robert Schuman Foundation, was held in 2005 under the banner of "Common Europe, Free Ukraine, Friendly Germany." Young people were entertained by the band Greenjolly, the author of the anthem of the Ukrainian revolution "Razom nas bahato," and president Yushchenko, then visiting Warsaw, was supposed to be the special guest at the festivities. Unfortunately he was absent at the parade due to an illness. Actions taken by the Polish authorities and non-governmental

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<sup>10</sup> See note 5.

<sup>11</sup> "Results of Ukraine elections. European Parliament resolution on the results of the Ukraine elections, Strasbourg, 13 January 2005," P6\_TA(2005)0009, [www.europarl.eu.int](http://www.europarl.eu.int).

<sup>12</sup> Publications available at the Foundation's website, [www.batory.org.pl](http://www.batory.org.pl).

organizations are justified by the conviction of the majority of Poles that Ukraine should become a Member of the EU. In the spring of 2005, 75% of the respondents were in favour of Ukraine's accession to the European Union. This number is substantially higher than in the "old" EU member states (41%) and in most of the new member states (the Czech Republic—46%, Slovakia—62%, Latvia—70%).<sup>13</sup> About two thirds of Polish respondents believed that the close cooperation between Ukraine and the EU was in line with the Polish interests, mainly because closer relations between Ukraine and Russia (which seemed to be the alternative), were perceived as definitely contrary to Polish interests.<sup>14</sup>

Despite Polish support for the Ukraine's European aspirations, the issue is not free from certain problems. The Ukrainians fear that Poland's EU membership can result in new barriers between the two countries, especially with regard to economic cooperation. Initially, Poland did not take an unequivocal stance regarding the date for the conclusion of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Communities. It was only the new Polish Ambassador to Ukraine, Jacek Kluczkowski, who confirmed in September 2005 that such an agreement could be concluded in 2008. Problems also arose from the unstable political situation in Ukraine and inconsistent European policy of the new authorities, which made it difficult for Poland to promote its eastern neighbour in the EU.

Another common field of interest for Poland and Ukraine is the post-Soviet area. During his election campaign, Viktor Yushchenko declared that under his administration Ukraine would become the "locomotive that will draw Russia and Belarus to the European Union,"<sup>15</sup> whereas Aleksander Kwaśniewski hoped that the "transformations that took place in Ukraine will also be beneficial to Russia."<sup>16</sup> In 2005, however, the attention of Polish and Ukrainian authorities focused on Belarus. Already in July, president Aleksandr Lukashenko expressed

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<sup>13</sup> Eurobarometer. Public opinion in the European Union, 2005, No. 63, p. 362, [www.europa.eu.int](http://www.europa.eu.int).

<sup>14</sup> P. Kaźmierkiewicz, Note on the State and Directions of the Polish Debate on the Prospects for Ukraine and Turkey's EU Membership. Outline of the Presentation at a Conference, Warsaw, 5 December 2005, [www.isp.org.pl](http://www.isp.org.pl).

<sup>15</sup> Ющенко впевнений, що 'сама Україна втягне Росію і Білорусь в Євросоюз' (undated), [www.foreignpolicy.org.ua](http://www.foreignpolicy.org.ua).

<sup>16</sup> A. Kwaśniewski, "Polska polityka wschodnia," in: *Polska polityka wschodnia. Materiały konferencji zorganizowanej w dniach 28–29 października 2005 r. we Wrocławiu*, Wrocław, 2006, p. 15.

his concern that Poland and Lithuania want to bring about a “coloured revolution” in Belarus and count on Ukraine’s support in this matter. This fear was not entirely groundless. In early August, Ukraine and Moldova joined the declaration of the European Union criticizing the “systematic and increasing” repressive measures of the Belarusian regime against representatives of the civic society, political opposition and the media. The declaration also condemned actions directed against the Union of Poles in Belarus (ZPB), finding them in breach of the obligations assumed by this country within the OSCE.<sup>17</sup> The Belarusian authorities regarded the stance taken by Ukraine and Moldova as unfriendly. When the presidents of Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania and Georgia met in Yalta in the middle of the month, they did not issue any joint declaration in this matter. Nevertheless, according to Aleksander Kwaśniewski, they were in full agreement that the Belarusian authorities should cease violating the rights of the Polish minority. In late August, following telephone consultations between the Prime Ministers of Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania and Latvia, these countries decided to establish a joint working group coordinating their policies towards Belarus. The first meeting of this group, consisting of high-ranking officials and diplomats, took place in the middle of September 2005. However, its activity has not produced any particular results so far.

It must be emphasized that the cooperation of Poland and Ukraine was not directed exclusively against Lukashenka’s regime. In September, at the request of president Kwaśniewski, Yushchenko sought to alleviate the tensions that arose between Poland and Belarus in connection with the policy of the Belarusian authorities towards ZPB. Furthermore, joint Polish-Ukrainian-Belarusian initiatives were undertaken to solve the problems that, from the perspective of Kyiv and Warsaw, divided Belarus and its neighbours, and to counteract the isolation of this country in the international arena. These joint actions resulted in a trilateral meeting in Kyiv in late September 2005 between Jerzy Bahr, chief of the Polish National Security Bureau; Hienadz Nievyhlas, secretary of the Belarusian Security Council; Anatoli Kinakh, secretary of the Ukrainian Council of National Security and Defence; and Borys Tarasiuk, Ukrainian Foreign Minister.

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<sup>17</sup> “Declaration from the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on Belarus. Brussels, 2 August 2005,” 11625/05 (Presse 205), <http://ue.eu.int>.

## Economic Cooperation

Even though Ukraine is not among Poland's most important economic partners, the cooperation of these two countries is developing dynamically in this field. In 2005, Polish exports to Ukraine amounted to PLN 8.4 billion (a 12.6% increase compared to 2004), which situated this country in tenth place among Poland's trade partners. Imports from Ukraine were more than twice as low and amounted to PLN 3.3 billion (a 14.5% decrease compared to 2004).<sup>18</sup> In 2005, on account of the volume of capital invested, Poland became the second largest target country for Ukrainian investments in the world,<sup>19</sup> whereas Polish investments in Ukraine place our country among the top ten foreign investors there.<sup>20</sup> In June, during the 8<sup>th</sup> Economic Summit Poland-Ukraine in Gdynia, a preliminary agreement on the purchase of Częstochowa Steelworks by the Industrial Union of Donbas (ISD) was signed in the presence of the president of both countries. Thus the ISD won the two-year rivalry against the world's largest steel producer, Mittal Steel. The Ukrainians not only offered to pay PLN 1.252 billion for the Częstochowa Steelworks, but also undertook to spend PLN 440 million on investments and to finance a social package worth PLN 800 million. The final agreement was concluded in July and in October the Polish Minister of the Treasury gave the green light to the deal. Also in Gdynia, an agreement was concluded on the sale of FSO car factory at Warsaw to the Ukrainian AwtoZAZ company; FSO had already been exporting the majority of its production to Ukraine in previous years. AwtoZAZ purchased 19.9% of FSO shares, securing a majority of votes (84.31%) at the Annual General Meeting. The controlling interest was sold for PLN 100 since FSO was in a difficult financial situation. The Ukrainians undertook to retain the then employment level (2,200 employees) until 2009, increase the production and release a new car model in 2007. The deal was closed in November after the Ministry of Interior and the Anti-Monopoly Office granted their approval.

Energy issues, primarily the relations with Russia and the future of the Odessa-Brody pipeline, were an important element of Polish-Ukrainian relations in 2005. As far as the energy sector is concerned, Poland and Ukraine depend heavily on Russia. The Odessa-Brody pipeline built in the beginning of this

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<sup>18</sup> Source: The Polish Central Statistical Office (GUS), Information Dissemination Department.

<sup>19</sup> Прямі інвестиції з України в економіку країн світу на 01 січня 2006 року, [www.ukrstat.gov.ua](http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua).

<sup>20</sup> Прямі іноземні інвестиції в Україну на 01 січня 2006 року, [www.ukrstat.gov.ua](http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua).

decade and planned to be extended to Płock and, possibly, to Gdańsk, was supposed to reduce the dependence. High quality Caspian Sea oil was to be transported through the pipeline to Ukraine and other European countries. In 2003, however, the Ukrainian government decided that the pipeline would only be used to transport Russian oil towards the Black Sea. The new Ukrainian authorities, declared in turn their willingness to use the pipeline according to the original plans. As a result, in April 2005, Poland, Ukraine and the European Commission jointly decided to resume works on extending the Odessa–Brody pipeline. International Pipeline Enterprise “Sarmatia,” a company established by Oil Pipeline Operation Company “Przyjaźń” (PERN,) and its Ukrainian counterpart, “Ukrtransnafta,” is to be responsible for the implementation of this undertaking. The cost of extending the pipeline to Płock is estimated at EUR 500 million. Ukraine attaches great importance to the implementation of the project, viewing it as an effective way to improve its energy security. On the Polish side, however, there are certain doubts concerning the economic rationality of the project. According to some commentators, Caspian oil would be more expensive than its Russian counterpart, because of transport costs, and its parameters do not meet the current demands of Polish oil refineries. Furthermore, an investor who would be ready to finance the extension of the pipeline, still has to be found. Taking the above reservations into account, Marek Belka’s government emphasized the necessity to include European partners in the Odessa–Brody pipeline extension project and argued that the investment would primarily increase the energy security of Western European countries, not Poland and Ukraine. The present Polish government does not emphasize this “European thread.” On their part, the Ukrainians declared that if the planned extension of the existing pipeline to Płock failed they would try to find an alternative solution, e.g. transporting Caspian oil to the Baltic ports via Belarus and Lithuania.

Poland and Ukraine are also transit countries for the majority of Russian energy resources exported to Western Europe. Russia consistently tries to diminish its dependence on other states with regard to the transport energy resources. The Northern Pipeline that is to run along the bottom of the Baltic Sea, connecting Russia and Germany, and whose construction began in December 2005, will serve this purpose. The completion of the new pipeline will be disadvantageous to Poland and Ukraine. Firstly, Russia will be able to limit or suspend gas supplies to these countries without risking that it will affect gas exports to Germany and other Western European countries. Secondly, Russia will be able to reduce the volume of gas transported across Poland and Ukraine,

which will bring them lower revenues from transit. The above-mentioned issues provide yet another argument for a closer Polish-Ukrainian cooperation on energy.

### Other Fields of Cooperation

From March 2004 to March 2005 both countries celebrated The Year of Poland in Ukraine. In February 2005, many Ukrainian towns hosted the music and literature campaign, Andruchoid Plus, as part of the celebrations. In March in Kyiv, the Sinfonietta Cracovia Chamber Orchestra played a concert and the artists of the Grand Theatre in Warsaw staged “King Roger,” Karol Szymanowski’s opera. In April 2005, during a gala concert at Warsaw’s Grand Theatre, the heads of the two states inaugurated The Year of Ukraine in Poland. On that occasion, President Kwaśniewski emphasized that “nothing creates stronger ties between nations than culture” and praised the richness of Ukrainian culture: its Scythian and Greek roots, the heritage of Kyivan Rus, Taras Shevchenko, Lesya Ukrainka and Ivan Franko.<sup>21</sup> The programme of The Year of Ukraine in Poland comprised numerous concerts of Ukrainian music, both classical and popular, theatre performances and exhibitions. In September 2005 The Day of Ukraine was celebrated in Warsaw; among other events, a concert of contemporary Ukrainian music and a presentation of Ukrainian cuisine took place. In October, the Odessa Ukrainian Music and Drama Theatre named after Vasyl Vasylko staged Sophocles’ *Oedipus the King* in Warsaw and Gdańsk. Also in October, an exhibition entitled “Ukraine—Poland. I can see you, you can see me” was held at the Agricultural University of Cracow.

In 2005 in Sopot, the 18<sup>th</sup> Festival of Ukrainian Culture was organized by the Union of Ukrainians in Poland. The Festival aims at promoting the work of amateur artistic groups of the Ukrainian community in Poland and the neighbouring countries, as well as presenting contemporary professional artists from Ukraine. The programme of the Festival included a concert of Polish and Ukrainian bands that supported the “Orange Revolution” and the performance of a folk opera *Fern Flower*. The Festival was accompanied by various events such as a screening of *Cossack Mamai*, the Ukrainian candidate for the 2003 Academy Award, and a concert of Orthodox music.

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<sup>21</sup> Udział Prezydenta RP z Małżonką i Prezydenta Ukrainy z Małżonką w koncercie inauguracyjnym ‘Rok Ukrainy w Polsce’, 11 kwietnia 2005 r. [www.prezydent.pl](http://www.prezydent.pl).

In September 2003, the Polish Football Association and the Ukrainian Football Federation decided to announce their joint candidacy as organizers of the 2012 European Championship. Poland and Ukraine do not have many assets; suffice it to mention the poor condition of the transport infrastructure, insufficient number of modern stadiums and hotels or the fact that Gdańsk and Donetsk (where some of the matches would be held) are 1900 km away from each other. Nevertheless, in November, the UEFA Executive Committee qualified both countries to the final selection stage. This choice seems to be due mainly to the activity of the Ukrainian Football Federation. The final decision as to who will organize the championships will be taken in December 2006.

Since 2001 Lublin has been home to the European College of Polish and Ukrainian Universities established with the intention to transform it into a Polish-Ukrainian university. This undertaking is supported by the authorities of both countries. During the April visit of the Ukrainian president in Poland, it was planned that the opening ceremony of the new university would take place in June 2005, with the participation of Aleksander Kwaśniewski and Viktor Yushchenko.<sup>22</sup> In practice, however, the Polish-Ukrainian university has not been established to this day. The creation of the State Eastern European High School that would educate Poles and Ukrainians and be modelled on the European University Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder), has also been delayed. One of the reasons for this state of affairs is the opposition from the Polish Veterans' Union and the League of Polish Families.

### **From Enthusiasm to Disappointment**

Ukrainian experts acknowledge that Poland is currently "Ukraine's only ally" and the main, alongside Lithuania, advocate of its membership in the EU. During his visit to Poland, the Ukrainian Prime Minister, Yuri Yekhanurov, declared that Poland "is a strategic partner" of his country.<sup>23</sup> It is difficult not to notice, however, that a year after the "Orange Revolution" Polish policy towards Ukraine did not exhibit the same level of enthusiasm as in the end of 2004. There are several reasons for that. Firstly, the Polish political class, and to a certain degree, the Polish society, are disappointed with the current situation in Ukraine. There is no doubt that the "Orange Revolution" has transformed

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<sup>22</sup> "Uniwersytet polsko-ukraiński," *Gazeta Wyborcza* (Lublin) of 13 April 2005.

<sup>23</sup> The speech of Yuri Yekhanurov at the meeting organized by the Centre for International Relations (CSM), Warsaw, 17 February 2006.

Ukraine, but Viktor Yushchenko's administration has not launched the ambitious socio-economic reforms, has not used the opportunity, created by the victory of Ukrainian democracy, in the international stage, and has not undertaken consistent actions towards a rapprochement with the Euro-Atlantic structures. What is more, the policy of the government headed by Julia Tymoshenko has had an adverse effect on the Ukrainian economic situation (Ukraine's economic growth in 2004 was 12.1%, whereas in 2005 it was only 2.4%<sup>24</sup>) as well as on the interests of Polish investors. Without warning, in April 2005 the Ukrainian government abolished all the privileges in the special economic zones where approximately 70 Polish companies conduct their business. Representatives of the Ukrainian authorities justified their decision with the necessity to ensure equal treatment for all the economic actors and referred to the World Trade Organization guidelines. In turn, the Polish entrepreneurs announced that they would pursue their rights in a court of law. During 2005, Poland observed the evolution of the difficult Ukrainian-Russian relations with concern, responding with deep suspicion to any attempts of rapprochement between the two countries or rather normalization of their relations after the 2004 political crisis in Ukraine.<sup>25</sup> The disintegration of the "Orange Coalition" and the resulting dismissal of Tymoshenko's government (September 2005) was another huge disappointment. Although the Poles expected that the Ukrainian democratic bloc would split, as it was the case with "Solidarity" in Poland, they were surprised that the split took place so soon and that Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, who had been allies until recently, engaged into such a violent confrontation with each other.

Secondly, after the "Orange Revolution" the Polish-Ukrainian relations entered, or rather should have entered, a new stage when the declarations about the willingness to cooperate need to be turned into concrete actions. As president Lech Kaczyński put it, "the strategic alliance with Ukraine should assume more concrete forms."<sup>26</sup> In practice, however, both countries are short of ideas how to achieve that.

Thirdly, Polish-Ukrainian relations may have been influenced by the change of the people in power in both countries. Over the last ten years, the bilateral

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<sup>24</sup> Ukraine. Macroeconomic focus, [www.securities.com](http://www.securities.com).

<sup>25</sup> See, e.g. T. Bielecki, "Kijów znów w objęciach Moskwy?," *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 1 October 2005.

<sup>26</sup> Zaprzysiężenie prezydenta RP Lecha Kaczyńskiego, 24 grudnia 2005 r., [www.prezydent.pl](http://www.prezydent.pl).

relations were shaped mainly by the presidents, Aleksander Kwaśniewski and Leonid Kuchma. Regardless of the assessment of their policy, it seems probable that Poland and Ukraine have to work out a new formula for their bilateral relations due to the fact that, within less than one year, both of these politicians ended their term in office.

The decreased interest in Ukraine is confirmed by statements made by Polish politicians and public opinion polls. In his inaugural speech delivered before the Polish Sejm, the Prime Minister, Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz, did not even mention Ukraine. He only declared that “Poland is keenly interested in stabilization beyond our eastern border,” that “guarantees of energy security will take priority” in the policy of the new government (in this connection, the Prime Minister mentioned the Brody-Płock pipeline project), and that “Minister of Culture and National Heritage will assume responsibility for such (...) fields as preservation of historic landmarks, cultural education, books and book-reading, or **the preservation of Polish cultural heritage in the East** [boldface by A.S.]”<sup>27</sup> According to opinion polls, fewer Poles declare positive feelings towards Ukrainians (a fall from 29% at the end of 2004 to 23% a year later).<sup>28</sup> Support for the Ukrainian efforts to join the EU also decreased: in March 2005 it was 77%, whereas in November it was 64%.<sup>29</sup> Thus, the liking for the Ukrainians, a consequence of the “Orange Revolution,” turned out to be short-lived. It is worth mentioning that the majority of Poles who actively supported the democratic transformations in Ukraine towards the end of 2004, have now lost interest in what is happening in our neighbours country. Grassroots initiatives that were conspicuous in November and December 2004 (e.g. the “Free Ukraine” (“Wolna Ukraina”) movement) have not succeeded in becoming institutionalized, which would allow continuing support for the transformations in Ukraine and the rapprochement between this country and Poland.

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<sup>27</sup> Exposé premiera Kazimierza Marcinkiewicza, Warszawa, 10 listopada 2005 r., [www.kprm.gov.pl](http://www.kprm.gov.pl).

<sup>28</sup> M. Skrzyszewski, *Sympatia i niechęć do innych narodów. Komunikat z badań*, Warszawa: Centrum Badań Opinii Społecznej, 2005, No. BS/196/2005, p. 6, [www.cbos.pl](http://www.cbos.pl).

<sup>29</sup> “Europeans and the Accession of Ukraine to European Union. Wave 2,” TNS Sofres, November 2005, p. 7, [www.tns-sofres.com](http://www.tns-sofres.com).

## Poland's Relations with the State of Israel

### Factors Influencing the State of Relations until 2004

Owing to the eight-century heritage of a common past and the traumatic memory of the Holocaust, relations between Poland and Israel have had a unique character from the very beginning of Israeli statehood. This was confirmed by the fact that Poland was among the first countries to support the idea of creating a Jewish State in the forum of the United Nations in 1948, it recognised Israel on the day of its declaration of independence (15 May 1948) and the two countries established official diplomatic relations (19 May 1948).<sup>1</sup>

Breaking off the relations with Israel by the People's Republic of Poland after the Six-Day War of 1967 and the ensuing nearly twenty-year-long absence of the Polish diplomatic mission in Tel Aviv had a very adverse effect both on Polish-Israeli and Polish-Jewish relations in the following years. The establishment of the Interest Section of the People's Republic of Poland in Tel Aviv in 1986 and the restoration of diplomatic ties at embassy level in 1990 admittedly led to the normalization of bilateral relations, but could not bring about a breakthrough that would be manifested, for example, by a quick improvement of Poland's and Poles' image in Israel. Throughout the 1990s, the majority of Israelis held a traditional view of Poland through the prism of the extermination of the Jews carried out on Polish territory, the responsibility of some Polish citizens for the Holocaust,<sup>2</sup> an unwillingness to resolve the issue of returning the so-called Jewish property and the inveterate anti-Semitism of the

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<sup>1</sup> J. Patryas (ed.), *Stosunki dyplomatyczne Polski 1944–1979 r. Informator*, 1982, vol. V, pp. 142–149.

<sup>2</sup> The common belief among Israelis that the majority of Poles witnessed the extermination of Jews during the World War II with indifference while some even collaborated with the Germans, as well as their knowledge of pogroms, e.g. in Kielce, that took place in Poland just after the war, were accompanied by an awareness that Poles constituted the most numerous group (approximately 6 thousand) among approximately 20 thousand people awarded the "Righteous Among the Nations" title by the Yad Vashem Institute.

Poles, particularly the disgraceful “anti-Semitism without Jews.” Israelis did notice Poland’s gestures indicating its willingness to cooperate, e.g. during the return (*aliyah*) of Jews from the Soviet Union to Israel in the early 1990s (simplified transit procedures were introduced at Warsaw airport especially for them); they did notice the Polish authorities’ care for places commemorating the Holocaust victims, the willingness to resolve the question of returning Jewish property (e.g. by passing the Act on the relationship between the State and Jewish religious communities in 1997) and attempts at an amicable settlement of religious-based conflicts, including the conflict over the Carmelite convent and the erection of crosses in the so-called gravel pit at the former Auschwitz-Birkenau death camp. All that, however, did not have any significant influence on the image of Poland dominant in Israel during the first decade following the renewal of bilateral relations.

A thaw between the two countries was signalled by the well-received visit of Polish Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek in Israel in November 1999 and the fruitful talks he had with his Israeli counterpart, Ehud Barak. One of the results of that visit was the announcement of the signing of a visa waiver agreement, which met the needs of the increasing (from the late 1990s) private traffic between Poland and Israel.

A real watershed in bilateral relations, however, was the year 2000 and the pilgrimage of John Paul II to Israel between 20 and 26 March. Israelis were very positively surprised by the Pope’s gestures towards Israel and Jews, which found its expression in the media coverage of the pilgrimage and referring to the Pope as a “friend of Israel” by local commentators. What is striking, numerous articles and comments on the homeland of John Paul II appeared in Israel at that time; the local media frequently interviewed “Polish Jews” who recalled their long-standing friendly ties with Karol Wojtyła and pre-war Poland. In effect, even before the Pope’s visit was over, for the first since the establishment of the Jewish State, many Israelis, particularly the young generation, understood how much Israel and Poland had in common.<sup>3</sup> The visit that President Aleksander Kwaśniewski paid to Israel and the Palestinian Authority shortly after the Pope’s departure (on 29 and 30 May) also had great significance for the Polish-Israeli and Polish-Jewish rapprochement. Both the Polish President’s visit itself and the

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<sup>3</sup> “Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel welcomes visit by Pope John Paul II,” March 2000, [www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/History/Modern+History/Historic+Events/Israel+welcomes+visit+by+Pope+John+Paul+II+-+March.htm](http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/History/Modern+History/Historic+Events/Israel+welcomes+visit+by+Pope+John+Paul+II+-+March.htm).

talks he held in Israel, including talks with President Ezer Weizman and Prime Minister Ehud Barak, were very well received by the local media.<sup>4</sup>

The improvement in Polish-Jewish relations was also indirectly influenced by the consequences of the Second Palestinian Intifada (also known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada) that broke out on 28 September 2000. Most Israelis saw that, as the Intifada dragged on, Poland appeared to be one of the few European countries, where anti-Semitic sentiments did not rise as they did in France, Germany and the United Kingdom. No anti-Israeli disturbances occurred either. The then state of Polish-Israeli relations was reflected by the friendly reception of the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Władysław Bartoszewski, who visited Israel (and the Palestinian Autonomy) only two months after the outbreak of the Palestinian Intifada and remarked, referring to the situation in the region and the time of his visit, that “a friend in need is a friend indeed.”<sup>5</sup>

Polish support for the United States during the campaign in Iraq in 2003, the presence of the Polish military contingent in Iraq and Poland’s accession to the EU in May 2004 were further factors that contributed to the final overcoming of Israeli stereotypes about Poland. The efforts of the Polish authorities and the activity of the Polish Embassy in Tel Aviv have also led to improving the image of Poland and Poles in Israel. The consecutive visits of top-ranking officials from Poland to Israel and the Palestinian Autonomy as well as return visits paid by high-ranking representatives of the Israeli government are worthy of particular attention. Poland’s close relations with the Palestinian National Authority (representatives of Polish authorities usually go to the Palestinian Autonomy after finishing their visit to Israel) as well as with other Muslim countries have not had an adverse effect on Poland’s relations with Israel. Paradoxically, the fact that Poland has managed to maintain good relations with the Muslim world while participating in the Iraqi operation over recent years, has been taken by the Israeli side as proof of the maturity and professionalism of the Polish authorities, including the diplomatic service.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> The visit of the President of the Republic of Poland in Israel—day one, <http://213.76.131.206/prezentacja/2000/List2.htm>.

<sup>5</sup> “Address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, Władysław Bartoszewski, to the Knesset, Tel Awiw, 28 November 2000,” *Zbiór Dokumentów* 2000, No. 4.

<sup>6</sup> Since the restoration of diplomatic relations, the following officials on the Polish side visited Israel: President Lech Wałęsa in 1991 and President Aleksander Kwaśniewski in 2000, 2004 and 2005; Prime Ministers: Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz in 1997 and Jerzy Buzek in 1999; Ministers of Foreign Affairs: Krzysztof Skubiszewski in 1992 and Władysław Bartoszewski in 1995 and 2000. Poland was visited by the following Israeli officials: President Chaim Herzog in

## Political Relations

In 2005, progress could be observed practically in all fields: political and economic relations as well as human contacts. The good state of relations is best exemplified by the number and high level of mutual visits. Poland was among the few states visited in 2005 both by the President and Prime Minister of Israel. It is another thing that both visits took place on the occasion of ceremonies commemorating the Holocaust held in Poland. Due to the election calendar in Poland and the tense political situation in Israel connected with the withdrawal of Jewish settlements from the Gaza Strip and part of the West Bank as well as the split of the election coalition in Jerusalem, most of the high-level visits took place in the first half of 2005.

On 26 January 2005, Israeli President, Moshe Katsav, came on his second visit to Poland. He participated in the memorial ceremonies of the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the liberation of the former death camp Auschwitz-Birkenau. He also took part in the opening ceremony of an international forum, "Let My People Live!," held at the Juliusz Słowacki Theatre in Kraków to commemorate this anniversary. On that occasion, a courtesy meeting of Presidents Kwaśniewski and Katsav took place at the Wawel Castle in Kraków. Aleksander Kwaśniewski thanked the Israeli President for coming to Poland and emphasized that Moshe Katsav was a special guest at the commemorations ceremony of the liberation of a camp that was a symbol of the Holocaust. Kwaśniewski also informed the Israeli President that, following an agreement between the authorities of Warsaw and the Polish government, the construction of a Museum of the History of Polish Jews, commemorating more than 800 years of Jewish presence and achievements in Poland, would soon begin. Besides, both presidents discussed the state of bilateral political and economic relations as well as the international situation, also from the perspective of the Middle East peace process and the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq.<sup>7</sup> Israeli commentators pointed out the thorough preparation of the ceremony in Oświęcim (Auschwitz) and Kraków as well as the excellent atmosphere of the meeting of the two presidents. The spontaneous speech of Miriam Yahav (Merka Szewah before the

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1992, Ezer Weizman in 2000, Moshe Katsav in 2003 and 2005; Prime Ministers: Yitzhak Rabin in 1993, Benjamin Netanyahu in 1998 and Ariel Sharon in 2005.

<sup>7</sup> The meeting between the President of the Republic of Poland and the President of the State of Israel, 26 January 2005, [www.prezydent.pl/x.node?id=1011848&eventId=2026389](http://www.prezydent.pl/x.node?id=1011848&eventId=2026389); The participation of the President of the Republic of Poland in the opening ceremony of the international forum "Let My People Live!," organized on the 60th anniversary of the liberation of the Auschwitz-Birkenau camp, [www.prezydent.pl/x.node?id=1011848&eventId=2026398](http://www.prezydent.pl/x.node?id=1011848&eventId=2026398).

war), a former inmate of Auschwitz, born in Poland, but now living in Israel, aroused great interest in the Israeli media, as was the case with the Polish media.<sup>8</sup>

Only a few weeks later, on 15 and 16 March 2005, President Kwaśniewski took part in the opening ceremony of the new museum edifice at the Yad Vashem Institute in Jerusalem and in a special session organized on that occasion, entitled "Remembering the Past, Shaping the Future." He was accompanied, among other officials, by Minister of Foreign Affairs Adam D. Rotfeld, Minister of Education and Sports Mirosław Sawicki, and Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Economy, Mirosław Zieliński. During his stay in Israel, Aleksander Kwaśniewski met President Katsav and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. The politicians unanimously emphasized that Polish-Israeli relations were developing very well. Among other positive developments, they mentioned the increasing trade and Israeli investments in Poland and expressed their belief that Poland's EU-membership would contribute to a further expansion of economic cooperation between both countries. Discussing the latest developments in the Middle East, including the process of resuming the Israeli-Palestinian peace dialogue, Kwaśniewski stressed that "Poland is ready to make a contribution to this process in as much as it is possible within the EU."

An important issue, raised during a special meeting with the local youth at Yad Vashem (attended, alongside President Kwaśniewski, by the Ministers of Education of the two countries, Mirosław Sawicki and Limor Livnat) as well as in the course of further talks between the ministers at the Israel Museum, was broadening the formula of the visits of Israeli young people to Poland. The question of expanding the economic cooperation between Poland and Israel was discussed by Mirosław Zieliński with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy Ehud Olmert, representatives of the Israeli Federation of Chambers of Commerce and the local business. Foreign Minister A.D. Rotfeld, after his visit to Israel (where he met Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom), participated in the official opening of the Polish Diplomatic Mission at the Palestinian National Authority in Ramallah (the mission has been functioning since January 2005).<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> G.F. Cashman, "Polish President Cites Survivor at Knesset," 17 March 2005, <http://isurvived.org/InTheNews/PolishPresident-HoloSurv.html>. Apart from talks with President Kwaśniewski, Israeli media attached great importance to the meeting between Moshe Katsav and the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, also held in Poland.

<sup>9</sup> Working visit of the President of the Republic of Poland in the State of Israel, [www.prezydent.pl/x.node?id=1011848&eventId=2526456](http://www.prezydent.pl/x.node?id=1011848&eventId=2526456), [www.prezydent.pl/x.node?id=1011848&eventId=2526457](http://www.prezydent.pl/x.node?id=1011848&eventId=2526457); "Jerozolima: otwarcie Muzeum Holokaustu," *Wprost*, 15 March 2005.

Also in March 2005, a delegation of the City of Warsaw, headed by Mayor of Warsaw Lech Kaczyński, visited Israel. Lech Kaczyński took part in a symposium on investment opportunities in Warsaw, co-organized in Tel Aviv by the Israel-Poland Chamber of Commerce, the Israeli Export Institute and other institutions. The programme of the visit also included Kaczyński's meetings with Deputy Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, Minister of Jerusalem and Diaspora Affairs, Tzachi Hanegbi, and leader of the Labour Party, Shimon Peres. The Mayor of Warsaw also conducted talks with representatives of the authorities of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa. The visit was yet another opportunity to familiarize the Israelis with the plans for the construction of a Museum of the History of Polish Jews in Warsaw.<sup>10</sup>

On 5 May, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon paid a short visit to Poland, to attend the 15<sup>th</sup> March of the Living jubilee. After the ceremony at the former death camp Auschwitz-Birkenau, Sharon met Prime Minister Marek Belka at Balice airport, where the two government leaders discussed the state of bilateral relations.<sup>11</sup>

Furthermore, several important visits of high-ranking military officials took place later in 2005. In April 2005, Vice-Minister of Defence Janusz Zemke went to Israel. The Polish delegation also included the Commander of the Armed Forces, Lt. Gen. Edward Pietrzyk and the First Deputy Chief of General Staff, Lt. Gen. Mieczysław Cieniuch. In mid-May 2005, Minister of Defence Jerzy Szmajdziński visited Israel and conducted talks with his Israeli counterpart, Shaul Mofaz. Among other topics, the two politicians discussed the implementation of the contract under which Poland was to purchase the Israeli Spike LR anti-tank missile. Only a few days later, the Israeli Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Moshe Ya'alon, came to Poland.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> *The Jerusalem Post*, 3 March 2005, for a synopsis of the article, see [www.msz.gov.pl/index.php?page=4295&lang\\_id=pl&bulletin\\_id=8&portlet=biuletyn%2Fpokaz](http://www.msz.gov.pl/index.php?page=4295&lang_id=pl&bulletin_id=8&portlet=biuletyn%2Fpokaz); *Haaretz*, 4 March 2005, [www.msz.gov.pl/index.php?page=4297&lang\\_id=pl&bulletin\\_id=8&portlet=biuletyn%2Fpokaz](http://www.msz.gov.pl/index.php?page=4297&lang_id=pl&bulletin_id=8&portlet=biuletyn%2Fpokaz).

<sup>11</sup> Sharon: Never Forget Nazi Killers, CNN, 6 May 2005, [edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/05/05/holocaust.day/](http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/05/05/holocaust.day/); *Yediot Aharonot*, 6 May 2005, [www.msz.gov.pl/index.php?page=4343&lang\\_id=pl&bulletin\\_id=8&portlet=biuletyn%2Fpokaz](http://www.msz.gov.pl/index.php?page=4343&lang_id=pl&bulletin_id=8&portlet=biuletyn%2Fpokaz).

<sup>12</sup> *The Jerusalem Post*, 17 May 2005, [www.msz.gov.pl/index.php?page=4343&lang\\_id=pl&bulletin\\_id=8&portlet=biuletyn%2Fpokaz](http://www.msz.gov.pl/index.php?page=4343&lang_id=pl&bulletin_id=8&portlet=biuletyn%2Fpokaz). During Minister Jerzy Szmajdziński's stay in Israel, the ceremony of recommissioning the former lieutenant of the Polish Army, Chaim Ben-Jaakov, took place.

Another important event, particularly for veterans of the Polish Army who now live in Israel, was the September 2005 visit to Israel, of the head of the Office for Veterans and Repressed Persons, Minister Jan Turski, at the invitation of the very active Association of War Invalids Against Nazism. Minister Turski awarded Pro Memoria medals to a group of veterans of the Polish Army.

### **Economic Cooperation**

After a few years' of stagnation following the outbreak of the Palestinian Intifada, the Israeli economy has been showing clear signs of recovery since 2004, exhibited by increased exports and imports as well as foreign investments. These developments have naturally influenced Polish-Israeli economic relations, as evidenced by a growth in trade from approx. \$244 million in 2004 to approx. \$306 million in 2005. Polish exports amounted to approx. \$120 million, compared to approx. \$91 million in 2004, whereas the imports from Israel increased from approx. \$153 million in 2004 to approx. \$186 million in 2005. The primary Polish products exported to Israel include metals, mechanical and electric devices, foodstuffs, tobacco, beverages, cardboard, paper and furniture. From Israel, Poland imports chemical industrial products, machines and devices, chemical articles and plastics.

According to Israeli data, Israeli companies have invested between 1 and 2 billion dollars in Poland in recent years. Since a large number of the investors operate as foreign branches in other countries, also within the EU, their investments are not registered as Israeli undertakings. Officially, Israeli investments in Poland amounted to approx. \$70 million in 2005. The major Israeli investors in Poland currently include IT International Theatres and smaller companies operating in the real estate market. Large indirect investments in Poland are also made by Kardan and a well-known Israeli businessman, Rami Ungar (who purchases ships from the Gdynia Shipyard).<sup>13</sup>

The economic cooperation between Poland and Israel was intensified in 2005 largely thanks to the conclusion, in 2004, of the offset agreement with an Israeli firm Rafael concerning the purchase of Spike LR anti-tank missiles for the Polish army. Representatives of the Israeli army and the world of business

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<sup>13</sup> Kardan's Subsidiary Globe Trade Centre Delivers Record Profits in 2005, 24 February 2006, [www.kardan.com/news\\_detail.asp?itemID=136](http://www.kardan.com/news_detail.asp?itemID=136); Israel to Invest in Poland's Gdynia Shipyards, [www.spacewar.com/2004/040211183505.zcihzg8h.html](http://www.spacewar.com/2004/040211183505.zcihzg8h.html).

repeatedly emphasized in 2005 that they saw Poland as an important, long-term partner among EU member states.<sup>14</sup>

### **Cultural and Scientific Cooperation and Cooperation at the Local Level**

A very important aspect of mutual relations in 2005 was the ever closer cooperation at the local level and in the field of culture and science. A significant role in this respect was played by the Polish Institute established in Tel Aviv in 2000. In 2005, in its own premises and at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, the Institute organized lectures for Israeli teachers and guides travelling to Poland, as part of the "Poznaj Polskę" ("Get to Know Poland") series. At the Institute's initiative and thanks to its support, many Polish artists and writers visited Israel in 2005. The participation of Polish writers, including Paweł Huelle, Joanna Olczak-Ronikier and Renata Jabłońska (the latter living in Israel) in the Jerusalem International Book Fair in February 2005 was an excellent opportunity for the promotion of Polish culture in Israel. Almost at the same time, on 8 and 9 February 2005, representatives of the Polish Tourist Organization, Gromada Polish Tourist Cooperative and the City of Łódź took part in the 11<sup>th</sup> International Mediterranean Tourism Market (IMTM) in Israel. In March 2005, the Polish Institute, in cooperation with the Givataim Theatre, organized the fourth edition of the Jazz Festival attended by several dozen jazzmen from Poland, Urszula Dudziak among them. A screening of films by Jan Lenica, organized by the Institute in the spring of 2005 in Tel Aviv, also attracted much attention. In November 2005, on the twenty-fifth anniversary of Solidarity, the Institute organized the Polish Week whose programme included, among other events, theatrical happenings.<sup>15</sup>

Another event important for the promotion of Polish culture in Israel in 2005 was the premiere of *Henryk Sławik—polski Wallenberg* (*Henryk Sławik: a Polish Wallenberg*), a Marek Maldis and Grzegorz Łubczyk film (created under the patronage of the presidents of Poland, Israel and Hungary). The premiere, organized by the Polish Embassy in a Tel Aviv cinema Cinematheque on 5 July 2005, was attended by the authors of the film, members of the TV Polonia management and film crew who came to Israel specially for that occasion.

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<sup>14</sup> Izrael, Gospodarka Izraela, [www.izrael.badacz.org/izrael/gospodarka.html](http://www.izrael.badacz.org/izrael/gospodarka.html); S. Sadeh, "Israel's Defense Industry in the 21st Century: Challenges and Opportunities," *JCSS* 2004, No. 3, [www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v7n3p5Sad.html](http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v7n3p5Sad.html).

<sup>15</sup> "Międzynarodowe Targi Książki w Jerozolimie," *Nowiny Kurier*, 4 February 2005, [www.msz.gov.pl/index.php?page=4276&lang\\_id=pl&bulletin\\_id=8&portlet=biuletyn%2Fpokaz](http://www.msz.gov.pl/index.php?page=4276&lang_id=pl&bulletin_id=8&portlet=biuletyn%2Fpokaz).

Alongside representatives of the Polish diplomatic mission in Tel Aviv, the guests included Henryk Zimmermann, a wartime associate of the hero of the film, as well as Polish Jews who were rescued by Sławik and currently live in Israel.<sup>16</sup>

In April 2005, a delegation from the Israeli town of Daliat El Carmel visited Łódź, and the mayors of the two cities, Jerzy Kropiwnicki and Akram Hassoun, signed a twinning agreement. It was a result of the cooperation started by the authorities of these two cities when a delegation of the City of Łódź, headed by the mayor, Jerzy Kropiwnicki, visited Israel in 2004 (the visit was connected with the observances of the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the liquidation of the Łódź ghetto, held in Israel and Poland).<sup>17</sup>

In relation to the fact that Poland assumed leadership in the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education Remembrance and Research in 2005, Prof. Daria Nałęcz, director general of the State Archives and chair of the Task Force from the beginning of 2005, visited Israel where she met Yad Vashem chairman Avner Shalev and representatives of the Israeli ministry of education. Among other topics, they discussed the problem of expanding the curriculum concerning the Holocaust in both countries and the question of resuming the activity of the joint Polish-Israeli Textbook Commission.

The most important event in bilateral relations in the second half of the year was the second meeting within the Strategic Polish-Israeli Dialogue, initiated in 2004. During the meeting, held in Tel Aviv on 27 and 28 November 2005 and attended, on the Polish side, by representatives of the academic circles and the world of business, there were discussed the possibilities of intensifying cooperation in the field of science and economy.

One of the recurrent issues raised in bilateral contacts in 2005 was the necessity to introduce changes in the programme of Israeli youth visits to Poland. Taking the scale of these visits into consideration (more than 20 thousand people annually), these “educational trips,” as they are called in Israel, are an important factor shaping young Israelis’ opinions on the Holocaust and contemporary Poland. Having regard to the above, the representatives of Polish authorities called for broadening the formula of those visits to encourage more

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<sup>16</sup> S. Andruczyk, “Film TV Polonia o Henryku Sławiku—po hebrajsku,” *Nowiny Kurier*, 22 July 2005, [www.msz.gov.pl/index.php?page=4389&lang\\_id=pl&bulletin\\_id=8&portlet=biuletyn%2Fpokaz](http://www.msz.gov.pl/index.php?page=4389&lang_id=pl&bulletin_id=8&portlet=biuletyn%2Fpokaz).

<sup>17</sup> For more information about the cooperation with the Druzes, see [www.uml.lodz.pl/index.php?menu2=2&zapytanie=2,01&poz=1&id=3770](http://www.uml.lodz.pl/index.php?menu2=2&zapytanie=2,01&poz=1&id=3770).

direct contacts between young Poles and Israelis. This issue, discussed in March 2005 during President Kwaśniewski's visit to Israel, was the subject of further direct talks between representatives of education ministries of both countries, who declared, among others, the necessity to develop educational curricula for a better understanding of the common history.<sup>18</sup>

Israelis observed the Polish parliamentary and presidential elections in autumn 2005 with great interest. The most popular Israeli daily newspapers, *Yediot Aharonot* and *Haaretz*, sent special correspondents to Poland (usually Israeli media write about elections in other countries based on agency reports) who regularly reported on the most recent developments in the elections.<sup>19</sup>

### Prospects

The end of 2005 and beginning of 2006 abounded in political events both in Poland and the Middle East. The disintegration of the election coalition in Israel, the establishment of a new party, Kadima, and lastly, the departures of Prime Minister Sharon from the Israeli political stage and President Kwaśniewski from the Polish political stage, have not had the slightest effect on Polish-Israeli relations. All the indications are that 2006 should be another good year in relations between the two countries and societies. A new, positive tendency to be seen since mid-2005 is a renewed increase in tourist traffic, including pilgrimages, from Poland to Israel (after a slump caused by the outbreak of the Intifada). Considering the fast improvement of mutual relations, one can hope that the influence of the emotional factor, resulting from the common but painful past will be diminishing in the years to come. The natural and everyday character of Polish-Israeli relations should foster a further development of contacts in every field.

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<sup>18</sup> *The Jerusalem Post* of 30 June 2005, [www.msz.gov.pl/index.php?page=4378&lang\\_id=pl&bulletin\\_id=8&portlet=biuletyn%2Fpokaz](http://www.msz.gov.pl/index.php?page=4378&lang_id=pl&bulletin_id=8&portlet=biuletyn%2Fpokaz).

<sup>19</sup> *Haaretz* of 23 October 2005, [72.21.49.138/~jaskola/wordpress/?p=320](http://72.21.49.138/~jaskola/wordpress/?p=320); *Yediot Aharonot* of 24 October 2005, <http://72.21.49.138/~jaskola/wordpress/?p=320>.

## **Poland's Relations with Asia-Pacific Countries<sup>1</sup>**

Although the Euro-Atlantic option still dominates Poland's foreign policy, a lot of attention is also devoted to developing contacts with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. The September 11<sup>th</sup> events demonstrated links between the situation in the Euro-Atlantic area, to which Poland belongs, and the situation outside Europe.

Countries of the Asia-Pacific region represent a varying level of economic development. On the one hand, there is Japan—an economic superpower; China—developing military potential and seeking a fuller economic integration with the rest of the world; India—with its social contrasts, but at the same time with huge economic capabilities; on the other—Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan—with important financial and investment markets; Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia—with export markets. Alongside the abovementioned states, there are countries struggling with the most basic problems, such as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Myanmar, Cambodia, Bangladesh, Mongolia. The Oceania Zone, Australia and New Zealand form a separate group of states with a significant investment potential and export possibilities. The political and economic situation in the countries of this region together with the social and demographic processes at work have a direct impact on the rest of the world. Political stability and economic development of the Asia-Pacific region lies also in the Polish interests.

As a mid-sized Central European country with a market economy and a membership in the EU and NATO, Poland is becoming a more and more interesting partner, both politically and economically, for the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. First of all it is perceived through its membership in the two

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<sup>1</sup> Asia-Pacific region: South Asia (Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Maldives), East Asia (Japan, China with Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao and Mongolia, the Republic of Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea), South-East Asia (Indonesia, East Timor, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, Brunei) as well as Australia and New Zealand with the South Pacific islands.

organisations. Poland participates in the elaboration of directions of the EU foreign policy concerning this region, as well as in multilateral efforts for sustaining peace and security and for reconciliation processes in regions of tensions and conflicts (*inter alia* Afghanistan, the Indonesian province of Aceh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the Korean Peninsula). It also contributes to the EU dialogue with Asia-Pacific countries, among others, in ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting), dialogue with ASEAN, ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEF (Asia-Europe Foundation).

The Polish policy towards the countries of the Asia-Pacific region, also within the EU, is marked with a priority of economic interests: intensification of trade exchange, development of exports, favourable industrial and technological cooperation, attraction of investment capital and seeking of alternative sources of necessary imports. The EU membership gave Poland new tools to carry out its foreign policy in this region.

### **Bilateral Cooperation**

In March 2005 a regional meeting of Polish ambassadors was held, at which bilateral relations of Poland with Asia-Pacific countries were reviewed and methods of better use of the EU instruments in the promotion and protection of national interests in relations with countries of this region were discussed. In November 2004 the Polish government adopted "The strategy of the Republic of Poland towards non-European developing countries,"<sup>2</sup> in which priority directions of activities in Asia were determined.

Diplomatic relations between Poland and the majority of the Asia-Pacific region countries were established as early as in the 1940s (the People's Republic of China, Afghanistan, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea) and in the 1950s (India, Japan, Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Burma, Mongolia, Nepal and Sri Lanka); with others in the 1960s (Pakistan, Laos, Singapore) and in the 1970s (Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Bangladesh, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines). In 1989 diplomatic relations were established with the Republic of Korea, in 1996 with Brunei, and in 2002 with East Timor. Moreover Poland maintained diplomatic and consular relations with some of the countries in the interwar period (China, Australia, Japan, the Dutch Indies).

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<sup>2</sup> "Strategia RP w odniesieniu do pozaeuropejskich krajów rozwijających się," *Zeszyty Akademii Dyplomatycznej MSZ* 2004, No. 22.

Poland has its own defined mechanisms of political, economic and cultural cooperation with the countries from this region. These are: official and unofficial visits, including high-profile meetings and meetings at the ministerial level; consultations of politicians and experts; trade missions; as well as an adequate legal and treaty base. The cooperation with countries from the Asia-Pacific region is carried out on the international stage within the framework of, among others, the United Nations. An important element of this framework was constituted by Poland's involvement in the activities of the International Commission for Control and Supervision in Indochina in the 1950s, and is now determined by the participation (still in operation) in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission for the sustaining of peace on the Korean Peninsula.

### **Political Relations**

The year 2005 witnessed many events of political, economic and cultural nature in Poland's relations with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. In the political dialogue, the interests of the Asian counterparts, besides bilateral issues, focused on opinions of Polish politicians and experts regarding the situation in Central and Eastern Europe, particularly in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and the Balkans, as well as the processes within the European Union and security issues, especially in the context of Iraq, Iran, the Middle East and Afghanistan. The Asian partners have been sharing their opinions on Indian-Pakistani and Sino-Japanese relations, the situation on the Korean Peninsula, in Afghanistan, around the Taiwan Strait, in Burma, the Indonesian province of Aceh, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Evaluations and analyses of particular importance concerned the integration processes in Asia and the role of China in these processes, particularly in ASEAN+3 (China, the Republic of Korea, Japan), the cooperation of ASEAN countries with India and the establishment of a new East Asia Summit forum, as well as the involvement of Asian countries in activities of ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum), which is the only forum of such size (including the US, the EU, Russia, China and Japan), where issues of security, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, war against terrorism and new threats in the Asia-Pacific region are discussed.

In bilateral relations, Poland's diplomatic focus fell on Northeast Asia. The dialogue established between Poland and China after the visit of the President Hu Jintao in Poland in 2004 was continued throughout 2005. Consultations at the level of deputy ministers and directors of departments were held in Warsaw. The Days of Polish Culture, organised in May and very well received by the Chinese audience, were an important event in Polish-Chinese relations.

After the visit of the Emperor and Empress of Japan in Poland in 2002, the political dialogue at the highest level was developing. In January 2005 the Prime Minister Marek Belka paid a visit to Japan During which a joint communiqué was issued. It concerned the realisation of not only political undertakings (dialogue at the highest level), but also economic (among others, a trilateral cooperation with Ukrainian partners in energy issues) and cultural (preparations for celebrations of the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two states) ones. The cooperation with Poland is a major element of Japanese policy towards Europe, especially its central and eastern part, where Japan seeks to increase its political and economic involvement. Since their accession to the EU the countries of this region became particularly interesting for Japanese investors. Very good relations between the EU and Japan are confirmed by the progress in the implementation of the Action Plan for the EU-Japan Cooperation, and the program 2005 Year of EU-Japan People-to-People Exchange, in which Poland is very actively involved. An advancing process of European integration makes Japan perceive the EU as an indispensable ally not only in the area of economic, but also in political contacts.

The Republic of Korea is a traditionally important political, trade and investment partner for Poland. An ongoing dialogue is carried out between politicians of the highest profiles. Seoul hosted the International OSCE conference, in which participated among others, the Polish Deputy Foreign Minister, Piotr Świtalski. Along with Sweden and Switzerland, Poland contributes to the works of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea. The last consultations within this commission at the departmental level were held in 2005 in Bern. Poland is also a participant of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). In the discussion on bringing the implementation of KEDO projects to a halt, Poland supports the continuation of the works of this organisation, as it is a tool that allows the international community to secure peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

India was the most important partner of Poland in South Asia. In 2005, Poland officially supported this country's permanent membership in the reformed UN Security Council. In Warsaw political consultations of the deputy ministers of both countries were held, during which major issues of bilateral cooperation and regional matters have been discussed. During the meeting of Polish ambassadors of the Asia-Pacific region, held in March in New Delhi, a program of cultural exchange was adopted. Economic contacts between Poland and India are developing in traditional industries, such as mining, energy and defence sectors. In 2005, Indian Deputy Minister of Commerce and Industry,

Ashok Jha, paid a visit to Poland, during which ways to expand the cooperation were discussed, *inter alia*, through an agreement on economic cooperation. In spite of the fact that India is one of the most important economic partners of Poland in the whole Asian region (except the People's Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea) a huge, unused potential still exists in this domain.

Since 2001 Poland has been actively participating in stability missions in Afghanistan. Polish non-governmental organizations are also present there. In 2005 a discussion has began on the restoration of the Polish diplomatic post in Kabul. In April this year, a special EU representative in Afghanistan paid a visit to Poland. This visit was the first in the cycle of visits to ten new EU member states. In his statements, he emphasised that among the new ten members, it is Poland that demonstrates the biggest involvement in the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

After the disaster in South and Southeast Asia, caused by the tsunami in December 2004, Poland, together with other countries, took part in the activities of the international community to help the affected countries. In 2005 Prime Minister Marek Belka paid a working visit to Sri Lanka, where he handed over financial aid for the victims of the disaster.

An intense political dialogue was carried out with Southeast Asian states. This region gains in political and economic significance, as it is enjoying sustained economic growth, an advancing integration of states around ASEAN (ASEAN+3, EAS) and plays a particular role in maritime trade (The Malacca Strait). The ASEAN countries are important political and economic partners for Poland. Many years of effort helped Poland regain its earlier position of military equipment exporter to these countries.

The year 2005 witnessed an exchange of visits of the highest profile between Poland and Southeast Asian countries. The Polish-Indonesian political dialogue was particularly intense—Prime Minister Marek Belka visited Indonesia. Then an inter-governmental agreement on granting a loan to Indonesia and an executive agreement to contracts for the delivery of Polish arms and military equipment were signed. In the area of economic relations, Indonesia is interested in going beyond the trade exchange and in establishing permanent cooperative ties, *inter alia* in the area of technology transfer.

In July 2005 Prime Minister Marek Belka paid a visit to Malaysia. The visit was a good opportunity to make an evaluation of the hitherto cooperation and to outline its future directions. A few months later, King Yang—di Partuan Gong XII Tuanku Syed Sirajuddin visited Poland. Economic cooperation plays an

important role in the relations between Poland and Malaysia. This includes the execution of the 2003 contract for the delivery of military equipment. There are chances for further contracts and—as it is in the case of Indonesia—for undertaking permanent cooperation in this domain, including technology transfers.

In 2004 the status of the director of the diplomatic post in Singapore was elevated to the rank of ambassador. The Polish ambassador is performing the function of a governor in the Asia–Europe Foundation (ASEF). In 2005 Prime Minister Marek Belka paid a visit to Singapore. The most important field in Poland's relations with this country is economic cooperation. There are great opportunities to carry out joint projects in the area of science and technology. During the Prime Minister's visit to Singapore, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed concerning scientific and technological cooperation, *inter alia* in biomedicine, electronics, IT and biochemistry. Attracting capital from Singapore is of vital importance for Poland.

The Polish Prime Minister's visits to the Philippines and Vietnam in 2005 were amongst the most important events in the agenda of contacts with Southeast Asian countries. The signing of a readmission agreement with Vietnam is particularly noteworthy. It is the first document of this kind between Poland and a Southeast Asian state. In 2005 Vietnamese delegations, interested in the Polish experience in building state and local administration and in the functioning of the state's tax system, visited Poland. The visit of Prime Minister Marek Belka to the Philippines concerned economic cooperation. In 2005 Polish MPs also visited the Philippines.

Poland continued to develop its political dialogue with Australia and New Zealand. In 2005 Helen Clark, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, paid a visit to Poland. Both Australia and New Zealand are interested in maintaining mutual political and economic contacts, including those concerning trade and investment. Development of these contacts is hindered by geographical distance and the focus of Polish entrepreneurs on less distant markets where they can operate more easily. New Zealand put forward a proposal to include Poland in its Working Holiday Scheme, which gives students from Poland and New Zealand the opportunities to study and work. Poland is conducting an intense dialogue with Australia on security issues.

### **Economic Relations**

The lack of trade equilibrium is Poland's major problem in economic cooperation with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. According to the

Ministry of Finance, trade exchange with these countries in 2004 totalled \$12 billion (and doubled in comparison with 2000), and in 2005 amounted to \$14.2 billion. However, a large trade deficit with these countries has been sustained for a few years now. In 2004 the deficit amounted to \$8.4 billion, i.e. almost 60% of the total trade deficit of Poland, and in 2005 it equalled \$10.3 billion, being 90% of total Polish deficit, of which 42% was the deficit in trade exchange with China.

**Trade.** In 2005 Poland had the largest trade exchange with the following countries of the Asia-Pacific region: the People's Republic of China (\$6.05 billion), Japan (\$2.13 billion), South Korea (\$1.62 billion), Taiwan (\$976 million), India (\$564 million), Thailand (\$ 449 million), Singapore (\$440 million), Malaysia (\$424 million) and Indonesia (\$360 million). In order to expand Polish exports, credit lines were opened for China, Vietnam and Indonesia.

The negative trade balance with China increases every year. No more than 0.3% of Polish exports is shipped there. The very low level of exports to China and a significant trade deficit are typical of trade relations of CEE countries with China. These countries make a market for Chinese products, often of low quality, manufactured with the use of less-advanced technologies and competitive in terms of price, because of a low-cost labour force in China. The Chinese encourage Polish economic partners to become interested in its interior provinces and in Western China. These regions retarded in terms of technology and infrastructure give Polish exporters an opportunity to enter a difficult Chinese market.

For a few years now Poland has had a trade deficit with Taiwan. According to experts, there is a real possibility to increase trade exchange with the island. Such institutions as the Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency and the Polish Chamber of Commerce have been undertaking activities aimed at promoting Polish exports. Around 50 companies from Poland take part every year in the Eurogate fair that has been organised in Taipei since 1999.

Hong Kong, considering its advanced economic integration with China, may become an attractive market for Polish manufacturers, especially for equipment and machinery used in transport, mining, energy production (including engines and turbines), environmental protection and the food industry.

The asymmetry in Polish-Japanese trade exchange increases. In 2000, the Polish deficit amounted to around \$1 billion, and in 2005 it totalled as much as \$1.8 billion. In terms of exports to the Japanese market, the following products enjoy the largest potential: furniture, chemicals, food, wood and wooden half-finished products, semiconductors and glass. In 2005 the Poland-Japan

Energy Conservation Technology Centre was opened in Warsaw with an aim to exchange experiences and to cooperate in the area of technical solutions for saving electrical energy. Poland's participation in the EXPO 2005 exhibition in Aichi was a particularly important event in Polish-Japanese relations; the Polish pavilion was very highly rated.

An opportunity for Poland to increase its trade exchange with the Republic of Korea, for which the deficit amounted in 2000 to \$600 million, and in 2005 to as much as \$1.4 billion, are *inter alia*, exports of food products. The Koreans are interested in increasing exports of electronic goods to Poland.

Poland seeks to intensify economic contacts and trade exchange with India. This country is one of the major markets of Polish investment exports, especially in the mining and energy sectors.

Singapore is a prospective economic partner. It is interested in increasing trade exchange with CEE countries, particularly with Poland, mostly in electronics. Poland's exports to Singapore include: ships, chemicals, plastics, equipment and machinery. The majority of these goods are not aimed at the Singaporean market, but for re-export to other countries in the region, mostly Indonesia, Malaysia, China, Thailand, Korea and Taiwan. A similar situation occurs with products exported from Singapore to Poland—in most cases they are not manufactured on the island, but originate from all the countries of the Far East.

Thailand is the fifth country on the list of Polish export markets in the Asia-Pacific region. Poland exports primarily include: chemicals, equipment and machinery, animal products and base metals. It should be noted here that the exporters are small- and medium-sized private companies operating without any loan support from the government.

Vietnam is one of the so-called priority countries benefiting from the Polish programme for development. The value of Polish exports to this country increased in recent years as a result of a loan granted by Poland with the purpose of modernising the Vietnamese shipbuilding industry.

It should be noted that—apart from activities aimed at increasing exports of Polish military equipment to Malaysia and Indonesia—there have been established contacts between economy-related ministries of these countries and Poland. As a result, trade exchange continues to develop.

**Investment cooperation.** According to the data of the Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency, in 2004 the Republic of Korea was eighth,

Japan sixteenth and Australia twenty-sixth on the list of 35 biggest foreign investors in Poland.

In 2005, the total value of Korean investments in Poland amounted to ca. \$1.2 billion. The Daewoo Corporation continued to be the largest investor, though other investors from the Republic of Korea became very active, especially LG Electronics and LG Philips LCD, the capital involvement of which was estimated at a few hundred million dollars.

New perspectives of investment cooperation with Japan have emerged. Poland is carrying out promotional activities on the Japanese market aimed at attracting larger direct investments from this country. According to the data including the inflow of capital both directly from Japan and the companies located outside its territory, the value of Japanese investments in Poland amounts to ca. \$1 billion. Japanese investors show real interest in placing capital in all CEE countries.

Other potential sources of investment originating from the Asia-Pacific region can be found in Australia, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Australian investments in Poland amount to ca. \$180 million. The inflow of capital from Singapore is estimated at over \$70 million. Taiwanese investments are definitely weak. However, the investment cooperation of companies from Poland and Hong Kong on third markets (capital from Hong Kong, Polish contracting) is gaining in significance. Opportunities also exist for Polish companies to participate as subcontractors or suppliers in investment projects of Hong Kong companies.

In the recent years, investors from India have become more active in Poland, primarily in the steel, electronics and pharmaceutical industries.

Cooperation with Asian Countries within the Framework of the European Union

The EU's strategy towards Asia, adopted in September 2001 and entitled "Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnership" describes the state of mutual bilateral and regional relations<sup>3</sup> as well as goals and tasks for the future. The basic goals for the next 10 years are: establishing a sustainable partnership and ensuring the active presence of the EU in this region. In view of the events of the 11 September 2001, cooperation in combating terrorism

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<sup>3</sup> The EU distinguishes the following regions in Asia: South Asia, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia and Australasia.

became an issue of vital importance. As Chris Patten stressed it, Asian countries are the EU's natural allies in the process of strengthening global anti-terrorist coalition. A preliminary assessment of the implementation of the strategy indicated a need to strengthen the ties between the EU and Asia in such key fields as: ensuring peace and security; trade and economic cooperation;<sup>4</sup> cooperation in fighting poverty; increasing the role of societies in the dialogue between Europe and Asia; building partnership in global issues (environment protection, combating terrorism, organised crime and disease), *inter alia* via the reform of the UN and a growing participation of Asian countries in the WTO. There is also a need to strengthen the EU's presence in Asia, which would be carried out—among others—through the opening new representative offices on the Asian continent.

The forms of European-Asian cooperation so far are as follows:

- EU-ASEAN dialogue (the EU has a representation from all member states);
- ASEM and the ASEF foundation established within its framework (all EU countries participate);
- ASEAN Regional Forum, in which—apart from ASEAN and EU countries (represented by the Troika)—the participants are China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the US, Canada, Russia, India, Pakistan, Australia, New Zealand, Mongolia and Papua New Guinea;
- traditional bilateral cooperation of the EU with Asian countries (*inter alia*, every year a summit is held with China, Japan, India and the Republic of Korea with the participation of the EU Troika).

ASEM is gaining in significance in contacts between Asia and Europe.<sup>5</sup> Every two years since 1996 the leaders of ASEM member states have been meeting in a selected capital; Meetings at the ministerial level are held during the year. The last summit, in which the new EU states and three ASEAN states (Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar) took part, was held in October 2004 in Hanoi.

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<sup>4</sup> According to the World Bank Development Report 2000/2001: the share of Asia in EU exports—21.1%, in imports—31.2%; in 2000, the EU's trade deficit amounted to €121 billion; in the years 1995–1999 the EU invested ca. €12 billion in Asia, which makes for around 8% of total investments on this continent.

<sup>5</sup> Members of ASEM: 25 EU states, the European Commission, 7 ASEAN states (Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam and Brunei), and the People's Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea.

The 6<sup>th</sup> ASEM Summit will be held in September 2006 in Helsinki. In 2005 Poland actively participated in political meetings and works of experts as well as in programmes and projects carried out as a part of ASEM and ASEF dialogue. In May 2005 a meeting of Foreign Ministers of ASEM countries was held in Kyoto. Poland, represented by Deputy Minister Jan Truszczyński, put forward an initiative called ASEM Diplomatic Academies Network. As part of the programme, a seminar for young diplomats will be organised in Poland in 2006. In June 2005 Minister of Culture Waldemar Dąbrowski participated in the meeting of ministers of culture of ASEM states in Paris, and Minister of Finance Mirosław Gronicki took part in the meeting of ASEM finance ministers in Tianjin.

Poland was also active in the cooperation of the EU with ASEAN. In March 2005 in Jakarta Deputy Minister Bogusław Zaleski took part in the EU-ASEAN ministerial meeting.

As a member of the EU Poland is using, in a more and more active way, the new tools and discussion fora, to which it previously had no access, to exert its own influence on the EU's policy towards the Asia-Pacific region.

**III.**

**Poland's Activities**

**at International Organisations**



## **Poland's Regional Policy**

The enlargement of the European Union has provided regional structures with a strong impulse for action and created new opportunities. New tasks have also emerged. Initially they were connected with the need to share experiences on adaptation to EU requirements and hold consultations on the course of accession talks, and later with the need to help establish a position for the new members in the EU (opposing their marginalisation) as well as EU external actions. Cooperation with non-EU countries and support for the membership aspirations of some of them assumed great importance. However, the consolidation of regional identity and the exploitation of regional potentials in European policy remained the basic objective of these groups.

The past twelve months have been an important period in Polish regional activity. Until the middle of 2005, Poland presided over the Visegrad Group and Council of the Baltic Sea States. In January 2005 in Warsaw there was a meeting of foreign ministers of the countries belonging to the Regional Partnership. This was a time to formulate a new profile for the work of these regional structures following the enlargement of the European Union and review Poland's activity in these groups.

### **Regional Issues in Polish Foreign Policy Documents**

In the broad sense of the term Polish policy in Central Europe and in regional structures occupied an important position in the guiding documents of the foreign policies of the governments of both Marek Belka and Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz. In his report on Polish foreign policy tasks in 2005, read to the Sejm on 21 January 2005,<sup>1</sup> Foreign Minister Adam D. Rotfeld specified the main objective of Poland's presidency of the Visegrad Group—a renewal of the sense of common action, especially within the framework of the EU. Our partners in the Visegrad Group: the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, are one of the three groups with which Poland will realise her EU interests (apart

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\* Jacek Gajewski—Counsellor at the Department of Strategy and Foreign Policy Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

<sup>1</sup> See p. 9.

from cooperation with Germany, France, Great Britain and the remaining EU member-states to whom we are joined by common interests in specific issues). According to Minister Rotfeld participation in the debate on the future of relations in Poland's immediate neighbourhood following EU enlargement requires an internal national debate concerning the "place and role of regional policy in foreign policy tasks as a whole." He described it as follows:

"Cooperation in the framework of the Visegrad Group, the Central European Initiative and the Council of Baltic Sea States has enhanced the identity of Central Europe and ensured stability in the whole region. After our accession to the European Union, but even 2 or 3 years before its enlargement, some of our partners expressed doubts as to the point of preserving the sub-regional structures. Our view on this matter is different. What is more, we have managed to use concrete initiatives—including those connected with our current presidency of the Visegrad Group—to define the needed direction of the evolution of cooperation in the region, so that its desirability and usefulness is convincingly manifested. This also concern to the Regional Partnership launched in 2001—which affiliates the states of the Visegrad Group, as well as Austria and Slovenia. Our partners have had an opportunity to become convinced that Poland does not treat the region as a base for its political ambitions at the EU forum. Nor do we make pretensions to playing the role of a regional leader. We have other goals: we want to use our prestige and position in the European and Transatlantic family to promote the interests of the region.

The enlargement of the European Union and NATO, the total change of the geopolitical picture of Europe, and also the emergence of new challenges, has altered the context of action of the whole institutional construction in Europe—and not only of the sub-regional links. These institutions must determine a new sense for their existence. That, too, is a task for our policy."

A similar view of Poland's regional activity is held by the new government, which has decided to continue close cooperation with Central European partners, among others, within the framework of regional groups. Prime Minister Marcinkiewicz spoke of this in his address to the Diplomatic Corps in Poland on 8 November 2005 and to the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London on 24 November 2005.<sup>2</sup> This was later confirmed by President Lech Kaczyński

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<sup>2</sup> Prime Minister K. Marcinkiewicz declared a desire for a further consolidation of cooperation with the countries of Central Europe, including at the Visegrad forum, and pointed out the need to expand this cooperation primarily in the context of the shaping of the so-called EU Eastern Dimension.

on 10 January 2006: “As far as Poland’s neighbours are concerned, we attach great importance to our cooperation within the framework of the so-called Visegrad Group with the Czech Republic, Slovak Republic and Republic of Hungary. I think that common interests connected with the fact that our countries are part of the same region of Europe provide an excellent platform to tighten our cooperation and develop it even further. Our historical ties primarily with Lithuania, but also with Latvia and Estonia, and the interests we share with these states, provide a good basis to enhance our cooperation within the EU framework on matters that exceed the scope of the EU.”<sup>3</sup>

It is worth recalling that the change of government led to the drafting of a new report in the Foreign Ministry entitled “Closing Report. The Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2001–2005 and Expected Challenges for the Immediate Future.”<sup>4</sup> In this report, a consolidation of Poland’s role in the region and regional identity are considered one of the most important goals of Polish foreign policy. The assessment of the Visegrad Group during this period contained in the report talks of both a communion of interests and of a “certain identity crisis” resulting from “the exhaustion of the hitherto catalogue of strategic goals” following admission to NATO and the EU. The report confirms that during the initial period of Poland’s membership of the EU, competitive behaviour was manifested by other countries in the region, but this competition was gradually neutralised thanks to an expansion of regional cooperation and common activity within the EU. The report also talks of an intensification of contacts with the Baltic and Nordic countries on EU and security issues as well as on policy towards Russia and the remaining countries of Eastern Europe.

### **Cooperation in the Visegrad Group (V-4)**

Poland continued to perform its role as the Visegrad Group’s Presidency in the first half of 2005. Its prime objective was: “to preserve the Visegrad Group as a regional forum of dialogue on European issues in accordance with the letter and practice of the European Union.” The priorities were: consultations on the EU New Financial Perspective for the period 2007–2013; cooperation in adapting to the terms of the Schengen Agreement; participation in the formulation and implementation of the EU Neighbourhood Policy; the launch of the Visegrad Strategic Programme realised by the International Visegrad Fund; and cooperation in energy, industry, the infrastructure and scientific research.

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<sup>3</sup> Source: [www.prezydent.pl/x.node?id=1011848&eventId=3026978](http://www.prezydent.pl/x.node?id=1011848&eventId=3026978).

<sup>4</sup> Duplicated typescript. Foreign Ministry archives.

Regarding political issues, especially in an EU context, the programme called for further regular meetings of politicians and experts (chiefly from foreign ministries and offices for European affairs) in order to improve the Group's consultative mechanism and lobbying potential. The subject of these meetings was set forth in an EU agenda at the time. Regarding cooperation with partners outside the Visegrad Group (the "V-4+" formula), the aim was to continue contacts with Benelux, the Nordic Council, Japan and Ukraine.<sup>5</sup> Poland postulated a strong position for the International Visegrad Fund as an institution that facilitates contacts between people and between NGO's. It wanted the emergence of a Visegrad Cultural Programme, which would facilitate joint ventures within the Group itself and in the third countries.

In the programme, the greatest importance in sector cooperation was given to activities in: infrastructure and transport, regional development and spatial planning, transnational cooperation and border protection, as well as environmental protection. It was also planned to continue cooperation in defence and military issues, justice, scientific research, cultural exchange, education and sport, and to develop contacts between institutions engaged in the protection of patents, trade marks and intellectual property, state control and the promotion of foreign investments.

The most important event during the second final part of the Polish presidency, and also the culmination thereof, was the meeting of Prime Ministers in Kazimierz Dolny on 10 June 2005. Three topics were discussed: the Group's regional role, its activity within the EU framework, and cooperation with Ukraine. Joint political declarations were devoted to the last two topics. There was discussed the Group's possibility of acting by making use of the structures of the EU and Council of Europe to formulate and implement resocialisation and education programmes for the Roma community in Central Europe. It was agreed that the annual contribution to the Visegrad Fund would be increased to €750,000. Poland's presidency of the Group was reviewed, and the Hungarian side presented the main points of its presidency until the middle of 2006.

The Heads of Governments expressed their conviction whereby the initial period of EU membership had confirmed the need for smaller regional forums of consultations and discussions, allowing regional identity to be preserved. The debate on EU issues concentrated mainly on the Constitutional Treaty in the context of the rejection of it by France and the Netherlands. Speaking on behalf

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<sup>5</sup> At working and expert level (e.g. in Foreign Ministry departments), this cooperation also embraced the United States, Germany, Lithuania, Romania and Israel.

of their countries, the Prime Ministers expressed support for the process of ratifying the Treaty. It was also decided that the Visegrad states would ensure that the New Financial Perspective (NFP) provides the EU with sufficient funds to finance the needs of EU members, especially the new ones (according to the so-called negotiating box method suggested by the Luxembourg presidency), and introduces more flexible rules on access to EU funds. Cooperation was also agreed upon during the final phase of the negotiations on the NFP and during the European Council in Brussels on 16–17 June. Support for an enlargement of the EU was sustained.

The Visegrad countries pledged to continue efforts to bring Ukraine closer to a fulfilment of EU standards by means of EU and bilateral programmes (e.g. so-called twinning projects). The following areas were considered important: Common Foreign and Security Policy, the III pillar issues (e.g. visa related problems and a readmission agreement), as well as economic cooperation, including Ukraine's admission to the WTO. These matters were the subject of a discussion between the Visegrad Prime Ministers and Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko on the sidelines of the meeting in Kazimierz.

On 30 September 2005, Presidents Aleksander Kwaśniewski, Václav Klaus, Ivan Gašparovič and László Sólyom met in Wisła in order to concentrate on the future of regional cooperation and cooperation within the Visegrad Group. They agreed that following the EU's enlargement, regional structures must redefine their agenda primarily vis-à-vis those countries in the region that remain outside the EU (the post-Soviet and Balkan states). They also considered an internal reform to the EU and the future of the Constitutional Treaty, as well as the situation of the newly-accepted members. They agreed that all the transitional periods resulting in "unequal" membership of the EU should be abolished as soon as possible. Yet again, the presidents spoke out in favour of the continuation of the present quadrilateral structure of the Group and the expansion of the cooperation with other countries and structures according to the "V-4+" formula.

As far as political cooperation is concerned, EU issues were the dominant subject of all the meetings of the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of the Visegrad Group throughout 2005.

Heads of Government or their representatives met in Budapest on 13 July, 30 August and 2 December and in Brussels on 15 December. They discussed: ongoing issues within the Visegrad Group; a stance on the subject of the EU crisis following the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by France and the Netherlands as well as methods of further discussion on this question; successive

phases of negotiations regarding the New Financial Perspective; and the highlight of the British presidency of the EU. They pointed to the need to adopt the kind of solutions regarding the Treaty and the NFP that would consolidate EU member states, the Union's cohesion policy, and the significance of the EU in global politics.<sup>6</sup>

At the August meeting, attended by the President of the European Commission, J.M. Barroso, it was agreed that the NFP must be accepted by the end of 2005, the current level of cohesion policy must be maintained, and that expenditures on cohesion should not be set against expenditures on competitiveness. A joint communiqué underlined the need for the NFP to finance hitherto EU policies, including Common Agricultural Policy, and to preserve a balance between reform and stability in the process of reforming the EU. During the meeting there were also discussed the EU's membership negotiations with Croatia and the possibility of involving the EU and European Commission in support for a civic society in Belarus.

The next meeting occurred during the final phase of talks on the NFP when British Prime Minister Tony Blair, in his capacity of the EU Presidency, consulted the new EU members on his latest proposals. Consequently, he was the guest of four Prime Ministers in Budapest.<sup>7</sup> No compromise was reached on the British proposal for sharp cuts to the EU budget, which would have meant less money for the new "10." The Visegrad countries were inclined to accept a reduced budget in exchange for easier access to structural funds, but Great Britain could not agree to this.<sup>8</sup>

The main meeting of Foreign Ministers took place in Budapest on 11 July. A programme for the Hungarian presidency until the middle of 2006 was adopted. Current EU issues and the prospects of joint activity between the Visegrad Group and Balkan candidate states to the EU were also discussed. A part of the discussion, devoted to cooperation with Ukraine, was conducted in presence of the Foreign Ministers of Ukraine, Austria and Slovenia.

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<sup>6</sup> Some of the issues were also discussed at the Regional Partnership forum, for the Austrian chancellor and Slovene prime minister also participated in the second part of the debate.

<sup>7</sup> Just before the Budapest meeting the Heads of Government of the nine EU new member states issued a joint letter to Prime Minister Tony Blair, asking for the continuation in the NFP of the hitherto level of subsidies for the poorer member states. Slovenia was the only country that did not sign this letter.

<sup>8</sup> A compromise was not made any easier by the stance of Slovakia, which was prepared to accept the British proposal in exchange for additional funds for closing down the nuclear plant in Jaslovské Bohunice.

The foreign ministers of the Visegrad Group also met in Vilnius on 21 April, during the NATO ministerial session, when together with Ukrainian Foreign Minister B. Tarasiuk, they discussed that country's transatlantic ambitions and possible support for them from the Visegrad countries.

On Poland's initiative, the Visegrad countries commenced consultations on issues related to the OECD. The first meeting on this subject of experts from foreign, financial and economic ministries was held in Warsaw on 21 March 2005. The agenda of the meeting included the question of enlarging the OECD to include Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Slovenia; the appointment of a new secretary-general of the OECD; and Visegrad support for Ukraine's candidacy to join the Organization.

The Visegrad countries have agreed to start work on a new Group communications and information strategy, especially towards recipients outside the Visegrad area. They have decided to expand and update the Visegrad Group website, edited by the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and then gradually create a Visegrad information and public relations agency and Television channel (modelled on ARDO), depending on legal decisions as well as on financial, organisational and technical possibilities. On Poland's initiative, consultations with experts on the subject of the website were held in Warsaw in October 2005. During these consultations, it was agreed to form working groups to prepare detailed solutions; the Polish side was given the task of coordinating work on the legal implications.

Parliamentary cooperation also continued. Although no meeting of Parliaments' speakers was held, there were three meetings of representatives of parliamentary committees responsible for EU affairs: in Zakopane (28–30 January 2005), Častá Papiernička in Slovakia (18–20 April) and Visegrad in Hungary (17–18 November).

The defence ministers of the Visegrad Group met in Warsaw on 4 March 2005. The discussion concentrated on the possibilities of cooperation in implementing the European Security and Defence Policy (among others, in the process of creating EU Battle Groups) and in the work of the European Defence Agency. It was agreed that regular meetings of political directors and directors of disarmament affairs departments in Defence Ministries would be held in order to formulate joint stances for the meetings of Defence Ministers in NATO, the EU and European Defence Agency. The prospects of Visegrad cooperation in the implementation of new information technologies, epidemiology and protection against the weapons of mass-destruction as well as the destruction of superfluous ammunition and dangerous substances were discussed. The Defence Ministers

also considered the participation of Visegrad Group countries in peacekeeping and stabilisation missions and the possibility of expanding the Multinational North-South Corps in Szczecin by including officers of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. The ministers examined the plan to create an International Flight Training Centre (not just for the Visegrad countries) on the premises of the Air Force School in Dęblin (Poland) and resolved to continue talks on those matters.<sup>9</sup> In Warsaw, the ministers met with their Ukrainian partner, Minister A. Hrycenka, as part of the "V-4+" formula, and discussed methods of cooperation between the armed forces of NATO Member States and Ukraine.

Work was also continued by the Salzburg Group, in other words, the Interior Ministers of the Visegrad countries plus Austria and Slovenia. The ministers met in Budapest on 21–22 April and in Graz on 29 July. The first meeting was devoted to an exchange of experience on the implementation of witness protection programmes and cooperation in improving road safety. During the meeting in Graz there were examined the participation of the Visegrad countries in realising the Hague programme (of consolidating freedom, security and justice in the EU, adopted by the European Council in Brussels on 4–5 November 2004), counteracting illegal migration and asylum issues (in cooperation with the International Organization for Migration, whose Director General, B. McKinley, attended this meeting), and the combating of terrorism (in the context of the bombings in London). Since Bulgaria and Romania signed EU accession treaties, it was decided to invite these countries to work in the Salzburg Group.<sup>10</sup>

At the meeting in Graz, Poland assumed the task of coordinating the work of the Salzburg Group until the end of 2005. Its priorities, apart from road safety and the protection of witnesses, were: an assessment of preparations to join the Schengen Agreement and a "considered approach towards the future exchange of credible and current information regarding one's country of origin."<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> The importance of this project is illustrated by the fact that the school in Dęblin was visited by the Prime Ministers of the V-4 countries after their official meeting in Kazimierz. There they met with the Ukrainian prime minister.

<sup>10</sup> The Graz meeting was also attended by the Vice President of the European Commission, Franco Frattini, which highlighted the significance of EU regional cooperation in security and domestic affairs.

<sup>11</sup> See communique by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration on the participation of Under-Secretary of State P. Dakowski in the meeting of the Salzburg Group. Source: [www.mswia.gov.pl/index\\_wai.php?dzial=2&id=3272](http://www.mswia.gov.pl/index_wai.php?dzial=2&id=3272).

Table

**Other important ministerial meetings of the Visegrad Group in 2005**

| <b>Date and place</b>             | <b>Participants</b>                       | <b>Adopted documents and most important subjects of discussion</b>  |
|-----------------------------------|---|---|
| 16–18 March, Straszyn near Gdańsk | Ministers of transport and infrastructure | Declaration on joint activity in rail and combined transport  |
| 14–15 April, Warsaw               | Ministers of regional development         | Declaration on formulation of common regional policy by the countries of the Visegrad Group   |
| 28–29 April, Banská Bystrica      | Ministers of culture                      | Declaration on cooperation in Central European film-making  |
| 6 May, Prague                     | Ministers of finance                      | Adoption of stance concerning negotiations on the NFP for 2007–2013   |
| 6–7 June, Białowieża              | Ministers of environmental protection     | Assessment of cooperation at the EU forum and the implementation of the Carpathian convention   |
| 9 September, Manchester           | Ministers of finance                      | Discussion on the status of negotiations on the NFP for 2007–2013   |
| 12–13 September, Keszthely        | Chairmen of Patent Offices                | Discussion of cooperation at the forum of the EU, WIPO and OHIM and between the Visegrad Group and Benelux  |
| 28 September–1 October, Marienbad | Ministers of justice                      | Discussion of cooperation within the EU framework   |
| 2 December, Sliač (Slovakia)      | Ministers of regional development         | Discussion of priorities in cooperation in the context of the NFP for 2007–2013 and structural and cohesion funds                                     |
| 8–9 December, Karlsbad            | Ministers of culture                      | Discussion of the “Culture 2007” and “Media 2007” programmes of the European Commission, and ways of using EU structural funds in the area of culture |

The Visegrad Group continued contacts with the Benelux countries. At a meeting of Visegrad national coordinators with the Secretary General of Benelux in Bratislava on 15–16 February, a programme of cooperation between the two groupings was agreed upon. The following were recognised as the most

important areas: Schengen, the protection of company logos and patents, state control and interparliamentary cooperation. The Benelux countries considered co-participation, including the financial one, in the realisation of projects within the framework of the International Visegrad Fund.

The most important political event as far as contacts with Benelux are concerned was the working meeting of Visegrad prime ministers with their Benelux counterparts in Brussels on 15 December (on the sidelines of the European Council meeting). This meeting affirmed the paths of cooperation and common objectives that had been agreed upon previously. The prospects of concluding negotiations on the NFP were also discussed.<sup>12</sup>

There were certain problems regarding cooperation with Japan. The absence of direct contacts and of a programme was an obstacle. The prospects of such cooperation were discussed at a meeting of the Visegrad Foreign Ministers with the Japanese Foreign Minister (on the sidelines of the conference on Iraq in Brussels on 22 June).<sup>13</sup> The UN reform was also considered.

Poland proposed to renew the Visegrad Group's cooperation with the Nordic Council of Ministers, which met with a positive reaction from Slovakia. The latter resolved to include this matter in the programme of its presidency of the Visegrad Group in 2006–2007.

Continuing its activity in Ukraine in 2004, the Group occupied itself with an expansion and consolidation of democracy in the post-Soviet area and with providing other countries with reports by experts on the subject of this region. One should recall the Czech idea of establishing a Visegrad House in Minsk, Belarus, offering free access to information; this would have been a European information centre managed by NGO's from the Visegrad countries. The Czech Republic also suggested the founding of a Visegrad Centre of Central-East European Studies at Oxford University. Both ideas, and especially the legal and financial aspects thereof as well as the possibility of using the resources of the International Visegrad Fund, are currently the subject of consultations by experts.

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<sup>12</sup> Cooperation between the Visegrad Group countries with Benelux is discussed on an ongoing basis at joint meetings of the national coordinators and representatives of the Benelux Secretariat General. They took place on 4 May and 27 September in Brussels.

<sup>13</sup> At the February 2005 meeting of national coordinators, Poland suggested consultations be attended by the heads of Asian departments of the Foreign Ministries of the Visegrad countries on the subject of their expectations vis-à-vis Japan, in which they would identify the areas and projects of cooperation with that country.

In autumn 2005, the Visegrad countries commenced consultations on the Group's support of the democratic transformations and the creation of European standards in Moldavia.<sup>14</sup>

The International Visegrad Fund entered 2005 with a budget increased to €3 mln (four equal contributions of €750,000 each, in 2004 the Fund had amounted to €2.4 mln)<sup>15</sup> In 2005, a New Visegrad Strategic Programme was created on Poland's initiative, to finance long-term projects (lasting 12–36 months) realised by entities in all Visegrad countries. During this period it was decided to subsidize two such projects for a total of €110,000 (a total of 8 such applications were filed).

In 2005, the International Visegrad Fund also provided 172 standard grants (for a total amount of over €1.8 mln ) and 129 small grants (for over €462,000). This was an increase of about 10% in the value of grants compared to 2004. The Fund also issued 80 grants during the academic year 2005/2006 for a total amount of €531,000, of which 29 grants were for Ukrainian students studying at high schools in the Visegrad countries (the programme of Visegrad grants for Ukrainian students was launched in March 2005).<sup>16</sup>

A 2<sup>nd</sup> Forum of Visegrad Regions was held in Bratislava on 26–27 September, attended by the marshals of the voivodships of Małopolska, Western Pomerania, Mazovia, Lublin and Pomerania, and representatives of the voivodships of Silesia, Lower Silesia and Podkarpacie. The participants called upon the governments to take into account in the financial plan of the International Visegrad Fund the so-called Visegrad Observatory project (a long-term research project by a group of Central European universities). They also drew attention to the need to increase the Fund's financial resources.

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<sup>14</sup> A study entitled, "Feasibility study of consular and visa cooperation between the Countries of the Visegrad Group for the benefit of the citizens of Ukraine and Moldavia," undertaken in spring 2005 by four academic centres: the Polish Institute of Public Affairs, the Czech EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, Slovak Foreign Policy Association, and Hungarian Centre for Policy Studies, may be an example of NGO interest in the engagement of the Visegrad Group in Ukraine and Moldavia.

<sup>15</sup> On the threshold of 2005 and 2006, Poland proposed increasing the Fund's financial resources to 5 mln euro, which was welcomed by the remaining partners.

<sup>16</sup> The grants also cover the expenses of colleges in the Visegrad countries which reserve study places financed out of grants coming from the Visegrad Fund.

## **Baltic Cooperation**

In 2005, Poland continued its presidency of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), which it had taken over from Estonia in the previous summer. The Polish programme of activities called for: an increase in the Council's status as a basic instrument of coordinating cooperation in the Baltic region following the enlargement of the EU (8 out of the 11 participating countries are EU members); closer joint activity with the European Commission; greater participation in EU-Russian dialogue and in the realisation of EU Neighbourhood Policy as well as EU Northern Dimension, and closer cooperation with the Nordic Council of Ministers and with Ukraine and Belarus (especially at local and social level with the latter). Poland highlighted the need to discuss the role of the CBSS and other Baltic structures following the EU enlargement in order to make the best use of existing expert and financial resources and avoid an accumulation of work. The programme also called for further joint activity between the CBSS and Council of the Euro-Arctic Region of the Barents Sea, Arctic Council and Central European Initiative.

In particular areas, Poland laid emphasis on the following projects and ventures:

Transnational and interregional cooperation: an expansion of cooperation along the new EU eastern border (especially the Kaliningrad Oblast) in order to reduce the socio-economic retardments and improve activities undertaken jointly by the CBSS, Union of Baltic Cities, Conference on Baltic Sub-Regional Cooperation and the Euroregions already existing in the Council's area;

Environmental protection: promoting the safety of maritime transport of oil, among others; reducing transnational source of Baltic pollution;

Economic cooperation: promoting an exchange of goods and investments between the Baltic countries and the development of an energy and transport infrastructure in these countries, supporting the development of SME's, counteracting corruption, participation in the Northern eDimension project;

Social integration: the development of interpersonal contacts and civic societies; the implementation of the recommendation of the CBSS Commissioner for Democratic Development; joint activity by Commissioners for Civic Rights (Ombudsmen) and by academic and scientific circles, the promotion of tourism;

Consolidation of civic security: deeper cooperation on nuclear and radiological safety, combating of crime, including trafficking in children and the sexual abuse of minors, terrorism.

The most important event during Poland's presidency was the XIII Baltic Ministerial Session in Szczecin on 9–10 June 2005, a platform to discuss three main topics: cooperation in the Baltic region following EU enlargement and consequently a greater role for the CBSS; transnational cooperation as a factor to increase economic links in the region and consolidate democratic civic societies; the environmental protection of the Baltic, among others, by combating land sources of pollution and safe transport of oil. In the end, the Ministers defined the Council's tasks for the immediate future:

- Participation in the consolidation of civic societies, increasing the knowledge of Baltic citizens about one another and enhancing their mutual contacts;
- Participation in EU-Russian dialogue, mainly by enriching regional, subregional (euroregional) and local cooperation;
- Laying greater emphasis on removing the obstacles to cooperation, promoting the rule of law, standards of political transparency and human rights as factors that increase the competitiveness of the entire region;
- In regional cooperation, priority treatment of projects which can be realised within the framework of the EU or other European or international structures;
- A consolidation of the role of the Council as a centre of regional cooperation in the Baltic area (a “political umbrella”: for other forms of intergovernmental cooperation);
- Encouraging an expansion of cooperation with other regional structures in Central Europe.

Poland's presidency ended in June 2005 and was taken over by Iceland. However, Poland will remain in the leadership troika of the Council of the Baltic Sea States until summer 2006.

Other important events during Poland's presidency:

- XIII Parliamentary Conference of the Baltic States, Bergen, (30–31 August 2004);
- Conference on various aspects of non-military security in Gdańsk on 10–12 September 2004, organised by the Office of the Marshal of Pomerania Voivodship in Gdańsk and the Finnish European Security Committee;
- III Meeting of Directors General of Civil Defence, Lithuania, 15–17 September 2004;
- Conference on Baltic cultural cooperation, Gdańsk, 23–25 September 2004;
- IX Conference of Baltic Prosecutors General, Copenhagen, 1 October 2004;
- IV Seminar of Baltic Commissioners for Civil Rights, Warsaw, 17–18 November 2005;

- Conference of Baltic Metropolies, Berlin, 10–11 February 2005;
- V Baltic Forum of NGO's, Gdynia, 12–13 May 2005;
- Scientific Congress of Baltic States, Sopot, 21–24 June 2005;
- X Conference of Baltic Prosecutors General, St. Petersburg, 27–29 June 2005.

On 19 September, in other words already after the formal end of Poland's presidency of the Council of the Baltic Sea States, the Ministers of spatial planning met in Gdańsk.<sup>17</sup> They decided to continue cooperation following EU enlargement and take transnational and regional cooperation as well as EU cohesion policy into greater account. They underlined the importance of a long-term development strategy for the Baltic region, taking advantage of available EU funds.

The following are considered to be the greatest achievements of Poland's presidency of the Council of the Baltic Sea States:

- A tightening of contacts with the Nordic Council of Ministers and a consensus on a joint project for expanding the institutional capability of the Euroregions located on the border with Russia (the Baltic Euroregional Network enjoys financial support from Interreg III);
  - An intensification of talks on the safety of oil shipments in Baltic waters;
  - The formation of an ad hoc working group for customs issues and border crossings, in order to consider ways of shortening the duration of customs clearances;
- Increasing the European Commission's involvement in the work of the Council;
- Involving Ukrainian partners in the work of the CBSS, taking advantage of Ukraine's observer status in the Council.

It should be remembered that apart from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on which the main burden of responsibility for Poland's presidency of the Council of the Baltic Sea States rested, other Polish institutions also chaired Baltic cooperation structures, e.g. the Ministry of Economy and Labour chaired the Working Group for Economic Cooperation, the Ministry of the Environment and Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development headed the Baltic Agenda 21, and the Chief Fire Brigade Command coordinated work in the EUROBAL TIC programme (cooperation in non-military security).

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<sup>17</sup> It was attended by ministers from the countries participating in VASAB 2010 (Vision and Strategies around the Baltic Sea 2010): Poland, Belarus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia and Sweden. The Gdańsk conference was organised by Poland, which coordinated the work of VASAB in 2005.

In the second half of 2005, Poland continued to maintain lively contacts with the three Baltic states: Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, primarily on military and naval issues, including cooperation within the framework of the Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON) and Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL). During this time, there were also political and organisational preparations for Polish airmen to start in early 2006 a three-month tour of duty within the framework of the NATO "Air Policing" mission.

Political cooperation was also energetic. A major event was President Aleksander Kwaśniewski's visit to Estonia and Latvia on 5–7 July. There was also a continuation of parliamentary contacts, including a meeting of the leaderships of the parliamentary committees for European affairs of Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in Białowieża on 25–26 April, whilst Paweł Zalewski, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Polish Sejm, took part in the XXIV Session of the Baltic Assembly in Tallinn on 24–26 November.

Poland, Lithuania and Latvia opposed the German-Russian plan to build the Northern Pipeline, and took joint action to block it. On 24 August, the prime ministers of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Ukraine held a conference call on the subject of the development of the situation in Belarus.

### **The Central European Initiative and other Forms of Cooperation**

In 2005, Poland took part in the work of the Central European Initiative (CEI), though less energetically than when it was president of the group (2003) and belonged to its leadership Troika (2002–2004). This resulted from the situation in which the Initiative found itself following EU enlargement: 7 of its 17 members were also members of the EU, and it was necessary to find ways of exploiting this as well as possible. Currently, Poland perceives the Initiative as a forum for sharing transformation experiences and as an instrument to promote the so-called triad of values: human rights, democracy and the rule of law. In 2005, the Initiative's work was headed by Slovakia. The most important meetings were held in Tatraska Lomnica on 27 May (Foreign Ministers) and in Piestany on 25 November (Prime Ministers). The priorities of the Central European Initiative are: promotion of SME's, combating organised crime, transnational cooperation and participation in EU Neighbourhood Policy projects, as well as a consolidation of a civic society and the development of institutions in those countries belonging to the Initiative which are also aspiring to membership of the EU (the inclusion of this item on the list of priorities was Poland's idea, announced at a meeting of Foreign Ministry political directors in Rome on 24 October). Poland supported the idea of limiting the number of

high-level meetings to one a year (conferences of Foreign Ministers and of Prime Ministers alternately).

In February 2005, also on Poland's initiative, the Central European Initiative adopted a political declaration commemorating the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of signing the Council of Europe Madrid Convention on transnational cooperation.

Successive meetings of the parliamentary speakers of countries belonging to the Initiative were held in Bled in Slovenia on 10–11 June 2005 and in Bratislava on 1–2 December 2005. Diplomatic consultations and talks by experts were also held on current EU topics.

Poland took part in the Regional Partnership, the least institutionalised forum of cooperation in Central Europe. The Foreign Ministers of Poland, Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary met in Warsaw on 12 January 2005. They discussed four topics: the situation in Ukraine and its future relations with the EU; EU policy towards the countries of the Western Balkans; the development of EU Neighbourhood Policy; as well as the coordination of humanitarian aid and consular cooperation (also within the EU framework). The last topic was inspired by the tsunami in Asia, for it also affected citizens of all the countries belonging to the Partnership. Regarding Ukraine, it was agreed that bilateral and multilateral actions (undertaken by regional structures, mainly the EU and NATO) should, first, consolidate the democratic orientation and process of changes in Ukraine; and second, encourage the EU to lend greater support to Ukrainian transformation. The European Neighbourhood Policy and the bilateral Plan of Action, geared mainly to the convergence of the legal systems of Ukraine and the EU, were considered the appropriate tools for performing these tasks. Discussing the development of the European Neighbourhood Policy, the ministers drew attention to the necessity to diversify this policy and adapt it to the needs and European aspirations of the countries to which it is addressed. The ministers also stressed the importance of resolving the problem of the future of Kosovo for stabilisation of the situation in the Western Balkans and close cooperation between the countries of this region and the ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia) as a political criterion bringing them closer to EU membership.

The Regional Partnership's involvement in Balkan issues resulted in a conference of foreign ministers in Budapest on 11 October 2005<sup>18</sup> on the possibilities of

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<sup>18</sup> At this meeting, Poland was represented by Jan Truszczyński, Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The talks were also attended by representatives of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro.

cooperation with the Balkan countries and supporting their preparations for integration with the EU. A division of responsibilities was agreed upon. Poland was to coordinate the use of assistance funds out of the EU budget. At the same time, it was stressed that effective domestic reforms in these countries would have the greatest importance for integration processes.

It is also worth mentioning that Poland was very active in the Organisation of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), in which it holds observer status that is renewed every two years. A representative of the Minister of Foreign Affairs (ambassador at large Józef Wierzbicki) attended the XIII meeting of foreign ministers of BSEC countries in Kishinev on 28 October 2005. Poland, perceiving the need for more energetic work in BSEC, indicated trade and economic development, SME's, tourism and energy as areas in which it is particularly interested, and announced its readiness to join working groups engaged in these issues. The task of the Foreign Ministry in the nearest future is to formulate, together with the relevant Polish government offices and institutions (the ministries of the economy, education and sport, as well as the Polish Academy of Sciences and Polish Tourist Organisation), ways for Polish experts to take part in these groups and specific proposals which Poland can contribute to the BSEC forum.

In 2005, thanks to Poland's diplomatic energy among others, there was continuation of efforts for a greater coordination of activities and projects by regional structures. Apart from the aforementioned meetings of the Council of the Baltic Sea States—Nordic Council of Ministers, there were also meetings of the CBSS, Central European Initiative, Council of the Euro-Arctic Region of the Barents Sea, and Adriatic-Ionian Initiative in Warsaw on 14 January 2005, as well as sessions of the Nordic Council of Ministers, Council of the Baltic Sea States, Council of the Euro-Arctic Region of the Barents Sea, Arctic Council and European Commission in Stavanger on 24 May. At these meetings, forms of mutual contacts were agreed upon (meetings of leadership troikas, permanent secretariats and coordination centres, as well as of chairmen of working groups).<sup>19</sup> There were also established areas in which the realisation of joint projects might be possible (transport and telecommunications infrastructure, the development of SME's and the combating of organised crime).

Moreover, there was a continuation of high-level political discussions on the present and future of the region of Central Europe as a whole. These discussions

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<sup>19</sup> For example, the BSEC secretary general, Ambassador Tedo Dzhabaridze, attended the ministerial session of the Council of the Baltic Sea States in Szczecin.

have been held by the Presidents of the Central European countries and of Germany, Austria and Italy for over a dozen years. The XII such meeting was held in Croatia on 14–15 October.<sup>20</sup> Two issues were discussed: this region's role in the EU, and a suitable socio-economic model for an integrated Europe (representatives of the world of business and of European banking and financial institutions also took part in the discussion on this subject).

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Poland, located in the very centre of the continent, at the crossroads of two major geopolitical axes (West-East and North-South), is not geographically associated with any particular regional group and acts in all directions, though the importance of these directions is not identical for Polish foreign priorities. Such a situation requires an energetic approach to cooperation in order to avoid Poland's marginalisation and prevent passive reaction to the proposals of partners whose interests differ from ours. Energetic participation is also necessary, because some countries in the region have an ambivalent attitude towards regional cooperation. An increasingly important place in Polish regional policy should be occupied by integration in an infrastructural and economic dimension, consolidating Central Europe's status in European policy.

In 2005, taking part in the work of Central European regional structures, Poland had three objectives: the formulation of a plan of action for these structures following EU enlargement, more intensive work on increasing the region's role in European policy, and increased activity vis-à-vis East European countries. It seems that these three objectives have been fulfilled, especially at the forum of the Visegrad Group and the Council of the Baltic Sea States. Thanks to this, Poland's regional position has strengthened and it has become an attractive partner in the region.

Two levels of activity can be identified in the Visegrad Group, which is a kind of trademark of the region and of democratic changes, recognised and highly rated on the international and regional arena. The first of these is a broadly-conceived political cooperation—consultations and exchanges of opinion. Unfortunately, members of the Group are still not convinced of the expediency and effectiveness of adopting a common position and steadfastly

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<sup>20</sup> This meeting was attended by the presidents of: Croatia, Poland, Italy, Moldavia, Bulgaria, Albania, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Serbia and Montenegro, Lithuania, Macedonia, Slovakia, Germany, Austria, Romania, Ukraine, Hungary, and the chairman of the Presidium of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

presenting it at the EU forum. The Group's members bow too easily to pressure from other countries and subscribe to their stances at the expense of their Visegrad partners (e.g. British pressure regarding NFP). It is essential to increase efforts to alter this situation, though this may not be possible because of the relative ease with which so-called coalitions of variable geometry are formed within the EU. The second level of Group activity is a well-developing cooperation between ministries, implementing agreements in particular areas. This cooperation will gradually improve as the scope of activity of the International Visegrad Fund expands and the possibilities of financing this Fund increase.

In 2005, the Visegrad Group developed a greater feeling of responsibility for stability in the countries immediately surrounding the EU, an illustration of which was the Group's support for the democratic changes in Ukraine and its manifestation of interest in changes in Moldavia. As far as help for the Balkan countries is concerned, the Regional Partnership displays greater activity. Such a division of roles seems to comply with the priorities of Poland's foreign policy, which is more committed to support for democratic changes in East European countries and their pro-Western ambitions.

A summary of Poland's presidency of the Council of the Baltic Sea States gives a positive picture. All the goals set in 2004 have been realised. Most of all, the Council's importance in Baltic cooperation has been increased, and thanks to the diversity of this cooperation, the Baltic and Nordic states are developing a greater sense of regional identity. The Council has also begun to play an increasing role in the realisation of EU and European Commission projects and programmes, contributing to them regional values (the Northern Dimension and regional aspects of EU-Russian cooperation). Poland's presidency has provided a strong impulse to adapt cooperation within the Council to the new international and regional conditions, and has consolidated Poland's position in the Baltic region.

## Poland in the United Nations

2005 marked the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the founding of the United Nations and of Poland's membership thereof. It provided an excellent opportunity to hold a summit meeting of representatives of the member states and to review the Organization's functioning. On 27 January, the anniversary of the liberation of the concentration camp at Auschwitz-Birkenau, the UN General Assembly commemorated for the first time the Day of the Holocaust, introduced by Israel and Poland. On 6 May a special session of the UN General Assembly was held, devoted to the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe.

This most universal international organisation is also one of the most heavily criticised subjects of international life. Every global event or major conflict that cannot be quickly and effectively resolved by international society immediately gives rise to criticism of the United Nations and to calls for improvements in its functioning, as if the Organization could be separated from the weakness and egoism of its members and from their lack of readiness to devote themselves fully to common principles and regulations.

The UN jubilee year was no different. Regional and domestic conflicts in various parts of the world, mass human rights violations, new unconventional dangers to international security, the ever-increasing development gap between the richest and the poorest countries, an increase in poverty, natural calamities, as well as bureaucracy, inefficiency and corruption which plagued the UN administration—all these phenomena, in the face of which the Organization yet again proved helpless, resulted in a surge of criticism and of calls for radical changes. An equally important argument in favour of a reform of the United Nations were outdated institutional arrangements, more suited to the period immediately following the World War II and not adjusted to the changes that had occurred since then. But at the same time, the participation of so many leaders of the member states in the UN summit that launched the 60<sup>th</sup> session of the General Assembly showed that the United Nations is the most universal international forum and that international society seeks solutions to its problems

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\* Stanisław L. Stebelski—Ambassador, deputy Director of the Department of the UN System and Global Issues at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

there and through the improvement of its functioning. For Poland too, “the United Nations—due to its achievement and universal nature—is and will remain the only organisation capable of setting tasks for regulating and putting an order in the international system, ensuring a peaceful development of the world on a global scale, and legitimizing the use of force in international relations.”<sup>1</sup>

In this context, it was quite understandable that the UN reform and the preparations for the summit dominated the Organization’s work in 2005. The discussion framework was defined by three reports:

- Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, entitled, “A More Secure World, Our Shared Responsibility” of 2 December 2004,
- Report by the UN Millennium Project Team, entitled, “Investing in Development, a Practical Plan for Realising Millennium Development Goals” of 17 January 2005,
- Report by the UN Secretary-General entitled, “In Larger Freedom—Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All” of 21 March 2005.

The results of the work of the High-Level Panel and Millennium Project Team, led by Prof. Jeffrey Sachs, have shown that the basic condition for improving world security is accelerated development and an assurance of decent living conditions for all people on earth. The Secretary-General based his report on the conclusions contained in the documents drawn up by these bodies, and also took into consideration proposals and recommendations of UN bodies and of other experts and politicians. In his report, he underlined the importance of human rights protection, environmental protection and sustainable development. He also formulated proposals regarding reforms of the Organization’s functioning and institutional structures.

Originally, it was planned that the participants of the summit would first of all review the implementation of the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals, because five years had passed since their adoption at the 2000 Millennium summit. But as the summit drew near, and especially following the release of the Secretary-General’s report, more and more attention was devoted to the UN reform.

Poland contributed to the debate on the UN reform with a draft of a New Political Act, submitted to the UN Secretary-General in February 2005. Taking

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<sup>1</sup> Speech by A.D. Rotfeld, Minister of Foreign Affairs at a conference marking the 60th anniversary of the UN— [www.msz.gov.pl](http://www.msz.gov.pl).

into account the problems that would occur in the case of a revision of the UN Charter, Poland suggested that the improvement to Organization's functioning be implemented in the form of a political act in which the member states would confirm their readiness to introduce the changes and define the ways of doing so, without the necessity to ratify that document. Poland proposed a re-definition of the concept of "international security" and the formulation of the principles that should be applied when reacting to newly-emerging challenges and threats. The choice of a political act as a document setting forth the principles and standards which suit the current situation and contemporary international challenges was dictated by the fact that such document would permit the UN to adapt its institutions to new needs faster than the revision of the UN Charter. Apart from promoting its own initiative of the New Political Act, Poland also took part in the shaping of common position by the European Union, one of the most active participants in the summit preparations. In parallel to the preparations to the summit, Poland participated in the Organization's ongoing work, ensuring that her position was included in a joint EU stance, or presenting it individually.

### **Poland's Participation in the Work of the United Nations in 2005**

Even though eight years passed since Poland was a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, it continued to monitor the work of the Council due to its status as the main UN body responsible for peace and international security. Furthermore, some of the debates at the Council forum and some of the Council's decisions had a direct impact on Poland, e.g. regarding UN peacekeeping missions. Following the Security Council's work on a continuous basis also allowed Poland to take active part in the formulation of a common EU position on current international events and conflicts.

The Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) were important events for Poland in the field of disarmament, non-proliferation of mass-destruction weapons and armaments controls. The conferences confirmed the key significance of these documents. But once again no rapprochement occurred between countries possessing nuclear weapons and the non-aligned ones. The consensus was considerably greater with regard to the non-proliferation of chemical weapons and the need to restrict the proliferation of hand-held weapons and firearms. The latter was the subject of an open debate in the Security Council, which suggested that the exporters of these weapons should bear greater responsibility for commercial transactions. Adoption of a political declaration

on the identification and marking of these types of weapons and on monitoring trade in these weapons was an important step towards regulating trade in hand-held weapons and firearms.

Poland continued to take an active part in the work of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. In his address to the Conference, Foreign Minister Adam Daniel Rotfeld underlined its importance for the consolidation of international peace and security, but also criticised it as well as other bodies for the lack of progress in the disarmament field. Rotfeld said that a review of the existing UN “disarmament machinery” was required in order to improve its functioning.<sup>2</sup> With assuming the chairmanship of the Conference in early 2006, Poland undertook intensive organisational preparations to break the impasse in the Conference’s work. It also took steps to prevent consideration of topics that are a traditional subject of deliberation by the Conference.

Poland’s representatives took part in the work of groups of experts and in meetings of states—parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. During the preparations to the Review Conference of the Convention on Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Poland spoke out in favour of launching of talks on new protocols to the Convention, indicating the need to take into account humanitarian aspects.

In September 2005, Poland’s two-year membership of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency came to an end. Poland supported primarily those actions of the Agency which aimed at restricting North Korea’s and Iran’s access to nuclear weapons. Poland’s permanent representative to the United Nations in Vienna significantly contributed to reaching of a decision by the Board of Governors on the subject of a protocol on small quantities of radioactive substances. Despite the IAEA’s reduced support for the new EU member states, Poland continued to receive technical assistance from the Agency, which served important scientific purpose, the value of which exceeded the total of Poland’s annual membership contribution.

Poland was among the initiators of the idea of extending the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to include nuclear facilities and the counteraction of acts of sabotage. The objective was to adapt the general

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<sup>2</sup> Speech by A.D. Rotfeld, Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on 17 March 2005—[www.msz.gov.pl](http://www.msz.gov.pl)

principles of the struggle against terrorism to the challenges posed by nuclear terrorism. Moreover, Poland also committed itself to apply the Code of Conduct regarding the security of radioactive sources and the Guidelines attached regarding the export and import of radioactive sources. Poland's participation in the Nuclear Safety Convention Review Conference enabled it to learn about the safety level of nuclear facilities in neighbouring countries. Finally, Poland supported the U.S. initiative of converting reactors to operate on low-enriched uranium. The IAEA did not detect any undeclared nuclear actions or substances in Poland.

Developing the proposal he had made at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Minister Rotfeld suggested in a letter to the UN Secretary-General of 27 June 2005 the appointment of a Committee of Wise Men to review the functioning of the global "disarmament machinery," and formulate recommendations to revitalise the institutions engaged in disarmament issues, exports controls and the non-proliferation of mass-destruction weapons. Prior to the 60<sup>th</sup> UN General Assembly session, he submitted a similar proposal to the foreign ministers of the EU member states, suggesting that an independent and recognised international institution of a specialised nature, not necessary within the UN system, be charged with the task of breaking the impasse in these areas.

In 2005 there was a further reduction in the size of the Polish contingent taking part in UN peacekeeping operations. The size of the Polish contingent had been falling steadily since 1998, when Poland had the highest number of soldiers serving under the UN flag. When the medical unit was withdrawn from UNIFIL in 2005, the Polish contingent was in 27<sup>th</sup> place in terms of size (707 soldiers and police officers out of a total 85,000 soldiers, police officers and civilians from 107 countries). However, Poland still had the largest group of soldiers placed at the disposal of the United Nations by a developed country in 2005. Poland's considerable contribution to the UN peacekeeping missions was acknowledged by the fact that a Pole was appointed chairman of the C-34 Committee, responsible for these issues.

Poland attached great importance to the development of cooperation in combating terrorism. Talks on an international convention on combating acts of nuclear terrorism were successful, but no progress was achieved in drafting of a comprehensive convention on combating terrorism, as it was impossible to reach a consensus on a definition of this phenomenon. There were also considerable differences of opinion regarding the exclusion of armed forces from the convention. Work on a UN strategy for combating terrorism was

disrupted. Nevertheless, the struggle against terrorism remained a frequent topic of Security Council debate due to numerous terrorist attacks in 2005.

In the field of economic cooperation and development, Poland's prime tasks in 2005 were preparations to implement the Millennium Development Goals and to participate in a debate on basic threats and challenges posed by globalisation. These issues dominated discussions the UN bodies engaged in trade, economic cooperation and development throughout preparations to the UN summit. Despite numerous initial proposals of new solutions, as the summit drew near, the discussions developed more and more into mere repetitions of earlier positions, confirming the major differences between developed and developing countries. The developing countries demanded additional concessions and increased aid, whilst the developed ones objected to new commitments. A positive development was the start of talks on new sources to finance development, in connection with the initiative of the presidents of France and Brazil in 2004, but the talks yielded no concrete decisions.

Preparations to the summit and its expected impact on the work of individual UN bodies could be seen most clearly in the economic sector. The work of the Economic and Social Council and its commissions was seriously hampered; it was impossible to reach a consensus on the concluding documents of individual sessions. In the work of UNCTAD, additional complications were caused by doubts about this organisation's identity under new conditions and the numerical superiority of the developing countries over the developed ones. The impasse in dialogue on economic issues inside the United Nations had a negative impact on the preparations for the WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong.

For many countries, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) was a relic of the bygone era. Poland's lack of support for the EU position concerning the UNIDO budget caused doubts about the sincerity of Polish pledges to increase development aid. When Poland became a member of the EU, expectations rose inside UNIDO that Poland would follow the example of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Croatia and become a new donor of development aid. Poland was entrusted with the implementation of the Regional High-Technology Programme of increasing industrial e-productivity and quality in the countries of Central-Eastern Europe and in the Commonwealth of Independent States. The work of Investment and Technology Promotion Office in Warsaw was an important element in Poland's cooperation with UNIDO.

The inclusion of Poland in the EU system of development aid made it necessary to regulate development aid and humanitarian assistance within the

legal system of the country. On 18 May 2005, the Council of Ministers decided to increase Polish development aid to 0.17% of the GDP in 2010 and, if possible, to 0.33% of the GDP in 2015. A Development Cooperation Department was created in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A social campaign entitled “Millennium Development Goals: A Time to help Others” was held jointly with the United Nations Development Programme. In the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Poland was also perceived as a country that should take increasing part in the provision of financial assistance to the countries in need.

The Economic Commission for Europe was the most important forum of Poland’s participation in UN regional policy. Poland engaged in the promotion of norms and standards of economic transformation and in the formulation of new priorities for the Commission. The Commission’s work was dominated by preparations to its reform. The appointment of Marek Belka to the post of the executive secretary of the Commission was of great importance for the consolidation of Poland’s position in this structure.

Poland took active part in the work of the UN Commission on Human Rights, despite observer status. The Commission was still divided between developed democracies and authoritarian regimes (which included some of the developing countries) as far as the interpretation and observance of international human rights standards is concerned. Many developing countries excused the breaches of human rights on their territory on the grounds that they were late in their development. The Commission’s substantive work and its basic function of monitoring the observance of human rights in particular countries was further hampered. Poland’s participation in the work of the Commission resulted in a resolution on the protection of the rights of persons infected with HIV/AIDS; on good governance, including the combating of corruption; and on the role of the jurisdiction in the transitional period. Poland also engaged in combating trafficking with women and in the rights of victims of prostitution. It cooperated with the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights in Belarus. Poland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs attended the annual Commission’s session. At the forum of the United Nations, Poland energetically promoted the combating of all forms of discrimination and intolerance. In 2005 it ratified two protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child. A representative of Poland was a member of the Human Rights Committee.

Poland cooperated well with the United Nations in combating drug addiction and organised crime. The Commission on Narcotic Drugs considered the prevention of epidemics of HIV/AIDS and of other diseases that could develop

through contact with the infected blood of addicts, and the creation of conditions propitious to the rehabilitation and treatment of these persons. Poland joined the programme of cooperation in counteracting illegal trade in ingredients for the manufacture of narcotics. Unfortunately, it did not fulfilled the duty of submitting regular reports on the seizure of smuggled substances of this type on its territory. The Eleventh UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (18–25 April, Bangkok) adopted a final declaration entitled “Synergies and responses—strategic alliances in crime prevention and criminal justice.” However, the second session of the Conference of States Parties to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime ended without any positive results. The work of the Commission on the Status of Women and Commission for Social Development concentrated on preparations to the September UN summit.

Efforts to set up a UN Habitat Office in Warsaw were successful. The appointment of a Polish judge to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea was a major success. For the second year running, Poland regularly paid its membership contributions to the United Nations.

### **Preparations to the UN Summit**

On 13 September 2005, after long negotiations, the General Assembly concluded its preparations to the summit. Their point of departure was a report by the UN Secretary-General. The draft final declaration underlined the interdependence between development, security and human rights as the three main pillars of the UN system. The main part of the document referred to the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals, and was an attempt to set in order the commitments of developed and developing countries. The provisions of the final declaration were based on the decisions reached at global conferences on development, especially the Monterrey consensus, and on the concluding documents of the World Summit on Sustainable Development as well as WTO conference in Doha. Being the result of a compromise, this declaration did not contain any new commitments, aid guidelines or binding calendars.

Poland helped Germany, Japan and India in their efforts to win permanent seats on the Security Council, but did not consider the enlargement of the Council as a basic purpose of its reform. Poland attached equal importance to increasing the effectiveness and transparency of the Council’s work. At the same time, it consistently strove for an additional seat on the Council for a group of East European countries. Poland considered it an important task to revitalise the

UN bodies and structures engaged in the spheres of disarmament and non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons. They should be adapted to the new challenges and dangers to security and should be able to counteract the proliferation of these weapons and the risk that they are used by terrorist organisations. Poland spoke out in favour of actions to consolidate non-proliferation regimes and strove for broad support inside the United Nations for major international initiatives on counteracting the proliferation of mass destruction weapons: the Cracow Initiative and G-8 Global Partnership.

Poland attached great importance to the adoption of a concept whereby countries and international society would assume responsibility for the protection of individuals when a sovereign government is incapable of or unwilling to prevent genocide, ethnic cleansing and serious violations of international humanitarian law. It supported the idea of establishing an authority responsible for helping countries that are threatened with “collapse” and actions to tidy up and coordinate international efforts to establish peace in countries emerging from conflicts. During the 60<sup>th</sup> General Assembly session, Poland attached great importance to improving the effectiveness of the struggle against terrorism, especially in the form of a comprehensive antiterrorist convention, and to more widespread participation by member states in multilateral treaties related to combating terrorism.

Poland actively supported the establishment of the Human Rights Council to replace the Commission on Human Rights, as the primary UN body responsible for ensuring observance and promotion of human rights and making them one of the three main pillars of the United Nations (apart from security and development). Poland also spoke out in favour of increasing the role of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, primarily by allocating a greater portion of funds for this purpose out of the UN regular budget, and in favour of establishing a Democracy Fund.

In the sphere of economic cooperation and development, Poland supported the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals by increasing its Official Development Assistance, among other things. It also attached great importance to closer cooperation between the United Nations and regional organisations as well as to a better correlation of their tasks.

During the preparations to the summit, Poland took part in the formulation of a position by the European Union. Even though the EU had not supported the Polish concept of a New Political Act, it still had an impact on the EU position. Poland succeeded in adding to the EU position questions regarding the economies of countries undergoing transition, new donors of assistance, the

protection of human rights, UN cooperation with regional and sub-regional organisations, and a reform of UN peacekeeping operations.

The European Union supported greater emphasis during the UN summit and 60<sup>th</sup> session of the General Assembly on problems with development and on the formulation of a particular plan of action to accelerate the realisation of the Millennium Development Goals, with special regard to the needs of Africa. The EU's priorities regarding security were: the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission, the prevention of conflicts, the struggle against terrorism, the adoption of principles applied when reaching decisions as regards the use of force, disarmament and the non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons, and increasing possibilities of launching UN peacekeeping operations. Regarding human rights, the most important issues for the EU were: the adoption of a concept of responsibility to protect, an increase of the role of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the resources at his disposal, and the creation of the Human Rights Council. The European Union attached great importance to reforming and revitalising the UN General Assembly, a further improvement to the work of the committees, a reform to the Economic and Social Council (changes to its *modus operandi*), and an improvement to management over the Organization. It also supported an expansion of cooperation between the United Nations and regional bodies as well as the creation of a UN Agency for the Environment, based on the UN Environmental Programme. The EU also wanted to boost the United Nations' capability of undertaking humanitarian actions, adopt a budget ensuring that the Organization is able to realise the Millennium Goals and the summit decisions, as well as reach a compromise in financing the renovation of the UN headquarters in New York. Despite the importance of reforming the Security Council, the EU was unable to formulate a uniform position on this matter, because there were major differences of opinion among the member states regarding an enlargement of the Council.

A major achievement during the preparations for the summit was reaching a consensus as regards responsibility to protect. This meant that the security of countries no longer came before the security of the population. Talks on the formation of the Peacebuilding Commission and Human Rights Council were successful. A positive outcome of the talks was an increase in the status of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and an increase in the funds for his Office. A proposal whereby the UN Secretary-General establishes a Democracy Fund was also accepted. As far as the reform of the Secretariat and management of the Organization are concerned, the Secretary-General's hitherto work was approved and his leading role in ensuring a proper functioning of the Secretariat

was confirmed. However, he was not granted the power to create supervisory and control mechanisms on his own, nor could he take decisions on the allocation of posts and financial resources.

The success of the negotiations was diminished by the absence of an accord on disarmament and the non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons. Attempts to agree on a definition of terrorism failed. Several weeks before the summit, it became apparent that an accord on an enlargement of the Security Council and an improvement to its work would not be possible.

The draft UN Summit concluding document and Poland's position for the Summit were discussed by the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Poland. The government stressed that the multiplicity and complexity of the problems facing international society require close cooperation within the framework of existing organisations, according to the principle of effective multilateralism. In this context, the United Nations, the only international organisation possessing a universal character, remains the main institution responsible for maintaining peace and security in the world. It should increase its effectiveness in solving of global problems, as well as its authority to sanction the activity of the international community. The Council of Ministers also agreed that since the world, international relations and the political reality are changing faster than structure of international organisations, Poland should speak out in favour of a thorough reform to the United Nations and a redefinition of the Organization's mandate, as well as in favour of an adaptation of its institutional structures to new tasks and requirements. At the same time, the Council of Ministers stressed that Poland had already made a significant contribution to the debate on a reform of the United Nations, having submitted to the General Assembly in 2002 the draft of a New Political Act of the United Nations for the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

### **The UN Summit and 60<sup>th</sup> Session of the UN General Assembly**

The UN summit which commenced the jubilee 60<sup>th</sup> session of the General Assembly was attended by the highest number of top country representatives in the Organization's history—175 leaders from all over the world. In his speech, Polish President Aleksander Kwaśniewski called for a world united in freedom and solidarity, citing the European Union as an example of the possibility of building structures and mechanisms of cooperation in the spirit of genuine solidarity. He said that the United Nations should inspire confidence by the fact that international society would render essential assistance and protection to people if their own countries were unable to do so. But for this purpose, the United Nations must have a far-sighted and comprehensive vision of changes

and be more determined in shaping a broadly-conceived policy of international development that will improve the quality of life all over the world. He praised the final document that had been agreed upon, but noted that in many respects it was a weaker consensus than expected, which should be regarded as the point of departure for further efforts at reforming the United Nations. President Kwaśniewski also chaired one of the “round table” talks that were held parallel to the plenary talks.

In his address to the assembled heads of states, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stressed that the decisions reached at the summit were a good starting point for further reforms of the Organization. Calling for collective action, he warned that deep divisions among countries could result in ad hoc reactions resulting in even greater instability and deeper divisions. Calling for a continuation of the reform process, he mentioned the non-proliferation of weapons of mass-destruction, disarmament and the absence of consensus on the Security Council reform as some of the main challenges to be tackled. He stressed the need for the effective implementation of the decisions taken and the determination in the solution of difficult issues. He appealed to the more powerful states to take the lead, and to the remaining ones to engage in cooperation. He warned that neglecting such principles as democracy, human rights and the rule of law undermined confidence in joint institutions and dispelled faith in their effectiveness.

During the general debate, Foreign Minister Rotfeld referred to the concept of solidarity presented by President Kwaśniewski during the summit. Minister Rotfeld proposed that 31 August be designated a Day of Freedom and Solidarity. He also pointed out that the UN reforms should be regarded as part of the process of adapting the Organization to the changing international environment, and not as a one-off event. In the absence of an accord on non-proliferation and disarmament at the UN summit, he reiterated his proposal of a comprehensive review of the “disarmament machinery,” and also repeated Poland’s postulate of defining at the UN forum such basic universal values as freedom and solidarity.

The implementation of the provisions of the Final Declaration of the UN Summit dominated the work of the 60<sup>th</sup> session of the General Assembly. On 20 December 2005, the General Assembly and Security Council adopted a resolution on setting up the Peacebuilding Commission. The Commission will be assisted by a new Peacebuilding Support Office at the UN Secretariat and a Peacebuilding Fund. Money from this fund, stemming from voluntary contributions, will be used to finance the initial stages of post-conflict reconstruction.

However, the talks on the creation of the Human Rights Council had still not been completed by the end of 2005. These talks confirmed considerable differences in the way the role of the Council is perceived by different groups of countries. The developed countries, including Poland and other EU member states, wanted the Council to be the main, permanent UN body, effectively monitoring the observance of human rights in the world and reacting quickly to urgent crisis situations. These countries attached considerable importance to preserving the strong aspects of the Commission on Human Rights: the existence of special procedures and cooperation with NGO's. But the opponents of the new Council, i.e. some of the developing countries, wanted to restrict its powers in relation to those possessed by the Commission on Human Rights, and narrow its work down to dialogue and general cooperation. They regarded the criticism of countries for violating human rights, mainly the developing ones, as a sign that the Commission was dominated by politics and was applying dual standards of assessment.

Regarding the development and reform of the Economic and Social Council, the developing countries wanted consultations on the broadest possible development agenda, not restricted to the final document and Millennium Development Goals. Their position in the fields of security, human rights and the UN reforms was conditioned by concessions from the developed countries regarding development issues. The developed countries concentrated on improvements rather than institutional changes. They stressed that changes to the functioning of the Council should occur without the need for additional outlay. They firmly opposed the idea of creating new indicators for monitoring the implementation of decisions and commitments. The most important changes proposed included replacing the annual summer high-level ECOSOC session with so-called global political dialogue, held alternately with the Development Cooperation Forum.

For the United States, the priority issue was a reform of the UN Secretariat and its system of management. The United States claimed that the hitherto system was not only ineffective, but conducive to corruption, as illustrated by the "oil for food" scandal. The concept of reforming the UN management system proposed by the developed countries was opposed by the developing countries. They regarded this as an attempt to restrict the number of projects advantageous for them and to diminish their influence in the Secretariat. In the end, a package of reforms was adopted providing for the establishment of an Ethics Office, a review of management structures and the creation of an impartial consultative Audit Committee. Within the framework of his powers, the Secretary-General undertook a series of actions to improve the work of the United Nations, including the appointment of a committee to implement

post-control conclusions and an increase in the scope of Office of Internal Oversight Services.

No progress was noted in reforming and expanding the Security Council. An initiative by Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Singapore, Costa Rica and Jordan to improve the Council's work was an attempt to break the impasse, but it did not spawn further debate due to lack of support from the Security Council's permanent members. The concept of responsibility to protect was not expounded during the session, either. Numerous developing countries continued to believe that the concept undermined the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of countries.

The 60<sup>th</sup> session of the General Assembly resulted in no breakthrough regarding disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass-destruction. The climate of the talks was marred by the continuing impasse in disarmament talks. As usual, questions regarding nuclear disarmament caused the biggest controversies. The nuclear states placed the main emphasis on non-proliferation, whilst most of the remaining countries treated non-proliferation and disarmament as a single issue. The question of the Iranian nuclear programme was also a contentious issue. In such a situation, the resolution on the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was a success for Poland.

Regarding economic issues, the necessity to preserve a balance between the commitments and interests of the developed and developing countries was expressed. Emphasis was placed on the need for good governance, observance of law and mobilisation of resources by the developing countries, as well as a fulfilment of the commitments made by the developed countries regarding the level of development aid. Issues connected with the international system of finance and trade caused major controversies. For a long time, the U.S. delegation objected to the addition to existing resolutions on globalisation and the international system of finance, of paragraphs on countries in a stage of economic transition, arguing that some of these countries had become members of the EU. It was decided that a high-level dialogue on international migration and development would be held during the next UN General Assembly session.

The debate on human rights was dominated by the plans to create the Human Rights Council and the political contest regarding its future shape. The developing countries stiffened their position regarding the Council's status, mandate and religious intolerance. This resulted in the adoption of fewer resolutions in comparison with the previous session.

Poland attempted to develop the activity of the Community of Democracies at the UN forum, but it was unable to turn it into a more cohesive pressure group.

It supported a further tightening of cooperation between the United Nations and regional organisations in peacekeeping operations. Poland also spoke out in favour of the policy of “zero tolerance” for sexual abuse committed by the personnel of UN peacekeeping missions. Palestine’s consent to a restriction in the number of resolutions on the Palestinian problem was a positive accent. The General Assembly condemned all forms of colonialism.

Parallel negotiations on implementing the reforms that had been agreed upon during the summit had a major impact on work on the UN budget for 2006–2007. The talks were blocked by the U.S. *injunction* between a rapid implementation of the entire reform package and the adoption of the UN budget. The United States and Japan altered their stances mainly, because the developing countries had accepted—virtually at the very last moment—a package of reforms on the system of management of the UN Secretariat. For the first time in the Organization’s history, a budget was adopted with a clause on the resumption of budget negotiations after six months. During the session, work was undertaken on a new scale of contributions due to be adopted at the next session of the General Assembly. It was not possible to consider the alternative scenarios, presented by the UN Secretary-General, for financing the renovation of UN headquarters in New York, but an agreement was reached on plans for financing two major UN peacekeeping operations—in Congo and Sudan. Each of these operations will have a budget of about one billion dollars.

The concluding document of the summit recognised the rule of law and international law as key instruments in the performance of tasks in the UN’s primary areas of activity (international security, development and human rights), what was reflected in the work of the session. The most important item on the agenda was the annual report by the International Law Commission. A Polish member of the Commission was chosen as rapporteur on the subject of “The obligations of countries to extradite or detain.” Much attention was also paid to the debate on the report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). A major achievement by the General Assembly was the adoption of an optional Protocol to the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel as well as the Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts.

During the 60<sup>th</sup> session, just like during the preparations thereto, the EU played a key role in undertaking more important initiatives. With its activities it supported the work of the President of the session, Jan Eliasson of Sweden. However, the EU had great difficulty to maintain a cohesive position on several questions. Against this background, Poland’s constructive engagement both

during consultations within the EU and during the General Assembly's work played an important role. This helped to promote Poland's positive image as an active and responsible member of the international community. Polish vice-chairmen of Committees V and VI also met with praise.

The end of the year did not mean the end of the work of the 60<sup>th</sup> UN General Assembly session. It was to continue until the next session.

The sixtieth anniversary of the United Nations Organization was an opportunity to launch an education programme about the United Nations and spread a positive image of the United Nations in Poland via the "UN Awareness" campaign.

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In the sixty years of Poland's membership in the United Nations Organization, there have been few periods that caused such changes to Poland's position as the past two years. The most important change was Poland's accession to the European Union in 2004 and its acquisition of full rights in EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. From a "like-minded" country, invited to join the EU on the UN forum and striving for support for its priorities and interests, Poland developed into the co-creator of the EU's position and a country whose support is being sought by other EU states. In rare cases only, justified by the particular significance of the subject-matter or Poland's interests, it decides to speak out separately at the UN. In most cases Poland's stance is incorporated in a joint EU position presented by the currently presiding states, Luxembourg and Great Britain, in 2005.

After sixty years of involvement in the work of the United Nations, Poland has finally found itself among the group of fully-fledged members who—despite past disruptions in their contacts and barriers—are joined by centuries of common culture and civilisation. The only relic of the recent past is Poland's membership in the Eastern Europe regional group which, on account of the changes that occurred in Central and Eastern Europe, has increased in size and is radically altering its character. The only criterion for membership in this group now is geographical location. The countries gathered in this group possess a unique experience of the transformations. Ever since the start of these transformations, Poland has been in favour of spreading the experience thereof more broadly among the developing countries.

Poland is anxious to continue its participation in the work on the UN reform. Its aim to make the Security Council more efficient and more representative by

securing an additional non-permanent seat for a representative of the East European regional group remains valid. Poland's traditional areas of activity also offer major possibilities.

In his speech to the Sejm upon becoming Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, Stefan Meller said, "In today's world we are exposed to untraditional, sometimes even dramatic challenges. They require an appropriate adaptation of regional organisations, and especially world organisations like the United Nations Organization. Can these challenges and dangers be effectively counteracted by the United Nations Organization, whose members include unreliable, dictatorial and authoritarian countries with regimes encouraging fanaticism and terrorism, as well as 'weak' and 'collapsing' countries? There is no simple answer to this dilemma. Rather, we must assume that the UN potential has not been exhausted yet, and if the entire UN structure is suitably reformed, this potential may be set in motion and put to proper use." The support of Poland and other member states, demonstrated in relation to the UN reforms and during its ongoing work, provides a good basis for the best possible use of the Organization's potential.

**IV.**  
**Selected Problems**  
**of Poland's Foreign Policy**



## **Poland's Involvement in Stabilisation in Iraq**

### **Political Process and Security Situation in Iraq**

2005 was the most important year from the perspective of the ongoing political process in Iraq, the key stages of which were defined by the UN Security Council Resolution No. 1546. On 30 January 2005, the first democratic parliamentary elections were held (with simultaneous elections to the provincial councils and Autonomous Assembly for the Region of Kurdistan). A provisional National Assembly of 275 persons was elected. Since the Sunni Arabs boycotted the assembly, the groups in the majority were Shias and Kurds.

On 6 April 2005, Jalal Talabani, the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, was elected president of Iraq by the members of the Assembly. The elected vice-presidents were Shia Adil Abdel Mahdi and Sunni Arab Ghazi al-Jawar (Massud Barzani became the president of the Kurdistan region). On 7 April 2005, the leader of the Shia Daawa party was appointed prime minister. In the cabinet he formed, the representatives of Shia groups took 18 ministerial positions while Kurds and Sunni Arabs had 8 each.

On 15 October 2005, Iraq adopted the new constitution in the nationwide referendum. The major political parties agreed that its controversial provisions, contested by Sunni Arabs, would be revised by the National Assembly, to be elected by the general elections of 15 December 2005. The controversies are primarily about the option to establish autonomous regions within the federal state system. The Sunni Arabs, living in the centre of the country and deprived of any natural resources, fear that they would become marginalised by Kurds and Shias in the new system, since the latter would control the oil abundant northern and southern provinces.

The parliamentary elections were held as planned on 15 December, but their final results, verified by international experts, were announced as late as on 10 February 2006. The mandates in the 275-seat parliament went to: Shia United Iraqi Alliance (128 seats), the co-ruling Kurdish coalition (53 seats), and major

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parties of the Sunni Arabs, with 55 seats. The key losers of the elections were the secular block of Iyad Allawi, the former Prime Minister, which won 25 seats (formerly 40), and the coalition of parties formed by the Shia vice-Prime Minister, Ahmed Chalabi, which did not even reach the election threshold. The remaining 14 seats were taken by small factions representing Kurdish fundamentalists, Sunni Arabs, Turkmen, Christians and Yazidis. The winning United Iraqi Alliance approved the candidacy of the then prime minister Al-Jaafari for the position of the head of the coalition government. The leaders of Sunni, Kurdish and secular Shia parties questioned his nomination, received owing to the support of the radical and anti-American Shia cleric, Muqtada as-Sadr, and demanded that the prime minister should be a person with more neutral views.

Despite the successful development of the political process, the situation in Iraq remains shaky. The negotiations of the major political parties on the national unity government are dragging, major conflicts of interest among the various ethnic and religious groups continue to exist and the rivalry between the politicians is deepening. Countries of the region interfere with Iraq's internal affairs by supporting individual religious and ethnic groups. The Iraqi political schedule for 2006 provides for the formation of the government, amendment of the constitution by the parliament, another constitutional referendum and local government elections.

The progress of the political process implemented in 2005 did not translate into more security. The instability of the situation results from three major, largely independent, factors: the presence in Iraq of international terrorists, guerrilla resistance of the Sunni Arabs and ordinary crime. International terrorist groups are unabatedly attempting to destabilise Iraq, viewing the country as the primary theatre for their war against the West. They continue to attack the Iraqi security forces, civilians, coalition troops and industrial infrastructure. They seek to deepen the animosities between Shia and Sunni Arabs and intimidate the representatives of the various ethnic and religious groups participating in the political process. The regions most threatened by terrorist attacks are Baghdad and the north-western provinces in the so-called Sunni triangle.

The Iraqi authorities are conducting negotiations with the representatives of some anti-government Sunni groups, interested in being included in the political process. The negotiations should gradually neutralise the Sunni resistance movement. However, many threats to Iraq's security are of a purely criminal rather than political nature. Of paramount importance here appears to be the

acceleration of the training process for the Iraqi security forces, to include boosting their efficiency and the police's prestige.

### **International Support for Iraq**

All representatives of the present Iraqi government agree that further presence of the coalition forces in Iraq is necessary, because their quick withdrawal would be an irresponsible move. A withdrawal at this stage of the coalition's support for the political process could have unforeseeable ramifications for Iraq, the stability of the entire region as well as the modernisation and democratisation processes already begun in the territory. However, the progress of assuming responsibility for the state by the Iraqi people themselves allowed a gradual drawdown in the number of multinational troops and modification of their present character. In case of the Polish Military Contingent (PMC), this meant the unit's focus on training and advisory tasks. An equally important task for PMC is also the implementation of aid programmes for the local population under civilian-military co-operation. It comprises a number of projects in such areas as municipal services, education, fuel sector, public security, water purification and sewerage system, electricity provision, health service, transportation and telecommunication.

Resolution No. 1637 of the UN Security Council, adopted unanimously on 8 November 2005, extended the mandate of the multinational stabilisation troops deployed in Iraq by the end of December 2006. The international community thus acknowledged the arguments of the Iraqi government. When addressing the Security Council, the latter argued that the Iraqi forces were not yet ready to ensure full security to the country, and the immediate withdrawal of the international force would prove a disaster for Iraq, as it could lead to a civil war and bring fatal consequences for the entire Middle East.

Under resolution No. 1546 of the UN Security Council of 8 June 2004, the key role in coordinating international support for Iraq should be played by the UN. In 2005 however, the actions of the Organisation for Iraq were not intensified. It failed to open the UN office in Baghdad which, following a terrorist attack in August 2003, was moved to Amman. For security reasons, the number of the UN's international staff in Iraq was reduced to the absolute minimum. The activity of Ashraf Qazi, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq, and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) appointed by virtue of the resolution No. 1500 of 14 August 2003 of the Security Council, focused on supporting the political process and humanitarian aid.

In 2005, the involvement of the European Union in Iraq intensified. On 22 June 2005, an international conference, co-organised by the EU and the US, was held in Brussels, attended by delegations from 84 states and international organizations participating in the stabilisation and reconstruction process in Iraq. In the second half of 2005, Javier Solana and ministers for foreign affairs of the “EU Troika” visited Baghdad. On 21 September 2005, the EU and Iraq signed a joint declaration on the political dialogue, which provides for regular contacts between the Union and Iraq on various levels. The work on the negotiation mandate for the European Commission is almost complete, and it is to be followed by signing with Iraq an agreement on cooperation and trade. The talks are scheduled to begin immediately after the formation of the new government in Iraq. The total value of aid provided to Iraq by the EU from the ousting of Saddam Hussein to the end of 2005 exceeded €500 million.

In March 2005, the EU Council adopted a Joint Action on establishing an integrated EU mission (EUJUST LEX), whose objective would be to train the Iraqi in the area of justice.

In 2004, a NATO Training Mission to Iraq (NTM-I) was established. Its tasks include the support for the Iraqi authorities in reconstructing the national security institutions, training their staff and preparing a programme of international and domestic courses for the Iraqi military and civilian officers.

Poland is actively participating in the following programmes: training of the Iraqi armed forces officers conducted by the NATO (NTM-I) and education of the Iraqi personnel of the justice system, organized by the EU (EUJUST LEX). Several Polish military instructors are training high-ranking officers of the Iraqi armed forces at the courses held in Ar-Rustamia.

Iraq’s reconstruction is also supported by the states of the Middle East and the League of Arab States. In 2005, regular meetings of the representatives of Egypt and the countries neighbouring Iraq were held. They were devoted to coordinating positions and tightening co-operation for the reconstruction of the Iraqi state. The Arab countries welcomed the progress of the political process in Iraq, but expressed a degree of caution as well. The satisfaction is connected with solidifying stabilisation processes, while the concerns revolve around the potential regional ramifications of accumulating power in Iraq by the Shia.

### **Polish Military Presence in Iraq**

The key factor in shaping the relations between Iraq and Poland since 2003 has been Poland’s participation in the stabilisation mission. By the end of 2005,

during five rotations of the Polish Military Contingent, over 10 thousand soldiers and officers served in Iraq, excelling at the tasks entrusted to them. The Polish effectively managed the Multinational Division Central–South, MND CS, formed by military contingents from over 20 countries.

The results of the Polish military presence in Iraq were evaluated positively. This is thanks to good preparation of the mission, professional attitude of the soldiers and a relatively friendly response from the Iraqi people to our commitment to the processes of transition in their country. Apart from stabilisation tasks, the Multinational Division has trained over 20 thousand soldiers of the Iraqi armed forces. Under civil-military co-operation, a large number of diverse projects were implemented in the area of the Polish responsibility, aimed at the improvement of living conditions for the local population.

In 2005, there were no casualties of terrorist attacks among the members of the Polish Military Contingent. One Polish soldier died in a car accident on 25 February 2006. Since the commencement of the mission to Iraq, Poland has lost 17 soldiers, who died as a result of terrorist attacks and mishaps. Two former GROM rangers, working as security officers for the American Blackwater company also died, similarly to two Polish TV reporters. In 2004, Polish citizens were twice abducted and subsequently freed.

Despite the fact that the United States covered a major portion of the cost of Poland's participation in the Iraqi mission, the maintenance of the PMC is a significant burden to the state budget. It exceeded the originally planned reserve and reached, by the end of 2005, approx. PLN 660 million in personnel cost and approx. PLN 800 million in equipment (30% of which will have to remain in Iraq).

The positive image of the Polish presence in Iraq cannot be changed by accusations of human rights violations, allegedly perpetrated by PMC soldiers, and destructive impact of the deployment of the Multinational Division on the artefacts of Babylon. The above accusations proved completely unfounded—human rights were violated by the American and British soldiers. In terms of the artefacts, the presence of soldiers in Babylon prevented mass-scale devastation and plundering of historic items, as admitted by the representatives of Iraq in July 2005. Towards the end of 2004, the military base located in Babylon was handed over to the Iraqis.

However, it should be noted here that there were cases of corruption among the soldiers of the PMC, notably during the tenders organised for the Iraqi companies to select contractors for civilian projects financed from the coalition's

budget. 14 military officers and civilian army staff were charged with the involvement in the so-called baksheesh scandal. Some of them admitted accepting bribes and counterfeiting documents in the course of tender supervision process.

In 2005, the support of the Polish people for PMC presence in Iraq gradually decreased (over 60% support in 2003). Currently, the majority of the Polish society opposes the continuation of PMC mission in Iraq. The prevailing attitude of the public opinion is that the participation in the stabilisation mission is doing more harm than good to the Polish interest. This belief results, among others, from the lack of expected economic benefits.

In February 2005, the number of soldiers in the Polish Military Contingent was reduced from 2400 to 1630. On 12 April 2005, Marek Belka's government took the decision on the reduction of the PMC in the second half of 2005 to 1400 soldiers and civilian staff as well as the withdrawal from the "classic" stabilisation mission from the end of the fifth rotation at the turn of 2006. In 2005, the number of soldiers in the Multinational Division also dropped. Following the withdrawal of Ukraine's and Bulgaria's military contingents in 2005, the division now consists of approx. 2000 soldiers from 12 countries.

On 29 December 2005, at the request of Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz, Lech Kaczyński, the President of Poland, took the decision on the continuation of the Polish Military Contingent's presence in Iraq by the end of 2006. This decision, complying with the request from the Iraqi authorities, was taken following the consultations with the coalition partners, under the resolution No. 1637 of 8 November 2005 of the UN Security Council, which extended the international legal mandate for the deployment of multinational force in Iraq until the end of 2006. With the sixth rotation, PMC's headcount was reduced from 1400 to 900 soldiers and civilian staff. The nature of the contingent's tasks also changed from training and stabilisation to advisory and training.

The tasks connected with ensuring security in the territory controlled by the Multinational Division Central-South are being gradually taken over by the Iraqi structures. At the beginning of 2006, 8<sup>th</sup> Division of the Iraqi Armed Forces, trained by the Multinational Division under the Polish command, reached the independent anti-terrorist operation capability.

The Polish military mission to Iraq is the largest foreign mission implemented thus far by the Polish Armed Forces. The participation in the Iraq's stabilisation required from the Polish Armed Forces an immense organisational, staffing and financial effort. As a natural consequence, it was conditional upon

establishing closer cooperation with the armed forces of the United States, Great Britain and other countries in the coalition. The experience of the Iraqi mission should decisively accelerate the modernisation of the Polish Armed Forces, adjusting their operability to the new security requirements.

### **Polish-Iraqi Relations**

The overthrow of Hussein's regime and Poland's participation in the international coalition invigorated the cooperation with Iraq. Over the last years political contacts with this country have reached a high level and intensity, although in 2005, it was Poland that was setting the tone for the mutual relations.

In July 2005, the Polish delegation, headed by Prime Minister Belka, visited Baghdad and Iraqi Kurdistan. Other members of the delegation were Adam Daniel Rotfeld, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jerzy Szmajdziński, the Minister of National Defence and Waldemar Dąbrowski, the Minister of Culture. Key elements of the plan for the reconstruction of mutual relations were agreed upon and the memorandum on the cooperation for the implementation of international agreements in the area of security and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was signed. In November 2005, the Minister of National Defence, Radosław Sikorski visited Baghdad and in December 2005, Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz. The Iraqi were informed of the considerations on further involvement of Poland in the stabilisation mission. To set up the institutional framework for the development of mutually beneficial relations in all fields, revitalisation of the Polish-Iraqi Mixed Committee was decided upon. Poland determined the composition of the Committee, to be presided over by the representative of the Ministry of the Economy. Preparatory work has also been launched by Iraq. The appointment of sectoral committees was also agreed upon, including the committees on oil and gas, along with the continued supply of equipment to the armed forces of Iraq. It was further decided that the talks on resolving the issue of Iraq's debt to Poland (coming to over \$786 million) would commence.

Not all the arrangements have been implemented, though. The developments on the Iraqi political scene prevented the planned visit of the Iraqi government delegation to Poland, headed by deputy Prime Minister Chalabi, and accompanied by the Minister of Finance and Minister for Oil. The security status in Iraq has also prevented the visit to Baghdad of the trade mission organised by the National Chamber of Commerce. The visit to Poland of the first deputy of Iraq's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hamid al-Bayati, and the representatives of

the economic ministries was also delayed until further date. No important, new contracts have been signed. The negotiations on the Iraqi debt to Poland have not started either. A drop in intensity of the Polish-Iraqi cooperation in recent months primarily stems from the prolonged process of formation of the permanent government for Iraq.

The hitherto actions for the development of relations with Iraq have brought, however, a clear development of contacts in various fields. The consistently pursued target has been to update the agreements and contracts signed. Poland submitted to Iraq a draft governmental agreement on the cooperation in the area of defence, together with a declaration of readiness to begin negotiations. The work on the proposals for actions under the agreement signed by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs on cooperation for the implementation of international agreements in the area of security and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the executive programme in the area of culture, science, education and sports for 2006–2008 is being continued. Iraq put forward a proposal for the agreement on cooperation in the area of archaeology and cultural heritage, Poland is interested in the development of interparliamentary contracts. A parliamentary, Polish-Iraqi group was set up in the Sejm. Iraq is one of the prioritised countries in the programme of Polish aid for development. In 2005, PLN 500 million was spent on aid programmes implemented in Iraq by Polish humanitarian organisations. In the academic year 2005/2006, the number of Iraqi students in Polish academic centres doubled. The bulk of the study grants were provided by chancellors of the Polish universities. In the academic year 2004/2005, a specialised training for the group of young Iraqi diplomats was held at the Academy of Diplomacy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

What remains unfulfilled, however, are the expectations of reactivating economic and trade cooperation. It is essentially restricted to Bumar's contracts for the supply of military equipment and arms, for the total value of over \$400 million. In mid-2005, the Iraqi and international press reported that Bumar was accused of failing to comply with the contractual terms. These totally unfounded accusations were an attempt to undermine the credibility of the Polish enterprise and hinder, or even prevent, its further operation in the Iraqi market. Poland's reaction was a wide and effective information campaign targeted at the Iraqi and American partners, to explain all the misunderstandings.

A difficult security situation in Iraq, limited financial and organisational potential of most Polish enterprises, as well as their non-competitive offer have prevented the implementation of the majority of undertakings planned by Poland. However, it should be noted here that the growing dynamics of the trade

exchange with Iraq is significant. In 2004, it totalled \$21.04 million (including our exports to Iraq amounting to \$17.14 million), while in 2005 our exports totalled \$94 million, at negligible imports value.

Poland's military involvement in Iraq has contributed to a greater interest on the part of our companies with not only the country, but the entire region as well. The process of reconstructing the Polish trade presence in the Arab states of the Middle East and North Africa, also implemented with a view to secure alternative supply of energy resources, is under way. Our exports to these countries in 2005 came to almost one billion dollars.

On 6 April 2006, a short visit to Iraq was paid by Lech Kaczyński, the president of Poland. It proved an excellent opportunity to reiterate Poland's support to the process of forming the national unity government and to get acquainted with the present internal situation. The talks between president Kaczyński and president Talabani were the case for the continuation of the Polish-Iraqi dialogue, creating the conditions for activating bilateral contacts upon the establishment of the new, constitutional authority in Baghdad.

### **The Prospects of Poland's Involvement in Iraq**

Irrespective of the future decisions in the military field, the gravity centre of our involvement in Iraq should gradually be moved towards civilian cooperation. This translates into creation of political and economic relations as well as continued efforts to enhance them. Poland should focus on establishing the infrastructure for cooperation (including the legal-treaty foundation) and institutional links between governmental and local government agencies, on establishing new interparliamentary contacts, business organisation and the preservation of the existing contacts (including with the provinces where Poland is present under the stabilisation mission). Poland should also consider the establishment of cooperation with the Autonomous Region of Iraqi Kurdistan, visited by the Polish Prime Minister in July 2005.

Iraq remains an important future partner of Poland despite the fact that Polish economic presence there is below the expectations. This stems both from objective reasons and insufficient preparation of Polish companies to act in extreme conditions. Together with the improved security status in Iraq and the normalisation of the situation, this country, with rich oil resources (world's second largest), stands a chance of becoming one of the key commercial partners of Poland in the Middle East region. The election of Iraq's constitutional authorities offers an opportunity for a gradual stabilisation of the internal situation and

improved conditions for cooperation with international partners. Poland's contribution to the process of stabilisation in Iraq is highly esteemed by the authorities of this country. Prime Minister Marcinkiewicz's talks in Baghdad confirmed that, in terms of economic cooperation, Iraq would give preference to those countries that supported it during the difficult time of transition.

The achievement by Poland of significant, direct economic benefits resulting from the involvement in Iraq is and has always been unrealistic in the short term. Consistent actions should yield this type of benefits in the future, leading to a marked progress in our relations with Iraq, including in the area of exploring oil and gas resources, as well as contribute to further strengthening of Poland's position in the Middle East and in North Africa.

However, any debate on further military presence of Poland in Iraq after 2006 is premature, since the decision on this issue should consider the position of the future constitutional authority of Iraq, arrangements with our coalition partners and, first and foremost, whether the UN Security Council takes a decision to act as an international legal mandate for the potential continuation of the presence of multinational forces in the country. What appears purposeful is the analysis of the whole spectrum of considerations on the Polish side required to assess the situation in a proper manner.

The United States, together with some other coalition partners, proceeded with the establishment in Iraq of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), to work as a new form of support from the international community to the reconstruction of the country. They are to be composed of civilian advisors on the economy and administration, who are to assist the local authorities. Poland was invited by the U.S. to join the organisation of the Teams in the provinces the Multinational Division (headed by Poles) is responsible for. The American proposal is under scrutiny now.

A consistent effort by Poland to support stabilisation and reconstruction of Iraq strengthens our image as a responsible member of the international community able to join the group for regional problem-solving, that reaches beyond the European and Euro-Atlantic context. The involvement in Iraq is an important element of Poland's participation in the war on terror as well as democratisation and modernisation of the Middle East. It also confirms a special character of the relations between Poland and the United States, leading to further development of the political and military cooperation with the U.S. It also solidifies Poland's position within NATO as a trusted ally, who has the potential for an effective military involvement on an expeditionary basis. With

the differences on the issue of Iraq in the Euro-Atlantic dimension being gradually levelled out, a negative impact which the Polish involvement in that country had on the relations with some EU states, has been eliminated. Poland's presence in Iraq also affects the expansion and change of character of Polish relations with the entire Arab area, as well as Iran and Israel. This was possible owing to, among others, the information campaign targeted at Iraq's neighbours and compliance of the tasks implemented by the Polish contingent with the declared, strictly stabilisation character of the mandate. The cost of the mission in Iraq suffered by Poland is balanced out by the experience that the armed forces have accumulated there. Poland's policy on Iraq should reinforce the international significance of the country as a trusted partner in the anti-terrorist coalition, as well as the country that is politically and military active and effective in solving the conflicts of the world of today.

## Poland's Economic Relations with Other States

Poland's economic results of 2005 indicate that the policy aimed at preparing the Polish economy to operate within the uniform internal market of the EU has been successful. The apprehensions expressed earlier proved ungrounded. The Polish economy did very well in the conditions of the strong competition in the EU market, which is indicated by the falling deficit in the current account of Poland's balance of payments, inflow of capital as well as other macroeconomic indicators: the level of inflation, the interest rates and the dynamics of the GDP growth. What remained unsatisfactory was the dynamics of the unemployment rates, but most of the macroeconomic indices improved as compared with the previous year. According to prognoses of the main economic centres (the Gdańsk Institute for Market Economics, Government Centre of Strategic Studies and experts of the PKO and PBH banks), the current macroeconomic tendencies should become stronger in 2006.

### Macroeconomic Characteristics

A country's macroeconomic situation defines its possibilities regarding economic cooperation with other countries and is a form of a synthetic evaluation of the condition of its economy. In 2005 Poland's gross domestic product grew by 3.2% as compared with the previous year, and industrial production increased by 9.7%.<sup>1</sup> Prognoses for 2006 assume greater dynamics of the GDP growth—to the level of 4.4% (data for the first quarter confirm the forecasts; the GDP increased by 5.5%) According to preliminary estimations, GDP in 2005 amounted to PLN 967.7 billion. In comparison with the year 2000 it increased by 15.7%, which means that its average annual growth totalled 3%, as compared with 1.6% in all the EU states. The average dynamics of the GDP growth in the new ten EU Member States was higher than in Poland and amounted to 3.6%.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See: [www.mgip.gov.pl/wiadomosci/gospodarka+ogolem/wyniki+gospodarcze+2005](http://www.mgip.gov.pl/wiadomosci/gospodarka+ogolem/wyniki+gospodarcze+2005).

<sup>2</sup> *Ocena sytuacji społeczno-gospodarczej kraju w 2005 roku wraz z elementami prognozy*, Warszawa, March 2006, p. 5.

In early 2006 the dynamics of the GDP growth was 3.7%. This means that the Polish economy returned to the path of progress, though the volume of the ratio was not high enough to significantly influence the reduction of the relatively high unemployment rate, which in December 2005 amounted to 17.6% of professionally active persons. Nevertheless, as compared with the year 2004, unemployment fell by a small, though visible percentage (i.e. by 1.4%).<sup>3</sup>

**Employment.** The improvement in the unemployment statistics partly follows from the fact that Poles take up employment in those EU states which have opened their markets to labour force from new Member States. In 2004 these included Great Britain, Ireland and Sweden. In May 2006—after the two-year transition period—Finland, Greece, Spain and Portugal also opened their labour markets. Switzerland, though not an EU Member itself, opened its borders to employees from the new EU states. Belgium and France are also considering such decisions. Longer transition periods apply to Austria and Germany. In those states Poles may only work within the quotas granted.

In Great Britain employment of foreigners is estimated at the level of 290 000 persons, which accounts for 0.4% of the total employment, in Sweden the figure is 250 00 (0.2%), and in Ireland 160 000 (2%). According to estimations, 800 000 Poles are employed beyond Poland, including 450 000 in Germany, 200 000 in Great Britain and 100 000 in Ireland. More precise statistics indicate that Poles account for 4.2% per each 1000 foreign employed persons in Sweden, 8.3% in France, 14.6% in Spain, 16% in Norway, 16.7% in Austria, 27.8% in Holland, 32.6% in Ireland, 37% in Italy, and 73.5% in Great Britain.<sup>4</sup>

The work performed by Poles abroad influences Poland's economic situation, e.g. decreases the rate of unemployment and the gap in the current account, which is related to transfers of income to Poland. In 2005 a growth of such transfers by 20% was noted as compared with 2004. In the last quarter of 2005 the amount transferred via banking systems totalled €1.6 billion. The total value of the transfers (including also transfers outside of the banking system) is estimated at €12.8 billion. In 2005 transfers of income of Poles working abroad were the source of financing for 4% of consumer spending in Poland. The

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<sup>3</sup> According to the Central Statistical Office in December 2004 the unemployment rate totalled 19%, see [www.stat.gov.pl/dane\\_spol-gosp/praca\\_ludnosc/stopa\\_bezrobocia/index.htm](http://www.stat.gov.pl/dane_spol-gosp/praca_ludnosc/stopa_bezrobocia/index.htm). In December 2005 Poland had 2 773 000 registered unemployed persons, including 1 486 400 women, and 42.6% of all unemployed were persons living in rural areas, see [www.stat.gov.pl/dane\\_spol-gosp/praca\\_ludnosc/bezrobocie\\_rejestrowane/2006-01/analiza.pdf](http://www.stat.gov.pl/dane_spol-gosp/praca_ludnosc/bezrobocie_rejestrowane/2006-01/analiza.pdf).

<sup>4</sup> See <http://praca.gazeta.pl/gazetapraca/0,73675.html>.

importance of the transfers for the Polish economy is expected to increase along with the enhancing integration of the Polish economy with the economies of the other states of the internal market.

Until the time when Poland became an EU Member, the Polish economy as the only one among the eight economies of the states undergoing the transformation process was catching up with the states of the Community and making up for its previously slower development. This opinion follows from the comparison of the average economic growth ratios of Poland and seven other states of Central and Eastern Europe as well as the Community Member States in the years 1989–2004. After the accession to the EU the tendency changed: the dynamics of growth in all new EU Member States—with the exception of Malta—was higher than that of Poland. If Poland maintains its present growth dynamics, it will be able to achieve GDP equal to the average value of the ratio for all the member states of the Monetary Union within 28–30 years. Achieving the GDP level equal to that of Greece should require the smallest amount of time. According to estimations, if the dynamics of the current economic growth is maintained, the goal can be achieved in 15–18 years. Shortening the period would have to mean increasing the dynamics of the economic growth (the annual rate of the Polish GDP growth would have to exceed 4.5%).

**Inflation.** The problem of inflation has been solved. The Polish ratio of the growth in the prices of consumer goods and services is the lowest among all the EU Member States. In this respect, the situation is stable and the inflation-related prices growth should not return. The annual inflation rate (from December 2004 to December 2005) amounted to 0.7% and was lower than the inflation target assumed by the Monetary Policy Council (1.5%–3.5%).<sup>5</sup>

**Interest rates.** In 2005 the Monetary Policy Council lowered interest rates with unprecedented frequency. In December 2004 they were as follows: reference interest rate—6.5%, the Lombard rate—8.0%, the deposit rate—5.0%, rediscount rate—7.0%. On the other hand, in December 2005 the figures were: 4.5%, 6.0%, 3.0% and 4.75%, respectively.

**The zloty exchange rates.** In 2005 the zloty got stronger against the euro and weaker against the U.S. dollar. In the early January the dollar exchange rate was PLN 4.0778, whereas at the end of December, the rate was as low as PLN 3.8814. The rates for the euro amounted to PLN 4.0714 and 3.8598 respectively.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> *Założenia polityki pieniężnej na 2005 r.*, National Bank of Poland, p. 3.

<sup>6</sup> Statistical data for foreign exchange rates are provided by the National Bank of Poland.

FX reserves. Growth in foreign exchange reserves in Poland increased from \$38 billion to 43.7 billion.<sup>7</sup> This helped the FX rate of the zloty get stronger (in spite of the persistent, albeit decreasing deficit in the trade exchange), made taking out credits abroad easier, and facilitated the process of repayment of Poland's credit liabilities, the oldest of which date back to the 1970s.

### Commercial Exchange

Commercial exchange was an important factor influencing the demand for the products manufactured by Polish producers, and as such had a strong influence on the economic growth in Poland. Export increased by 19.6%, import by 13%. The deficit in the trade account amounted to €9.3 billion and was by €2.4 billion, i.e. by 20.6%, lower than in 2004. From 2000 the deficit decreased by €9.5 billion, i.e. by over a half.<sup>8</sup> In January 2006 the trade balance for the last 12 months was minus \$2.9 billion, and the current account was minus \$4.5 billion. By way of comparison, similar rates for the Czech Republic and Hungary were \$1.7 billion and minus 2.6 billion, minus \$3.4 billion and minus 8.7 billion, respectively.<sup>9</sup>

Table 1

#### Foreign trade turnover in total and by countries in 2005

| Specification                        | 2005               |                    |                    |              |              |              | 2004           | 2005         |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|
|                                      | In PLN<br>'000 000 | In USD<br>'000 000 | In EUR<br>'000 000 | 2004 = 100   |              |              | I–XII          |              |
|                                      |                    |                    |                    | PLN          | USD          | EUR          | Structure in % |              |
| <b>EXPORT</b>                        | <b>288780.8</b>    | <b>89378.1</b>     | <b>71423.5</b>     | <b>106.1</b> | <b>121.1</b> | <b>119.6</b> | <b>100.0</b>   | <b>100.0</b> |
| Developed countries                  | 241374.8           | 74746.6            | 59699.5            | 104.0        | 118.9        | 117.4        | 85.3           | 83.6         |
| UE                                   | 222890.6           | 69013.9            | 55135.6            | 103.4        | 118.2        | 116.7        | 79.2           | 77.2         |
| Including the euro zone <sup>a</sup> | 156618.0           | 48521.8            | 38736.0            | 102.3        | 117.1        | 115.5        | 56.3           | 54.2         |

<sup>7</sup> "Emerging Markets Indicators," *The Economist*, 1–7 April 2006, p. 94.

<sup>8</sup> See. [www.fundusze-strukturalne.gov.pl/NR/rdonlyres/11A29886-D9F9-4C29-A75E-C936260B8D00/20417/roczne08.pdf](http://www.fundusze-strukturalne.gov.pl/NR/rdonlyres/11A29886-D9F9-4C29-A75E-C936260B8D00/20417/roczne08.pdf).

<sup>9</sup> "Emerging Markets..."

|  |                 |                 |                |              |              |              |              |              |
|--|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Developing countries                                 | 18427.4         | 5688.1          | 4553.8         | 118.0        | 133.4        | 132.1        | 5.7          | 6.4          |
| Countries of Central and Eastern Europe <sup>b</sup> | 28978.6         | 8943.4          | 7170.2         | 118.5        | 134.2        | 132.9        | 9.0          | 10.0         |
| <b>IMPORT</b>  | <b>328192.0</b> | <b>101538.8</b> | <b>81169.7</b> | <b>100.8</b> | <b>115.2</b> | <b>113.8</b> | <b>100.0</b> | <b>100.0</b> |
| Developed countries                                  | 240614.3        | 74476.9         | 59484.4        | 97.3         | 111.3        | 109.8        | 75.9         | 73.3         |
| UE   | 215164.8        | 66595.5         | 53200.0        | 96.8         | 110.8        | 109.3        | 68.3         | 65.6         |
| Including the euro zone <sup>a</sup>                 | 164599.7        | 50948.3         | 40698.8        | 97.0         | 111.0        | 109.5        | 52.1         | 50.2         |
| Developing countries                                 | 49615.7         | 15338.7         | 12283.9        | 107.5        | 122.6        | 121.3        | 14.2         | 15.1         |
| Countries of Central and Eastern Europe <sup>b</sup> | 37962.0         | 11723.2         | 9401.4         | 117.9        | 134.0        | 132.9        | 9.9          | 11.6         |
| <b>BALANCE</b>                                       | <b>-39411.2</b> | <b>-12160.7</b> | <b>-9746.2</b> | <b>X</b>     | <b>X</b>     | <b>X</b>     | <b>X</b>     | <b>X</b>     |
| Developed countries                                  | 760.5           | 269.7           | 215.1          | X            | X            | X            | X            | X            |
| including UE   | 7725.8          | 2418.4          | 1935.6         | X            | X            | X            | X            | X            |
| Including the euro zone <sup>a</sup>                 | -7981.7         | -2426.5         | -1962.8        | X            | X            | X            | X            | X            |
| Developing countries                                 | -31188.3        | -9650.6         | -7730.1        | X            | X            | X            | X            | X            |
| Countries of Central and Eastern Europe <sup>b</sup> | -8983.4         | -2779.8         | -2231.2        | X            | X            | X            | X            | X            |

Source: Central Statistical Office, [www.stat.gov.pl/dane\\_spol-gosp/ceny\\_handel\\_uslugi/obroty\\_handl\\_zagr/2006/01-12\\_2005.htm](http://www.stat.gov.pl/dane_spol-gosp/ceny_handel_uslugi/obroty_handl_zagr/2006/01-12_2005.htm).

<sup>a</sup> Turnover with the countries of the euro zone include: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Germany, Portugal, Italy.

<sup>b</sup> Turnover with countries of Central and Eastern Europe include: Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Moldova, Russia, Romania and Ukraine.

Table 2

**Foreign trade turnover by the most important countries**

| Specification  | 2005               |                    |                    |            |       |       | 2004           | 2005 |
|----------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|------------|-------|-------|----------------|------|
|                | In PLN<br>'000 000 | In USD<br>'000 000 | In EUR<br>'000 000 | 2004 = 100 |       |       | Structure in % |      |
|                |                    |                    |                    | PLN        | USD   | EUR   |                |      |
| <b>EXPORT</b>  |                    |                    |                    |            |       |       |                |      |
| Germany        | 81449.4            | 25224.7            | 20142.0            | 99.6       | 114.0 | 112.5 | 30.1           | 28.2 |
| France         | 17939.9            | 5558.5             | 4438.4             | 109.0      | 124.8 | 123.2 | 6.0            | 6.2  |
| Italy          | 17677.1            | 5482.8             | 4375.7             | 106.1      | 121.6 | 120.0 | 6.1            | 6.1  |
| Great Britain  | 16127.6            | 4995.6             | 3989.6             | 109.6      | 125.3 | 123.6 | 5.4            | 5.6  |
| Czech Republic | 13195.9            | 4076.9             | 3266.3             | 112.4      | 127.9 | 126.6 | 4.3            | 4.6  |
| Russia         | 12821.0            | 3960.5             | 3171.1             | 123.2      | 139.3 | 137.9 | 3.8            | 4.4  |
| Netherlands    | 12009.0            | 3721.4             | 2970.2             | 102.6      | 117.5 | 115.8 | 4.3            | 4.2  |
| Sweden         | 8889.0             | 2749.8             | 2198.2             | 93.1       | 106.7 | 105.3 | 3.5            | 3.1  |
| Belgium        | 8591.7             | 2665.2             | 2122.8             | 98.6       | 113.0 | 111.3 | 3.2            | 3.0  |
| Ukraine        | 8410.3             | 2588.2             | 2084.6             | 112.7      | 127.9 | 127.1 | 2.7            | 2.9  |
| <b>IMPORT</b>  |                    |                    |                    |            |       |       |                |      |
| Germany        | 80994.3            | 25053.4            | 20024.0            | 102.0      | 116.6 | 115.1 | 24.4           | 24.7 |
| Russia         | 29124.7            | 8985.5             | 7216.0             | 123.9      | 140.6 | 139.7 | 7.2            | 8.9  |
| Italy          | 23195.0            | 7181.2             | 5738.1             | 90.2       | 103.6 | 102.1 | 7.9            | 7.1  |
| France         | 19657.8            | 6094.7             | 4859.7             | 89.7       | 102.9 | 101.4 | 6.7            | 6.0  |
| China          | 17807.3            | 5496.6             | 4412.0             | 119.1      | 135.2 | 134.2 | 4.6            | 5.4  |
| Czech Republic | 11742.5            | 3633.3             | 2903.4             | 99.6       | 114.0 | 112.4 | 3.6            | 3.6  |
| Netherlands    | 11218.1            | 3474.0             | 2773.1             | 99.0       | 113.1 | 111.5 | 3.5            | 3.4  |
| Great Britain  | 10158.8            | 3143.4             | 2511.9             | 93.8       | 107.6 | 106.1 | 3.3            | 3.1  |
| Belgium        | 8630.1             | 2670.4             | 2134.3             | 104.4      | 119.3 | 117.8 | 2.5            | 2.6  |
| United States  | 7819.5             | 2415.8             | 1932.2             | 100.1      | 114.0 | 112.8 | 2.4            | 2.4  |

Source: See the source of Table 1

In 2005 export in current prices amounted to PLN 288.8 billion, whereas import totalled PLN 328.2 billion. As compared with 2004 export increased by

6.1% and import by 0.8%. The trade exchange deficit amounted to PLN 39.4 billion (and to PLN 53.5 billion in 2004). Export—calculated in U.S. dollars—totalled 89.4 billion, import 101.5 billion. As compared with 2004 export grew by 21.1%, and import by 15.2%. The foreign trade deficit amounted to \$12.1 billion (in 2004 it amounted to 14.4 billion). Export—expressed in euro—totalled 71.4 billion, import 81.2 billion, the foreign trade deficit reached the level of 9.8 billion, whereas a year before the figure was 11.7 billion (export increased by 19.6%, import by 13.8%).

Discrepancies in the values of foreign trade turnover and balances expressed in various currencies and after the translation into a common currency with the use of annual average exchange rates indicate the variations in the rates of the U.S. dollar and the euro (expressed in zlotys), which illustrates the varying demand and supply of the two currencies in Poland. The level of the rates is influenced both by the transfers of the incomes of Poles working abroad and income of foreigners working in Poland, buying foreign currencies and sending them abroad.

In 2005 trade deficit was observed in the relations with developing countries—PLN 31.2 billion (\$9.6 billion), the states of Central and Eastern Europe—PLN 9.0 billion (\$2.8 billion) and the countries of the euro zone—PLN 8.0 billion (\$2.4 billion). A surplus was achieved in the relations with the EU Member States amounting to PLN 7.7 billion (\$2.4 billion). The share of developed countries in total export amounted to 83.6% (including the EU—77.2%), in import the share was 73.3% (including the EU 65.6%).

The share of Germany in the Polish export in 2005 was lower than that of 2004 by 1.9 percentage points and amounted to 28.2%, whereas in import the share was higher by 0.3 percentage points and totalled to 24.7%. The surplus was PLN 0.4 billion (€0.1 billion). In 2004 the balance was also positive and totalled PLN 2.4 billion (€0.5 billion).

The greatest dynamics in turnover was noted in the export to Russia, Ukraine, the Czech Republic, Great Britain and France, among Poland's main trade partners as well as in import from Russia, China, Belgium and Germany.

Ukraine became one of the ten most important trading partners of Poland (2.9% of the Polish export in 2005), taking the place of Hungary, which dropped out of the first ten. Trade exchange with Ukraine is based on the partnership and cooperation agreement (PCA) between this country and the European Union. A protocol to this agreement broadened its application to the 10 new EU Member States, similarly as in the cases of other states of the Commonwealth of Independent States which have signed PCA-type agreements with the EU. The first ten states from which Poland bought goods included the United States

(2.4% of the Polish import in 2005). The U.S. getting to the top of the list moved Spain out of the first ten of exporters to Poland.

Turnover with the first ten of the Polish trade partners accounted for 68.3% of the value of export (in 2004 the figure was 69.4%) and 67.2% of the import value (66.1% respectively).

Developed countries dominate both in the Polish exports and imports. An most important role is played by the EU market. The share of the EU Member States, just as that of the members of the Economic and Monetary Union, is relatively lower in import than in export. This indicates that Poland seeks import markets where conditions are more competitive than in the EU uniform market. The deficit in the trade with the EU has turned into a surplus, which results from the economic policy, pursued since 1989, focusing on improving the competitiveness of Polish producers and restructuring the economy.

The goods structure of the export is evolving considerably, which results from the changing production capacities, and that in turn follows from foreign investors' involvement in the Polish economy. Processed goods accounted for 78.9% of the Polish exports as early as in 2000. The tendency persists, which indicates the gradual disappearing of the technological gap between Poland and highly developed countries.

Export of food developed dynamically and accounted for approximately 10% of the total exports. Turnover in this group of goods had a positive balance for the third year in a row and totalled €1.6 billion. The balance shows a growing tendency (in 2004 it was lower by a half). Poland is the second largest exporter of ham to the United States (15% in the American market), after Canada (21%).

In import the share of investment goods is growing, which indicates the investment revival of the Polish economy. The high dynamics of export and import of services is also worth noting. In this area Poland has a surplus of €1.7 billion (in 2004 the balance was at the level of €795 million). The growth dynamics regarding export of services was 20.2 % (in 2004 it totalled 9.9% only), whereas for import the figure was 13.1% (as compared with 6.6% in 2004).

Over 45% of enterprises exported some of their production.<sup>10</sup> The zloty appreciation was a greater problem for small and medium enterprises, especially those whose production was meant for export markets. Greater turnover in foreign trade was observed in the case of companies with foreign capital. As

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<sup>10</sup> Among enterprises producing goods for export 17% exported over 75% of their production, and 28% over a half.

much as 60% of the Polish export and 70% of import were generated by this group of producers. There were also companies which exported almost all of their production to foreign markets, e.g. the Volkswagen company from Poznań (95% of the value of trucks production) or the Faurecia Group company (96% of the value of production of car seats).

The observed tendencies reflect the changes occurring both in the structure of the economy and in its exporting capabilities. They may have a positive influence on the further acceleration of the economic growth and the consequent shortening of the time necessary for Poland to make up for the economic backwardness and the previously slower development.

### **Transfers of Capital**

Several factors are of decisive importance in terms of the given market's attractiveness for investors and the consequent inflow of capitals. The most important among them include: the rate of inflation, interest rates, the volume of the fiscal burdens, the tendencies regarding FX rates, the dynamics of efficiency growth, the dynamics of the economic growth, the size of the market created by institutional solutions (uniform market, a customs union, free trade zone, agreements regarding privileged access to the market). An important factor determining the inflow of direct foreign investment are the infrastructure-related conditions which the state guarantees to investors, thus facilitating the operation of the firms situated in the given region. Having ended the process of accepting foreign capitals in special economic zones, Poland began developing technological parks in order to encourage investors to involve capital in the economy. All these factors determine the attractiveness of the Polish economy for investors and may help increase the inflow of foreign capitals in the near future.

Among the states of Central and Eastern Europe Poland comes second, after Russia, in terms of attracting the largest foreign capital. The shares of the individual markets in the whole of the foreign capital invested in the region is as follows: Russia—27%, Poland—14%, the Czech Republic—13%, Hungary—6%, Slovakia—4%, Romania—8%, others—28%.<sup>11</sup>

The value of direct investment in Poland in 2005 was estimated at \$7724 million by the National Bank of Poland. The figure is by \$5149 million lower than that of 2004, when the inflow of foreign capital totalled \$12 873 million. The drop was as large as 40%.

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<sup>11</sup> *Word Investment Report*, New York, Geneva, 2005.

Table 3

**Components of the capital inflow to Poland  
in the years 2004 and 2005 (in \$'000 000)**

| Year | Specification |                     |               | Total  |
|------|---------------|---------------------|---------------|--------|
|      | Shares /stock | Re-invested profits | Other capital |        |
| 2004 | 7463          | 6340                | -930          | 12 873 |
| 2005 | 2341          | 3898                | 1485          | 7724   |

Source: *Napływ zagranicznych inwestycji bezpośrednich do Polski w 2005 roku*, see: [www.nbp.pl/publikacje/zib/zib2005.pdf](http://www.nbp.pl/publikacje/zib/zib2005.pdf)

The volumes of capital export and import were not spread evenly over the four quarters of 2005. Most of the capital came to Poland and left it in the first quarter, the figures were the lowest in the fourth. Almost 75% of the capital inflowing to Poland comes from the European Union, about 15% from the United States, almost 5% from international corporations and financial organizations and 5% from other states. In terms of states' involvement in the investment-related activities in the Polish economy, the United States come first, followed by France, then by international organizations<sup>12</sup> and international corporations. Germany comes 4<sup>th</sup>, The Netherlands come fifth, followed by Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, Italy, Great Britain, Korea, Australia, Finland, Japan and Luxembourg. The most active investors in terms of the number of companies operating in Poland are Germany—258 firms, the Netherlands—126, the United States—118, France—101, Sweden—60, Great Britain—56, Belgium—25, international corporations and organizations—14 and Denmark—6. In total, 2005 saw the arrival of 1082 foreign investors, each of which invested over one million dollars.

In compliance with the Lisbon Strategy, Poland plans to support entrepreneurship and facilitate starting business activity.<sup>13</sup> This goal is to be achieved thanks to, *inter alia*, the Better Regulation initiative, i.e. simplifying and improvement of the EU law. As a result, administrative burdens for entrepreneurs following from the regulations currently in force are to decrease. The implementation of goals in this area, defined by the European Commission,

<sup>12</sup> The entities in question include the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), International Financial Corporation (IFC), European Investment Bank (EIB) etc.

<sup>13</sup> Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council 23/24 March 2006, The Relunched Lisbon Strategy for Jobs and Growth, p. 8.

is supervised by the Międzyresortowy Zespół ds. Nowoczesnych Regulacji Gospodarczych (*Inter-Department Team on Modern Economic Regulations*).<sup>14</sup> Poland participated in the process of defining new legal solutions, both of a primary and secondary character.

Table 4

**Polish investments in the states of the European Union at the end of 2005**

| State          | Investment value | Specification of the investment  |
|----------------|------------------|--|
| Germany        | €500 million     | Over 20 thousand Polish firms are registered in Germany, out of which 9.8 thousand are active. Approximately 4.7 thousand firms operate in Berlin The largest Polish investors include: PKN Orlen, Boryszew S.A., SANPLANST, VOX, Zakłady Odzieżowe Bytom S.A., Budimex, Kopex, Polservice.      |
| Czech Republic | €500 million     | Industries: petrochemical, construction, automotive industry, commercial real estate, agriculture and food processing, IT The largest investors include: PKN Orlen, VAB Tychy, Maspex (juices and drinks), Polish clothing salons (LPP, Tatum), footwear (CCC, Ryłko), furniture (Vox and Kler). |
| Great Britain  | £ 200 thousand   | Participation in the privatization of foreign companies, belonging to the central foreign trade offices  |
| Lithuania      | \$88.3 million   | 126 Polish investors (including: Huta Szkła "Warta," Opoczno S.A., PZU S.A.)   |
| Latvia         | €2.8 million     | The most significant investment in trade, real estate and food processing industries   |
| Slovakia       | €9.53 million    | Industries: production of cellulose, paper and paper products, sales and repair of motor vehicles, sales and intermediation, production and distribution of electric energy, natural gas, water  |
| Belgium        | €6 million       | 12 groceries, furniture salon and other companies  |
| Denmark        | No data          | AMICA S.A., Węglkokoks Skandinavia A/S and other companies   |
| Portugal       | No data          | AMSI Polska, Polish Pharmaceutical Services sp. z o.o. and other companies   |
| Hungary        | No data          | Maspex Hungary Kft, Bella Hungaria Kft. and other companies  |

Source: *Polska inwestuje w krajach UE*,

see: [www.mgip.gov.pl/wiadomosci/eksport+i+inwestycje+zagraniczne](http://www.mgip.gov.pl/wiadomosci/eksport+i+inwestycje+zagraniczne)

<sup>14</sup> See [www.mgip.gov.pl/wiadomosci/gospodarka+ogolem/better+regulation.htm](http://www.mgip.gov.pl/wiadomosci/gospodarka+ogolem/better+regulation.htm).

Table 5

**Largest foreign investors in Poland in 2005**

| <b>Name of the investor</b>     | <b>Country of origin</b>         | <b>Industry</b>   |
|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|---|
| 3M Nederland B.V.               | Netherlands                      | Chemical production   |
| A. Espersen A/S                 | Denmark                          | Food  |
| A/S Roulunds Fabriker           | Denmark                          | Non-metal products  |
| ABB Ltd.                        | International capital and Sweden | Electric products   |
| ABBA Seafood AB                 | Sweden                           | Food  |
| ABN-AMRO Bank NV                | Netherlands                      | Financial intermediation  |
| Accor SA                        | France                           | Hotels  |
| ACCIONA Inmobiliaria            | Spain                            | Construction  |
| ACP Europe                      | Belgium                          | Chemical production   |
| Actaris Measurement Systems     | Germany                          | Wholesale and retail sale, repair of two- and four-track vehicles and durable goods |
| Actebis Holding GmbH            | Germany                          | Wholesale entities and retail trade   |
| Adidas AG                       | Germany                          | Wholesale entities and retail trade   |
| ADO Gardinenwerke GmbH & Co. KG | Germany                          | Fibres, clothes   |
| Adrenatio                       | Germany                          | Rubbers, plastics   |
| AES Horizons Ltd.               | International capital            | Electric products, gas, water deliveries  |
| Aesculap AG                     | Germany                          | Producer of high quality medical tools and devices                                  |
| AGA AB                          | Sweden                           | Production of chemicals   |

Source: *The List of Major Investors in Poland*, December 2005,  
 see: [www.paiz.gov.pl/index/?id=4c56ff4ce4aaf9573aa5dff913df997a](http://www.paiz.gov.pl/index/?id=4c56ff4ce4aaf9573aa5dff913df997a)

Poland's largest investment of 2005 was the enterprise of LG.Philips, a company with its registered office in Cracow which decided to build a household goods factory near Wrocław (a greenfield investment).

As analysts predict, the unfavourable trend in foreign investments in Poland may be expected to change in 2006. The main factors here will be the good results of the trade exchange and positive macroeconomic results. Investors may also regard as important a more favourable climate for investors deciding to

involve their capital in the Polish market. Of particular significance are improved investment conditions in industrial and technical parks and facilitating the start of business activity, e.g. by accelerating the relevant administrative procedures.

In 2005 Poland increased its investments abroad. As compared with Hungary and the Czech Republic, these were only timid attempts, but their results can already be observed in the current account of the balance of payments. The asymmetry between import and export of capital remains large, though in 2005 it became smaller than in the previous year. The relation of the import of foreign capital to export of Polish capital was 8:2. This was the smallest disproportion recorded so far. In 1996 the Polish export of capital was estimated at \$53 million (Czech—184 million, Hungarian—337 million). In the years 1990–1995 the annual average of the capital exported from Poland was \$19 million (from Hungary—26 million, the Czech Republic—67 million).<sup>15</sup> The improved proportion between export and import of capital in 2005 resulted on the one hand from the relatively lower direct foreign investment in Poland, and on the other—from the growth of the Polish capital. Poland exports capital primarily to the EU Member States (*inter alia* to Germany—financial intermediation), United States (services, banking) and the states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (including Ukraine and Uzbekistan—food processing sector and consumer goods).

### Foreign Debt

According to the estimations of the National Bank of Poland, Poland's foreign debt as at the end of 2005 amounted to €105.6 billion, and over a half of the debt, €49 billion, belonged to the government and self-government sectors. The indebtedness of the NGOs and non-banking sector amounted to €43.9 billion, the debt of the banking sector was €11.3 billion and the National Bank of Poland owed €1.3 billion. As compared with the similar period of the previous year, public debt increased by 10.4%. The largest share in the growth belonged to the government and self-government sectors (20.2%), the share of the banking sector was lower (12.3%), and the enterprise sector had the lowest share (1.2%).

Poland's external debt is growing fast. Since 2000 it has grown by 41%. Its structure is deteriorating, as the share of short-term credits, which must be repaid within a year, is growing. In 1995 short-term credits accounted for 2.9% of the

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<sup>15</sup> *Word Investment Report 2002*, New York, Geneva: UN, 2002, p. 309.

total external debt, whereas in 2005 the share was 19.7%. The fast growth in this area has been observed since 1998. In absolute values, the debt does not look optimistic, but the view changes completely after the analysis of relative values, i.e. the proportion of the debt to foreign trade turnover or the volume of the GDP. In the light of such indices the volume of external debt does not look threatening, it actually gives rise to certain optimism, as it indicates that the Polish economy should be able to handle the debt.

### Absorption of the EU Funds

Poland is the largest beneficiary of the EU assistance programmes among the new Member States. This results both from its size and (area, population, the volume of the GDP), and the number of programmes financed from the EU budget. However, if the volume of the transfers is given in *per capita* values, it becomes clear that larger amounts are given to Lithuania, Estonia, Malta, and lower to Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary.

In 2004 Poland obtained €2.7 billion from the EU, and other Member States collectively received €3.3 billion. Similar proportions are observed between the transfers from Poland to the EU and from the EU to Poland with transfers of other EU Member States from and to the EU. The surplus in Poland amounts to €1.4 billion and in other ten new states the amount totals €2.8 billion.

Table 6

#### Balance of financial transfers between the European Union and Poland in the years 2004 and 2005 (in €'000 000)

| Specification                                       | 2004      | 2005 (estimates)  |
|---|-----------|-------------------|
| EU transfers to Poland                              | 2793.002  | 5791.210          |
| Pre-accession assistance (including cohesion funds) | 1009.950  | 1924.744          |
| Prepayment for structural funds                     | 840.975   | 2057.819          |
| Common agricultural policy                          | 247.426   | 1069.750          |
| Transfers improving the budget liquidity            | 541.299   | 612.040           |
| The Schengen financial instrument                   | 103.352   | 103.860           |
| Program Transition Facility                         | –         | 22.997            |
| Payment to the EU budget                            | -1238.920 | -2099.087         |
| Burden on the GDP                                   | -853.341  | No data available |
| VAT   | -280.495  | No data available |

|   |          |                   |
|---|----------|-------------------|
| Transfers within the traditional own funds<br>(duties, sugar payment) | -105.084 | No data available |
| Transfer balance  | 1554.082 | 3692.123          |

Source: M. Antczak, R. Antczak, *Krótkookresowe skutki integracji dla polityki fiskalnej—bilans kraju, budżetu państwa i sektora finansów publicznych*, CASE, 2006, see: [www.ukie.gov.pl/HLP/files.nsf/0/DA0B51C5010DF472C1256FF2003B9BEE/\\$file/13\\_x.pdf](http://www.ukie.gov.pl/HLP/files.nsf/0/DA0B51C5010DF472C1256FF2003B9BEE/$file/13_x.pdf)

In the budget for 2005 the amount of PLN 10.22 billion was allocated to payments of contribution to the European Union. Due to the zloty appreciation, the amount transferred to the EU budget in euro increased, though it remained unchanged in zlotys. The appreciation of the currencies of the states making up for their delays in development is yet another element additionally mobilizing the states to adopt the common currency. Poland was the only state among those which joined the Union in 2004 which has not named the target date of joining the Economic and Monetary Union, though initially the cabinet of Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz proposed Poland's joining the EMU in 2009, which would mean joining the currency stabilizing system, ERM-2 in 2007.<sup>16</sup>

According to the EU budget perspective for the years 2000–2006, Poland has €13.55 billion at its disposal, which accounts for 48% of all the resources for the new Member States. If the rate of the euro remains stable, the rate of the zloty becoming weaker increases the value of the funds transferred from the EU, whereas the zloty getting stronger decreases the value. States which belong to the Economic and Monetary Union do not face this problem, similarly as the states stabilizing their currencies within the ERM-2. The value of the exchange rate proved important for Poland already in 2005, when the EU budget perspective for the years 2007–2013 was determined, as the adopted base for the calculation of the transfers to Poland was the high value of the appreciating zloty. In practice this means a lower allocation for Poland.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> ERM-2 (Exchange Rate Mechanism-2)—before a state becomes a member of the Economic and Monetary Union, it must stabilize the rate of its national currency to the euro after fixing the rates to the common currency.

<sup>17</sup> The GDP estimation at the rate of PLN 4.08 to the euro amounts to €217 billion, which results in transfers equal to €59.2 billion, whereas with the rate of PLN 4.53 to the euro, the GDP expressed in euro amounts to 195 mln, which means that the transfers should amount to €53.2. The value of the rate equal to PLN 4.08 to the euro is the average of 2004, while PLN 4.53 to the euro is the rate dominant at the time when the budget perspective was being negotiated in May 2005.

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The year 2005 was good in terms of macroeconomic indices, although the results obtained do not satisfy the Polish ambitions. If the indices can be maintained in 2006, the predictions regarding the dynamics of the economic growth, level of unemployment and inflow of direct foreign investment should be more optimistic. A lot will depend on the Parliament approving fiscal reforms and other changes. In the context of macroeconomic results, the events occurring in the political scene can hardly be regarded as neutral.

Poland is doing fine if its results are regarded without being compared to the results of other states in the region. They do not seem so good if considered in the context of other new EU Member States. In terms of the inflation level and the evolution of the capital market, the results observed in the Polish economy were better, but the dynamics of the economic growth was a bit (slightly?) lower than in other states of the region, and the unemployment rate was higher. However, the ratios improve along with the growing pace of the Polish economic growth. In Poland level of corporate taxes (CIT) is lower by one percentage point than in Hungary and the Czech Republic. Poland's results regarding the development of export and import are also better. The gap between the Polish export and import is slowly closing. All this gives reasons to hope that the favourable trends in the Polish economy can be maintained and that the perspectives for 2006 are optimistic.

## **Historical Issues in Polish Foreign Policy in 2005**

In 2005 issues connected with attitudes towards history gained prominence in the foreign policy of many countries. This resulted from an accumulation of important anniversary ceremonies and also involved intensified discussions on the role of history in state policies. Historical issues were used both as an instrument to shape the international image of individual states and as an instrument to exert influence in internal politics. In Poland, the discussion on the role of history in the state's foreign policy overlapped with the general debate on the role of history in politics and the role of the state in fostering specific historical attitudes and interpretations; they both influenced the election campaign and the platform of the party that won. The notion of "history-based politics" took an important place in political disputes; ideas stipulating a more active role of the state in this field refer to processes taking place abroad and the adoption of these ideas entails specific consequences in the sphere of foreign policy.

Changes in the attitude towards history that occurred in Germany and Russia provided a strong impetus for the Polish discussion concerning the use of "arguments underpinned by history in politics." The accession to the European Union gave rise to an expectation in Poland that historical issues in relations with Germany would be closed once and for all. The Poles would also like the EU to recognize and respect the experiences that Central European countries had had with Communist totalitarianism and Russian imperial tradition, both of which were significant for the identity of Central European nations. Therefore, the deliberations concerning the place of historical issues in Polish foreign policy in 2005 necessitate a presentation of the role they played in Poland's relations with Germany and Russia in recent years. The historical burden in relations with the other neighbours was much smaller and, in the case of Ukraine, considerable progress in the process of overcoming problems from the past has been observed.

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## **The Burden of History in Bilateral Relations**

**Historical antecedents in relations with Germany.** Increased importance of historical issues in Polish politics is correlated with the process of changes in the approach to contemporary history in Germany. Although substantial progress had been made in the reconciliation process after 1989, the past remains a sensitive issue in mutual relations. The concept of the formation of the Centre Against Expulsions in Berlin, advocated since 2000 by the Federation of Expellees (BdV), was perceived in Poland as an attempt to relativise history. Fears were also caused by the establishment of the Prussian Claims Society, a capital company that announced filing claims for restitution and compensation in relation to the post-war displacements and resettlements of Germans from lands incorporated into Poland after the World War II. These actions triggered turbulent political and public response as, simultaneously, the German Compensation Office demanded that they [the displaced Germans] return the settlement aid, invoking the right of recourse in connection with the political transformations that had taken place.

Obviously, the difficult history was not the only factor responsible; the crisis of confidence was also caused by Poland's and Germany's diverging positions on key foreign policy issues (the military operation in Iraq and the Constitutional Treaty). In 2003, German politicians began using rhetoric that was termed "a language of blackmail" in Poland. Neither party made sufficient effort to explain the emerging differences of the priorities in their foreign policies. Although the authorities of the two countries emphasised the need to continue the reconciliation process and tried not to publicise problems connected with the difficult past, Polish-German relations were aggravated in 2004 by an escalation of mutual grievances and disputes over history which affected the emotional sphere of neighbourly relations.

The Gdańsk Declaration of 29 October 2003, in which the Presidents of Poland and Germany stated that there was no room in this dialogue for making compensation claims or for settling damages, was supposed to establish the framework of dialogue dealing with historical problems. However, it did not put an end to claims put forward by *Landsmannschaft* territorial associations, to which the Polish Sejm, right-wing opposition and local governments responded in the spring of 2004. One of the most spectacular responses was the decision of the Council of the Capital City of Warsaw to initiate the assessment of losses incurred by the city in the Second World War. The German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, during ceremonies commemorating the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the

outbreak of the Warsaw Uprising, opposed actions aimed at contorting and misinterpreting history, and declared that the German government did not endorse individual claims brought by Germans against Poland, and that it was against the creation of the Centre Against Expulsions in Berlin. He also expressed his support for the establishment of a European network of academic and research centres dealing with these issues in the spirit of the Declaration of Gdańsk.

Nevertheless, the Chancellor's visit, however important from the perspective of the Polish-German reconciliation, did not allay the fears. On 10 September 2004, the Polish Sejm passed a resolution on Poland's right to obtain German war damages and on the unlawful claims made in Germany against Poland and Polish citizens. A month later, the Warsaw City Hall published preliminary estimates indicating that the losses incurred by Warsaw as a result of the Second World War amounted to \$45.3 billion. The Mayor of Warsaw and, at the same time, a candidate for President of Poland, handed over the report to the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a remark that "the report would not have been prepared, had it not been for the actions of certain German circles."

Marek Belka's Cabinet responded to the initiatives of the Sejm with restraint. In August 2004, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs initiated research work on difficult historical issues that were a subject of controversy in Polish-German relations. In September, the Prime Minister received an assurance in Berlin that the German Ministry of Finance and the Compensation Office would not refer individuals with claims to Polish institutions. The Polish-German team of experts' confirmed the position represented by both governments that there was no lawsuit procedure to address the claims of Germans resettled under the Potsdam Agreement and that such claims did not exist in the light of international, Polish and German law.<sup>1</sup> Presenting the achievements of Polish researchers, Polish post-1989 foreign ministers jointly proclaimed a declaration entitled *With a View to a Common Future*, in which they indicated the achievements that had been made so far towards Polish-German reconciliation and emphasised that this reconciliation required "constant efforts, persistent work, time and respect for the sensitivities of our societies and for historical

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<sup>1</sup> J. Barcz, J.A. Frowein, "Ekspertyza w sprawie roszczeń z Niemiec przeciwko Polsce w związku z drugą wojną światową" (2 November 2004)," *Sprawy Międzynarodowe* 2005, No. 1, pp. 110–138.

truth.”<sup>2</sup> The care for the improvement of Polish-German relations led both governments to appoint on 4 November 2004 special representatives whose tasks included taking actions aimed at building mutual trust, understanding and reconciliation.

The priorities of Polish foreign policy for 2005, as presented to the Sejm by Minister Adam Daniel Rotfeld, included “seeking jointly with the government of the Federal Republic of Germany a future-oriented formula of relations between our states—a formula, that would finally put a closure to the burdens of the past and open qualitatively new prospects for the development of relations between Poland and Germany.” Summarizing the recent debates and frictions concerning history, sparked off “usually in reaction to the activity of various political circles in Germany,” Minister Rotfeld stressed that the importance of Polish-German relations within the EU “have significance that transcends bilateral relations, with a dimension that is not only historic and determined by the past.” The Minister appealed that the perspective of broader political aspirations, both with regard to the European and Transatlantic dimension, be taken into account. In view of the upcoming elections in Germany, he called on the main political forces and parties in Germany to unequivocally declare their readiness to close the matters of the past which “which are again introducing elements of distrust, uncertainty and destabilization into Polish-German relations.” At the same time he emphasised that Poland appreciated the understanding and willingness to cooperate on the part of the German President, Chancellor and Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs.<sup>3</sup>

The deterioration of Polish-German relations, caused by historical issues, cast a pall on the reflection of the public on reconciliation forty years after the exchange of letters between the Episcopates of Poland and Germany and the Memorandum of the Evangelical Church in Germany. The fact that the 2005 Award for Singular Contributions to Boosting the Development of Polish-German Relations went to Anna Wolff-Powęska and a team of the Western Institute in Poznań as well as Klaus Ziemer and a team of the German Historical Institute in Warsaw was a sign of recognition given to the importance of historical research in shaping friendly relations. The award was handed over by Foreign Ministers, Adam D. Rotfeld and Joschka Fischer on 27 June 2005 in

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<sup>2</sup> “Z myślą o wspólnej przyszłości,” in: *Problem reparacji, odszkodowań i świadczeń w stosunkach polsko-niemieckich 1944-2004*, vol. I.: *Studia*, W. Góralski (ed.), Warszawa: PISM, 2004, pp. 1–3.

<sup>3</sup> A.D. Rotfeld, *Government Information on the Polish foreign Policy in 2005*, p. 9.

Warsaw. A major event of the Polish-German Year 2005–2006 was an exhibition at the Royal Castle in Warsaw entitled *Solidarity 1830. Germans and Poles after the November Uprising*, presenting the support given by Germans to Polish exiles.

Poland and Germany agreed that their cooperation with regard to the memorialisation and documentation of disputed historical issues would develop within the “Memory and Solidarity” European Network, to be presented hereafter. However, the agreement reached with regard to the usefulness of the Network did not prevent history from being invoked in mutual relations. Fears re-emerged in connection with the “agreement that went over our heads;” the fears, whose major component is historical experience, arose from the strengthening of German-Russian cooperation concerning the power industry. Poland responded with concern to the September 2005 agreement on the construction of the Trans-Baltic (Northern) Pipeline, and associations with the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact tradition appeared in the media.

Remedying the mistakes of the demographic policy of the authorities of Germany and Communist Poland towards the so-called late displaced persons remains a challenge for both parties, at once a historical issue as well as a current political and social problem. Controversial issues regarding the citizenship and property of the displaced require a thorough legal analysis. In 2005, Polish experts made some progress with regard to this problem<sup>4</sup> that still requires coherent and comprehensive solutions to be developed, taking into account an individual approach to the varied individual cases.

**Historical antecedents in relations with Russia.** The increased importance of historical issues in Poland’s foreign policy also ensued from the peculiar character of the processes taking place in Russia and their influence on Polish-Russian relations. Similarly to previous years, the tendency to rehabilitate the Communist era and its symbols, inherent in the policy of integrating the Russian society, painfully clashed with the awareness of the Polish society. Polish diplomacy consistently indicated that contentious issues were not connected with the Polish attitude towards Russians, but with the Poles’ remembrance of experiences under Communism, the Soviet occupation and its consequences. Such an approach was becoming less and less effective as in April, President Vladimir Putin openly declared the fall of the USRR “the greatest geopolitical disaster of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.”

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<sup>4</sup> See W. Góralski (ed.), *Transfer—obywatelstwo—majątek. Trudne problemy stosunków polsko-niemieckich. Studia i dokumenty*, Warszawa: PISM, 2005.

The revival of historical issues in Poland's relations with Russia occurred as early as in 2004 when, in connection with the celebrations of the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising, there resurfaced questions about the behaviour of the Red Army that did not come to the insurgents' rescue. There were also plenty of historical reminiscences in relation to the Polish engagement in the "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine.

Polish-Russian relations were particularly affected by the decision of the Russian Military Prosecutor's Office, dated 21 September 2004, to close the Katyń massacre investigation that had been conducted for 14 years. Contrary to Polish expectations, the Russian Prosecutor's Office did not find any grounds for declaring the murder an act of genocide to which the statute of limitations does not apply. Having regard for the fact that the burial places of more than 7 thousand Polish prisoners of war were not known, on 30 November 2004 the Polish Institute of National Remembrance launched an inquiry into this issue, to Russia's discontent. In March 2005, during anniversary remembrance ceremonies, the Russian Prosecutor's Office maintained its position without providing its own legal qualification of the crime. The closing of the investigation without providing a legal qualification was perceived, not only in Poland, as a refusal to bear any responsibility for the crime.<sup>5</sup> What is more, the Russian side did not fulfil its promise to hand over the complete records of the investigation to the Poles. Contrary to what President Putin announced in 2002, endeavours to obtain indemnities for Poles who were oppressed in the Soviet Union found no sympathy of the Russian authorities.

As the anniversary of the end of the World War II in Europe approached, tensions centred around historical issues were mounting. The decision to establish the National Unity Day on the anniversary of the "liberation of Moscow from Polish invaders" (4 November 1612) was met with distrust in Poland, whereas the naming of a roundabout in Warsaw after the Chechen President, Dzhokhar Dudayev, was received in Russia as an unfriendly gesture. The Russian media campaign presented Poland's role in the anti-Hitler coalition as ambiguous. The way Russia presented the policy of the Soviet Union towards Poland during the Second World War as well as Russia's refusal to admit that the annexation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in 1940 was carried out in violation of international law provoked outrage in Poland.

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<sup>5</sup> A similar stance was expressed by the Russian "Memorial" society. See "Memoriał o Katyniu," *Karta* 2005, No. 40.

The divergent interpretations of history were revealed by the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Yalta Conference. While Polish MEPs were making efforts towards the adoption of a special resolution by the European Parliament, the Information and Press Department at the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation issued a communiqué that expressed outrage at the criticism of the Yalta Conference resolutions and indicated that it was thanks to the conference and the implementation of its decisions that “a free, independent and democratic Poland could be established.” This communiqué was greeted “with outrage” by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Polish Sejm and called a “falsification of history.” Shortly afterwards, on the 65<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Katyń massacre, on 22 March the Polish Sejm expressed its regret that the crime remained an object of actions aimed at its “relativisation as well as diminishing and diluting the responsibility of the perpetrators.” According to the Sejm, “only revealing the whole truth about the crime as well as condemning and punishing all the perpetrators will help heal the wounds and shape good neighbourly relations between the Republic of Poland and the Russian Federation.” The Sejm called on Russia to recognize the murder as genocide and to indicate the as yet undiscovered burial places; at the same time it expressed its support for the decision of the Institute of National Remembrance to launch a Polish investigation into the matter. Polish MPs appealed to the international community to pay due honour to the memory of the victims of the crime whose “uniqueness must be recognised and respected in the name of the fundamental principles of justice and human solidarity.”<sup>6</sup> The resolution passed by the Polish Sejm was also endorsed by the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania.<sup>7</sup>

On the 16 April, during the national anniversary remembrances, the Polish President awarded orders and honorary decorations to 31 Russians and Ukrainians for their “singular contribution to the revelation and documentation of the truth about repressive measures against the Polish population in the USSR.”<sup>8</sup> The President thanked them and emphasised that “the remembrance of the Katyń murder holds a special place in the relations between Poland and Russia.” Appreciating the Russians’ contribution to breaking the wall of “lies and silence,” the President appealed that “the road of reconciliation based on the

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<sup>6</sup> *Monitor Polski* 2005, No. 18, item 469.

<sup>7</sup> See: [www.polandembassy.lt](http://www.polandembassy.lt).

<sup>8</sup> J. Adamska, “65. rocznica Zbrodni Katyńskiej. Odznaczenia Rosjan i Ukraińców za działania na rzecz ujawnienia prawdy o Zbrodni Katyńskiej i upamiętnienia jej ofiar,” *Przeszłość i Pamięć* 2005, Nos. 1–2 (34–35), pp. 82–91.

truth be followed.” The question of the final elucidation of the Katyń massacre was a heavy burden on Poland’s relations with Russia and reappeared in connection with the observances of other anniversaries in 2005.

### The Key Actions

**Against “Polish camps.” The anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz-Birkenau.** Minister Adam Daniel Rotfeld emphasised in his address to the Sejm that “it is the Polish role to safeguard the historic truth, to resist its distortion and falsification.” In connection with the upcoming ceremonies commemorating the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz-Birkenau, he remarked that Poland should undertake actions aimed at the international propagation of the truth that the extermination of Jews in Polish territories was perpetrated by Germans and that it also encompassed Poles and other nations. Because in previous years foreign media more and more frequently referred to German death camps and concentration camps as “Polish camps,” the Minister emphasized that the “mindless or intentional” use of this term is “insulting and disgraceful,” and called for counteracting the defamation of Poland in international media.<sup>9</sup> The idea was taken up by the *Rzeczpospolita* daily which, on 26 January, published an appeal to major daily newspapers in the world, calling on them to write the truth about the camps and the Holocaust. *Rzeczpospolita*’s campaign was aided by numerous media and circles in Poland and abroad.

In cooperation with *Rzeczpospolita*, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched an initiative “Against ‘Polish camps’,” within which public opinion was informed about the actions of the diplomatic posts of the Foreign Ministry abroad in connection with the defamation of Poland abroad. Earlier, in 2004, Polish diplomats were given instructions on how to proceed in such situations and were obliged to cooperate with the *Polonia* (Polish Diaspora) organisations and circles, academics and members of the opinion-forming elites, the Jewish Diaspora as well as camp survivors. Joint actions led to numerous disclaimers and greater care in the publication of information about Poland’s contemporary history, although they did not fully eliminate this negative phenomenon.

A very important event, from the perspective of the propagation of the knowledge about Poland’s role in the World War II, was the ceremonies

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<sup>9</sup> A.D. Rotfeld, *op. cit.*

commemorating the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz-Birkenau. In his address to the Sejm, Minister Rotfeld stressed that “it was in Polish territories that the Germans created the largest camps of annihilation, where—alongside the Jewish people—Poles and members of other European nations were murdered on a mass scale.” For the first time, the observances had such a broad international dimension. It was the largest meeting of high-ranking politicians in post-war Poland, attended by 45 official delegation led, among others, by Presidents of: Israel, Moshe Katsav; Russia, Vladimir Putin; Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko; Germany, Horst Köhler; France, Jacques Chirac, and U.S. Vice-President Dick Cheney. Among the participants were also 1,500 former prisoners from all over the world as well as Red Army veterans who liberated the camp in 1945; 1,700 journalists, 100 television crews and 40 radio crews from 39 countries were accredited.<sup>10</sup>

During the ceremony held on 27 January in front of the Monument to the Memory of Nations at Birkenau, the Presidents of Poland, Russia and Israel delivered their speeches. A message from John Paul II was read out by the Apostolic Nuncio to Poland, Archbishop Józef Kowalczyk. The Charter of the International Education Centre about Auschwitz and Holocaust was signed by former prisoners of Auschwitz: Simone Veil and Władysław Bartoszewski—former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland, who presented the planned establishment of the centre as “the last will of the departing prisoners.” Another official part of the state remembrance programme was the “Let My People Live!” forum, organised by the Polish Ministry of Culture and the European Jewish Congress.

Poland also actively supported the idea of organising observances commemorating the liberation of concentration camps in the forum of the United Nations, and indicated that preserving the memory of the genocide perpetrated in these camps as well as shaping the awareness of the young generations in the spirit of tolerance and respect for human rights was a moral obligation of the democratic world. A few days before the ceremonies in Poland, a special session of the United Nations General Assembly was held. One of the speakers was Special Representative of the President of the Republic of Poland, Prof. Bronisław Geremek, who emphasized that Poland was aware of its special role resulting from the fact that it takes care of “places of remembrance of the most

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<sup>10</sup> For more see A. Wojnarowska-Olek, “60. rocznica wyzwolenia terenów niemieckich obozów koncentracyjnych,” *Przeszłość i Pamięć* 2005, Nos. 1–2 (34–35), pp. 12–38.

enormous crime of the second millennium.” He also pointed out that, despite the location of the camps in Poland, they could not be described as “Polish” camps since it was a misleading phrase that “deeply hurts the feelings of the Poles.” On the day of the anniversary observances, the European Parliament also passed a special resolution. However, German responsibility for the camps, in the face of numerous attempts to ascribe the responsibility to Poland and the Poles, was expressly mentioned in the resolution only after Polish MEPs, threatened to abstain from voting.

Unfortunately, despite various efforts and campaigns “against Polish camps,” Polish anti-Semitism was widely commented on in foreign media during the anniversary remembrances, and there were attempts to falsely impose the co-responsibility for the German crimes of the Holocaust on the Polish state. The message conveyed by the media frequently confirmed negative stereotypes and a false image of Poland’s history.<sup>11</sup> The works of the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research, begun under Polish leadership in March 2005, indirectly served to improve Poland’s international image, but did not receive wider media publicity.<sup>12</sup>

**Celebrations of the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the end of the World War II in Europe.** Minister Adam Daniel Rotfeld emphasized in his January address to the Sejm that the anniversary of the end of the World War II in Europe was also linked with the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of “the return of the Western Territories to the Homeland,” and this aspect affected the form of the celebrations in Poland. The central commemorations, modest in form, but solemn and symbolic, took place in Wrocław on 7 May and were attended by top-ranking representatives of the state authorities. During the war, the majority of the inhabitants were resettled by the German authorities who turned the city into a fortress; after the war, Wrocław was rebuilt by Poles expelled from the Polish *Kresy* (Eastern Borderlands). The international dimension of the celebrations was emphasized by the host of the ceremony, Mayor of Wrocław Rafał Dutkiewicz, who reminded people that just as Vilnius and Lviv “are and will remain part of

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<sup>11</sup> See [www.msz.gov.pl/editor/files/obozy/raport\\_dsi\\_1.html](http://www.msz.gov.pl/editor/files/obozy/raport_dsi_1.html).

<sup>12</sup> An international conference was held in Cracow during the Polish leadership in the Task Force. See D. Nałęcz, M. Edgare (eds.), *Facts and lies in the common knowledge on the Holocaust: conference materials 2005.11.17*, Warsaw-Cracow 2006. Under the auspices of the Polish leadership, a study of the media phenomenon of “Polish camps” was also published. P. Migalska, *The power behind Words: the Holocaust and WWII Era German Concentration and Death Camps*, Warsaw, 2006.

Lithuania and Ukraine while being part of Polish history,” Wrocław “is and will remain a Polish city while being part of German history and culture.” The Mayor also stressed that this city “cherishes the memory of the expelled Germans as well as the thousands of Poles who came here to rebuild the city from the ravages of war and on whose behalf, only twenty years after the war ended, their bishop, along with other bishops, said: we forgive and ask for forgiveness.”<sup>13</sup> In the presence of diplomats accredited to Poland, a roll of honour was read at the Polish military cemetery in the Oporów district of Wrocław. President Aleksander Kwaśniewski also laid a wreath at the Soviet military cemetery.

A discussion on the appropriateness of the participation of the top-ranking Polish state officials in the anniversary commemorations in Moscow was going on in Poland from the beginning of 2005. Both politicians and society were divided with regard to the decision taken by President Kwaśniewski. The right-wing opposition held the view that the President should not take part in the celebrations with the Allies in Moscow since, in fact, it was tantamount to approving the manipulation of history by the hosts of the ceremonies. It was argued that Poland, with its “unique record of injustices and grievances,” should organise anniversary observances on its own in order to speak up for historical truth along with other countries that, similarly to Poland, fell victim to Soviet expansionism at the beginning of the World War II (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia). Sending a delegation of a lower rank was also proposed.

The Polish authorities, however, remained steadfast in their opinion that, regardless of the problems presented by the visit, the absence of the Polish President on the parade stand in the Kremlin would result in even worse political ramifications. According to the experts, the Russian side expected a nervous response in Poland, which would confirm the assumptions made by Russian propaganda about “Polish Russophobia” and Poland’s ambiguous role in the World War II. The Foreign Minister explained that attempts were made at isolating Poland and other countries in the region as “a kind of peripheral states, always representing an anti-Russian bias,” and the refusal to participate in the Moscow celebrations “would facilitate the realization of such an idea.”<sup>14</sup> The presence of President Kwaśniewski was supposed to preclude the symbolic “exclusion” of Poland from the anti-Hitler coalition, of which Poland was

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<sup>13</sup> See: [www.miastowroclaw.pl/akt.php?r=str&nr=19](http://www.miastowroclaw.pl/akt.php?r=str&nr=19).

<sup>14</sup> “Musimy jechać do Moskwy”—interview with Minister Adam Daniel Rotfeld, *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 10 March 2005.

actually a founding member, and to show, at the same time, that Poland appreciated the sacrifices made by Russians and other nations of the USSR during the Second World War. Prime Minister Belka pointed out that “we clearly separate the homage paid to the fallen from an explicit condemnation of the policy of Stalin who used the sacrifice of Russian blood as an argument for enslaving the nations of Central Europe,”<sup>15</sup> whereas the Polish Ambassador reminded that “had it not been for the blood shed by the Soviet soldiers, the Polish nation may have been exterminated.”<sup>16</sup>

Polish authorities expressed their expectation that during the anniversary commemorations, “words of condemnation and unequivocal disassociation from what Stalinism represented” would be heard from the Russian side. Russia not only failed to condemn the Soviet 1939–1940 conquests, but also claimed that the incorporation of the Baltic states to the USSR “was not against the standards of applicable law” and did not constitute an occupation.<sup>17</sup> The Polish President’s decision to go to Moscow did not prevent actions that were received in Poland as unfriendly. In his address, President Putin did not mention Poland’s contribution to the victory over Germany, whereas the Polish President was assigned a distant seat on the parade stand. A day before, in order to highlight the Polish view on the conclusion of the World War II, President Kwaśniewski laid flowers on the symbolic grave of Gen. Leopold Okulicki and Minister Stanisław Jasiukowicz who died in a Soviet prison after the illegal “Trial of the Sixteen.” He also laid flowers at the Solovetsky Stone, in front of the Lubyanka building, commemorating the victims of Stalinist terror, and met veterans and members of the “Memorial” society. The media coverage of those events was limited; instead, the hosts ensured that suitable media publicity was provided to the visit of Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski who was given a red carpet reception.

Foreign Minister Adam Daniel Rotfeld had an opportunity to present the Polish perspective concerning the history of the World War II and its consequences before a wider public. During a special session of the United Nations General Assembly on 9 May, he reminded attendees that “the end of the war, and the concurrent fall of the Third Reich, did not bring the long-awaited full independence to the Poles.” He stressed that, although the Poles had made

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<sup>15</sup> M. Belka, “Jałta-Moskwa-Warszawa,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 23 February 2005.

<sup>16</sup> Interfax of 2 May 2005.

<sup>17</sup> PAP of 6 May 2005.

the largest contribution to the victory over Germany, after the USA, USSR and the United Kingdom, the 1945 Yalta Agreement that “went over the Poles’ heads,” actually gave Stalin’s Soviet Union a free hand to subjugate Central and Eastern Europe. The Minister indicated that the end of the post-war division of Europe and the “real end of the war” begun 1939 was initiated by “Solidarity.” He emphasized the Poles’ readiness to reach understanding and reconciliation with the German and Russian nations, which should be based on the truth, “without concealment, without obscuring some subjects and whitewashing others.”<sup>18</sup>

Apart from the official anniversary observance in Poland and abroad, the Foreign Ministry, Polish politicians and non-governmental organisations undertook various initiatives aimed at emphasizing Poland’s participation in the World War II and Poland’s contribution to the victory. The cooperation of Polish MEPs in the European Parliament led to the adoption of a special resolution whose wording reflected the Polish view on 20<sup>th</sup> century history of Europe.<sup>19</sup> The Foreign Ministry launched a special website, in six language versions, devoted to the Poles on the fronts of World War II ([www.ww2.pl](http://www.ww2.pl)). A similar purpose was served by the popularisation of the results of the research carried out by the Anglo-Polish Historical Committee, including the truth about the deciphering by Polish cryptologists of the German encoding system Enigma.<sup>20</sup>

**Establishing the “Memory and Solidarity” European Network.** The idea of establishing an international institutional framework for the research and propagation of 20<sup>th</sup> century history of Central and Eastern Europe was born as an alternative to the planned construction of the Centre Against Expulsions in Berlin. An impulse for the conceptual work was provided by the Declaration of Gdańsk issued by the Presidents of Poland and Germany in October 2003, in which they appealed for documenting, “in the spirit of reconciliation,” the history of 20<sup>th</sup> century dictatorships, resettlements and repression.

The idea of establishing a “European network” was put forward by the Federal Government Representative for Culture and the Media, Christina Weiss. Poland actively joined the implementation of this plan and took over the

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<sup>18</sup> See: [www.msz.gov.pl/files/file\\_library/29/onzpol9maj\\_11498.html](http://www.msz.gov.pl/files/file_library/29/onzpol9maj_11498.html).

<sup>19</sup> *Official Journal of the European Union*, C 92E, vol. 49, 20 April 2006, p. 392.

<sup>20</sup> See T. Stirling, D. Nałęcz, T. Dubicki (eds.), *Intelligence co-operation between Poland and Great Britain during World War II*, Vol. 1: *The report of the Anglo-Polish historical committee*, foreword by T. Blair and M. Belka, London-Portland, 2005.

initiative. The ceremony of signing the Declaration on the establishment of the Network took place at the Royal Castle in Warsaw on 1 February 2005 and was attended by ministers of culture of Poland, Germany, Slovakia and Hungary.<sup>21</sup> “Guided by the European spirit of reconciliation,” the ministers expressed their readiness for joint actions with regard to “analysing, documenting and propagating knowledge of the history of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, a century of wars, totalitarian dictatorships and sufferings of the civilian population that fell victim to wars, oppression, conquests and forced displacements as well as nationalist, racist and ideologically-motivated repression.” The Network aims at “strengthening mutual trust and building friendly relations among the countries concerned,” while it remains open to new members.<sup>22</sup> The objective of the Network is to link the existing initiatives in individual countries, organise cooperation between public and state institutions, non-governmental organisations, academic centres and places of remembrance, as well as support, finance and implement joint scientific and educational projects. According to the Declaration, the activity of the Network is to be co-ordinated by the Warsaw-based Secretariat, placed at the Council for the Protection of the Memory of Struggle and Martyrdom (*Rada Ochrony Pamięci Walk i Męczeństwa*—ROPWiM).

In search of the optimum legal basis for the functioning of the Network in Poland, it was decided to establish a private foundation acting in close cooperation with the ministries of culture of the Network countries. The foundation was set up on 23 August. The Board of the Foundation agreed on a list of projects to be implemented in the years 2006–2007, including three joint projects and more than ten national projects (Polish, Czech, German, Slovak and Hungarian) conducted under the auspices of the Network.

The creation of the “Memory and Solidarity” European Network was approved by the government of Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz and gained the support of President Lech Kaczyński. Although the new German government was in favour of locating “a meaningful sign concerning the commemoration of the sufferings of the expelled” in Berlin, it regarded the “Memory and Solidarity” European Network as an appropriate foundation on which solutions that would satisfy Germany’s eastern neighbours could be built. The assurance that the new German government supports the idea of the Network should be considered a success of the Polish side. However, the Network should not be treated

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<sup>21</sup> See: [www.mkidn.gov.pl/website/index.jsp?artId=783](http://www.mkidn.gov.pl/website/index.jsp?artId=783).

<sup>22</sup> See: [www.mkidn.gov.pl/website/document/?docId=228](http://www.mkidn.gov.pl/website/document/?docId=228).

exclusively as a panacea for the Centre Against Expulsions project if it is to make a lasting positive contribution to the development of neighbourly relations in Europe. The Polish side holds a view that the issue of expulsions should not dominate the activities of the Network, arguing that they do not constitute the central problem of 20<sup>th</sup> century history, but they were a consequence of the war; if they became the focus of interest, it would antagonise other countries participating in the project and impede its expansion to other Central and Eastern European states.

**The opening of the Lviv Eaglets' Cemetery.** Historical issues did not become an obstacle to establishing good Polish-Ukrainian relations. There is wide agreement among the general public in Poland that the existence of an independent, stable, democratic and friendly Ukraine is in Poland's national interest and that independent Ukraine is interested in a lasting agreement with Poland. Polish-Ukrainian relations have acquired the character of a strategic partnership, which however, does not mean that problems connected with the tragic episodes in the history of mutual relations have ceased to be a burden. Particular controversy is caused by the commemoration of the extermination of the Polish population in Volhynia as well as the former South-Eastern Borderlands on the one hand, and the victims of Polish retaliatory actions and resettlement campaigns on the other.

For years, the state authorities have worked for reconciliation, which was symbolised by the observances of the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Volhynia tragedy in July 2003, attended by Presidents of both countries. However, the problem of the Cemetery of the Defenders of Lviv, where participants of the fights against Ukrainians in the years 1918–1919 and the Polish-Soviet War of 1920–1921 were buried, remained a painful sign of discord. The ceremonial opening of the necropolis, devastated and desecrated in Soviet times, was planned for 1998, 2000 and 2002, but agreement as to the extent to which the original state would be restored, could not be reached. The local government and pressure groups in Lviv opposed the rebuilding of “the pantheon glorifying the Polish army.”

Hope for working out a compromise appeared in late 2004, following Viktor Yushchenko's election victory, amidst an atmosphere of enthusiastic Polish-Ukrainian rapprochement. In April 2005, during his visit to Warsaw, the Ukrainian leader declared that “he assumes political responsibility” for solving the problem of the cemetery. A chance also arose that the Lviv City Council, with which the President was quite popular, would consent to the compromise. On 13 May in Kiev, during a meeting attended by head of the National Security Bureau Jerzy Bahr, ROPWiM secretary Andrzej Przewoźnik, Ukrainian

Secretary of State Oleksandr Zinchenko and Mayor of Lviv Andriy Burniak, an accord was negotiated under which a protocol on the tidying-up of the Cemetery was signed in Warsaw on 6 June.<sup>23</sup> The contents of a large implementation protocol to the Polish-Ukrainian agreement on the graves of the victims of wars and repression were also agreed. The Polish side announced that, in compliance with the appeal of the Lviv City Council, it would consent to duly commemorate the Ukrainian inhabitants of the Pawłokoma village (Podkarpackie Province) murdered by Poles, whereas the Ukrainian side would give its approval for the commemoration of the massacre in Huta Penyats'ka (Ternopil Province). Although the Lviv City Council approved the protocol concerning the Lviv Eaglets' Cemetery, the Ukrainian Parliament tried to stonewall the ceremony at the last moment; eventually, the parliamentary resolution to that effect, primarily an element of an internal political strife, was successfully withdrawn.

On 24 June, the ceremonious opening and consecration of the Polish necropolis and the neighbouring Ukrainian Galician Army Cemetery took place, attended by President Aleksander Kwaśniewski and Viktor Yushchenko. The Presidents evoked, among others, John Paul II who, during His visit to Lviv four years before, called for the purification of historical memory and giving priority to that which unites over that which divides. The Orthodox bishops of Ukraine and Catholic bishops of Poland published a letter with the words "We forgive and ask for forgiveness" that had "a historic power in the work of reconciling nations."

The accord concerning the Lviv Eaglets' Cemetery revealed that both sides had the will to find compromise solutions and that the state authorities wanted to actively participate in the reconciliation process between the two nations. By making concessions, the Polish side proved that it did not intend to take advantage of the support given to Ukrainian democracy and toughen its position on contentious issues concerning the memorialisation of the victims of the Polish-Ukrainian armed conflicts. The ceremony became a symbol of the progress achieved in building friendly relations and in the reconciliation process. The progress was also confirmed by the unveiling of the memorial in Huta

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<sup>23</sup> The text of the main inscription, the same as on the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Warsaw ("Here lies a Polish soldier who gave his life for his Homeland") was agreed, thus avoiding the disputed phrase "to those who valiantly gave their lives for Poland." It was also decided to restore the monuments to American pilots and French infantrymen, and to abandon the original plan to restore the stone lions, the symbol of the city, and the image of the *Szczerbiec* [a sword that was traditionally used in the coronation ceremony of Polish kings—translator's note], associated by Ukrainians with Polish expansion to the East.

Penyats'ka (21 October), a symbol of the martyrdom of the Polish population in the former south-eastern Borderlands in 1943–1944. The state, however, still has to complete the unfinished tasks of commemorating numerous places of martyrdom on both sides of the border, supporting historical research and, where possible, seeking justice. The Polish Institute of National Remembrance (*Instytut Pamięci Narodowej*—IPN), conducts several dozen investigations into massacres of the Polish and Ukrainian population). As B. Berdychowska remarked, “we have left behind the conflict on the symbolic plane that was simmering for the last dozen years or so, thanks to which it will be much more difficult to launch campaigns of mutual grievances and hatred.”<sup>24</sup>

The Polish and Ukrainian side declare that they want to base the reconciliation not on forgetting the injustices, but on studying the past and telling the truth about history. This trend is strengthened by the increasingly friendly attitude to Ukrainians in Poland and to Poles in Ukraine, occasioned by the “Orange Revolution.” While looking into the past of Polish-Ukrainian relations, Poland emphasises the most recent pages of history: the common experience of the struggle with the Communist totalitarianism and the close affinity between the “Orange Revolution” and August 1980 events in Poland.

**The celebrations of the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of “Solidarity.”** The celebrations of the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of “Solidarity” became the largest Polish promotional undertaking abroad. For the third time in 2005 (after the ceremonies in Oświęcim and the Council of Europe Summit), Poland hosted a meeting of numerous top-ranking personages. The objective of the anniversary observances was to emphasise that “Solidarity” was not exclusively a Polish event, but that its significance went beyond the experiences of one nation. Polish initiatives aimed at propagating the awareness that the transformations in Europe and worldwide took place, to a large extent, thanks to the fight for freedom and respect for human rights under the banner of “Solidarity,” which led to the collapse of the Communist system and a breakthrough on the way to European integration. Attention was also drawn to the fact that adequate, international presentation of the “Solidarity” anniversary celebrations had not been ensured so far, as a result of which the importance of the Polish bid for freedom was overshadowed by other events skilfully presented to the public opinion in other countries (particularly the tearing down of the Berlin Wall).

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<sup>24</sup> B. Berdychowska, “Cierpliwe wyjaśnianie zaszłości historycznych,” in: *Pamięć i polityka zagraniczna*, Warszawa: Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego, 2006, p. 97.

Cross-partisan agreement was reached with regard to the commemoration of the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the birth of “Solidarity;” the Sejm established a new state holiday, the Day of Solidarity and Freedom.<sup>25</sup> A similar initiative was taken by Polish MEPs in the European Parliament on the eve of the anniversary of signing the August Accords in Gdańsk. At their motion, on 29 September 2005 the European Parliament passed a resolution commemorating “Solidarity’s” historic contribution to the overthrow of the Communist system and liberation of Central and Eastern European countries. The European Commission and EU member states were called on to pay tribute to “the struggle of Polish workers and those in Central-Eastern Europe who fought for human rights, freedom, solidarity and unity of Europe” and to “strengthen the awareness of the fact that ‘Solidarity’ is part of European education and culture.”

The central national celebrations in Gdańsk, on 31 August, had an international character. Foreign guests included Presidents of Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Serbia and Ukraine, as well as Prime Ministers of more than ten countries of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe—Prime Ministers of Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden and the Deputy Prime Minister of Romania—that regained independence in consequence of the transformations initiated by “Solidarity.” There were also present José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, Prime Ministers of Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden, Deputy Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and Malta, the Speaker of the Senate of Canada, large delegations of the European Parliament and United States Congress. President George W. Bush was represented by his personal envoy, former Secretary of State James Baker, whereas Pope Benedict XVI was represented by Archbishop Stanisław Dziwisz. Special invitations, signed by Lech Wałęsa as Chairman of the Honorary Committee of the celebrations, were accompanied by invitations from the Polish President, Prime Minister and Marshal of the Sejm. Besides the official state delegations, many renowned guests from abroad participated in an international conference “From Solidarity to Freedom” (Warsaw-Gdańsk, 29–31 August) and the official celebrations in Gdańsk. Also in Gdańsk, the foundation act of the European Solidarity Centre was signed by representatives of the Polish authorities, the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity,” local government and leaders of the foreign delegations. There are plans to organize museum

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<sup>25</sup> *Dziennik Ustaw* (Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland) 2005, No. 155, item 1295.

exhibitions in the multi-purpose facility in the historic grounds of the Gdańsk Shipyard, with the participation of countries that regained freedom as a result of democratic transformations.

Anniversary celebrations were also held in Brussels. They began on 30 August with the opening of the “Roads to Solidarity” exhibition at the European Parliament. At the NATO headquarters near Brussels, an exhibition entitled “The Phenomenon of Solidarity” was presented, whereas at Université libre de Bruxelles an international conference “Solidarity as the Beginning of the Road to the United Europe” was held (21–22 September 2005). The Brussels celebrations, which also included events for a wider public, were crowned on 3 October with the gala concert “Thank You Europe” at Théâtre Royale De La Monnaie. Lech Wałęsa, together with former Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek, former Foreign Affairs Minister Bronisław Geremek and “Solidarity” chairman Janusz Śniadek, awarded honorary decorations to the people and, symbolically, the states that helped Poland in the 1980s.<sup>26</sup> Polish diplomatic posts were engaged in the commemoration of the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of “Solidarity” in other countries as well. A particularly impressive setting was arranged for the celebrations in the United States, attended by Lech Wałęsa, when the House of Representatives passed a resolution naming 31 August the Day of Solidarity.

On many occasions during the anniversary observances, Polish politicians emphasized that the process initiated by “Solidarity” 25 years ago had not been completed in certain European states, notably Belarus; they also indicated the EU’s insufficient commitment to supporting transformations in Eastern Europe.

### **Discussions on the Role of History in Foreign Policy**

In the heated discussions about the state’s policy with regard to shaping historical memory that began in 2004, it was indicated that the desired perception of Polish history, particularly by our neighbours, may have a positive influence on Poland’s prestige, but “Poles must make an axiological judgement

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<sup>26</sup> The honorary decorations were given to former Belgian Prime Ministers Leo Tindemans and Wilfried Martens, former Dutch Prime Minister Wim Kok, former German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, chairman of the French National Assembly Delegation for the European Union, Pierre Lequiller, former Mayor of Bremen Hans Koschnik and former Secretary General of the World Confederation of Labour, Jan Kulakowski. Medals were also awarded to Jacques Clerbaux, one of the thousands of anonymous people who helped Poles, and posthumously to Giles Hart, leader of the *Polish Solidarity Campaign*, victim of the recent terrorist attack in London.

with regard to their past, to what they value and revere in their history, and what they condemn.”<sup>27</sup> The debate concerning the Jedwabne crime clearly revealed that historical memory cannot be banished from the public sphere and excluded from the scope of interest of the state.<sup>28</sup> The following question emerged very conspicuously: if you may and should refer to collective shame, then why should you not evoke collective pride in the positive aspects of national history? The advocates of the state’s activity in this field emphasized that these actions must be based on the truth, that “it must be a policy that refers to facts, to the real historical balance sheet.”<sup>29</sup> Furthermore, they did not question the principle of freedom of scientific research, recognising that thanks to this research the state may have an opportunity to develop history-based policies relying on knowledge and truth.

The atmosphere of the 2005 anniversary observances and of the discussion on the social role of memory was influenced by the stir caused by the sickness and death of John Paul II. The history of the Pontificate that had a tremendous impact on the birth of “Solidarity” and Polish transformations went before the eyes of Poles, and not only them, with renewed intensity. While pondering the role of historical memory, the words of the Holy Father were often quoted when, talking about European integration, He emphasized the role of the spiritual wealth of Central and Eastern Europe and the necessity to defend the identity that had been shaped by the struggle for human dignity. An important role in this context must be ascribed to comments made by John Paul II on the essence of two totalitarianisms, “the central problem of the previous century.” Owing to the Holy Father, remembering the past took on a special meaning in 2005 and influenced the intellectual and emotional climate of the discussion on the role of history in state policy.

History-related problems in the relations with neighbours, history-based policies of the state and the place of historical issues in Poland’s foreign policy became a subject of numerous public debates and press polemics. These subjects also had a direct impact on the election campaign conducted by right-wing

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<sup>27</sup> Z. Krasnodębski, “Zwycięzcy i pokonani,” in: R. Kostro, T. Merty (eds.), *Pamięć i odpowiedzialność*, Kraków, 2005, p. 68.

<sup>28</sup> M.A. Cichocki, “Polityka historyczna,” *Ozon* of 10 November 2005.

<sup>29</sup> See statement by A. Nowak, “Polityka historyczna—polityka zagraniczna?,” in: A. Panecka (ed.), *Polityka historyczna. Historycy – politycy – prasa*, Warszawa, 2005, p. 127; Also see W. Roszkowski, “O potrzebie polskiej polityki historycznej,” in: R. Kostro, T. Merty (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 115–126.

parties that called for building “a solidarity-based strategy that allows no room for compromise when the sphere of memory is concerned.”<sup>30</sup> These parties put forward proposals of concrete institutional solutions that were supposed to strengthen Poland’s international rank and boost its prestige through invoking history. The “Law and Justice” Party (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*—PiS), announced the creation of the Museum of Freedom that would present Poland’s road to freedom, from the First Republic to the Solidarity movement, and emphasized the intended international character of the museum’s activities. The Civic Platform (*Platforma Obywatelska*—PO), proposed founding a network of Polish historical institutes located in major European capitals.

In the discussion on the role of history in foreign policy, there was general consent as regards the necessity to stand up for historical truth in the international forum in the face of the “propaganda attempts to glorify and exploit the past for the needs of building a new Russian identity.”<sup>31</sup> One of the central points of the argument was the already mentioned discussion on the participation of the Polish head of state in the Moscow ceremonies of the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the end of the World War II as well as the assessment of the influence that the process of rehabilitating Soviet traditions in Russia might have on the policy towards this country. As regards the context of European integration, the perception of the changes in the German approach to history was more significant for the discussion of foreign policy issues. In extreme cases, this evolution was presented as a process of transforming “a nation of perpetrators” into “a nation of victims,” and exposing their own sufferings was perceived as an escape from responsibility for Nazi crimes. Various interpretations were given to the new paradigm in the German attitude to the past regarding the generational change and the disappearance of the sense of direct responsibility for Nazi crimes. In the opinion of many participants of Polish discussions, contemporary Germans, with their lack of identification with the defeated Nazis, increasingly concentrated on the sufferings of their ancestors and often treated the resettlement from the “eastern territories” as an act of injustice. It was indicated that the Polish patriotic and heroic tradition was not understood by Germans who perceived its manifestations as a sign of nationalism or “historical oversensitivity.” Meanwhile in Germany, attention was focused on the experiences of individuals, often accompanied by the process of the decontextualisation of crime, so painful

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<sup>30</sup> D. Tusk, “Problem niemieckiej ‘normalności’,” in: *Pamięć i polityka zagraniczna...*, p. 43.

<sup>31</sup> A.D. Rotfeld, “Pamięć i polityka zagraniczna,” in: *Pamięć i polityka zagraniczna...*, p. 18.

to Poles. This process gained particular significance with regard to Holocaust remembrance, which was “Europeanised” and “globalised.”

Discussions on historical issues in the relations with Germans were incorporated into the political debates as well as the election campaign before the presidential and parliamentary elections in Poland. The opposition emphasized the fact that, despite spectacular gestures, Polish-German relations deteriorated when the social democrats were in power. Even the avowed advocates of Polish-German rapprochement blamed the German side for the intensification of animosities. “Germans cannot understand why the awareness of the events of World War II is so markedly present in Poland. I am amazed at the incapability of empathising with a nation that was on the brink of absolute catastrophe,” remarked Donald Tusk, the Civic Platform presidential candidate.<sup>32</sup> PiS underlined the need to conduct a more firm policy towards Germany and accused its rivals of a pro-German attitude. A few days before the second round of the presidential elections, the authorities of Warsaw led by Lech Kaczyński, the PiS party’s candidate for President, presented a publication with supplemented estimates of the war losses incurred by Warsaw. A similar rhetoric was adopted by the “League of Polish Families” party.

PiS clearly spoke in favour of pursuing “modern history-based policies” and undaunted use of arguments underpinned by history in foreign policy. The party’s platform stressed that “Poland’s contributions in the World War II, to the struggle against Nazism and Communism, remain a factor that defines Poland’s prestige and international position.” According to PiS, Poland should respond, in the field of diplomacy, education and promotion, to “attempts at relativising merit and guilt from the times of World War II” (particularly “the manifestations of moral and legal revisionism” in Germany). When highlighting “Poland’s contributions to the cause of freedom,” including the accomplishments of “Solidarity,” the largest freedom movement in 20<sup>th</sup> century Europe, these issues must be raised by institutions responsible for promoting Poland (Polish institutes abroad, the Adam Mickiewicz Institute), and new institutions of a museum and research character must be established, notably the Museum of Freedom. Furthermore, it was emphasized that a history-based policy “should be an element of foreign policy, not an isolated section of the state’s policy whose goals may be formulated independently of the political objectives of Poland.”<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> D. Tusk, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

<sup>33</sup> “Dyskusja,” in: *Pamięć i polityka zagraniczna...*, p. 105.

Increasing the activity of the state in the sphere of shaping the collective memory and the concept of active history-based diplomacy are directly linked to the PiS party's vision of the state and European integration. PiS rejects the concept of integration where the state is actively engaged in building the "European identity" and remains neutral in matters related to strengthening national identity through shaping the collective memory of the society. Not only PiS, but also, for instance, the Civic Platform, emphasized in their election campaign that Poland's historical experience was particularly important for Europe—experience of two totalitarian systems that should become Poland's contribution to the formation of the identity of the European Union.

The concept of the state's active role in the field of history-based politics also came under fire. Fears were voiced in connection with using "arguments underpinned by history in politics" as well as "arguments underpinned by politics in history." Among others, former Foreign Ministers Krzysztof Skubiszewski and Dariusz Rosati expressed their distrust of the concept of history-based politics. The former observed that "what is dubbed as history-based politics may easily become a cause of tensions and complications in the field of foreign policy" and spoke in favour of "separating the historical debate from formulating and pursuing both current and long-term policies, particularly foreign policy;"<sup>34</sup> whereas Rosati regarded history-based politics as "politics of isolation" since "it is dominated by fear and stereotypes originating from the past."<sup>35</sup>

Fears were voiced that stressing the role of history in foreign policy does not necessarily serve Poland's interests, but may jeopardise them instead, leading to antagonisms between nations and the weakening of Poland's position. Aleksander Smolar, President of the Batory Foundation, described the essence of the discourse as "a conflict between striving for a shared, open Europe, deepening its identity and sense of historical rootedness, where Poland might feel secure, enjoying a recognition of its membership as well as its otherness, on the one hand, and the effort to solidify national identity and memory coupled with endeavours to strengthen Poland's role among the world's nations, on the other."<sup>36</sup> PiS rejects the formation of the "European identity" that competes with the strengthening of national identity and memory. The feeling among rightist intellectuals is that a national state remains the broadest community with which

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<sup>34</sup> Quoted after Bogdan Twardochleb, "Nie ma fatalizmu historii," *Przegląd Uniwersytecki. Pismo Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego* 2005, nos. 10–12.

<sup>35</sup> D. Rosati, "Europa albo śmierć," *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 12 January 2006.

<sup>36</sup> A. Smolar, "O pamięć naszą, waszą i wspólną," in: *Pamięć i polityka zagraniczna...*, pp. 11–12.

people can identify and patriotism remains the farthest-reaching project of surpassing human egoism. Contrasting the West and modernity with national traditions is mistaken since the West is made up of various “modernities,” traditions and cultural identities. Under these circumstances, the state should deliberately pursue history-based policies, consisting of conscious support for actions aimed at strengthening the Polish identity of a democratic community.<sup>37</sup>

### **History in the Foreign Policy of Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz’s Government**

The need for an affirmation of their own past was indirectly manifested by the Poles through the ballot box. The parties that gained the largest support had called for a more active role of the state in shaping the historical awareness of the society, whereas the government of Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz treats history-based politics as an element of effective foreign policy. In his inaugural address, the Prime Minister declared that it was essential to “conduct a policy that presents, in modern form, Poland’s historical achievements and our contribution to European and world history” and illustrated his point with the initiation of work towards the establishment of the Museum of Freedom—Polish Historical Museum.<sup>38</sup> In one of his first addresses, Minister of Foreign Affairs Stefan Meller indicated that “history can and should provide inspiration for positive actions” and announced the continuation of activity in the field of the so-called “history-based diplomacy,” consisting of diagnosing and counteracting phenomena and tendencies that negatively influence Poland’s image abroad. He also remarked that history-based diplomacy “does not have to be reactive only” as it should also “propagate the historical image of Poland and Poles as a valiant and, at the same time, industrious nation; a heroic country, but, at the same time, an efficiently functioning state; a defender of European values, but also a sanctuary of tolerance.” Furthermore, he emphasized that it was advisable to draw on the traditions of the multiethnic First Republic, which may be interpreted as “a historical prefiguration of European integration.”<sup>39</sup> That does not mean simplistic references to the unifying traditions of the Jagiellonian era, which arouse controversy among Poland’s eastern neighbours.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> For more see M.A. Cichocki, *Władza i pamięć*, Kraków, 2005.

<sup>38</sup> See: [www.kprm.gov.pl/1433\\_14848.htm](http://www.kprm.gov.pl/1433_14848.htm).

<sup>39</sup> Text of the address by Minister of Foreign Affairs Stefan Meller at the conference “Continuity and Change in the Foreign Policy of the Republic of Poland,” PAP of 22 December 2005.

<sup>40</sup> See K.M. Ujazdowski, “Wspólne doświadczenia: komunizm i pomarańczowa rewolucja,” in: *Pamięć i polityka zagraniczna...*, pp. 94–95.

Historical issues were not particularly prominent in the relations with our neighbours over the first months the new government was in office. Poland's position on contentious issues remained unchanged. As the new government of Angela Merkel was almost concurrently constituted in Germany, chances for "a new opening" and restoration of good relations arose. Caution in the approach to historical issues could be observed on both sides. Poland did not change its position concerning the establishment of the Centre Against Expulsions in Berlin.<sup>41</sup> In talks with the Germans, the Polish side emphasized that the "Memory and Solidarity" European Network could provide the framework for the common platform of discussion, in which there was also room for the commemoration of the fate of Germans resettled from Poland.

After the elections, chances for an improvement of the relations with Russia also emerged. Historical issues were not raised in the talks with the Russians merely, because Poles were predominantly sceptical about the possibility to persuade Moscow to adopt an interpretation of history consistent with material truth, particularly with regard to the World War II. More attention was paid to ensuring that the historical truth was known to Poland's western allies who would thus become less susceptible to manipulation. The Polish state signalled the possibility to support actions aimed at the development of peaceful dialogue on sensitive historical issues, with the participation of historians.<sup>42</sup> It is impossible to build a single common vision of history and common memory, but one must seek to propagate the results of historical research and to attain a mutual understanding of historical awareness.

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Historical issues played a significant part in Polish foreign policy in 2005. Poland not only responded to negative external phenomena in this respect, but also initiated actions aimed at enhancing the international prestige of the state. Although it is too early for a comprehensive evaluation of the consequences of those undertakings, it seems that it is already possible to indicate examples of the real impact they had on current politics. No doubt the celebrations of the 25<sup>th</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> *Solidarne Państwo*, p. 28 ([www.kprm.gov.pl/\\_i/dokumenty/solidp.pdf](http://www.kprm.gov.pl/_i/dokumenty/solidp.pdf); English version: [www.kprm.gov.pl/english/\\_i/dokumenty/sp.pdf](http://www.kprm.gov.pl/english/_i/dokumenty/sp.pdf)).

<sup>42</sup> One of such initiatives was the Polish-Russian conference organised by the Polish Institute of International Affairs, "The Historical Memory of the Poles and Russians about the Second World War vs. Polish-Russian Relations" (Kazimierz Dolny, 28–29 October 2005).

anniversary of “Solidarity” reinforced Poland’s arguments in its striving for a solidarity-based EU budget during the negotiations of the new EU financial perspective for the years 2007–2013. Fears that the importance attached to the role of memory in state policy would negatively influence Polish-Ukrainian relations did not come true. The development of friendly relations with Ukraine is accompanied by the continuation of the reconciliation process, actively supported by President Lech Kaczyński.

The increased significance of historical issues in relations with our neighbours, the social climate in response to these phenomena and the atmosphere of the election campaign led to the intensification of activities in Polish foreign policy with regard to historical issues as early as at the end of 2004. The affirmation of Polish history in foreign policy was clearly invoked in the first months of Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz’s term of office. Also the key political forces in the country did not question the importance of history-based diplomacy.<sup>43</sup> It became an essential component of foreign policy, owing to international circumstances as well as the correlated public demand in Poland.

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<sup>43</sup> The Civic Platform, the largest opposition party, believes that “a well-thought-out and consistently pursued history-based policy of restoring the international community’s memory about the historical truth concerning Poland” should become “one of the key elements of the foreign policy of the state.” *Państwo dla obywateli. Plan rządu 2005–2009*, Warszawa, 2005, p. 255 (<http://www.ipia.org.pl>).

## Poland and the Conflict over the Union of Poles in Belarus

The autocratic transformation in Belarus during the presidency of Aleksandr Lukashenko meant the self-induced isolation of this country from Western democracies. In consequence, also the Polish-Belarusian political cooperation over the last decade has been limited to the minimum, primarily to meeting challenges resulting from the fact that the two countries are neighbours.<sup>1</sup> The year 2005 brought a further deterioration of mutual relations; the previously low intensity of these relations gave way to an open diplomatic conflict, at the root of which were the actions of the Belarusian authorities aimed at subordinating the Union of Poles in Belarus (*Związek Polaków na Białorusi*—ZPB).

The Polish minority in Belarus numbers 396 thousand people representing 3.9% of its population (according to the 1999 census) and inhabits mainly the western part of the country, close to the border with Poland and Lithuania, primarily the Hrodna (Grodno) province. ZPB is an organization of the local Poles, functioning since 1990 and aimed at propagating Polish culture and education, awakening the Poles' national identity and defending their rights.<sup>2</sup> Currently, the Union has more than 22 thousand members and 75 branches, with the headquarters of the Board in Hrodna. The official newspaper of the Union is the *Głos znad Niemna* (Voice from the Niemen River) weekly; there is also published *Magazyn Polski* (The Polish Magazine) quarterly. Sixteen “Polish

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\* Adam Eberhardt—Deputy Director of the Research Office at the Polish Institute of International Affairs.

<sup>1</sup> To learn more on this subject, see M. Krzysztofowicz (ed.), *Polska i Białoruś po rozszerzeniu Unii Europejskiej*, Warszawa: PISM, 2005; A. Eberhardt, U. Ułachowicz (eds.), *Беларусь і Польшча—Polska i Białoruś*, Warszawa: PISM, 2003; H. Chałupczak, E. Michalik (eds.), *Polska-Białoruś: problemy sąsiedztwa*, Lublin, 2005.

<sup>2</sup> The right for national minorities to establish and run educational and cultural institutions, organizations and associations was included in the currently binding Treaty between the Republic of Poland and the Republic of Belarus on good neighbourly relations and friendly cooperation, dated 23 June 1992. This right is also guaranteed by Belarusian legislation: more than 20 acts of law, including the Act on National Minorities of 11 November 1992 with subsequent amendments. See “Traktat między Rzeczpospolitą Polską a Republiką Białoruś o dobrym sąsiedztwie i przyjaznej współpracy z 23 czerwca 1992 r.,” *Zbiór Dokumentów* 1993, No. 1, [www.zbiordokumentow.pl/1993/1/3.html](http://www.zbiordokumentow.pl/1993/1/3.html); *Ведамасці Вярхоўнага Савета Рэспублікі Беларусь* 1992, No. 35; <http://pravo.kulichki.ru/zak/year2004/doc03479.htm>.

Houses” and two Polish schools, in Hrodna and Volkovysk, have been established at the initiative of ZPB. More than 70 artistic groups are affiliated with the Union that also provides patronage for the activity of numerous associations, e.g. the Polish Doctors’ Association, Polish Visual Artists’ Association or the Belarusian branch of the Polish Veterans’ Association and the World Association of Home Army Ex-Servicemen.

ZPB is the third largest public organization in Belarus, outnumbered only by two mass organizations that are fully controlled by the government, i.e. the Trade Union Federation of Belarus and the Belarusian Republican Youth Union.<sup>3</sup> Tadeusz Gawin, the founder and president of ZPB over the first decade of its existence, emphasized his support for the democratic development of Belarus.<sup>4</sup> In 2000 he was replaced by Tadeusz Kruczkowski who openly criticized the Union’s contacts with the democratic opposition and declared his readiness for a closer cooperation with the Belarusian regime.<sup>5</sup> The activity of ZPB over the years was possible thanks to support from Poland: from budget funds (primarily from the Polish Senate), through Polish non-governmental organizations such as the Stowarzyszenie Wspólnota Polska (the Polish Community Association) or Fundacja Pomoc Polakom na Wschodzie (Aid to Poles in the East Foundation). The Belarusian government provides the Union only with token financial support despite its statutory obligations.

### The Development of the Conflict in 2005

In early 2005 the personal conflict which had been building up in ZPB over the previous months came to a head. The chairman’s opponents accused him of acting to the detriment of the Union (limiting the scope of its effective activity and seeking to hand over the control over the “Polish Houses” to the Belarusian authorities), as well as corruption and indecent behaviour.<sup>6</sup> On 18 January, the

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<sup>3</sup> The Trade Union Federation of Belarus has 4 million members, whereas the membership of the Belarusian Republican Youth Union is 320 thousand. See: [www.fpb.by/about/index.php](http://www.fpb.by/about/index.php); <http://brsm.by>.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. T. Gawin, *Zwycięstwa i porażki. Odrodzenie polskości na Białorusi w latach 1987–2000*, Białystok, 2003.

<sup>5</sup> PAP of 19 November 2000; В. Саласюк, “В Союзе поляков смена руководства и приоритетов,” *Советская Белоруссия* of 24 November 2000.

<sup>6</sup> A. Pisalnik, “Burza w Związku Polaków na Białorusi,” *Rzeczpospolita* of 20 September 2002; P. Szaniawski, “Piąta kolumna Łukaszenki,” *Życie Warszawy* of 14 June 2005; A. Stelmachowski, *Prześladowanie Polaków na Białorusi*, [www.wspolnota-polska.org.pl/index.php?id=ak50815](http://www.wspolnota-polska.org.pl/index.php?id=ak50815); PAP of 1 February 2005.

Board of ZPB made a decision to suspend Kruczkowski in his capacity as the chairman. This decision, however, was revoked by the Belarusian Ministry of Justice under the pretext of procedural irregularities. The problem concerning the management of the Union was to be resolved during the 6<sup>th</sup> Congress of ZPB convened in Hrodna on 12 and 13 March. Over the few weeks prior to the Congress, the Belarusian authorities exerted pressure on the delegates, urging them to support the then incumbent chairman, and took other measures against the opposition within the Union. The most conspicuous instance of these measures was the arresting of deputy chairman and Kruczkowski's main rival, Józef Korzecki, which prevented him from taking part in the congress.

The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs judged these actions a "blatant violation of bilateral agreements and commonly accepted international standards with regard to national minority rights." The Belarusian Ambassador to Warsaw was summoned to the Ministry to provide an explanation. Furthermore, owing to the tense political situation, high-ranking Polish government officials decided not to take part in the congress held in Hrodna (neither the Polish ambassador to Belarus nor representatives of the Parliament or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

Despite the Belarusian authorities' actions aimed at preserving the *status quo*, the majority of the delegates to the ZPB Congress were in favour of replacing the chairman of the Union and voted for Andżelika Borys, head of the education department who was critical of the policy conducted by the previous chairman and declared her support for the political neutrality of ZPB. Also this decision was questioned by the Belarusian authorities. On 12 May the Belarusian Ministry of Justice ruled that the March congress was not legally valid, arguing that the Union's statute was violated during the delegate appointment process and that procedural irregularities occurred during the sessions of the congress. The ruling of the Ministry meant that the previous leadership of the Union retained their powers until the rerun of the congress. The Council of ZPB found this ruling "politically biased, violating the national minority rights in the Republic of Belarus, degrading the national dignity of Poles in Belarus, and not grounded in the legislation of the Republic of Belarus."<sup>7</sup> The Council also argued that the Belarusian regulations concerning public organizations did not provide for such far-reaching powers of the Ministry as a supervisory body. The Belarusian authorities, however, maintained their ruling and threatened to make the Union illegal unless a new congress was convened.

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<sup>7</sup> The statement of the Council of SZ ZPB, 14 May 2005, [www.wspolnota-polska.org.pl/index.php?id=kr50514](http://www.wspolnota-polska.org.pl/index.php?id=kr50514).

The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed its outrage over the decision to declare the March congress illegal.<sup>8</sup> Minister Adam D. Rotfeld stated that it was not merely a campaign against an organization of the Polish minority, “but one of the preventive measures aimed at scuppering the activities of all independent Belarusian non-governmental organizations.”<sup>9</sup> He also decided to ban individuals who inspired and implemented actions directed against ZPB from entering Poland.

Poland’s stance was used by the Belarusian authorities to justify their thesis that the conflict within the Union was triggered by Polish functionaries and that with the new leadership ZPB would actually become a branch of Belarusian opposition. This subject was brought up by Aleksandr Lukashenko on 19 April in his annual presidential address in which he accused Polish diplomats of trying to exploit Poles in Belarus to achieve political objectives.<sup>10</sup> The Belarusian media also launched an anti-Polish propaganda campaign. The state television broadcast films implicating that Polish diplomats interfered with the activity of public organizations in Belarus. At the same time, the printing of the *Głos znad Niemna* weekly was obstructed and, with the consent of the authorities, fake issues of the newspaper were published with the original masthead, relentlessly criticizing the supporters of Andželika Borys.

The media campaign was a harbinger of diplomatic actions. On 17 May, the counsellor of the Polish Embassy in Minsk, Marek Bućko, presented in one of the films as the “initiator of the coup in ZPB,” was declared *persona non grata* by the Belarusian authorities. In retaliation, Poland decided to expel the counsellor of the Belarusian Embassy, Maxim Rizhenkov. In the following weeks, the Polish authorities attempted to resolve the crisis, as evidenced by the talks between the head of the National Security Bureau, Jerzy Bahr, and the secretary of the Belarusian Security Council, Hienadi Nievyhlas, held in Minsk on 8 July. Further developments proved the ineffectiveness of that mission; on 15 July the Belarusian side declared that the head of the Consular Department of the Polish Embassy, Andrzej Buczak, must leave Belarus. The Polish Foreign

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<sup>8</sup> The statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the decision of the authorities of the Republic of Belarus to pronounce the Congress of the Union of Poles in Belarus illegal, 12 May 2005, [www.msz.gov.pl](http://www.msz.gov.pl).

<sup>9</sup> PAP of 25 May 2005.

<sup>10</sup> Обращение Президента Республики Беларусь А. Лукашенко с Посланием Белорусскому Народу и Национальному Собранию, 19 April 2005, <http://president.gov.by/rus/president/speech/2005/AnnualM.html>.

Ministry accepted this decision “with particular disapproval,” finding it destructive and tantamount to a rejection of the offer presented a week before in Minsk.<sup>11</sup> In response to the expulsion of Buczak, on 25 July Poland declared Mykola Petrovich, counsellor of the Belarusian Embassy in Warsaw, *persona non grata*. When, a day later, Belarus announced the expulsion of Andrzej Olborski, *charge d'affaires a.i.* of the Polish Embassy in Minsk, Poland did not decide to take further retaliatory measures. The conduct of the Belarusian side was described by Polish Prime Minister Marek Belka as “deliberate, methodical actions aimed at aggravating the relations between the two countries,”<sup>12</sup> whereas the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Adam D. Rotfeld, stated that “the problem lies in the fact that Belarus is governed by a man who established an authoritarian system, described by some as the last dictatorship in Europe, (...) a man who does not respect any obligations that he accepted in international relations.”<sup>13</sup>

President Lukashenko, in turn, accused Poland of preparing an insurrection in Belarus “on orders received from across the ocean” and assured that he would not allow Belarusian citizens, including Poles, to become “Warsaw’s or Washington’s cannon fodder.”<sup>14</sup> On the following day, 27 July, the police stormed into the ZPB offices in Hrodna and forcefully removed the activists who were on duty there, including Andżelika Borys. Tadeusz Kruczkowski took over control of the building. On the same day Borys and her seven associates were excluded from Union on a charge of “seeking to politicize the organization.”<sup>15</sup> At the same time the Belarusian authorities intensified the harassment of the “intractable” ZPB members. In the following months, Andżelika Borys was summoned dozens of times by the police and the prosecutor’s office and accused of misappropriating funds. Numerous activists came under pressure to lend their support for the pro-government leadership of the Union; other activists were sentenced to fines under the pretext of violating the law (e.g. the prohibition of illegal assemblies). The most active members of the Union, including Tadeusz Gawin, Mieczysław Jaśkiewicz, Wiesław Kiewlak, Andrzej Pisalnik, Andrzej Poczobut and Józef Porzecki, received jail sentences. The

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<sup>11</sup> See [www.msz.gov.pl](http://www.msz.gov.pl).

<sup>12</sup> PAP of 26 July 2005.

<sup>13</sup> PAP of 22 July 2005.

<sup>14</sup> Белоруссия и Польша продолжают избавляться от дипломатов, 26.07.2005, <http://lenta.ru/news/2005/07/26/diplomat>.

<sup>15</sup> PAP of 27 July 2005.

authorities also made every effort to prevent Polish journalists from reporting on the congress; there were also cases of Polish politicians being refused entry to Belarus (On 8 August, four Members of the European Parliament representing the Civic Platform party, namely Barbara Kudrycka, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, Bogusław Sonikow and Bogdan Klich, were refused entry to Belarus).

With the forceful measures taken against ZPB in late July, the crisis in Polish-Belarusian relations reached boiling point. On 28 July, the Polish Sejm passed a resolution where it expressed its outrage over the developments in Belarus and condemned the “widespread violation of the basic standards of international law by the Republic of Belarus, including the freedom of assembly and association.”<sup>16</sup> The Polish Senate passed a resolution with a similar content.<sup>17</sup> In a statement released on the same day, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasized that the crisis did not result from the difficulties and problems in the bilateral relations between Poland and Belarus, but from actions taken by the Belarusian authorities against their own citizens, namely the “blatant interference in the activities of a nongovernmental, independent association whose democratic elections attested to the formation of the civic society in Belarus.”<sup>18</sup> The Ministry accused Belarus of violating international obligations assumed by this country as member of the United Nations (the 1966 International Covenants on Human Rights) and OSCE (the Copenhagen Document of 29 June 1990 and the Moscow Document of 3 October 1991), as well as the internal standards of Belarusian law. Furthermore, the Ambassador, Tadeusz Pawlak, was recalled to Poland for “consultation,” and it was announced that he would not return to Minsk until repressive measures against ZPB were removed.

Meanwhile, on 1 August, Donald Tusk, Deputy Speaker of the Polish Sejm and leader of the “Civic Platform” party, visited Hrodna in order to support the local Poles. Other politicians, including Roman Giertych (chairman of the parliamentary Committee on Liaison with Poles Abroad and leader of the “League of Polish Families” party), and Adam Lipiński (vice-president of the “Law and Justice” party), paid similar visits to Belarus at an earlier stage of the conflict (on 23 May and 18 June respectively). Having regard to the then oncoming parliamentary and presidential elections in Poland, the activity of the

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<sup>16</sup> See [http://ks.sejm.gov.pl/proc4/uchwaly/4406\\_u.htm](http://ks.sejm.gov.pl/proc4/uchwaly/4406_u.htm).

<sup>17</sup> See [www.senat.gov.pl/K5/dok/uch/087/1073uch.htm](http://www.senat.gov.pl/K5/dok/uch/087/1073uch.htm).

<sup>18</sup> See [www.msz.gov.pl](http://www.msz.gov.pl).

Polish party leaders may be interpreted not only as a sign of support for ZPB, but also as part of the election campaign. The proposal put forward by Prime Minister, Marek Belka, to Andżelika Borys at a meeting in Warsaw on 7 September, inviting her to assume the position of Honorary Consul of Poland in Belarus, may also be seen as a political gesture. The required consent of the host country made the proposal unrealistic.

Despite the escalation of the diplomatic conflict between the two countries, Poland announced actions aimed at “establishing close and friendly relations with the Belarusian society,” for example by allowing more freedom of travel to Belarusian citizens (concessions or exemptions from visa fees) and providing them with full access to uncensored information (supporting the planned establishment of an independent radio station). As Minister Rotfeld put it, the Polish policy should be severe to those breaking the law, while it should support the society.

The Polish authorities also tried to exert pressure on Belarus through the agency of the European Union and international organizations. Part of this strategy was the letter sent on 29 July by Minister Rotfeld to the British Foreign Minister, Jack Straw (the United Kingdom held the EU Presidency at that time), in which the Polish minister appealed that the European Union take positive actions to persuade Belarus to observe its international obligations.<sup>19</sup> On 2 August, the European Union issued a declaration condemning the Belarusian authorities repressive measures against the organization of the Polish minority.<sup>20</sup> It announced further support for democracy and the civic society in Belarus (which, in the following month, primarily took the form of actions aimed at starting an independent radio station for Belarus with the use of EU funds). The European Union’s position was shared by all other European countries except Russia and Switzerland.

However, international pressure did not influence the policy of the Belarusian authorities. The repeated ZPB congress, held in Volkovysk on 27 August, was carefully staged. Delegates selected by the local administration (Andżelika Borys and her supporters excluded) almost unanimously elected a retired teacher, Józef Łuczniak, backed by the state administration, as president of

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<sup>19</sup> PAP of 29 July 2005.

<sup>20</sup> See [www.eu2005.gov.uk](http://www.eu2005.gov.uk). An even more unequivocal position criticizing the conduct of the Belarusian authorities was adopted by the European Parliament on 29 September 2005. See the European Parliament Resolution on Belarus, 29 September 2005, [www.europarl.eu.int](http://www.europarl.eu.int).

the organization. Although the Belarusian authorities achieved their goal, which was to take control over the Union, repressive actions against activists associated with Ms. Borys were continued in the following months. This manifested itself, *inter alia*, in hindering their contacts with Poland.

The Polish government declared the repeated ZPB congress undemocratic and did not accept the leadership chosen during the congress as a reliable partner representing the Polish community in Belarus. High-ranking representatives of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that funds sent to Belarus from Poland through ZPB would now be sent there bypassing the Union; they even admitted the possibility of establishing an alternative organization for the Polish minority. Subsidies for ZPB were indeed significantly reduced (e.g. investment projects were suspended), but it was impossible to entirely bypass the Union as its branches have the well-developed infrastructure (e.g. the “Polish Houses”), essential for the activities of the Polish minority in Belarus. That is probably the reason why, in the following months, the Polish government did not publicly mention the concept of creating an alternative organization again.<sup>21</sup>

The Polish Ambassador to Belarus, Tadeusz Pawlak, who was recalled for “consultation” in late July, returned to Minsk on 10 October. One of the reasons for his return, as it was explained, was a new internal situation in Belarus after the Belarusian opposition had chosen their joint candidate for president. Some of the Polish minority activists (e.g. Tadeusz Gawin) criticized this decision as an indication of inconsistent policy towards Belarus. Also Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz, at that time a candidate for Prime Minister, found the return of the Ambassador to Minsk a mistaken decision owing to the lack of progress with regard to the observance of human rights in Belarus, including the treatment of the Polish minority. In the following weeks, the actions of Tadeusz Pawlak also came under fire from the media and his former associates. Accordingly, the Ambassador resigned on 7 November and his dismissal was accepted.

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<sup>21</sup> It is highly doubtful whether the Belarusian authorities would agree to register another organization of the Polish minority. A statement made by Stanisław Buko, president of the Belarusian State Committee for Religions and Nationalities, should be treated as a warning; he said that the authorities did not need another public organization “parallel” to ZPB. PAP of 29 August 2005.

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The repressive measures taken by the Belarusian regime against the Polish minority should be seen in a wider context of the evolution of the social and political situation in this country. The scope of civic liberties in Belarus was significantly limited in 2005 both as a result of changes in the legislation and an increasingly repressive behaviour of the security services as well as the judiciary in cases of a political character. Before the 2006 presidential elections, the Belarusian authorities countered the consolidation of the opposition forces and tried to restrict the functioning of nongovernmental organizations as well as the few independent media even more consistently than in previous years. In view of the size of ZPB and its potential influence on the Polish minority, taking control over the Union was one of the main objectives of the Belarusian authorities.

The diplomatic conflict with Poland, a side effect of actions taken against the Polish organization, was used by the Belarusian government to consolidate the society against external threat.<sup>22</sup> The regime also sought to create an impression (both within the country and in the EU states) that Poland's commitment to the democratization of Belarus was motivated by its particularistic interests: concern for the privileges of the Polish minority.

By emphasizing the necessity to diversify the policy towards Belarus (implementing sanctions against president Lukashenko's administration while supporting the Belarusian society), the Polish government managed to minimize the above threats. Poland also managed to convince the European Union and its member states that the violation of the rights of the Polish minority in Belarus represented a challenge to the entire Community. However, owing to the lack of efficient instruments to directly influence the situation in Belarus, Polish diplomacy was unable to achieve its primary goal, i.e. maintaining the autonomy of the Union of Poles in Belarus. The crisis continuing throughout 2005 clearly revealed that the rights of the Polish minority in Belarus can be fully secured only by the victory of the democratic processes in this country.

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<sup>22</sup> An article published in the *Respublika* daily (the official newspaper of the Belarusian government), which argued that the conflict over ZPB is an intrigue resulting from Polish territorial claims, is typical of the strategy adopted by the Belarusian regime. See Н. Шелдышева, "Большая польская интрига. От эскалации конфликта вокруг СПБ к территориальным претензиям?," *Рэспубліка* of 3 August 2005.

## From Public Diplomacy to a Brand for Poland

**Promotion of Poland.** Francis Fukuyama, the American political scientist and economist once—during his stay in Warsaw—said the following about the changes taking place in the contemporary Poland: the transformation which occurred in this period is an economic and political miracle, and I will probably never see one like that again in my life.<sup>1</sup> But Poland of the late 20<sup>th</sup> and the early 21<sup>st</sup> centuries is not only a country experiencing an objective, historic, political, economic and cultural success. It is also a large European state boasting over 1000 years of tradition. This was the starting point of the 2005 continuation of the policy aimed at reaching foreign opinion-forming and decision-taking circles with matter-of-fact information on Poland, meant to be one of the ways of influencing opinions about our country. On the basis of Polish foreign policy priorities, specified in the exposé of the Minister of Foreign Affairs,<sup>2</sup> specific promotion tasks were realized and new channels of communication were created with the selected target groups active in politics, export, culture, science and education. *Ex definitione*, those tasks contributed to the achievement of the long-term goals of Polish foreign policy and to the long-lasting promotion effect.

Poland had to face particularly difficult challenges: making its activities visible to foreign entities in the situation of a generally unclear and incoherent image of Poland in most countries of the world and working in spite of continuously limited financial resources allocated to the promotion of Poland in the budget of the Ministry in the years 2002–2005. The reduction of outlays led to a considerable limitation of promotion activities in several states. Consequently, we failed to take advantage of the time when the world took interest in Poland to an exceptional extent.

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\* Jarosław Szczepankiewicz—Head of Division in the Promotion Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

<sup>1</sup> See [www.poloniam2002.pl/wpigulce\\_pl.html](http://www.poloniam2002.pl/wpigulce_pl.html).

<sup>2</sup> “Government Information on the Polish foreign Policy in 2005,” see p. 9.

In 2005, celebrations taking place in several states at the same time offered favourable conditions for presenting Poland to broader groups of foreign partners and for attracting the attention of foreign media: the 25th anniversary of “Solidarity,” the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the end of World War II and the 150<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Adam Mickiewicz’s death. The Polish-German Year and the Year of Poland in Ukraine were also celebrated.

The idea of “Solidarity,” with its general human character, is one of the most appreciated concepts among the achievements of Polish social and political thought. It contributed to the improvement of overseas perception that Central Europe played a significant role in the history of the fall of communism in Europe and it helped to break away from the persistent false stereotypes, such as the opinion according to which the fall of communism in Europe began with the fall of the Berlin Wall. The exhibition “Drogi do wolności—przez Solidarność do Europy” (*Roads to Freedom—through “Solidarity” to Europe*) was presented in prestigious locations in both Americas, Africa and in many European states, in the places such as the seat of the European Parliament in Strasburg, the UN in Geneva and Vienna, the Senate of the Czech Republic in Prague, the Museum of Political History in St. Petersburg, King’s College—one of London’s major universities—as well as in city halls of several German cities.

The exhibitions opened by Lech Wałęsa had a particularly ceremonial character—those in New York, London, Bratislava and Riga. The former Polish president also delivered speeches on those occasions. In Brussels, Lech Wałęsa, accompanied by the former Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek and the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Bronisław Geremek, as well as Janusz Śniadek, the Chairman of the Independent, Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity,” gave commemorative medals to persons of particular merit for the “Solidarity” of 1980s.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, the Lech Wałęsa Institute gave the Ministry of Foreign Affairs albums with the autograph of the former president, which were subsequently offered to foreign affairs ministers of the EU and NATO states as well as to several other states (e.g. Ukraine, Georgia), and to selected foreign persons of distinction, with merits for the Polish affairs. A well-known photographer, Erazm Ciołek, contributed for free his pictures of the years 1980–1989 to the exhibitions dedicated to “Solidarity.”

The celebrations commemorating the end of World War II started as early as in January 2005, before the celebrations of the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the liberation

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<sup>3</sup> M. Gniazdowski, “Historical Issues in Polish Foreign Policy in 2005,” See p. 234.

of the Auschwitz-Birkenau extermination camp. After many years of joint works conducted by the Polish Naczelna Dyrekcja Archiwów Państwowych (Head Office of State Archives) and the British National Archives—a two-volume report on the cooperation of the Polish and British intelligence services during World War II was published. Information materials for members of the European Parliament on the contribution of Poland to the victory of the Allied Forces were prepared. Following the initiative of the Polish Consulate General in Los Angeles, Cardinal Roger Mahony gave a solemn mass in the Los Angeles cathedral; in the Czech Republic celebrations were held to commemorate the pilots of the Squadron 303; in Vilnius a conference was organized, entitled “II wojna światowa w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej: pamięć, polityka pamięci i znaki pamięci. Ciągłość oraz przełomy” (WW II in Central and Eastern Europe: remembrance, the remembrance policy and signs of remembrance); Berlin witnessed another conference entitled “Czy możliwa jest wspólna pamięć? Polska i Niemcy 60 lat po Konferencji Poczdamskiej” (Is joint remembrance possible? Poland and Germany 60 years after the Potsdam Conference), and Budapest—a historical conference “Pokonani. Miejsce II wojny światowej w XX wieku” (The Defeated. The place of WW II in 20<sup>th</sup> century), which became an important media event in Hungary. The anniversary celebrations in Holland, Sweden and Italy, actively co-organized by the Polish diplomatic units, are also notable.

An important and long-term project involved the education programmes, initiated in 2003 and systematically broadened. Their objective was to prepare Israeli teachers to organize trips for young people to Poland and arrange appropriate programmes for the latter, thanks to which they could meet their Polish peers and become familiar with Poland and its culture, including the history and culture of the Polish Jews.

The 150<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the death of Adam Mickiewicz fell on 25 November 2005. It was commemorated in a symbolic manner, by poetry evenings, film presentations and inspiring journalists to write texts on the Polish poet. The celebrations were particularly ceremonial in the places connected with the poet: in France, Lithuania, Ukraine, Russia and most of all in Turkey. In Istanbul the Adam Mickiewicz Museum was opened and celebrations were organized involving high level local authorities and the Polish Minister of Culture.

The Polish-German Year, inaugurated on 30 April 2005 with a ceremonial concert in the Berlin Schauspielhaus, was a joint promotion project of Poland and Germany with the honorary patronage of the Presidents of the two states. It ended on 18 May 2006 in Warsaw. The intense promotion of Poland in Germany

in the years 2005–2006 was necessitated by deteriorating political Polish-German contacts, resulting from the discrepancies in standpoints concerning the resolution of the Iraq conflict, German property claims and the German plans to build the Centre Against Expulsions in Berlin. The events of the Polish-German Year took place in Poland and in Germany at the same time. A joint logo was designed for all the projects included in the agenda of the Year. From March 2005, a Polish-German Internet site ([www.de-pl.info](http://www.de-pl.info)) was available, offering information on the project. The Polish part of the programme, realized in the Federal Republic of Germany, included projects prepared by central institutions, regional authorities, NGOs, religious communities, Polish emigration circles and organizations in Germany. An important element of the project was the cooperation of the Polish voivodships and federal states as well as partner cities in Poland and Germany.<sup>4</sup>

In 2005, Poland continued its works on establishing and broadening the legal basis for cultural cooperation with the states of Western Europe, the former USSR, Africa, Middle East, Asia and Latin America. Intergovernmental agreements on cooperation in culture, education and science (the so-called Master Agreements) were negotiated and signed (or are to be signed) with the following states: Italy, Latvia, Sri Lanka and Paraguay. Executive programmes, which are an instrument for implementing agreements, were negotiated and concluded (or are to be signed) with Moldova, Egypt, Tunisia, Mexico, Uruguay and Argentina.

In 2005, Central European countries (Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary) carried out joint promotion actions in the capitals of the states taking the presidency in the European Union. In Luxembourg, they organized an exhibition devoted to contemporary architecture in the countries of the region, in London a festival of documentary films entitled “Across the Border.” Cultural projects in non-European states included moving the architectural exhibition from Luxembourg to New Delhi, and organising days of music of the region in Beijing. The organizers also published a compendium on the history of their music.

A total amount of €2,376,864 from the International Visegrad Fund was allocated to subsidize the realization of 303 international projects. Over half of the projects concerned cultural cooperation and 16.23% cooperation in science and research. The International Visegrad Fund granting additional funds to programmes aimed at tourist promotion of the region was a new phenomenon.

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<sup>4</sup> T. Jaskułowski, “Poland’s Relations with Germany,” See p. 89.

The dynamically developing scholarship offer of the Fund is also notable. In 2005, 80 scholarships were granted, including over 30 given to students from Ukraine. In addition, Poland granted 65 scholarships to the participants of the III edition of the scholarship programme of the Polish government for foreigners from Afghanistan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

In 2005, the programme of 85 study visits in Poland was carried out for foreign journalists and representatives of opinion-forming circles. The largest group among approximately 500 participants from almost all continents were journalists (208) and representatives of the world of culture (77). After the visits, many articles and special supplements on Poland appeared (e.g. in *Financial Times*, *The Daily Telegraph*, *The Guardian*). TV and radio programmes on Poland were shown (e.g. by EuroNews, BBC, TV5), objectively presenting Poland and the Polish viewpoint on political, economic and cultural issues. The participants of the visits took great interest in the celebrations of the first anniversary of Poland's joining the European Union, the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the "Solidarity" and the autumn parliamentary and presidential elections in Poland. Following the appearance of the phrase "Polish concentration camps" in the world media, during the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the liberation of the Auschwitz-Birkenau camp a visit "following the traces of concentration camps in the occupied Polish lands during World War II" was also organized.

In September 2005, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Adam D. Rotfeld handed out 17 certificates of distinction for outstanding merits in the promotion of Poland in the world to, *inter alia*, Marek Kamiński and Jaś Mela, the travellers who reached the Earth's two poles, as well as to Jerzy Owsiak and the rock band Myslovitz. He also honoured Professor Leszek Kołakowski with a Special Certificate of Distinction. Moreover, in June 2005, he handed certificates for the world's most popular sportspersons of 2004. This time these were only disabled sportspersons who received them: swimmer Katarzyna Pawlik, athlete Tomasz Błatkiewicz and fencer Robert Wyśmierski.

Publications of a promotional and informative nature regarding culture, tourism and economy were updated or printed in larger quantities in English, French, Spanish, German and Russian. Such publications included: *Polscy Nobliści* (Polish Nobel Prize Winners), *Polska kultura* (Polish Culture), *Jak inwestować w Polsce* (How to Invest in Poland), *Mniejszości narodowe w Polsce* (National Minorities in Poland), *Spółeczeństwo informacyjne* (Information Society), *Badacze* (Researchers), *Sportowcy* (Sportspersons), *Polska dla cudzoziemców* (Poland for Foreigners), *Polska dla dzieci* (Poland for Children), *Made in Poland*, *Polscy odkrywcy* (Polish Discoverers), *Studia w Polsce* (Studies in

Poland), *Polska w pigułce* (Poland in a Nutshell), *Polska archeologia* (Polish Archeology) and *Polska w liczbach* (Poland in Figures).

An important promotion instrument popularizing the Polish viewpoint on many international issues and informing readers about important events in Polish political, economic, cultural and scientific life are *The Polish Voice* monthly, a supplement of *The Warsaw Voice* weekly. A similar role is played by *The Polish Culture* quarterly.

It is worth noting that the two recently published calendars—a wall calendar and a calendar in the form of a book—both in English—include photographs of outstanding Polish photographers, with Zdzisław Beksiński, Adam Bujak and Stanisław Ignacy Witkiewicz among them. The second one was awarded the 1<sup>st</sup> prize in the II International Calendar and Christmas Card Competition Vidical 2006. A wall calendar with posters commemorating the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the UN was also issued.

Radio Polonia—Programme for Listeners Abroad of Polish Radio SA broadcast a series of shows *Promocja Polski jako członka Unii Europejskiej* (Promotion of Poland as an EU Member).

Due to the growing role of the Internet in public diplomacy and its low costs, the increased use of the medium as a manner of publishing information on Poland became an important issue. In 2005 the promotion portal [www.poland.gov.pl](http://www.poland.gov.pl) was redesigned, a service devoted to Poland's contribution to the victory of the Allied forces in World War II ([www.ww2.pl](http://www.ww2.pl)) was created along with a multi-media presentation on the Battle of Britain and a service devoted to the events of August 1980 (commemorating the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of “Solidarity”).

Table

**Users of the [www.poland.gov.pl](http://www.poland.gov.pl) portal in 2005.**

| Specification   | Total users        | Foreign users     | Visits             |
|---|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Growth in the number of users over the last 12 months | 41%                | 63%               | 41%                |
| January   | 89,427             | 25,505            | 101,326            |
| December  | 125,751            | 41,581            | 142,952            |
| Month with the highest number of users                | November (153,869) | November (52,661) | November (177,207) |

Over the last 21 months, the portal was visited by over 1.6 million of users from the whole world. In December 2005, after entering the key word “Poland” in the American version of Google or AltaVista, the [www.poland.gov.pl](http://www.poland.gov.pl) portal appeared as the 6<sup>th</sup>–8<sup>th</sup> result. Starting from May 2005 in the Russian, German, Spanish and French versions of Google a promotion campaign of the [www.wv2.pl](http://www.wv2.pl) service was conducted. The service is available in six languages: Polish, English, Spanish, French, German and Russian. Over the last 12 months, the number of users of [www.poland.gov.pl](http://www.poland.gov.pl) grew by 41% and now amounts to 2.5 million.

**Brand for Poland—diplomacy through the image.** Due to the growing role of the media in shaping the foreign policy, the promotion of a country should not be limited to establishing connections and dialogues within public diplomacy, but should also create a specific image of the country through images, symbols, logo and information. A country’s brand may be the carrier of the most important messages and thanks to that strengthen its recognizability in the international arena. A country, like an international corporation, functions and exists in a very competitive environment. Though building a brand and public diplomacy stem from two various approaches to the promotion of a country, in practice they do not have to be separate.

In spite of the enormous social, political and economic growth, we have so far failed to build a strong brand of “Poland” in the world. In foreign public opinion, the image of Poland is to a greater extent shaped by what Poland used to be before 1989 than what it is today. Prejudice, stereotypes and sometimes even false opinion result in an untrue image of Poland in the eyes of foreigners. Simply speaking, Poland as a brand is not highly valued in the world, and Polish products and trade marks are practically unknown. There is also a very poor general knowledge about Poles as a nation. In the index of nation brands (Anholt-GMI Brands Index)<sup>5</sup> in 2005 Poland held the low 19<sup>th</sup> position among the 25 researched states. As the creator of the index, Simon Anholt was right to note in his book *Brand New Justice*,<sup>6</sup> such states as Poland simply have no time to wait for their reputation to catch up with reality.

It is the unfavourable image of Poland in the world that made broadening the traditional scope of public diplomacy absolutely necessary. Coherent national marketing, using various forms of information flow, increases the chance of not

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<sup>5</sup> The Anholt-GMI Nation Brands Index, Q2, 2005, Overall Rankings.

<sup>6</sup> S. Anholt, *Sprawiedliwość marek*, Warszawa: Instytut Marki Polskiej, 2006.

only raising the level of the acceptance of a country and its citizens, but also contributes to the greater effectiveness of more specialized types of promotion, including culture, direct foreign investment, export, tourism or regions.

The first systematic activities aimed at designing the image strategy of the country, based on the dynamically changing reality, were undertaken in December 2003. The Spanish company Saffron, headed by Wally Olins, a British brand expert, developed the project “Brand for Poland.” The Polish government supported the programme. If the project is successfully implemented, all products, services, cultural and sports events, films, etc. which can be recognized as Polish or Polish-made will be perceived as an interconnected whole. The effect will be measurable and will have a positive influence on direct foreign investments, number of tourists visiting Poland, exports of products and services, popularizing Polish culture abroad as well as Poland’s public diplomacy.

The debate on the national brand, presently beginning in Poland, is not only an opportunity for creative reflections on our identity and more conscious use of our promotion assets in the international arena—it may also help us accept at least some of our flaws.

**V.**

**Views on Polish Foreign Policy**



## A Review of Polish Foreign Policy in 2005

Debate, Warsaw, 16 March 2006

**Roman Kuźniar:** Thank you for accepting the invitation to take part in the debate devoted to a review of Polish foreign policy in 2005. I warmly welcome all participants: Prof. Jerzy Kranz, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs; Ambassador Jarosław Bratkiewicz, Head of the Department of Foreign Policy Strategy and Planning at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Dr. Sławomir Dębski, Head of the Research Office at the Polish Institute of International Affairs; and Mr. Marek Madej from the Institute of International Relations of the Warsaw University, a promising expert in the field of international security.

In this debate we shall concentrate on three topics: security, the European Union, and policy towards the East.

Let's begin with the first one: Is Poland secure? I'm asking this because in his exposé last year, Minister Adam Daniel Rotfeld did not list security among the eight priority tasks of Polish foreign policy. This is important because for the first time since 1989, when Krzysztof Skubiszewski was foreign minister, security has not been included among the priority tasks. Perhaps Minister Rotfeld left this subject out deliberately, after all he is an expert on security. Perhaps he did so as a result of his assessment of the international situation. But because this is something completely new, and I do not quite agree with such a treatment of the topic, I would like us to begin by answering the fundamental question: Is Poland secure?

**Marek Madej:** How should we define security? The more we comprehend it, the more difficult it is to answer that question. Unless we reduce this concept to the political-military dimension, the answer might be negative. Therefore are we concentrating only on the political-military category, or are we treating security in a broader context?

**Roman Kuźniar:** I hope the participants will properly determine the scope of the assessment they wish to provide.

**Jarosław Bratkiewicz:** I do not know the background to the Foreign Minister's exposé, but I think that if the subject of security was not included among the priorities, there must have been a deliberate reason for not doing so, and that there was justification for such an action. Is Poland secure? I think that if we were to wake someone up in the middle of the night and ask him that question, he would say that yes, Poland is secure. This is a new situation in Poland's history over the past, let us say, several centuries, as far as the traditional dangers to Poland, the curse of her most recent history as a country

sandwiched between Germany and Russia, are concerned. Of course, the political German-Russian quern is a metaphor that is completely inappropriate to the present situation, because today's Germany, in its identity and essence, does not relate to any of the hitherto forms of German statehood. This is a completely new statehood. One can say that today's German state is thoroughly democratised, though various things have happened to German democracy in the past, and that Germany has learned the lessons of the twentieth century and drawn proper conclusions from it.

Russia is also undergoing fundamental change. We can only surmise about attempts to recreate some kind of imperial system, because these usually take the form of wishful thinking or nostalgia, and mostly by certain people on the political sidelines in Russia. This has no fundamental impact on those who teach decisions in Russia. The decision-makers may succumb to certain atavistic post-imperial visions, but basically Russia is nevertheless developing towards democracy, albeit with various problems and difficulties, of course.

Therefore one can say that the traditional threats to Poland do not exist. Moreover, Poland has been firmly anchored to western structures since 2004. That is a totally exceptional situation. Today's Europe is different from traditional Europe. This is no longer the old continent with its various mechanisms governing the balance of forces and its ever-changing geometry of alliances, to which Poland virtually always fell victim, for Poland usually fell prey to the competing European powers and was sacrificed for the sake of some consensus, so that the European concert could be played in harmony.

Today we are witnessing a departure from this type of European tradition towards integration. We are included in this process. This is a comfortable situation that will finally eradicate the traditional threats to which Poland has been exposed in its modern history.

However, there are new threats which are discussed relatively seldom. They are the result of the changing global configuration, and are dependent upon the situation in the countries of the Southern zone. These countries are struggling with problems stemming from their own unfinished modernisation and are in the throes of various mechanisms that are preventing them from modern functioning not only in a technical and industrial sense, but also in the sense of political culture and social mentality. The specific reaction of these countries to this "culture of revenge" can be described thus: If we are not succeeding in modernisation, if we are late with modernisation, it is the fault of forces that are acting outside our zone. Therefore we have to communicate in some way our dissatisfaction with what is happening in our country, which is largely the result

of the influence of those external forces, in other words the highly-developed countries of the West.

For me, the clearest manifestation of the new dangers is fundamentalism and its armed branch in the form of terrorism, as well as the fact that a major part of the Islamic communities in western countries refuses to comply with the standards of life in those societies. In particular, it can be noticed that the young generation is dominated by a spirit of protest and by the need to seek their own traditionalist, Muslim identity. I think the unrest in France and several other European countries in 2005 was a sign of these specific new threats. Today we are facing a broad range of threats which are not always perceived as such, but which can have very serious consequences. Terrorism can cause losses in human lives comparable to the losses in traditional theatres of warfare.

How do these threats relate to Poland? That is quite an important question. Poland is a distant country unnoticed by all the forces that are contesting the world order, or rather contesting the role of the West or, to be more exact, the North, because the new global configuration is divided into North and South, and not East and West, as was the case before. In this configuration, Poland is located on the sidelines. Even so, as far as I can remember, I think it was in 2005, there were warnings of the possibility of terrorist attacks on Poland. However, our country did not develop into a theatre of terrorist activity. Why not? Because terrorists have no suitable infrastructure here. They also do not have the support of the local Muslim community which is largely loyal to the Polish state and in no way identifies itself with the political terrorist movement. In a nutshell, Poland does not seem to be a possible target of any terrorist attacks. I think any new threats in Poland will be indirect in a certain sense. Because Poland belongs to the institutions of the West/North, it must formulate, together with the allied and partner countries, a proper line of conduct vis-à-vis terrorism. Until now, the debate inside western structures has concentrated mainly on how to counteract these threats and to what extent this counteraction must be military in order to succeed, and to what extent it should refer to certain kinds of political and economic instruments, social dialogue etc. Important challenges for us will depend on how effectively Western institutions, to which Poland belongs, will be able to counteract the new threats.

**Roman Kuźniar:** Thank you very much. So we have traditional threats resulting from our geostrategic position—not new challenges, but rather secondary ones connected with the reaction to the new threats by the institutions to which Poland belongs. Would anyone care to expand on this or question it?

**Marek Madej:** The purpose of my first question was to establish what kind of security we are talking about. If we are talking about security in the traditional sense, in other words political-military security and classic military threats, as well as the new asymmetrical threats and any other military threats whatever they are called, the answer to the question about Poland's security is relatively straightforward: Poland is secure. Therefore that automatic reply which Mr. Bartkiewicz spoke about is genuine. I do not think the question of so-called new threats is a serious problem for Poland, not just because Polish Muslims are not a large group, but also because the origin of this group is different from that of the groups from which the majority of Muslim terrorists come from. The likelihood that Polish Muslims will become radical and fundamentalist is virtually zero. But that is not the only thing that determines our relatively high level of security in the context of the new threats. What Mr. Bratkiewicz said about Poland being far removed from the point of view of Muslim fundamentalists is also partly true, because we see them as the main problem in the event of new threats. Indeed, we are not an attractive target for them, nor an interesting subject of action.

The basic question for our security is: How will the need to struggle against terrorism and similar phenomena affect the unity and cohesion of the institutions, both the European Union and NATO, to which we belong, and not how they will cope with the problem of terrorism and what ways and means of reaction they will employ. Therefore it is not just a question whether these institutions will find an answer to the problem of the threats of terrorism, especially because we should not overestimate these threats. I very much doubt that the number of victims of terrorism, especially direct terrorism, is comparable with the number of victims of armed conflicts, and the events of 11 September are not the best evidence of that, because they were a rather unique precedent, and the likelihood of similar actions in future is rather small. Therefore the threat of terrorism is not the basic problem, especially in the context of Polish security. From our point of view, the main problem is the danger that terrorism affects the unity and cohesion of the institutions that are of key importance to us, in other words NATO and the European Union, as well as the communion of interests of their members, mainly because of the difference in their natures, especially the differences between the United States and the remaining partners and allies, as well as the level of the threat to the individual participants in these structures.

**Sławomir Dębski:** Unfortunately, I cannot agree with the view that the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 were an exception. The experience of the past few years—the attacks on the Atocha railway station in

Madrid on 13 March 2004 and last year's bombings of the London underground—suggest the very opposite. Before our very eyes, a world order is being shaped in a way in which, unfortunately, large-scale armed attacks against civilians and public utility buildings will be a part of our reality. This is becoming a rule rather than an exception, and we will have to get used to it.

I think that the events in Madrid and London have made us realise, as well as most Europeans, that Europe is not altogether free of the threats that were initially associated with the consequences of U.S. foreign policy and of that country's hegemonic position in the world system. It turns out that the threats generated by transnational terrorism, exploited by radical Muslim fundamentalism, are not purely the result of the asymmetry between the military potentials of the United States and its radical Muslim opponents. They are also connected with a fundamental conflict of values and with the different rates of development in the world system. And if that is so, Europe and the United States are on the same side of the conflict, whether they like it or not. But because this conflict has a lot in common with an ideological conflict, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to remain neutral. This is illustrated by the tension in Europe caused by the influx of immigrants from the Muslim countries and the collapse of what was commonly held to be a progressive policy of assimilation.

Answering the question whether Poland was secure in 2005, we must first place Poland in the broader context we mentioned earlier, and secondly we must remember that the shaping of state security is a permanent process, therefore it is difficult to relate to just one episode, which as such was the year 2005, especially when it elapsed so recently.

What one can say for sure is that during the twelve-months in question, we did not face any direct threats. None of our neighbours tried to conquer Poland, change the system in our country or impose its wishes on us by force. Also, happily, there were no events like the bombings in Madrid or London.

But if we are talking about a process, then we should ask whether last year there emerged any symptoms of dangers that could lead to threats that we might face in future. I agree with my esteemed interlocutors that one must pay attention to the condition of the institutions that have a fundamental meaning for our long-term perception of security, in other words the European Union and NATO. For example, Mr. Madej spoke about a noticeable lack of cohesion in both these institutions. That might be one disturbing symptom. Another might be the fall in mutual confidence between the countries participating in European integration—as suggested by the affair of the so-called Northern Pipeline. Questions are being asked whether the EU member-states will be able to

compete effectively both against the United States and against their Asian partners, China and India, whose power is ever-growing.

There is no doubt that Poland has considerably improved its security over the past 16 years. As far as its world position is concerned, it made a giant step forward by becoming a member of NATO and the EU. We are co-participants in systems that gather the world's most developed countries. But this means that we are gradually becoming a part of the global establishment, which is seeking to preserve the status quo, and that of course might generate new threats to our country.

**Roman Kuźniar:** Are we right to remain in Iraq? At the start of the year we decided to stay there for a further 12 months, without ruling out the possibility of an extension of our mission until 2007. Are we right to do so? I am asking this because if on the threshold of 2002–2003 we could pretend, or at least some of us could pretend, that there were strong arguments for this war, in 2005 it became difficult to present such arguments, because President Bush admitted that the operation was based on false information, though the war itself was just. Also, errors were made that compromise this war. The recent report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) shows that the way in which the war in Iraq is being fought is merely extending it. The ICG is exceedingly well disposed to the use of force in order to establish better order in the world, but even the ICG reckons that this war is dragging on, because the Americans are abusing their strength, torturing people, treating prisoners inhumanely, and using weapons in a manner that is causing excessive losses of civilian lives, and this is all creating opposition and moral problems, and is also creating the danger of a setback in the battle for hearts and souls, or hearts and minds, as the Americans say. The problem is the way in which our politicians view this war. We remember how, in his programme on Polsat, Tomasz Lis asked the two presidential candidates, Messrs. Kaczyński and Tusk, whether our presence in Iraq was justified. They both replied that the Americans had asked us for our help, therefore we could not refuse. But must we really accept every request to take part in such operations?

**Jerzy Kranz:** Let me return to the main thread of our discussion, in other words to the question whether Poland is secure. I agree that there is no direct threat to Poland and that, as we said earlier, our presence in the new structures has improved that security. But the world has changed, and for Poland that means that the world is securer in some ways and more dangerous in others. As far as domestic affairs are concerned, Poland's security depends largely on the condition of the army, i.e. on the state of armaments, methods of leadership and personnel, and there is still much to be done in this regard. Membership in

NATO or the EU on its own does not make Poland's security 100% greater, for on the one hand our army's condition is the way it is, and on the other hand problems are appearing inside the structures we have joined. As soon as we joined them, everything began to disintegrate—whether one likes this or not is a different matter. NATO's relations with the EU boil down to the question of the commands, or headquarters, which may perform military operations. From what I hear, the Americans could, though with difficulty, simultaneously perform a second operation like the one in Iraq, e.g. within the framework of NATO, and yet it turns out that NATO has no headquarters. The EU has national armies—French, German, British—and national commands for international operations, but even here shortcomings may come to light when something really serious happens.

Considering whether Poland is secure, one should also ask whether the world is secure. Although no events like World War I or II have happened for a long time, internal armed conflicts are multiplying. What is more, there is a growing threat in the shape of international terrorism, which is a new phenomenon in a certain sense. The new generation of terrorists does not necessarily operate in the theatre of the conflict, and seeks resonance by attacking civilians. What are the objectives of this terrorism? Those who carried out the attacks in Madrid or New York had no positive objectives from their point of view, they were intent on pure destruction. That is a new quality.

Former German foreign minister Joschka Fischer said that after the two totalitarian ideologies that had been formed in Europe in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, a new totalitarian and fundamentalist ideology was being formed outside Europe. It is dangerous and destructive, and the reasons for its development can be explained in various ways. I am not saying that the problem is Islam *per se* and that all Muslims support terrorism; nonetheless Islamic fundamentalism, which wants to rearrange the world, is a serious problem. Against this background there is a certain asymmetry of threats, because for instance, one does not know whom one is fighting against and who will attack and when. In this sense, the world has become not quite secure.

Additionally, there is the question of mass destruction weapons. Does every country have the right to possess them? There is no straightforward reply. I would say that not all countries should have the right to possess these weapons, though how to cope with this is a different matter. But if, for example, Iran has a mass destruction weapon, one will have to talk to Iran in quite a different way, and even the United States, not to mention Russia, will be very polite to Iran. After all, we know why Iran wants these weapons.

The armed operation in Iraq in 2003 induces the following question: When can we be sure that a certain regime does not possess a mass destruction weapon? I don't want to appear as an advocate of Bush, because the U.S. administration has made various errors, but this question, which has dissented lawyers and politicians, should be asked. To be honest, one cannot be sure if a dictator possesses a mass destruction weapon until he has taken over a country. I agree that taking such a decision is risky, but it may be naive to believe Saddam Hussein's claims that he has no mass destruction weapons, or similar claims by inspectors who are seeking such weapons like needles in a haystack. Iraq is one example of the situation that awaits us in the forthcoming years. There is a similar problem with Iran and Korea today, and tomorrow there may be such a problem with international terrorists. It is easy to say this now, but a politician's, chancellor's or president's responsibility for a country's security does not exist only in legal terms. So-called pre-emptive strikes to prevent serious threats that may arise in a few months' or a few years' time arouse controversies. Let me recall that such strikes are envisaged not only in American military doctrine, but also in the military doctrines of Russia and France.

In this context, the question of our presence in Iraq reappears, and I think the decision to remain in Iraq is right. One can justify this in various ways. First, the Polish army is benefiting from this, and we are not there to occupy the country or fight in a bad cause. Secondly, and this is not without importance, Poland's presence in Iraq is consolidating the country's political position to a certain extent.

**Roman Kuźniar:** One person in this group will not answer my question whether we are right to be in Iraq. I imagine that Ambassador Bratkiewicz would agree with Professor Kranz. However, Iraq was a problem on the threshold of 2002 and 2003, and this question was just a bridgehead to a more topical issue, in other words the American proposal to include Poland in the missile defence system. Will that improve our situation as far as security is concerned? I have two doubts. First, do you not have the impression, gentlemen, that the affair with alleged CIA prisoners in EU countries, including Poland, has shown that we have a problem with maintaining our territorial sovereignty? We do not know what our ally is doing in our country. Minister Meller admitted this when he asked Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice about secret jails. The minister does not know what is happening in his own country. That is a question of territorial sovereignty. If American missile launchers and radar stations are stationed on our territory, will our sovereignty be respected, will we have any influence over our ally if he decides to use them in a manner that does not necessarily coincide with our wishes and our view of the security situation?

The second doubt stems from a mistaken assessment of the situation. America has definitely ceased to be credible as far as its assessments of security or the degree of danger are concerned. Of course, one can say that if we do not know what is happening in a certain country, then let us go in there, and maybe later we will see that there was nothing happening, just as in the case of Iraq. If we had found something, we would have felt better, but we found nothing. Therefore the credibility of American intelligence is almost nil, not because it was incompetent, but because it operated according to political demands and that fact emerged during the Iraqi war. Consider these two doubts, gentlemen, and answer the question: what should be Poland's reply to the American offer to join the missile defence programme?

**Ślawomir Dębski:** I think an answer to such a question should begin with the statement that every government reaches decisions under conditions of a systemic uncertainty. There is never complete knowledge about a subject on which a decision is to be reached usually in a short period of time. That is why it is so important to encapsulate strategic objectives correctly and pursue a foreign and security policy with foresight.

**Roman Kuźniar:** We are not saying enough about Poland, Poland's situation and Polish politics. My guests are inclined to talk about abstract matters. Please, let us concentrate on Poland.

**Ślawomir Dębski:** I am coming to that. But to cut the long story short, the way I understand the situation is that Poland's presence in Iraq, just like a decision on our country's inclusion in the American MD system, is a function of our politics vis-à-vis the United States. We would never have engaged ourselves in the intervention in Iraq, and then in the process of stabilisation (actually, occupation) of that country, were it not for specified objectives in our foreign policy towards the United States. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein did not have anything directly to do with Polish interests.

The reasons why Poland supported American actions against Iraq in 2003 are valid to this day. This is illustrated by last year's decision—taken by the new government—to prolong our army's involvement in the stabilisation mission, as well as signs of the Polish government's readiness to join the American MD programme. Various kinds of doubts are appearing regarding this last issue. On the one hand, we know that the system of destroying ballistic missiles will not defend Polish territory directly, only because the danger of such an attack on Poland will be very small. Poland is simply not an attractive target. But on the other hand, the infrastructure of monitoring and defending ballistic missiles is accompanied by close-range defence systems which protect it against a tactical

missile or air strike. Poland has no advanced air defence systems, and without participation in the MD programme it will probably not have such systems for a long time. Furthermore, we are talking about the construction of American installations on Polish soil. An attack on them will not be an attack on Poland alone, but will also be a direct attack on the United States as well. For the United States, every attack on Poland will result in the need to engage in Poland's defence in order to protect the infrastructure that forms a significant part of the American defence system. That is more or less how it looks.

Therefore I do not believe that Poland's consent to the presence of such installations on Polish soil will result in a greater threat to Poland. I dismiss arguments about an increase in the danger of terrorist attacks on Poland, because the protection of American bases around the world is quite effective and such incidents do not even occur in Iraq nowadays. Of course there is no 100% guarantee that there will be no terrorist attacks in future, but there is no such certainty today either, even though American installations have not been built in Poland yet. I also do not think there is any reason to fear an attack by any of our eastern neighbours.

Then why join the American MD system? Here we come to political incentives. The following question assumes key importance: Will Poland's permission for the installation of anti-missile systems on its soil improve our relations with the United States and with other countries? In the not too distant future, one can expect countries like Romania and Bulgaria to compete against Poland for the role of most important U.S. allies in this part of Europe. They will be in a similar situation to the one we were in on the threshold of 2002 and 2003, and will try to increase their status in American foreign policy. That will create a certain challenge for Polish foreign policy in the future. The question is: Do we want to compete against them, are we capable of doing so, and with what instruments? Right now, our policy vis-à-vis the United States is weak. Poland should seek an opportunity to signal greater assertiveness. Perhaps the MD programme provides such an opportunity.

**Marek Madej:** The first thing that seems important to me is that Mr. Dębski spoke of short-range missiles and air defence systems from which we might reap an advantage. Might we not reap a relatively small advantage in return for a very serious decision? I think the problem we are facing in connection with the missile defence system is very similar to the problem we faced in connection with the intervention in Iraq in 2003. We made one mistake. Why must we make another very similar one? When we reach such a decision, we will clearly place ourselves in support of the American vision of the world and transatlantic

relations, because that decision will affect not only relations between Poland's and the United States or between Poland and Romania or Bulgaria, with whom we will compete for the role of partner of the Americans, but will also seriously affect our relations with the European Union. As a whole and with its individual member states.

A separate issue—not talked about much in Poland—is the reliability of the MD system. Whether or not it will be built does not depend on us, but we must remember that its reliability as a means of defending any territory is doubtful and open to discussion. The programme is being realised somewhat ahead of schedule, as a reserve so to speak, and envisages threats that do not exist right now and might never exist. Therefore if we are talking about possible conflicts between countries or about a country with reduced credibility that could launch a missile attack with relatively low intensity—such an attack could not be intense because of the meagre financial and military resources of the attacking country—let us primarily consider whether we are capable of defending ourselves at all, or whether the Americans would be capable of defending us. Also important is what the attacker would gain from attacking us, what advantage he would derive from this, because this determines the level of the threat against us.

The MD system is not very reliable, especially from a technical point of view. Of course it is up to the Americans whether or not they will go ahead with its construction. It was the same with Iraq—it was their decision. Our only decision was whether or not to go into Iraq with them. I fear that if the situation is similar, and the profit and loss account of the Iraqi operation is in our disfavour, we can assume that the result of the operation will also be in our disfavour. That might not be the best analogy, but it is worth considering the experience of Denmark, which already has American bases that are part of the MD system on its territory. Although the territory in question is different—it is not the Danish mainland—Denmark will still have to participate in this system in some way. Is its policy towards the United States and European Union reminiscent of our policy at this stage? Not quite. Have we made any attempt to cooperate with the Danes in this regard, or have we learned from their experience? Personally, I am not aware that we have.

**Roman Kuźniar:** I think Ambassador Bratkiewicz will speak out in a similar vein.

**Jarosław Bratkiewicz:** As far as missile defence is concerned, I personally see political elements in this. This is a significant political act addressed to the Americans. Why to the Americans? Because that is the way we perceive the

condition of the institutions in which we have found ourselves. The unity of these institutions seems strained perhaps not much because of someone's ill wishes, but rather because countries belonging to these institutions have visibly become divided into two groups over the way in which one should react to modern threats. One group claims that all threats localised in the South, especially in the Greater Middle East, should be actively combated.

**Roman Kuźniar:** Ambassador, please talk about Poland.

**Jarosław Bratkiewicz:** I only want to present the background. In a nutshell, some countries believe that the new real threats should be countered in an active way; one should act in advance and solve problems in these locations where they are still in the formation stage, whilst other countries adopt an evasive attitude, preferring various kinds of political solutions, dialogue and auxiliary action. The latest Mediterranean Dialogue summit in Barcelona has shown how effective these actions are. This summit produced a lot of grand words which did not provide much. As a country born out of the spirit of "Solidarity" and a firm desire to counteract wrongdoing, Poland believes that certain matters should be dealt with directly. The Americans believe that problems regarding modernisation in the Greater Middle East have to be dealt with now, because each extra day of delay is increasing the disappointment and frustration of the Muslims, especially young Muslims, and is pushing them towards a terrorist revenge on the affluent West, the alleged source of all their misfortunes. I think the Iraqi question should be perceived not only in the light of the problem of mass destruction weapons, but also in the light of the need to commence the process of changes in the Middle East right away. President Bush's speeches before the Iraqi war suggested that the point was to launch a mechanism that would commence or accelerate the processes of modernisation and democratisation. For me, the basic problem is how to commence the process of modernisation in countries where people are constantly being told: You have to wait. Give us time for changes, another five, ten or perhaps fifty years, and this has been repeated for decades. One cannot wait, because during these fifty years—as a result of neglect—a new generation of terrorists will emerge.

As far as our decision regarding Iraq is concerned, it was not so easy, and was not taken without prior consideration. It was not that the Americans gave us a signal and we shouted "hurrah" and went straight into battle. As a country undergoing transformation, we considered all the dilemmas connected with the challenges of modernisation in the Wider Middle East and the real threats that emerged in this context. We realised that these issues cannot be resolved by politically correct talk, and certainly not in the case of Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

We realised that in these specific circumstances a clear signal or shock therapy is needed. We, in Poland, know that a shock often brings salutary results.

Should our engagement continue? Of course I am aware of all the dilemmas. I agree that this is a very difficult situation, but every choice of firm action causes a polarisation of forces and arouses the spirit of confrontation. Iraq is now a point of friction between two global forces: modernisation, modernity and militant traditionalism, a new totalitarian ideology based on an overinterpretation of Islam. Iraq has become a kind of arena for a clash of civilisations. If one side withdraws, the other will regard this as its victory. This will be an important signal for the whole world. Either the “knights and lions of Islam,” acting by means of nihilistic methods of terrorism will win—what is now happening in Iraq is not a resistance or any kind of partisan movement, but pure banditry and terrorism—or the forces of modernisation supported by the stabilising coalition will win. Because of the engagement of international forces, Iraq has become part of the global cause of democratisation and modernisation. Therefore this is also our cause.

**Roman Kuźniar:** We are approaching the conclusion. I am closing this point.

**Jarosław Bratkiewicz:** Let me just say that it would be wrong to withdraw at a time of culmination of the confrontation between the forces of militant traditionalism—these people are really intent on setting up a world caliphate—and the forces that, despite all their mistakes, are fighting for the modernisation of this region. Personally I think we have invested too much militarily, politically and, most of all, economically, to simply pack our bags and quietly leave, as the Spaniards did. What would our allies in Iraq think? What would happen to our reputation? Such a withdrawal would be a waste and a stupid move. Iraq is a key point of contact for us in this region, and a very important one from the point of view of global strategy.

**Sławomir Dębski:** I only want to ask one question to which I myself have no proper answer, about something that directly concerns our security. Does Iraq not contain radical fundamentalist forces that are prepared to take armed action against the broadly-conceived West? Instead of travelling round Europe and wondering where to plant bombs, they go to Iraq, because the Americans there are an easier target, and moreover the stabilisation forces, the Iraqi forces and the new Iraqi government are also there. After all, it is a fact that if people are ready to undertake an armed struggle against the West and its civilisation, it is easiest to do so in Iraq. Perhaps it lies in our broadly-conceived security interests that people with this kind of motivation and world outlook should be engaged in Iraq?

**Jerzy Kranz:** I do not quite agree. It is like saying: if we were not there, they would not attack us. I see no connection.

Let us leave the subject of technical missile defence to the experts. I would not question it just because right now the system is not very effective, because the Americans and, as far as I know, also the Russians, are working on it and they are not countries that invest in something that will not work. That is the first thing.

Secondly, if that missile station were in the Czech Republic or Romania instead of here, would that make Poland less or more secure?

Thirdly, is Poland meant to play any kind of military role and take part in international armed actions, and not just in Iraq? If so, according to what rules?

If we are opposed to this anti-missile shield, let us say what else we can do. If not, let us sit and engage in military exercises in some dump like Drawsko Pomorskie.

**Roman Kuźniar:** Poland is a beautiful country, not a dump. Military exercise grounds are located in beautiful areas. I know, because I was in the army and I saw them.

**Marek Madej:** Firstly, I do not agree with the statement that Muslim fundamentalism is an offensive against our existence. Rather, it is a form of defence. Therefore the view whereby terrorism is embedded in Iraq is correct. Fundamentalism is not as offensive as you say.

**Jerzy Kranz:** It is offensive, absolutely.

**Marek Madej:** Secondly, I did not mean to question the technical possibility of constructing this system, but merely its feasibility. That is indeed the Americans' business, not ours. We must consider whether to take part in it or not.

**Roman Kuźniar:** We are ending this part of the debate. I am sorry that I could not take active part in it.

Let us proceed to European affairs, Polish European policy and Poland. There is a certain problem with our policy towards the EU. Are we correctly interpreting the current situation in the EU and Europe? Because I have the impression that right now the EU is in an unprecedented weak condition, weakness that we are enhancing by renationalising foreign and economic policy. We are consolidating this trend, in other words contributing to it in the way in which it has already appeared in several other EU countries.

Another point is that we demand from the EU solidarity in matters regarding Belarus, Russia or energy, and yet we are unable to provide the EU with solidarity when it is in difficulties. I have the impression that we have a rather

anachronistic understanding of integration and the sovereignty of national interests, and that is one of the main reasons why our policy towards and within the EU is rather confrontational, often destructive, calculated to weaken the EU rather than strengthen it. As a result, I fear that we are going to lose out in the long run, because our national interests, foreign security and economic interests will be realised to a lesser degree. Are we correctly interpreting the situation in which the EU has found itself? Are we correct to enhance the problems with which the EU is struggling, both institutional ones and those connected with the trends that have appeared in some countries? I mean the renationalisation of economic and foreign policy. Is my preliminary assessment appropriate or not? How do you view this with regard to Polish foreign policy?

**Slawomir Dębski:** Am I to understand that we are concentrating on 2005?

**Roman Kuźniar:** Of course we are concentrating on 2005, a year which saw a change of authority in Poland and one or two months of office by a new government—the president had not yet managed to be appointed, but the new government did manage to come into existence. The remarks I made earlier also concern an even earlier period, because at present we are witnessing a certain attitude whose symptoms were present in our thoughts and convictions regarding Poland's accession to the EU.

**Slawomir Dębski:** These symptoms were certainly present in the debate about our expectations vis-à-vis European integration just before accession and during the first year of membership. Last year this intensified in connection with the Constitutional Treaty and the situation regarding its ratification. After the referendums in France and Holland, it was announced in Poland that the treaty was definitely dead, but unfortunately no one was concerned about what would happen next. It is true that we had an election campaign, and that is never a good time to hold a debate of this kind.

But generally, in Poland we have a problem with answering the question of what use to us is the EU. Sometimes one has the impression that we need membership in the EU purely to obtain financial assistance from the richer members who, once they have issued us with a blank cheque, should no longer concern themselves with our domestic and foreign policy or how we define our interests. We support EU common policy in those areas where we have specific needs, but when we ought to act in a spirit of solidarity with other members states, we often find that a coherent policy is inconvenient and we combat it.

**Roman Kuźniar:** You have formulated the question well. Do we know what kind of EU Poland needs? I have the impression we think Poland needs a weak EU. That is obvious from our unchanging attachment to the international

formula of cooperation and our neglect of community institutions or even our hostile approach towards them, especially towards the Commission and towards everything connected with EU tradition. How is it?

**Jerzy Kranz:** I do not think you are mistaken about this inimical attitude. The attachment to intergovernmental cooperation results from a failure to understand the essence of the EU, which does not involve such cooperation, or at least not only such cooperation. I have the impression that many political forces in Poland—to say nothing of society which never had a chance to learn about it—do not know exactly what the EU is. The simplest answer is that the EU is a certain necessity in the case of transnational problems. Security, the economy and transnational crime are problems with which European countries cannot cope on their own today. Therefore, certain new forms of cooperation are inevitable. For example, they involve a transfer of powers, which the Polish Constitution explicitly allows, with the result that certain state functions are now performed by Brussels, in other words EU authorities. Various people are opposed to this idea, but they do not understand the need for this. In the first pillar, the economy, the pressure to understand this is quite big. Moreover, one can see certain advantages from this, therefore it is accepted. In the third pillar, major progress has been achieved in this sphere in recent years, but the methods for reaching decisions are somewhat different there. The situation is the most difficult in the second pillar, in other words foreign policy, because everyone thinks there is still something that can be achieved on one's own, though everyone knows that joint action is essential.

Another remark about the Polish situation. I can understand it when someone says that he does not want a foreign minister in the EU. That is an unfortunate name, because everyone identifies this with the foreign minister in a country and with a single decision-making centre, which does not conform to the truth. Similarly, EU democracy is compared to national democracy, which leads to various misunderstandings, because there is no comparison. We can see the deep misunderstandings there. If someone does not want a free movement of manpower right away, I can understand that, because this involves certain political interests, a certain game. But I do not understand why people moan that an EU foreign minister will deprive us of our sovereignty.

That the Constitutional Treaty creates a quasi-state is one thesis. A second thesis professes the existence of a permanent opposition between a federalist Europe and a Europe of fatherlands. Well, the EU is already federalist, with priority accorded to EU law, with its institutions. The Constitutional Treaty is only a phase of the evolution. Therefore it should be stated clearly, and a little

perversely, that the EU/EC is already a quasi-state. The Community bodies that lay down the law exercise public authority on the territory of the member states, in other words they exercise state authority to a certain extent, whilst the judicial authorities and administration are becoming Community bodies to a certain extent. As long as these matters are not explained, there will be misunderstandings about a loss of sovereignty which Germany and France have allegedly already experienced, and we will do so soon. All this is reminiscent of a cheap cafe. I think it is Minister Rotfeld who said, though he was not the first to do so, that the Community is a certain social process and structure in Europe. There is something about it that every country dislikes. But if Polish policy is geared to the reaping of benefits like dishes from a menu, this policy will collapse, for such a trend leads to a disintegration of the EU structure. Of course, some countries can help us with this, but that might not end successfully. In the context of Polish foreign policy in 2005, I would suggest a better coordination of actions and the creation and proper use of a strong intellectual base in EU matters, because much remains to be done.

**Jarosław Bratkiewicz:** A cheap cafe is perhaps an exaggerated euphemism, Professor.

**Roman Kuźniar:** I am interested to hear what Director Bratkiewicz has to say. He is in the middle of the foreign service, the diplomatic service, which is nevertheless pro-European all the time and cannot be accused of any actions or initiatives that contradict the construction of Europe, especially today when the EU is experiencing momentary weakness and so many doubts are surrounding it. But perhaps one can see even more clearly from the point of view of the Foreign Ministry than from any other angle that Poland possesses what we can call a confederate nature, expressed in the fact that certain elements of the public administration or state authority are attempting to enforce their view of Poland's place in the EU and formulate their philosophy in that regard.

**Jarosław Bratkiewicz:** Professor, I promise that I will disengage from ideology and that I will tell the truth and nothing but the truth. What I am going to say is basic, because I do not deal particularly with EU issues. I believe that an evolution of thinking about the EU and everything connected with it is taking place among the Polish elites. At first, this thinking was sometimes superseded by cries like during a pre-election campaign, but now one can observe greater reflection. Firstly, I think that for us, the EU is becoming more important than NATO in a certain sense. Up to a certain time, the only topic was security and transatlantic relations. That is still important. Nevertheless, the EU is now becoming the main point of reference for us, mainly because Europe is our home

and our future. Secondly, fewer and fewer Poles view the EU solely as a horn of plenty from which one can break off something for oneself. Instead, there is talk of exploiting the opportunities presented by the EU and its funds for our development. Thirdly, support for the EU results from the realisation that the EU is a factor of integration and that thanks to it, today's Europe is different from the Europe of the 18<sup>th</sup>, 19<sup>th</sup> or the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, when the balance of forces was in our disfavour. Integrated Europe is friendly to us. Fourth, there was different thinking about Europe until 2004. The point was to catch up with the departing European train, so we gradually accelerated and in the end we succeeded in jumping onto it. However, only now can we feel—just like in NATO—that we are travelling in a specific direction and heading towards a specific destination. What direction, what destination? It is high time to consider these questions and answer them.

I think there is an increasingly deeper feeling in Poland that we must anchor ourselves to the EU to ensure that it remains a solidary structure and takes our wishes into consideration. But we must also consider the view of others, the views of the entire Community. Yes, there is increasing talk of national interests in the EU. That is both a good and a bad sign for us. We should realise our interests, but we should remember that they can collide with the interests of other, more powerful entities. The interests of the EU as a whole must not suffer as a result of such collisions, because that would be harmful to our interests. These are trivial truths, but it is worth recalling them every now and then.

Poland was often pointed to as a country that would not ratify the Constitutional Treaty. But the treaty did not collapse in Poland. Poland does not act in a non-solidary manner. Given the current dissonance about the treaty, we have to act responsibly in order not to enhance the dissonance.

It is not Poland that receives various visits by people from Russia who are basically intent on breaking the EU apart, because this way of thinking, or rather the way of thinking of their countries, is narrow-minded *realpolitik*, so that the EU become a concert of national interests.

There is only just beginning the debate on the subject of what the EU is and what European identity is, everything is still ahead of us. I think the Foreign Ministry has an important role to play here, and we of course will attempt to liven this debate. The point is where to hold this debate and what forum would guarantee a proper shape and energy for this debate, so that it is visible.

In Poland there is no shortage of people who think seriously of the EU as an institution in which the European, Western values provide the basis for integration, consensus and joint decision-making.

Of course, common EU foreign policy, especially vis-à-vis Eastern Europe, lies in our best interests. I think that Germany's declarations on this matter should be taken very seriously as evidence of Germany's pro-European attitude. The Germans say that the litmus paper of common foreign policy should be Eastern Europe. We should support this way of thinking.

**Roman Kuźniar:** I am pleased that our assessments of the European Union are concurrent, at least as far as the last year is concerned.

**Marek Madej:** The debate on the subject of what kind of EU we need is only just beginning, and it is a difficult beginning. But it is very disturbing that so far, the debate has concentrated on how EU membership is influencing the specific interests of certain parties on our domestic political scene. This is not a debate on whether the EU should be confederative, federative or a Europe of fatherlands. It is a manipulation of certain topics to suit the interests of a particular party, a certain distortion of the debate.

**Jarosław Bratkiewicz:** You are right.

**Marek Madej:** Unfortunately, when joining the EU and since that time, Poland has been in a kind of chronic pre-election campaign. This has largely determined the language about the nature and future of the EU, which has become infested with party colours. Now it is time to divest the EU of the parties, because it is national interests that are at stake, not those of individual political groups.

**Sławomir Dębski:** We should not demonize that aspect, because one must realise that European integration is used as an instrument in many EU member states, including France, Great Britain and Holland. If we monitor the pre-referendum debate in France, we will discover that the EU and French foreign policy were also used as instruments. There was no intellectual thinking on the future and path of European integration. Instead, attention was paid on how to use the EU, the Constitutional Treaty and enlargement order to combat the political adversaries in France.

**Jarosław Bratkiewicz:** I would like to add one more sentence if I may. Today we have a rather sceptical approach towards some Western European countries, but there is one thing that must be stressed—the political elites that brought about the EU's latest enlargement performed a great, very bold piece of work. It was indeed a demonstration of imagination and courage in thought and action. I believe there is still great potential inherent in the EU, for this is a unique, unusual venture. Not everything always moves along preset paths; sometimes movements are improvised and even chaotic. I also believe—and here I agree with the professor—that there is rather no justification for

perceiving the EU as a superpower. It seems more important to underline that we are the obvious beneficiaries of EU membership.

**Jerzy Kranz:** I agree that it was a very bold, good and far-sighted decision. But it was a mistake—I have in mind the western countries—to speed up work on the Constitutional Treaty, which was a certain political idea. I believe that the treaty *per se* is not a monster or great danger. Whatever kind of treaty is negotiated in the end, it will be similar to the Constitutional Treaty, because it will touch upon similar problems. However, that treaty was “badly sold” as a result of certain pressure on the Convention, to accelerate its promulgation. Apart from that, it coincided with an unfavourable period in Western Europe, as a result of which people voted in the referenda on other matters, and not on the text of the treaty.

Another thing—Poland and the Poles are already reaping many advantages from EU membership, but the Polish political elite has no enhanced concept of the development of the EU structure. People in Europe have various ideas, including the one about what to do if the treaty fails. In Poland, the new president has said that the “treaty is dead.” Why, I ask? It is the French and Dutch who killed it, and we are confirming their action. That shows that the new government and centres of authority have no idea about this matter. This requires a great political effort. Certain ideas appear in the West—I am not saying they are all wise—someone wants something more, someone else less, but everyone knows what they want, they have ready variants and reports, as well as lawyers and economists ready to work. But we merely keep saying that the treaty is dead and we repeat what we do not want to. All right, we have to say what we do not want, but we must also show the EU that we are a sensible and valuable partner. If we have no ideas of our own and merely criticise the decisions of others, consultations on what happens next will be held above our heads, and we will merely find out the results; in any case that is what is already happening. The beginnings of such an attitude could be observed already in 2004–2005, in the policy of the previous government, which nevertheless did not indulge in such far-reaching negation as the present one.

**Marek Madej:** That is why I am so worried about the instrumental treatment of EU topics, because now is the time for the member states to learn from each other and listen to each other’s proposals, whilst we in such conditions will neither listen nor present any cohesive proposals.

**Roman Kuźniar:** We have to praise the president, because when he said that the “treaty was dead,” he expressed the joy of the political formation which he belongs to and which is in power, and its greatest wish. That formation is

convinced that the treaty is dead, whether it really is or not. That shows that were it not for the French, we really could have played that role; in any case, it was announced by both the main formations when they prepared to assume power in Poland after the elections.

**Jarosław Bratkiewicz:** That would not have been easy last year.

**Roman Kuźniar:** The decision was not planned for last year. We know that the results of most surveys suggested that support for the treaty was above the required threshold. However, a pre-referendum campaign might have altered the picture.

**Jarosław Bratkiewicz:** That is a very interesting subject. First of all, in Poland the results of the elections were connected with a certain change in the way in which the EU is perceived, or rather some of its original member states. I think that the Poles interpreted French reactions to the symbolic Polish plumber as a kind of social reluctance by the West to receive new arrivals from Eastern Europe who are not completely civilised yet. And yet it turned out that the “old” EU is not threatened with a plague of cheap workers from Poland. However, this illustrated the distrust towards new members. In Poland, this was converted to party rhetoric to some measure.

Basically, I agree with Professor Kranz that if a new European treaty or other such document emerges, it will refer to the earlier treaty. I only wonder if our role really is to provide ready solutions in this regard. Perhaps we ought to consider a certain specialisation, thinking in terms of the future, for example on the problem of the EU borders or the Eastern dimension of EU policy.

**Jerzy Kranz:** You are talking about politics, but I was talking about the structure of the Constitutional Treaty, not its content. Of course the treaty does not define the final policy which the EU will pursue, there is a great deal of manoeuvring space there. The entire debate concentrated mainly on the institutional aspect, which forms the first and third parts of the treaty.

**Roman Kuźniar:** Nevertheless I will use my authority as chairman of this debate and suggest that we move on to the final point. Let us talk about the eastern direction of our foreign policy. I often wonder whether the term “eastern policy” which we have been using for all these years is relevant and adequate, or whether it is time to finally dispense with the myth that there is a single eastern policy. After all, such a policy cannot be introduced in view of all differentiation that has been occurring to the east of our borders recently. But that is another story.

In connection with my doubts about whether we should continue to use the term “eastern policy,” I would like to dwell briefly on Russia. I have the

impression that last year we witnessed the culmination of ill feelings that had been brewing for several years. As a result, Polish-Russian relations fell to a very low level. I wonder if Polish foreign policy played any role during all those years in which this fall occurred, in this culmination of animosity, ill feeling and very negative statements? After all last year our mutual relations were usually at rock bottom and are only now rebounding, as suggested by the latest signs. Did we perhaps make some mistakes regarding our knowledge of our partner or specific decisions? Was the entire control package, all the cards, really on Russia's side, and did Russia really completely control the condition, climate and content of our bilateral relations, which were poor in the political sphere, full of disruptions in the economic one and not free from misunderstandings as far as security is concerned? I have in mind the role which Poland plays vis-à-vis relations between NATO and Russia. How was it? Could we have prevented such a degradation of relations with Russia, or did our partner really have all the cards in his hand and played the cards on our behalf, as a result of which things happened the way they did, because they could not have happened any other way? Who would like to start off on this subject?

**Ślawomir Dębski:** The question about the adequacy of the term “eastern policy” is very appropriate indeed. I am one of those who have recently spoken out in public against the use of this term to define Poland's political activity vis-à-vis Eastern Europe. Instead, one should now talk of policy towards Eastern European countries, and the term “eastern policy” should finally pass into the history of Polish political thinking where it deserves a special place as an idea that has helped resolve many age-old disputes with our eastern neighbours. The concepts of Mieroszewski and Giedroyc possessed justification in the 1970s and 1980s, when the Soviet Union existed, the only entity that determined Polish political thinking about Eastern Europe. When the Soviet empire collapsed, the need for a differentiated Polish policy towards Belarus and Ukraine emerged. Our policy towards these countries was no longer coloured by our policy towards Russia or by the condition of Polish-Russian relations. Of course it also became necessary to pursue a separate policy towards Russia. Thus, an individualised approach to each Eastern European country evolved, and therefore the term “eastern policy” is a historical definition rather than a practical one. The best illustration of this was our engagement in the dissolution of the political crisis in Ukraine in 2004. Poland developed a broad-scale diplomatic campaign for the sake of a peaceful solution to the Ukrainian conflict, because a use of force by anyone might have been dangerous consequences to us, and not because we were concerned about this or that Russian policy towards Ukraine. At the same time, we lent support to the pro-European model of development which, on the

entire territory east of our borders, is competing with the considerably less-effective post-Soviet model. So even if the Russian Federation had been an ideal democracy in 2004, our stance and policy towards Ukraine would have been no different.

Unfortunately, the condition of Polish-Russian relations fell to a drastically low level last year. These relations have never been good since August 1993, but in 2005 we noted a negative record. To what extent was this attributable to our policy?

Following an analysis of that 12-month period, one must conclude that the major part of our policy was reactive. Poland reacted to the conduct of Russia which, during this time, effected the biggest change in its foreign policy since the turnabout in 1991, or even 1985—Russia ceased to seek an accord with its western partners by means of foreign policy, and instead began to open new fields of conflict with the West. Russian foreign policy became exceptionally assertive. Polish-Russian relations were merely a litmus paper of the changes to this policy.

Nevertheless, I would like to indicate two episodes for which Poland is responsible and which might have led to deterioration in Polish-Russian relations in 2005 or might even have accelerated this deterioration.

The first of these was President Aleksander Kwasniewski's interview for *Polityka* in December 2004, in which he discussed in detail his mediation in Ukraine and did not hide his pleasure in the fact that he managed to fool the Russians there. To be honest, I failed to see any political purpose in reflections of this sort. I think this interview was a mistake and had the worst possible effect on Polish-Russian relations. It is also possible that this interview imparted a certain personal character to Russia's policy towards Poland, and that subsequently, Russian policy towards Poland was the way it was, because Poland's president was Aleksander Kwaśniewski. In any case, a series of actions by Russia, e.g. the invitation to General Wojciech Jaruzelski to visit Moscow in May and its treatment of the Polish president during the 9 May festivities, might have been dictated by a dislike for Kwaśniewski.

The second episode that might have led to deterioration in Polish-Russian relations was Poland's reaction to the killing of Aslan Maskhadov. Poland's reaction could have been more subdued, especially because the details of this crime are still not fully known. I am not referring to the Polish foreign minister's critical reaction, because I feel this was within the permissible limits of negative assessments. I am referring to a statement by a Foreign Ministry official who, commenting on the minister's statement as it were, expanded it considerably. I

noticed that Minister Rotfeld's first commentary on this matter did not cause a Russian reaction. It was the Foreign Ministry official's statement that caused it. These are conjectures, of course. We do not know what has in fact happened. Perhaps the foreign minister's first comment simply escaped the Russians notice.

In any case, these two episodes have certainly not halted the deterioration in Polish-Russian relations.

Nevertheless, I think that if we have to blame someone for this state of relations last year, a major part of the blame has to be heaped upon the stronger side, in other words Russia. It is usually the stronger side that is to blame for poor state of relations, because it simply has better possibilities of shaping relations via its own policy. If the stronger side decides that it does not care for good relations with partner who has lesser potential, there is obviously not much that the weaker partner can do about it.

**Roman Kuźniar:** Ambassador, perhaps that was the inevitable price we had to pay for choosing the pro-Western option. The Russians dictated it to us in order to stop us or offload their frustration. In any case, any price was worth paying to prevent ourselves from being on the other side, perhaps not just to show the Russians a thing or two, but to pursue an eastern foreign policy more effectively, for I not share the views of Jerzy Giedroyc, God rest his soul, on the subject of our eastern policy. I believe that the higher is our position in the West, the higher is our status in the East. So perhaps we had to pay this price, we have paid it, we are where we wanted to be, and now we can play from the beginning. Perhaps that is how it was?

**Jarosław Bratkiewicz:** I do not think that Polish-Russian relations are governed by the logic of the post-cold war system any more. When we joined NATO in 1999, these relations were still part of a zero option—at least that is how many Russians saw it—and for many Russians our accession to NATO meant the loss of yet another territory and a part of their sphere of influence where many of their boys shed their blood. Now Russia is orientated primarily to the West, believing that thanks to this, it has the greatest development opportunities. Moreover, the West is not a real threat to Russia, whereas such threats might come from a different direction, e.g. from the South. Therefore, Russia seems to be heading towards becoming a part of the North to find itself closer to the West. In a certain sense, it is already becoming a part of the West in any case.

It seems to me that the problem of Polish-Russian relations that manifested itself so clearly last year is based on the fact that we have collided with Russia regarding one important issue, i.e. the status of the countries that have emerged from the Soviet Union, the identity of these countries, and the essence of their

sovereignty. To this very day, Russian statements are imbued with the feeling that there is such a thing as a Russian sphere of influence. This sphere includes countries that have special relations with Russia, whom Russia regards as its sphere of responsibility, and therefore, in the words of Khrushchev, “let the West not poke its nose in our Soviet garden.” We see this as a manifestation of the mentality of the zero option with the West.

To Moscow’s way of thinking, the Ukrainian elections were meant to underline that this country belongs to the post-Soviet zone and its specific political culture. In other words, in Ukraine special principles governing outside support for candidates were meant to apply. And yet another country successfully torpedoed this plan and prevented the application of these principles and thus raised its hand against an alliance of three Slav nations. That country was Poland. The specific principle of the policy pursued by Russia in its “own zone,” which might even have been silently accepted by some western capitals, was questioned by a neighbouring country that had had good—i.e. neutral—relations with Russia for years and in whom Russia had not been interested. Russia treated Poland as a transit county for its energy carrier and nothing else. And yet here all of a sudden, the Poles had acted effectively, put an end to these plans and stopped the rather mysterious operation of retaining Ukraine in the Russian sphere of influence. People began to ask: Who are these Poles, for God’s sake? What game are they playing? What do they want to achieve? Who is behind them? Russia’s hitherto strategy began to be browsed. Of course, representatives of the great Russian people had written no such thing about Poland and the Poles in this strategy. The only answer was to refer to stereotypes. The white blotches caused by the absence of strategic thinking about Poland were replaced by stereotypes, such as the Polish occupiers of the Kremlin in 1612. The first response to the arrogant Poles was the new Russian national holiday commemorating the year 1612. It is possible that the elements of such a response were also included in the Russian efforts to create the Northern Pipeline.

But generally, there are no objective reasons to believe that Polish-Russian relations must be bad. When Sergey Yastrzhembsky was in Poland, I tried to make him understand that out of all the major EU members, the Poles have the warmest sentiments towards the Russians. Poles have knowledge of the Russian language, to varying degrees of proficiency. There is no Russophobia, not even in ordinary interpersonal contacts, and there is no automatic repulsion towards people who speak Russian. Russian culture arouses interest. I know that people in Poland are interested in this. The Russians have a splendid literature, including modern literature, and excellent cinematography. The problem is that we cannot agree with the view that Ukraine belongs to the Eastern Slav zone

from which the Polish landlords are excluded. Let the Ukrainians themselves decide to whom they feel closer. We also feel that they are close to us, a fraternal people. We cannot accept the Russian argumentation that Eastern Slav fraternity is superior to all other forms of contacts between the Ukrainian people and other peoples.

**Jerzy Kranz:** Of course you are right, Mr. Bratkiewicz, as far as the post-Soviet zone is concerned. You are also right as far as culture and society are concerned. But is it not culture and society who finally decide on politics. We really have no problems with hatred on a social or cultural level. The problem is completely different. I will start with the *Ostpolitik* you talked about. The Germans are beginning to realise that they cannot pursue *Ostpolitik* the way they used to. There used to be a single *Ost*, with its centre in Moscow, and there were satellite countries. It made sense then. Looking at today's Russia, we see that the biggest difficulty is the fact that since the changes, Moscow has been unable or unwilling to formulate a policy towards Poland, Czechoslovakia, perhaps Romania or Hungary. That is changing a little, but where is it heading now? You wondered whether the stronger we will be in the West, the more important we will be in the East, or vice versa. That is a great problem of Polish politics, therefore it is very difficult for us to be important, I am not saying strong, in the East. Why? Because they do not want that. From our angle, there is no longer a single East. There is Ukraine, Belarus, etc. Our greatest difficulty is that the Russians are absolutely reluctant to treat us in subjective terms. It is difficult for us to exist there economically and politically. If we look at the work of the previous government, it was like this: Putin arrived, everything had to be arranged, and a lot of promises were made. After four years, everything finished with no results. Can one seek any blame on our part? In a certain sense yes, because our foreign policy is limited to management and reaction—that is the chief accusation against it, and does not apply to just 2005. Nevertheless it is even more difficult with the Russians than it is with the Germans and French.

In Russia, post-imperial trends are becoming stronger in two aspects. The Russians have realised that they are less significant since all the changes that took place in 1990, therefore they have backed two horses. The first of these is energy and the energy network, and the second is trading in weapons, in other words the development of a suitable weapons technology and trade. That is not all, of course, but those are the two chief tools of Russian policy. In these questions we are not counting on Russia. At the very most, our energy networks are attractive to take over.

That is why our policy will always have great difficulties in the East, leaving aside the bilateral and historical issues, which are difficult to settle, because

everyone has his own point of view. And since energy prices will rise, because China and everyone else is going to buy it, Russia will be in a good financial situation, which means that a socially and economically very weak country will be able to support itself on good financial crutches. Therefore we are going to have trouble. But I would put what you said the other way around, in other words we should attempt to have some significance in the West first, so that we can have any status in Russia. The view whereby we will exert greater influence on the West if we have good relations with Russia is a little anachronistic for me today.

**Roman Kuźniar:** I basically said the same thing, only I spoke too quickly. This is what I believe—the strength of our influence in the East will depend on our position in the West, and not, as Giedroyc claimed, that the road to the West leads via the East.

**Sławomir Dębski:** I agree almost entirely with the view that Poland has a good potential to shape the best possible relations with Russia. In Poland there is certainly no anti-Russian phobia that affects foreign policy. Of course there are certain spheres in which a conflict of interests occurs, but there is no doubt that Poland wants the Russian Federation to realise its rightful interests in the region. However, this should be as transparent as possible. Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's conduct before and immediately after ending his office, and the method of securing Russian interests in Lithuania, are not positive symptoms, unfortunately. If such practices become the rule for Russian activity in our region, there will be no accord and Poland will be compelled to counteract them with greater determination.

As for historical issues, I agree that most of them should be put aside, but the settlement of disputes about common history does not lie within the powers of politicians. I am saying this as a historian. However, not all historical matters possess a purely historical nature today. Some of them possess political significance, and of such importance that Poland will never be able to give up an attempt to settle them. One of them is the question of Poland's access to all documents on the subject of the crime of Katyn. That is an absolutely fundamental issue. I think we can discuss everything with the Russians, including the legal qualification—for instance I have serious doubts about the legal qualification adopted by the Institute for National Remembrance last year—but Poland will never be able to abandon its demand for access to absolutely every single document on the subject of this atrocity. No documents connected with this topic may remain secret any longer. This every Russian attempt to improve relations with Poland should meet this Polish fundamental need halfway.

**Jarosław Bratkiewicz:** The latest events have shown both the Polish and the Russian side that Polish-Russian political and diplomatic conflicts really do not lie in our interests. Neither side is winning. Last year, the Russians really launched an intense campaign to make it appear as if Poland was in the throes of Russophobia, but the campaign failed. I think that there are communities in the West who would love to hear stories about Poland's anti-Russian obsession, but these stories failed to convince those circles who think seriously. Besides, it transpired that the Poles have a talent for describing what is happening in Russia in a convincing manner, and the Russians have also realised this. I agree that Polish-Russian relations will be difficult, but I also have the impression that we are heading towards overcoming these difficulties, though we still have some way to go. Nonetheless, Moscow has perceived Poland as a country with whom it is better to have good relations, because in the end, the advantages are greater than the disadvantages. If the Russians come to the EU and say: listen, our relations with the Poles are quite good, they will benefit by this. What is more, the Russians are beginning to understand this. We also know that if we tell the EU: listen, our relations with the Russians are quite good and that there is no Russophonia, then we will also benefit by this. Good relations are convenient to both sides.

It is true that the Russians feel slightly disturbed by the fact that Poland has become a successful country after shaking off its Soviet shackles. They also know, though they will not admit it, that their Slavonic, Soviet friendship was a factor of regression for us. They prefer to repeat that we used to be friends, though it suddenly transpired that we fared much better without this friendship.

**Jerzy Kranz:** First, I think the path of politics towards a pro-democratic change is correct. Europe should not accept any barbarianism within its borders. Second, against this background we will have certain problems with Russia, because we are becoming active in the post-Soviet area. Third, there is no doubt that the changes in Belarus cannot be fast, but we must be politically determined. The problem is that Polish policy towards the post-Soviet area possesses little energy, even when some experts put forth ideas. For instance, remember that the first thing the previous government did was to close down the Byelorussian radio channel on Radio Polonia. And what can be done? One must exert influence on civic societies. I must say that I am surprised that for years, Poland has been unable to open a radio channel for Belarus. Yet it only takes a small room like this one and a dozen people. I think that is the basis for any sensible policy towards Belarus, though we will get into trouble for this. But Lukashenko is not immortal.

**Jarosław Bratkiewicz:** The Belorussian problem seems insoluble. We are dealing with the last remnant of the Soviet Union, existing within the borders of a potentially national state, but a state devoid of a political nation. It is inhabited by the heirs of Soviet people. And how do Soviet people react? Alexandre Zinoviev described the character and mentality of *Homo Sovieticus*, who is capable of the craziest actions when exercising power, rigging elections and reacting crazily in an apparently neutral situation. That cannot be foreseen.

**Jerzy Kranz:** I agree with you generally, but this opinion cannot be presented as a concept of Polish policy. Thirty years ago people in the West said that we would be in the Soviet camp for another hundred years. I agree that radical changes will not come to Belarus quickly and that there is no political nation there yet. In Ukraine the situation is somewhat different than in Belarus. But someone has to help them.

**Jarosław Bratkiewicz:** I agree with you entirely, but I do not think we can assume that the changes in Belarus will succeed just because they succeeded in Poland. Nevertheless, we have to be energetic and consider where the driving force of change is. This is probably young people, especially in large cities. We have to get through to them. The political opposition is no doubt such a force, and a part of the nomenklatura is as well. Of course the nomenklatura is acting in a conformist manner, but somewhere deep inside it feels ashamed of the system in which it has to operate.

**Sławomir Dębski:** I would like to describe in support of the professor's argument a minor incident which happened to me during a conference on the subject of European neighbourhood policy. Talking about the objectives of this policy, a few experts from Western Europe referred to "stabilisation" at every possible opportunity. In the end I became a little annoyed and asked them what they meant by that term, because Aleksandr Lukashenko also uses it. But to him, it means a consolidation of his regime. Silence fell. No one dared answer. With this experience in my memory, I think we should avoid the term "stabilisation" when talking about policy towards Belarus. The EU is certainly not interested in stabilisation in Lukashenko style.

I think 2005 saw a breakthrough in Polish foreign policy towards Belarus. Previously, our stance towards that country could be explained by the fact that we were suffering from a delusion that dialogue with Lukashenko was essential and that he could somehow be made civilised in that way. And yet after the events in Ukraine in 2004, he drew the conclusion that Poland was responsible for the processes occurring in Ukraine. That is also why he struck at the Union of Poles in Belarus. The actions of the Byelorussian authorities before the

presidential elections showed that they wanted to prevent a repetition of the Ukrainian scenario in Belarus. No doubt that has consequences as far as relations with Poland are concerned. It will be necessary to pursue a long-term policy targeted at young people and supporting the Belarusian émigré community. One must realise that if changes occur there one day, it is today's émigrés who will build this state.

**Roman Kuźniar:** I have certain hopes regarding Lukashenko himself, and wonder what yours are. In the final phase of their rules, dictators tend to make mistakes that increase the potential for change. I have the impression that Lukashenko is losing his cool, his nerves are frayed, and he is starting to commit mistakes which might make the Belarusians realise certain things, however much a political nation, a nation separated from the East Slavonic mass, they may be. Perhaps the style of government will be unpleasant for them?

**Sławomir Dębski:** Lukashenko is stopping up the last air vents of security, which may prove dangerous.

**Jarosław Bratkiewicz:** What you have said sounds like a footnote to all this. I must say I was surprised to hear some very characteristic opinions from Ukraine and Moldova about Belarus. For many simple people there, Belarus is a country of success. Stalin once said that socialism can be built in one separate country. Lukashenko has succeeded in building socialism in one separate province, the province of Belarus. This is socialism with a human face, in other words the kind of socialism where murders take place but not excessively, and where things get stolen but to a moderate extent. This is a country of success for those who escape from freedom and need a paternal state to feed them. That is a paradox. One would have thought that a stake had been driven through the Soviet monster, but it is still alive. For people who are frustrated with the transformation that has turned out to be a great criminal revolution and has caused extreme social differentiation, Belarus is an oasis of little stability. But a little stability is unstable these days.

**Roman Kuźniar:** Unfortunately, that is a pinch of scepticism as far as the success of our plans vis-à-vis Belarus is concerned. Gentlemen, thank you very much for taking part in the debate.

**VI.**

**Annexes**



# Chronicle of Poland's Foreign Relations in 2005

## General Issues

5.01. Professor Adam Daniel Rotfeld, hitherto secretary of state in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was appointed to the office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

21.01. In the Sejm, Minister A. D. Rotfeld presented an exposé on basic directions of Polish foreign policy in 2005.

26–27.01. The celebrations of the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the liberation of the Auschwitz–Birkenau concentration camp were held. 46 foreign government delegations participated. President Aleksander Kwaśniewski had a meeting in Cracow with President of Israel Moshe Katsav, President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko and Vice-President of the United States Dick Cheney, who arrived for the celebrations. After the ceremony, the Polish president met with the president of Russia, Vladimir Putin.

28–30.01. President A. Kwaśniewski participated in the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, where he participated in a plenary session devoted to the future of Ukraine in Europe. He also held talks with: the President of Switzerland Samuel Schmid, the President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili, the Prime Minister of Egypt, Ahmed Nazif and the Prime Minister of Pakistan Shaukat Aziz.

17–18.02. Attorney General of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Ms. Carla del Ponte, paid a visit to Poland, where she held talks with Minister of Foreign Affairs A. D. Rotfeld and met with President A. Kwaśniewski and the Speaker of the Sejm Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz.

10–11.03. Prime Minister Marek Belka took part in the International Summit on democracy, terrorism and security, organised in Madrid for the purpose of commemorating the victims of the terrorist attack from before a year; several hundred politicians and experts from 55 countries participated. The Prime Minister M. Belka took part in a panel session and held talks with the Prime Minister of Greece Kostas Karamanlis and the Prime Minister of Romania Calin Popescu–Tariceanu.

5.05. The Prime Minister of Poland Marek Belka, the Prime Minister of Israel Ariel Sharon and the Prime Minister of Hungary Ferenc Gyurcsány participated in the March of the Living, organised annually on the area of the former camp of Auschwitz–Birkenau.

30–31.08. 29 representatives of foreign delegations participated in celebrations commemorating the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Independent Self–Governing Trade Union “Solidarity.” President Aleksander Kwaśniewski met with the participants of

the International Conference "From Solidarity to freedom." Prime Minister M. Belka held talks with the Prime Minister of Belgium Guy Verhofstadt, the Prime Minister of Latvia Aigars Kalvitis, the Prime Minister of Croatia Ivo Sanader, the Prime Minister of Finland Matti Vanhanen, the Prime Minister of Macedonia Vlado Bučkovski and the Prime Minister of Estonia Andrus Ansip.

7–10.09. Around 1,200 politicians, scientists and entrepreneurs participated in the 15<sup>th</sup> Economic Forum in Krynica. Prime Minister M. Belka met with the head of Slovak government, Mikuláš Dzurinda. President A. Kwaśniewski, together with the President of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus took part in the ceremony of unveiling of the monument of Nikifor.

31.10. At the request of the Prime Minister, President A. Kwaśniewski appointed Prof. Stefan Meller for the office of: the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the head of the Committee of European Integration.

8.11. A meeting of Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz with the heads of diplomatic missions, accredited to Poland, was held in Warsaw. The Prime Minister emphasised the need to continue "all the good things" in the foreign policy and to make changes in the areas where the activities of the government were "not dynamic enough."

## **Multilateral Cooperation**

### **The Visegrad Group**

10.06. In Kazimierz Dolny, a meeting was held of heads of governments of the Visegrad Group states: M. Belka from Poland, Jiří Paroubek from the Czech Republic, Ferenc Gyurcsány from Hungary and Mikuláš Dzurinda from Slovakia. After the meeting, a joint communiqué was issued. The Prime Ministers of the Visegrad Group states held a meeting with the Prime Minister of Ukraine, Yulia Tymoshenko, and participated in the presentation of International Pilot Training Centre in Dęblin.

13.07. In the seat of the Hungarian parliament in Budapest a meeting of the Visegrad Group states was held dedicated mostly to the future budget of the European Union.

30.08. A meeting was held in Budapest of the Prime Ministers of the Visegrad Group states with the President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso.

30.09. A meeting was held in Wisła of the Presidents of the Visegrad Group states: A. Kwaśniewski from Poland, Václav Klaus from the Czech Republic, Ivan Gašparovič from Slovakia and László Sólyom from Hungary. The meeting was dedicated to the issues of European and regional policy.

2.12. Prime Minister K. Marcinkiewicz participated in the meeting of the Visegrad Group states held in Budapest. The meeting was of a working nature and was dedicated to the issues related to the future EU budget. Heads of governments of the Visegrad Group states met with the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Tony Blair, who was paying a visit to Hungary at that time.

## NATO

31.01–1.02. President of the Parliamentary Assembly of NATO Simon Lunn paid a working visit to Warsaw.

12.02. Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. D. Rotfeld, participated in the international conference on security held in Munich. One of the issues on the agenda was the German proposal of reform of the Atlantic Alliance.

20–21.02. President A. Kwaśniewski participated in the NATO summit in Brussels and in a meeting of heads of NATO states with the President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko. At that time a meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Council was held with the participation of Minister of Foreign Affairs A. D. Rotfeld.

1–4.04. Speaker of the Senate Longin Pastusiak took part in the meeting of the Standing Committee of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Reykjavik.

11.04. Speaker of the Senate Longin Pastusiak took part in an annual meeting of the members of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly with the North Atlantic Council, held in Brussels.

21.04. Polish Foreign Minister A.D. Rotfeld paid a visit to Vilnius, where an informal meeting of Foreign Ministers of 26 NATO states, Russia and Ukraine was held. Issues related to the political reform of the Alliance, to the co-operation with the European Union, the United Nations, Ukraine and Russia as well as Middle East issues. An agreement was signed on the transit of Alliance soldiers over the territory of Russia.

24–25.05. Foreign Minister A.D. Rotfeld participated in EAPC Security Forum—a meeting of representatives of NATO states governments and partner countries from Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council held at Åre (Sweden). 600 delegates from 47 countries participated, including 15 Foreign Ministers from NATO member states and allied countries from North Africa and Central Asia. The meeting was dedicated to crisis management issues—from the Balkans to Central Asia.

23.11. President A. Kwaśniewski hosted the Chairman of NATO Military Committee, Gen. Raymond Henault, with the purpose of discussing Poland's achievements as North Atlantic Alliance member state, including the participation of our soldiers in missions abroad and of making an assessment of the present state and prospects of security in Europe and in the world.

## OSCE

20.07. The Foreign Minister A.D. Rotfeld participated in a Vienna conference devoted to the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary of signing of the Final Act of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe. He also held talks with the Foreign Minister of Austria Ursula Plassnik.

29–30.09. An annual Review Meeting of the Human dimension of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe was held in Warsaw with the participation of representatives of 55 OSCE states and representatives of international and non-governmental organisations.

5–6.12. The Foreign Minister S. Meller participated in the 13<sup>th</sup> meeting of OSCE Ministerial Council held in Ljubljana. During the talks activities of the Organisation in 2005 were reviewed and the direction of activities for 2006 was set.

## UN

24.01. On a special UN session summoned with the purpose of celebrating the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz-Birkenau camp, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan promised that the UN will combat all signs of anti-Semitism and racism.

8.02. The Foreign Minister A.D. Rotfeld paid a visit to the UN seat in New York City, where he met *inter alia* with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. The politicians discussed issues related to the reform of the Organisation and the preparations for the UN summit.

9.05. For the first time in UN history, a special celebration was held devoted to the commemoration of the victims of World War II. The Polish delegation was headed by Foreign Minister A.D. Rotfeld.

13–22.09. The 60<sup>th</sup> session of General Assembly of the UN was held in New York City with the participation of Foreign Minister A.D. Rotfeld, who took part in the general debate. In order to celebrate the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the establishment of the UN, a meeting of heads of over 170 member states was held, major theme of which was the future of the UN (16.09). President A. Kwaśniewski gave a speech during the meeting.

## The Council of Europe

23.02. A high-level meeting of the Council of Europe and OSCE, as well as a session of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe were held in Strasbourg. Foreign Minister A.D. Rotfeld, who participated in the meetings, had also a meeting with Slovenian Foreign Minister Dimitrij Rupel.

30–31.03. Foreign Minister A.D. Rotfeld paid a visit to Moldova as President of Council of Ministers of the Council of Europe. In Chişinău (Kishinev), he held talks

with Prime Minister Vasile Tarlev, the Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Minister Andrei Stratan, Speaker of the parliament Marian Lupu. He also paid a visit to President Vladimir Voronin. In Tiraspol, he had a meeting with representatives of separatist authorities of the so-called Republic of Transnistria.

27–28.04. The Polish delegation, headed by Foreign Minister A.D. Rotfeld, participated in the meeting of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. The chief of Polish diplomacy, as President of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, presented to the Assembly the report from the activities of the Committee, including, *inter alia*, a summary of the hitherto achievements of the Polish presidency. The delegation of Polish MPs had a meeting with the President of the Assembly René van der Linden, Secretary General of the Council of Europe Terry Davis and the President of the European Court of Human Rights Luzius Wildhaber.

16–17.05. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Summit of the Council of Europe was held in Warsaw, which adopted the Warsaw Declaration, Action Plan for the coming years and three conventions: on the prevention of terrorism; on laundering, search, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds from crime and on the financing of terrorism and on action against trafficking in human beings. President A. Kwaśniewski had a meeting with the President of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus, of Moldova Vladimir Voronin, of Latvia Vaira Vike-Freiberga, of Romania Traian Băsescu, as well as with the Prime Minister of Portugal José Sócrates and the Deputy Prime Minister of the United Kingdom John Prescott. Prime Minister Marek Belka held talks with the Prime Minister of Croatia Ivo Sanader, of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan and with the Deputy Prime Minister of the United Kingdom John Prescott. A.D. Rotfeld talked to the Foreign Minister of Russia, Sergey Lavrov.

25.10. Ambassador of Poland, Piotr Świtalski, on behalf of the Polish government, signed in the seat of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, the Revised European Social Charter (adopted by the Council of Europe on 3 May 1996).

### **The Weimar Triangle**

19.05. The summit of the Weimar Triangle states—Poland, France and Germany—was held in Nancy, with the participation of President A. Kwaśniewski, President Jacques Chirac and Chancellor Gerhard Schröder.

27.06. A meeting of foreign ministers of the Weimar Triangle states was held in Warsaw. The Ministers paid a visit to A. Kwaśniewski and had a meeting with Prime Minister M. Belka.

## The European Union

7.01. Foreign Minister A.D. Rotfeld took part in an extraordinary meeting of the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), held in Brussels, summoned in relation to disastrous effects of the earthquake in South-East Asia.

22.02. The Polish delegation, headed by Prime Minister M. Belka, participated in the European Union-United States summit held in Brussels. During the meeting with President George W. Bush, the leaders of 25 EU states discussed, including the situation in Iraq, Iran, the Middle East peace process, as well as relations with Eastern neighbours of the enlarged Union. Foreign Minister A.D. Rotfeld had a meeting—together with other EU states ministers—with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. He also had an individual conversation with the chief of British diplomacy Jack Straw.

18.03. President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso paid a working visit to Warsaw, where he had a meeting with Prime Minister M. Belka and took part in a conference “The Lisbon Strategy—time to act.”

22–23.03. Prime Minister Marek Belka and Foreign Minister A.D. Rotfeld took part in the meeting of the European Council in Brussels, where they had a meeting with President of the European Parliament Josep Borrell Fontenelles and—together with the Prime Minister of Lithuania Algirdas Brazauskas and the Prime Minister of Latvia A. Kalvitis—with President of the European Commission J.M. Barroso.

6–7.05. A delegation of Polish MPs, headed by the Speaker of the Senate L. Pastusiak, took part in the Conference of the Speakers of European Union Parliaments, held in Budapest.

10–11.05. Secretary General of the Council of European Union, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, paid a visit to Warsaw. His meetings with Foreign Minister A.D. Rotfeld and Prime Minister M. Belka concerned, *inter alia*, the development of Common Foreign and Security Policy as well as EU's neighbourhood policy. J. Solana had a meeting with President A. Kwaśniewski and the Speaker of the Sejm W. Cimoszewicz.

2.06. Prime Minister M. Belka visited Luxembourg for intergovernmental consultations before the summit of the European Council. He had a meeting with the Prime Minister of Luxembourg Jean-Claude Juncker.

10.06. Foreign Minister A.D. Rotfeld took part in a meeting of EU Foreign Ministers held in Luxembourg.

16–17.06. Prime Minister M. Belka and Foreign Minister A.D. Rotfeld visited Brussels, where they participated in the meeting of the European Council and had a meeting with the President of the European Parliament J.P. Fontenelles.

21–22.06. Foreign Minister A.D. Rotfeld visited Brussels for International Conference on Iraq, organised jointly by the European Union and the U.S. Delegations and 84 states and international organisations that are engaged in stabilisation and reconstruction of Iraq participated. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan was also present.

30.06. The President of the European Commission, J.M. Barroso, paid a visit to Warsaw, where he had a meeting with Danuta Hübner, EU Commissioner for Regional Policy, and Minister A.D. Rotfeld. J.M. Barroso also paid a visit to President A. Kwaśniewski.

1–2.09. Minister A.D. Rotfeld took part in the meeting of EU Foreign Ministers in Newport, where he had a meeting with the head of British diplomacy Jack Straw.

27.10. Prime Minister M. Belka took part in an informal meeting of heads of states and governments of the EU, held in Surrey near London, where preparations for the December EU summit were discussed.

7.11. Foreign Minister S. Meller took part in the GAERC meeting in Brussels.

21.11. Minister S. Meller participated in the GAERC meeting in Brussels.

22.11. In the Presidential Palace in Warsaw, President A. Kwaśniewski had a meeting with EU Council Secretary General, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy J. Solana. During the meeting, the politicians discussed current issues concerning external relations of the European Union.

23.11. Prime Minister K. Marcinkiewicz, paid a visit to Brussels—his first foreign visit as Prime Minister. The most important topic of the talks with the head of the European Commission J.M. Barroso and then with the head of the European Parliament J. Borrell was the EU budget for the years 2007–2013.

28.11. Prime Minister K. Marcinkiewicz participated in a meeting of 38 representatives of the EU and the Mediterranean states, held in Barcelona. The Euro–Mediterranean summit was organised on the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the commencement of the Barcelona process, the aim of which was to tighten co-operation between those countries in the field of politics, security, economy and culture. K. Marcinkiewicz also held bilateral talks on the project of EU budget for the years 2007–2013, *inter alia* with the Prime Minister of Spain José Luis Zapatero, the Prime Minister of the Netherlands Jan Peter Balkenende and with the Chancellor of Austria Wolfgang Schäussel.

29.11. President A. Kwaśniewski paid a working visit to Brussels, where he had a meeting with the Prime Minister of Belgium Guy Verhofstadt, with NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer as well as with the President of the European Commission J.M. Barroso. President Kwaśniewski was also presented with the award of the magazine *European Voice* in the category “Statesman of the

Year 2005” for the role he played in securing the peaceful course of the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine.

12.12. Foreign Minister S. Meller represented Poland on the GAERC meeting in Brussels.

15–17.12. A meeting of the European Council was held in Brussels, where the EU budget for the years 2007–2013 was agreed upon. The Polish delegation was headed by Prime Minister K. Marcinkiewicz, who was accompanied by Foreign Minister S. Meller and Secretary of State in the Office of the Committee for European Jarosław Pietras.

### **Co-operation in Central Europe**

12.01. Foreign Minister A.D. Rotfeld took part in a meeting of Foreign Ministers of Regional Partnership comprising Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary. Politicians discussed the perspectives of EU-Ukraine relations, relations of the EU with the West Balkan states and EU's regional policy.

27.05. An annual conference of Foreign Ministers of Central European Initiative states was held in Tatranská Lomnica (Slovakia).

10–11.06. Speaker of the Senate L. Pastusiak took part in the 4<sup>th</sup> Conference of the Speakers of the Parliaments of Regional Partnership States in Bled (Slovenia).

14–15.10. An annual 12<sup>th</sup> Meeting of Presidents of Central Europe was held in Zagreb, with the participation of President A. Kwaśniewski. After the plenary meeting, A. Kwaśniewski had a meeting with the President of Croatia Stjepan Mesić, whom he assured about Polish support for Croatian efforts to enter the EU. During an official dinner, held by the President of Croatia, A. Kwaśniewski gave a toast on behalf of all invited presidents. In Zagreb, the Polish president met with the head of the presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina Mirko Jović.

24–25.11. In Pieszczany (Slovakia), an annual summit of Central European Initiative states was held with the participation of Poland represented by Deputy Prime Minister Ludwik Dorn. The leading topic was the integration of the West Balkans with the European Union and continuation of this process in further CEE states. Working meetings of L. Dorn with the Prime Minister of Moldova Vasil Tarlev were held during the summit.

### **Other**

21.03. In Kiev, trilateral consultations of Foreign Ministers of Poland A.D. Rotfeld, of Germany Joschka Fischer and of Ukraine Borys Tarasyuk were held, devoted to the perspectives of development of cooperation of Ukraine with

European institutions. The ministers were hosted by the President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko.

9–10.06. 13<sup>th</sup> session on the Ministerial Council of Baltic Sea States was held in Szczecin with the participation of Foreign Ministers or Secretary of State of: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Lithuania, Latvia, Germany, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden and a European Commission representative. Polish Foreign Minister A.D. Rotfeld held bilateral talks with Foreign Ministers of Lithuania Antanas Valionis, of Russia Sergey Lavrov and of Iceland David Oddsson.

27.06. Foreign Minister A.D. Rotfeld invited for an annual meeting with Polish ambassadors the Foreign Ministers of Germany J. Fischer, of France Philippe Douste-Blazy and the British Minister for Europe Douglas Alexander. The Ministers were also met by Prime Minister M. Belka.

18.08. A meeting of presidents of Poland A. Kwaśniewski, of Ukraine V. Yushchenko, of Lithuania V. Adamkus and of Georgia M. Saakashvili was held in Crimea. Relations with Russia, Polish–Ukraine relations, co-operation in the region as well as the situation of Polish minority in Belarus were discussed. According to A. Kwaśniewski, Presidents of Ukraine, Lithuania and Georgia shared Polish anxieties with regard to Belarus.

1–2.09. Speaker of the Senate L. Pastusiak visited Berlin, where he participated in the 7<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the European Senates.

## **Bilateral Relations**

### **Afghanistan**

20–21.10. The Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, Abdullah Abdullah, paid a working visit to Warsaw, where he had a meeting with Foreign Minister A.D. Rotfeld.

### **Albania**

6–8.02. The Foreign Minister of Albania, Kastriot Islami, paid a working visit to Warsaw. During the meeting with Polish Foreign Minister A.D. Rotfeld, the politicians discussed the state of bilateral relations and exchanged views on international issues, particularly on the issues of security and co-operation in the region, Euro-Atlantic and European aspirations of Albania and global terrorist threat. K. Islami was hosted by Prime Minister M. Belka and paid visits to the Sejm and the Senate.

### **Algeria**

13–16.02. An official delegation of the Senate, headed by the Speaker L. Pastusiak, paid a visit to Algeria and was received in the Council of the Nation by its

President Abdelkader Bensalah. It also had a meeting with President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the President of the National People's Assembly Amar Saidani, Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia, Internal Affairs Minister Yazid Zerhouni and Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Belkhad.

### **Austria**

2.11. President A. Kwaśniewski paid an official visit to Austria, where he had a meeting with President Heinz Fischer and with the President of the National Council Andreas Khol.

### **Azerbaijan**

30–31.03. The President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Alijev, paid an official visit to Poland. He had a meeting with President A. Kwaśniewski and participated together with him in plenary talks of the delegations of Poland and Azerbaijan. He also took part in the ceremony of signing of agreements between the two governments: on co-operation in the field of defence, on economic co-operation and on co-operation and mutual aid in customs issues.

### **Belgium**

27–28.03. The Belgian royal couple, Albert II and Paola, paid a visit to Poland. The guests, together with A. Kwaśniewski and his spouse, visited Cracow and spent Easter in the residence in Wisła.

### **Cambodia**

4–6.01. At the invitation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Cambodia, Hor Namhong, paid an official visit to Poland. Major topics of talks with Minister W. Cimoszewicz, were: development of bilateral economic cooperation and issues related to Polish and international development assistance for Cambodia. During a meeting with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Social Policy Izabela Jaruga-Nowacka, bilateral relations, cooperation within ASEM and possibilities of help from Polish specialists in monument conservation in Cambodia were discussed. Hor Namhong was also received by President A. Kwaśniewski and held meetings in the Sejm and the Senate.

### **Croatia**

7–8.02. An official delegation of the Sejm, headed by its Speaker W. Cimoszewicz, paid an official visit to Zagreb.

18.02. President A. Kwaśniewski took part in the solemn swearing of the President of Croatia, Stjepan Mesić, for his second term of office.

## Cyprus

16–17.03. President A. Kwaśniewski paid an official visit to the Republic of Cyprus, where he had a meeting with President Tassos Papadoulos. A. Kwaśniewski gave a lecture at the University of Cyprus under the title “Poland and the Republic of Cyprus in the United Europe.”

7–8.06. The delegation of the Czech Chamber of Deputies, headed by its president Lubomir Zaoralka, paid a visit to Warsaw.

20–21.07. Prime Minister M. Belka paid a working visit to the Czech Republic, where he had a meeting with Prime Minister J. Paroubek and President V. Klaus. The politicians discussed, *inter alia*, the state of bilateral relations and the issues related to the budget of the European Union. M. Belka had also meetings with Deputy Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies Vojtech Filip and the Speaker of the Senate Premysl Sobotka.

22.07. Working talks of Foreign Ministers of the Czech Republic Cyril Svoboda and of Poland A.D. Rotfeld were held in Cieszyn. Current European affairs were discussed as well as the issues concerning the co-operation of the two countries in EU and regional dimension. In the second part of the talks representatives of Polish and Czech regional and local authorities and of the Cieszyn Silesia Euroregion took part.

25.11. Foreign Minister S. Meller paid a working visit to Prague, where he had a meeting with Czech Foreign Minister C. Svoboda. During the meeting the politicians discussed the issues of bilateral and European co-operation and the co-operation within the Visegrad Group, as well as transatlantic relations. Minister Meller presented the assumptions of the foreign policy of the new government.

## Denmark

29.11. Danish Foreign Minister, Per Stig Møller paid a visit to Warsaw, where he discussed with Minister S. Meller the major issues concerning the cooperation between the two states, the European integration as well as situation in Iraq and in the Middle East. Major topic of talks of the Danish minister with Prime Minister K. Marcinkiewicz was the cooperation of the two states within the European Union.

## Egypt

31.05–3.06. A delegation of the People’s Assembly of the Republic of Egypt, headed by its president Ahmed Fathy Sorour, paid a visit to Poland at the invitation of the Speaker of the Sejm W. Cimoszewicz.

## Estonia

5–6.07. President A. Kwaśniewski paid an official visit to Estonia, where he had a meeting with President Arnold Rüütel and Prime Minister Andrus Ansip. The

politicians discussed the issues of bilateral cooperation, including investment and cultural one, as well as the problems related to the EU. An agreement on cooperation between the Museum of the Polish Army in Warsaw and General Johan Laidoner Museum in Tallinn was signed in the presence of the two presidents.

### **Finland**

25–28.01. At the invitation of the Speaker of the Sejm W. Cimoszewicz, the delegation of the Eduskunta of the Republic of Finland, headed by Paavo Lipponen, paid an official visit. The Finnish MPs took part in the celebrations of the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the liberation of the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp.

2.12. Head of the Finnish government, M. Vanhanen, paid a working visit to Poland. During the meeting with K. Marcinkiewicz, he discussed bilateral relations, including possibilities of tightening of economic cooperation between the two states, as well as cooperation within the EU.

### **France**

13.01. French Foreign Minister, Michel Barnier, paid a working visit to Warsaw. He held talks with Polish Foreign Minister A.D. Rotfeld on the European integration, transatlantic relations, Eastern policy and the situation in the Middle East. He was also received by President A. Kwaśniewski. Minister Barnier met MPs and gave a lecture to students of the Warsaw School of Economics. He took part, together with Minister Rotfeld, in the opening of the new building of the embassy of France.

28.02. A Polish-French summit was held in Arras with the participation of presidents A. Kwaśniewski and J. Chirac. Delegations of a few ministries took part as well, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In an “Arras declaration,” adopted at the end of the meeting, it was emphasised that the parties reached an agreement as regards issues discussed within the European Union and that “they would make attempts to take converging standpoints and to undertake joint initiatives.”

16.03. During his visit to Israel, President A. Kwaśniewski met with the Prime Minister of France, Jean-Pierre Raffarin, who also visited this country. The politicians talked about political relations between Poland and France and about some issues discussed during the Arras summit. They also discussed the state of economic cooperation, in particular as regards French investments in Poland.

7.09. The Internal Affairs Minister of France, Nicolas Sarkozy, paid a visit to Warsaw. He announced that he would make a demand “in the near future” for including Poland into the group of five largest EU countries that is shaping the policy of the Community in justice and home affairs.

6–7.12. Foreign Minister S. Meller paid a working visit to Paris, where he held talks with French Foreign Minister P. Douste-Blazy, Minister for European Affairs Catherine Colonna and with French deputies. The major topic were European issues, and the New Financial Perspective in particular. Minister Meller also outlined major directions of foreign policy of the new government.

### **Germany**

25–26.02. President A. Kwaśniewski paid a working visit to Berlin. He met with President Horst Köhler, with whom he discussed the issues related to European policy, and to EU-Russia and EU-Ukraine relations in particular. President Kwaśniewski took part in the Bertelsmann Foundation Forum “European Talks” and—together with the President of the Bundestag Wolfgang Thierse—he visited the exhibition “Warsaw—the capital of freedom. The Warsaw Rising, August–October 1944” in the Memorial of the German Resistance.

4.03. Deputy Chancellor and Foreign Minister of Germany Joschka Fischer paid a working visit to Warsaw, where he met with Polish Foreign Minister A.D. Rotfeld. The two ministers presided over the plenary talks of the two delegations. J. Fischer paid also a visit to President A. Kwaśniewski.

26.04. German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder paid a working visit to Warsaw. During his meeting with Prime Minister M. Belka, he discussed issues related to the EU and Polish-German relations.

28–29.04. An official delegation of the Senate, headed by Speaker L. Pastusiak, paid an official visit to Berlin.

30.04. President A. Kwaśniewski paid a visit to Berlin, where—together with President H. Köhler—he took part in the inauguration of the Polish-German Year 2005–2006.

22.06. President A. Kwaśniewski paid a working visit to Germany and had a meeting with President H. Köhler. He also took part in celebrations on the occasion of the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the German Institute of Polish Culture.

25.07. President A. Kwaśniewski paid a visit to Germany, where he met with Chancellor G. Schröder and took part in the World Congress of the German Central European Knowledge Society. In the presence of the two politicians a statement was signed on joint financing of the foundation supporting the Viadrina European University.

30.08.–1.09. German President H. Köhler paid an official visit to Poland, where he met with President A. Kwaśniewski and Prime Minister M. Belka. Major topics of talks were bilateral issues and common history. Both presidents took part in a ceremony of setting of a foundation stone under the building of the new embassy of Germany in Warsaw, in a special session of the conference “From Solidarity to

Freedom” in Gdańsk and in a ceremony at the Heroes of Westerplatte monument commemorating the 66<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the outbreak of World War II.

2.12. Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel paid a visit to Warsaw. One of the major topics of talks with K. Marcinkiewicz were the issues related to the EU budget for the coming years and mutual relations, particularly economic ones.

### **Hungary**

30.05. Prime Minister M. Belka paid a working visit to Budapest, where, with the Prime Minister of Hungary Ferenc Gyurcsány, he discussed bilateral co-operation and issues connected with the EU.

25.11. Foreign Minister S. Meller paid a working visit to Budapest, where he headed, together with Hungarian Foreign Minister Ferenc Somogyi, plenary talks of Polish and Hungarian delegation. They discussed bilateral and European current issues, and issues of transatlantic relations. Minister Meller also introduced the priorities of foreign politics of a new government.

### **Indonesia**

1–4.07. Prime Minister M. Belka paid a working visit to Indonesia, where he met with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The talks concerned bilateral relations, including economic ones, and security issues. The politicians signed an Agreement on cooperation in the combat against organised crime and other types of crime. Prime Minister Belka also met with the Speaker of the lower chamber of the Parliament, Agung Laksono, with Deputy Secretary–General of ASEAN, Pengiran Dato Mashor Pengiran Ahmad, with the governor of special administrative district Sultan of Yogyakarta Hamengku Buwono X, with representatives of Indonesian business circles and with the Polish community.

### **Iraq**

26–27.07. A delegation of Polish government, headed by Prime Minister M. Belka, paid a working visit to Iraq. The Prime Minister met in Baghdad with Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari, with President Jalal Talabani and with the Speaker of the National Assembly Hajim al-Hasani. The Polish Prime Minister announced redemption of 80% of Iraqi debt, and Prime Minister Jaafari promised that Iraq will not file any claims against Poland for damages made by the coalition army on the terrain of ancient Babylon. Prime Minister M. Belka met with U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and with the Commander of Multinational Force Iraq General George W. Casey. Political processes in Iraq and its prospects as well as cooperation between the forces of multinational coalition were discussed. During the meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs A.D. Rotfeld and Hoshiar M. Zebari, a memorandum was initialled on agreement on cooperation regarding implementation of international agreements in the area of security and non-proliferation. During the

meeting of Ministers of Culture Waldemar Dąbrowski and Nuri ar-Rawi, a memorandum was signed on exchange of know-how and on commencing cooperation in the area of the protection of archaeological heritage. A meeting of Ministers of Defence, Jerzy Szmajdziński and Sadoun al-Duleimi, was also held.

21–22.12. Prime Minister K. Marcinkiewicz travelled to Iraq, where he paid a Christmas visit to the military base of Multinational Division Central-South, and then he had a meeting in Baghdad with Iraqi Prime Minister I. Jaafari and President D. Talabani. Political-military issues as well as economic, cultural and scientific cooperation were discussed.

29.12. President L. Kaczyński issued a decision—at the request of the Prime Minister—on prolonging the period of use of Polish Military Contingent making part of Multinational Force Iraq. In line with the request of the Council of Ministers, the Polish Military Contingent with 1,500 soldiers and military workers, will be used in the period from 1 January 2006 till 31 December 2006.

### **Ireland**

12.02. The Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern paid a visit to Warsaw, where he had a meeting with Prime Minister M. Belka. The politicians emphasised the very good level of bilateral relations and discussed the most important issues of the Luxembourg presidency. The two Prime Ministers took part in the Grand Gala of Business Centre Club, during which Prime Minister Ahern was presented with an award—the Golden Statuette of BCC.

18.05. The Irish Foreign Minister Dermot Ahern, Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for preparation of the UN summit, paid a visit to Warsaw. Minister Ahern met with Foreign Minister A.D. Rotfeld, he was also received by President A. Kwaśniewski, to whom he presented, *inter alia*, the state of works on the UN reform and the progress in preparations for the summit.

### **Israel**

15–16.03. President A. Kwaśniewski paid a visit to Israel, where he had a meeting with President M. Katsav and Prime Minister A. Sharon and participated in the celebrations of opening of the new building of Yad Vashem Museum, in the opening of a new exhibition of the Museum and in a special session “Remembering the past, shaping the future.” Polish Foreign Minister A.D. Rotfeld, who accompanied the President, paid visits to Jerusalem and Ramallah. Minister Rotfeld met with Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom and with the Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority Ahmad Qurai and Palestinian Foreign Minister Nasser al-Kidwa. Major topics of talks were bilateral relations and the current situation in the Middle East.

16–17.05. Polish Defence Minister Jerzy Szmajdziński paid a visit to Israel, where he discussed with Defence Minister Shaul Mofaz the political–military situation in the Middle East, in Iraq and in Central and Eastern Europe.

### **Italy**

11–12.07. In Rome, foreign minister A. D. Rotfeld discussed with Foreign Minister Gianfranco Fini the issues of the future of the EU and bilateral relations in politics, economy and culture. An agreement about cooperation within culture and education was signed. Minister Rotfeld also met with the Chairman of the Senate Marcello Pera and Chairman of the centre-left coalition Romano Prodi.

9.12. In Rome, President A. Kwaśniewski met with the President of Italy Carlo Azeglio Ciampi.

### **Japan**

12–15.01. Prime Minister M. Belka paid a visit to Japan and—together with the Prime Minister of Japan Junichiro Koizumi—he headed the talks between the delegations of both countries, during which bilateral relations and international policy were reviewed. Opportunities for trade exchange and increase of Polish exports to Japan were discussed. M. Belka took part in an economic seminar and in a meeting with Japanese-Polish Interparliamentary Group. Together with his spouse, he was received by the Emperor and Empress on an audience. At the end of the visit, a communiqué was adopted entitled “Tangible results of cooperation based on the joint statement of August 2003 regarding strategic partnership between Japan and the Republic of Poland and the prospects of further cooperation.”

### **Kazakhstan**

16–21.04. A delegation of the Senate, headed by Speaker L. Pastusiak, paid a visit to Kazakhstan.

### **Kuwait**

25.07. Prime Minister M. Belka paid a visit to Kuwait, where he held talks with Prime Minister Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jaber as-Sabah on political and economic relations and military cooperation. He also met with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence sheik Jaber al-Ahmad al-Jabu as-Sabah and Foreign Minister Mohammed al-Salem al-Sabah. Defence Minister J. Szmajdziński and Foreign Minister A.D. Rotfeld, who accompanied the Prime Minister, held talks with their Kuwaiti counterparts.

### **Latvia**

14–15.02. Latvian Prime Minister A. Kalvītis paid a working visit to Warsaw. He discussed with Prime Minister M. Belka the bilateral issues—including the

issues of “Amber Pipe” gas pipeline and the so-called energy bridge linking—via Poland—the Baltic countries with Western Europe. Prime Minister Kalvitis was received by President A. Kwaśniewski and also paid visits to the Sejm and the Senate.

6–7.07. President A. Kwaśniewski paid an official visit to Riga, where he talked with President Vaira Vike-Freiberga about mutual political, scientific, cultural as well as economic and trade relations. He also held a meeting with the Polish minority in Latvia.

### **Libya**

4–6.01. Prime Minister M. Belka paid a visit to Libya, where he met with Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi and Prime Minister Shukri Muhammad Ghanem. Bilateral relations were first of all discussed, as well as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the problem of Iraq. A bilateral agreement was signed on cooperation in non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

### **Lithuania**

13–14.01. Speaker of the Sejm W. Cimoszewicz paid an official visit to Vilnius.

28.01. The Prime Ministers of Lithuania Algirdas Brazauskas and of Poland M. Belka held talks in Warsaw on bilateral political and economic relations and the problems related to the EU. They emphasised the need for both countries to cooperate within the New Financial Perspective.

1–2.02. Foreign Minister A.D. Rotfeld paid a working visit to Vilnius, where he held talks with Lithuanian Foreign Minister A. Valionis on bilateral relations, cooperation of Poland and Lithuania within the European Union and on activities for EU’s Eastern neighbours. He also met with Deputy Speaker of the Sejm of the Republic of Lithuania, co-chairman of the Lithuanian-Polish Parliamentary Assembly Česlovas Jursenas.

9–10.03. President A. Kwaśniewski paid a visit to Lithuania, where he discussed with President Valdas Adamkus the issues related to bilateral relations, European and international issues. The presidents issued a joint communiqué entitled “Strategic Partnership.” In their presence an Agreement was signed between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on mutual recognition of documents entitling to undertake graduate studies and on recognition of study periods, professional titles, scientific degrees and degrees in arts, which makes a realisation of the provisions of the Treaty between the Republic of Poland and the Republic of Lithuania on friendly relations and good-neighbourly cooperation of 1994. President A. Kwaśniewski also met with Prime Minister A. Brazauskas, President of the Parliament Artūras Paulauskas

and—together with V. Adamkus—businesspeople in the seat of the Confederation of Entrepreneurs of Lithuania.

20–21.04. Foreign Minister A.D. Rotfeld paid a visit to Vilnius, where he took part in an informal meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers, in a meeting of NATO-Russia Council and NATO-Ukraine Commission, as well as in a meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Visegrad Group states with Foreign Minister of Ukraine B. Tarasyuk.

7.07. Speaker of the Sejm W. Cimoszewicz paid an official visit to Lithuania.

18.08. The presidium of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, headed by its president C. Jursenas, paid a visit to the Polish Sejm.

4–5.11. President A. Kwaśniewski paid a cross-border visit to Sejny and Druskininkai, where he met with President V. Adamkus.

30.11. Foreign Minister of Lithuania, A. Valionis, paid a visit to Warsaw. The talks of Foreign Ministers of the two states concerned bilateral issues, problems related to European integration, cooperation with Eastern neighbours, security policy and the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan. Minister Valionis was received by President A. Kwaśniewski.

### **Malaysia**

4–6.07. Prime Minister M. Belka paid a working visit to Malaysia, where he discussed with Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi the issues of regional policy and the UN reform, as well as possibilities of extending bilateral cooperation. The Polish Prime Minister also met with Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Najib Tun Razak and was received on the audience by King Syed Sirajuddin.

### **Morocco**

7–9.02. An official delegation of the Senate, headed by Speaker L. Pastusiak, paid a visit to Morocco, where it was received at the Chamber of Councillors by its Speaker Moustafa Oukach and met with Prime Minister Driss Jettou, Foreign Minister Mohammed Banaissa and governors of Casablanca and Marrakesh.

### **The Netherlands**

9.03. On the occasion of the 14<sup>th</sup> session of the Conference of Utrecht, as part of which Polish-Dutch consultations involving experts from many various ministries are held, Dutch Foreign Minister Bernard Bot visited Cracow. He held talks with Polish Foreign Minister A.D. Rotfeld. They discussed mostly EU issues, including further EU enlargement, as well as the situation in Iraq, the UN reform and the peace process in the Middle East.

1.12. Foreign Minister S. Meller paid a visit to Amsterdam for the 15<sup>th</sup> session of the Conference of Utrecht. Together with Foreign Minister B. Bot, he opened the

meeting of the Conference. Then working talks of the two ministers took place, during which major issues were discussed related to cooperation of both states on the EU forum and on bilateral platform.

### **New Zealand**

21–23.05. The Prime Minister of New Zealand Helen Clark paid an official visit to Poland. Together with Polish Prime Minister Marek Belka, she presided over the plenary talks which confirmed the consensus of opinions in major political issues, both of regional and global scale. In the presence of the two Prime Ministers, a double taxation avoidance agreement was signed. H. Clark was received by President A. Kwaśniewski and held meetings at the Sejm and the Senate. She also participated in the ceremony of opening of the embassy of New Zealand. She also paid a visit to Cracow and to the Auschwitz–Birkenau camp.

### **Norway**

20.04. Prime Minister M. Belka paid a visit to Oslo, where he held talks with Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik on the possibilities of extending the cooperation in the field of gas and ship-building industries. The Polish Prime Minister paid a visit to the heir to the throne, Prince-Regent Haakon and Princess Mette-Marit. He also met with President of Storting Jorgen Kosmo.

30.05. Heir to the throne of the Kingdom of Norway, Prince Haakon, paid a visit to Warsaw together with Princess Mette–Marit. The Norwegian guests were received by President A. Kwaśniewski and his spouse.

### **Pakistan**

19.10. At the request of the Council of Ministers, President A. Kwaśniewski issued a decision on the use of the Polish Military Contingent in the NATO peace mission in Pakistan with the purpose of giving assistance after the earthquake.

### **The Philippines**

6–7.07. Prime Minister M. Belka paid an official visit to the Republic of the Philippines, where he had a meeting with President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and paid a visit to the parliament. The talks concerned bilateral relations, the reform of the UN and the situation in Iraq. The Polish delegation also met with the Philippine business circles.

### **Russia**

8–9.05. The President of Poland took part in the celebrations of the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the end of World War II in Moscow, in which heads of over 50 states participated. A. Kwaśniewski laid flowers at the Donski Cemetery under the plaque commemorating victims of political repressions in 1945–1953 and under plaques in

honour of Gen. Leopold Okulicki and Minister Stanisław Jasiukowicz as well as under Monument of the Red Army Soldiers and under Solovetskiy Stone in honour of victims of political repressions.

13–18.11. Foreign Minister S. Meller paid a working visit to Moscow, where he met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. The two ministers emphasised the necessity to call the Intergovernmental Commission for Economic Cooperation and the need to call another meeting of “Difficult Issues Group.” They also recognised the need to activate interministerial consultations of Ministries of Foreign Affairs as well as to intensify contacts between the ministers without unnecessary formal nature of the meetings.

### **Romania**

29–30.03. Foreign Minister A.D. Rotfeld held talks in Bucharest with Romanian Foreign Minister Mihai Răzvan Ungureanu, paid visits to President Traian Băsescu and the President of the Senate Nicolae Vacaroiu and met with Romanian experts in international affairs. The talks concerned mutual relations as well as solving the crisis in Transnistria. A protocol on review of bilateral agreements was signed.

### **Saudi Arabia**

2–3.08. Prime Minister M. Belka paid a visit to Riyadh, where he participated in the official funeral service after the death of the King of Saudi Arabia Fahd bin Abdel Aziz Al-Saud and had a meeting with the King of Saudi Arabia Abdullah bin Abdel Aziz Al-Saud.

### **Serbia and Montenegro**

6–7.07. Foreign Minister A.D. Rotfeld paid a visit to Serbia and Montenegro, where he met with President Svetozar Marović and Foreign Minister Vuk Drašković, as well with the authorities: of the Republic of Serbia—Prime Minister Voislav Koštunica and President Boris Tadić; the Republic of Montenegro—Prime Minister Milan Djukanović, Foreign Minister Miodrag Vlahović and President Filip Vujanović and with the interim authorities of Kosovo—President Ibrahim Rugova and Prime Minister Bajram Kosumi. The talks concerned development of bilateral relations, the European integration and the issues of security in the region, including the situation in Kosovo. Minister A.D. Rotfeld also met with deputy head of the UN mission in Kosovo Larry Rossini and Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General Kai Eide.

### **Singapore**

15.01. Prime Minister M. Belka paid a visit to Singapore, where he had a meeting with its Prime Minister Lee Hsien Long. During the talks the heads of governments made a brief review of Polish-Singapore relations. During the visit, a

memorandum was signed on an agreement between the Ministry of Science and Information Society Technologies of the Republic of Poland and the Agency for Science, Technology and Research of the Republic of Singapore. The Polish Prime Minister laid flowers under the plaque commemorating Joseph Conrad Korzeniowski. He also met with representatives of the local Polish community.

### **Slovakia**

29–30.03. The delegation of the Senate, headed by Speaker L. Pastusiak, paid an official visit to Bratislava.

14.11. President A. Kwaśniewski paid a farewell visit to Slovakia, during which he had a meeting with President Ivan Gašparović, President of the National Council Pavol Hrušovský and Prime Minister M. Dzurinda. The Polish President laid a wreath under the monument of Ludovít Štur and gave a lecture in Slovak Foreign Policy Association entitled “Poland and Slovakia in Europe—regional and European challenges.”

25.11. Foreign Minister S. Meller paid a working visit to Bratislava, where—together with Slovak Foreign Minister Eduard Kukan—he headed plenary talks of the Polish and Slovak delegations. During the meeting the problems of bilateral and European cooperation and within the Visegrad Group as well as transatlantic relations were discussed. Minister Meller presented the assumptions of foreign policy of the new government.

### **Slovenia**

13–14.04. Slovenian President Janez Drnovšek paid an official visit to Warsaw, where he met with A. Kwaśniewski. The two presidents headed plenary talks of Polish and Slovenian delegations, took part in the ceremony of signing of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the Republic of Slovenia on the Co-operation in the Prevention of Natural and Other Disasters, and in Suppressing of their Consequences, as well as in the meeting with representatives of Polish and Slovenian entrepreneurs.

### **Spain**

8–9.02. 2<sup>nd</sup> Polish-Spanish intergovernmental consultations were held in Warsaw, headed by Prime Ministers M. Belka and José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero with participation of ministers, deputy ministers and representatives of many ministries of Polish and Spanish governments. Bilateral relations as well as European and international issues were reviewed. Experience of Spain in the use of EU funds were discussed and a memorandum was signed on the use of structural funds.

28–29.03. At the invitation of the Speaker of the Sejm W. Cimoszewicz, a delegation of Spanish MPs, headed by the President of the Congress of Deputies of the General Courts Manuel Marin, paid a visit to Warsaw.

20–23.06. The delegation of the Senate, headed by Speaker L. Pastusiak, paid an official visit to the Kingdom of Spain.

### **Sri Lanka**

19.01. Prime Minister M. Belka paid a visit to Sri Lanka, where he met with President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga and Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapakse. The major issue of talks was the development of economic cooperation. On the territory affected by the tsunami, the talks concerned the consequences of the disaster and the aid to countries which suffered from the disaster.

### **Tunisia**

10–13.02. The official delegation of the Senate, headed by Speaker L. Pastusiak, paid a visit to Tunisia. The delegation was received in the House of Deputies by its head Fouad Mebaz and had a meeting with Foreign Minister Abdelbaki Hermassi. Speaker Pastusiak met also with President of Tunisia Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.

### **Turkey**

15–18.03. At the invitation of the Speaker of the Sejm W. Cimoszewicz, the delegation of the Grand National Assembly of the Republic of Turkey, headed by its President Bülent Arınç, paid a visit to Poland.

27.07. The Polish governmental delegation, on its way back from Iraq, paid a working visit to Istanbul, where Prime Minister M. Belka held talks with President Ahmet Necdet Sezer on enlargement of the European Union, Turk-Iraqi relations in the context of the present situation in Iraq as well as bilateral issues.

### **Ukraine**

23.01. President A. Kwaśniewski paid a visit to Kiev for the swearing-in ceremony of Viktor Yushchenko into the office the President of Ukraine.

16.02. Defence Minister J. Szmajdziński paid a visit to Kiev, where he discussed with his Ukrainian counterpart Anatoliy Hrytsenko the issues related to gradual withdrawal of the Ukrainian army from Iraq.

18.02. Foreign Minister of Ukraine, B. Tarasyuk, paid a visit to Poland. During his meeting with Polish Foreign Minister A.D. Rotfeld, he discussed the issues related to the European Union and bilateral relations. B. Tarasyuk paid visits to Prime Minister M. Belka and Speaker of the Senate L. Pastusiak.

23–24.02. Speaker of the Sejm W. Cimoszewicz paid a working visit to Ukraine at the invitation of the President of the Supreme Council Volodymyr Lytvyn.

3–4.03. Prime Minister M. Belka paid a visit to Ukraine, where he held talks with President V. Yushchenko, Prime Minister J. Tymoshenko and Defence Minister A. Hrysenko on the development of bilateral relations and international policy, and European and Euro-Atlantic ambitions of Ukraine in particular. Intergovernmental agreements were signed: on economic cooperation and on cooperation as regards telecommunications and postal services. Prime Minister M. Belka met with representatives of the Polish community, and gave a speech in Kiev–Mohylan Academy on “Advantages of the European Integration.”

18.03. Foreign Minister A.D. Rotfeld paid a visit to Kiev on a common meeting with Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister of Germany J. Fischer and Foreign Minister of Ukraine B. Tarasyuk. Minister Rotfeld also met with President. V. Yushchenko, Prime Minister Tymoshenko and with chancellors of the European College of Polish and Ukrainian Universities.

11–12.04. The President of Ukraine V. Yushchenko paid an official visit to Poland, where he had a meeting with President A. Kwaśniewski and Prime Minister M. Belka, mostly on economic cooperation. In the presence of the two presidents intergovernmental agreements were signed: on mutual recognition of academic documents on education and on equivalence of academic degrees; and on cooperation in the field of information technologies. A. Kwaśniewski and V. Yushchenko also met with young people at Warsaw University.

13.05. Speaker of the Sejm W. Cimoszewicz paid a visit to Lutsk, where he took part in the meeting of Presidents of Parliaments of Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine.

31.05. President A. Kwaśniewski met in Warsaw with the Prime Minister of Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Anatoliy Matviyenko. During the meeting Polish-Ukrainian bilateral relations were discussed with particular emphasis put on cooperation with Crimea, especially in the domain of tourism, ecology and agriculture. Cooperation in the region and with the European Union were also discussed.

16.06. President A. Kwaśniewski paid a visit to Kiev for the Conference of the Extraordinary Roundtable on the Ukrainian issue, organised by World Economic Forum. At the occasion, he also met with President V. Yushchenko and President of Georgia M. Saakashvili.

24.06. A ceremony of opening of the Lviv Eaglets' Cemetery was held in Lviv. President A. Kwaśniewski, the President of Ukraine V. Yushchenko, Speaker of the Polish Senate L. Pastusiak were among participants. Presidents of Poland and Ukraine took also part in the ceremony at the Memorial of Soldiers of the Ukrainian Galicia Army.

30.06.–1.07. The President of Ukraine V. Yushchenko paid a visit to Poland. Together with the President A. Kwaśniewski he participated in a closing meeting of

8<sup>th</sup> Economic Summit Poland–Ukraine in Gdynia, in a meeting of presidents of state administration of the provinces and provincial councils of Ukraine and provincial governors and marshals of the Polish voivodships, and also in a celebration of signing the agreement on the sale shares of FSO S.A. to an Ukrainian company AvtoZAZ. Afterwards both of the Presidents met in Jurata, where they discussed the development of Polish-Ukrainian relations, needs and requirements of European integration and the position of Ukraine in that process.

17–19.07. The 2<sup>nd</sup> Session of the Parliamentary Assembly of Poland and the Supreme Council of Ukraine was held in Warsaw. The leader of the Ukrainian deputies was the Chairman of the Council, Sergey Bychkov.

18–19.08. President A. Kwaśniewski paid a visit to Kiev, where he met with the Presidents of: Ukraine V. Yushchenko, Lithuania V. Adamkus and Georgia M. Saakashvili. The politicians discussed the problems of bilateral relations and relations with Russia and Belarus.

5–6.09. Speaker of the Sejm W. Cimoszewicz paid a working visit to Kiev and Odessa.

24–25.11. For the end of his presidency, President A. Kwaśniewski paid an official visit to Ukraine, where he talked to President V. Yushchenko, met with the leader of the Yulia Tymoshenko Electoral Bloc Y. Tymoshenko, former president of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma and representatives of the Ukrainian intellectuals. The President of Ukraine decorated the Polish president with the Order of Merit, 1<sup>st</sup> Grade, and the Polish President decorated V. Yushchenko with Jan Karski Order.

### **The United Kingdom**

28.06. John Prescott, Deputy Prime Minister of Great Britain and Northern Ireland paid a visit to Warsaw, where he met with Prime Minister M. Belka and was received by President A. Kwaśniewski. The main aim of J. Prescott's visit was to introduce the priorities of the British presidency and to discuss the situation in the EU after the last European Council summit.

3–4.07. Foreign minister A.D. Rotfeld was in London, where he met with the Secretary of State Jack Straw and participated in celebrations of the official publication of a report of Polish-British Historical Commission on the work of the Polish secret service during World War II and its cooperation with the British secret service.

1.09. On the occasion of the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of "Solidarity," the British Deputy Prime Minister J. Prescott and Prime Minister M. Belka discussed the EU issues, like further EU enlargement and the situation in Iraq.

8–9.11. For the end of his term of office, President A. Kwaśniewski paid a farewell visit to Great Britain, where he met with the U.K. Prime Minister, Tony

Blair, and was received—together with his wife—at a farewell audience with the Queen Elizabeth II. The Polish President participated in a meeting with the Polish community in the U.K., which was held in the Polish embassy in London, and decorated merited representatives of the Polish community.

23–24.11. Prime Minister K. Marcinkiewicz paid a visit to London, where he discussed with T. Blair the issue of the EU budget, bilateral relations, and the cooperation of both countries within the EU and NATO. The prime ministers declared a continuing participation of Poland and Great Britain in international military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Polish Prime Minister met with the U.K. Minister of Defence John Reid, visited Royal Institute of International Affairs, where he discussed the European policy of Poland, and met with representatives of the Polish community.

### **The United States**

5–6.02. U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, paid a working visit to Warsaw, where she held talks with Prime Minister M. Belka and Foreign Minister A.D. Rotfeld. The state of Euro-Atlantic relations was discussed, as well the situation in Ukraine and Iraq. Bilateral issues were also discussed: military cooperation, American aid in modernisation of Polish armed forces and the issue of visas of entry to the United States.

7–10.02. Foreign Minister A.D. Rotfeld paid a working visit to the United States and to the seat of the United Nations. In Washington, he met with representatives of American research centres and with senators. In New York City, he held talks *inter alia* with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and the president of the 59<sup>th</sup> session of the UN General Assembly Jean Ping.

8–9.02. President A. Kwaśniewski paid a working visit to Washington. He had a meeting with U.S. President George Bush, with whom he discussed the visa issue, bilateral cooperation, including financial aid for the Polish army, Iraq and common policy towards Ukraine. A. Kwaśniewski also met with representatives of the House of Representatives and American research centres, the ambassadors of Lithuania, Luxembourg, Germany, Ukraine and the European Commission, as well as with Professor Zbigniew Brzeziński.

30.05.–1.06. Foreign Minister A.D. Rotfeld paid a visit to Washington, where he met with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, with the President of National Endowment for Democracy Carl Gershman and with representatives of scientific institutes. The minister took part in the talks of the second round of Polish-American strategic dialogue.

19.07. Polish Defence Minister Jerzy Szmajdziński held talks in Washington with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, during which ways of use of American military aid in the amount of \$100 million were agreed upon.

10–16.09. President A. Kwaśniewski paid a visit to the U.S., where he held a series of meetings, *inter alia* with California governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, Head of North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) Admiral Timothy Keating, with scientific workers and members of the Aspen Institute and representatives of the Hoover Institution. In New York City, the Polish President took part in the 60<sup>th</sup> session of the UN General Assembly.

28.09. The Polish Prime Minister M. Belka paid a visit to Washington, where he met with U.S. Vice-President Richard B. Cheney. Bilateral relations and further cooperation, including the military sector, were discussed.

11–12.10. President A. Kwaśniewski travelled to Washington, where he paid a farewell visit to President G.W. Bush. He also met with representatives of leading political science centres in Washington and with non-governmental advisors to discuss the future of transatlantic relations.

19–20.12. Foreign Minister S. Meller paid a visit to the U.S., where he met with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. The topics discussed included: the mission of Polish army in Iraq, Poland's relations with neighbours, including Ukraine and Russia, as well as the visa issue. Minister Meller met with Madeleine Albright, with the editorial staff of *The Washington Post*, representatives of the Congress and the members of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate.

### **The Vatican**

8.04. President A. Kwaśniewski was the leader of a national Polish delegation to the funeral of Pope John Paul II.

23–24.04. President of Poland with national delegation and members of parliament participated in a Mass inaugurating the pontificate of Pope Benedict XVI.

9.12. For the end of his term of office, President A. Kwaśniewski paid a visit to the Vatican, where he was granted a private audience with Pope Benedict XVI and then he met with the Vatican Secretary of State, Cardinal Angelo Sodano.

### **Vietnam**

16–18.01. Prime Minister M. Belka paid an official visit to Vietnam. The main purposes of the visit were the meeting with President Tran Duc Luong, Prime Minister Phan Van Khai, Chairman of the National Assembly Nguyen Van An, and Secretary General of the Communist Party of Vietnam Nong Duc Manh. In the presence of both heads of governments there were signed: An Agreement between

the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development of the Republic of Poland and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on cooperation in the field of agriculture, rural development and the development of agricultural markets, and An Accord between the Ministry of National Education and Sport of the Republic of Poland and the Ministry of Education and Culture of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on cooperation in education and sport in 2005–2008. M. Belka also met with the authorities of the Vietnamese shipbuilding and coal-mining corporation, with the graduates of Polish schools and participated in Polish-Vietnam Business Forum.

Edited by *Małgorzata Ławacz*

Sources: *Rzeczpospolita* 2005, [www.prezydent.pl](http://www.prezydent.pl), [www.kprm.gov.pl](http://www.kprm.gov.pl), [www.msz.gov.pl](http://www.msz.gov.pl)

## Management Staff of Polish Foreign Service\*

### I. Ministry of Foreign Affairs

#### Minister

**Stefan Meller.** Born on 4 July 1942 in Lyon. 1966 graduate of the Faculty of History of Warsaw University. Full professor in humanities. In the perisince 1966–1968 an employee at the Polish Institute of International Affairs. After the March 1968 events, he was dismissed from the Institute. Former editor-in-chief of the magazine *Mówią wieki*. Employee of the branch of Warsaw University in Białystok and Deputy Vice Chancellor of the State Higher School of Theatre. Since 1992, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including as Director of the Department of Europe, twice as Undersecretary of State. Since 1996, the Ambassador of Poland in the French Republic, and since 2002 the Ambassador of Poland in the Russian Federation. A lecturer in history specialising in modern history, scholarship holder of universities and scientific institutes in France, the Netherlands and the U.S. Minister of Foreign Affairs from 31 October 2005 to 9 May 2006.

\* \* \*

**Anna Fotyga.** Minister of Foreign Affairs since 9 May 2006.

#### Secretaries of State

**Anna Fotyga.** Born on 12 January 1957 in Lębork. In 1981, after graduating from Gdańsk University (majoring in foreign trade) she began to work in the International Department of the National Executive Commission of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity.” During the martial law perisince she was giving private lessons in English and Russian. Between 1987 and 1989 she worked at “Modem” company (as Member of the Management Board); between 1989 and 1991 she worked in the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the National Commission of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity” (Office Manager), and in the perisince 1992–1994 at the company “Przekaz,” a press publisher in the coastal region of Poland. In the years 1999–2001 she was a councilor to the President of the Office of Supervision of Health Insurance for European Integration, and in 2000 a councilor to the Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs, acting as Foreign Affairs Department Director at the Chancellery of the Prime Minister. Councilor of the city of Gdańsk (2001). From 2002 to 2004 Deputy President of Gdańsk. Member of te

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\* As of 31 December 2005 (with changes by 15 June 2006). Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs; [www.msz.gov.pl](http://www.msz.gov.pl).

European Parliament (2004–2005), coordinator of the UEN Group in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament.

**Barbara Krystyna Tuge-Erecińska.** Born on 24 March 1956 in Gdańsk. Graduated from Gdańsk University in 1980, majoring in Scandinavian studies. A year later she began working at the International Department of the National Office of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity.” In the years 1982–1987 a member of Primate’s Committee for Aid to Repressed Persons and was active in underground “Solidarity.” Between 1987 and 1990 she held an office of honorary secretary of the Consular Agency of Sweden, Denmark and Norway in Gdynia. In the period since 1990–1991 a plenipotentiary of the City Board for Foreign Contacts at the Gdańsk Town Hall. Since 1991 in the diplomatic service—first as Ambassador of Poland in Stockholm (1991–1997), then as Europe-West Department Director (1997–1998), European Policy Department Director (1998–1999) and Undersecretary of State (1999–2001) and Ambassador of Poland in Copenhagen (2001–2005). Since November 2005 Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (responsible for Polish Eastern policy, has a seat in the Council of Ministers Committee and in the European Committee of the Council of Ministers).

#### Under-Secretaries of State

**Stanisław Jerzy Komorowski.** Born in 1953 in Warsaw. Graduated from the Faculty of Physics of Warsaw University (in 1978), doctor of physics (1986), scholarship holder at Utah University in Salt Lake City, United States. In 1978–1990 a research worker at Institute of Physical Chemistry of Polish Academy of Sciences. Since 1991 at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, initially as a unit manager, then as a deputy director of Bureau of Personnel. The same year he was promoted to the position of Deputy Director, and in 1992 he became Director of the Department of Europe. He performed this function until 1994, when he became Ambassador of Poland to the Kingdom of the Netherlands. After the termination of his mission, he took over the position of Director of Secretariat of the Minister of Foreign Affairs (1998–1999). In 1999–2004 he was Ambassador of Poland in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. From 2004 to November 2005 he worked as Director of the Department of Asia and the Pacific. Since 3 November 2005 he has been Under-Secretary of state at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

**Janusz Józef Stańczyk.** Born in 1955 in Tarnów. Graduate of the Faculty of Law of the Jagiellonian University (1977) and an employee of this university (1978–1980). PhD studies in the Institute of State and Law (1980–1983), crowned with the title of doctor of legal sciences (1985). Assistant professor at the Institute of Legal Studies in Polish Academy of Sciences (1983–1993). Since May 1992 he has been working at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as: Director of Department of Legal and Treaty Issues (1992–1995); Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

(1995–1996); Deputy Director of the Department of Studies and Planning (1997); Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1997–1999), Ambassador—permanent representative of Poland accredited to the United Nations (2000–2004); in 2002 he received the title of Ambassador *ad personam*; Director of the Department of the UN System and Global Issues (2004–2005). Since 4 November 2005 he has been Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

**Witold Jan Waszczykowski.** Born in 1957 in Piotrków Trybunalski. Graduate of the Faculty of Philosophy and History of Łódź University (1980), of the International Relations Faculty of the University of Oregon (1991) and post-graduate studies in international security and armaments control at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva (1993). He is a Doctor of Humanities. He has worked for many years at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (including as chief of the Polish Liaison Office with NATO, deputy representative of Poland to NATO, Ambassador of Poland in Iran). Since 4 November 2005 he has been Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

**Rafał Wiśniewski.** Born in 1965 in Łódź. Graduated from the Faculty of Modern Languages of Warsaw University (1989). In 1988–1991 he was an employee of the Chair of Hungarian Studies of Warsaw University. Author of analyses and translations concerning modern history of Hungary and Central Europe. Co-founder of the Foundation of International Initiatives. Specialist in Central European affairs at the International Studies Centre with the Senate (1990–1991). He has been with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 1991. In the years 1991–1992 he was Secretary of the Embassy of Poland in Budapest, then Director of the Polish Institute in Hungary (1992–1997). He was Head of the Central Europe Division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1998) and Director coordinating the work of departments in the public and cultural diplomacy units at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1998–2001). In 2001–2006 he was Ambassador of Poland in Hungary. Since November 2005 he has been Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

### Director-General of Foreign Service

**Jerzy Pomianowski.** Born in 1960. Graduate of the Faculty of Philosophy and Sociology of Warsaw University. Founder and publisher of the independent publishing house NYS (1980–1982). UNESCO expert in Sri Lanka (1988). Senior expert at the Ministry of National Education (1990–1991). Since 1991 he has been employed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1992–1997 he was Deputy Director, then Director of the Department of Africa, Asia, Australia and Oceania. Ambassador of Poland in Japan in 1997–2002. Executive secretary of the Polish Committee of the 2005 EU-Japan Year of People-to-People Exchanges. From 2004 to 2005 he was Ambassador *ad personam* at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, plenipotentiary of the

Minister of Foreign Affairs for the preparation and organisation of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Summit of the Council of Europe. From November 2005 to June 2006 Director-General of the foreign service. At present is Director of Development Co-operation Department.

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**Piotr Wojtczak (Acting Director-General of Foreign Service).** Born in 1963 in Lublin. A graduate of French language studies and political studies at Marie Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin and a graduate of the National School of Public Administration in Warsaw. With the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 1994: the Minister's councilor in the Department of European Institutions, then in the Department of the European Union. Since 1999 has been a councilor at the Permanent Representation of Poland to the EU in Brussels. From November 2004 he was deputy head of the Polish Embassy in Brussels, from January 2006 he was deputy director in the Department of Europe. Since 13 June 2006 he has been acting as Director-General of the foreign service.

#### **Sekretariat of the Minister**

Director (acting): Marek Prawda

Deputy Directors (acting): Marek Pernal, Zbigniew Zaręba

#### **Bureau of the Director-General**

Director (acting): Piotr Kaszuba

Deputy Directors (acting): Przemysław Czyż, Grzegorz Rynkiewicz

#### **Departments**

##### **1. Department of Strategy and Foreign Policy Planning**

Director (acting): Jarosław Bratkiewicz

Deputy Director (acting): Mariusz Kazana

##### **2. Department of the European Union**

Director (acting): Paweł Świeboda

Deputy Directors (acting): Małgorzata Banat, Beata Kolečka, Zbigniew Krużyński

##### **3. Department of Security Policy**

Director (acting): Robert Kupiecki

Deputy Directors (acting): Tadeusz Chomicki, Wojciech Flera, Marek Ziółkowski

##### **4. Legal and Treaty Department**

Director (acting): Remigiusz Henczel

Deputy Directors (acting): Krzysztof Kocel, Andrzej Kremer, Janusz Łacki

##### **5. Department of the UN System and Global Affairs**

Director (acting): Anna Grupańska

Deputy Directors (acting): Mirosław Łuczka, Stanisław Stebelski

**6. Department of Foreign Economic Policy**

Director (acting): Katarzyna Skórzyńska

Deputy Director (acting): Jarosław Starzyk

**7. Department of Europe**

Director (acting): Jerzy Margański

Deputy Directors (acting): Stanisław Borek, Jerzy Chmielewski, Wojciech Zajączkowski, [as of 15 June 2006: Jerzy Chmielewski, Piotr Wojtczak]

**8. Department of Eastern Policy (since 16 January 2006)**

Director (acting): Wojciech Zajączkowski

Deputy Director (acting): Henryk Litwin

**9. Department of the Americas**

Director (acting): Henryk Szlajfer

Deputy Directors (acting): Krzysztof Hinz, Andrzej Jaroszyński

**10. Department of Asia and the Pacific**

Director (acting): vacancy

Deputy Directors (acting): Beata Stoczyńska, Jacek Najder

**11. Department of Africa and the Middle East**

Director (acting): Krzysztof Płomiński

Deputy Directors (acting): Wojciech Bożek, Marcin Kubiak, Maciej Kozłowski

**12. Diplomatic Protocol**

Director (acting): Tomasz Orłowski

Deputy Director: Grzegorz Chmielewski, (acting) Mariusz Solis, (acting) Tadeusz Żyliński

**13. Department of Promotion**

Director (acting): Agnieszka Wielowieyska

Deputy Director (acting): Tomasz Niegodzisz [as of 15 June 2006: Marcin Nawrot, Tomasz Niegodzisz]

**14. Department of Information System**

Director (acting): Paweł Dobrowolski

Deputy Directors (acting): Przemysław Antoniewicz, Marcin Nawrot [as of 15 June 2006: Przemysław Antoniewicz, Włodzimierz Marciński]

**15. Department of Consular and Polish Diaspora Affairs**

Director (acting): Tomasz Lis

Deputy Directors (acting): Bogusław Dubiński, Jacek Janusza-Kisielewski, Zygmunt Matynia

**16. Development Co-operation Department**

Director (acting): Jerzy Pomianowski (since 23 June 2006)

Deputy Director (acting): Andrzej Skrzydło

**17. Archives**

Director: Adam Halamski

Deputy Director (acting): Małgorzata Mroczkowska

**18. Bureau of Personnel and Training**

Director (acting): Tadeusz Szumowski

Deputy Directors: Mieczysław Karczmarczyk, (acting) Stefan Hatys [as of 15 June 2006: Mieczysław Karczmarczyk, (acting) Beata Brzywczy]

**19. Bureau of Administration and Finance**

Director (acting): Leszek Brenda

Deputy Directors (acting): Iwona Arkuszewska, Mariusz Skórko

**20. Bureau of Communications**

Director (acting): Stefan Caliński

Deputy Directors (acting): Zbigniew Powalka, Waldemar Sarnowski, Dariusz Toruń

**21. Bureau of IT**

Director (acting): Roman Faber [as of 10 April 2006: Grzegorz Pachulski]

**22. Office of the Plenipotentiary for Classified Information Security**

Director (acting): Sylwester Sadłowski

Deputy Director (acting): Edward Białkowski

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**23. Maintenance Services Unit**

Director: Wiesław Mazur

Deputy Director: Małgorzata Tyszkiewicz-Adamczyk

**II. Ambassadors and Consuls  
Polish Diplomatic Posts  
(to States and International Organisations)**

**States**

**Albania**

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Tirana

Rruga e Durrësit 123, Tirana

Phone: (0 0355 42) 34 190; fax: (0 0355 42) 33 364

polemb@albaniaonline.net

**Ambassador: Artur Tomaszewski (since 29 August 2002)\***

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\* The date of nomination.

### Algeria

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Algiers  
37, Avenue Mustapha Ali Khodja, 16 030 El-Biar, Algér BP 60  
Phone: (0 0213 2) 1 923 474, 1 922 553; fax: (0 0213 2) 1 921 435  
marekmal@wissal.dz

**Ambassador: Janusz Mrowiec (from 21 December 2002 to 1 April 2006)**

**Chargé d'affaires: Sławomir Klimkiewicz (as of 15 June 2006)**

### Angola

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Luanda  
Rua Comandante N'zaji 21/23, Alvalade, Luanda; C.P. 1340  
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fax: (0 0244 2) 323 086  
www.embpolonia-ang.info; embpol@netangola.com

**Ambassador: Eugeniusz Rzewuski (since 18 December 2002), also accredited to Sao Tom and Principe**

### Argentina

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Buenos Aires  
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1425 Buenos Aires  
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polemb@datamarkets.com.ar

**Ambassador: Stanisław Paszczyk (since 25 July 2005), also accredited to Paraguay**

**Honorary Consul: Juan Estanislao Stachnik**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Mar del Plata  
Calle La Roja 2773  
7600 Mar del Plata  
Phone: (0 054 22 3) 491 52 94

**Honorary Consul: Miguel Antonio Skowron**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Obera  
c. Gobernador Barreyro 1176  
3362 Obera, prov. Misiones  
Phone/fax: (0 054 37) 55 42 17-63

**Honorary Consul: Bartłomiej Stanisław Moszoro**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Rosario  
Bv. Oirono 275  
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### Armenia

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**Ambassador: Tomasz Knothe (since 22 June 2004)**

## Australia

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Canberra  
7 Turrana Street, Yarralumla ACT 2600, Canberra  
Phone: (0 061 2) 6272 1000, 6273 1208; fax: (0 061 2) 6273 3184  
www.poland.org.au; embassy@poland.org.au

**Ambassador: Jerzy Więclaw (since 30 December 2002), also accredited to Papua New Guinea**

**Consul General: Ryszard Sarkowicz**

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Sydney  
10 Trelawney Street, Woollahra NSW, 2025 Sydney  
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**Honorary Consul: Brian Patrick Kilmartin**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Brisbane  
270 Adelaide Street, 4000 Brisbane, Australia  
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**Honorary Consul: Keith James Aitken**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Darwin  
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**Honorary Consul: George John Zbigniew Łuk-Kozika**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Melbourne  
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## Austria

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Vienna  
Hietzinger Hauptstrasse 42c, 1130 Wien, P.O. Box 17  
Phone: (0 043 1) 870150-46, 87015-100; fax: (0 043 1) 87015-222  
www.botschaftfp.at; info@BotschaftRP.at

**Ambassador: Marek Jędryś (since 26 May 2004)**

**Honorary Consul: Gerold Ortner**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Graz  
Joannenumring 18/3, A-8010 Graz  
Phone: (0 043 316) 33 82 51 00; fax: (0 043 316) 33 82 51 15

**Honorary Consul: Siegfried Resl**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Innsbruck  
Technikerstraße 1–3, A-6020 Innsbruck  
Phone: (0 043 512) 28 63 14 00; fax: (0 043 512) 29 34 61 20

**Honorary Consul: Jürgen Hinterwirth**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Salzburg  
A-5020 Salzburg, Nonntaler Hauptstraße 1  
Phone: (0 043 662) 84 00 33, 84 00 34; fax: (0 043 662) 84 00 33 14

### **Azerbaijan**

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Baku  
2 Kichik Gala Street, Icheri Sheher, AZ-1000 Baku  
Phone: (0 0994 12) 492 01 14, 497 52 81, 497 47 08; fax: (0 0994 12) 492 02 14  
www.embpol.azeurotel.com; embpol@azeurotel.com

**Ambassador: Krzysztof Krajewski (since 3 June 2005)**

### **Bangladesh**

**Honorary Consul: Mumtaz Uddin Ahmed**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Chittagongu  
"Commercial Court"  
95 Agrabad Commercial Area  
Chittagong – 4100  
Phone: (0 0880 31) 72 15 23; fax: (0 0880 31) 71 00 66  
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### **Belgium**

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www.polembassy.be; polambbxl@skynet.be

**Ambassador: Iwo Byczewski (since 21 March 2002)**

**Consul General: Elwira Kucharska**

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Brussels  
Rue des Francs 28, 1040 Bruxelles  
Phone: (0 032 2) 73 90 100-101; fax: (0 032 2) 73 64 459 or 73 60 464  
www.konsulat.be; info@konsulat.be

**Honorary Consul: Eduard Lima A. van der Pluym**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Antwerp  
A. van der Pluymstraat 1  
2160 Wommelgem  
Phone: (0 0323) 35 00 260; fax: (0 0323) 35 00 609

**Honorary Consul: Jean-Marie De Baerdemaeker**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Gent  
Langebilkstraat 9, 9032 Gent

**Honorary Consul: Philippe Godfroid**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in La Louvière  
13, rue Boucquéau, 7100 La Louviere  
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### **Belarus**

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Minsk  
P. Rumyantseva 6, 220034 Minsk  
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**Ambassador: Tadeusz Pawlak (from 31 July 2002 to 15 November 2005)**

**Chargé d'affaires: Aleksander Wasilewski (as of 15 June 2006)**

**Consul General: Romuald Kunat**

**Consul General: vacancy (as of 15 June 2006)**

Consulate General in Brest

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**Consul General: Andrzej Krętownski**

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Hrodna

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**Benin**

**Honorary Consul: Krystyna Hounkponou**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Cotonou

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**Bolivia**

**Honorary Consul: Esther Caroy Salzmänn Donig**

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**Bosnia and Herzegovina**

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Sarajevo

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**Ambassador: Andrzej Tyszkiewicz (since 25 July 2005)**

**Brazil**

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Brasilia

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www.polonia.org.br; embaixada@polonia.org.br

**Ambassador: Paweł Kulka Kulpiowski (since 3 June 2005)**

**Consul General: Jacek Perlin**

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Curitiba

Rua Agostinho Leão Júnior 234, 80.030-110 Curitiba-PR-Caixa Postal 2366

Phone: (0 055 41) 301 94 662; fax: (0 055 41) 301 97 909

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**Consul General: Dariusz Dudziak**

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Rio de Janeiro

Praya de Botafogo 242, IX Piso, 22.250-040-Rio de Janeiro

Phone: (0 055 21) 255 180 88, 255 180 47; fax: (0 055 21) 255 250 93

riodejaneiro@polonia.org.br

**Consul General: Marek Kryński**

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in São Paulo  
Rua Monte Aegre 1791, CEP 05.014-002-SP-São Paulo  
Phone: (0 055 11) 367 23 778, 367 25 778; fax: (0 055 11) 387 11 921  
saopaulo@polonia.org.br

**Honorary Consul: Jerzy Markiewicz**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Belo Horizonte  
Rua Fernandes Tourinho 718 apt 1601  
30.112-902 Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais, Brasie  
Phone: (0 055 31) 328 25 569; fax: (0 055 31) 328 16 826  
mgmconpl@cdlnet.com.br

**Honorary Consul: Maria Vanda Krepinski-Groch**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Erechim  
Rua Euclides da Cunha 114  
CEP: 99700-000 Erechim  
Phone/fax: (0 055 54) 321 46 49  
rsj4380@pro.via-rs.com.br

**Honorary Consul: Zildo Teixeira Braga de Morais**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Recife  
Av. Prof. José dos Anjos, 569  
CEP: 52.110-130 Recife – PE  
Phone/fax: (0 055 81) 343 00 26  
ztbmorais@hotmail.com.br

**Honorary Consul: Adam Emil Czartoryski**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Vitoria  
Rua Lauro Soares Machado Casa 12  
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**Honorary Consul: Job Lim**

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**Ambassador: Sławomir Dąbrowa (since 14 November 2003)**

**Consul General: Wiesław Nowicki**

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**Burundi**

**Honorary Consul: Samuel Bigawa**

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**Cambodia**

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**Ambassador: Ryszard Olszewski (since 25 July 2005)**

**Cameron**

**Honorary Consul: Mirosława Etoga**

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**Ambassador: Piotr Ogrodziński (since 31 July 2004)**

Consul General: Włodzimierz Zdunowski

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**Consul General: Piotr Konowrocki**

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**Consul General: Maciej Krych**

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**Honorary Consul: Zygmunt Potocki**

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**Honorary Consul: Frank John Szumlas**

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**Honorary Consul: Henry Lebioda**

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## Chile

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**Ambassador: Jarosław Spyra (since 29 July 2002)**

**Honorary Consul: Mario Suwalsky**

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**Honorary Consul: Jaime Pozo Cisternas**

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**Honorary Consul: Gaston Krauss Piera**

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**Honorary Consul: David Dahma Bertelet**

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**Ambassador: Krzysztof Szumski (since 1 September 2005)**

**Consul General: Ryszard Potocki**

**Counselor: Piotr Sławiński (as of 15 June 2006)**

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**Consul General: Sylwester Szafarz**

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**Colombia**

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**Ambassador: Henryk Kobierowski (since 29 July 2002)**

**Honorary Consul: Gabriel Restrepo Santa Maria**

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**Honorary Consul: Luis Fernando Acosta Osio**

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**Honorary Consul: Benjamin Schuster Bejman**

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**Congo (Democratic Republic of the)**

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**Ambassador: Bogusław Nowakowski (since 30 August 2004), also accredited to Chad, Gabon, Republic of Congo, Central African Republic**

**Costarica**

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**Ambassador: Andrzej Braiter (since 16 February 2005), also accredited to Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Salvador**

**Côte d'Ivoire**

**Honorary Consul: Tomasz Witold Iwanków**

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**Croatia**

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**Ambassador: Kazimierz Kopyra (since 14 May 2003)**

## Cuba

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**Ambassador: Tomasz Turowski (since 1 September 2001)**

**Chargé d'affaires: Daniel Gromann (as of 15 June 2006)**

## Cyprus

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**Ambassador: Zbigniew Szymański (since 31 July 2004)**

**Honorary Consul General: Loukis Papaphilippou**

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## Czech Republic

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**Ambassador: Andrzej Załucki (from 8 July 2005 to 1 April 2006)**

**Chargé d'affaires: Stanisław Borek (as of 15 June 2006)**

**Consul General: Antoni Sadowski**

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**Honorary Consul: Petr Mrkývka**

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## Denmark

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**Ambassador: Jakub Wolski (from 25 July 2005 to 1 April 2006)**

**Chargé d'affaires: Robert Filipczak (as of 15 June 2006)**

**Honorary Consul: Ole Lykke Ravnsbo**

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**Honorary Consul: Roar Bendtsen Schodu**

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**Honorary Consul: Jan Krossteig**

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## Djibouti

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## Dominican Republic

**Honorary Consul: José Radhames Miniño Rodríguez**

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## Ecuador

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**Honorary Consul: Tomasz Morawski**

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**Ambassador: Jan Natkański (since 20 January 2004), also accredited to Sudan**

**Honorary Consul: Samy Aly El Rashidi**

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## Eritrea

**Honorary Consul: Belay Tewelde Tesfe Mariam**

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**Ambassador: Tomasz Chłoń (since 25 July 2005)**

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**Ambassador: Mariusz Woźniak (since 8 July 2005)**

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**Ambassador: Andrzej Szyuka (since 8 July 2005)**

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**Honorary Consul: Timo Ensio Antila**

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**Ambassador: Jan Tombiński (since 9 April 2001), also accredited to Monaco**

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**Consul General: Piotr Adamiuk**

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**Consul General: Tomasz Wasilewski**

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**Consul General: Piotr Szymanowski**

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**Honorary Consul: Bertrand de Bentzmann**

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**Honorary Consul: Eugene Horoux-Horszowski**

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**Honorary Consul: Michel Dorin**

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**Honorary Consul: Longin Fourdrinier**

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## Gabon

**Honorary Consul: Andrzej Władysław Dębski**

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## Georgia

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**Ambassador: Jacek Multanowski (since 23 December 2004)**

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## Germany

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**Ambassador: Andrzej Byrt (since 25 November 2002)**

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**Consul General: Elżbieta Sobótka**

**Consul General: Andrzej Kaczorowski (as of 15 June 2006)**

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**Consul General: Ryszard Król**

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**Consul General: Jan Granat**

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**Consul General: Waclaw Oleksy**

**Consul General: Elżbieta Sobótka (as of 15 June 2006)**

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**Honorary Consul: Karl Gerhard Schmidt**

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**Honorary Consul: Bernd Kobarg**

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## Ghana

**Honorary Consul: Enchill Kofi Asare**

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## Greece

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**Ambassador: Maciej Górski (from 8 July 2005 to 1 April 2006)**

**Chargé d'affaires: Maciej Lang (as of 15 June 2006)**

Consular section

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**Honorary Consul: Stelios Golemis**

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**Honorary Consul: Alexander Panagopulos**

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**Ambassador: Hanna Suchocka (since 22 October 2001)**

## Honduras

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### **Honorary Consul: Epaminondas Marinakys Zelaya**

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**Ambassador: Joanna Stempińska (since 17 August 2005)**

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**Ambassador: Tomasz Łukaszuk (since 16 February 2005)**

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**Ambassador: Witold Śmidowski (since 29 August 2002)**

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**Ambassador: Władysław Jan Sokółowski (since 31 July 2004), also accredited to Kyrgyzstan**

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www.poland.org.nz; polishembassy@xtra.co.nz

### **Ambassador: Lech Mastalerz (since 31 July 2004)**

### **Honorary Consul: John Roy-Wojciechowski**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Auckland

51 Granger Road, Howick, Auckland 1705

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## **Nigeria**

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Abuja

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www.abuja.polemb.net; poembabu@linkserve.com

### **Ambassador: Grzegorz Waliński (since 18 December 2001), also accredited to Benin, Ghana, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Niger and Togo**

### **Consul General: Stanisław Pisarski**

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Lagos

10 Idejo Street, Victoria Island, Lagos, P.O. Box 410

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poemb@mwebafrica.com

## **Norway**

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www.poland-embassy-no.com; ambpol@online.no

### **Ambassador: Ryszard Czarny (since 18 July 2005), also accredited to Iceland**

Consular section

address – see above

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**Honorary Consul: Fritz Thorkil Rieber**

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**Honorary Consul: Ulf-Einar Staalesen**

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**Honorary Consul: Harald Johan Lydersen**

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## **Pakistan**

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www.embassyofpoland.org.pk; polemb@isb.comsats.net.pk

**Ambassador: Bogdan Marczewski (since 30 April 2004), also accredited to Afghanistan**

**Consul General: Ireneusz Makles**

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Karachi

6–D, 1st Gizri Lane, Phase IV

Defence Officers' Housing Authority, Karachi

Phone: (0 092 21) 587 95 93, 587 95 94; fax: (0 092 21) 587 95 92

www.polandconsulatekarachi.com; consulrp@sat.net.pl

## **Panama**

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Panama

Embajada de Polonia

Bella Vista, Calle 47, Edificio "Vista Marina", piso 2

Correspondence address:

Embajada de Polonia, Zona 5, Apartado Postal 8782, Panama

Phone: (0 0507) 263 62 54, 263 50 97; fax: (0 0507) 223 37 17

www.embajadadepolonia.net; polamb@cwpanama.net

**Ambassador: Marek Makowski (since 22 July 2004)**

**Honorary Consul: Jose Palermo**

Honorary Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Colon  
Calle 50, Edificio Discount Bank, piso 2  
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jpalermot@hotmail.com

**Paraguay**

**Honorary Consul: Jorge Aníbal Goldenberg Asrilevich**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Asunción  
Palma 685, Asunción, Paraguay, P.O. Box 276  
Phone: (0 0595 21) 44 85 20, 44 72 66; fax: (0 0595 21) 49 58 07

**Peru**

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Lima  
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Lima 18, Perú  
Phone: (0 051 14) 71 39 20; in emergency:(0 051 14) 70 04 24  
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www.pOLONIA.org.pe; consrplima@amauta.rcp.pe

**Ambassador: Przemysław Marzec (since 25 July 2005), also accredited to Bolivia and Ecuador**

**Honorary Consul: Mauricio Chabaneix Belling**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Arequipa  
Mariscal Benavides 307 Selva Alegre, Arequipa  
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**Honorary Consul: Piotr Nawrocki**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Callao  
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**Honorary Consul: Władysław Bobrek**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Trujillo  
Los Granados 389, Trujillo, Peru  
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**Philippines**

**Honorary Consul General: Fernando V. Listing**

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Manila  
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Phone: (0 0632) 527 15 82, 527 15 75; fax: (0 0632) 527 16 03

## Portugal

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Lisbon  
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www.emb-polonia.pt; embpol@mail.telepac.pt, konsulat@mail.telepac.pt

**Ambassador: Janusz Rydzkowski (since 11 February 2004)**

**Honorary Consul: Rui Miguel Duarte Alegre**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Porto  
Rua da Corticeira, 34, 4536-902 Mozelos VFR  
Phone: (0 0351 22) 747 5875; fax: (0 0351 22) 747 5803

## Romania

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Bucharest  
Aleea Alexandru No. 23  
Sector 1, București  
Phone: (0 040 21) 308 2200; fax: (0 040 21) 230 9362  
www.bukareszt.ro; ambasada@bukareszt.ro

**Ambassador: Krystyn Jacek Paliszewski (since 25 September 2003)**

Consular section  
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## Russia

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www.polandemb.ru; embassy@polandemb.ru

**Chargé d'affaires: Wiktor Ross**

**Ambassador: Jerzy Bahr (since 19 June 2006)**

Consular section  
address—see above:  
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**Consul General: Jarosław Drozd**

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**Consul General: Jarosław Czubiński**

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### **Rwanda**

**Honorary Consul: Charles Ngarambe**

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### **Salvador**

**Honorary Consul: Carlos Enrique Merazzo Pinto**

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### **Saudi Arabia**

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Consular section

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**Ambassador: Adam Kułach (since 20 January 2004)**

**Honorary Consul: Sheik Hassan Omar Saddik Attar**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Jiddah  
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### **Senegal**

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Dakar  
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Phone: (0 0221) 825 24 03, 824 23 54; fax: (0 0221) 824 95 26  
www.ambassade-pologne.sn; ambassade.pl@sentoo.sn

**Ambassador: Andrzej Łupina (since 16 February 2005), also accredited to Burkina Faso, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Cape Verde and Sierra Leone**

### **Serbia and Montenegro**

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ambrpfrj@Eunet.yu

**Ambassador: Maciej Szymański (since 8 July 2005)**

### **Singapore**

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Singapore  
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fax: (0 065) 6235 9479  
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**Ambassador: Bogusław Marcin Majewski (since 8 November 2004)**

### **Slovakia**

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Bratislava  
Hummelova 4, 814 91 Bratislava  
Phone: (0 0421 2) 5441 3174-75, 5441 2142, 5441 3196; fax: (0 0421 2) 5441 3184  
www.polskaambasada.sk; bratampl@nexta.sk

**Ambassador: Zenon Kosiniak-Kamysz (since 23 July 2003)**

Consular section  
address: see above:  
fax: (0 0421 2) 5441 3193

**Honorary Consul: Tadeusz Frąckowiak**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Liptovský Mikuláš  
Liptovský Mikuláš  
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### **Slovenia**

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www.poland-embassy.si; ambpol.si@siol.net

**Ambasador: Janusz Jesionek (from 28 August 2002 to 1 April 2006)**

**Chargé d'affaires: Grzegorz Nowacki (as of 15 June 2006)**

**Honorary Consul: Nedžan Brataševac**

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5000 Nova Gorica, Slovenija  
Phone: (0 0386 5) 331 52 45; fax: (0 0386 5) 331 52 36  
klm.inwest@siol.net

**Honorary Consul: Miloš Kovačič**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Novo Mesto  
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**South Africa**

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Pretoria  
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Phone: (0 027 12) 430 26 21; fax: (0 027 12) 430 26 08  
www.poland.co.za; amb.pol@pixie.co.za

**Ambassador: Romuald Szuniewicz (since 31 July 2004), also accredited to Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia and Swaziland**

Consular section  
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**Honorary Consul: Andrzej Kiepela**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Durban  
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**Spain**

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fax: (0 034 91) 373 6624  
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**Ambassador: Grażyna Bernatowicz (since 28 March 2002), also accredited to Andorra**

**Consul General: Joanna Kozińska-Frybes**

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Barcelona  
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www.kgbarcelona.org; polonia@kgbarcelona.org

**Honorary Consul: Bogdan Dziekoński**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Las Palmas de Gran Canaria  
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**Honorary Consul: Jorge Matias Zieleniewski Redziejowski**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Murcia  
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**Honorary Consul: Sylvia Riera Borrego**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Palma de Mallorca  
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**Honorary Consul: Angel Tellechea Goyena**

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**Honorary Consul: Juan M. Veites Baptista de Sousa**

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**Honorary Consul: Ramón Sentis Duran**

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**Sri Lanka**

**Honorary Consul General: Deshamanya Kandiah Balendra**

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**Sudan**

**Honorary Consul: Hussein Mohamed Hasan**

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**Surinam**

**Honorary Consul: Dennis Kopinsky**

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**Sweden**

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**Ambassador: Michał Czyż (since 20 September 2005)**

**Consul General: Wieslaw Scholz**

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Stockholm  
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**Consul General: Marek Bykowski**

**Consul General: Gerard Pokruszyński (as of 15 June 2006)**

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Malmö  
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Box 20512, SE-200 74 Malmö  
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**Honorary Consul: Magdalena Kurczewska-Svensson**

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**Honorary Consul: Elisabeth Harlevi Larsson**

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**Honorary Consul: Bo Ulf Roland Chronier**

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**Honorary Consul: Ann-Catherine Haglund**

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**Switzerland**

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Bern  
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www.pol-amb.ch; polishemb@dial.eunet.ch

**Ambassador: Janusz Niesyto (since 7 June 2005), also accredited to Lichtenstein**

Consular section  
address—see above  
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## Syria

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Damascus  
Abou Rumaneh, Baha Eddin Aita Street, Damascus P.O. 501  
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**Ambassador: Jacek Chodorowicz (since 12 October 2001)**

**Honorary Consul: Ahmad Azzam Zeitouni**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Aleppo  
Cappuccini Jmm. Kalioundji, Al Muhafaza, Aleppo, Syria,  
P.O. Box: 615 Aleppo, Syria  
Phone: (0 0963 21) 268 88 38-9, 268 86 38, 268 86 39, 266 09 35,  
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## Tanzania

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Dar es Salaam  
63 Aly Khan Road, Upanga, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, P.O. Box 2188  
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Phone/fax: (0 0255 22) 211 58 12, 266 83 09  
polamb@wingrouptz.com

**Ambassador accredited also to Comoros, Somalia and Zambia**

**Chargé d'affaires: Ryszard Malik**

## Thailand

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**Ambassador: Bogdan Góralczyk (since 15 October 2003), also accredited to Myanmar and the Philippines**

Consular section

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## Togo

**Honorary Consul: Soumou Tchamdja**

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## Tunisia

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Tunis  
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www.pologne.intl.tn; amb-pologne@wanadoo.tn

**Ambassador: Zdzisław Raczyński (since 15 July 2004)**

## Turkey

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Ankara  
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**Ambassador: Grzegorz Michalski (since 16 February 2005)**

**Consul General: Marcin Wilczek**

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**Honorary Consul: Talha Görgülü**

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**Honorary Consul: Jan Taşççi**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Mersin  
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## Uganda

**Honorary Consul: Ephraim Kamuntu**

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## Ukraine

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**Ambassador: Jacek Kluczkowski (since 22 July 2005)**

**Consul General: Sylwester Szostak**

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**Consul General: Wiesław Osuchowski**

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**Consul General: Jarosław Książek**

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www.kgrp.kharkov.ua; kgrp@kharkov.ukrtel.net

**Consul General: Wojciech Gałązka**

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Lutsk  
Katedralna 7, 43–016 Lutsk  
Phone: (0 038 332) 77 06 10, 77 06 13; fax: (0 038 332) 77 06 15  
www.konsulat.lutsk.ua; konsulat@konsulat.lutsk.ua

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Odessa  
Uspienska 2/1, 65–014 Odessa  
Phone: (0 038 48) 729 39 36; fax: (0 038 48) 729 43 88

**First secretary: Anetta Sondej**

**United Arab Emirates**

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Abu Dhabi  
Abu Dhabi, Delma Street, Corner with Karama Street  
P.O. Box 2334, ABU DHABI, United Arab Emirates  
Phone: (0 0971 2) 446 52 00; fax: (0 0971 2) 446 29 67  
www.plembassy.gov.ae; polemb@emirates.net.ae

**Ambassador: Roman Chałaczkiwicz (since 25 July 2005), also accredited to Qatar**

**United Kingdom and Northern Ireland**

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in London  
47 Portland Place, London W1B 1JH  
Phone: (0 044) 87 07 74 27 00, 87 07 74 27 02; fax: (0 044) 20 73 23 40 18  
www.polishembassy.org.uk, polishembassy@polishembassy.org.uk

**Ambassador: Zbigniew Matuszewski (from 1 August 2004 to 1 April 2006)**

**Chargé d'affaires: Cezary Król**

**Consul General: Janusz Wach**

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in London  
73 New Cavendish Street, London W1W 6LS  
Phone: (0 044) 20 87 07 74 28 00, 87 07 74 28 02; fax: (0 044) 20 73 23 23 20  
www.polishconsulate.co.uk; konsulat@polishconsulate.co.uk

**Consul General: Aleksander Dietkow**

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Edinburgh  
2 Kinnear Road, Edinburgh EH3 5PE  
Phone: (0 044 131) 552 03 01; Phone/fax: (0 044 131) 552 10 86  
www.polishconsulate.org; edinburgh@polishconsulate.org

**Honorary Consul: Ireneusz G. Peszyński**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Bristol  
132 Henleaze Road, Henleaze, Bristol BS9 4LB  
Phone/fax: (0 044 117) 962 10 86  
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**Honorary Consul: Anthony Julius Lombard**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Gibraltar  
35, Governor's Parade, Gibraltar  
Phone: (0 0350) 745 93; fax: (0 0350) 794 91

**Honorary Consul: Joseph Carby-Hall**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Hull  
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**Honorary Consul: Michael Maciek George Oborski**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Kidderminster  
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**Honorary Consul: Graham Edwin White**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Sheffield  
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Phone: (0 044 114) 276 65 13

**Honorary Consul: Rodney Hodges**

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3rd Floor, 38 Esplanade  
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**United States of America**

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Washington  
2640 16th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009, USA  
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**Ambassador: Janusz Reiter (since 20 September 2005), also accredited to Puerto Rico**

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**Consul General: Krzysztof Kasprzyk**

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in New York  
233 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y. 10016, USA  
Phone: (0 01 646) 237 21 00, 237 21 49; fax: (0 01 646) 237 21 05  
www.polishconsulateny.org; kgrpny@aol.com

**Consul General: Jarosław Łasiński**

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Chicago  
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www.polishconsulatechicago.org; polcon@interaccess.com

**Consul General: Krystyna Tokarska-Biernacik**

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Los Angeles  
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**Honorary Consul: Stanisław Borucki**

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**Honorary Consul: Marek Leśniewski-Laas**

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polishconsul@comcast.net

**Honorary Consul: Tomasz Skotnicki**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Colorado  
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Longmont, CO 80504  
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**Honorary Consul: Bożena Jarnot**

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**Honorary Consul: Zbigniew J. Wojciechowski**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Houston  
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Sugar Land, TX 77479, USA  
Phone: (0 01 281) 565 04 99; fax: (0 01 281) 565 15 07  
polishconsul@houston.rr.com

**Honorary Consul: Blanka A. Rosenstiel**

**Honorary Vice-consul: Beata Paszyc**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Miami  
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**Honorary Consul: Marek Dollár**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Oxford, Ohio  
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**Honorary Consul: Thaddeus R. Winnowski**

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**Honorary Consul: Robert Ogrodnik**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Saint Louis  
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**Honorary Consul: Bohdan Chester Hryniewicz**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in San Juan, Puerto Rico  
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**Honorary Consul: Christopher Kerosky**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in San Francisco  
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## Uruguay

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Montevideo  
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Phone: (0 0598 2) 480 11 51, 480 13 13; fax: (0 0598 2) 487 33 89  
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**Ambassador: Lech Kubiak (since 20 November 2003)**

## Uzbekistan

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Tashkent  
Firdavsiy 66, Yunasabadskiy Rayon  
700084 Tashkent, Uzbekistan  
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**Ambassador also accredited to Tajikistan**

**Chafge d'affaires: Marian Orlikowski**

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## Venezuela

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Caracas  
Av. Nicolas Copernico, Qta. "Ambar"  
Valle Arriba, Sector Los Naranjos, Caracas  
Correspondence address:  
Apartado 62293, Chacao, Caracas 1060-A  
Phone: (0 058 212) 991 61 67, 991 14 61; fax: (0 058 212) 992 21 64  
www.embasada.org.ve; ambcarac@embasada.org.ve, konsul@embasada.org.ve

**Ambassador: Adam Skrybant (since 1 October 2002), also accredited to Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Grenada, Jamaica, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and to Surinam**

**Honorary Consul: Wojciech Gałazka**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Maracaibo  
Calle 15 A, csa 15 D 55, Urb. Lago Mar Beach, Maracaibo, Venezuela  
Phone: (0 058 261) 748 03 18

**Vietnam**

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Hanoi  
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Phone: (0 084 4) 845 20 27, 845 37 28; fax: (0 084 4) 823 69 14  
polamb@hn.vnn.vn

**Ambassador: Mirosław Gajewski (since 10 December 2003)**

**Consul General: Przemysław Jenke**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Ho Chi Minh  
Saigon Centre, 65 Le Loi Blvd.  
Ho Chi Minh  
Phone: (0 084 8) 914 28 83; fax: (0 084 8) 914 28 84  
kgrphcm@hcm.vnn.vn

**Yemen**

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Sana  
Fajj Attan Area, Sana'a, Yemen  
P.O. Box 16168  
Phone: (0 0967 1) 413 523, 413 524, 412 243; fax: (0 0967 1) 413 647  
www.y.net.ye/polemb; polemb@y.net.ye

**Ambassador: Tadeusz Strojwąg (since 14 July 2003), also accredited to Djibouti and Eritrea**

**Honorary Consul: Abdul Karim Ahmed Alsheibani**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Aden  
Sheibani Building Al.-Aqaba Roundbout, Mualla, Aden  
P.O. Box 4333, Mualla, Aden  
Phone: (0 0967 2) 242 222, 240 677; fax: (0 0967 2) 244 616  
shbni50@y.net.ye

**Zambia**

**Honorary Consul General: Maria Rosalia Ogonowska-Wiśniewska**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Lusaka  
Protea House, Cha cha cha Rd., Lusaka, Zambia, P.O. Box 30529  
Phone/fax: (0 0260 1) 27 46 48

**Zimbabwe**

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Harare  
16 Cork Road, Belgravia, Harare, P.O. Box 3932, Zimbabwe  
Phone: (0 0263 4) 25 34 42-3; fax: (0 0263 4) 25 37 10  
polamb@africaonline.co.zw

**Ambassador: Jan Wieliński (since 27 April 2005), also accredited to Malawi**

### III. International Organisations

#### Council of Europe

Permanent Representation of the Republic of Poland to the Council of Europe  
2, rue Geiler, 67000 Strasbourg, France  
Phone: (0 033) 388 372 300, in emergency: (0 033) 680 418 764  
fax: (0 033) 388 372 310  
sp.rp.strash@wanadoo.fr

**Ambassador—Head of the Mission: Piotr Świtalski (since 20 September 2005)**

#### European Union

Permanent Representation of the Republic of Poland to the European Union  
282–284, Avenue de Tervueren, B–1150 Bruxelles, Belgium  
Phone: (0 032 2) 77 77 200, 77 77 224; fax: (0 032 2) 77 77 297, 77 77 298  
101642.2616@compuserve.com

**Ambassador—Head of the Mission: Marek Grela (since 21 March 2002)**

#### NATO and WEU

Permanent Representation of the Republic of Poland to NATO and WEU  
Bld Léopold III, B–1110 Bruxelles, Belgium  
Phone: (0 032 2) 707 13 88, 707 11 17; fax: (0 032 2) 707 13 89

**Ambassador—Head of the Mission: Jerzy Maria Nowak (since 21 February 2002)**

#### OSCE

Mission of the Republic of Poland to OSCE in Vienna  
Hietzinger Hauptstrasse 42 C, 1130 Wien  
Phone: (0 043 1) 870 15 804; fax: (0 043 1) 870 15 331

**Ambassador—Head of the Mission: Jacek Bylica (since 1 August 2004)**

#### OECD

Permanent Representation of the Republic of Poland to OECD in Paris  
136, rue de Longchamp, 75116 Paris, France  
Phone: (0 033) 156 285 760; fax: (0 033) 156 289 466  
www.oecd.pologne.net; pol.deleg@oecd.pologne-org.net, info@oecd.pologne.net

**Ambassador—Permanent Representative: Jan Woroniecki (since 27 June 2005)**

#### United Nations

##### New York

Permanent Representation of the Republic of Poland to UN in New York  
9 East 66th Street, New York, N.Y.10021  
Phone: (0 01 212) 744 25 06, 744 25 09; fax: (0 01 212) 517 67 71  
www.polandun.org; general.mailbox@polandun.org

**Ambassador—Permanent Representative: Andrzej Towpik (since 31 July 2004)**

##### Geneva

Permanent Mission of the Republic of Poland to UN Office in Geneva  
15 Chemin de l' Ancienne Route, 1218 Grand Saconnex, Geneva

Phone: (0 041 22) 710 97 97 fax: (0 041 22) 710 97 99  
www.mission-polska.org; mission.poland@ties.itu.int, mission.pmsz@ties.itu.int

**Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Permanent Representative:  
Zdzisław Rapacki (since 30 April 2004)**

### **Vienna**

Permanent Representation of the Republic of Poland to United Nations in Vienna  
Hietzinger Hauptstrasse 42c, 1130 Wien, Austria  
Phone: (0 043 1) 870 15 816; fax: (0 043 1) 870 15 331  
oscepl@BotschaftRP.at

**Ambasador—Permanent Representative: Jacek Bylica (since 1 August 2004)**

### **UNESCO**

Permanent Representation of the Republic of Poland to UNESCO in Paris  
1, rue Miollis, 75015 Paris  
Phone: (003314) 568 29 97; fax: (003314) 566 59 56

**Ambasador—Permanent Delegate of the Republic of Poland to UNESCO:  
Maria Wodzyńska-Walicka.**

Compiled by *Sylwia Kozieln*

# Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 2004

## WEKTORY

**Informacja rządu na temat polskiej polityki zagranicznej w 2003 roku**  
(przedstawiona przez ministra spraw zagranicznych  
Włodzimierza Cimoszewicza)

**Zaangażowanie Polski w wojnę i stabilizację Iraku**  
(Jarosław Bratkiewicz)

**Polska polityka bezpieczeństwa w dobie kryzysu stosunków  
transatlantyckich** (Robert Kupiecki)

**Polityka zagraniczna w debacie publicznej** (Barbara Wizimirska)

## POLSKA A UNIA EUROPEJSKA

**Unia Europejska a Polska – próba oceny** (Michał Czyż)

**Polityka rozszerzonej Unii Europejskiej  
wobec wschodnich sąsiadów – wkład Polski** (Andrzej Cieszkowski)

## PROBLEMY

**Polska w stosunkach transatlantyckich** (Jadwiga Stachura)

**Strategia polskiej współpracy na rzecz rozwoju** (Paweł Bagiński)

**Polska w ONZ. Inicjatywa Nowego Aktu Politycznego**  
(Sergiusz Sidorowicz)

**Stosunki gospodarcze Polski z zagranicą** (Mariusz Gasztoł)

## STOSUNKI DWUSTRONNE I WIELOSTRONNE

**Stosunki Polski ze Stanami Zjednoczonymi** (Dariusz Wiśniewski)

**Stosunki Polski z Niemcami** (Stanisław Michałowski)

**Stosunki Polski z Francją** (Stanisław Parzymies, Sylwia Kanarek)

**Stosunki Polski z państwami Azji i Pacyfiku** (Tomasz Kozłowski)

**Współpraca wyszehradzka** (Jacek Gajewski)

## ANEKSY

**Stosunki traktatowe Polski** (Agata Stachura)

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Cena 30 zł. Zamówienia prosimy nadsyłać pod adresem:  
Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych  
00-950 Warszawa, ul. Warecka 1a, tel. (22) 556 80 00, faks (22) 556 80 99  
e-mail: publikacje@pism.pl

# Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 2005

## WEKTORY

**Informacja rządu na temat polskiej polityki zagranicznej w 2004 roku**  
(przedstawiona przez ministra spraw zagranicznych  
Włodzimierza Cimoszewicza)

**Środowisko międzynarodowe Polski A.D. 2004, czyli geopolityczna  
rewolucja w regionie** (Roman Kuźniar)

**Polska w Unii Europejskiej** (Paweł Świeboda)

**Polityka bezpieczeństwa Polski** (Robert Kupiecki)

## STOSUNKI DWUSTRONNE

**Stosunki Polski ze Stanami Zjednoczonymi** (Artur Michalski)

**Stosunki Polski z Niemcami** (Irena Lipowicz)

**Stosunki Polski z Rosją** (Grzegorz Czerwiński)

**Stosunki Polski z Francją** (Adam Halamski, Tomasz Majchrowski)

**Stosunki Polski z Ukrainą** (Wojciech Zajączkowski)

**Polityka Polski wobec regionu środkowoeuropejskiego** (Jacek Gajewski)

## WYBRANE PROBLEMY POLSKIEJ POLITYKI ZAGRANICZNEJ

**Zaangażowanie Polski w stabilizację Iraku** (Łukasz Kulesa)

**Stosunki gospodarcze Polski z zagranicą** (Krzysztof Marczewski)

**Polska polityka zagraniczna w świetle Strategii RP w odniesieniu  
do pozaeuropejskich krajów rozwijających się** (Katarzyna Kacperczyk)

**Polska wobec konstytucji mórz i oceanów** (Janusz Symonides)

## AKTYWNOŚĆ POLSKI W INSTYTUCJACH WIELOSTRONNYCH

**Udział Polski w reformie ONZ i polityczna aktywność na forum  
Organizacji** (Tomasz Chłoń)

**Aktywność Polski w ONZ w zakresie spraw społeczno-ekonomicznych**  
(Ryszard Rysiński)

**Polska w OBWE w latach 2003–2004** (Aleksandra Piątkowska)

**Rada Europy – III szczyt w Warszawie** (Michał Klinger)

## BILANS POLSKIEJ POLITYKI ZAGRANICZNEJ. DEBATA

## ANEKSY

**Stosunki traktatowe Polski** (Agata Stachura-Świeżawska)

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