

# Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy

2007



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## From the Editor

We are pleased to present you with another volume of the *Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy*. It contains both information on topical events and studies on Poland's actions in its external affairs policymaking in 2006. The material that makes up *2007 Yearbook* does not cover in equal detail all the foreign policy dimensions, and not in every instance offers a fully satisfactory insight. Despite all appearances, experts who can produce thorough papers on foreign policy are not that easy to come by. However, we are absolutely sure that the body of knowledge this volume contains is useful, will increase in value every year, and hopefully be appreciated by future researchers on Polish foreign policy.

Papers in this *Yearbook* focus on foreign policy events in their institutional dimension, primarily focusing on the activity areas of the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Authors of some papers published here are Foreign Affairs Ministry staff members, owing to which we get insight into the actual policymaking. To a lesser degree are the contents of the *Yearbook* focusing on, or reflecting, the public debate around the foreign policy in 2006, heated as it was, which primarily stemmed from the changes in the policy itself, its substance and conduct, as well as the internal foreign policy environment (government change, change of the foreign affairs minister and changes in other positions important for the institutional dimension of our foreign policy, including in the President and Prime Minister's offices). Representatives of the ruling party were on numerous occasions announcing the dawn of the new approach to foreign policy, which was related, at least symbolically, to the concept of transition from the "3<sup>rd</sup>" to the "4<sup>th</sup>" Republic of Poland.

Attempts at a new start in a democratic state's foreign policy will always stir up controversy and discussions, not only in Poland. Next to everyday criticism, usually strictly political in its appeal, fundamental questions are being asked in the context of this transition, related to the long-term horizon for Polish foreign policy, and our status in the international arena. The questions revolve around the actual conduct of foreign policy, its unilateralism, inclination to adopt *Realpolitik* attitudes, proper balance between continuity and change, and between awareness of the history and prospects for the future. These questions are essentially about what tools work best in the pursuit of our national interests. Last year, many fundamental questions were also asked about primary objectives of Polish foreign policy. Particularly difficult proved to be the search for new tools in the policy on Germany and Russia (in the context of resurfacing historical and geopolitical sentiments). Observers racked their brains over what

the Polish vision of the European Union was and what was Poland's contribution to the integration process. Some were satisfied with the "strong Poland in the Union" slogan, while others called for something more, yet there was no agreement on what this "something more" was supposed to be. Traditionally, our involvement in conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan provoked some heated discussions.

In essence, it was an interesting year for Polish foreign policy. We hope that this *Yearbook* will prove useful for today's and future researchers in Polish foreign policy.

*Roman Kuźniar*

**I.**

**The Basis of Polish Foreign Policy**





## **Government Information on Polish Foreign Policy in 2006**

(presented at the session of the Sejm on 15 February 2006)

by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, Stefan Meller)

Mister President,  
Mister Speaker,  
Mister Prime Minister,  
Members of the House,

Every year at this time the Sejm holds a debate on Polish foreign policy. As you review the records of these debates over the years you can see both continuity, reflected in the fundamental goals in the international arena, and change—determined by the attainment of the objectives that we set forth in the early Nineties. Today, it is evident how much has changed with regard to Poland's security, development and position. We are not alone in guarding our security, since we have the support of our NATO allies. We have been given prospects of accelerated development through our membership of the European Union. The stature of Poland has been clearly enhanced by the membership of both these powerful structures of the Western world, as well as by our significant international activity, commensurate with Polish ambitions and potential.

Only several years ago our present attainments would have seemed elusive and improbable, as did Poles' erstwhile dreams of independence. And yet they have been transformed into reality. The upsurge of courage, initiative and resourcefulness, released by the great social movement of Solidarity gave enormous momentum to our actions aimed at resurrecting and rebuilding an independent and sovereign Poland. What is most important, however, is that this momentum in all areas of activity of the State and Nation has inculcated a truly Promethean spirit, inspiring people to confront greater challenges and consolidating determination to achieve their goals.

Naturally, the advancement was not all smooth. The process of transformations encountered resistance of the residues of post-communism, and there was no shortage of difficulties and pitfalls. We should remember how low was the point of our civilizational departure, how mediocre the economic condition of Poland in the late Eighties. When you consider all these modalities, when you compare them with transformations in other countries, the measure of progress becomes more apparent. It also becomes evident how far we have departed from the bad Polish tradition of negligence and inaction. The listing of Polish achievements and successes justifies the claim that a modern political

culture is being formed in Poland, based on self-confidence and courage, which in turn are integrally linked to prudence and knowledge. Perhaps that is the reason why our Western partners increasingly refer to the assertiveness of Poles, our readiness to tackle tough problems, our skill and consistency in standing up for our interests.

It is only natural that the momentum of Polish transformations has been accompanied by a corresponding drive in Polish foreign policy. That momentum has prompted us to set ambitious goals in foreign policy and fulfil challenging tasks, so as to lend optimum support to the project of reconstruction and change. The effectiveness of the transformations, in turn, enhanced the positive image of Poland in Europe and around the world, giving inspiration and flair to diplomatic work. You could say that Poland's success in internal policy became a crucial component of its international success.

Mister Speaker,  
Members of the House,

Present-day Poland is firmly anchored in NATO and the European Union. We are linked in a strategic partnership with the United States. Good neighbourly relations bind us with all our neighbours. I wish to mention one more country at this point, at the beginning of my speech, namely Ukraine. The recent Polish-Ukrainian relations have become a special part of our history and our new consciousness. Considering our past, it would be hard to believe several years ago, that Poland might become such an important part of Europe's Eastern policy and that Poland would be a key supporter of Ukrainian democracy or Ukrainian rebirth. I think that our relations reflect, in a particular way, our place in Europe and in the world, as well as our international activity and a truly European, conciliatory identity.

Safe and confident, we must now undertake fundamental toil of matching our Western allies and partners in the economic and social spheres, of overcoming civilisational underdevelopment, resulting from the stagnation and chaos characteristic of socialist construction of the People's Republic of Poland. A development leap is both an ambitious and difficult task. Yet, as once Poland grasped independence, so it must grasp modernity. The time we have is short and determined by the rate of growth inside and outside the Union, by related international economic competition, including that in our region, as well as by advances in science and technology. These will define Poland's place in international division of labour and the resultant economic security of the country, which is essential for modernization and sustained growth of the Polish economy.

That in turn will reflect on our position and potential to act effectively on the international scene in pursuit of Poland's interests. It will enable us to erase, once and for all, stereotypes of a coarse but cocky Poland, barefooted but in stirrups; a Poland that aspires to a role that surpasses its true capacity and potential, and which, in consequence, loses in confrontation with the powerful of this world.

If we are to make optimum use of the vast possibilities given by the European Union membership, we must elaborate a studied, analysis-based strategy for our actions in the Union. This is facilitated by the period of reflection inside the Union, which should address not only institutional change but also restitution of the Europeans' faith in the integration project. This period of reflection should be treated in Poland as an impulse for a broader debate on our EU strategy. In particular, we should ask ourselves what kind of a Union we want. And to answer that, we should determine what vision of the future Union is best attuned to our key goals in three main areas:

- first, accelerated development and civilisational advancement;
- second, the requirements of broadly perceived security, taking into account transatlantic dimension and the role of the United States;
- third, the consolidation of our position as a reliable member of the European community, capable of skilfully harmonizing own and community interests.

I would like to add that while considering the matter of the future of Europe, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs counts on cooperation with the Parliament. We hope to be able to debate this issue together with you, Honourable Members, and to work out a common denominator for our thinking about European Union and Poland's place in it.

Let me briefly focus on our present and future position in the European Union. The Union is a successful and—what's more—unique political project as regards the level of policy integration of the respective member states. You could say that European—and also transatlantic—integration has removed the curse of a centuries-long, essentially conflict-prone system of the balance of power in Europe, which caused the continent to be dominated by a concert of powers, at the expense of weaker and smaller states. That does not mean that in an integrated Europe the national interests of the member states have been subordinated to the rule of Brussels and have, in effect, disappeared. The Union states have divergent interests and their pursuit requires appropriate negotiating procedures. Concern for national interests must not, however, degenerate into a clash of national egoisms, contrary to community interests. Such egoisms

sometimes make their presence known in the Union, especially on the part of the Union powers, and I consider them dangerous to our interests and would like to see safety measures to prevent the Union from being split up into exclusive subgroups, whose interests would overshadow those of the community. The Union as a whole should be an area of healthy competition—without which the Western civilization would be doomed to atrophy—and concomitantly of the inseparable, rational elaboration of the directions and principles of cooperation.

Poland's main contribution to such a Union can be our vigour, initiative, and ability to reach compromise and conclude alliances. This has been demonstrated by the success of the Polish delegation headed by Premier Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz during the European Council in December 2005. We clearly showed that in the process of decision-making, the Union must take the Polish point of view into account. And it is not about thinking in terms of “winners or losers.” Not at all. It is about having a substantial share in the common success. Attainment of such success will be easier if the rules of the process have a sturdy foundation. The matter should be resolved through an honest debate, conducted in a spirit of historic duty and responsibility for a Poland that is modern, strong and respected in Europe and around the world.

At the same time we should listen with utmost attention to the opinions of our Union partners concerning the Constitutional Treaty. They are quite divergent. Thus, we are dealing with an equation with many unknowns which requires a deeply premeditated reaction on our part.

Honourable Members,

This year we should define priority areas for cooperation within the Union and the instruments of its effective operation. An important place here is occupied by issues relating to energy security. We will seek a reassessment in perception of these problems by our partners in the Union and in America, in order to elaborate—possibly within the whole Western system—a comprehensive strategy of energy security, and to involve Poland in its implementation. We will pay due attention to other looming problems that increasingly affect or could affect Poland: the problem of ageing of European societies, and the closely related question of recruiting foreign labour, particularly through migration from non-European countries, including Muslim ones. We are not losing sight of the implications of this phenomenon for relations within European societies, for cultural adaptation and social stability.

We will consistently affirm our position concerning the need for creating a single market in the Union through eradicating all barriers to implementation

of the four freedoms, particularly the freedom of movement of persons and services. We are grateful to Great Britain, Sweden, and Ireland for not blocking access of Polish workers to their labour markets; we know that Poles employed there are working well and contribute to economic growth of those countries and of the Union as a whole. We expect that also other states open their labour markets to Polish citizens. We will become active in the discussion on the European Social Model. We feel that the principle of solidarity is the central element here. It recognizes the need for healthy competition and honest rivalry as the core values of Western civilization. They must not be allowed to degenerate, leading to social Darwinism, however. Similarly, the need for assistance and support—rooted in the principle of solidarity—should stimulate pro-active attitudes, rather than inducing indolence and advancement of claims. The other key factor affecting the Social Model is economic growth, which leads to the creation of new and—more importantly—“dignified” jobs, securing individual development and satisfaction for the citizens of the Union.

The invigoration of economic growth throughout the Union would be served by implementation of a modified Lisbon Strategy. In a globalised world the future will be claimed by those who effectively cope with the challenges of modern free-market competition and win thanks to their better knowledge and professionalism, innovation and creative attitudes. We will strive to upgrade the competitiveness of the Polish economy, becoming involved in research and development cooperation, including research projects financed by the Union. We expect that true to the principle of solidarity, Poland will obtain Union support for the development of its scientific research.

Naturally, Poland’s accelerated economic development will hinge on implementation of the decisions of last December’s European Council, which resulted in compromise over the budget for the years 2007–2013. We will seek a quickest possible conclusion of the work on the package of legislation concerning the New Economic Perspective, so that its actual implementation is possible from 1 January 2007.

Honourable Members,

The economic dimension of the Union is obviously of key importance. However, we would like to see the Union continue its evolution from a primarily economic project toward a comprehensive architecture of institutional, political, and social solutions, so that a solidary Union of Societies and Politicians gains strength alongside the Union of Entrepreneurs and Bookkeepers. We attach particular significance to the efficient operation of the decision-making

mechanism, which, so far—as demonstrated by the December summit—largely depended on the good political will and ability to compromise on the part of the major Union states. We believe, therefore, in the need of precisely such collaboration—based on good will and compromise—of the states that feel a particular responsibility for the Union, and for building its strong and efficient foundations and mechanisms.

An important test of the political will and potential for collaboration will come with the elaboration of the European Union's common foreign policy, equipped with suitable executive instruments. In particular—through appointment of the Union's foreign minister and creation of the EU External Action Service. The Common Foreign and Security policy is the emanation of Union's activity in this field. We will work for its consolidation and deepening. The East European direction is a promising area of development for the Union's foreign policy. It is high time for the Union's decisions and actions—and particularly those of the respective member states—to be based on solid foundations of deep and rationalized knowledge about Russia, Ukraine and other states of Eastern Europe. We are not only prepared to share such knowledge, but also to be actively involved in elaborating appropriate decisions. We know that such is the expectation of our Union partners. We are particularly pleased by the relevant initiatives of Germany.

Poland consistently supports the enlargement of the European Union. We feel that the Big Bang enlargement of 2004 invigorated the Union, rejuvenating it with new enterprise, creativity, and energy of the states and societies of Central and Eastern Europe. Admittedly, on occasion, it also aroused stereotypes, symbolized by “the Polish plumber,” that were unfriendly to Poland. However, the balance sheet of gains and losses clearly shows dominance of the former. If the Union wants to unite everything that has grown out of the spirit of European civilization and has identified with its values, it has to define the meaning of European identity and the extent of its political and civilisational borders. It must draw appropriate conclusions from this. We should see interdependence between the legal foundations of the Union and the possibility of its further expansion—something Poland supports unequivocally.

Our knowledge of the region suggests that the Union's borders should move further to the east and south-east, embracing Ukraine as well. In the Union debate on the subject, we will not limit ourselves merely to advocating our own point of view. We will strive to ensure that “enlargement fatigue” does not influence attitudes toward those states, leading to their exclusion in advance. We should be guided by strategic thinking and long-term perspectives. We will seek

to ensure that the emerging Eastern Dimension of the Union's Neighbourhood Policy draws the countries involved closer to the Union. At the same time, they should not be doomed to the role of "eternal partners." At least some of them—the ones with a pro-European orientation and advanced internal transformations—should be given the prospect of membership, however distant it may be.

The system of the European Union's agreements and links with states and institutions in, practically, the entire world offers Poland a chance to utilize that system for promotion as well as political, economic, and cultural expansion far beyond our regional backyard. It is a profound challenge that puts us face to face with problems and opportunities of globalization. In Iraq we have demonstrated that we can cope with such challenges—but we have to transform them into opportunities, including development opportunities, and not only in Iraq and the Broader Middle East, but also in other regions enjoying particularly rapid economic growth.

Mister Speaker,

Members of the House,

In order to ensure Poland's rapid economic growth, enabling us to narrow the development gap that separates us from the wealthy Western countries, we must not only make use of our membership of the European Union and other international economic organizations, such as the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development or the World Trade Organization. We must not only be more active in world markets, wherever niches for our exports and investments appear, and wherever investments—including advanced technologies—can be attracted to Poland. In addition to obtaining sound knowledge and elaborating hierarchy of priorities and goals in this area, we must prepare suitable instruments ensuring effective operation.

In this context I will invoke two concepts: economization of diplomatic activity and promotion. We should make the most of the "5 minutes" of world's attention we enjoyed in 1989, and have again received nowadays, after the EU accession. Europe and the rest of the world—notwithstanding elements of criticism—are again curious about Poland, our ideas regarding further development, and opinions on the problems of our neighbourhood and the continent as a whole. The current interest in Poland assumes a very concrete form, and may be translated into offers of economic co-operation, imports of our goods, common scientific and cultural projects as well as an increase in foreign investments and number of tourists visiting Poland. We must not miss this opportunity.

Knowledge about Poland around the world is still limited, and our image is often distorted and obscured by stereotypes. There is no need to explain how this affects attitudes and willingness to do business with Poles. Hence, we must reform governmental system of promotion and finalize work on the basic promotional message on Poland, which will be disseminated internationally. The message will be clear: Poland is a politically vigorous country with a robust economy, fascinating culture, a moving history and millions of young, dynamic well-educated and open-minded people. If such an image is attuned to the emerging civilisational advancement of Poland, our political successes and economic attainments, we will see a gradual disappearance of views about Poland—both new and historic—that are rooted in ignorance, falsehood or bad will. Whilst promoting Poland, we will adhere to the principles of maximum objectivity. However, should we encounter problems—such as lack of good will or misinformation, especially in describing painful elements of our history—we will resolutely defend Poland's good name.

In order to intensify promotional activity, particularly in the economic sphere, we will introduce appropriate changes and innovations. First of all, we will draft a comprehensive Strategy for Promotion of Poland in the Years 2007–2013, elaborating key goals and methods of promotion, including its preferred recipients. We will establish a professional government agency for economic promotion, modelled on the best examples of such institutions in highly developed countries. Most importantly, we will transform and consolidate the so-called economic diplomacy, bind it with other segments of the foreign service, so that it is capable of strategic planning and implementation of our economic interests abroad.

Honourable Members,

While promoting Poland around the world we must not forget about Polish expatriates—the Polonia, and the Polish national minorities. To some extent we will be also promoting them—the Poles scattered across all continents. We are hoping that they will actively join in that promotional campaign, feeling justified pride in their Polish roots. We will encourage representatives of the Jewish diaspora, emotionally linked to Poland and remembering the land of their forefathers, to support our promotional message abroad.

We will ensure that persons belonging to all groups of Polish expatriates support economic aspects of our activity abroad, whether in the promotional or business sphere. We assume that this will constitute an important factor enhancing economization of Polish foreign policy.



At the same time we will consistently provide support for the Polonia and Polish minorities abroad, particularly in the cultivation of their Polish roots and language. We will resolutely defend their rights wherever they are violated due to undemocratic practices—as in Belarus.

It is important for the Government Program of Cooperation with the Polonia and Poles Abroad to be systematically upgraded and modified. In our opinion, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which deals with Polonia issues on a daily basis, should not only be the coordinator of the implementation of the Government Program, but also the main disposer of the state funds earmarked for the purpose. I would like to add one more remark. We are considering new methods of uniting Polonia. We have currently great numbers of young, well-educated Poles, working abroad. Large numbers of Polish intelligentsia. I believe it is crucial that they, this group of people functioning in the opinionmaking circles, come together, and that we work together with them.

Mister Speaker,  
Members of the House,

In the present-day world we are confronted with non-traditional, often dramatic challenges. They necessitate appropriate adaptation of the regional and world organizations, such as the United Nations.

Poland will continue to be involved in the work on UN reform, particularly concerning the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission, the Human Rights Council, reform of the Economic and Social Council, prevention of terrorism and elimination of the shortcomings in the regulations and mechanisms concerning disarmament and nonproliferation. We will strive to make the Security Council more effective and representative, also through allocation of an additional nonpermanent seat to the Eastern Europe regional group.

The aforementioned changes and other related actions should help reduce such negative global phenomena as the economic gap between the rich North and the poor South, the dishonest appropriation or waste of assistance resources by corrupt regimes that are usually undemocratic or even authoritarian. The vicious circle of poverty, misrule and frequent political oppression drives societies in the South into deep social and cultural frustration, and blind fury, which turns against the powerful of this world—the prosperous countries of the West, seen as patrons of those corrupt and repressive regimes. In that disorientation and anger, religion becomes a discernible point of reference, particularly in Muslim societies. Subjected to serious misinterpretations, it is transformed into ideological call for a global revenge against the world of “the

rich and infidel.” However, we should remember that the proportion of the fundamentalist fanatics, particularly those who resort to armed terrorism, is low, and that their terrorist activity targets not only Westerners. “Local tyrants” rarely fall victim to terrorist attacks; more often they hit other Muslims who call for modernization and oppose authoritarianism, whether lay or exploiting religion. And most frequently, the victims are ordinary, innocent people. This is eloquently illustrated by Iraq. We are dealing there with a “hot” civil war between forces seeking modernity and normalcy, and forces pushing toward the darkness of traditionalism and seclusion. Many Muslim countries are experiencing the “cold” version of that war. It is the region of the Broader Middle East where all gravest dilemmas, challenges and threats of the modern world have become most intertwined.

Can those challenges and threats be effectively confronted by the United Nations, whose members also include states that are devoid of credibility, that are dictatorial and authoritarian, with regimes that condone fanaticism and terrorism, or states that are weak and “failed”? There is no simple response to this question. However, it must be assumed that the potential of the UN has not become exhausted, and that with a suitable reform of the whole structure it can be duly activated and utilized.

The states and institutions of the Euro-Atlantic zone attach top significance to the promotion of global democratization and modernization. In recent years, much has been said in Western states about preemptive and preventive military strikes as an effective way of averting terrorist attacks. It seems, however, that prevention can be made even more effective by addressing the core factors generating the non-traditional threats, including terrorism, and by eliminating or substantially curtailing them. This requires undertakings that are protracted and costly, but which ultimately are more effective than even the most brilliant military victories. Since the time of Kant it has been known that democratic societies, guided by a collective common sense, are more predictable and—even more importantly—more peaceful, than societies subjected to the oppressiveness of autocracy and authoritarianism. Let me repeat: we consider political and economic preventive actions to be the most effective and least risk-prone method of counteracting terrorism and other non-traditional threats. However, it does happen on occasion, as it is in Iraq, that a military *ultima ratio* becomes unavoidable.

Honourable Members,

Our centuries-long tradition of struggle for freedom and independence and, particularly, the experience gained in our successful transformation, constitute a kind of rich political know-how, which predestines Poland to concern itself with human rights, and the right to democracy and free market. This is also connected with the fulfilment of our obligations to provide development aid—something that will gain increasing prominence in our international activity. We will support efforts to attain sustainable development, reduce poverty and hunger and find new sources of financing aid for the least developed countries. We will continue to implement these actions through the UN, European Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, to name just a few prominent organizations in this field. We will continue our activity in the framework of the Community of Democracies, founded six years ago at an international conference in Warsaw, considering it a significant instrument of support for the democratization initiatives undertaken within the framework of the UN and by major democratic states. We will actively implement the conclusions of the Third Summit of the Council of Europe, held last May in Warsaw, and become especially engaged in the work of the Forum on the Future of Democracy, established by a decision of the Summit. All in all, you could say that the above plans and actions have imparted upon us the role of an advocate of international solidarity, sensitive to the needs of countries in our immediate and more distant proximity, particularly those in which our actions may have actual impact on positive transformations. Poland is country that is open to others and we want the world to know it.

We recognize the strategic significance of the broadly-perceived region of the Middle East as the addressee of many Western initiatives—to mention the Union's Barcelona Process or the American initiative of a Broader Middle East, designed to stimulate modernization and democratization in the countries of the region. We are prepared to become involved in them. We wish to expand our participation in the stabilization mission in Iraq by providing training and counselling, particularly for the non-military personnel of the reborn civil service and self-government administration.

Eastern Europe remains a particularly important region where Poland supports systemic transformations, democratization and human rights. We note with satisfaction that the Polish example may serve as inspiration for the activity of the Ukrainian elite and society, disappointed by the model of transformations which are slow, and which either preserve certain attributes of post-Sovietism, or replicate certain bad solutions and degenerated practices, such as the oligarchic-

clan system. We are deeply convinced that the return of authoritarianism in some states of Eastern Europe and Central Asia will not last in the face of the mounting democratization tendencies. With word and deed we will support the formation in those states of the civil society, aware of its inalienable rights.

Mister Speaker,  
Members of the House,

The transatlantic community remains the cornerstone of our security. It is now being confronted by a new, non-traditional type of threats, rooted in a whole array of phenomena characteristic of the South, and especially the Broader Middle East. I have already referred to them. It is a peculiarity of these threats that they are not generated, as during the Cold War, by an ideological “empire of evil,” with all its attributes of state and resources that can be calculated or estimated, and with an identifiable leadership, which—though faithful to the doctrine—was prepared to negotiate its position, guided by the basic, pragmatic desire to survive. But, is it possible to locate the fundamentalist Internationale of Terrorism on the map, to define its material and human potential, to identify all its leaders, and most of all—to come to terms with the terrorists, for whom life has little value? It is only with a limited certainty that we can point out certain communities, where the evil of terrorism is germinating, fed by blind hatred and deeply distorted religious dictates. We can name certain states, with despotic regimes and terrorist practices, or states torn apart by internal strife and in effect “failed,” which were the mainstay, or to some degree the incarnation, of that Internationale of Terrorism.

The haziness and secretiveness of these threats, which—when manifested in the form of terrorists attacks—cause casualties comparable in number to the effects of modern warfare, pose a dilemma when it comes to their effective suppression. I have already mentioned the array of political and economic measures that, if deployed in advance, can reduce and eliminate the conflict-inciting tensions and frustrations among societies of the South. However, the actions of terrorists can only be rebuffed by force. What instruments and institutions should then be used for this purpose?

Poland believes, as do many of our allies, that the North Atlantic Alliance should play the leading role. Terrorist threats have their clear military or guerrilla dimension, considering the methods of warfare and particularly their consequences. We, therefore, feel that NATO—while retaining its original attributes of a defensive alliance—should develop the capacities that can serve suppression of terrorism, its state and non-state backers. This requires an

appropriate modification of the military doctrine, allowing for the operation of expeditionary forces of the Alliance beyond the treaty zone. Such changes are already under way, including the creation of the NATO Response Force and the implementation of the Prague Capabilities Commitment. In this context one should mention the allied training mission in Iraq and NATO's engagement in Afghanistan, where in 2007 Poland will assume the command of the international security forces (ISAF).

Together with other allies we are moving to strengthen the political dimension of the North Atlantic Alliance, which should not only remain the institutional keystone of the Western civilization, but also a forum for the elaboration of key strategic decisions of the West. This would be enhanced by an invigoration of internal Alliance dialog and of the NATO–EU and US–EU contacts, complementing transatlantic cooperation. We will campaign for continuation of the Alliance's "open doors" policy, also with relation to Ukraine. That country's accession to NATO would not only strengthen the Alliance, but would fundamentally change the geopolitical situation in our neighbourhood, greatly benefiting Poland, Ukraine and many other states.

We will support the process of elaboration of the European Policy of Security and Defence, so as to make it complimentary to the capabilities and resources of NATO. This applies, in particular, to the collaboration of NATO's Response Force and the Union's Battle Groups, and also the implementation of joint projects in the field of the arms industry, research and high technologies. We will strive to make optimum use of the benefits of that cooperation and the work of the European Defence Agency.

We will actively contribute to the initiatives designed to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, such as the initiative unveiled by President George W. Bush during his 2004 visit to Krakow. I wish to pledge Poland's support for the efforts of our allies and partners, aimed at finding satisfactory resolution to the problem of the Iranian nuclear program. Furthermore, I wish to inform you that we are continuing talks concerning the possible participation of Poland in the American missile defence system.

Mister President,  
Mister Speaker,  
Mister Prime Minister,  
Members of the House,

In today's world of global links and interactions, where an increasing role is played by multilateral relations and supra-national actors, the significance of

traditional bilateral relations has somewhat diminished. Still, such relations remain prime foundation of international life. Taking up this issue I have chiefly in mind the fact that President Lech Kaczyński, during his New Year's meeting with the diplomatic corps in early January, dwelled at length on the subject of bilateral relations. Fully agreeing with the President's assessment of Poland's relations with the respective states, I would like to comment on certain questions concerning selected states with which Poland has maintained special relations.

First of all, I wish to declare that we will continue to tighten the strategic partnership with the United States, which constitutes a significant factor of our security and serves the consolidation of the transatlantic links. High- and top-level bilateral contacts are an important component of this partnership. We have to mention here the recent visit to the United States by President Lech Kaczyński, visits to Washington by members of the government, including myself, and the recent, latest round of the Polish-American Strategic Dialog. All these meetings have confirmed that we communicate and collaborate with our American partners as befits allies and friends. In addition to our excellent political and military cooperation, we would like to upgrade our economic cooperation and acquire American investments and high technologies. Energy cooperation is assuming particular importance. We will try to persuade world-renowned American research institutions to establish branches in Poland. We will consistently campaign for the lifting of the visa requirement for Poles travelling to the US.

We are closely following the political evolution of the united Germany. We believe that the deep democratic transformations in that country over the last half century have consolidated its role as the bulwark of democracy and a proponent of European and transatlantic integration. In fulfilling that role Germany can count on its tested friends, including Poland. We remember well the important and favourable signals from the new German leadership, indicating a broadening of the area of close cooperation between Poland and Germany. With that in mind, we will lend an even more friendly and sincere character to both the contacts of representatives of the government and elite, and the relations between ordinary Poles and Germans. We have difficult history behind us and together we must struggle for a good future—for us and other nations of Europe.

France continues to evoke a reaction of affinity among Poles. This is an excellent basis for developing bilateral relations with that country, especially since we are receiving encouraging signals from the French side as well. The regular Polish-French summit meetings are an important factor enhancing better

understanding and cooperation. I think that the possibilities lying in front of us were very well shown by the December summit in Brussels.

The well developing relations with Germany and France will be reflected in the tripartite cooperation, which has been known for 15 years as the Weimar Triangle. Broad possibilities of tripartite collaboration are offered by activity within the Union, particularly with regard to urgent Union problems, joint approach to the question of transatlantic relations and coordination of the policy addressed to our eastern neighbours.

As concerns the above and other issues, we are also open to tight cooperation with other Western states, particularly Great Britain, Spain and Italy, although in fact I should mention all the countries here.

As both a Central European and Baltic country, we feel predestined to play the role of a keystone in regional cooperation, also involving the Scandinavian sub-region. You could say that the focus on the East–West axis, so characteristic of Polish foreign policy, should be increasingly supplemented with new accents and greater attention to the North–South axis. This is confirmed by the experience of the Visegrad cooperation, which is 15 years old precisely today. It has passed the test of time and can still constitute a good platform for cooperation, e.g. on European Union issues or East European policy. Its effectiveness would be boosted if Baltic and Scandinavian partners joined in this cooperation on matters of common interest.

As concerns our relations with Russia, we particularly want them to be normal and partner-like, and to draw on the already tested spheres of cooperation, primarily the economic one. I wish to reciprocate the recent warm words of President Vladimir Putin and agree that Poland and Russia share a considerable potential of ethnic, historic and cultural closeness. We must activate it and use it to stimulate dialog at different levels and between different communities, particularly the political and opinion-making circles. It is in Poland's vital interest that a modern Russian state be formed to the east of the Polish borders, a state that does not seek inspiration in its imperial heritage, but builds a new identity of a credible and cooperative country, and especially—a good neighbour. We feel that there are no objective causes or reasons in our relations with Russia which could hinder good-neighbourly cooperation based on rationally formulated national interests. We will strive, creatively and consistently, to achieve and consolidate such a state of affairs in our relations with Russia.

Inspired by the Orange Revolution, we will continue to support the fraternal Ukrainian nation in its difficult movement—marked by unexpected twists and turns—toward modernity and democracy. We note with satisfaction that Ukraine, with new pro-Western elites resolutely defending Ukrainian national interests and an emerging civil society, is becoming a prominent actor on the European political scene. We expect that the country will cope with yet another great test of democracy, namely the forthcoming parliamentary elections. On our part, we will spare no effort to ensure that the strategic partnership between our countries is filled with new content, enhancing the transformations in Ukraine. This applies in particular to cooperation in the political and military area, further orienting that country to achieve high Western standards and, in consequence, to obtain membership of Western institutions, particularly NATO. This also refers to energy cooperation.

Our relations with Belarus will depend on the development of the internal situation in that country, and especially on the extent to which its clearly undemocratic regime continues to undermine human and civil rights. The forthcoming presidential elections will indicate how the situation is developing. We are hoping for victory by the civic-minded and democratic forces of Belarus. However, we are concerned that the elections will be conducted in accordance with Stalin's well-known adage that it is not who votes that matters, it is who counts the votes. If that were to be true, then it would be extremely difficult to restore full-fledged political relations between Poland and Belarus, particularly at the top level. At the same time, we will try to maintain pragmatically justified inter-ministry contacts as well as economic, cultural, legal and social cooperation. Most importantly, we will continue to support democratic and civic forces in Belarus, facilitating their access to information through the planned launching of a radio station broadcasting to that country.

I have already repeatedly referred to the growing significance of Poland's non-European engagement—both political and economic. Special opportunities here are offered in the Middle East, where we notice not only profound challenges but also trustworthy partners and friends, both in the Arab countries and Israel. We see similar opportunities in Asia. We will continue to maintain good contacts with many partners, such as Japan, the Republic of Korea and the ASEAN states. We highly value the role that the investors coming from those countries play in the process of modernizing Poland. We are closely following the emergence in Asia of two supra-regional powers: China and India, with which we intend to develop economic cooperation and political dialog. However, it is worth emphasizing that we will also test our strength elsewhere—for example



in Latin America and Africa—where we see good prospects for mutually advantageous cooperation. Let me add, that it was perhaps somewhat reckless of us to miss the opportunities for political and economic cooperation with those countries where Poles had once been present in large numbers and active in supporting the local economies. I will not mention them all here, but this problem is on my mind and I would like to strengthen the cooperation especially with those states, where Polish experts were so very active.

Honourable Members,

I realize that I have not referred to many countries deserving friendly mention. I certainly was not guided by the well-known saying that a diplomat remembers what to forget. I focused on matters and issues rather than on respective states, keeping in mind that the status of relations with this or that country in Polish foreign policy will be best revealed through joint resolution of these matters.

Mister Speaker,  
Members of the House,

All the plans and undertakings, which I have presented, require appropriate staffing and organizational decisions. The ambitious plans of our activity within the European Union necessitate further consolidation and professionalisation of the Polish foreign service, incorporating the hitherto separate segments of the administration concerned with Union issues. This will take place through the merger of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Office of the Committee of European Integration, resulting in a new character of the Ministry. The combining of foreign and union affairs in a single structure will allow greater effectiveness and improved coordination. It will also bring tangible savings due to the joining of institutions whose tasks have overlapped to some degree.

Another important area of foreign service reform will involve the establishment of a professional corps of economic diplomats, unambiguously subordinated to the foreign minister. At the same time, we will create an agency for promotion of exports and investments. It will lend support to Polish entrepreneurs, especially those debuting on new markets, and help to stimulate influx of foreign investments to Poland. We expect that an optimally effective and professional operation of the two segments in the economic aspects of Polish foreign policy will quickly produce tangible financial benefits for the state.

The aforementioned changes in the activity of the Polish diplomatic service will make it possible to rationalize a substantial part of state expenditures on foreign policy, thanks to a judicious reduction of administrative and

maintenance structures—and the related costs, and also thanks to a richer array of instruments in diplomatic work. The MFA will present a project of rationalization of the network of Polish missions abroad, so that they ensure optimum implementation of the state's interests and appropriate presentation of the country's image. Still, justified savings should not imply unjustified restrictions and desistance. The peculiarity of diplomatic work is also determined by visible, though not excessive, attributes of prestige, such as the condition of diplomatic facilities, a suitable car pool, and finally diplomats' salaries. The stature of a country and its economic potential is judged on the basis of these attributes. I wish to state emphatically that Poland spends substantially less money on its diplomatic activity than most of our neighbours—new members of the European Union. The condition of many Polish diplomatic facilities is glaringly incompatible with elementary standards, not to mention their prestige function. The effective remuneration of members of the foreign service is far below the salaries of diplomats from the new member states of the Union. This causes tensions and undermines morale. I appeal for this state of affairs to be changed. Excessive savings on diplomacy turn out to be very costly in the final account.

We intend to energize the efforts to promote our politicians, diplomats, economists and other experts as candidates to senior posts—especially in the European Union, but also within the UN system and global and regional organizations. This will give us influence, commensurate with our role and potential, on the decisions and undertakings of these institutions.

Mister President,  
Mister Speaker,  
Mister Prime Minister,  
Members of the House,

Poland, from its very beginnings, has been part of the Western world. Today, it integrally belongs to the system of Western institutions, and in its daily practice endorses its values and spirit. Together with the whole West, together with the whole responsible international community, we confront new, often difficult and dangerous challenges. The way we cope with them will determine our security and our civilisational advancement, our position in Europe and in the world. They say that you should honour the past, and roll up your sleeves as you face the future. Polish diplomats are ready for the job.

Thank you for your attention.

## World 2006—Back to Multipolarity?

The “unipolar moment” is inevitably drawing to an end, a multipolar system is emerging. The unipolar order was based on the assumption that other countries treat the United States as a gentle hegemony holder, which does not threaten them. However, this feature of the American hegemony is becoming increasingly more dubious, and countries are more and more often interpreting the expansionist policy of the US as dangerous to their interests.<sup>1</sup> Owing to difficulties in Iraq, the relative power of the US, in relation to other powers, such as China, Russia, India, or Germany, diminished.

The European Union experienced difficulties with implementing the necessary institutional reforms, and with ensuring both, the coordination of external actions, and the coherence of internal measures. Divergence of opinions among Member States and economic rivalry grew more acute, which impaired European integration process based on Community model. An optimistic message was the economic growth in Germany and France—the two largest European economies. The reflection period on the Constitutional Treaty resulted in a more pragmatic approach to the issue by Member States, which abandoned their “all-or-nothing” positions.

The US intervention in Iraq failed to bring the planned results, which forced the administration of George Bush to consider the opinion of countries that criticised the American policy on the Middle East, and to reevaluate the relations with them. The change in the American policy with regard to its recent critics did not stem from a new strategy, but rather from a necessity to solve urgent problems in the Wider Middle East. The countries that criticised the US policy, skilfully used their problems in Iraq, to improve their international standing.

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<sup>1</sup> The term “unipolar moment,” referring to the power distribution following the end of the “cold war,” was coined by Charles Kauthammer (“The Unipolar Moment,” *Foreign Affairs*, 1990/1991, no. 1.) Critical approach to the argument of unique nature of the American hegemony, see notably Ch. Lane, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited. The Coming End of the United States’ Unipolar Moment,” *International Security*, 2006, no. 2, pp. 7–41.

Important decisions for the international order were still made outside the United Nations. Russia and China opposed America's power, using international organisations and law to solidify their position in the world. At the same time, they opposed UN actions towards the promotion of democracy and human rights.

2006 confirmed that access to natural resources, notably the energy resources, which are becoming a source of power, plays an increasingly important role in contemporary international relations, and the energy exporter status is used as a tool in foreign policy. Price rise continued on the world energy resources markets, a trend that began after the American military intervention in Iraq in 2003. The main reason behind it was an increasing demand from rapidly developing economies of China and India, as well as the United States and the European Union Members.<sup>2</sup>

### **European Union—Attempts to Overcome Crisis**

The primary item on the EU agenda during the Austrian and Finnish presidency in 2006, was the institutional reform and energy issues. The enlargement strategy was also discussed (accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU was by and large a foregone conclusion), to admit Turkey and Western Balkans, as well as countries of Eastern Europe, along with the question of the ultimate geographical reach of the Union, and the problem of European borders, as well as relations with Russia, and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The amended Lisbon Strategy (economic growth, employment, investing in knowledge, innovation) was another topic of interest, in relation to which it should be noted that 2 million new jobs were created in the European Union last year. Among other subjects also discussed were the visa and immigration policy, the development of the Schengen Information System, as well as relations with other continents.

In connection with the suspended debate on the Constitutional Treaty, the reflection period was extended. Scepticism as to the reaching a potential compromise was dominant, along with the rising conviction that the point of departure for the future agreement should be the present text of the Treaty, rejected in 2005 by referendums in France and the Netherlands. It was agreed,

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<sup>2</sup> Crude oil price, long at the level of \$18–25 per barrel, rose in 2006 to \$78. The rising price of natural gas was additionally affected by perturbations on the US and UK markets. These countries, so far natural gas exporters, began to import. It is estimated that proper investment projects, in particular in the Middle East and Russia, are required to cover the increasing demand for energy resources.

that the German presidency would evaluate the situation, and propose further course of action in mid-2007.

Discussions also tackled the subject of democracy deficit in the European Union. The very fact of raising this problem implies a specific vision of Europe as a political community, where legitimisation of actions by states is not sufficient. It was not certain, however, to what extent the institutional reform provided for in the draft Constitutional Treaty was prerequisite for efficient operation of the EU. Some countries blocked various EU actions not because they did not agree, but because they wanted to prove the case that the EU could not operate efficiently without the reform.<sup>3</sup> Other countries, including Poland, feared that the Union would be dominated by large countries, and transformed into a peculiar directorate, or a “concert of powers.” In a system like this, similar to the one prevalent in Europe in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, smaller countries must accept decisions made by the dominating countries. From this perspective, of paramount importance are the EU Council decision-taking and vote-counting systems.

Due to strong links between the large countries—and some small ones as well—the process of decision-making in the European Union is not always based on the objective assessment of reasons and arguments. Poland’s attempt at establishing a coalition proved extremely difficult, not because of missing diplomacy skills, but due to divergent interests of Poland and big Community countries, and the lack of intra-community solidarity.

The cutting off the Russian gas supply for Ukraine in early 2006, and the crude oil for Belarus, helped the EU countries to understand the sensitivity of the energy resources supply. It also posed as a stimulus to address the energy issues. Energy policy, defined in the Green Paper entitled the European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy, is based on four principles of supply security, ensuring competitiveness of the energy and gas markets, as well as the environmental sustainability.<sup>4</sup> Experts estimate that the European Union’s energy dependency will increase in the next 25 years from the present 50% to 70%. Under the circumstances, gas supply from Russia, which holds 25% of all

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<sup>3</sup> Charles Grandt quotes an opinion of a high German official who, against the policy so far, opposed the coverage of justice and internal affairs by majority voting: “We do not want to take any steps that would let others claim that the EU may operate well without the Constitutional Treaty.” Ch. Grandt, *Europe’s Blurred Boundaries. Rethinking Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy*, London: Centre for European Reform, 2006, p. 44.

<sup>4</sup> Commission of the European Communities, 8 March 2006, COM 2006 (105).

world resources of natural gas,<sup>5</sup> became vitally important for European states. The drive to guarantee the supply individually breaks up the European solidarity.

EU also assumed that increased energy security would be achieved by a better utilisation of energy carriers, development of alternative and renewable energy sources, as well as incorporation of the energy policy into the common foreign and neighbourhood policies.<sup>6</sup> The need to develop infrastructure and to diversify gas supply, notably using North Africa and the Caspian Sea, was also indicated. The Commission sought a ratification by Russia of the Energy Charter, and signing of the Transit Protocol, but Russia did not agree.

Inside the European Union, main states pursued a pragmatic policy, and the policy of realising one's own interests at the expense of advocated values. Germany, headed by Angela Merkel, strengthened its position, skilfully using the weakness of the United States, caused by the fiasco of the intervention in Iraq, and the fact that France and the United Kingdom waited for the change of political leadership. Germany's Eastern policy did not change substantially, it was marked by the "realpolitik pragmatism," and Russia remained the strategic economic partner for the country. Actions intended to ensure the construction of the Northern Pipeline at the bottom of the Baltic Sea continued.

A subject of the Union's interest was also the implementation of the Hague Programme, stipulating a closer cooperation of Member States on internal and justice affairs. Efforts were made towards drafting a European migration policy. Concerns as to the increased influx of citizens from the new Member States failed to match the reality; four countries (Spain, Portugal, Finland and Greece) opened their labour markets. However, a conservative decision was made on the service directive, which, in practice, failed to open the market of services for the new Member States.

On 1 January 2007, the Union was acceded by new states—Romania and Bulgaria. Negotiations with Turkey, where internal reforms slowed down, were suspended in some areas, similarly to the negotiations with Croatia, and those on

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<sup>5</sup> According to statistics on 2004, own gas resources satisfied in 46% the demand of Member States for this material, whereas imports from Russia totalled 24%, from Norway—13%, from Algeria—10%, and from other regions—7%. For crude oil, own resources accounted for 21%, imports from Russia for 27%, from Norway for 16%, from the Middle East for 19%, from North Africa for 12%, and from other regions for 5%. *An External Policy to Serve Europe's Energy Interests—Paper from the Commission/SG/HR For the European Council*, in: C. Gliere (ed.), "EU Security and Defence. Core Documents," *Chaillot Paper 7*, March 2007, p. 234.

<sup>6</sup> External energy relations—from principles to action, Communication of the European Commission, COM (2006) 590 final of 12 October 2006.

the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Serbia. On the other hand, the European Union played an important role in the process of regaining the independence by Montenegro, as a result of the referendum held on 21 May 2006.

Discussions on a further enlargement of the Union featured an argument concerning the so-called absorption potential, which was planned to be introduced as an additional enlargement criterion. Countries that shared the opinion wanted to offer the European Neighbourhood Policy to the states of Eastern Europe, but without specifying their membership prospects. When Germany joined the group, it started to dominate. In turn, the United Kingdom, Scandinavian countries, and the new member states declared themselves in favour of presenting to the EU's European neighbours a clear membership perspective. In their opinion, the dilemma of "deeper or broader European integration" is false: the processes enhance each other. The European Union is not a club where the benefits diminish when the number of members increases. Benefits here result from applying common rules: the more countries respect them, the bigger the benefits for everyone.<sup>7</sup>

The increased scepticism about the enlargement was affected by a number of factors. Not the best economic results triggered fears over a substantial change in the societies. The failure of the Constitutional Treaty fuelled further the uncertainty as to the efficiency of the Community institutions under the present legal framework, even though a more varied structure may impede the achievement of the common objectives. The crisis of legitimisation and leadership lingered; the Commission was weak, and leaders of Member States blamed the EU for their own, internal difficulties.<sup>8</sup> As a consequence, the December European Council defined three principles that the strategy of enlargement was to be based on: 1) consolidation, that is focusing on the actions so far, 2) conditionality, that is strict observance of the nature of the accession treaty and 3) communication and broader dissemination of the information in the society.<sup>9</sup>

The Eastern dimension of the EU is composed of the European Neighbourhood Policy towards states of the region, which supplements the old ENP towards the countries of the Mediterranean, the EU policy on Russia, and

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<sup>7</sup> G. Rachman, "The Heath of Enlargement," *Washington Quarterly*, Summer 2006; F. Vibert, "Absorption Capacity. The Wrong European Debate," *openDemocracy* of 21 June 2006.

<sup>8</sup> Ch. Grandt, *op.cit.*, pp. 1–6.

<sup>9</sup> See also: EU Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006–2007 (Including Annexed Special Report on the EU's Capacity to Integrate New Members), COM 2006, no. 649 of 8 November 2006.

the initiative towards Central Asia. ENP thus far has been dominated by the technocratic approach, which slowly gave way to the geopolitical approach, that is the assessment of the importance of cooperation for key players in the region. The last stage of the development of ENP towards the states of the region is marked by realism. When the prospects of incorporating Ukraine and other countries of Eastern Europe into the EU drift away, ENP turns into a lasting policy, even though, formally, it is not a replacement for the EU enlargement, or an alternative to it. The objective is the Europeanization of the states covered by ENP, through political system reforms and improved management, rather than unification, consisting in adopting *acquis communautaire*. It is expected that countries covered by ENP will be included in the work of the Community institutions on the basis of an observer states, in the areas where they implemented the *acquis*, as well as on the common foreign and security policy.

The Union attempted to include Russia in the cooperation, through a new, enhanced agreement. The Finnish presidency negotiated with this state, however the mandate was not adopted as a result of Poland's veto. The European Union, treated by Russia as a potential competitor in the post-Soviet space, becomes a (geo)political player in the region. The Union's Eastern policy is perceived by Russia as a threat to its influences and interests. Several strategic players are competing in Central Asia—Russia, China, India, Iran and the United States, while the competition is increasingly marked by the zero-sum game formula. The EU will have to declare whether it wants to be one more geopolitical player in the game, or to limit itself to providing development aid and ensuring stabilisation and security.

The European Union committed itself to solving the Kosovo problem, by supporting the plan of the UN's special envoy Martii Ahtisaari, which stipulated entrusting the EU with a task of establishing the foundations for the state administration (police, customs administration, justice).<sup>10</sup> Kosovo is planned to have such statehood attributes as: a constitution, a flag, an anthem, an army and an option to join international organisations. Solving the problem depends on the EU influence on Serbia, which, supported by Russia, does not agree to Kosovo's independence, although accepts it turning into a broadly autonomous province. These actions are of major importance: fiasco of the policy on Kosovo would

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<sup>10</sup> See Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement of 2 February 2006 ([www.ngofractal.org/download/Comprehensive\\_proposal.pdf](http://www.ngofractal.org/download/Comprehensive_proposal.pdf)); The Western Balkans on the Road to the EU: Consolidating Stability and Raising Prosperity, COM 2006, no. 027.



prove the Union policy's ineffectiveness in the Organisation's immediate neighbourhood.

International regulations following the "cold war" validated the territorial *status quo*, and initiatives that questioned the existing borders failed to be accepted by the international community.<sup>11</sup> The situation at present is different, and granting independence to Kosovo, if it actually happens, may be an important precedence for separatist movements in other countries. Some observers see it as a chance to bring the so-called frozen conflicts in the area of the Commonwealth of Independent States, in particular in Transdniestria and South Osetia, to international attention. The EU's involvement in these conflicts would deprive Russia of the monopoly on the military presence in the area.

The European policy of Poland in 2006 focused on the struggle for the status of a full member of the European Union. Due to the unjustified discrimination of Polish meat and vegetable products by Russia, Poland blocked the adoption by the EU of the mandate for negotiations with Russia on the new agreement. The decision met with understanding, the presidency and the European Commission conducted negotiations with Russia on lifting the embargo, which did not happen in the end, even though veterinary inspections of the Commission's experts proved that Russia's charges were unfounded.

### **United States—in the Shadow of War in Iraq**

Major changes took place on the American political scene in 2006. The Congress elections of 7 November 2006 took on the character of a referendum on the support for President Bush's policy. The Democratic Party won the election, and assumed control of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The result of the elections was primarily affected by the course of the Iraqi operation. Its consequence was the resignation of the Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld. Neoconservative influences diminished, while the position of the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice strengthened. American foreign policy took a more pragmatic approach, which was evidenced by less importance being attached to democracy promotion, among other things.

The central place in the American foreign policy was occupied by the Wider Middle East region, specifically the stabilisation in Iraq and Afghanistan, the

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<sup>11</sup> This is why e.g. the so-called Balladur's Plan was modified in the nineties of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. More in J. Czaputowicz, *System czy nieład? Bezpieczeństwo europejskie u progu XXI wieku*, Warszawa, 1998, pp. 120–133.

nuclear ambitions of Iran, the situation in Lebanon, and the Israel-Palestine conflict. It was assumed that this region might be a source of real threats for the United States security. The National Security Strategy, adopted in March 2006, reflected the countries top priorities. An important change was a greater emphasis on multilateral actions, and on the necessity to differentiate the influencing mechanisms in the international environment, in order to eliminate threats. In comparison to the previous strategy of 2002, rapprochement with the European strategic culture took place, as evidenced by attaching more importance to non-military measures.<sup>12</sup>

In turn, the four-year defence review, adopted in February 2006, stipulated that the United States would be involved in the war on terrorism in the longer run. The importance of special forces is growing, and the model for American presence in the world is evolving. Permanent military bases will be replaced by mobile expeditionary force that can participate in combat actions in different parts of the world. It is also expected that the number of aircraft carriers, and other military ships, in the area of the Pacific Ocean will increase, to counterbalance the rising power of China. The development of the system of missile defences will also continue.<sup>13</sup>

The United States substantially increased their military headcounts in Iraq, while troops of their allied countries were drawn down in numbers, which reinforced the unilateral nature of the American involvement. The war on terrorism is an increasingly heavy burden for the US economy, and the draft budget, adopted in 2006, stipulates further rise in defence spending. The basic budget of the Pentagon in 2007 totals \$481 billion, which represents a rise by 62% in comparison to 2000. In addition, \$93 billion have been earmarked for the war on global terrorism in 2007, waged in Iraq and Afghanistan, while \$142 billion, and \$50 billion are set aside for 2008 and 2009, respectively.<sup>14</sup>

The report of the special study group on Iraq, announced in December 2006 by James Baker and Lee Hamilton, provided for an involvement in solving the crisis of Iraq's neighbours, Syria and Iran, and a gradual withdrawal of American troops.<sup>15</sup> The

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<sup>12</sup> The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006 ([www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html)).

<sup>13</sup> Quadrennial Defense Review Report of 6 February 2006 ([www.comw.org/qdr/qdr2006.pdf](http://www.comw.org/qdr/qdr2006.pdf)).

<sup>14</sup> 2008 Budget. Fact Sheets, February 2007 ([www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/budget/BudgetFY2008.pdf](http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/budget/BudgetFY2008.pdf)).

<sup>15</sup> J.A. Baker III, L.H. Hamilton, "Report Iraq Study Group," *Międzynarodowy Przegląd Polityczny*, 2007, no. 1, pp. 70–135.

above decisions, however, failed to be implemented.<sup>16</sup> Nothing indicates that the United States will abandon the use of force in international politics, as they believe that American troops contribute to stabilisation of the contemporary world.<sup>17</sup>

Focus on the Wider Middle East area resulted in the relations with other powers, which have always been a subject of great concern for the United States, receding in the background. The power standing of China, Russia and India rose further, and the countries used the American weakness to strengthen their position and ensure a free hand on actions in their neighbourhood.

The United States perceived Europe as a set of national states, whose international standings resulted from their power. Deeply involved in Iraq, the US sought support and understanding in Europe. As a consequence, transatlantic relations improved, which stemmed directly from the mutual demand for cooperation, and convergent interests on the key international security issues. The EU remains an important partner of the US in politics as well. Among the Community states that criticised the American policy, Germany consolidated its position of the main, next to the United Kingdom, partner of the US on the continent. Following A. Merkel's succession as the Chancellor of Germany, after the end of term for Gerhard Schröder, rapprochement between the countries took place. At the same time, anti-American sentiments grew in Germany, where 74% claimed that the United States were exerting a negative influence on the world events, while the same was argued by a mere 24% in Poland.<sup>18</sup>

Poland was perceived in Washington as a country which creates problems. It was not acknowledged that its rather imperfect relations with neighbours, Russia and Germany, resulted from a pro-American foreign policy, in particular Poland's involvement in Iraq. The planned establishment in Poland and Czech Republic of missile defence systems will contribute to the anchoring of the United States on the European continent.<sup>19</sup> Some German politicians, especially those from the Social Democratic Party of Germany, criticised this American

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<sup>16</sup> G.W. Bush, "Ameryka musi odnieść sukces w Iraku. Orędzie prezydenckie do narodu," *Międzynarodowy Przegląd Polityczny*, 2007, no. 1, pp. 153–159.

<sup>17</sup> R. Jervis, "The Remaking of a Unipolar World," *Washington Quarterly*, summer 2006.

<sup>18</sup> "World View of US Role Goes From Bad to Worse," *BBC World Service Poll* of 23 January 2007 ([http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/23\\_01\\_07\\_us\\_poll.pdf](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/23_01_07_us_poll.pdf)).

<sup>19</sup> More in: O. Osica, "Powtórka z Iraku? 'Tarcza' i relacje w trójkącie Polska, Niemcy i USA," *Analizy Natolińskie*, 2007, no. 4; K. Hołdak, "Polska w amerykańskim systemie obrony antyrakietowej," *Biblioteka Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego*, 2007, no. 1.

decision, fearing a loss of the status of the main ally of the United States in Europe, and a deterioration in relations with Russia.

### **Unfavourable Trends in the East**

In the East, notably in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, trends that were unfavourable for Poland emerged. Non-liberal democracies, that is systems where free elections are held but market freedoms restricted, and the principles of constitutional liberalism, such as the division of power, the observance of civil freedoms, the protection of dignity and freedom of individuals, are not well-rooted.<sup>20</sup> Unlike Western states that advocate the doctrine of democratic peace, Russia perceives the existence of democratic states at its borders as a threat. Deep-seated fear of liberal and civil values trickling through the border effectively thwarts the trans-border cooperation.

The main objective of the Russian policy was to regain the superpower position. Russia perceives itself (next to China, India and Brazil) as a one of the rapidly developing economies. Growing financial reserves offered a feeling of independence from the West. High prices of energy carriers, which generated a significant profit for Russia, enabled it to consolidate the government, introduce stable and effective institutions, and become a global player not owing to ideology, but by the sheer size and economic power. It also made increasingly clearer the references to its aspirations to play the role of an equal decision maker in world politics, opposed the dominant position of the United States, and their encroachment on the traditionally Russian areas of influence.<sup>21</sup> At the same time, it reinforced its cultural and civilisational identity.

Although the US and Russia shared a number of strategic interests connected, among others, with the proliferation of nuclear technologies, the combating of global terrorism, and the “management” of the process of unprecedented rise in power of China, a number of moot points continued to trouble the mutual relations. They were related to the blocked gas and oil investment processes in Sakhalin, which the American corporations were involved in, the attitude to sanctions on Iran, and the contract for the delivery of

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<sup>20</sup> On non-liberal democracies, see F. Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” *Foreign Affairs*, 1997, no. 6.

<sup>21</sup> These aspirations were most comprehensively formulated by President Vladimir Putin already at the beginning of 2007, in his address during the Munich Conference on Security. See V. Putin, Speech at the 43<sup>rd</sup> Munich Conference on Security Policy of 10 February 2007 ([www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?sprache=en&id=179&](http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?sprache=en&id=179&)).

weapons to Venezuela (including submarines, air defence systems and Su-30 aircraft). Russian attempts to join the World Trade Organisation failed, also owing to the position presented by Americans.<sup>22</sup>

The dispute between Japan and Russia over Kuril Islands continued, with a dramatic climax in shooting a Japanese fisherman dead by Russian forces, in the vicinity of one of the islands, north of Hokkaido (August 2006).

In its policy on Europe, Russia segregated European countries based on its priorities, giving preference to bilateral relations with the key countries, notably Germany, over the relations with the entire European Union, and discriminated against some new members of the Union in the course of cooperation. Russia introduced an unjustified ban on imports of Polish animal and vegetable products, and, in the case of Lithuania, stopped crude oil supply to the refinery in Možejki.

Russia pursued the objective of strengthening its economic influence on Ukraine and Belarus, making it increasingly clearer that it treats the latter as its own part, only temporarily separated from the Motherland. In order to achieve the re-accession of Belarus to Russia, it used the energy as a pressure tool and attempted to win control of transmission networks and keep its military presence in the country.

Taking advantage of the lack of European solidarity and the increased demand for and prices of energy carriers, Russia skilfully applied pressure, using the energy argument. Pursuing the goal of slowing down the process of excessive exploration of its deposits, and retaining the monopoly position of Gazprom, the country drove foreign capital out of its internal market of crude oil and gas. In addition, it benefited from its strategic location as a transit country for the gas sent from Central Asia. It initiated cooperation with natural gas manufacturers, such as Qatar, Iran, Algeria and Venezuela, which limited the options for other countries to ensure alternative supplies. Russia evolved towards a petrodollar state, appropriating profits from the sales of energy carriers, and at the same time showing authoritarian tendencies and high levels of corruption.

Changes in the Ukrainian constitution took effect on 1 January 2006. As a result, the parliamentary minority was entitled to nominate the Prime Minister, who could not be removed by the President. Parliamentary elections of March 2006 were held in compliance with democratic standards, however, the parliament was unable to form the government for four subsequent months. In

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<sup>22</sup> J. Ferguson, "U.S.-Russia Relations: Energy and Strategy," *Comparative Connections* 8, no. 3 (2006) ([www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/0603qus\\_russia.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/0603qus_russia.pdf)).

the end, Viktor Yanukovich's government was sworn into office in August, owing to the coalition between the Party of Regions, which won a full control of the economic dimension, and Our Ukraine, which dominated the foreign and security policy. President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich tried to keep control of their separate government sectors.<sup>23</sup>

Ukraine evolved towards Russia, adopting its transformation formula. A divide within the country emerged, into the eastern part, gravitating towards Russia, and western, gravitating to the West. In external relations, no major change was present. Conflicts over delimiting sea borders, the Russian presence in Crimea, and the status of the Russian language were not solved. However, Russia's position on energy issues (sharp rise in gas prices) strengthened.

Ukraine's strategic objective remained the integration with European structures, supported by the majority of Ukrainian elites and a large portion of the society. In 2006, the implementation of the Plan of Actions under the European Neighbourhood Policy continued, and negotiations on the new framework treaty, to replace the present Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, commenced. Ukrainians did not hear, however, a statement on admission of their country to the EU in the future. In its relations with NATO, Yanukovich's government pursues a policy of delaying actions for the accession to the organisation, although he did not rule out the prospects altogether.<sup>24</sup>

Following the presidential elections in Belarus, held in March 2006, Alexandr Lukashenko's power tightened, as he managed to consolidate the control over the government camp.<sup>25</sup> The opposition was fragmented and subjected to increasing pressure by the state. Owing to low prices of energy resources imported from Russia, the economic situation was relatively good. Russia, however, exerted a strong influence on Belarus, intending to ensure ever-closer integration. The most important topic was the dispute over the control of the energy sector, notably the gas transport and distribution channels, and the petrochemical sector. Towards the end of the year, the mutual relations were marred by a crisis resulting from raising by Moscow the prices of exported gas. Poland and other Western Europe countries offered assistance to the Belarusian opposition, at the same time limiting their relations with the country's authorities.

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<sup>23</sup> P. Burkovsky, O. Haran, "From Presidentialism to Parliamentarianism," *PONARS Policy Memo*, no. 414 ([www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/pm\\_0412.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/pm_0412.pdf)).

<sup>24</sup> A. Moshes, "Ukraine between a Multivector Foreign Policy and Euro-Atlantic Integration," *PONARS Policy Memo*, no. 426 ([www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/pm\\_0426.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/pm_0426.pdf)).

<sup>25</sup> More in R. Sadowski, "Białoruś 2006," *Raport Ośrodka Studiów Wschodnich*, January 2007.

### The Chinese Development Formula

The power of a country in the globalisation era is largely determined by the size of its population, which affects the development potential of the economy. This is evidenced by the continuous rise in power of such countries as China and India. The present consolidation of China's power may be compared to Germany's rise to the position of the main superpower of Europe towards the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. China came fourth among global economy superpowers, and third in terms of international trade. China is consistently pursuing its superpower aspirations, attempting to utilise for its own purpose the weaker position of the US and the divergent opinions among the United States, the European Union and Russia. Also, China is increasing its military budget (by 17.8% in 2007). Although the authorities are gradually expanding the area of freedom, granting economic rights to its citizens, political freedoms are still limited. In terms of the political system makeup, China resembles European states of early 20<sup>th</sup> century.

The country's economic success encourages researches to dub the principles governing the Chinese economy the "Beijing consensus."<sup>26</sup> It is an antithesis of the Washington consensus, the basis of which is privatisation, free market and macroeconomic stability. In China, the state controls the economy, and liberalisation applies only partially, introduced in special economic zones, where new solutions are tested. China has shown that the success is possible without surrendering to the pressure of Western financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which questions a claim that liberal democracy is a precondition for the economic growth. It turns out that, under certain circumstances, authoritarian regimes can be effective, although no correlation exists between democracy and the level of economic development, even though it does exist between the duration of the democratic process and the level of affluence. The Chinese development formula is closely watched by such countries as India, Brazil and Vietnam

China cooperated with both, developed countries, in order to ensure access to their markets and advanced technologies, and developing countries, in order to get access to their resources. In relations with other states, China uses a strategy that contradicts the United States' strategy in this respect. Americans maintain relations with governments of democratic countries, and prefer direct relations with societies and non-governmental organisations in dealing with

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<sup>26</sup> J. Cooper Ramo, *Beijing Consensus*, Foreign Policy Centre, 2005.

authoritarian states, whereas China maintains good relations with governments of authoritarian countries, and prefers direct relations with entrepreneurs and businesses in democratic countries.<sup>27</sup>

An example of China's political actions in international relations is the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which is used as a tool for expansion of the Chinese economy, and for securing the supply of energy resources. In 2006, China extended a credit facility of \$900 million to the organisation, which has an overtly anti-American nature, and its purpose is to reduce the United States' influence in Central Asia, a strategically important and rich in resources region. The cooperation between Russia and China, as well as India, which keeps the same distance in its relations with other powers, was conducive to the consolidation of a multipolar world order.

### **Wider Middle East—the Troubled Area**

The Wider Middle East remained a battlefield for various ideologies. Continued destabilisation of the region was affected by strong influences of fundamentalist movements. The conflict between the world of Islam and the West deepened, and the religious and cultural confrontation was fuelled by negative consequences of the globalisation process.

The purpose of actions by rebels both, in Iraq and Afghanistan, was to drive the coalition forces out of those countries. As a result of deposing Saddam Hussein, the influence of Iran and Shiites on Iraq grew. Execution of the dictator of the latter failed to change the situation. It is difficult to build a democratic system in a country, whose public life is dominated by competing ethnic groups. Rapid demographic growth of the Arab world (from 280 million in 2000 to the forecasted 450 million in 2020) is not accompanied by economic development, which will result in a decline of living standards of the population.

In Afghanistan, the armed resistance of the Taliban grew, as they adopted the methods used by the terrorists in Iraq, with a view to not only pushing the coalition forces out, but also removing Hamid Karzai's administration. Resistance against the authorities was clearly evolving into an insurrection, which increased the death toll among civilians. NATO operation will be a test for the Alliance's usefulness in counteracting the present-day threats and providing a common defence, which is its primary function.

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<sup>27</sup> M. Leonard, *Divided World: The Struggle for Primacy in 2020*, Centre for European Reform, 2007, p. 49



Iran's influence (Shiites) grew in the Middle East, which was interpreted by moderate Arab regimes (Sunni, who are allies of the United States) as a threat to their position. During the summer operation in Lebanon, Israel failed to destroy the Shiite Hezbollah, enjoying the support of the local population. The outcome of the operation was contrary to the plans—it triggered a surge in anti-American sentiments in the region, and in Lebanon itself, demonstrated the weakness of Israel's army in facing an enemy who uses guerrilla warfare, and strengthened Iran's position and influences.

Israel also stated that territorial limitations are necessary to preserve the Jewish character of the state. Building the wall that separates the Palestinian community from Jews contributed to the reduction in the number of terrorist attacks. Russia voiced its aspirations to play the role of an intermediary between the civilisation of the West and the world of Islam (Russian Jews account for 20% of Israel's population).

Iran developed its nuclear programme against the position of the international community. Sanctions imposed by the Security Council resolution no. 1737 of 23 December 2006 never brought the expected results. The continuation of the programme by Iran indicates that nuclear weapons prove to be the most reliable measure of protection against a potential aggression, for the threatened states. The potential acquisition by Iran of nuclear weapons will hinder the use of military force for political purposes by the United States. At the same time, its separate culture, tradition and identity offer a competitive advantage to Iran over Arab states, where self-identification of the society with the state is not that strong.

The situation in the Wider Middle East indicates that we should be careful about planting democracy in countries that do not have the appropriate tradition, and about the impact of democracy on international relations. It also turned out that nationalism is a more powerful idea than democracy. The occupation of a country such as Iraq, where strong nationalist trends are present, proved extremely expensive, both in the financial and political dimension. At the same time, Americans still seem to advocate the claim that the transition from authoritarianism to democracy requires consistent introduction of institutional change, while the democratic culture will appear later. The outcome of the American policy on Germany and Japan following World War II, and the policy of the EU on Central Europe after the end of the "cold war," confirms them in their belief that long-term commitment yields the required results.

### **Latin America and Africa—Where Powers Compete**

Both Latin America and Africa are becoming more and more the competition ground for powers, in their struggle for the access to natural resources. The case of Venezuela, Saudi Arabia and Nigeria goes on to show, that the realm of politics overlaps with business in countries where economy is based on the export of energy resources. This consolidates the authoritarian tendencies, and establishes a model of “state as a business,” which is a threat to democracy.

As a result of the globalisation processes, the exploration of the supply markets, and the growing need for natural resources, the importance of Latin America increased. The United States attempted to establish a free trade zone, covering the states of North and South America. However, G.W. Bush’s foreign policy is severely criticised in the majority of Latin America countries.

The expansion of China continued on both continents, as the country, contrary to the Western states, did not make the cooperation and financial assistance conditional on the promotion of democracy, and the observance of human rights. Chinese reached the energy markets left by Americans and Europeans due to the risk related to the political situation. A positive consequence of these actions, for the global economy, is an increased supply of deficit resources.

Brazil continued its efforts to strengthen its position of a leader on the continent, and to achieve the status of a regional power. As a result of a disappointment with the liberal economy model, as well as due to the oligarchy pursued by the authorities, the unsolved social problems, and a further widening of income gaps in the society, the popularity of leftist concepts increased. In many countries of Latin America, democracy deteriorated, along with the intensification of populist trends, as evidenced by the popularity of the anti-American Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez.<sup>28</sup> In Andean countries, politicians who enjoyed the support of the Indian population were popular. At the same time, civil war continued in Colombia. The illness of Cuban leader Fidel Castro necessitated a reflection on the future developments in the country.

Instability on the African continent continued, as it was still marked by a weakness of the state structure, and by an aggravation of ethnic conflicts. Unrest in the Horn of Africa continued. In May 2005, a peace agreement was signed between the government of Sudan and the rebel groups in Darfur, which, however, failed to bring a halt to hostilities. The conflict spread out, and covered

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<sup>28</sup> “More in Venezuela: Hugo Chávez’s Revolution, International Crisis Group,” *Latin America Report*, 2007, no. 19.

Chad and Central African Republic. The situation in Africa proves that the actions of the United States, intended to stop the dissemination of terrorism, overshadowed the initiatives for the promotion of good governance practices. In order to achieve its objective, G.W. Bush's administration maintained relations with autocracies, supporting military and intelligence operations at the expense of diplomatic actions.<sup>29</sup>

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Countries referred to above may be divided into democratic and authoritarian, and into those that apply force or international law in foreign policy making. The United States is a democratic state that promotes democracy in the world, and uses force in its foreign policy. At the other extreme, there are Russia and China—authoritarian states, whose actions are legitimised by the international order and its institutions, rather than by internal democratic systems. They use international law in their international relations, in order to preserve the *status quo*. In turn, the European Union is democratic and advocates the application of international law in international relations. Countries of the Middle East represent the opposite approach, as they are authoritarian and use force in their international relations (see table).<sup>30</sup> Some countries, such as India, are somewhere in between the above clear-cut categories, while countries of Africa and Latin America have their specific problems, and are not covered by the above division.

Table

### Types of foreign policy behaviours

		Foreign policy basis	
		International law	Force
Political System	Democracy	European Union	United States
	Autocracy	Russia and China	Wider Middle East

Source: M. Leonard, *Divided World: The Struggle for Primacy in 2020*, Centre for European Reform, 2007, p. 47 (author's modification).

<sup>29</sup> J. Prendergast, C. Thomas-Jensen, "Blowing the Horn," *Foreign Affairs*, 2007, no. 2, p. 60.

<sup>30</sup> M. Leonard, *op.cit.*, pp. 2–3.

Both, the United States and the European Union declared themselves in favour of promoting democracy in the world. They differed, however, in the ways of pursuing this policy: military force was an important tool for Americans, while international law was the overriding principle for Europeans. The US acted unilaterally in their foreign policy, sought a legitimacy for their actions, notably in the American society. Europeans preferred a multilateral approach, and demanded a validation of international actions by the UN.<sup>31</sup>

The situation in the Middle East demonstrates, that the contemporary threats are not posed by other power states, but rather by weak, failing states, that are not able to control their territory fully, and their sovereignty is of a token nature only. To strengthen those countries, by planting democracy, proved hardly achievable in practice. Slowly, however, the attitude is gaining ground, that threats can be challenged by building an ability to govern, and by the appropriate institutions, as well as, under specific circumstances, by delegating power to external institutions for a limited period of time.

The fundamental mistake of American neo-conservatives, who support the intervention in Iraq, consisted in their assumption that the international relations are governed by the bandwagon logic, rather than the logic of the balance of power. The stipulation that all countries would yield to the United States, fearing its power, proved erroneous. In accordance with the principle of the balance of power, the potential domination of the US over the world is challenged by other powers, such as China, Russia and India, as well as by Germany and France. This is conducive to overcoming the “unipolar moment,” and a gradual emergence of a multipolar system.

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<sup>31</sup> More in R. Kagan, *Potęga i raj. Ameryka i Europa w nowym porządku świata*, Warszawa, 2003.

## Poland's Activities in the European Union

Austrian and Finnish presidencies in the European Union in 2006 were marked by debates on topics of fundamental importance for the EU: the institutional reform, the geographical reach, its potential for further enlargement, as well as ways to improve competitiveness of the economy, e.g. by stimulating economic growth and employment, investing in knowledge and innovation. At the same time, the European Union faced challenges resulting from the developments in its neighbour countries, e.g. in Ukraine and Belarus, once again challenged the crisis in the Middle East (military conflict between Lebanon and Israel), as well as responded to the Russia-Ukraine conflict over stopped gas deliveries, which prompted a broad discussion on the European energy policy.

This specific area, energy security in particular, was considered by Poland as a priority for cooperation in the European Union in 2006. The key challenge was to induce change in the Community states' perceptions of the problem. The efforts brought good results, which was reflected by the documents adopted by the EU.

Poland consistently argued that all restrictions on the realisation of the Four Freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty should be lifted, in particular restrictions on free movement of persons and services, and emphasised good experience of the Community states that opened their labour markets for the citizens of the new Member States. Poland also considered the implementation of the assumptions of the amended Lisbon Strategy and cooperation within the Union in the area of research and development as important elements of the EU policy, which contribute to greater competitiveness of the Polish economy. This was evidenced by, *inter alia*, the Polish bid for the seat of the Governing Board of the European Technology Institute to be located in Wrocław.

In terms of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Poland provided steady support for the development of relations between the Union and countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. In addition, Poland declared itself in favour of the so-called Eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy, the

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\* Małgorzata Banat-Adamiuk—Deputy Director of MFA Department of the European Union.

purpose of which would be not only to bring the states covered by the policy closer to the EU, but also to open up membership prospects for those among them that achieved significant progress in terms of internal transformation, while showing pro-European attitudes. Being one of the most active members of the EU among supporters of further enlargement, Poland promoted this attitude among Member States and proposed the employment of a long-term strategy for that purpose. In discussions on the subject, it primarily raised the question of incorporating Ukraine into the process of rapprochement with the EU.

### **Reflection Period**

The Austrian presidency was sceptical about opportunities for resolving the issue of the Constitutional Treaty in 2006, therefore decided to focus on actions to restore citizens' confidence in the European Union and its institutions. It also attempted to determine the present positions of Member States on the Treaty. Already on 4 January, Austria's Minister of Foreign Affairs Ursula Plassnik issued a letter to her counterparts, asking to present their positions on the future of the Treaty. The majority of states that responded to the letter reiterated their previously presented positions.

Another initiative of the Austrian presidency was to convene an informal meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers on 23 March in Brussels, using the occasion of the European Council summit. The outcome of the meeting was the decision on convening another informal meeting in the same format on the future of the EU, including the enlargement process. The meeting was held on 27–28 May in Klosterneuburg.

In 2006, EU countries continued internal debates, which proved that societies support the European project, despite concerns and criticism from some circles, but expect real benefits of integration, and greater operational efficiency of the European Union, which should take initiatives to fulfil urgent needs of its citizens. As a result, during the meetings on 15 and 16 June, heads of states and governments decided to extend the so-called reflection period and intensify discussions on the future and reforms of the EU.

Actions of the Austrian presidency were continued in the second half of 2006 by the Finnish presidency, which held consultations with all Member States as well as with Romania and Bulgaria. Their purpose was to collect initial positions on the Treaty, determine the schedule of next actions and the contents of the basic document. The results were summarised at the European Council meeting on 14 and 15 December.

In 2006, the future of the European Union ranked high on the agenda of talks between Polish top level authorities, in particular the President, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and other EU politicians. Poland declared itself in favour of the extension of the “reflection period,” arguing that there was a need for a broad internal debate that would help to acquaint Poles with the vision of common Europe and determine what actions were necessary to increase the confidence of Polish citizens in the European Union. Poland also emphasised the need for more substantial involvement of the Union in actions for social cohesion and projects related to enhancing security of citizens (e.g. in the area of combating terrorism, organised crime, trafficking in human beings, corruption). Poland's position on the future of the EU was expressed, among other occasions, during consultations with the Finnish presidency and during the session of the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 11 December.

### **Energy Policy**

The events of early 2006, that is disruptions in deliveries of the Russian gas, supplied via Ukraine, changed the views of countries of the European Union on the issue of energy security, and induced the Austrian presidency to make this area one of EU priorities. The discussion on energy policy was initiated on 8 March, when the European Commission Green Paper was published.<sup>1</sup> The issue was also one of key items on the agenda of the European Council on 23 and 24 March. The Council supported the introduction of energy policy for Europe, the pillars of which would be: security of energy supply, competitiveness of electrical energy and gas markets, and long-term environmental balance.

Poland's position presented at the Council summit in March indicated that among six complex issues tackled by the Green Paper, three are of paramount importance for Poland. These are: diversification of energy supply, the principle of solidarity and consistency of the internal energy policy. It was emphasised that Europe needs both greater diversification of energy sources, and greater solidarity, in order to be effective in facing security threats. An open and honest exchange of ideas on priorities of individual states in terms of security of energy supply was suggested, along with the proposal for guarantees that every position would be taken into consideration when the principles of energy policy for Europe are developed. A review of the European *acquis* on energy was further

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<sup>1</sup> COM (2006)105 final ([http://ec.europa.eu/energy/green-paper-energy/doc/2006\\_03\\_08\\_gp\\_document\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/energy/green-paper-energy/doc/2006_03_08_gp_document_en.pdf)).

suggested, along with its adjustment to meet the present-day threats. As argued by Poland, a special working group could be tasked with this, which would address all European Union energy security aspects, as well as monitor and exchange information on the subject among Member States. In addition, Poland pointed out that there was a need for a large-scale upgrade and expansion of energy infrastructure of Member States and key transit third countries. Security of energy supply was named as Poland's priority, but it was also emphasised that an assumption should be made that actions that enhance energy security in one state of the EU should improve the situation in this respect throughout the Union, and never adversely affect the situation in any other EU state.

The Russia-Ukraine gas conflict of early 2006, the consequences of which afflicted many European countries, including Poland, formed the framework for the Polish concept of the European Energy Security Treaty, which would ensure solidarity among its signatories (EU and NATO Member States) in the face of an energy threat, caused by supply shortages or lost sources of supply as a result of natural calamities, disruptions in the supply systems, or political decisions of suppliers.<sup>2</sup> The assumptions for the Treaty were presented by Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz in his letter to the NATO Secretary General of 24 February, and, in the EU forum, at the meeting of the EU Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Council on 14 March. Both the European countries and the United States treated this proposal with reserve. However, Poland's success was definitely the incorporation into the Green Paper, and to the conclusions of the European Council from the March summit, of the idea of solidarity, on which the assumptions of the Treaty proposal were based.

An important component of the debate was the internal dimension of the EU energy policy. The first discussion on the subject took place during an informal meeting of political directors of Member States in Vienna, on 10 and 11 January 2006. Poland actively participated in the meeting, emphasising the need to enhance partnership with external suppliers and run a truly common European policy in terms of energy supply. It suggested the establishment of the energy dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy, and development of the concept of the Energy Community of South-Eastern Europe, also to cover Ukraine, Norway and Turkey. Poland considered developing common European policy on energy cooperation with biggest suppliers, notably Russian Federation

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<sup>2</sup> The idea of the Treaty was first presented in articles published on 10 February 2006 in *Rzeczpospolita* and *Financial Times*.



and countries of the wide Middle East, as the main political task in terms of energy security. It also declared itself in favour of the establishment of the code of conduct for relations with third countries.

In the conclusions from the sessions on 15 and 16 June, the European Council encouraged the presidency, the Commission and High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy to continue their work on the establishment of the external energy policy and its implementation in a coherent and coordinated manner, using all available instruments of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defence Policy. This would apply in particular to the development of strategic partnership with major states-suppliers of energy, transit countries and consumers. The Council also underscored the need for further diversification of energy supply sources, support for the development production from renewable sources, and more effective utilisation of energy resources.

Poland offered its full support for directions of actions defined by the Council. Referring to the document of the Commission and High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, it stated that one of key threats to energy security was using energy carriers as a tool of foreign policy and non-commercial reasons behind decisions taken by major energy suppliers. Poland also underscored the importance of supply security monitoring and early warning mechanisms, which should be part of the crisis response system, required to ensure genuine energy security for the European Union. Polish representatives also emphasised that diversification of supply at the Community level does not contradict the concept of internal energy market but rather does the opposite, namely promotes its development and counteracts the establishment of oligopoly and monopoly on the market, and therefore it should precede liberalisation. Poland declared its support for the process of liberalisation and greater competitiveness of the Community economy in the energy sector. In the context of supply security, Poland found it important to reach a decision, as quickly as possible, on the Trans-European Energy Networks and common projects to be prioritised in terms of funding from the EU budget. On Poland's request, the text of the Council's conclusions from the June summit was expanded, to include a paragraph that guarantees taking into consideration the interests of Member States during the decision making process on funding infrastructural projects pursued in order to open new energy supply routes. Poland also supported Sweden's proposal for the assessment of such projects to consider their impact on the environment. This was of importance for the discussion on the Northern Gas Pipe funding. As a result, chiefly due to

Poland's consistent position on the so-called external mandate of the European Investment Bank, the option of financing the gas pipeline with the Bank's funds was blocked.

External dimension of energy policy was also one of key topics of the informal European Union summit on 20 October in Lahti, where the Commission's communication, drafted for this particular event,<sup>3</sup> was discussed.

Polish position for the Lahti summit emphasised that developing European external policy in the energy dimension is a necessity, since only a European Union that speaks with one voice stands a chance of exerting substantial influence on the rules of cooperation with third countries that export crude oil and gas, as well as on global standards of environmental protection and energy efficiency. Poland found it fundamental to come up with an integrated approach to all countries-suppliers of energy and transit countries, including Russia—the most important supplier of energy resources for Europe, and also for Poland. The need to speak with one, Community voice stems not only from the principle of solidarity, but is also an economic necessity, in connection with the building of a single, internal energy market (for electricity and gas). In the context of work on the new agreement between the European Union and Russian Federation, Poland insisted on ratification by Russia of the Energy Charter Treaty and signing the Transit Protocol, as well as welcomed the idea of establishing a network of energy correspondents, expressing hope that the network would allow implementation of specific, practical solutions.

The European Council conclusions of the 14–15 December summit strongly emphasised the need to ensure coherence between external and internal aspects of EU actions in the area of energy. Heads of states and governments noted that what was required for a long-term energy security of the European Union was improved cooperation among states-exporters, transit states and receivers of energy resources, the establishment of the internal energy market, coverage of EU neighbouring states by such market principles, notably under the Energy Community Treaty, but also under the European Neighbourhood Policy, development of internal energy sources, renewable sources in particular, and new energy technologies. The Council supported the concept of setting up a network of energy correspondents, to collect and process information of importance for energy security, which could become an effective instrument of

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<sup>3</sup> External Energy Relations—From Principles to Action, COM (2006)590 final, Brussels, 12 October 2006, ([http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external\\_relations/energy/docs/com06\\_590\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/energy/docs/com06_590_en.pdf)).

the early warning system for crisis situations. It was also agreed that the Action Plan would be adopted at the spring 2007 summit, to become a core element of energy policy for Europe, covering also its external aspects. The Council also referred to the impact of energy policy and other sectorial policies on climate change. Poland declared itself in favour of the establishment of the network of energy correspondents and welcomed the Council's conclusions suggesting the extension of the rules for the internal energy market on neighbouring states, notably those covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy.

2006 was full of events of strategic importance for energy policy, both in its internal and external dimension. Positive developments include the European Commission's initiatives that stimulated the debate in Member States and in the EU Council. Poland's efforts to shape energy policy reflected the crucial importance Poland attaches to security, including energy security. Main proposals offered by Poland during the debate on energy policy for Europe, such as: intensified actions for diversification of energy supply and transport routes (also in terms of the Union's own resources), developing a common action plan for crisis situations, based on the principle of solidarity, pursuit of consistent and coordinated energy policy, based on the same principle, in the external dimension, ratification of the Energy Charter and signing by its signatories of the Transit Protocol, were reflected in the documents adopted by the European Union.

### **Freedom, Security and Justice**

Based on previous decisions of the European Council, 2006 saw a review of the implementation status of the Hague Programme,<sup>4</sup> which provides for increased activity of the EU in combating such phenomena as illegal immigration, trafficking in human beings, terrorism, or organised crime. In the conclusions of the December summit, the European Council confirmed that it planned to develop EU political strategy in this area, and called on the EU Council to make further progress by intensifying operational cooperation among the appropriate EU bodies and EU Member States. The Council also prioritised coordination and coherence of the EU policy on justice and internal affairs, and its policy on third countries, notably the implementation of the strategy for the external cooperation dimension in this area. Poland requested clear definition of priorities, political objectives and measures related to the external dimension,

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<sup>4</sup> Doc. 16054/04, Brussels, 13 December 2004.

which would increase the European Union's role in the international arena, in particular in relation to the development of global legal instruments and framework of cooperation with third countries.

In connection with the mounting problem of illegal immigration in the Mediterranean, the EU took actions in order to prepare a comprehensive European migration policy. Mediterranean and African countries were invited to the debate on the subject. Poland gave its positive opinion on the communication prepared by the Commission,<sup>5</sup> acknowledging that it contained a proposal for more attention to be paid to migration from eastern and south-eastern regions. Poland also called for greater emphasis on the principle of solidarity as regards the approach of EU countries to migration issues.

At the December summit, the European Council pointed out the necessity of quicker implementation of the integrated strategy for external borders management, adopted by the EU Council in 2006. The actions to serve that purpose were, among others, increasing the operational potential of "Frontex" agency, and the development of the European Surveillance System at southern sea borders of the EU. The regulation issued by the Parliament and the Council on 20 December, establishing the rules for local border traffic at external borders of Member States,<sup>6</sup> is of paramount importance for the maintenance and development of good neighbourhood relations with Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. In accordance with Poland's position presented previously, the agreed-on solutions can be flexible and adjusted to local conditions and current international situation. The discussion on the potential introduction of local border traffic for Poland's bilateral border relations with its non-EU neighbours will continue in 2007.

In June, in response to the call from the European Council, the Finnish presidency, jointly with the Commission, initiated a discussion on streamlining the decision-making process in the area of freedom, security and justice on the basis of the currently binding treaties, including on the agreement to use the so-called *passerelle* procedure, that is new rules for decision making on issues covered by the 3<sup>rd</sup> pillar. During the EU debate, Poland consistently presented a reserved position, justifying it by the necessity to perform thorough assessment, both for the entire Union, and individual Member States, in order to determine in what areas and scope the procedure could be applied. In addition, it

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<sup>5</sup> COM (2006)735 final, Brussels, 30 November 2006.

<sup>6</sup> Regulation (EC) no. 1931/2006, *Official Journal of the European Union* of 30 December 2006, L 405/1.

expressed an opinion that it is the non-implemented instruments in the area of security and internal affairs, rather than the present decision-making process, which is the main reason for low effectiveness of cooperation in this respect. Polish representatives emphasised that the application of the procedure specified in art. 42 of the Treaty on European Union<sup>7</sup> may entail serious problems of constitutional nature, as the adoption of legal instruments that refer to cooperation in criminal affairs and to police cooperation is subject to detail scrutiny of national constitutional courts, which require that particular protection of basic rights.

In terms of visa policy, Poland's priority, similarly to previous years, was the principle of reciprocity. As a result of July 2005 implementation by Poland and other EU countries of the community reciprocity mechanism, in January 2006, the European Commission initiated talks with the United States, Canada and Australia, that is countries that retained the visa requirement for citizens of the new Member States. On 10 January 2006, the Commission published a report,<sup>8</sup> where it noted the lack of "satisfactory progress in talks," although failed to recommend e.g. a temporary visa requirement for citizens of these third countries. The next report, published in October, with information that full visa reciprocity was achieved with Uruguay, Costa Rica and Paraguay, also failed to announce any steps towards the United States, Canada and Australia. Talks with these countries will continue, and their significance is bound to rise in relation to the re-negotiated agreement on passenger data exchange (Passenger Name Record, PNR) and planned modification of the American visa programme.

Considering the development of the Eastern dimension of EU migration policy and relations with its neighbours, Poland participated actively in the work on the formulation of the decision on charging fees corresponding to administration costs of processing Schengen visa applications.<sup>9</sup> The EU Council adopted the document on 1 June 2006. It provides for the increase in visa fees, resulting from the implementation of the Visa Information System and biometric data collection from persons applying for visas. Thanks to Polish representatives, a waiver option in relation to third country citizens, and the corresponding collection of non-increased fees, was successfully negotiated.

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<sup>7</sup> Art. 42 TEU contains a clause that allows to depart from unanimous voting requirement in areas under Title VI TEU, e.g. police and court cooperation, and the application of the regime under Title IV of the Treaty establishing the European Community (regime for 1st pillar).

<sup>8</sup> COM (2006)3.

<sup>9</sup> Decision 2006/440/EC, *Official Journal of the European Union* of 29 June 2006, L 175/77.

The European Union continued to work on the package of legislative projects submitted by the Commission, concerning the enhancement of visa and consular cooperation, including the establishment of common centres for receipt and processing of visa applications, and extended scope of the Community consular support. Poland supported the idea of establishing common visa centres, raising a reservation, however, that they should form a system that is complementary to the existing national solutions.

Considering visa enhancements and the agreement on re-admission as an important component of the Community policy on candidate countries, countries with open membership prospects, and those covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy, Poland presented a consistent position on these issues. It supported the decision of the EU Council on the commencement of negotiations on visa enhancements with Albania, Bosnia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Moldova and Serbia (signed in December 2006), the issuance of the regulation simplifying the rules of crossing external EU borders, achieved by acknowledging by the "Ten" countries of some documents as equivalent to visas they issue, as well as complex amendment of regulation no. 539/2001, which streamlines regulations on visa procedures with no-nationals, members of NATO armed forces and refugees, as well as modified the contents of the so-called positive and negative visa lists.

In 2006, Poland attached a lot of importance to accelerated work in the Council on the legal framework for the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II), and the Visa Information System. Disappointingly enough, the European Commission made an announcement in June on a serious delay in the implementation of SIS II project, which will prevent lifting border checks at EU internal borders in accordance with the schedule adopted before, i.e. from 27 October 2007. Disappointment with this delay was primarily expressed by all new Member States, which demanded delivering on the commitments made before. At the beginning of October 2006, Portugal proposed temporary incorporation of national modules of the Schengen Information System (so-called N-SIS) of new Member States into the currently operating system (SISone4All). At the meeting of the EU Council for Justice and Internal Affairs on 4 December 2006, a new draft schedule for lifting border checks at EU internal borders was agreed upon, which stipulates abolition of checks at land borders from 31 December 2007, and at airports from 1 March 2008, which is a delay by two months only in relation to the original schedule. Final decisions will be taken at the EU Council meeting in December 2007, after the individual evaluation of the operation of the Schengen Information System in every country concerned is completed. An

important factor for the decision on lifting border checks at internal borders is the outcome of the first stage of evaluation of progress in implementing Schengen acquis, performed in 2006. Polish preparations received an overall positive option. Only the status of compliance with the requirements of airports in Warsaw, Kraków and Gdańsk as well as the operation of common border points at the eastern border failed to receive acceptance. This will be the subject of detailed inspection by the EU in 2007.

Towards the end of 2006, negotiations on the legal framework for the operation of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights finished. Long discussions on the scope of its competencies, attended by Polish representatives at all stages, ended with a satisfactory compromise. The only item that failed to be agreed upon was the rules of cooperation between the Agency and the Council of Europe.

### **Free Movement of Persons**

Pursuant to the Accession Treaty provisions, the EU Council was required to evaluate, on the basis of the European Commission's report, the operation of the first two-year stage, ending on 1 May 2006, of transitional periods concerning the free movement of labour. Before that date, the countries that introduced transitional periods in this respect were obliged to notify to the Commission their resignation, or extension of the limitations.<sup>10</sup> In the communication published on 8 February, the Commission stated that there were no economic and social premises to extend transitional periods, and emphasised that the statistics failed to show an increased inflow of citizens from new Members States to the countries of the "Fifteen," while workers from those states significantly contributed to meeting growing needs of labour markets in EU countries.<sup>11</sup> Positive recommendations of the Commission were supported in April by the European Parliament.

Already at the beginning of 2006, the Polish government initiated dialogue with the states that kept the limitation. The topic of liberalisation of access to labour markets was tackled during all visits by Polish politicians in EU

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<sup>10</sup> The Accession Treaty provides for transitional periods regarding the free movement of labour lasting up to 7 years, according to 2+3+2 formula.

<sup>11</sup> Report on the operation of transitional periods referred to in the Accession Treaty of 2003 (between 1 May 2004 and 30 April 2006), COM (2006)48 final ([http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/pl/com/2006/com2006\\_0048pl01.pdf](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/pl/com/2006/com2006_0048pl01.pdf)).

countries, and also at meetings of the Visegrad Group, which decided to take actions on the issue. The Polish Prime Minister and Minister of Labour drafted letters to their counterparts, addressing the issue. The Lower (Sejm) and Upper (Senate) House of Parliament of the Republic of Poland passed a joint declaration,<sup>12</sup> where they supported the government's actions in this respect and called on EU Member States parliaments to change their position. Prime Minister K. Marcinkiewicz also made a similar call at the meeting of the European Council in March, and thanked Spain and Portugal for their declaration to free their labour markets in 2006.

On 1 May 2006, four European Union states: Spain, Portugal, Finland and Greece, and one state of the European Economic Area, namely Iceland, made their labour markets available to citizens of new EU Member States. On 27 July, Italy joined the group. The remaining Member States kept the limitations. Some of them, including France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Denmark, reduced their limitations, e.g. by excluding selected sectors and professions, where local labour shortage existed, and by introducing enhancements to the work permit procedure. On 1 November, Austria's federal government also took a decision liberalising its labour market in the sector of elderly people nursing at home.

Poland, considering the free flow of labour as the fundamental principle of internal market, resigned from the application of balanced measures towards EEA countries that decided to keep transitional periods. In addition, in connection with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania on 1 January 2007, Poland decided to open its labour market for citizens of those countries. These decisions are important premises for lifting the limitations and may prove to be a decisive argument in the discussion with those states that present the most sceptical attitude towards complete abolition of the limitations in the short term.

### **European Union Enlargement**

Reflection on the institutional future of the EU was accompanied by heated discussions on the strategy of further enlargement. A recurring topic was the so-called absorption capacity of the Union. France was a steadfast supporter of a more precise definition of the notion and its inclusion, as another condition for the achievement of the membership status. Opposite views were advocated by

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<sup>12</sup> Senate resolution on the opening of labour markets in old countries of the European Union, Monitor Polski 2006, no. 21, item 233.



countries that consistently support pro-enlargement policies, such as the United Kingdom, Sweden and Poland, which questioned the necessity for new criteria, although they did not reject altogether the requirement to incorporate EU absorption potential in the future.

Addressing suggestions of countries that expressed their concerns about proper operation of the EU in the case of subsequent accessions, as well as those that positively evaluated enlargements thus far, and supported continuation of the process, the European Council decided at its June meeting that during the December session a discussion will be held on all enlargement aspects, considering methods to improve the quality of the process, and EU absorption capacity.

In line with the announcements, a detailed debate of EU heads of states and governments took place, following which the text of conclusions was agreed upon, listing three rules that the enlargement strategy should be based on. These are: consolidation, conditionality and social communication. Combined with the capacity of the EU to admit new Member States, these principles are to form the foundation of the new consensus on enlargement. The Council offered assurances that it would keep its commitments in relation to countries already covered by the process, and underscored positive impact of the enlargement policy on strengthening stabilisation, economic growth and increasing importance of the EU internationally. It also noted that integration capabilities of the Union depend both on meeting membership commitments by the acceding countries, as well as on the EU potential to operate efficiently and develop. In addition, it was agreed that decisions on accession times would be taken only towards the end of negotiations with individual countries. The Council stated that the pace of enlargement must take into account the Union's capacity for absorption of new members, and at the same time obliged the European Commission to evaluate the impact of enlargement on key Community policies.

Poland supported the assumptions of this strategy. Referring to the obligation imposed on the Commission, concerning the evaluation of all main stages of subsequent accession, it emphasised that such evaluations must be of objective nature, in order to eliminate their potential employment as an instrument of deferring enlargement, and, acknowledging strict enforcement of compliance with membership conditions in relation to candidate countries, it emphasised that these strategy components, together with the new evaluation

instrument, the so-called benchmarks,<sup>13</sup> should ensure effective and fair course of the accession process, if they are based on clear-cut criteria, applied to all candidates on equal terms. Poland also declared itself in favour of initiating a broad debate on enlargement, notably in old Member States, which would help societies understand benefits of the process better.

**Turkey.** Already at the June summit, the European Council expressed its concerns about unsatisfactory compliance of Turkey with obligations under the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement. However, despite significant diplomatic efforts by the Finnish presidency in the second half of the year, Turkey could not be persuaded into taking actions to achieve some progress. In view of decelerated internal reforms process, as well as lack of actions by Turkey in terms of implementation of the Additional Protocol, the Commission issued a communication on 29 November, with its recommendations on further negotiations with Turkey. It suggested putting them on hold in eight chapters, related to restrictions of the state on the Republic of Cyprus, and continuation of work in the remaining 27 chapters, yet without an option to close them. The Council obliged the Commission to monitor issues included in the Declaration of 21 September 2005 and submit relevant reports.

Poland treated the Commission's communication with reserve, arguing that it was not a good message for Turkey. It further claimed that the solution to be pursued should be one that did not close the route to the EU for Turkey, but rather offered stimuli to encourage Turkey to meet the agreed-on obligations, as well as allowed for regular checks of the state's compliance. Reservations were mainly raised in relation to a proposal that until the Commission confirmed full implementation of the additional Protocol, no negotiation chapter could be closed, even if it was not linked with the customs union. As argued by Poland, this very item represents an incentive to continue with reforms, has a positive impact on maintaining the pace of the membership negotiations, and increases social support for EU integration processes.

The question of Turkey dominated the session of the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 11 December 2006. Following an all-day debate, it was agreed that key components of the Commission's recommendations would be retained. This decision by the Council was subsequently confirmed by the European Council.

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<sup>13</sup> Conditions the compliance with which is prerequisite for opening or closing a specific negotiation chapter.

Despite a pro-enlargement position on Turkey, Poland supported the Council conclusions, emphasising that they represented a strong political message (also for other countries), specifying consequences of non-compliance with obligations towards the EU. Poland was of the opinion that, irrespective of the decision on the accession negotiations, the European Union should continue its cooperation with Turkey, in order to avoid a major deceleration of internal reforms, harmonising the state with the Community standards. Poland also claimed that this topic should by no means be avoided in the internal EU debates on enlargement, or even strategic significance of the state for the EU should be underscored, and its transformation effort thus far should be evaluated positively, as this was of vital importance for Turkey, where anti-Community and anti-European sentiments were on the rise, and social support for accession was dropping, which could be used during the presidential and parliamentary election campaign in the country in 2007.

**Bulgaria and Romania.** In the conclusions of the June summit, the European Council stated that the accession to the EU of Bulgaria and Romania represented integral part of the so-called fifth wave of enlargement, economic consequences of which were evaluated positively in the Commission's report "Enlargement, Two Years after: an Economic Evaluation" of 3 May 2006,<sup>14</sup> and encouraged Member States to ratify the Accession Treaty with both countries without delay. At the same time, it called on Romania and Bulgaria to increase their efforts to make up for the still outstanding items.

Both countries made significant progress by the end of 2006, which enabled the Council to take a decision in December on granting EU membership status to Bulgaria and Romania from 1 January 2007.

A sign of Polish support for the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union was the adoption by the Sejm of RP on 10 March 2006 of the Law on the Treaty ratification between European Union Member States and Bulgaria and Romania on the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union.<sup>15</sup> The resolution, accepting ratification of this Accession Treaty, was adopted by the Senate of RP on 30 March 2006.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> "Enlargement, Two Years after: an Economic Evaluation," *European Economy, European Commission, Occasional Papers*, no. 24 (2006) ([http://ec.europa.eu/economy\\_finance/publications/occasional\\_papers/2006/ocp24en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_papers/2006/ocp24en.pdf)).

<sup>15</sup> Dziennik Ustaw (Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland) of 10 May 2006, item 548.

<sup>16</sup> See: [www.senat.gov.pl/k6/dok/uch/008/a/092uch.pdf](http://www.senat.gov.pl/k6/dok/uch/008/a/092uch.pdf).

## External Relations of the European Union

In 2006, the European Union participated in solving crisis situations all over the world and continued its involvement in the Balkans, South Caucasus, the Middle East, Africa and Asia. On 25 August, at the extraordinary meeting of the General Affairs and External Relations Council, convened by the Finnish presidency and attended by the UN Secretary General Kofi Anan, support was expressed for the UN Security Council resolution no. 1701, and for the Lebanese government, and increased involvement of EU states in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was announced. Despite numerous limitations of political and financial nature, the European Union smoothly carried out a military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUFOR RD Congo). It managed to convince non-European members of the Security Council to accept EU position on the Iranian nuclear programme, which resulted in the adoption of two Council resolution. In addition, the EU made significant progress in implementing its Strategy for Africa.

Owing to substantial involvement of the European Union in developing relations with third countries, one of key challenges became to maintain uniformity and coherence of actions in this respect. This was emphasised by, *inter alia*, Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Meller during the annual address on Polish foreign policy,<sup>17</sup> as substantial differences in positions among Member States emerged on such important issues as the shape and ways of implementing strategic partnership with Russia, relations with Ukraine and Caucasus states.

**Russia.** Relations with Russia ranked high on the agenda of both presidencies in 2006, however the burden of negotiations on legal framework for the relations with Russia after 2007 was mainly shouldered by the Finnish presidency. The EU-Russia summit, held on 25 May in Sochi, failed to result in a breakthrough on the issue. It was agreed that the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement would be in force until a new agreement takes effect. During the Sochi summit, the problem of Polish food exports to Russia was not raised. Following the presentation by the Commission of the draft mandate for negotiations with Russia on 3 July, an internal debate over the contents of the document commenced. The overriding objective for Finland was to finalise the work on the mandate and proceed to negotiations at the EU-Russia summit in

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<sup>17</sup> “An important test both for political will and cooperation potential in the EU is shaping a truly common foreign policy of the European Union and providing it with appropriate executive instruments.”

Helsinki on 24 November. However, despite efforts of the presidency, the mandate was not agreed upon, not only before the EU-Russia summit, but also until the end of the Finnish presidency.

Poland openly made the adoption of the mandate and commencement of negotiations on the new agreement conditional on abolishing by Russia of the ban on imports of Polish animal and vegetable products, ratification by Russia of the Energy Charter Treaty, and its signing of the Transit Protocol. Polish veto, announced at the November meeting of the General Affairs and External Relations Council, came as a surprise not only for the Commission, but also the presidency. It met with opposition from the majority of Member States, as they wanted to finish the discussion and commence negotiations as quickly as possible (Lithuania and France agreed with Poland only on the issue of lifting the Russian embargo). Putting a veto at the ministerial level resulted in adding a political dimension to the conflict, which encouraged the presidency and the Commission to take intense actions to resolve the problem. The change in the attitude of Member States towards Poland's position largely resulted from an additional veterinary inspection, carried out by the Commission's experts at Polish meat plants, which confirmed that the Russian embargo was unfounded and should be lifted as soon as possible, which also applied to Russia's threat to stop meat imports from all EU countries (under the pretence of blocking imports of Romanian and Bulgarian meat). The Commission and Member States showed solidarity and did not agree to the signing of bilateral protocols with Russia. Understanding emerged for Poland's steadfast position, and its veto. In November, relations between the Finnish presidency and Polish authorities were very frequent, which included, *inter alia*, the visit to Warsaw of Finland's Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen. Despite those efforts, neither at that time, nor in December, when the presidency embarked on the last attempt to find a compromise, was the EU able to reach agreement on the issue. For that reason, the EU-Russia summit in Helsinki took a routine course, and boiled down to discussing key areas of cooperation. In October, President Putin attended the EU summit in Lahti, where energy security was discussed. In December, Russia insisted on the adoption of a political declaration, to be annexed to the protocol extending the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, to cover Romania and Bulgaria. The Commission offered its counterdeclaration, which, however, faced opposition of six Member States, including Poland. By the end of 2006, no agreement was reached on the issue.

Blocking the mandate for the EU-Russia negotiations was the first decision of this type in external relations of the European Union since the accession of

Poland, whose participation in the process not only proved that it was able to use all instruments and mechanisms available in the Union to defend its national interests, but also showed that Poland wanted to be an active player in shaping the Eastern policy of the Union.

**Ukraine.** At the beginning of 2006, there were growing concerns in the EU about the outcome of the March parliamentary elections in Ukraine, and continuation by the new government of the programme of political and economic reforms. The EU positively evaluated the election campaign and acknowledged results of the vote, which was confirmed by a special declaration. However, under the new, post-election circumstances, notably owing to attempts to marginalize the “Orange Revolution” camp, consolidation of EU actions that support democratic and structural reforms in Ukraine, increasing the level of importance of mutual relations, as well as speedy preparation of a concept of cooperation following the expiry of the binding Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, became vitally important.

This was exactly Poland’s position at the meeting of the General Affairs and External Relations Council. On 11 April, it emphasised that the democratic course of the elections, the distribution of votes in the parliament and the emerging agreement on the establishment of the government of “Orange alternative,” fully corroborated the validity of the Community aspirations of Ukraine. Poland called for more dynamic actions of the EU for democratic transformation in the country, and its maintenance of the pro-European policy, as well as adding new value to the mutual relations. Poland positively assessed general proposals for the course of work and assumptions for the new EU-Ukraine agreement, submitted by the European Commission in April. At the meetings devoted to the problem, it suggested that the agreement should be an association agreement, with reference to art. 49 of the Treaty on European Union, specifying the conditions for accession. This failed to gather positive responses from the Commission and some Member States.

The draft mandate for negotiations on the new EU-Ukraine agreement was officially presented by the Commission on 13 September. In December, agreement was reached on items related to trade and energy. What remained open was Ukraine’s prospects for EU membership. Poland reiterated its reservations as to the nature of the agreement. The Finnish presidency failed to complete the work on the mandate, although it managed to ensure consensus on the majority of technicalities. With the discussion on the mandate in the background, the EU-Ukraine summit was held on 27 October in Helsinki. It reiterated the will of deeper cooperation and bringing Ukraine closer to the

European Union. Among the most important results of the summit were signing agreements on readmission and visa enhancements, as well an agreement on the timing of negotiations on the new EU–Ukraine agreement, scheduled for early 2007.

**Belarus.** In connection with presidential elections in Belarus, planned for 19 March 2006, Poland submitted a proposal for a discussion on the internal situation in the country, and potential EU actions. At its meeting on 30 January 2006, the General Affairs and External Relations Council called on Belarusian authorities to carry out the elections in compliance with democratic standards, or otherwise face restrictions. Along with the main summit, a meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs with Alaxandr Milinkievitch, the opposition leader in Belarus, was organised on the initiative of Lithuania and Poland. Also on Poland's request, the topic of the situation in Belarus entered the agenda of the informal March meeting of the ministers in Salzburg. Negative evaluation of the events before the elections in Belarus encouraged the Austrian presidency to submit a declaration in mid-March, where it called on Belarusian authorities to improve election campaign standards and refrain from repressions on the opposition. In spring, the European Commission considered the course and outcome of the elections as non-democratic and took a decision, also on Poland's request, to impose visa sanctions on those responsible for election rigging and repressions, including President A. Lukashenka.

On 17 March, Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Meller issued a letter to his EU counterparts, Commissioner Benito Ferrero-Waldner and High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, where he proposed extension of visa sanctions, freezing assets of the regime members and imposing sanctions of companies linked with them. On 10 April, the Council took a formal decision to cover 31 representatives of Belarusian authorities by visa sanctions for election rigging and repressions on the opposition, while in May decided to freeze financial assets of those individuals deposited with European institutions.

Poland, along with other countries of the Visegrad Group, Baltic states, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands, signed the April letter to Austria's Minister of Foreign Affairs U. Plassnik, with a proposal to increase financial assistance for the civil society in Belarus.

In accordance with proposals submitted by Poland, the Finnish presidency was also active in this respect. Among the actions was, *inter alia*, the adoption of a document specifying the position of the EU and its Member States on

Belarusian authorities and a non-paper on benefits that the society in Belarus will be able to enjoy if closer cooperation with the EU is initiated.

**Countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy.** The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is for Poland a prioritised area of EU external relations. Poland consistently declares itself in favour of differentiating the policy depending on particular regions, owing to the differences that exist among them, and unequal progress in implementing democratic and market reforms. On 13 September, a formal recognition of the Eastern dimension of ENP was proposed in the EU forum, along with enabling Eastern Europe neighbours to integrate gradually, in economic terms, into the common market, increasing assistance for implementing reforms and developing administrative capacities, more active political dialogue and more intense efforts for the resolution of conflicts in Transdnistria and South Caucasus, as well as the establishment of an instrument of support for transformation in Eastern Europe states covered by ENP, similar to the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP). Poland also proposed to even out assistance for individual ENP regions under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), inclusion of neighbour states in the EU cooperation on energy security, and support for regional and transborder cooperation among states of Eastern Europe covered by ENP.

2006 brought progress in the agreements on further action Plans, including those for three states of South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Works have been concluded on the ordinance concerning ENPI, which constitutes an important element supporting the implementation of the assumptions of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Poland supported the even division of funds within this instrument, however it was finally agreed that a 70 to 30% proportion in favour of the south dimension should be chosen.

**Western Balkans.** The status of Kosovo and the break-up of Serbia and Montenegro was the centre of EU attention. Relations with Serbia posed a serious problem. The conviction that Serbia, owing to its potential and administrative readiness, deserves the membership status in foreseeable future, was countered by the frustration at the political tactics used by Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica, the outcome of which was lack of progress in cooperation of the state with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and uncompromising position on the status of Kosovo. Due to no progress in cooperation with ICTY, talks with Serbia (at that time still with Montenegro) on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) were suspended in May. In 2006, no decision was taken on the resumption of negotiations on the



Agreement with Serbia, although a similar document was signed with Albania in June, and talks on the subject continued with Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The European Union played a momentous role in mediation between political powers in Montenegro during the period preceding the referendum, held on 21 May 2006. Its result decided on the independence for the country. During the June summit, the EU decided to develop relations with the Republic of Montenegro as a sovereign state.

Poland was a consistent supporter of European aspirations of countries in the region, at the same time accentuating the requirement to meet the criteria specified by the European Union by all candidate countries, in particular the requirement of full cooperation with ICTY. Similarly to other EU members, Poland looked at lasting peace and stabilisation in Western Balkans from the angle of political situation in Serbia, its democratisation progress and reform of authority structure, as well as settlement with its troubled past. Since Serbia failed to fulfil international commitments it made, Poland unreservedly supported the decision on the suspension of negotiations on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the country.

Supporting the activities of the special envoy of the UN Secretary General Martti Ahtisaari, Poland emphasised, in its position on Kosovo presented in the EU, that, according to the UN resolution no. 1244 of 10 June 1999, responsibility for its future rests with the international community, and the most important goal for the Union is to come up with a common position concerning the status of the province, including a potential recognition of Kosovo's independence by Member States.

Poland did not raise reservations as to the decision on the relations between the European Union and the sovereign Republic of Montenegro, supported the European prospects for the country, and resumption by the Commission of talks on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement on the basis of a new mandate and agreements made during previous negotiation rounds.

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The European Union's priorities were largely a consequence of the crisis of 2005. Lack of decision on the Constitutional Treaty, parliamentary elections, or election campaigns in some Founding Member States (e.g. the Netherlands and France), as well as an adverse international situation, defined the political agenda for the EU and its institutions. Actions of the Union were also a response

to the various crisis situations in its relations with third countries, such as disruptions in gas supply from Russia, which caused the internal debate to be dominated by the problems of energy security and relations with Moscow. Growing importance of Asian economies, increasing sense of threat in relation to the situation in the Middle East, the war in Iraq, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Iran, North Korea), exerted negative influence on the Union's readiness for subsequent enlargement, or even specifying a European perspective for subsequent states. A reflection of these tendencies were also such decisions as freezing some negotiation chapters with Turkey, or the suspension of negotiations on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Serbia.

Poland's activity in the year 2006 was particularly perceived in the context of the negotiations on the mandate for the European Commission for negotiations on the new agreement with Russia, and the Polish veto on the mandate. Poland also played an important role in preparing a draft mandate for the Commission's negotiations on the new agreement between the EU and Ukraine, vehemently demonstrating its support for integration aspirations of that state. It was also one of initiators of the Union's actions to condemn malpractices of the authorities and non-democratic course of presidential elections in Belarus. Poland's impact on EU policies on these three states was substantial. It consolidated our standing in the Union and, to a large extent, stimulated interest of the remaining Member States in this neighbourhood region. Moreover, Poland played a positive role in shaping relations between the EU and Western Balkans, consistently supporting the membership attempts of countries in the region, as well as European initiatives bringing them closer to the EU, such as the liberalisation of visa policies.

The observable, rising level of Poland's activity in the EU will definitely have a positive impact on the change of its image in the other Member States. Combined with the experience of three years of membership, this will guarantee strengthening of Poland's presence in the European structures, as well as ensure greater share for Poland in decision-making processes. This is of fundamental importance owing to the decision making on strategic (for the EU) and prioritised (for Poland) issues, scheduled for 2007, such as the future of the Constitutional Treaty and the strategy of cooperation with Russia and eastern EU neighbours.

## **Polish Security Policy**

The foundations of the contemporary Polish security policy were formed during the last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. This included our membership in NATO, cooperation as part of the Common Foreign and Security of the European Union and the European Security and Defence Policy, strategic partnership with the United States of America as well as stabilised relations with our neighbours. Those were the foundations of Poland's actions towards its own as well as international security in 2006.

### **The North Atlantic Treaty**

The several-year long debate concerning the consolidation and transformation of NATO continued in 2006. The main conclusions on the above issues were reached during the Organisation's summit in Riga, 28–29 November 2006.<sup>1</sup> Transformation, usually understood as synonymous with military changes within the Organisation, also encompasses postulates of political nature. They are concerned with the maintenance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's leading role in the international security system. The military transformation decisions from Riga lead to an increase of the expedition capabilities of the Organisation; this results in an increase in the Organisation's involvement outside the treaty territory.

The discussions concerning the organisation's expedition capabilities, which went on for many weeks, were connected with the progression of NATO's operation in Afghanistan as part of the framework of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the postulates of the commandment of this operation concerning reinforcement of the operating military contingent. A few weeks before the summit, the Polish President Lech Kaczyński announced the decision to send c. 1,050 troops to bases in eastern Afghanistan in 2007. In Riga, the allies declared the will to engage jointly in a successful completion of the

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\* Marek Ziółkowski—Ambassador ad personam, Deputy Director of the MFA Security Policy Department.

<sup>1</sup> See [www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int).

operation and an increase in aid for Afghan security forces. They noted the need of greater connection between the question of security and issues of development. They summoned other states and organisations to cooperate and they called on the UN to take over the coordination function of all civic and military efforts of all subjects present in Afghanistan. ISAF was created on the foundations laid by the UN Security Council Resolution no. 1386 from December 2001 in order to support the Afghan authorities in securing political stabilisation, strengthening security and reconstruction of the country as well as in conducting reforms of the army, demobilising armed groups and fighting drug production. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation declared the will of leadership of the operation in August 2003. The ISAF operation is currently entering its decisive phase. On 5 October 2006, the American troops stationed in the east of the country were transferred under NATO command; this initiated phase IV of the operation—the Organisation's assumption of responsibility of the stabilisation of the entirety of Afghanistan.

The documents of the Riga summit have also confirmed the durability of NATO's engagement in Kosovo towards security and stability in the region. A decision to continue the engagement in the training mission in Iraq was taken. A readiness was declared to widen the support for the African Union's mission in Darfur, especially in the areas of training and aerial transport. Maintenance of the Active Endeavour operation in the Mediterranean Sea was declared.

A lot of attention was given to the improvement of transatlantic relations as a condition for the successful political transformation of the Organisation. The breaking of the impasse between the most important organisations of the Euroatlantic region—NATO and EU—is becoming extremely significant. The aim of both organisations should be effective and dynamic cooperation in the area of security policy based on common values and usually homogenous security interests. The Organisation's internal political problems in recent years mainly stem from the difficulties in re-establishing the functionality of transatlantic relations. The Iraq crisis revealed the differences in the perception of dangers, the method of neutralising these dangers and the basic individual political interests of the most significant members of the transatlantic commonwealth. NATO should remain the basic forum of security consultations of Euroatlantic commonwealth as common security requires mutual complementation of NATO and the EU.

The present strategic partnership of the two organisations in terms of crisis management is to a large extent dependent on the cooperation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as part of the Berlin Plus agreement, as well as on the common

support of the operation of African forces in Darfur. The cooperation in the field of the development of military capabilities is based on exchange of information on the forum of the NATO-EU Capability Group concerning, including the potential of securing complementarity of The European Union Battlegroups and the NATO Response Force. From the formalistic point of view, Turkey's objection to Cyprus and Malta's participation in joint committee meetings of the EU and NATO, based on the fact that the countries have not signed an agreement with NATO about protection of confidential data, is an obstacle in cooperation between the organisations. From the political point of view, this situation seems to be welcomed by those countries (France, Belgium, and Greece) which are not interested in intensifying the relations between the two organisations in the area of widely-understood security policy and who plan the EU's development in the field. During the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's summit in Riga a breakthrough in EU-NATO relations was not achieved. The countries interested in wider cooperation between the two organisations are convinced that the EU's planned involvement in 2007 in Afghanistan (policing mission—c. 200 people) and Kosovo (between 1,000 and 1,500 people) as well as NATO's significant engagement in those countries can contribute—through the necessity of wide cooperation on operational level—to breaking the impasse, at least partially.

The summit's documents display a clear tendency to find ways of operation of the Organisation and their justification outside the treaty territory. This role is supposed to be fulfilled by the proposal of creation of a global partnership, which would take into account the cooperation between NATO and countries which can significantly contribute to the Organisation's operations outside the treaty territory. The leading motive of such cooperation would be the development of military capability serving the jointly undertaken peace operations and stabilisation missions. NATO's cooperation with countries such as Japan, Australia, South Korea or New Zealand will become a practical test for the idea. According to Poland's position the search for partners outside the Euroatlantic region is a natural consequence of NATO's engagement in different parts of the world. However, the globalisation of partnership should not weaken the Washington Treaty (especially art. 5) or the "open doors" policy.

NATO's expansion is one of the most significant mechanisms of increasing the area of stability, predictability, common values and joint interests within the Euroatlantic region. The abandonment of the "open doors" policy would weaken the Organisation's international significance and it would deprive many countries, for which NATO membership is an engine for internal reforms and an indicator of direction, of perspectives. In the declaration from the Riga Summit the

Organisation maintained its obligation to continue the “open doors” policy for the next countries. All democratic European countries can be considered as candidates to membership in the Organisation as well as to participation in the Membership Accession Plan. Poland consistently supports the continuation of the “open doors” policy for those countries which share our common values and are prepared to meet NATO’s high standards. We perceive a particular importance in Ukraine and Georgia’s presence in the process.

A significant assumption of Polish foreign policy, which strengthens our security in the region, is the support of the development of Ukraine’s cooperation with the Organisation, which in the long run would conclude in Ukraine becoming a member of NATO. Polish ambition lies in the definition of the integration of Ukraine with NATO as a process of cementation of geopolitical, democratic and modernising changes in Central and Eastern Europe initiated in Poland almost 30 years ago. The definition of such a task for Polish foreign policy is addressed by the pro-Atlantic course of Ukraine’s foreign policy. Undoubtedly, the speed and manner of Ukraine’s integration with NATO will be influenced by the conflict between Ukrainian political forces on the issue, as well as by the decrease in social support for the idea of Ukraine’s membership in NATO in the last two years. The discussion concerning relations with NATO—lasting since early 2006—introduced the issue of Ukraine’s Euroatlantic aspirations into the parliamentary electoral campaign. The issue has become a point of conflict between Ukraine’s president and prime minister. In the light of this situation the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine proposed the exclusion of the issues of national security from current politics through the introduction of Security Strategy for Ukraine.<sup>2</sup> The document makes it clear that the issue of increasing Ukraine’s national security is not only a choice pro or against NATO, but an issue of defining of targets of the Ukrainian state and basic directions of the state’s foreign policy.

According to Polish opinion, the changes introduced by the Organisation should encompass the widening of the catalogue of consulted issues in the area of security policy. The best example of this is Poland’s introduction of energy policy issues to NATO’s agenda. In March 2006, the Secretary General proposed three types of NATO actions in the area of the issues of energy security: political consultations inside the organisations, evaluation of dangers and potential military operations as well as dialogue with external partners (countries and

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<sup>2</sup> The Security Strategy for Ukraine, passed by the President of Ukraine, 12 February 2007 ([www.president.gov.ua/documents/5728.html](http://www.president.gov.ua/documents/5728.html)).

international institutions). Military authorities completed the Organisation's role with the defence of infrastructure of special significance and securing of sea routes. The NATO summit in Riga acknowledged the importance of the issue of energy security and recommended that the North Atlantic Council conducts consultations concerning the most important dangers in the field and defines the areas in which NATO could play a role of support of security interests of its members in the area of energy. The inclusion of the clause about energy security in the text of the final declaration is treated by us as an acknowledgement of NATO's role in the process of consultations and defence of interests of member states within the field.

### **European Security and Defence Policy—ESDP**

The support of the development of the ESDP lies in Poland's interest. This development would lead to gradual increase of the scope and effectiveness of the EU's external actions, it would allow the EU to participate in the efforts of the international community towards the maintenance of peace and security and at the same time it would not have a negative influence on the position and operational capabilities of NATO. This is still a significant reservation as the EU-NATO relations are in a deadlock and a breakthrough was not reached at the Riga Summit.

Poland supports further development of the EU's military capabilities. The participation in the process of improving these capabilities results in a significant modernising impulse for the Polish armed forces. A particularly significant element of this process—due to the nature of the current security dangers—is the development of fast reaction capabilities. Poland expressed its involvement in the development of the EU's military capabilities by declaring to create, together with Germany, Slovakia, Lithuania and Latvia, the EU Battlegroup by 2010. A Memorandum of Understanding was signed on 13 November 2006, which became a legal foundation for the creation and operation of the group. Poland is responsible for the organisation of the leadership of the forces and the battle element of the group.

Together with the creation of the European Defence Agency in 2004, the member states gained yet another instrument of improving strategic capabilities and gradual harmonisation of the process of force planning. One of EDA's major efforts concentrates on searching for rationalisation of expenses through, *inter alia*, the launching of joint projects, attempts at harmonisation of needs and joint purchases of specified types of equipment. The Agency's other tasks also

include gradual construction of European market of military production and its technological base as well as the support of the research and development sector in the field of defence. Poland actively participates in selected projects of the European Defence Agency. Poland believes that due to the putting together of abilities and means of the interested countries the Agency enables the development of defence capabilities, which, for many EU countries including Poland, would be impossible to achieve through the exclusive use of their own means. Poland in particular acknowledges the need to increase the Agency's role as a forum of cooperation and exchange of experiences, especially in the field of research and new technologies. Poland joined the international regime which stimulates the competitiveness of the European defence market. It was introduced on 1 July 2006 and it operates on the basis of the Code of Practice in the area of defence orders.

Poland participates in the EU's civic and military operations.<sup>3</sup> It considers the Balkans, the eastern neighbours of the EU and the Middle East to be the regions of priority in terms of the EU's operational engagement. It pays particular attention to the planned EU operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan in 2007. Due to the significant NATO involvement, Poland counts on a close cooperation between the two organisations in those countries.

EUFOR ALTHEA—EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which began in December 2004 and in 2006 consisted of c. 4,500 troops. The Polish Military Contingent (c. 190 troops) is a part of the Multinational Task Force North (MTFN) with its headquarters in Tuzla.

EUPM (European Union Police Mission)—European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina consisting of 196 international constables. The main objectives of the mission include helping to implement reforms of the Bosnian police and supporting the authorities in their actions against organised crime (operation planning and supervision). The cooperation with EUFOR Althea and with the local security forces plays a significant part. Representatives of the Polish police serve in the mission.

EUBAM (EU Border Assistance Mission)—from 1 December 2005 an observational/advisory EU mission is in operation of the border between Ukraine and Moldova. It is evaluated as a significant step on the road to the solution of the conflict in Transnistria. On top of the advisory activity concerning the improvement of control on the border, the mission provides

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<sup>3</sup> More details about the operations available in B. Górka-Winter, "Poland in Peacekeeping and Stabilisation Operations," pp. 257–272 below.



information about the scale of smuggling and the connections between the sphere of politics and criminal structures in the region. Poland is the most numerously represented country in the structures of the mission. Presently, within the group of c. 70 international experts there are 18 Poles (customs officers and border police)

EUJUST LEX—the mission began in July 2005 and was extended until the end of 2007. Poland, as the only one out of the 10 new member states of the EU, took part in the mission. The mission aims to organise training for the Iraqis concerning the reform of judicial system. Poland organised a course for 29 representatives of the Iraqi administration within the area of criminal law in March 2006 at the Higher Police Academy in Szczytno. Komenda Główna Policji (The Main Police Headquarters) was the sponsor and coordinator of the programme.

EU and UN opened a consultancy mechanism at a workshop level. As part of the mechanism the organisations undertake actions towards strengthening the cooperation concerned with planning, training, information and experience exchange in the field of crisis management. In a response to the UN's request regarding the support of the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) as well as sending forces to the country in order to supervise the electoral process, in 2006 the UE conducted the EUFOR RD Congo operation in the country. The operation lasted from June to November 2006. Poland contributed one of the most numerous military contingents—131 troops.

### **The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe**

It can appear that human rights issues as well as the development or state of democracy do not relate to security policy. However, more than enough historical and theoretical examples certify their connection. The simple formula could be described as the following: the more democracy, the less danger for security. It is also commonly accepted that democratic states are more peaceful than non-democratic ones.<sup>4</sup> In this sense the heterogeneous actions of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe have their particular place in the shaping of European security. For instance, the operation of the OSCE's ground missions for many years have constituted a supplement and reinforcement of the UE states and the USA's policy in the area of stabilisation in the Balkans, solving local conflicts in Transnistria and the Caucasus as well as in

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<sup>4</sup> The philosophical bases for such opinions were created by, *inter alia*, E. Kant, *Rozprawy z filozofii historii*, Kęty, 2005.

many issues connected with the human dimension of European security. Poland has been systematically supporting these actions. From 1992 it is a host to the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR).

Between 2 and 13 October 2006 the annual Human Dimension Implementation Meeting of the OSCE took place in Warsaw. Three topics were discussed in depth: the access to justice system, the phenomenon of people trafficking and the promotion of tolerance and non-discrimination. Around 1,000 participants took part in the meeting, including the representatives of more than 300 non-governmental organisations from, *inter alia*, Belarus, Russia and Central Asia. The latter group used the Warsaw forum as an opportunity to draw the attention of the international public opinion to the ongoing serious problems in the area of human rights in the said countries.

Furthermore, the issue of freedom of the media and electoral matters were discussed. From September 2005 the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights took part in observing elections in 12 countries including Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus. Almost 100 Polish observers took part in these missions in 2006.

### **Fight Against International Terrorism**

Poland, as a member of the UN, EU and NATO, as well as part of its strategic alliance with the United States, participates in the fight against international terrorism and in the prevention of the phenomenon's occurrence. This participation occurs, for instance, as part of the European Union in the coordination of actions of special and police forces, which aim to limit the possibilities of terrorist attacks as well as of the terrorist groups recruiting EU nationals, who often originate from the countries of the Middle East and the Maghreb. Poland has ratified all 12 antiterrorist conventions recommended by the UN. It is also one of the many countries which implement the strategy of counteracting terrorism (A Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy)<sup>5</sup> passed by the UN General Assembly in September 2006.

In 2006, c. 800 soldiers served within the Multinational Division "Central-South" (MND CS)<sup>6</sup> in the anti-terrorist coalition in Iraq. The responsibility for conducting antiterrorist operations and providing security within the area of Polish Division is now being gradually passed to Iraqi authorities. In January

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<sup>5</sup> See [www.un.org/sc/ctc](http://www.un.org/sc/ctc).

<sup>6</sup> More details available in B. Górka-Winter, *op.cit.*

2006 partial responsibility for security in five provinces of central Iraq (including the two commanded by Poland) was assumed by the VIII Division of the Iraqi Army.

### **Armaments Control**

In the area of armaments control Poland stands out in its engagement in actions aiming to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Poland is the leader of the so called Cracow Initiative—Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)—initiated in 2003 at the Wawel Hill. The purpose of the Initiative is the prevention of illegal trafficking of weapons of mass destruction, missiles and their equipment as well as materials and technologies used in the production of weapons of mass destruction. The Initiative is currently supported by c. 80 countries and 20 countries permanently participate in the operations of the Initiative (Argentina, Australia, Denmark, France, Greece, Holland, Spain, Japan, Canada, Germany, Norway, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Italy, and USA). The said countries participate in the meetings of operational experts, where intelligence, customs, legal and other issues connected with actions of capturing weapons of mass destruction are discussed as well as the training of the forces of the countries participating in the PSI and the states supporting the Initiative. The training, besides the meetings of the experts, constitutes the most important element of the Initiative's activity.

As oppose to the traditional international agreements and their export control regimes, concentrating on political, international law and national obligations, the Initiative targets the practical counteraction to illegal trafficking of weapons of mass destruction, missiles and materials and technologies used in their productions. The development of practical mechanisms of counteraction and capturing of weapons of mass destruction has been supported by the UN Security Council in resolution 1540 (2004), G-8 Group, EU and NATO as well as by the UN Secretary General in his report concerning the reform of the UN.

The most important event of 2006 was the organisation by Poland of the High Level Political Meeting (23 June, Warsaw) of the countries supporting the Initiative. The main objective of the meeting was the promotion of international cooperation in counteracting dangers related to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the increase of support for the PSI. 65 countries participated. Some of them (Angola, Bahrain, Brunei, Philippines, Cambodia, Kuwait, Oman and Turkmenistan) joined the Initiative just before the meeting by accepting the

Declaration on the rules of capturing. The significance and positive results of the Warsaw meeting were emphasised by the G-8 countries in their statement about non-proliferation issued on 16 July 2006 in Petersburg.

As part of the PSI Poland, Denmark and Russia conducted the Amber Sunrise 2006 training in 2006 (Gdansk, 13–15 September). Russia's participation was especially significant as up until that point it had not engaged in the PSI's particular actions, despite being a member of the group of 20 most involved countries. During a session summing up the training, Russia emphasised its contentment with the fact that the training had taken place and declared the will to continue cooperation as part of the PSI and to plan more training sessions.

One of the most original disarmament agreements concerning the European continent is still the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) signed in 1990. The maximum limits of possessions of conventional weapons by the sides were laid out in the Treaty, as were a clear system of inspection and exchange of information about armed forces. In 2006 the Third CFE Review Conference took place (Vienna, 30 May – 2 June), which recapitulated the activity of the CFE Treaty and the progress of ratification of the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty from 1999 in conjunction with the accompanying political obligations. Unlike during other meetings, this time a joint final document was not agreed on. This situation was caused by the confrontational stance of Russia, who demanded the inclusion of clauses obliging NATO member states to ratify the adapted CFE Treaty by the end of 2007. The demands were rejected by the members of NATO. The importance of the CFE Treaty and its contribution to international security were emphasised in all speeches.

## **II.**

# **Bilateral Relations**



## **Relations between Poland and the United States**

One of the pillars of Polish foreign policy is to develop cooperation with the United States. Intense relations with the US contribute to the achievement of Polish objectives and pursuit of the country's interests in key areas, security in particular. It is in the Polish national interest to maintain the involvement of the United States in Europe, as it guarantees security and stabilises political and military relations on the continent.

The primary platform for cooperation between Poland and the United States is international security: Poland's presence in the anti-terrorist coalition and in operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo and Lebanon. In addition, Poland also actively participates in the transatlantic dialogue on the Wider Middle East and Iran.

Poland's involvement in the Middle East reflects the intent to be an active player in international politics, and is used to enhance transatlantic relations. The Middle East conflict is one of the key topics on the agenda of Poland-US consultations. Currently, it is fundamental to the US foreign policy, and Poland appears to be a valuable partner in this respect. Owing to the support offered during the US war in Iraq, Poland started to be perceived in Washington D.C. as a reliable state and one willing to take risky actions. This accumulated significant "political capital," not only from the Republican administration, but also from its numerous critics. The capital represents substantial value in international relations and allows bolder planning of Polish actions in the relations with the United States.

Poland's decision on the deployment of additional troops, to reinforce the Polish military contingent in Afghanistan was construed by the United States as a sign of responsibility for the success of NATO's Afghan operation. It also represented a gesture of support for the vision of the Alliance as an organisation that plays an active role in international politics, develops its military capabilities, and is preparing to take on new security challenges in an effective manner.

This is how Poland not only solidifies its image as a reliable ally, but makes an effort to retain the key security policy mechanism in the transatlantic region

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\* Maciej Pisarski—First Secretary at the MFA Department of America.

for NATO, which combines the traditional function of a political and military alliance with the properties of an organisation that adapts to the constantly changing environment of international relations.

Polish diplomacy presents the development of strategic relations with the United States and membership in the European Union as complementary objectives. Good relations with the US strengthen our position in relations with other EU states. Also, by building a robust position in the Union, Poland becomes a more attractive partner for the United States, as it indicates the need for an ever more actions by the US on European policy, not being limited to the European Union issues. Therefore, Poland is an active interlocutor in the transatlantic dialogue, used by the US and the EU not only to offer new quality of the relations between them, but also to influence the phenomena and processes in the regional and global dimension. This cooperation is extremely broad and covers economic issues, international security (combating terrorism, counteracting proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, stabilisation in the Middle East and the Balkans), political issues (such as the promotion of democracy in Eastern Europe and other regions of the world) as well as energy security, climate change and fighting infectious diseases.

Poland declares itself in favour of enhanced transatlantic cooperation regarding policies on Eastern Europe, South Caucasus and Central Asia, and supports coordination of US–EU actions wherever possible. This primarily applies to the support to political and economic reforms in Ukraine and the country's integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions, as well as the long-term commitment in favour of transformation in Belarus. Poland encourages its partners to work out joint policy standards on Russia, including the energy security aspect.

### **Political Dialogue**

A reflection of the extensive agenda of Poland-US relations was the countries' active political dialogue.

On 8–11 February 2006, President of RP Lech Kaczyński visited the US. The agenda of the visit covered, *inter alia*, a meeting with President George W. Bush, officials of the American administration, and leaders of the Republican and Democratic Party at the Senate of the US Congress. The President also met representatives of Washington D.C. think-tanks, the leadership of the Polish American Congress and the heads of the American Jewish Committee. Political talks focused on such issues as Eastern policy (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus), policy



on Iran, energy security, the future of NATO and bilateral relations. During the visit, a Poland-US agreement was signed on cooperation in science and technology, and on financing F-16 pilot training.

On 18–20 June 2006, Poland's Minister of Foreign Affairs Anna Fotyga took a working visit to Washington, D.C., to meet Vice-President Richard Cheney, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, President's advisor for national security Steven Hadley, national coordinator for intelligence John Negroponte, as well as representatives of the US Congress, Polish Americans and Jewish organisations.

On 12–15 September 2006, Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński visited the United States. During his meeting with Vice-President Richard Cheney, he also briefly met President George W. Bush. The Prime Minister also held talks with Speaker of the House of Representative Dennis Hastert, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Richard Lugar, Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman, and Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez. The Chairman of the Polish Council of Ministers also met representatives of American corporations: Lockheed Martin Corporation CEO J. Stevens and GE Energy CEO John Krenicki. In Chicago, the Prime Minister had a meeting with representatives of Polish Americans, including the authorities of the Polish American Congress and the Polish National Alliance, Polish American media, as well as attended a church service at the Holy Trinity Church.

Poland–US cooperation in security was the motto of the visit to the United States of Minister of National Defence Radosław Sikorski, held between 17 and 21 May and 1–4 November 2006. Among his interlocutors were Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld and other high officials of the Administration, American Armed Forces and the US Congress (e.g. Senator John McCain, during the May visit).

The platform for developing cooperation between Poland and the US that has already become a permanent fixture was the Strategic Dialogue. Comprehensive consultations under this mode represent an opportunity to discuss key areas of cooperation between both states. The Dialogue contributes to better understanding of objectives and validates the far-reaching convergence of interests as well as shared assessment of the international situation. It is also an apt occasion to present positions on difficult issues. The main item on Dialogue's agenda in 2006 was security issues. At that time, the US were implementing major modifications to their strategies of action for Iraq, and Poland was preparing for the mission in

Afghanistan, still being involved, both politically and militarily, in Iraq. The F-16 purchase programme for the Armed Forces of RP also entered its final stage. Other prioritised topics included energy security and Eastern Europe.

The fifth round of the Dialogue was held in Washington, D.C., on 15 June 2006. It was chaired by Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Witold Waszczykowski, and Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried. The meeting was also attended by representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of National Defence and Ministry of the Economy from Poland, and representatives of the Department of State and the Pentagon from the US.

### **Military Cooperation**

The military is one of the most important areas of Poland-US cooperation. It covers joint peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and the Balkans, as well as non-returnable assistance and purchase of modern weaponry to upgrade the Polish Armed Forces. Partner associations are being formed between Polish and American Army units, the Navies cooperate in the area of upgrading vessels and training, while the Air Force jointly works with the service readiness programme for F-16 aircraft.

The main American assistance programme for Poland was still Foreign Military Financing. Between 1995 and 2006, it totalled \$318.5 million (\$165.5 million in 2005 and 2006, including a special payment under the so-called Solidarity Fund). The annual value of this assistance project totalled approx. \$30 million—which was the highest amount among European receivers of American assistance.

These funds were primarily used to co-finance the purchase of C-130 Hercules transport aircraft and training of F-16 pilots, but also to purchase: unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) for surveillance, Hummer vehicles, radiolocators, equipment and weaponry for special forces.

Similarly to previous years, training projects were funded under the International Education and Training (IMET) programme, whose annual budget for Poland exceed \$2 million.

The programme of delivering F-16 multipurpose aircraft to the Armed Forces of RP entered its final stage. The first machines landed at Poznań-Krzesiny airport in November 2006. In total, Poland purchased 48 aircraft. The deliveries will continue until December 2008.

A subject of expert meetings was a potential establishment in the territory of Poland of components of the American missile defences system. Formal decision of the American authorities on the issue was still pending. The Polish party emphasised its readiness to initiate talks on missile defences, viewed as an opportunity to enhance relations with the US in the area of political and military cooperation (it was not until January 2007 that the United States presented their offer in this respect).

### **Economic Cooperation**

According to the US Census Bureau, Poland ranked 56<sup>th</sup> among states where US companies exported their goods and services, and 62<sup>nd</sup> in the ranking of states exporting to the US. This should by no means be construed as success. The figures clearly indicate that there is still substantial, currently idle, development potential to be harnessed for mutual trade exchange. However, the entire spectrum of economic relations between Poland and the US should not be looked at solely from the perspective of these statistics. In reality, the relations are much more vibrant and multi-dimensional.

The primary shaping factors of the economic cooperation are the role of the United States as the largest economic entity of the global economy and Poland's place on the economic map of Europe. In terms of the latter factor, we are witnessing far-reaching changes, initiated by our country's accession to the European Union. This event had a major impact on the accelerated rate of our economic growth. Gradual integration of Poland with the economies of EU Member States in terms of laws and regulations allows better utilisation of the Polish market's assets (e.g. labour costs are still more competitive than those in Europe) and helps to attract foreign capital, including American investors.

Poland participates in developing multi-faceted transatlantic relations in the economic dimension. This includes an intense dialogue on harmonisation of regulations and removing formal barriers to trade and investment. Relations between business circles are developed, new opportunities for having a stake in processes that decide on the shape of the economy, in the transatlantic region and globally, are also being worked out.

Poland is a consistent supporter of deeper transatlantic economic relations. It advocates the implementation of cooperation projects under the European Union and the United States Initiative to Enhance Transatlantic Economic Integration and Growth, which was the topic of discussions at US-EU summits in 2005 and 2006.

Of key importance for Poland is the problem of the US-EU cooperation in the area of energy security. Another important factor that stimulates the development of Poland-US economic relations is deeper political and military cooperation between the states, as well as the implementation of RP Armed Forces upgrade projects.

The development of Poland-US relations in the economic dimensions was also affected by specific limitations of bilateral nature, regarding access to the American market for Polish suppliers. This exerted a negative influence on the potential increase of the export volume of agri-food products. Following the failure to recognise Poland as a country free from some animal diseases, exports of some products were put on hold. Polish authorities made continuous efforts to resolve the issue with American authorities.

**Trade exchange.** The volume of foreign trade exchange between Poland and the United States has been steadily rising since the beginning of this decade. In 2006, trade exchange (all statistics on trade exchange use the period January–November 2006) totalled \$4.434 billion and rose by over 14% in comparison with the previous year.<sup>1</sup> The value of Polish exports exceeded \$1.930 billion, which represents an increase by 14.5%. The largest share in the exports was taken by: machinery and equipment (30%), base metals and their products (13%), ships, vessels and other non-rail vehicles (12%), as well as furniture, food products and mineral products, mostly fuels, glass and ceramics.

The value of imports from the US totalled over \$2.503 billion, a rise by 14% in comparison with the previous year. The exports primarily included: machinery and equipment (35%), chemical industry products, including drugs (15%), aircraft and their spare parts and other non-rail vehicles (14%), measuring apparatus and tools (11%) as well as base metals and their products.

According to the statistics of the Central Statistical Office, Poland's deficit in trade exchange with the United States came to \$570 million. The US ranked 16<sup>th</sup> among countries-receivers of Polish exports, and 11<sup>th</sup> among exporters to Poland.

When assessing the figures for Poland–US foreign trade, we should consider that since Poland's accession to the EU, we have been bound by the same regulations that apply to all other members of the European community. This means that Polish exports to the American market no longer receive preferential customs treatment that they were enjoying in the 90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and face

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<sup>1</sup> Central Statistical Office data, quoted by the Ministry of Economy.

stiff competition. This is accompanied by greater openness of the Polish market to goods and services from the US. Thus, we should appreciate even more the growth in Poland-US trade exchange in another consecutive year of Polish economy's operation within the common European market.

**American investment in Poland.** American investors are still among top of the list of foreign businesses in Poland. They provide not only capital, but also modern technologies, organisational, marketing, etc. standards. Polish authorities are particularly keen on acquiring the most advanced technologies through American investment. This would allow full utilisation of the potential of Polish scientists and experts employed at national research and development institutions and offer competitive edge to the Polish economy in international relations.

The latest full data on incoming foreign investment, prepared by the National Bank of Poland, are for 2005. The figures show that American companies invested \$773 million in Poland, which accounted for 8% of investment outlays incurred by entities in which foreign capital had a stake. By 2005, the aggregate value of American investment totalled \$6.66 billion, representing 7% of the total foreign investment in Poland. Based on the data provided by the American embassy in Warsaw, the total value of American investment in Poland reached approx. \$15 billion, which incorporates investment by American companies registered in third countries.

Next to unabated interest of investors in such sectors as automotive industry, food processing, real estate and financial services, new trends are emerging, such as the establishment of offshoring centres, as well as research and development centres, built in Poland by, *inter alia*, General Electric, IBM, Pratt&Whitney, Motorola, Delphi, Avon and Hewlett Packard.

Based on the information from the Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency, American investors in 2006 were building production facilities, or extended the existing ones (Procter&Gamble, American Axle Manufacturing, Becco, Pentair, Colgate-Palmolive, 3M, EEZ, TRW), were expanding in the services sector (Accenture, ACN, Prologis UPS, Polimeni Organisation, Rockwell Automation, Motorola, Electronic Data Systems) as well as were taking actions in the area of research and development (Microsoft, Bunge, General Electric).

Public opinion in Poland took a keen interest in the decision by Dell corporation to establish a computers factory in Łódź. This will be the second European production site of this recognised computer manufacturer, after the

facility in Ireland. The estimated investment project value is up to €200 million, and the new site will employ 3,000 staff. The production launch is planned for October 2007. The coming of this major investor represents an opportunity for the various subcontractors and vendors from the Łódź area.

Another important event was the talks between the Industrial Development Agency and Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation on the latter's purchase of shares in PZL Mielec. The ultimate objective of the American corporation is to manufacture Black Hawk International helicopters at the site in Mielec. This will potentially make PZL Mielec a major entity on the extremely competitive and technologically advanced aerospace market. Sikorsky Corporation's investment is an example of Poland-US cooperation of industries that supply to the military, which may open up new development opportunities for the national economy.

### **Offset Programme**

2006 saw continued implementation of the offset agreement, signed with Lockheed Martin Corporation (LMC) on the purchase of F-16 aircraft for the Armed Forces of RP. By the end of 2006, out of the total pool of offset obligations of \$6.028 billion, projects valued at \$3.9 billion were completed. This keeps the programme of offset obligations 30% ahead of the schedule.

As assessed by the Ministry of the Economy, the implementation by the investor of the so-called indirect (unrelated to production for the military) offset obligations did not evoke any reservations. Important achievements in this area of cooperation include the production of Opel Zafira at the Gliwice site owned by General Motors, and acquisition by LOTOS Group of modern technologies for fuel production from Shell corporation.

Major reservations were raised by Poland regarding the implementation of the so-called direct offset (projects valued at \$1.1 billion) in the military industry, notably military aerospace industry. Projects that have not been implemented are referred to in this context, such as those at PZL Mielec or WZL-2 in Bydgoszcz (upgrade, technical maintenance, repairs and overhauls of aircraft). Poland expected more robust support from the United States as regards the sale to Iraq of M28 SkyTruck aircraft, manufactured at PZL Mielec.

A positive story of a direct offset project is the launch at ZM Mesko in Skarżysko Kamienna of combat agents production, based on technologies provided by the Norwegian company Nammo (2005).

The priorities for Poland remain to be: investment in defence industry, transfer of modern technologies and research and development projects with the

participation of Polish institutions. When assessing the offset programme, we should, however, remember that it is ultimately a business project, with the overriding business objectives. The implementation of the project requires not only the involvement of Lockheed Martin Corporation, but also capabilities of Polish entities to utilise the obtained technologies in an effective manner.

**Economic dialogue.** Economic cooperation was discussed during the numerous bilateral meetings. During President Lech Kaczyński's February visit to Washington, one of key items on the agenda was energy security. The topic was more extensively covered during the meeting between Secretary of State at the Ministry of the Economy Piotr Naimski and Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman. The issue was further tackled during the September visit to the US of Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński, who discussed it with Secretary Bodman. Finally, a "round table" meeting on the issue was held during the visit to the United States of Minister of the Economy Piotr Woźniak (26 November – 1 December 2006). Next to representatives of authorities from both states, the meeting was also attended by representatives of businesses that declared their intent to cooperate on energy issues. Poland also tried to arouse interest of American businesses operating in Europe and the Caspian Sea region in projects that would serve the purpose of diversification of energy supplies to our country.

Poland–US energy cooperation also covers potential application of modern technologies to process natural resources of our country. One of them is carbon gasification technology, developed by General Electric and used in IGCC (Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle) installations. General Electric offered to build a 900MW power plant in the IGCC technology. The problem still to be solved is operation cost of the power plant which, with the present level of technological development, is up to 40% higher than those of conventional installations. General Electric looks forward to utilising EU structural funds assigned to Poland to complete the project.

Another subject of economic dialogue was bilateral trade exchange and investment. While Poland still sought the rise in trade exchange volumes, the United States strived to support the interest of their companies already present in Poland. The biggest controversy revolved around the change of drug reimbursement regulations, to which some American exporters raised major reservations. The problem was discussed during the talks of Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez, held in Warsaw (23–24 January 2006), and during his meeting with Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński in Washington, D.C.

## **Visa Free Movement**

Talks continued in 2006 on incorporation of Poland into the American Visa Waiver Programme. Regular working meetings of the Poland–US Task Group for Consular Affairs were held in order to develop practical ways of introducing the agreed-upon “road map” arrangements.

Polish diplomacy was actively supporting legislative initiatives at the United States Congress, on top of the “road map” implementation, in order to include Poland in the visa waiver programme. These initiatives brought partial success. On 17 May, the Senate adopted an amendment to the immigration law, which opened up opportunities for Poland to be incorporated in the programme. The amendment was proposed by Senator Rick Santorum (Republican, Pennsylvania) and Senator Barbara Mikulski (Democrat, Maryland).

Since the immigration law adopted previously by the House of Representatives differed in terms of contents from the Senate Version, the law required both houses to agree on the same version of the document. Owing to deep-seated differences in opinions on the immigration policy and the controversies surrounding the problem in the context of the US Congress election campaign, the compromise that would allow entry into force of Santorum-Mikulski amendment was not reached.

This amendment was the first legislative initiative that received support from one of the houses of the American Congress. Previously, resolutions of state legislatures were adopted, or amendments submitted to the Congress that failed to gather sufficient support. Owing to the Santorum-Mikulski initiative, the question of admitting Poland and other Central and Eastern Europe states to the visa programme captured the attention of both the Congress and the administration. It also was a stimulus for other countries in our region to consolidate efforts to extend the programme, and for greater coordination among states interested in such extension.

The coverage of all European Union Member States by the US visa waiver programme (out of the countries acceding in 2004, only Slovenia was incorporated in the programme, and only Greece remained outside of it among the “old” members) was one of the items on the agenda of the US-EU consultations under Policy Dialogue on Transport and Border Security. Thus far, the talks have failed to bring significant breakthrough on the issue.

The factor that gave impetus to the debate on the visa programme was the announcement of far-reaching changes in the present system, delivered by President George W. Bush during his visit to Tallinn (28 November). The main



purpose of the reform is to tighten security and border protection-related criteria, and introduce a more lenient approach to economic and social criteria, where the present visa application denial threshold is at 3%. Some modifications to the visa programme are of administrative nature and do not need the Congress' involvement. The most important, however, require legislative change. This issue was tackled during the 110<sup>th</sup> Congress, following its inauguration in January 2007.

### **Cooperation in Science and Education**

On 10 February 2006, in the presence of President Lech Kaczyński, a new intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in science and technology was signed in Washington, D.C (effective from 22 November). The framework agreement will be executed based on executive regulations signed directly between the concerned governmental agencies of both states. The agreement sets forth general terms of cooperation and detailed terms of intellectual property protection. Executive regulations are to specify in detail, *inter alia*, the scope of cooperation, and to regulate organisational and financial aspects.

An Interdisciplinary Team for Poland-US Cooperation was established at the Ministry of Education and Higher Learning in order to support the implementation of the above agreement. The team will work on the programme of intensified scientific cooperation with the United States. Research on advanced technologies (e.g. biotechnology, nanomaterials) is planned to be among priorities of the programme.

2006 saw continued work on the new agreement on Poland-US Fulbright Commission. The new intergovernmental agreement is to establish the legal framework for the development of this oldest scholarship programme in relations between the countries, notably for the rise in the number of researchers enrolled in the Fulbright Commission's programmes.

Polish diplomacy also sought development of cooperation in education. It supported the establishment of Poland-US Parliamentary Youth Exchange Programme, initiated by Senator Richard Lugar, Republican of Indiana. The programme, providing for temporary study visits to the US, or Poland, for the youth, is targeted at high school attendees. However, the related legislative process was not finished before the end of the Congress term. The initiative was re-launched in early 2007. Another interesting undertaking is the US cooperation on pure sciences programme for selected countries, known as the Global Partnership for 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

### **Relations with Polish American and Jewish Communities**

In 2006, relations with Polish American community developed further. Cooperation flourished with Polish American organisations, including the leadership of the Polish American Congress. One of major forms of cooperation was the support to the Polish American communities in their efforts to incorporate Poland in the visa waiver programme. As a result, state legislatures of Massachusetts, New Jersey, Vermont, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Maine, Nebraska, Ohio, New York and Michigan adopted resolutions expressing their support for the Polish proposals. As usual, Polish American activists protested (letters to the editor, phone calls) against anti-Polish statements, surfacing every now and then in American media.

Dialogue with Jewish communities was also actively developed. Organisations of Jews in the US showed interest in Poland-Israel relations, expressing their satisfaction with the balanced and constructive policy of Poland on the Middle East issues. Another item on the agenda of the meetings was the remembrance of the Holocaust and joint historical heritage. Poland made efforts to increase volumes of youth exchange and develop joint education programmes in order to get to know each other better, and to understand the history of both nations better.

Jewish organisations raised an unsolved problem of restitution of private property of Jews. After a thug's attack in Warsaw on Rabbi Michael Schudrich, opinions on anti-Semitic sentiments in Poland were voiced. However, a resolute and unprecedented action by the Polish government met with positive reception of leaders of the Jewish community.

The publication of another book by Jan Gross<sup>2</sup> provided a stimulus for the discussion in some media on anti-Semitism in Poland. Sadly enough, some responses clearly displayed the big challenge that dissemination of competent knowledge on the complex history of relations between Poles and Jews, and lasting nature of stereotypes and simplifications, definitely is. This was also reflected in some respects in the assessment of the present political situation in Poland.

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<sup>2</sup> J. Gross, *Fear. Anti-semitism in Poland after Auschwitz*, Princeton University Press, 2006.

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2006 brought further reinforcement of Poland-US cooperation in all major areas. It is still one of the key tasks of Polish foreign policy in the period to come. The dynamics of relations between the countries is determined by discussions on the deployment of components of American missile defences system. Another important issue is the participation of the Armed Forces of RP in NATO operation in Afghanistan. The Iraqi problem also represents an important platform for bilateral cooperation, however its role will depend on the evolution of the American policy on the issue and the future of Poland's involvement in the operation.

The outcome of Poland-US cooperation will remain a subject of heated public debate in our country. We can only hope that a positive stimulus for the debate will be, *inter alia*, changes in the visa programme, if they lead to incorporation of Poland, and more intense relations between societies of the two countries.

## **Relations between Poland and Germany**

### **Genuine Partnership**

2006 was a year of continuation of the modes of cooperation and dialogue established over the last 15 years in relations between Poland and Germany, but also a period of defining, sometimes anew, the neighbourhood between both countries. The social and political basis for the relations, established in early nineties of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, guaranteed robust relations in almost all areas, in particular the economy. Closer cooperation under NATO and the European Union was superimposed on the already existing network of bilateral relations. Efforts to arrive at a new formula for bilateral relations, expended by the governments of Poland and Germany, resulted primarily from the changes in the international environment, and social awareness transformation processes in both countries. The philosophy of neighbourhood from the nineties no longer fitted in with the new reality, marked primarily by:

1) completion of the process of European integration, with the majority of the former Eastern bloc states having EU membership status;

2) new definition of international security—no longer a conflict between the East and the West, but rather looked at from the angle of threats posed by international terrorism and “rouge states;”

3) globalisation.

These processes co-existed with, and at the same time triggered off, Germany’s maturing to be a “regular” country, without any burden from the past, aware of its potential and role that they can play not only on the European, but also global scene, as a “middleweight superpower.” Processes of social and political transformations in Poland went even further. The country became a stable democracy, recorded economic growth, acted as a fully-fledged member of NATO and the European Union, aware of its role on the international scene and prepared to defend its interest. Owing to these changes, Poland and

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\* Janusz Styczek—Head of Section for German-Speaking Countries at the MFA Department of Europe.

Germany were gradually becoming almost equal partners. Governments of first Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz, and then Jarosław Kaczyński, aware of the new realities and challenges they were facing, made an attempt at a policy of “new opening” in relations with Germany. At its core was open talk on difficult issues, presenting legitimate interests, solving problems that accumulated over the previous years and the establishment of authentic partnership, based on mutual understanding of each other’s interests and concerns.

The policy of defining Poland-Germany relations anew met with incomprehension and criticism from some German media and opinion leaders. This attitude of the media consisted in, by and large, extremely critical and biased approach to the Polish government and the coalition parties. The picture of Poland as presented by the German media was that of a country ruled by a coalition of conservative, eurosceptical parties, with insular attitudes, extremely distrustful about not only Europe, but also their neighbours, including Germany. The climax of the criticism from the German media on the camp currently in power in Poland was a satire published in the German daily “*Tageszeitung*.” In 2006, media became an extremely powerful tool in shaping the general atmosphere of bilateral relations. As a result, there was a clash between opinions of German media on Poland-Germany relations, viewed as bad, and the actual state of affairs, as measured by the intensity and nature of relations between the countries. From this point of view, Poland-Germany relations maintained the level present in previous years, although they were not unmarred by issues where their respective opinions differed.

The nature of Poland-Germany relations in 2006 was affected by the fact that it was a period of getting to know each other’s governments better. Parliamentary elections were held in both countries in late 2005 (in Poland, also presidential), as a result of which new government coalitions were formed.

### **Continued Dialogue**

Both countries, against the opinions in the media heralding ice age in Poland-Germany relations, and attempts to destroy the legacy accumulated thus far, signalled on many occasions their will for to cooperate further, on the basis of what was already achieved in recent years. An opportunity to express this attitude was a conference organised on 12 June 2006 in Warsaw, on the 15<sup>th</sup> anniversary of signing the Good Neighbourhood and Friendly Cooperation Treaty. Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz reiterated on this occasion the statement delivered in 1989 by Tadeusz Mazowiecki: “We need a breakthrough

in our relations with Germany. Societies of both countries have gone further than their governments. We want a genuine reconciliation.”<sup>1</sup>

The statement delivered on 26 October 2006 by Minister of Foreign Affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeier at the Viadrina European University in Frankfurt (Oder), devoted to Poland-Germany relations, represented another vital political message. Steinmeier said: “Poland is not just a country among 25 EU states. If Europe is to be successful in the future, the success will only be possible if a powerful voice of Poland is there.”<sup>2</sup>

2006 was marked by intense political relations at all levels. Presidents of Poland and Germany met as many as four times. President Lech Kaczyński took his first visit to Germany on 8 and 9 March. He met President Horst Köhler, Chancellor Angela Merkel and Chairman of the Bundestag Norbert Lammert. Soon thereafter, on 18 May, President Horst Köhler made a visit to Warsaw to close Poland-Germany Year at an official event. Presidents of both countries met again during the commemoration of the Poznań June and a visit to the headquarters of Multinational Corps Northeast in Szczecin. They also watched together a football game played between Poland and Germany during the FIFA Football World Cup.

No less intense than in previous years were also relations at the governmental level. On 30 October 2006, intergovernmental consultations were held in Berlin, attended by heads of governments Jarosław Kaczyński and Angela Merkel, Ministers of Foreign Affairs Anna Fotyga and Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Ministers of Transport Jerzy Polaczek and Wolfgang Tiefensee and Deputy Ministers of Internal Affairs Wiesław Tarka and Peter Altmeier. The fact that the consultations resumed after one year (none were held in 2005 owing to the elections and change of governments in both countries), indicates the intent to maintain the forms of cooperation operating thus far. 2006 also brought a substantial number of meetings at the level of heads of ministries. Those who visited Poland were Minister of Environment Sigmar Gabriel, Minister of Internal Affairs Wolfgang Schäuble and Minister of Justice Brigitte Zypries,

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<sup>1</sup> Speech by Prime Minister K. Marcinkiewicz at the conference on the occasion of the 15<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the signing of the Good Neighbourhood and Friendly Cooperation Treaty. Unpublished text.

<sup>2</sup> Polen und Deutschland – Gemeinsam Europas Zukunft gestalten—address by F.W. Steinmeier at the academic year inauguration ceremony at Viadrina University ([www.auswaeritesamt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Presse/Reden](http://www.auswaeritesamt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Presse/Reden)).

who met their Polish counterparts, namely Jan Szyszko, Ludwik Dorn and Zbigniew Ziobro.

Cooperation also continued between parliaments of both states. On 28 and 29 August, Speaker of the Polish Sejm (Lower House) Marek Jurek visited Berlin. During the visit, important arrangements were made on the meetings of the Foreign Affairs Committees and European Union Committees, as well as Presidia of both parliaments. In December, Poland was visited by Chairman of the Bundesrat Harald Ringstorff, who met Speakers of the Sejm Marek Jurek, and Senate, Bogdan Borusewicz, Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński and Minister of Foreign Affairs Anna Fotyga. The talks focused on property claims filed with the European Court of Human Rights by the Prussian Trust, and the present status of mutual relations.

Not without its significance for inspiring good atmosphere for cooperation in Europe was the Weimar Triangle summit, held on 5 December 2006 in Mettlach, attended by the President of Poland Lech Kaczyński, President of France Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Against the sentiments of German media, which reported Polish scepticism about this form of cooperation, the meeting proved that Poland was ready to discuss the future of Europe with France and Germany.

An important component of Poland-Germany political dialogue was international policy. Good basis for the dialogue was provided by a clause of the coalition agreement between the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) of November 2005, on intensified relations with Poland, and in the transatlantic dimension, as well as on issues of peacekeeping in the world. Readiness of both countries to get involved in peacekeeping missions was corroborated by the presence of Polish and German troops (and other EU countries as well) in the EUFOR Congo mission and the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon. Other operations of similar nature, e.g. in Afghanistan, were a subject of intense dialogue at various levels. A qualitatively new form of cooperation is the Task Force formed by Poland, Germany, Lithuania, Slovakia and Latvia, established under the European Security and Defence Policy. At the meeting of Defence Ministers of Poland (Radosław Sikorski), Germany (Franz Josef Jung) and France (Michèle Alliot-Marie) in Wieliczka, held on 25 July 2006, arrangements were made on the establishment of the Weimar Task Force by 2013.

Not always, however, was there full agreement on international issues between Poland and Germany. In 2006, an intensive debate on the future of

European integration continued. The German government supported the quickest-possible resumption of work on the Constitutional Treaty, and retaining as many provisions of the existing project as possible, while Poland treated with reserve both the planned contents of the Treaty and the need to resume the work speedily. Opposite views of the countries were also observable on the issue of further enlargement of the European Union. Poland clearly advocated offering membership prospects to Ukraine, and Germany claimed that all existing forms of EU cooperation with the country should be utilised, rather than offer made with an unrealistic hope for membership.

Social relations were also thriving, based on the Treaty of 17 June 1991, which is also the basis for the Poland-Germany Youth Cooperation (PGYC). This organisation, celebrating 15 years of existence in 2006, can pride itself on massive contribution to rapprochement between Polish and German youth. Since its establishment, joint Poland-Germany meetings have been attended by over 1.5 million young people. Throughout its operation, PGYC has funded over 38 thousand youth exchange projects, and the number of its undertakings is still growing. In 2006, its 4,233 meetings were attended by 165,000 young people from both countries. In 2006, for the first time in the organisation's history, the contribution of the Polish government equalled the German contribution, totalling €4.6 million.

Germany was still the top foreign university study destination for young Poles, and in 2006 as many as a dozen or so thousand Polish students were enrolled at German universities.

In 2006, Poland-Germany Reconciliation Foundation finished the disbursement of benefits to the victims of forced and slave labour. In 1992–2005, using the funds transferred by Germany, the Foundation paid a total of PLN 4.6 billion to the victims of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Reich.<sup>3</sup>

Poland's accession to the EU was the reason for comments on 2006 as another year of growing trade exchange between the countries. Polish exports to Germany rose by 18% in comparison to 2005, and totalled €23.8 billion. Imports from Germany grew by 19.1%, and came to €24 billion. Germany remains a leading investor in Poland. Aggregate value of the capital invested by German companies in Poland as at the end of 2006 totalled €15 billion.<sup>4</sup> This solidified

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<sup>3</sup> Data on payments by Poland-Germany Reconciliation Foundation in 1992–2006 on [www.fjnp.pl](http://www.fjnp.pl).

<sup>4</sup> News bulletin of the Promotion and Trade Section of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Berlin, April 2007.



Germany's position as the second-largest foreign investor in Poland. Germany is also an important market for Polish service providers. It is estimated that the opening of the services market in EU countries, including Germany, resulted in several dozen thousand Polish service providers being established in Germany.

As a result of the extension by the German government of the transition period on labour force for three more years (from 1 May 2006 to 2009), and the simultaneous opening of their job markets by the United Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden, the number of persons interested in jobs in Germany dwindled in 2006. However, 226,000 seasonal workers from Poland<sup>5</sup> (drop by 20% in comparison with 2005) still represent the largest group among workers from the new Member States.

### Open Points

The atmosphere of bilateral relations was also substantially influenced by the debate on commemorating displacement of Germans following 1945. The project of the Centre against Expulsions, presented in 2000 by the President of The Federation of Expellees Erika Steinbach faced opposition from Poland from the very beginning, as it posed a threat of contorted version of history, and turning victims into perpetrators. However, Polish politicians and journalists did not question the tribulations of all those who survived the flight and displacement. The discussions in 2006 were also significantly affected by the provision of CDU/CSU-SPD coalition agreement of November 2005, stating that "the coalition recognised the need for a social, and historical, examination of the phenomenon of forced displacements, flight and expulsion;" "we want to establish a clear symbol in Berlin, which would commemorate the suffering related to expulsions, and condemn them, in the spirit of reconciliation, and in cooperation with the European Network "Memory and Solidarity," with the participation of Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Austria and Slovakia."<sup>6</sup>

This provision might have been construed as an official statement of Angela Merkel's government on the commemoration of expulsions, which meant that the idea was no longer a private initiative. The German government wanted this issue to be on the agenda of talks of the European Network "Memory and Solidarity." However, no specific arrangements were finally made. The existence of two initiatives: the government one—a clear symbol, and private (Centre

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<sup>5</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>6</sup> Koalitionsvertrag, [www.bundesregierung.de](http://www.bundesregierung.de), November 2005.

against Expulsions Foundation), was reflected by the organisation of two, independent exhibitions devoted to the problem of displacement. One of them was the exhibition “Flight, expulsion, integration,” opened at the German History House in Bonn in late 2005, and shown in Berlin in 2006, while the other, entitled “Forced paths. Flight and expulsion in the 20<sup>th</sup> century in Europe,” was prepared by Erika Steinbach and her Foundation against Expulsions, and exhibited from August 2006, also in Berlin. The first exhibition failed to provoke major controversies, while the latter met with severe criticism. The statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, of 11 August 2006, reads that “The tragedy of World War Two cannot be looked at from the perspective of expulsions. Poland, as a state that was the first victim of aggression by Nazi Germany, and that lost 6 million citizens in war, cannot accept a selective approach to history. Commemoration of the tragedy of war cannot take place without due respect for the truth, and without comprehending sensitivity of nations that sustained heavy losses in the course of the war and, similarly, such questions as genocide, Holocaust, concentration camps, may not be left out.”<sup>7</sup>

Unabated discussion on German expulsions, as well as a broader debate on the history of Germany and on German identity, encouraged Poland to present to German opinion-leading circles its point of view on the history of Poland-Germany relations, notably World War Two and its ramifications, in a more distinct manner. To that end, the Polish Academy of Sciences’ Station in Berlin was transformed into PAS Centre for Historical Research. The opening of the Centre, headed by Robert Traba, took place on 22 November 2006.

The overall atmosphere of relations with Germany was adversely affected by the actions of the Prussian Trust. Founded in 2001, the company announced on several occasions that it would file compensation claims against Poland, concerning the property left in the country after the war. It was not until 15 December 2006 that the Foundation actually did so, filing 22 individual petitions with the European Court of Human Rights. The petitioners demand that the Court should agree with the claim that Poland violated art. 1 of the First Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights, in connection with art. 14 of the Convention. Poland argues that all compensation claims for the property left in its territory are unfounded. Expert opinions drafted in 2005 by

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<sup>7</sup> See [www.msz.gov.pl](http://www.msz.gov.pl)

professors Jan Barcz and Jochen A. Frowein<sup>8</sup> share this view, arguing that claims from expellees, or their successors, under the Potsdam Agreement, are unfounded. Germany's Ministry of Foreign Affairs claims that petitions filed with the European Court of Human Rights stand no chance of success, and will be dismissed on *ratione temporis* grounds. Representatives of the German government offered assurances that they did not support the claims of the Trust and would reiterate the position in German and international courts. Key to the German government's position is the statement by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, made on 1 August 2004 in Warsaw, that "property issues related to World War Two are not the topic for both governments in relations between Poland and Germany. Neither the German government, nor any major political power in Germany, supports individual claims, even if they are nevertheless being made. The government of Germany will argue the same in international courts."<sup>9</sup>

Next to the debate on history and claims, another topic that stirred up major controversy was the construction of the Northern Pipeline, commenced in December 2005. The gas pipeline will deliver natural gas from the fields in northern Russia to Greifswald, Germany. Poland was irritated by that fact that such a massive Germany-Russia undertaking was not consulted with Poland—Germany's ally and partner in NATO and the EU, even though the project clearly infringes on our interests. As argued by the Polish government, the undertaking is disadvantageous for Poland in political, economic and environmental dimension. The pipeline running at the bottom of the Baltic Sea and bypassing the territory of Poland allows Russia to use gas supply as a tool of political pressure, as it enables it to limit or even cut off the supply, without affecting Western Europe. In Germany, on the other hand, there was a consensus of all political forces that the decision on the construction project was right. Chancellor Angela Merkel referred to the project as strategic for Germany and for Europe. Faced with criticism from Poland, Germany took actions to alleviate it. It was suggested that Poland should join the project, however the offer was not accepted.

Implementation of the provisions of Poland-Germany Treaty of 17 June 1991, which guaranteed rights for the Polish community in Germany, was an important item on the agenda of Poland-Germany political debate in 2006. The

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<sup>8</sup> J. Barcz, J. Frowein, "Ekspertyza w sprawie roszczeń z Niemiec przeciwko Polsce w związku z II wojną światową," *Sprawy Międzynarodowe*, 2005, no. 1.

<sup>9</sup> Rede von Bundeskanzler Schroeder zum 60. Jahrestag des Warschauer Aufstandes, ([www.bundeskanzler.de](http://www.bundeskanzler.de)).

problem was raised by Prime Minister K. Marcinkiewicz, who said: “its own representation in the parliament is definitely an achievement for the German minority in Poland, yet Poles in Germany do not enjoy the same position.”<sup>10</sup> Poland argues that there is a substantial asymmetry between benefits of the Republic of Poland offered to the German minority in Poland, and the support for Poles in Germany. The Polish government is interested in particular in more opportunities for learning Polish in German schools and at universities.

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2006 proved that relations between Poland and Germany gradually normalise, to become those of equal partners. Rapprochement is achieved through open debate on the existing problems. It appears that Poland and Germany can afford this dialogue without fears that it may destroy the accumulated legacy, since, owing to the achievements so far, the foundations for bilateral relations are solid enough, and are further reinforced by close international cooperation in NATO and the European Union.

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<sup>10</sup> Unpublished text.

## Relations between Poland and France

### Political Relations

Rapprochement continued in relations between Poland and France in 2006. Misunderstandings related to the assessment of the American intervention in Iraq were overcome. It appears that modifications in cooperation between Poland and France, initiated on the day of Poland's accession to the European Union, have consolidated. Poland and France established cooperation within the European Union, also on issues where their interests converged, as evidenced by fruitful cooperation during negotiations on the New Financial Perspective for 2007–2013 in December 2005 in Brussels. Owing to support from France, notably personal involvement of the then Minister of Internal Affairs Nicolas Sarkozy, Poland joined the G-5 group (currently G-6) of the largest EU states (France, Germany, Spain, Italy and the UK), where cooperation in justice and internal affairs is developed.

Vibrant political relations in 2006 contributed to solidified qualitative change in the dialogue between the states and pragmatic cooperation on European affairs. Bilateral relations at top level developed dynamically. In response to the invitation from the French President Jacques Chirac, extended by the ambassador of France in Warsaw thirty minutes after the announcement of preliminary election results, President Lech Kaczyński paid a visit to Paris on 24 February 2006. This was one of his first visits abroad. During the year, presidents of both states had two subsequent meetings: on 19 September, at the 61<sup>st</sup> session of the UN General Assembly in New York, and on 5 December, at the Weimar Triangle meeting in Mettlach. On 7 and 8 July, former President of the Republic of France Valéry Giscard d'Estaing visited Poland. His meetings focused on the future of Europe.

Cooperation at the governmental level also developed. On 3 April, Polish Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz made a visit to Paris, holding talks with French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin and President Jacques Chirac. He also delivered a lecture for French businesspeople. Robust economic

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\* Barbara Sośnicka—Deputy Director at the MFA Department of Europe.

relations were emphasised, notably high level of French investment and trade balance. Prime Minister D. de Villepin confirmed the intent of “controlled and progressive” opening of the French labour market for citizens of 8 new EU Member States. Poland declared itself in favour of deeper cooperation with France under the European Security and Defence Policy.

Ministers of Foreign Affairs of both countries held frequent meetings in 2006, which testified to the policy of enhancing mutual relations since Poland’s accession to the EU, and strategic partnership in the Union. The meetings started with Minister Stefan Meller’s visit to Paris on 6 and 7 December 2005, followed by a journey to Poland of French Minister Delegate for European Affairs Catherine Colonna between 12 and 14 January, Minister Anna Fotyga’s visit to Paris on 14 June and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of France Philippe Douste-Blazy’s visit to Warsaw on 24 June. On 3 November, French Minister of Foreign Affairs Philippe Douste-Blazy, accompanied by Minister Delegate for European Affairs Catherine Colonna visited Poland again. The agenda of the meetings focused on the status and development prospects for bilateral cooperation, political relations and economic cooperation. The subject of cooperation in the European Union was also tackled, along with current international issues.

Consultations between high officials of the Polish and French Ministries of Foreign Affairs on key issues in both European (the future of Europe, European Neighbourhood Policy, the Constitutional Treaty, cooperation within the Weimar Triangle) and international (UN, Middle East issues) policies were also regularly held. The talks held between Ministers of Foreign Affairs clearly showed France’s willingness to co-operate with Poland in many areas. France listened attentively to our position on the Eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy. France was the first to respond “with understanding” to the Polish veto on the mandate for the EU’s negotiations with Russia. Clearly, this indicates that Poland is perceived as a reliable and effective partner, with whom the Eastern policy can and should be built.

In 2006, good cooperation between the Ministries of Defence continued, both bilaterally (visit to Paris of Minister of National Defence Radosław Sikorski), and trilaterally, with Germany (meeting of Ministers R. Sikorski, M. Alliot-Marie and F.J. Jung on 25 July in Wieliczka). The ministers expressed their support for the development of cooperation under the Weimar Triangle, signed a letter of intent and issued a joint communication.

Political cooperation was supported by the parliamentary dialogue. On 30 and 31 March, Deputy Speaker of the Senate Marek Ziółkowski visited Paris, while Speaker of the Senate Bogdan Borusewicz met in Prague the Chairman of the Senate of the Republic of France Christian Poncelet on 28 and 29 September in Prague. Bilateral parliamentary cooperation was discussed at the meetings, along with the status of political relations and the international situation. On 4–6 December, the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Sejm (Lower House of Parliament) of the Republic of Poland Paweł Zalewski took part in the conference “Poland in the European Union,” organised in Paris by the French Institute of International Affairs.

2006 also saw symbolic gestures that form an inherent part of our joint tradition and history. After several years of efforts, Cyprian Kamil Norwid garden was opened on 4 March in District XIII of Paris. The ceremony was attended by Minister of Culture Kazimierz Ujazdowski, who also unveiled a plate in the garden, in the shape of a book with a quotation from Norwid, authored by Aleksander Śliwa. On 3 May, the Secretary of the Council for the Remembrance and Martyrdom Andrzej Przewoźnik unveiled a monument “To Poles who died for France” at the Paris cemetery of Père-Lachaise.

Poland supported the French initiative addressed to the EU Council, contained in the Memorandum on implementation and future of the reformed Common Agricultural Policy. On 23 October, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture Andrzej Lepper visit Paris to meet Minister of Agriculture Dominique Bussereau, who expressed his satisfaction that the partners shared their views on many aspects of the Common Agricultural Policy. The talks were held in a friendly atmosphere, conducive to continued bilateral cooperation.

### **Economic Cooperation**

Bilateral economic cooperation developed in the aura of improving political relations. French Minister Delegate for Foreign Trade Christine Lagarde made a visit to Poland on 1 and 2 June, where she attended the exhibition *Futuralia* in Wrocław and met Minister of Foreign Affairs Anna Fotyga and Minister of the Economy Piotr Woźniak.

**Trade Balance.** France ranks third among Poland’s trade partners (behind Germany and Italy) in terms of volume of exports, and fifth (behind Germany, Russia, Italy and China) in terms of imports. Poland is France’s 14<sup>th</sup> largest trade partner, and the most important partner among 10 newly admitted EU states. In 2006, the value of Polish exports to France totalled €5,052.8 million, while

imports came to €4,981.8 million. In 2005 and 2006, trade exchange between Poland and France rose faster than trade exchange figures with other developed states. A marked increase in Polish exports to imports ratio resulted in the first trade Poland-France balance surplus for Poland in many years. The trade in agricultural and food products was particularly dynamic. France's share in the Polish trade balance in 2006 was at 5.9% (exports accounted for 6.3% and imports for 5.5%). Based on 2006 data, trade exchange, as compared to the corresponding period of 2005, showed a rising trend. Polish exports to France rose by 23.7%, to reach €5.5 billion, while imports from France also went up by over 11%, and reached €4.98 billion.

**Trade balance structure.** The following merchandise groups are prevalent in the total Polish exports to France: machinery and equipment, electrical devices, vehicles, aircraft, boats and ships as well as metals and metal processing products. Highly processed industrial goods account for nearly 47% of our exports to France, and the figure is still growing. Foreign investors, including French businesses, play an important role in our sales abroad. Among them there are Thomson Multimedia, Kombinat Górniczo-Hutniczy Miedzi (Copper Mining Complex), Faurecia, Philips Consumer Electronics, Jabil, Stomil Olsztyn (Michelin), Węglkokoks and others. The structure of imports from France is as follows: chemical industry products and plastics, machinery and equipment, electrical devices and vehicles, aircraft, boats and ships. The above goods jointly account for approx. 63% of Polish imports from France. Foreign companies, also with French stakeholders, play an active role in our purchases in France. Among them there are companies such as Peugeot Polska, Renault Polska, Citroën Polska, Volkswagen Motor Polska, Thomson Multimedia, Toyota Motor Poland, Renault Trucks, Servier, Faurecia and GlaxoSmithKline.

Investment and capital cooperation. According to the National Bank of Poland data for 2005, the value of French capital invested in Poland totalled €9.574 billion, which represented 12.7% of the aggregate value of direct foreign investment in Poland. This puts France in the third place (behind the Netherlands and Germany) in the ranking of major foreign investors in Poland. Among the biggest French investors there are such companies as: France Télécom, Vivendi, Carrefour, Casino, Crédit Agricole, Auchan, Saint-Gobain, Electricité de France, Thomson Multimedia, Lafarge. Small and medium companies are in majority among French businesses in Poland. The list of the Economic Mission with the Embassy of the Republic of France to Poland includes 700 names of French companies. However, the actual total number is markedly higher. French businesses invest primarily in such sectors of the



economy as telecommunications, industrial production and technology, trade and services, finance and insurance, construction and hotel industry, food and agricultural processing.

**Free flow of labour.** Poland-France working group on free flow of labour was established in 2004 in Paris. The purpose was to investigate opportunities for the opening of the French labour market for Polish workers. Two meetings of the group were held: on 27 and 28 January 2005 in Paris, and on 21 and 22 February 2005, in Warsaw. Agreement was reached on, *inter alia*, partial opening, starting from 1 May 2005, of the French labour market for Polish workers, to apply for professions and regions specified by France. The deadline was put on hold by President J. Chirac, who, at the Poland-France summit in Arras on 28 February 2005 indicated that more flexibility of the French labour market for Polish workers could be expected following the French referendum on the Constitutional Treaty (29 May 2005). On 13 March 2006, the meeting of the Interministerial Committee on the opening from 1 May of the French labour market for the citizens of eight new EU Member States (except Malta and Cyprus) was held, chaired by Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin. It was announced that France intended to open its market gradually. Following consultations with the President, the Parliament, trade unions and associations of employers, the government decided on the opening of the French labour market all over the country in the following seven sectors: construction and community works, catering, hotel industry and nutrition, agriculture; mechanical engineering and metal processing; processing industry, trade and sales and cleaning services, covering 61 professions in total. At the same time, France expects that the eight new Member States will provide administration support regarding illegal employment and using labour law loopholes.

### Cultural Cooperation

The number of large, significant projects presenting Polish culture in France dropped in comparison with the previous year. 2006 will be associated with Krzysztof Penderecki, who was a guest at the “Présences” festival, organised by Radio France, and with Krzysztof Kieślowski, whose retrospective film festival continued from March to May. The most important projects of the Polish Institute in Paris were the celebration of the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Jerzy Giedroyc’s birthday, the conference “March 68” and the four-day event “1956—European date.” The area where cultural relations between Poland and France developed most vibrantly was fine arts. Many Polish artists receive invitations to attend collective exhibitions. In 2006, for the first time in many years, Polish artist Paweł Althamer carried out

his individual project at Centre Pompidou. Worth noting are also the exhibition of Tamara Łempicka at the Museum of the 1930s near Paris and posters exhibition by Henryk Tomaszewski at the Museum of Book and Poster in Chaumont.

### **Cooperation in Science and Technology**

Poland is perceived by France as an important partner for science and technology cooperation. On 8 March, Minister of Education and Science Michał Seweryński paid a visit to Paris. In 2006, negotiations on the agreement between the Minister of Education and Higher Learning of the Republic of Poland and the Minister of National Education, Higher Learning and Scientific Research of the Republic of France on mutual recognition of documents that allow enrolment eligibility for prospective university students as well as on recognition of university studies, diplomas, titles and degrees as well as the Agreement on cooperation in science and technology between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the Republic of France were closed. In September, agreement between the Polish Academy of Sciences and the National Centre for Scientific Research (Centre national de la Recherche scientifique) was renewed. An agreement between the National Institute for Nuclear Physics and Molecular Physics (Institut National de la Physique Nucléaire et la Physique des Particules) and the Institute of Nuclear Physics of the Polish Academy of Sciences, representing a syndicate of Polish scientific institutions, on cooperation in nuclear physics and fundamental particles physics, was signed.

### **Regional Cooperation**

Regional cooperation represents an important part of relations between Poland and France. This is conducive to rapprochement, developing community initiatives, and the promotion of local interest at the EU level. The cooperation is particularly active in the economic and social dimensions, as well as in youth exchange and culture. In 2006, 5 new agreements on cooperation were signed (Aleksandrów Łódzki and Puget-Ville, Osiaków and Trévol, Krościenko and La Valette du Var, Brzeg and Bourg-en-Bresse and Krynica Zdrój and Le Touquet).

### **Francophone Aspects**

Poland has an observer status at the International Francophone Organisation, whose 11<sup>th</sup> summit was held on 28 and 29 September 2006, in Bucharest. The motto for the summit was information technologies for education. The majority

of presentations covered such topics as education, scientific research and upbringing. Acknowledging the importance of raising qualifications to a higher level of professionalism, a decision was taken to establish in Bucharest a model educational institution for higher learning—the Francophone University. At the summit, Abdou Diouf, the then Secretary General of the International Francophone Organisation, was appointed for another term in the capacity.

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2006 showed that Poland remains an important European partner for France. Good foundations of historical relations and the sense of proximity rooted in the consciousness of both societies should be used by governmental policies to support the establishment of the community of interests between Poland and France. Lifting the relations between Poland and France to a higher level, by regular meetings of the presidents and intergovernmental seminars, will evidence mutual recognition of the importance of this cooperation.

## **Relations between Poland and Italy**

As a result of Poland's accession to the European Union and NATO, relations between Poland and Italy have become more deeply grounded in the international, and primarily European context. Paradoxically, however, Poland's membership of the EU did not provide a vital stimulus for Italy in 2004–2006 to expand and enhance cooperation with our country. There was a growing interest in economic cooperation, a tangible result of which was the development of trade exchange, as well as cooperation in the area of culture and tourism. This can only partially be explained by an intense election campaign preceding the parliamentary elections of spring 2006 in Italy. Poland and Italy, despite sharing the status of EU and NATO members, did not take any significant steps in 2006 to bring the two states closer together, and essentially remained secondary political partners for each other.

### **Political Relations**

Political relations in 2006 were not extensively vibrant, even though, as declared verbally by representatives of both governments, they remained very good. Their nature was, however, largely formal. The main reasons behind this state of affairs were with Italy which is only marginally interested in Central and North Europe, focusing on the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Balkans, as well as on large European states, and states with which they want to develop economic cooperation (Russia, the US, China, Japan, India). Therefore, common platforms were missing, which was also a result of the divergent political configuration of the ruling coalitions in both states (centre-right in Poland since 2005, and centre-left in Italy since spring 2006) and different priorities in international policy-making. This was not conducive to enhancing relations, although it would still be difficult to pinpoint any clear contrasts between the states. There were, however, discrepancies in perceptions on a number of European and international issues.

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\* Krzysztof Strzałka—Counsellor at the MFA Department of Europe.

The new, centre-left Italian government, formed by Romano Prodi in May 2006, put the emphasis on a more active European policy, primarily seeking reactivated discussions on the EU Constitutional Treaty, effective multilateralism and more cautious Atlantic policy. Although no fundamental cooling of relations between Italy and the US took place following the withdrawal of Italian troops from Iraq (in line with Prodi's pre-election promises), the relations became less intense than at the time of Silvio Berlusconi's government. Also, the policy on the Middle East, following an episode of pro-Israeli policy of the centre-right, returned to its traditional, pro-Palestinian and pro-Arab attitudes. Conversely, the extremely pro-Russian tactics of the Italian government, perceiving the whole of Eastern Europe through the spectacles of Moscow's interests, did not undergo any transformation, although some circumstances did actually change.

The above strategic objectives of European and international policy of the Italian government were and still are clearly divergent from the priorities of the centre-right Polish government. The governments don't share views on the policy of Israel, or the policy of Russia towards Central and Eastern Europe. It was not possible to overcome these differences in 2006, although they affected bilateral relations only to a marginal degree.

Direct relations between Polish and Italian politicians were limited in 2006 to the meeting between President of the Republic of Poland Lech Kaczyński and President Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, approaching the end of his term in the office, held on 26 January 2006, in connection with the visit to the Vatican City, and the meeting in Rome of Poland's Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński with Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi on 12 October 2006. Before the meeting, both Prime Ministers had the opportunity to meet at the ASEM summit in Helsinki (10 September 2006).

The agenda of the meeting held between heads of both governments in Rome primarily featured items concerning bilateral cooperation, notably economic and trade, as well as current European and international developments. Prime Minister Kaczyński emphasised Prodi's positive attitude towards Poland, thanking him for his commitment as the head of the European Commission as regards the enlargement of the European Union with the states of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as for allowing free access to the country's labour market for employees from the new EU member states. The topic that dominated the talks was, however, the European agenda, notably energy policy tackled by the European Union, which is a prioritised area for Poland. As both countries found it necessary to establish a common strategy towards countries which are suppliers of energy resources, their efforts in this respect were convergent,

although certain differences were revealed in terms of actual implementation of this proposal. The heads of governments shared the view that the process of EU enlargement, to cover subsequently the states of the Western Balkans, notably Croatia and Macedonia, and, in the longer run, also the remaining states of the region that meet the membership criteria, should be the strategic objective, and requires commensurable commitment of the Community institutions. They did not, however, agree fully on the issue of Ukraine. Although the new Italian government is not, by and large, opposing European prospects for Ukraine, they see their involvement in Ukrainian affairs only within the European Neighbourhood Policy. In connection with the discussion on the future of the EU Constitutional Treaty, Kaczyński and Prodi also tackled, in general terms, the issue of reform of the Community institutions, although they did not come up with any remarkable solutions, owing to their divergent opinions in this respect.

A very positive factor in the Rome meeting was the declaration of closer cooperation of both countries in international organisations. Both countries undertook to support each other in the vote for a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (Italy in 2007–2008, Poland in 2010–2011), which represented a symbolic overcoming of their divergent positions on UN Security Council reform.<sup>1</sup> Since the idea of a speedy reform of the Security Council fell through in 2006, those differences lost their importance. Both countries also showed similar views on fundamental global issues and climate change, including the implementation of the United Nations Millennium Objectives and continued the dialogue on the liberalisation of global trade (within the WTO).

The meeting of the Prime Minister proved that economic issues dominate bilateral cooperation between the countries. Prodi asked for support for Italian investment projects in Poland, notably as regards the establishment of the light industry district in the Łódź region, as well as the development of cooperation in the aviation and arms industries. In turn, the head of the Polish government emphasised the growing dynamics of Polish exports to Italy and the necessity to increase the volume of Italian direct investment in Poland.

No discussions were held, however, on the topic of initiating Poland–Italy intergovernmental summits, headed by the Prime Ministers, which was actually announced in mid-2005 during a conversation between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Poland and Italy, Adam D. Rotfeld and Gianfranco Fini. No reference

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<sup>1</sup> In 2005, Poland supported the resolution sponsored by the G-4 Group (Germany, Japan, India and Brazil), and against the position of Italy and the group it established, called *Uniting for Consensus*.

to this issue should be assessed negatively, as such summits could in future become a very useful mechanism for agreeing common positions of the states, verification of bilateral obligations and levelling out differences. The lack of prospects for the establishment of the governmental meeting mechanism marginalizes the relations between Poland and Italy, and contributes to even greater differences in their respective opinions and policies. A visible lack of will to enhance intergovernmental dialogue appears to be an effect of insignificant interest of both governments in intensifying mutual relations facing divergence on European and international policies.

The divergence was manifested by three fundamental issues tackled in the international forum: relations with the US, participation in NATO peacekeeping operations, and attitudes towards Russia. On the first and second issues, the position of the Italian government underwent negative evolution, from the declaration of close cooperation with the United States and delivering on commitments related to NATO missions, to open criticism of American actions in the Middle East, their actions on Iraq and Iran, questioning of the operational strategy of the international Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, and preference for participation in peacekeeping missions outside the Alliance. The evolution was considerably affected by radical and anti-American leftist groups forming the government coalition in Italy. The Polish government, on the other hand, sought further rapprochement with the United States, deciding to keep a reduced military force in Iraq, and responding in the affirmative, unlike the Italian government, to the call from the NATO Secretary General to increase involvement in Afghanistan. The 2006 submission of the project of deploying elements of American missile defence in Poland brought even broader divides in perceptions on European security issues between both countries. This was also affected by continued pro-Russian position of the Italian government not only on security, but also energy cooperation.

A positive example of Poland-Italy relations in 2006 was the fruitful cooperation of law enforcement agencies and the judiciary on the issue of slave work of Polish citizens in the south of Italy (in the so-called labour camps), in the Apulia region. The case resonated significantly in Italy. Thanks to the efforts of Italian police, prosecutors and local authorities, the criminal group was successfully broken up, key offenders were arrested, and the process of investigating several cases of Polish citizens gone missing in Italy began.

## European Issues

Relations between Poland in Italy in 2006 were dominated by the European agenda, although divergent attitudes of both governments towards a number of European issues adversely affected the dynamics of cooperation. However, ongoing disagreements were cleared up by an extremely positive, (from the Polish perspective) decision by the Italian government of 21 July 2006 to open the country's labour market for employees from new EU member states, including Poland, although the pre-election period in Italy was not conducive to such decisions. Therefore, it came as a surprise, in particular because the Italian centre-left was clearly indicating during the election campaign that they were not intending to offer a concession of this sort to the new Community members, and the previous government headed by Berlusconi decided to keep the transition period. Except for this advantageous step, earlier trends exhibited by the Italian government, namely to marginalize the role of smaller and medium EU states, solidified. Simultaneously, the implementation of the European agenda in 2006 revealed a further widening of differences in the positions of both countries on the fundamental EU issues. These were primarily:

– perception of the EU common energy policy: while Kaczyński's government, relying on the principle of solidarity, sought the adoption of the common energy security strategy (including that towards state-suppliers and transporters of energy resources), Prodi's government, offering its verbal support for such projects, carried out its own policy on Russia in terms of resource supply, e.g. by supporting ever closer links between Italian energy groups (ENI and ENEL) and Gazprom (the result of which was a long-term agreement on cooperation between ENI and Gazprom of autumn 2006, entitling the Russian company to be a direct distributor of gas in Italy, and giving access for the Italian consortium to Russian deposits). Equally unclear is the Italian government's position on the Nord Stream gas pipeline, and the oil and gas transport routes from Russia;

– the vision of the future EU Constitutional Treaty: Italy, which ratified the Treaty, sought the completion of the ratification process and the adoption of key provisions of the document in an unchanged wording before the elections to the European Parliament in 2009. It also agreed only to a minor modification of the original text (as a simplified Treaty). Although Poland relaxed its position, it still proposed drafting a new version of the Treaty (the small treaty), that would not conflict the concept of "the Europe of homelands" and regulate only legal and



institutional issues. The position of the Polish government met with criticism from Italy's representatives and mass media on numerous occasions;

- priorities on future EU enlargement: the strategic objective for Italy was integration of Western Balkans states and Turkey, while they remained sceptical about the possibility of accepting any concrete obligations towards Ukraine and Moldova, also owing to Russia's negative position on the issue. In turn, the priority for Poland is the determination by the EU of membership prospects for Ukraine. The country also advocates open debate on the future of the enlargement and remains cautious about Turkey's chances;

- evaluation of the nature of the European Neighbourhood Policy: while Poland demands that similar support for both key directions of ENP (eastern and southern) be given, in order to uphold reforms and European aspirations in such countries as Ukraine (together with significant financial and expert assistance), Italy, owing to its geographical location and the related political and economic interests, focuses much more on the development of the Mediterranean dimension, and is also concerned about shifting the EU centre of gravity to the east;

- the attitude of both countries to EU policy on Russia: Italy perceives Central and Eastern Europe through Russian interests there, often reiterating Russian arguments, notably as regards Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia. Italy expressed its dissatisfaction with the vetoing by Poland of the negotiation mandate concerning the new EU-Russia agreement, and emphasised that the embargo problem could be solved in the course of negotiating this agreement. The Italian government was reluctant to show Community solidarity towards Poland on this issue, and accepted its right of veto only with difficulty. Poland proposed a more realistic attitude of the EU towards Russia, indicating the necessity to preserve solidarity among all EU member states;

- promotion by the Italian government of solutions leading to diluting the originally ambitious version of the service directive, both in terms of levels and scope of service market liberalisation in Europe, which, from the standpoint of Polish interests, is extremely disadvantageous.

An important element of Poland-Italy relations within the EU were concepts of further development and operation of the Community, as well as the future role of both states. All the proposals put forward by Italy related to state founders of the Union and enhanced cooperation on Euro, the Lisbon strategy, or close cooperation with Germany, while no proposal emerged concerning cooperation among EU states that would incorporate Poland (such as Nicolas

Sarkozy's proposal). This failure to appreciate the position and role of Poland in the Community matched Italy's preference, referred to above, for closer relations with the largest EU countries only.

### **Economic Cooperation**

Following Poland's accession to the EU, economic and trade exchange between the countries gained impetus. In 2006, Italy was Poland's third-largest economic partner in the European Union, and the third largest in overall foreign trade exchange. Italy's share in Polish exports came to 6.4%, and in imports to 6.7%. In absolute terms, the volume of mutual trade exchange exceeded €12.3 billion (€5.6 billion of Polish exports to Italy, €6.7 billion of imports). Trade exchange rose by over 20% in comparison to 2005. Positive trends for Poland continued to be present. These were high-export dynamics (growth by 28%), which was accompanied by a less significant growth of imports (by 17%). This contributed to the systematic reduction in Poland's trade deficit with Italy (from €1.35 billion in 2005 to €1.13 billion in 2006). The trade exchange growth and shrinkage mutual trade balance deficit was one positive consequence (for Poland) of the economic situation in Italy, far from perfect as a result of the decreasing competitiveness of its industry.

Poland came 11<sup>th</sup> in the ranking of 2006 exporters to Italy (share of 2.1%), and 14<sup>th</sup> (1.6%) in the importers ranking. The structure of the trade exchange with Italy showed little variety, in particular in terms of Polish exports, although the situation in this respect slightly improved in comparison to previous periods. Polish exports to Italy in 2006 were again dominated by passenger cars/vehicles, combustible engines, car parts and accessories, machinery and equipment, non-noble metals and their products, transmission devices for TV and radio, live animals and animal products, wire and cables, including electric cabling, tyres, meat, and coal, as well as textile materials and products. The largest merchandise groups imported from Italy were machinery and equipment, non-noble metals and their products, vehicles and their spare parts, textile materials and products, chemical industry products, drugs and white goods.

Following 1 May 2004, new market niches emerged, notably in sectors previously blocked by administrative barriers, e.g. in agriculture (growth in exports of agricultural and food products to Italy). Out of the top ten goods exported from Poland to Italy, three belong to the agricultural and food sector. What deserves a mention here is the fact that Italy is a net importer of over 40%

of raw materials and semi-finished goods for the food industry, while remaining the largest importer of live animals from Poland.

### **Investment Cooperation**

According to the data of the National Bank of Poland, the volume of direct capital investment in Poland as on 31 December 2005, totalled €2,761.4 million. This figure gives a remote, 8<sup>th</sup> place for Italy in the ranking of foreign investors in Poland. Italian data (Istituto nazionale per il Commercio Estero—ICE) indicate, however, that the overall value of Italian investment in Poland totalled €4.5 billion. 67 Italian businesses are currently operating in Poland, each of which invested over €1 million. The top ten are: Fiat (automotive and car accessories—approx. €1.7 billion), UniCredito (banking—€1.1 billion), Gruppo Lucchini (steel processing), Industrie Cartarie Tronchetti (paper industry), Ferrero Holding (food industry), Fortrade Financing SPA (finance and real estate), Indesit-Merloni Elettrodomestici (white goods), Brembo (braking parts), and E.B.S. Montedison, Coimpredil SPA, Simest SPA (shares in Italian companies). The Fiat group is clearly ahead of the others (employer of approximately 9,000 staff), followed by UniCredito. These two account for 80% of the entire investment volume.

Owing to the late-2005 merger between UniCredito and Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank AG—HVB (owner of Bank Przemysłowo-Handlowy, BPH), Pekao S.A. (second largest bank in Poland) and BPH will also merge. This will lead to the emergence of the largest banking group controlled by Italian shareholders, owning over 1,200 branches across the country, with a share in the finance and banking market of 20%. The decision on the merger between UniCredito and HVB, and the merger of two Polish banks met with countermeasures by the Polish government in early 2006. Before that date, Poland was openly disappointed with unfulfilled hopes for playing a major role in attracting Italian investment by UniCredito (as a result of acquiring a majority stake in Pekao S.A. in 1999, no expected commitment of the bank in building a bridge for potential investors interested in Poland followed. The Ministry of the Treasury considered UniCredito's actions incompliant with the Pekao S.A. privatisation agreement, referring to the provision on lack of competition, and the requirement to give its consent to the acquisition of shares in HVB. Fears lingered concerning their domination on the banking market in Poland as regards some services, and job cuts at BPH. The European Commission, however, questioned the legitimacy of Polish claims, and the Banking Supervision Commission ultimately failed to raise reservations concerning the merger of Pekao S.A. and BPH. Under the

circumstances, a compromise was reached in early April 2006 between UniCredito's President Alessandro Profumo and the Minister of Treasury Wojciech Jasiński. The agreement provided for the sales by the Italian bank of 200 BPH branches (out of the total 466), in favour of a third, independent party, and employment guarantees (by 31 March 2008) in exchange for the Polish government's consent to the merger of the two banks.

In 2005–2006, subsequent Italian investment projects were implemented in Poland. Among the major ones were a foundry, opened in early 2005 in Dąbrowa Górnicza by Brembo (manufacturer of brake disks), valued at €50 million, which was the company's second investment project in Poland, and the refrigerator manufacturing plant by Merloni, set up in Łódź (valued at €40 million). In 2006, Pirelli Re launched its operations in Poland, forming a joint venture company with Pekao S.A. named Pirelli Pekao RE, with the tyre manufacturer holding 75% of shares. Pirelli Pekao Re develops residential housing construction projects. Further, Indesit Company Polska, a leading Italian investor in Poland in the sector of white goods (share of 22%), announced an investment project of approx. €80 million, consisting in the construction of the third consecutive plant in the Łódź district (Radomsko locality).

In mid-2006, Autostrade per Italia SPA, the largest European consortium dealing with motorway construction and management (equity value of over €50 billion) decided on a major investment in Poland. Following the signature of the agreement with Stalexport S.A., concerning the acquisition of 21.7% of its shares, and following a subsequent recapitalisation and acquisition of the majority stake (50% plus 1), it intends for Poland to be its main investment ground in Europe. According to the investment plans presented towards the end of 2007, Autostrade SPA, along with Stalexport which S.A. it controls, wants to participate, employing its proprietary operational and technology know-how, in the construction and management of toll motorways in Poland and other states of Central and Eastern Europe.

Numerous other Italian businesses were in the process of arriving at final investment decisions, notably concerning their strengthening and increased business presence, or launching operations in Poland. These were such companies as: Ponzi S.A., Fimi S.A., Athera S.A., Gruppo Cremonini S.A. (Inalca S.A.), Gruppo Marcegaglia S.A., MEI srl, Regal srl, and companies under Gruppo Finmeccanica S.A.

Owing to Poland's membership of the EU, small and medium Italian enterprises were also looking at investment opportunities in Poland. Approximately 800

business entities partially, or entirely, Italian capital-owned, operated in Poland at the end of 2006. They show significant interest in utilising Community funding granted to Poland for environmental protection and waste management, the development of the road and rail networks, as well as the internationalisation of enterprises. Many Italian businesses report their readiness to participate in using those funds, combined with employing their own investment funding in Poland. This applies to such sectors as tourism and hotel services, agricultural and food processing, advanced technologies and energy. Additional opportunities emerged in 2006 concerning extended cooperation in the arms industry, despite certain problems with the execution of offset contracts by OTO Melara. Cooperation on helicopter production (the AgustaWestland consortium) and the interest of the Italian arms holding Finmeccanica in sales to Poland of military aircraft and navigation, radar and electronics systems, open up an opportunity for Polish production plants, as well as research institutions, to become suppliers under offset contracts.

An increasingly keen interest of Italian businesses in investments in Poland in 2006 was also a product of positive response to Poland's high rate of economic growth and market development. Italian investors accentuated such factors as: proximity to direct receivers of products or services; strategic location of Poland, allowing exports to German markets, while at the same time controlling the markets of Eastern Europe, low production costs (Polish rates represent 20% of Italian rates), and favourable taxation schemes (half the rates prevalent in Italy), qualified labour, an efficient banking system and much less bureaucracy than in Italy. Among deficiencies quoted by Italian enterprises were serious shortcomings in terms of infrastructure.

The image of investment cooperation between Poland and Italy would not be complete without referring, if only briefly, to the business activity of Poles in the Apennine Peninsula. Following the repeal by the Italian government of transition periods for the free movement of labour, new opportunities emerged in this respect, even though the previous bureaucratic barriers were not entirely brought down. By mid-2006, Polish citizens registered over 2,500 business entities in Italy (the majority of them being established in Rome and key industrial centres in the north of Italy, the smallest number in the south), with the overall figure of Polish citizens employed there totalling approximately 70,000. The dominant business activity form was self-employment, while partnerships and companies were in the minority. The majority of the latter had insignificant capital resources, and employed several employees only, dealing mainly with crafts, trade and services. In 2006, no significant Polish investment in Italy was

recorded. Generally speaking, the Italian market is rather difficult to operate in, but relatively attractive for Polish enterprises. The companies that fared best were those that cooperated with local partners, notably in the area of agricultural and food processing, clothing manufacturing and subcontracting. The Italian market was also opened for Polish service companies, in particular in the area of construction and transport.

### **Cooperation in Culture, Science and Education**

Cultural cooperation developed very dynamically, contributing to better mutual understanding between the societies of both countries. In mid-2005, an intergovernmental agreement was signed on the cooperation in the area of culture and education, which superseded the previous agreement of 1969. Thus far, however, the Italian parliament has not ratified it (Poland did so 2006).

A fundamental role in the cultural cooperation was played by the Polish Institute in Rome. It was the organiser of one-off cultural events, as well as the initiator of long-term projects, intended to present the accomplishments of Polish artists and major trends in contemporary Polish culture. One of the most important events in 2006 was the participation in the inauguration of the European Library of Ryszard Kapuściński, a well-known and highly regarded writer in Italy, who presented a collection of his photos from different parts of the world.

Yet another event that became a permanent fixture in the activities of the Polish Institute in Rome was the 4<sup>th</sup> Corso Polonia Festival, organised at the turn of November. This interdisciplinary event presents the most interesting phenomena in Polish culture in the so-called dialogue between generations, confronting tradition with the contemporary. In 2006, the prestige of the festival was enhanced by the presence of numerous well-known writers, such as Ryszard Kapuściński and Olga Tokarczuk, a painter and poster designer Stasys Eidrigėvičius, as well as actors: Zbigniew Zamachowski, Jerzy Radziwiłłowicz and Piotr Adamczyk. The Silesian Quartet were also among the performers. In addition, a portrait of Czesław Miłosz was unveiled at the famous literary cafeteria Café Greco, and some of his poems, discovered after his death, were presented. For the first time literature and culture for children was presented, attracting considerable attention from Italian receivers, and the Corso Polonia events were extended to cover other Italian cities, such as Milan, Naples, Bolzano and Catania. Polish Days were also held—cultural initiatives prepared

jointly with organisations, associations and authorities of selected Italian cities (for the first time in Bolzano in 2006).

Poland was also an honorary guest at the International Sea Biennale in Naples; Polish artists attended the festival Roma Europe (including visual artist Anna Baumgart). Also, the conceptual urban project by Jarosław Kozakiewicz was exhibited from September to November 2006 at the Venice Biennale (as part of its architecture section), while a sculpture and installation artist Katarzyna Kozyra made her appearance at Festival Gender Bender in Bologna. Several open exhibitions of contemporary art in Italy featured works by Polish artists such as Niki for at the Rome Ethnography Museum.

A number of events devoted to renowned Polish writers also took place in 2006, often attended by famous Italian writers. Next to works of the highly regarded Kapuściński, Czesław Miłosz and Rev. Jan Twardowski, the works of younger writers, such as Olga Tokarczuk, Dariusz Gajewski, Maciej Pieprzyca, were also presented. Some cultural events were attended by Polish artists residing in Italy, such as the famous sculptor Igor Mitoraj and film director Michał Żnaniński.

2006 was another post-accession year in which a positive change in perceptions of Poland in Italy could be seen. Polish initiatives met with positive responses and interest, and numerous Italian institutions organised cultural events, where the most important Polish artists of all fields of arts were presented. The group of promoters of Polish culture in Italy grew, including notably the theatre arts circles, for years fascinated by the works of Tadeusz Kantor and Jerzy Grotowski, and film arts—interested in Polish film, notably the works of Krzysztof Kieślowski. Recently, there has also been a more vibrant activity by Italian publishing houses, publishing Polish literature classics (from the masterpieces of Polish Romanticists, such as Adam Mickiewicz and Zygmunt Krasiński, to works of Stanisław Lem, poems by Miłosz and Zbigniew Herbert, and prose by Kornel Makuszyński). A special place on the cultural scene was occupied by exhibitions and conferences devoted to the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Poznań June and Polish October events of 1956.

In 2006, a decidedly less positive was the condition of Polish studies at Italian universities. Two (Florence and Padua) out of nine Polish language centres (Milan, Turin, Rome, Padua, Florence, Genoa, Udine, Naples and Bologna) in Italy lacked minimum staffing levels (at least one professor and visiting lecturer) and financial support from Poland to maintain the operations of the department of Polish literature and language. Authorities of Italian

universities are not always keen on keeping Polish language academic positions, sometimes re-allocating the funding to support Russian language departments. An additional problem, that grew acute in 2006, was the systematically rising number of Polish language students of Polish descent, or with Polish citizenship. This requires Italian universities to employ additional professorial staff and lecturers, as well as modifications of the curricula.

### **Regional Cooperation**

2006 marked the extension of cooperation between local governments of Poland and Italy. The cooperation continues between Warmińsko-Mazurskie province and Val d'Aosta region, as well as between Podkarpackie and Małopolskie provinces and Molise region. Institutional and economic relations were also initiated between Lubuskie province and Abruzzi region, as well as between Dolnośląskie province and Sardinia.

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The following trends stand out in Poland-Italy relations in 2006:

- relatively insignificant impact of membership of both countries in the EU on the development of their relations, except economic and cultural cooperation. Bilateral relations, notably in politics, became for both countries, of secondary importance, or at least not of priority nature;

- a clear domination of economic, trade and, to some extent, cultural cooperation over the political dimension, which primarily results from the prioritising trade relations by Italy, and ignoring political cooperation;

- no major breakthrough in political relations, which, despite the various announcements, and the membership of Poland and Italy of the EU, failed to reach the level that would be satisfactory for both parties. An example of this trend is the failure to realise the announcement of establishing political summits at the Prime Ministerial level;

- divergent views of both countries on key European agenda issues, notably the future of the Constitutional Treaty, further EU enlargement policy, European Neighbourhood Policy and attitude towards Russia; this partially results from different priorities, geopolitical strategies as well as the “specialisations” of both countries in the EU;

- a significant growth of interest in Poland in Italy, which is reflected by a multitude of cultural relations and initiatives, the frequent presence of



Poland-related topics (not only political, but also historical and economic) in the Italian daily press, as well as intense tourist relations, and a considerable influx of Italian tourists to Poland;

– continuously positive mutual perceptions of both nations, which is evidenced both by public opinion polls conducted in both countries, as well as the periodical Eurobarometer survey. Open borders, the lack of barriers to travelling and establishing relations, the ability to take up jobs without major limitations and, primarily, the historical tradition of good interpersonal relations—these are the main factors behind this continued positive trend. This is also affected by an extremely positive image of Poles working in Italy.

## **Relations between Poland and the Holy See**

The death of Pope John Paul II on 2 April 2005, turned a new page in the relations between Poland and the Holy See. Before that date, all contacts, both official and informal, the latter temporarily prevailing over the former, were marked by utmost cordiality. We grew used to very friendly relations with the Holy See, where formal and informal contacts were treated equally. Also, the number of communication channels was unlimited, on top of opportunities for personal meetings with the Pope at private audiences. We also grew used to identifying the Holy See with the Pope, paying less attention to other actors in the Holy See, who do play a major role in its foreign policymaking.

With the death of Pope John Paul II, Poland also lost its special link with the Vatican City as well as the opportunity to have a discreet influence on the Holy See's foreign policy. Its state authorities and the clergy got used to preferential treatment of Polish proposals and were ready to follow the Pope's recommendations with due respect, irrespective of the political wing currently in power. This peculiar polonophilia of the Vatican City in the era of John Paul II must have clashed with the new reality following the appointment of his successor. The return of bilateral relations to regular and more official channels, natural as it was, also had to be acknowledged.

After almost two years from the appointment of the new Roman Pontiff, some fears have proved unfounded. A lot of respect from Pope Benedict XVI for the Pope from Poland, shown not only in the doctrinal, but also formal dimension, as evidenced by his quick decision on the opening of the beatification process, results in a higher profile of Poland's relations with the Holy See than initially expected. This is corroborated by the number and place in the hierarchy of Polish priests who still work for the state apparatus of the Catholic Church (Roman Curia). The appreciation by Benedict XVI of the power of Catholicism and the Catholic Church in Poland, as well as its strategic location in Europe, could also be easily inferred from the very start of the pontificate. Poland is perceived by the Vatican City as one of important partners and interlocutors in Central and Eastern Europe and in the European Union. A pastoral visit to

Poland that Benedict XVI made after his visit to Italy and Germany, his home country, was also a symbolic indication of continued excellent relations.

### **Bilateral Relations**

A consequence of this nature of relations between Poland and the Holy See has been the mutual conviction that the interests of both states in the international arena are convergent, which was evident following the victory of the right-centre in the parliamentary and presidential elections in Poland. Although 2005 was marked by sporadic and routine contacts linked with John Paul II's funeral ceremony and the election time in Poland, 2006 saw invigorated contacts in all dimensions between state authorities at the working, parliamentary and church level. They were initiated by the first foreign visit of President Lech Kaczyński, with the destination in the Vatican City (26 January 2006). The assumption was that the visit would send a symbolic message and underscore the importance that Poland attaches to good relations with the Holy See. During the audience with Pope Benedict XVI and the meeting with Secretary of State Angelo Sodano, preparatory work the Pope's visit to Poland was primarily discussed, as well as topics related to globalisation processes, situation in Africa (notably in the context of development aid) as well as realisation of the principle of worldwide solidarity.

President Kaczyński's visit opened a series of meetings and bilateral contacts at different levels. On 10 April 2006, the Pope met Speaker of the Sejm (Lower House of Parliament) Marek Jurek, who also talked with the head of the Vatican diplomacy, Archbishop Giovanni Lajolo. On 18 May 2006, Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz made a visit to the Vatican City. The agenda of his meetings with Benedict XVI and Secretary of State, Cardinal Angelo Sodano, focused on European affairs and practical aspects of the approaching papal visit to Poland.

The pastoral visit of Pope Benedict XVI in Poland (25 to 28 May 2006) was undoubtedly the most momentous and historic event in the relations between Poland and the Vatican City in the last two years. The pastoral visit with the motto "Stand firm in faith" was of religious nature primarily, but also had distinct symbolic and international meaning. The latter aspect was the least visible, even though the Pope met Poland's supreme authorities (the President and Prime Minister) to discuss the most important issues of cooperation with the Holy See in the international environment, mainly in the area of bioethics. The pilgrimage was to express the Pope's thanks for the gift to the Church and the

world that the pontificate of John Paul II was, as well as for the faith and power represented by the Catholic Church in Poland. An enthusiastic reception of Benedict XVI by Poles and signs of trust in him were a spontaneous response to massive respect of the new Pope to his late predecessor, demonstrated from the beginning of his pontificate. The Pope himself was clearly surprised by the cordial reception of Poles. Positive perceptions of the visit to Poland, both in the religious and pastoral, as well as diplomatic, dimension contributed to the strengthening of mutual relations. It also reinforced the bonds between Poles and the Holy See, as well as respect and admiration that Benedict XVI enjoys in Poland. It was also the sign of the vitality of the Church in Poland for the Pope himself.

The coping stone of the bilateral relations in 2006 was the visit of Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński to the Vatican City (12 October), where he was received by Benedict XVI and the new Secretary of State for the Holy See, Cardinal Tarcisio Bertone. Originally, it was intended as a thank-you visit for the Pope's pilgrimage to Poland, but the agenda of the meeting also covered a number of other topics, notably the issue of potential incorporation in the EU Constitutional Treaty of the clause on Christian origins of Europe, in view of the resumed debate on the issue, and cooperation in the international forum on bioethics, in line with the Church's teaching. The head of the Polish government also expressed his solidarity with the head of the Catholic Church following a wave of bombings by Islamic extremists, triggered off by the unfortunate statement by Benedict XVI in Regensburg. It should be emphasised here that the solidarity was expressed not only by the President and Prime Minister of Poland, but also by members of the Polish Parliament, headed by Speaker M. Jurek. The Prime Minister probably also tackled a very delicate problem that the filling of the vacant Primate of the Church in Poland function undoubtedly is.<sup>1</sup>

A new channel for working contacts at the medium and expert level was established in 2006. It was opened with the working visit in the Vatican City of MFA Secretary of State Paweł Kowal, held on 31 September 2006, where he met Undersecretary for Relations with States of Section II, Secretary of State Office of the Holy See, monsignor Pietro Parolin. It was decided that the exchange of opinions and facts would cover all aspects of bilateral relations, as well as the relations with Eastern Europe states (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus), including the situation of the Church in those countries, European integration issues, as well as

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<sup>1</sup> *Rzeczpospolita* of 24 October 2006.

other “hot” international topics. Systematic consultations within the next few months after the visit were also announced. Of similar nature were the talks of Director of MFA Department of America Andrzej Jaroszyński, who exchanged opinions on the relations between the Vatican City and some states of both Americas (September 2006) at the Secretary of State Office of the Holy See. Further, Minister of Education and Science Michał Seweryński took part in the session organised by the Holy See and devoted to cultural heritage and academic values of European universities (between 31 March and 1 April 2006). During the same visit, he met his Vatican counterpart, Cardinal Zenon Grocholewski, Prefect of the Congregation of Catholic Upbringing, to discuss the situation of Catholic education in Poland. These initial contacts at the working and expert level met with very good reception of the Secretary of State. It appears that the Holy See is interested in their continued operation and development in the forthcoming years.

The relations between the state and the Church were also developing vigorously, earning recognition from the Holy See. In the second half of November and in December 2005, the traditional “ad limina Apostolorum” visit took place, under which Benedict XVI hosted a group of Polish bishops, headed by the Primate of Poland, Cardinal Józef Glemp. The activities of the Church in Poland following the death of John Paul II were discussed, and the role of the Church in the society assessed. The Pope referred to the importance of Catholic upbringing and the activity of lay Catholics, notably in the area of politic and voluntary service. He also made an appeal for closer cooperation between the Church and schools, local governments and all lay institutions that deal with upbringing and education of young people. In turn, the Primate of Poland confirmed significant progress in ecumenical dialogue in Poland both with the Orthodox Church and Protestants, as well as expressed his positive opinion on the role of Catholic universities and theology department at non-Catholic universities.

On 30 June 2006, a meeting was held in Warsaw of the Concordat Commission, devoted mainly to the issue of recognising by the state of graduate diplomas issued by subsidiaries of theology departments at state universities. Another important issue in the relations with the Holy See was the question of the status of the Primate of Poland, as this function played a vital role in the history of contemporary Poland. Some political circles in Poland thought it reasonable to keep the arrangements in effect so far, and “assign” this honorary title to the archbishopric of Warsaw. However, the Pope took a different decision and, on 6 December 2006, an official announcement was made on the “return” of the title to Archbishops of Gniezno when Cardinal Józef Glemp would turn

80. The Holy Father wrote that historical and legal considerations were in favour of the Gniezno See, as the first Polish Metropolitan Archdiocese, where holy relics of Saint Adalbert, martyr and the patron saint of Poland, are kept.

The Pope's decision on the separation of this honorary title from the position of the Archbishop of Warsaw and attaching it to the archdiocese in Gniezno involuntarily gave rise to unprecedented events in the history of the Polish Church. Archbishop Stanisław Wielgus, nominated by virtue of this decision as the new archbishop of Warsaw, stepped down after a month amidst accusations of collaboration with the communist secret services. The related tension and turmoil revealed the need for an even closer cooperation and better communication between the Church and state authorities and the Holy See.

### **Cooperation in International Arena**

Due to his close relations with John Paul II, as well as being aware of the power and role of Catholicism in Poland, as well as of massive support and authority he enjoys in the country, as evidenced by his last pastoral visit to Poland, Benedict XVI has shown considerable care for Poland recently. His effort for excellent bilateral relations represented the main frame of reference for actions by Poland and the Holy See. These characteristics have had, and will continue to have impact on the convergence, in general terms, of views of both parties on many international issues of ethical and global nature. These include:

- similar vision for united Europe, based on Christian roots and values, which translates directly into the support for the corresponding clause in the preamble of the future version of the EU Constitutional Treaty;
- support to solutions that safeguard ethical and moral standards in the European Union and the UN (protection of human life and the disabled as well as protest against provisions that enfeeble the role of the family and allow stem cell research);
- support to the concept of open and solidarity-showing EU, both in its internal and external relations;
- support to EU enlargement with Eastern Europe states (Ukraine, Moldova);
- similarities in the vision of international order, based on effective multilateralism as well as ethical and moral foundations;
- attempts to maintain good relations with the present US administration;

– shared vision of the Catholic Church’s mission in the world, as the champion of moral principles and values in international relations.

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Following the death of John Paul II, the relations between Poland and the Holy See have been undergoing a structural transformation, caused not only by the appointment of a new Peter’s Successor, but also by a slightly different vision for international policy of the present Pope, and markedly limited informal contacts. This does not mean, however, that bilateral relations have deteriorated. Quite the contrary, the events of 2006 go on to show that the relations will be reinforced not only through official visits, but also by working contacts. This will serve the vital interests of Poland, as it will allow to get to know international plans of the Holy See better, as well as to communicate to the Vatican City’s Secretary of State the Polish position on specific international policy issues. In the near future, Poland should strive to enhance and develop these contacts. In addition, owing to worldwide authority and recognition of the Roman Pontiff, built also on the comprehensive activities of John Paul II, the Holy See will continue to be the point of reference for the Polish diplomacy on many international issues of multilateral nature, as well as one of the most important sources of information and support, thanks to the positive attitude towards Poland of Pope Benedict XVI. The task of the Polish diplomacy will be to ensure effective consolidation and retaining the positive image of Poland and its foreign policy in the Vatican City, as well as to shape positive tendencies, while counteractive negative phenomena. This applies primarily to the entire realm of Eastern policymaking, notably contacts with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, and the situation of the Catholic Church in those countries, where the dominant community is still Catholics of Polish descent.

## Relations between Poland and Russia

Relations between Poland and Russia at the turn of 2006 were heavily burdened by controversies that emerged in the previous dozen or so months. The Ukrainian “Orange Revolution” of December 2004 blatantly revealed conflicting interests of both states in the area of their common neighbourhood. In turn, 2005, abounding in round anniversaries related to World War II, showed that historical issues still remained a source of controversies, adversely affecting mutual relations between Poland and Russia.<sup>1</sup> Simultaneously, despite the systematic growth of trade exchange between the states, economic disputes surfaced, with clear political ramifications, e.g. over energy cooperation or access to the Russian market for Polish goods. Negative trends in Poland-Russia relations were accompanied by the hope, expressed by some politicians and commentators, that it could be overcome in 2006, which was mostly attributed to a major political reshuffle in Poland. The victory of Lech Kaczyński in presidential, and Law and Justice party in parliamentary elections, in late 2005, were perceived as an opportunity for the “new opening” in Poland-Russia relations.<sup>2</sup>

### Political Relations

At the beginning of 2006, statements were delivered from the authorities of both states indicating the intent to overcome the previous crisis. On 10 January, when addressing diplomats accredited in Warsaw, President Lech Kaczyński referred to Russia as a country of special importance for Poland, with which we would like to have best-possible relations.<sup>3</sup> This view was elaborated by Minister of Foreign Affairs Stefan Meller in his 15 February address on Polish

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\* Adam Eberhardt—Deputy Director of the Research Office at the Polish Institute of International Affairs.

<sup>1</sup> 2005 marked, *inter alia*, the 65<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Katyń massacre, 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Yalta conference and the end of World War II.

<sup>2</sup> More in A. Eberhardt, “Stosunki Polski z Rosją,” *Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 2006*, Warszawa, 2006, pp. 114–129.

<sup>3</sup> Noworoczne spotkanie Prezydenta RP z Korpusem Dyplomatycznym ([www.prezydent.pl/x.node?id=1011848&eventId=3026978](http://www.prezydent.pl/x.node?id=1011848&eventId=3026978)).



foreign policy in 2006. He expressed an opinion that in the relations between Poland and Russia “there are no objective causes or reasons in our relations with Russia which could hinder good-neighbourly cooperation based on rationally formulated national interests.”<sup>4</sup> The declaration of the Polish President induced a positive response from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,<sup>5</sup> and President Vladimir Putin, at the annual press conference (31 January), offered assurances that Russia has massive respect for Poland, and called for overcoming mutual distrust.<sup>6</sup> If there had been less tension in the relations between Poland and Russia, the above statement would not have attracted a lot of attention, and would have been treated as a component of universally employed diplomatic courtesy. However, owing to deep-reaching disputes from previous months, these should be looked at as important gestures indicating that the intent of Russia at that time was to normalise relations with Poland. The reconciliatory gestures can be linked to the discussion, initiated in the EU, on the future relations with Russia, also in connection with the plans to draft a new document to regulate the mutual relations. It should be noted that Russian policy on the entire Central Europe region intensified in early 2006 (while it was, by and large, ignored in previous years), in particular in relation to Hungary and the Czech Republic, whose relations with Russia were much less conflict-arousing.<sup>7</sup>

The primary means to improve the atmosphere in Poland-Russia relations in the first months of 2006 was to be the visit to Warsaw of the Russian President’s advisor Sergei Yastrzhembsky, organised on the initiative of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Stefan Meller. Acting as a special envoy of Vladimir Putin, he offered to Lech Kaczyński a personal letter from Russia’s President, which formulated the intent to improve bilateral relations. Yastrzhembsky also met the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, as well as attended the meeting of experts at the Polish Institute of International Affairs. A lot of

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<sup>4</sup> Minister’s Annual Address 2006 ([www.msz.gov.pl/Ministers,Annual,Address,2006,4602.html](http://www.msz.gov.pl/Ministers,Annual,Address,2006,4602.html)).

<sup>5</sup> Ответ официального представителя МИД России М.Л.Камынина на вопрос СМИ в связи с оценкой Президентом Польши российско-польских отношений, Департамент Информации и Печати, Министерство Иностранных Дел РФ ([www.mid.ru/brp\\_4.nsf/sps/01A5523E22001AC7C32570FB00532AD8](http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/sps/01A5523E22001AC7C32570FB00532AD8)).

<sup>6</sup> Стенограмма пресс-конференции для российских и иностранных журналистов, Президент России ([www.kremlin.ru](http://www.kremlin.ru)).

<sup>7</sup> An expression of this policy was e.g. Vladimir Putin’s visits to Budapest and Prague, held at the turn of March. More in A. Eberhardt, M. Gniazdowski, “Wzrost aktywności Rosji w Europie Środkowej—implikacje dla Polski,” *Biuletyn PISM*, no. 16 (356), 3 March 2006 ([www.pism.pl/biuletyny/files/356.pdf](http://www.pism.pl/biuletyny/files/356.pdf)).

coverage from the Polish media on the Russian guest's visit, despite its relatively low level, indicates how strong the need for the improvement of relations with Russia was in Poland.

In subsequent months, indications of normalised relations between Poland and Russia were present, mainly in the diplomatic dimension. Ambassadorial vacancies, continuing from the death Nikolai Afanasyevski in June 2005 and the assumption of the position of the Minister of Foreign Affairs by Stefan Meller in November 2005, were filled. Towards the end of April, President Vladimir Putin appointed Vladimir Grinin as the ambassador of the Russian Federation to Warsaw,<sup>8</sup> and within the next month, Jerzy Bahr received his nomination as the ambassador of the Republic of Poland to Moscow.<sup>9</sup>

Also, two meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs were held. Anna Fotyga, the new Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, took the opportunity of the international conference in Moscow to talk briefly to Sergei Lavrov (28 June). At the beginning of October, Lavrov visited Warsaw. This was the first visit of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs in Poland in two years. The visit was marked by friendly atmosphere, although yielded few tangible results. Although on the previous day the Russian Minister announced that he would present to the Polish counterparts interesting proposals on energy cooperation, the actual Russian offering was limited, based on publicly available information, to the declaration that the "North Stream" gas pipeline project "provides for participation of other states, if they are willing to join it."<sup>10</sup> In reality, this was only a reiteration of the position formulated on numerous occasions by the Russian authorities, which failed to refer to the reservations raised by Poland. After the meeting with the Russian visitor, Minister Fotyga stated that Poland did not plan to join either construction, or operation, of the Baltic Sea gas pipeline. A positive outcome of the meeting between the ministers was the agreement on the resumption of work by the so-called Group for Problematic Issues—a bilateral team of experts, intended to contribute to the resolution of vexed issues, including those related to the Katyń massacre.

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<sup>8</sup> Vladimir Grinin is a professional diplomat with over 30 years of professional experience. He was e.g. ambassador of the Russian Federation to Vienna and, recently, to Helsinki. PAP Media brief of 26 April 2006.

<sup>9</sup> Before this appointment, Jerzy Bahr was a counsellor at the Polish embassy in Moscow, Consul General in Kaliningrad, ambassador to Kiev (1996–2001) and Vilnius (2001–2005) and head of National Security Office (2005). PAP Media brief of 19 May 2006.

<sup>10</sup> PAP media brief of 5 October 2006.

An important item on the agenda of talks held both by Sergey Yastrzhembsky in Warsaw, and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, was the preparations for the meeting of Presidents of Poland and Russia. Polish politicians initially indicated that it could be scheduled for the second half of the year, and did not want to waive the condition formulated by Lech Kaczyński, that the meeting should take place in Poland, or on “neutral ground.” Talks between both Presidents on a ship in the Bay of Gdańsk were considered as an option, or, which was initially suggested by Minister Fotyga, the meeting could take place at the informal EU-Russia summit in October 2006 in Lahti, Finland. The latter concept was finally rejected by Poland, as President Kaczyński on numerous occasions expressed his lack of interest in a courtesy meeting only, which would be practically limited to a joint photo.

Representatives of Russian authorities were less inclined to reveal their clear-cut proposals on the meeting of the Presidents. Representatives of the President of the RP Chancellery made it clear that the talks were difficult. Based on the releases in the Polish press, Russians offered Belarus as the “neutral” venue for the talks.<sup>11</sup> A proposal of this type, in the context of the boycott of Aleksandr Lukashenko’s regime by Poland, cannot be construed in any other way than as an attempt to torpedo the idea of the meeting.

In the end, neither direct talks between the Presidents were held, nor rapprochement of positions was reached in 2006, which would signal a possibility of organising the Poland-Russia summit meeting before the end, in spring 2008, of the second, and last presidential term of Vladimir Putin. The problems might have resulted from the controversies which, despite certain improvement in the political dialogue, existed in Poland-Russia relations throughout 2006.

One of the sticking points continued to be historical issues. Throughout the year, no progress was made as regards revelation by Russians of all files of the Katyń investigations, which was previously announced by President Putin. In addition, the Chief Military Prosecution Office of the Russian Federation denied considering the murder of Polish officers as an instance of political repression, and thus failed to cover the victims by the rehabilitation procedure. This position was justified by the lack of evidence indicating that Poles murdered in Katyń were convicted under the Soviet Criminal Code of 1926.<sup>12</sup> The communication

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<sup>11</sup> *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 25 May 2006.

<sup>12</sup> PAP media brief of 6 March 2006.

of the National Remembrance Institute rejects the Russian reasoning, emphasising that Stalin's personal signature under the order to execute Polish officers represents an unambiguous proof of political nature of the crime.<sup>13</sup> Polish authorities received the Russian position with surprise and regret. "We should find out the truth in all its aspects, because only this can serve as a foundation for our bilateral relations and positive connection between Poles and Russians" argued President Kaczyński.<sup>14</sup>

Negative impact on Poland-Russia relations in 2006 was also exerted by the problem of navigation in the Vistula Lagoon. On 7 May, Russia introduced a ban on passenger vessel traffic on the Russian side of the reservoir, making the resumption of traffic conditional upon signing an interstate agreement on the issue. Russian authorities claimed that the agreement regulating the traffic of Polish vessels in Russia's territorial waters expired with Poland's accession to the EU. They changed their position in August only, allowing Polish ships to navigate in the Vistula/Kaliningrad Lagoon under the previous arrangements.<sup>15</sup> The freedom of navigation of third countries' vessels, demanded by Poland, remained a vexed issue.

The cause of improvement in relations between Poland and Russia was not served well by the states' general views on international issues. Lech Kaczyński, along with Presidents of Lithuania and Latvia, criticised Russia for its policy of sanctions on Georgia,<sup>16</sup> while Minister of Foreign Affairs Radosław Sikorski evaluated negatively the construction project of Russia-Germany Baltic pipeline, and advised caution concerning the return to tradition of Molotov-Ribbentrop pact thinking.<sup>17</sup> On the other hand, Russians severely criticised the emerging idea of a potential installation in Poland of American missile defences components, warning that they would take, rather undefined, "adequate actions."<sup>18</sup> Polish

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<sup>13</sup> Komunikat w sprawie Zbrodni Katyńskiej oraz informacja o stanie śledztwa, Instytut Pamięci Narodowej ([www.ipn.gov.pl/portal/pl/245/135](http://www.ipn.gov.pl/portal/pl/245/135)).

<sup>14</sup> PAP media brief of 6 March 2006, 20 April 2006; Oświadczenie Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych w sprawie rosyjskiej interpretacji zbrodni katyńskiej ([www.msz.gov.pl/mdex.php?page=7974&lang\\_id=pl&bulletin\\_id=9&document=955](http://www.msz.gov.pl/mdex.php?page=7974&lang_id=pl&bulletin_id=9&document=955)).

<sup>15</sup> PAP media brief of 9 May 2006, and of 9 August 2006.

<sup>16</sup> PAP media brief of 30 September 2006.

<sup>17</sup> PAP media brief of 19 May 2006.

<sup>18</sup> К. Косачев, "От тюрем—к базам," *Независимая газета* of 13 September 2006; М. Камынин, *Москва предпримет соответствующие меры в случае размещения в Польше элементов ПРО США или НАТО*, ([www.interfax.ru/r/B/0/22.html?id\\_issue=11597722](http://www.interfax.ru/r/B/0/22.html?id_issue=11597722)).

authorities attempted to alleviate Russian concerns. Minister Sikorski assured them that Warsaw would try to consider the Russian position as well, before the final decision is reached.<sup>19</sup>

The most destructive impact on relations between the countries in 2006 was exerted by keeping by Russia the import ban on Polish agri-food products, that is meat, its products and vegetable produce. The restrictions, motivated by incidents of forging Polish export certificates, were introduced in November 2005. Continuing restrictions turned the commercial conflict into a political one, with negative consequences, as proven by the subsequent months, also for EU-Russia relations.

In view of ineffective attempts to resolve the conflict by technical consultations (with Russian veterinary and fitosanitary authorities<sup>20</sup>), the Polish government tried to pressurise the Russian authorities direct. The problem was on the agenda of both meetings of Foreign Affairs Ministers, as well the subject of a special letter with a call for lifting the ban, sent on 29 March by Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz to Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov.

In mid-year, Poland was increasingly firm in demanding support from the Community structures, arguing that continuing sanctions revealed political intentions of Russia, which represented a violation of trade regulations between Russia and the European Union. In May, at the meeting of EU Ministers of Agriculture, Deputy Prime Minister Andrzej Lepper proposed, with no effect, incorporation of this item into the agenda of the approaching EU-Russia summit in Sochi. In June, Minister of the Economy Piotr Woźniak addressed Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson with a motion requesting adequate actions, to result in the repeal of the restrictions.

Although the European Commission initially argued that sanitary and veterinary issues belonged to the competencies of individual EU states, rather than the Community bodies, the position evolved in line with the interests of Poland. By November, the European Commission held a dozen or so meetings with representatives of Russian and Polish authorities.

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<sup>19</sup> PAP media brief of 1 November 2006.

<sup>20</sup> One of the crucial sticking points was the demand of Russian authorities, outright refused by Warsaw, for the Polish services to carry out veterinary and fitosanitary inspection on the entire EU food exports, and to pass it through one border point only (so-called mirror border point, such as Bezledy). Polish authorities claimed that the demand could not be reconciled with the principle of the free flow of goods inside the EU. See: PAP media brief of 19 May 2006.

A year after the sanctions were introduced, due to no prospects of lifting the ban, Polish authorities decided to use the EU forum as tool of pressure on Russia. On 13 November, Poland opposed the adoption by EU Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the mandate for negotiations on the new agreement with Russia (to replace the present Partnership and Cooperation Agreement), scheduled for 24 November at the summit in Helsinki. Although in the next days Finland, presiding over the Union at that time, attempted to convince Poland to withdraw its veto, the attempt failed, and, as a result, the work on the new agreement failed to commence. “We want a fundamental thing: we want the agreement covering the EU to cover Poland as well, not in terms of words, but actions”—as Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński justified this steadfast position of Poland, suggesting at the same time that a desirable response of the Union to the Russian policy should be corresponding sanctions imposed on Russia.<sup>21</sup>

The second problem raised by Poland at that time revolved around energy issues. Poland demanded that during the negotiations on the agreement ratification by Moscow of the European Energy Charter, and its signing of the transit protocol, should be sought, which should introduce more transparency to the sector, along with non-discrimination safeguards.

Resolute decision of the Polish government on blocking the negotiations “caused dismay” at the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry, which, in a special communication, advised caution against actions that hold the EU-Russia dialogue hostage to particular, narrowly formulated interests of individual states.<sup>22</sup> Russian authorities emphasised that the dispute was of purely commercial nature and would be resolved in bilateral relations with Warsaw. Russian politicians and the media jointly branded Polish actions as blackmail.

Initially, the Polish veto evoked astonishment and criticism from the EU partners. This position was gradually mitigated, after the preliminary reports on the mission of EU inspectors for food safety in Poland were published. The reports did not confirm the charges and the inspectors claimed that there were no reasons for Russia to keep the embargo on the exports of Polish agricultural products.<sup>23</sup> It appears that what helped Poland was the rejection by Russia of the

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<sup>21</sup> PAP media brief of 15 November 2006.

<sup>22</sup> Ответ официального представителя МИД России М.Л.Камынина на вопрос агентства «Интерфакс» в связи с блокированием Польшей утверждения главами МИД Евросоюза мандата на переговоры с Россией по новому соглашению о стратегическом сотрудничестве, ([www.mid.ru/brp\\_4.nsf/0/F2580B29E327AC47C3257226006797A9](http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/F2580B29E327AC47C3257226006797A9)).

<sup>23</sup> PAP media brief of 16 November 2006.

compromise proposal that suggested withdrawing the veto if Russia promised to lift the ban within 50 days. Not without their meaning were also actions by Russian authorities that fuelled the conflict: referring to epidemiological threats posed by Romania and Bulgaria, the new EU members, Russia threatened to close its market for meat from all EU countries, except for the privileged few (Poland was not among them), with which it would enter into bilateral agreements. These threats were interpreted as an attempt at destroying the unity of the Union, thus a corroboration of accusations formulated by Poland, concerning unequal treatment of individual EU members.

Although Polish authorities used EU institutions to bring the conflict with Russia to international attention, and managed to secure support of the vast majority of its EU partners (despite actions that sabotaged the Union's intentions), no agreement on trade restrictions was worked out by the end of 2006. Under the circumstances, Russia, interested as it was in the withdrawal of the Polish veto, was not willing to lift the ban on the exports of goods from Poland. Caving in as a result of the pressure would encourage other European states to use the Community structures in the future as a tool of pressure on Moscow.

In the last weeks of 2006, the parties found themselves in a dead-end situation. The EU pressure to resolve the issue grew, and at the same time a compromise was increasingly more difficult to reach for prestige-related reasons. Simultaneously, the slow process of improving the atmosphere of Poland-Russia relations, observable in previous months of 2006, slumped into another crisis.

### **Economic Relations**

Paradoxically, Russian restrictions on trade, which marred the political relations, had limited economic impact. For many years now, Russia has ranked only 6<sup>th</sup> among receivers of Polish produce, while the Polish export portfolio is markedly wide. Differently than in mid-nineties, agri-food products account for an insignificant share of Polish exports to Russia. The other exported goods are electrical machinery engineering, chemical, wood and paper products. When imposed towards the end of 2005, the Russian sanctions applied to a mere 8% of Polish exports to Russia, valued at \$300 million. Losses incurred by the end of August 2006 were estimated by the government at \$22 million—less than 1 per cent of the value of our exports.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> A. Kublik, K. Naszkowska, "Do Rosji jeździ żywec zamiast wędlin," *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 15 January 2007.

According to the Ministry of the Economy, the ban on meat and meat product exports was compensated in 2006 by a sharp rise in live animal exports to Russia.<sup>25</sup>

The available statistics show that sales of meat to third countries also grew. In addition, Polish exporters found new receivers for their vegetable produce. There are also premises to believe that Polish agri-food products still reach Russia, only that this takes place via third countries, notably Lithuania. Based on a widespread formula, Polish companies custom cleared their goods in another country, to obtain their fitosanitary certificates, only to re-export them<sup>26</sup> to Russia afterwards.

Thus, although Russian restrictions did translate (initially) into losses incurred by individual Polish exporters, they failed to impact in a significant way the overall economy. They even failed to impact materially Poland-Russia trade exchange. In 2006, the exchange volumes even grew—by 25.9% in comparison to the previous year (in dollars). This was a continuation of positive trends of the previous year. The trade exchange totalled \$16.837 billion, while it came to \$12.927 billion a year before, and to a mere \$6.334 billion in 2003.

Despite exports rising by 18.7%, a negative phenomenon for Poland was the growing trade deficit. It totalled a significant \$7.433 billion, which accounted for as much as 47.8% of the overall Polish foreign trade deficit. In 2005, the share of the deficit with Russia in the overall deficit was at 43.5%, and in 2003 at 30% only. The trends stem primarily from the continuing rise in the prices of energy resources (crude oil and natural gas) that dominate imports from Russia.

Table

**2006 Trade between Poland and Russia**

Type of foreign trade action	2006						2005	2006
	In PLN billion	In USD billion	In EUR billion	2005 = 100			Share in %	
				PLN	USD	EUR		
Exports to Russia	14.684	4.701	3.753	114.5	118.7	118.4	4.4	4.3
Imports from Russia	38.062	12.135	9.731	130.7	135.1	134.9	8.9	9.7

Source: Obroty handlu zagranicznego ogółem i według krajów 1 XII 2006 r. (wyniki wstępne), Central Statistical Office, ([www.stat.gov.pl/dane\\_spol-gosp/ceny\\_han-del\\_uslugi/obroty\\_handl\\_zagr/2006/01-12\\_2006.htm](http://www.stat.gov.pl/dane_spol-gosp/ceny_han-del_uslugi/obroty_handl_zagr/2006/01-12_2006.htm)).

<sup>25</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>26</sup> PAP media brief of 18 December 2006.



Positive symptoms in the relations between the two states in 2006 include the initiation of the dialogue under the Poland-Russia Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation, appointed eighteen months earlier. Its sessions, held on 30 and 31 March in Moscow, were chaired by Polish Minister of the Economy Piotr Woźniak and Russian Minister of Transport Igor Levitin. Among key items on the agenda were obviously Russian trade restrictions, although the attendees also managed to review economic cooperation in other areas, such as the energy, or transport sector. The parties agreed as to the need for acceleration of the dragging work on the bilateral agreement on investment support and mutual protection.

Another symptom of convergence between the Polish and Russian economic interests were joint efforts, drawing to a successful end in 2006, for the reduction in the Community customs duties on Russia-imported aluminium that Poland is the biggest importer of in the EU (customs duty reduction serves the purpose of greater competitiveness of the Polish processing industry).

Conversely, a subject of competition between Poland and Russia, formally between economic entities, was the sales offer of the Lithuanian company *Mateikiř nafta*, whose main asset was the refinery in *Mažeiki*. Both Orlen, the Polish oil group, and Russian corporations, mainly TNK-BP and Lukoil, were interested in the acquisition. In the end, Orlen managed to secure the majority stake for the record price (in terms of Polish foreign investment) of \$2.34 billion, justifying this generous offering by fears of the Russian energy sector expansion in Central Europe (if they had managed to take over the refinery in Lithuania, Russia would have become a serious competitor also on the Polish fuel market). Simultaneously with the refinery acquisition by the Polish company, Russians (the state-owned pipeline operator *Transneft'*), suspended supplies of crude oil for the Polish business. Officially, the reason for breaking off the contract was the pipeline failure, yet no remedial action in the next months lent a lot of credence to the argument that the actual intent was to punish Orlen for frustrating the plans of the Russian energy businesses.

### **Cultural Relations**

Poland–Russia cultural relations, vibrant in the preceding months, seemed to be on the wane in 2006. Cultural events were for the most part a continuation of projects launched earlier under the Polish Season in Russia (March–October 2005) and Russian Season in Poland (November–January 2004).

The most important event was documentary film shows, under the series “Russia–Poland. A new look,” held in Warsaw in March, in Moscow in May and

in October in Saint Petersburg. Paintings by young artists from both countries offered a look at phenomena characteristic of contemporary Poland-Russia relations, including negative stereotypes on both nations. Young Russian documentary film makers shot their films in Poland, and young Poles—in Russia.

Mutual cultural exchange also consisted of Moscow performances by the Polish Montownia Theatre, presentation of the *Swan Lake* by the Moscow City Ballet at the Wrocław Opera House and a tour of the Alexandrov's Choir, extremely popular in Poland. In addition, on the initiative of the authorities of Łódź, the "Russian Year" was organised in the city, consisting of a series of events, such as concerts, exhibitions, theatre plays and recitals, acquainting the residents of Łódź with Russian culture. Also, the Polish artists' football team played the stars of the Russian music scene at the stadium of Torpedo Moscow. The profit from the match, won by the Russian team, was a charitable donation to help children suffering from diseases in Moscow and Warsaw.

2006 was important for Poland-Russia cultural relations mainly owing to the agreements made on the future joint projects. The arrangements were formulated in a protocol on mutual cultural cooperation, signed on 23 November by Minister of Culture Kazimierz M. Ujazdowski and Head of Federal Agency for Culture and Cinema Arts of the Russian Federation Mikhail Shvidkoi. The protocol provides for supporting cooperation between theatres (notably the National Theatre and state theatres in Moscow and Saint Petersburg), in cinema arts and education in arts. National libraries in Poland and Russia may also count on the support under this project. The parties are also to support Polish and Russian invitees of musical festivals, e.g. the "Warsaw Autumn" Festival and the Frederic Chopin International Young Pianists Contest in Moscow. Extended exchange between universities, both in terms of academic staff and students, was also announced. Poland and Russia also declared cooperation between institutions and organisations responsible for the protection and curatorship of cultural heritage and museums. They also mutually declared the will to organise the Russian Culture Festival in Gdańsk and the Polish Culture Festival in Kaliningrad.

The signing of the agreement on the cooperation was an opportunity to award the head of the Russian agency for culture Mikhail Shvidkoi, a theatre director and professor in theatre studies, with the supreme Polish distinction in culture, the "Gloria Artis—Meritorious for Culture" Medal, for his personal involvement in invigorating Poland-Russia relations and popularisation of Polish theatre arts in Russia.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> G. Stańczak, "Jak obejść rosyjskie embargo," *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 2 August 2006.

In 2006, talks were also held on organising a Poland-Russia Citizens' Forum, to allow more extensive dialogue among cultural activists and experts in education, youth exchange and sport. Presidents of both countries are to be honorary patrons of this event, planned for 2007.<sup>28</sup>

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Relations between Poland and Russia in the last few years resemble the sine wave, where periods of deep-reaching, acute controversies alternate with careful, yet unsuccessful attempts to overcome them. Following heated disputes of previous months, in early 2006 authorities of both countries expended tentative efforts to bring mutual relations back to the normal state. The improvement occurred, however, primarily at the level of declarations, and failed to translate into resolving any of the accumulated vexed issues. Also, unjustified upholding trade restrictions by Russia on some Polish goods escalated the tension, turned the conflict into a political problem and, as a result, a secondary issue became one of prestigious value, which obstructed the efforts to reach a compromise and, first and foremost, shed negative light on the overall Poland-Russia relations.

Taking the controversies to the Community forum by Poland, including the veto on the framework EU-Russia agreement, was a qualitatively new phenomenon, in view of limited capabilities of influencing Moscow's policies by the Polish government which, for the first time, used its presence in the European Union as an instrument of policy on Russia. In the forthcoming months and years, we should expect that such tendencies will be on the rise, while Russian authorities will undoubtedly attempt to counteract them.

Permanent crisis in political relations between Poland and Russia was accompanied in recent years by increasingly better economic and cultural cooperation. 2006 was partially the case for that, as a marked increase in trade exchange volume was recorded, although, from the Polish perspective, a negative phenomenon (next to the embargo on agri-food products) was the growing trade deficit gap. Significantly poorer in 2006 were cultural relations, although a large number of projects to be launched suggests that less intense cooperation between Poland and Russia in this particular area was of momentary nature.

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<sup>28</sup> Podpisanie Protokołu o polsko-rosyjskiej współpracy kulturalnej. Złoty medal Gloria Artis dla Michała Szwydkoja ([www.mkidn.gov.pl/website/index.jsp?artId=1419](http://www.mkidn.gov.pl/website/index.jsp?artId=1419)); PAP media brief of 23 November 2006.

## **Relations between Poland and Lithuania in 2004–2006**

### **Political Relations**

The beginning of 2004 was a very difficult time for Lithuania. The continuation of normal Polish-Lithuanian relations was difficult because of a complicated internal situation that began with the decision of the Lithuanian parliament on opening the impeachment procedure of President Rolandas Paksas, accused of violating constitutional laws. Polish diplomats had to make standpoint to the invitation which president Paksas sent to president Kwaśniewski to pay an official visit to Lithuania in April 2004. The visit, planned before indictment of the Lithuanian president, was an occasion to celebrate the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the signing of Polish-Lithuanian treaty. However, it fell exactly when the Lithuanian parliament was supposed to vote on dismissal of the head of the state. Some Lithuanian political analysts and politicians said that the president, who could be removed from his office, should be planning his foreign policy activities more carefully and not risk Lithuania's reputation as well as the embarrassment of politicians of countries it has good relations with. Aleksander Kwaśniewski might have been concerned that his visit would be considered support for a seriously accused president so he didn't make a decision for a long time.

In spite of that, in February diplomats from both countries continued their talks on how the anniversary would be celebrated, which was mainly an occasion for summarising the effects of the treaty. In Vilnius, during the meeting of Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jan Truszczyński, with Deputy Minister Evaldas Ignatavičius issues were discussed stemming from that document, which were not regulated that far. It referred to agreements provided for in the treaty: 1) about the spelling of Polish names in Lithuania and Lithuanian ones in Poland and 2) about acknowledgement of diplomas (finally that problem was solved when both countries joined the EU). Truszczyński emphasised that it depended on Lithuania how fast both agreements would be signed. Ignatavičius

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\* Joanna Hyndle—researcher at the Centre for Eastern Studies,  
Miryna Kutysz—researcher at the Centre for Eastern Studies.

didn't respond in any binding way and said that in the case of changes in spelling some amendments to the Lithuanian constitution were necessary, but didn't mention when the Lithuanian parliament was going to take care of the matter.

Lithuanians also had some expectations concerning Poland. In early April, Lithuanian Prime Minister, Algirdas Brazauskas, stated that Poles were hindering the implementation of the project of linking the power systems of both countries, i.e. the construction of the so-called energy bridge. His words were commented on by Mirosław Zieliński, Undersecretary of State of the Polish Ministry of Economy, Labour and Social Policy, who was at that time visiting Vilnius. He stated that they didn't need the bridge right now, as Lithuania and Poland have surpluses of energy. During the 9<sup>th</sup> meeting of Polish-Lithuanian Committee for Economic Cooperation they discussed the common energy policy and the bridge project, as well as the case of acceleration of the construction of the rapid Rail Baltica railway and Via Baltica highway.

In spite of solemn character of the celebrations of the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the signing of the Polish-Lithuanian Treaty on 26 April, the heads of both states failed to participate in those celebrations. President Kwaśniewski didn't come to Vilnius, as the internal situation in Lithuania was still difficult after the impeachment of President Roland Paksas in early April. Eventually Poland was represented by Deputy Speaker of the Sejm, Tomasz Nałęcz, and Lithuania by Arturas Paulauskas, acting as the Lithuanian president and until recently the Speaker of the Lithuanian Seimas. In the official speeches both politicians stressed the breakthrough significance of the treaty, which brought the historical disputes on the political level to an end, opening the dialogue of historians, and became the impulse for new cooperation on many levels. Apart from the celebrations, Nałęcz and Paulauskas were talking about creating a Polish-Lithuanian-Ukrainian Parliamentary Assembly similar to the Representatives Assembly of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland and the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania. It was Paulauskas's idea. It was supposed to support the diplomatic actions of Poland and Lithuania towards Ukraine and it was greeted with interest by Polish people.

Along with that solemn occasion, the representatives of Poland and Lithuania tried not to accentuate controversial issues in mutual relations. But representatives of the Polish minority (including Polish MPs in the Parliament of Lithuania, like Artur Płockszto) appealed to them, emphasising that Poles still have to fight for the issues guaranteed by the Treaty although they perceived the document itself as a very positive one. The implementation of the 15<sup>th</sup> article

was criticized, according to which both sides committed to hold back actions which could lead to the ethnic changes on territories densely inhabited by the Polish or Lithuanian minority. In the opinion of Poles that article is still being violated on the Vilnius region, especially when it comes to return of land. Along with the celebrations, Paulauskas talked about the breakthrough initiative, brought in by veterans of the World War II in Lithuania from troops of general Povilas Plechavičius: they proposed reconciliation to the soldiers of the Home Army, against which they fought in the Vilnius region.

With the cancellation of his visit in Vilnius, on 28 April 2004, President Aleksander Kwaśniewski met with the Prime Minister of Lithuania Algirdas Brazauskas in Warsaw. Both politicians again emphasised the significance of the treaty between Poland and Lithuania, and Brazauskas informed Kwaśniewski about internal situation in Lithuania. The next day, the Lithuanian Prime Minister discussed the issues of energy cooperation with the Polish Prime Minister Leszek Miller.

Celebrations of the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the signing of the treaty ended with a roundtable meeting. The topic of the debate was adapting the partnership of both countries to the new situation after Poland's and Lithuanian's EU and NATO accession and outlining new tasks. Lech Wałęsa and Algirdas Brazauskas participated in that debate, as the presidents who signed the treaty in 1994. There was also acting President Arturas Paulauskas, former and present ambassadors and other persons involved 10 years ago in its drawing up. Most of the participants appealed for activation of the dialogue of societies and moving the cooperation on the social and local level although there were some statements as well that now both countries have no ideas for new forms of cooperation. Polish representatives criticised the quality of mutual relations as well. They stated that strategic partnership has an ideological dimension, however, it isn't reflected in specific actions. In Lithuania, there were also voices stating that although Poland helped Lithuania on her way to NATO and EU membership, in a new Union these countries were placed in two different interest groups. Poland is more related to bigger countries, like Spain, that don't have to be interested in fighting for smaller countries' interests. There will be some issues in which Poland and Lithuania will differ.

In late May, in response to an appeal for moving the cooperation to the regional level, the prime ministers of Lithuania Algirdas Brazauskas and of Poland Marek Belka, participated in opening of the House of Lithuanian Culture in Puńsk, a municipality where most Lithuanians in Poland live. They talked with the representatives of minorities. Lithuanians emphasise that the inauguration of this facility makes a great example of cooperation of both

countries in the enlarged EU, in line with the Polish-Lithuanian treaty that mentions supporting the actions of minorities.

The meeting of prime ministers became an opportunity to develop other joint initiatives. Marek Belka introduced to Prime Minister Brazauskas the proposal to create the position of the EU Commissioner for enlargement and neighbourhood, which would coordinate a European neighbourhood policy. He also mentioned the matter of expanding in the European Neighbourhood Policy a declaration encouraging Ukraine to aim for joining the EU. He stated that Poland perceived Lithuania as a natural partner in creating the Union's neighbourhood policy, including the Eastern dimension of EU policy. The two prime ministers agreed that the EU should take a decided standpoint referring to the future of Ukraine.

In June, in Lithuania, pre-term presidential elections were held, won by Valdas Adamkus. President Kwaśniewski received this news with content, as—as he emphasised—Adamkus was not only a great friend of Poland but also a person strongly committed to the process of European integration. Adamkus's victory created a new opportunity for continuation of the presidents' cooperation, which was frozen after the accusations towards Paksas had been revealed. The first meeting of the presidents took place in Poland in early August. It was also the first official foreign visit of Adamkus after having been elected. In that way, Lithuania emphasised the significance of its strategic relations with Poland. To strengthen the positive impression on the first day of his visit, Adamkus declared his will to solve the problems of Polish minority in Lithuania, especially in two most delicate cases: spelling of names and return of the land to the Poles living in the Vilnius region. It was also a gesture towards the Polish minority living in Lithuania, which has been supporting President Paksas for a long time as he had been promising many things to it, but also had been keeping his promises (as Prime Minister, he was the first one to give state administration functions to Polish representatives, which were so important for the Polish minority, and touched on the issue of return of lands in the Vilnius region—in the opinion of Lithuanian politicians these were purely populist actions). President Kwaśniewski received the declaration of Adamkus on minorities with satisfaction, emphasising that the rights of Poles in Lithuania have been a burden to bilateral relations for a long time.

Though Adamkus' declaration was not later reflected in any concrete decisions and actions, some important events took place after it. In late August, the Club of Veterans of the Home Army was officially registered in Lithuania. Home Army veterans living in Lithuania have been appealing for its legalisation

for 14 years. This cleared the way for another historic event—the signing, in early September, of the Declaration of reconciliation between the former Home Army soldiers and the auxiliary corps of General Plechavičius, which was fighting on the Nazi side during World War II. The Declaration closed the historic series of misunderstandings between the two nations and contributed to the building of a true partnership, without any historic trauma—which was emphasised by President Adamkus while hosting the veterans of the two units in the Presidential Palace in Vilnius.

The political rapprochement in late 2004 allows the two countries to achieve better cooperation on the EU level. In November, Lithuania gave its support to Poland as regards the issue of direct farm subsidies and joined to its pledge concerning the case filed in June with the European Court of Justice.

The partnership cooperation between the presidents of Poland and Lithuania played a major role in solving the conflict in Ukraine between the authorities and the opposition. In November, Presidents Kwaśniewski and Adamkus accepted the proposal of mediation in Ukraine made by Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma.

President Adamkus decided to leave for Kiev in late November to participate in the round table meeting with the participation of the two candidates for the office of the President of Ukraine—Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych—after having consulted Aleksander Kwaśniewski and contrary to the opinion of Prime Minister Brazauskas, who believed that Lithuania should not interfere in internal affairs of other states.

**The year 2005** in Polish-Lithuanian relations was particularly important because of a series of initiatives, undertaken by the governments of the two states, related to policy towards the East. The January visit of the Speaker of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz to Vilnius was devoted to developing further cooperation as regards Ukraine. The Presidents of Lithuania Adamkus and of Poland Kwaśniewski, participated in the solution of the Ukrainian crisis, provoked by the falsification of results of the second round of presidential elections. During the visit of Cimoszewicz, the Lithuanians put forward an idea of establishing a Ukrainian-Polish-Lithuanian Parliamentary Assembly.

The issue of the Eastern policy was also discussed in early March during the official visit of Polish President Aleksander Kwaśniewski in Vilnius. The president emphasised that both Poland and Lithuania involved in solving the crisis in Ukraine and to a large extent contributed to the success of this state



primarily, but also of the European Union. In relation to the nearing end of his term, President Kwaśniewski made a summary of the last ten years of Polish-Lithuanian relations, pointing out that there is no atmosphere of cautiousness and distrust anymore. In the opinion of Kwaśniewski, Lithuania and Poland are close neighbours now, who can jointly strengthen stability, create a new political quality and help Europe alleviate conflicts as well. In the joint communication issued after the talks, the two presidents emphasised the importance of strategic partnership and good-neighbouring relations of the two countries for harmonious and successful development of the Baltic region and of Europe, and also announced that the problem of spelling of Polish names in Lithuania would soon be resolved. According to Adamkus, a special working group had already sent all necessary recommendations to the government. An important aspect of the visit was the signing, on 9 March, by the ministers of education Mirosław Sawicki from Poland and Remigijus Motuzas from Lithuania of an inter-governmental agreement on mutual recognition of documents entitling undertaking university studies and on recognition of periods of studies, professional titles, academic titles and arts titles, waited for for years particularly by Lithuanian Poles, since a lot of them graduate from Polish universities and then return to Lithuania.

The joint activities of Poland and Lithuania for Ukraine bore its fruit in the establishment on 13 May of Ukrainian-Polish-Lithuanian Parliamentary Assembly in Łuck. The relevant statement was signed by the heads of parliaments: Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz for the Polish Parliament, Arturas Paulauskas for the Lithuanian Parliament and Volodymyr Lytvyn for the Ukrainian Parliament. The major task of the Assembly was to assist Ukraine as regards integration with the European Union and Euro-Atlantic structures. In early June in Vilnius, during the 13<sup>th</sup> session of the Polish-Lithuanian Parliamentary Assembly, the members voted for the development of common policy towards Belarus. In their statement, the two parties announced that they confirmed the purpose of active, mutual support on the EU forum as regards responses to the actions undertaken by Belarussian authorities of any level in relation to discrimination of national minorities in this country. Concerning the issue of the Polish minority in Lithuania and the Lithuanian minority in Poland, Deputy Speaker Tomasz Nałęcz stated that the problems relating mostly to the Polish education system in Lithuania and the Lithuanian one in Poland remain unresolved, as well as the issue of the way of writing Polish names in Lithuania and the return of lands in the Vilnius region. An important moment in mutual relations was the demonstration of solidarity with Poland by the Lithuanian authorities in the Belarussian-Polish

diplomatic conflict, in place for a few months. In July, the President of the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the Lithuanian Seimas, Justinas Karosas, stated that Lithuanian authorities appealed to European Union to cease the implementation of the policy of Belarussian isolation and to let Lithuania to actively cooperate with this country and thus help it overthrow the authoritarian government; in addition, he expressed his solidarity with Poland.

As part of harmonisation of Polish and Lithuanian law with EU regulations, the ministers of justice of the two countries, Andrzej Kalwas and Gintautas Bužinskis signed, in early August in Vilnius, a memo on establishing working groups whose purpose would be to adjust to EU norms the 1993 Polish-Lithuanian agreement on cooperation and mutual legal assistance.

In spite of cordial gestures of Poland and Lithuania and successful cooperation, less pleasurable accents occurred in 2005 as well. In late August, the Polish embassy in Vilnius handed over a note to the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the issue of a destroyed monument of Polish soldiers in Orany—Poles demanded it be rebuilt in the previous form and placed besides Polish tombs in the city's cemetery.

In September, the Polish and Lithuanian authorities were exchanging information and were coordinating activities of state-neighbours vis-à-vis Belarus. A meeting was held in the Chancellery of the Prime Minister in Warsaw of a working group on Belarus, composed of special representatives of Prime Ministers of Lithuania, Latvia, Ukraine and Poland. The initiator of establishment of such a group was the Polish Prime Minister Marek Belka.

Problems concerning Polish minority in Lithuania regarding education, spelling of names and the return of land were discussed during every visit of representatives of Polish authorities in Vilnius. In response to Poland's expectations the Lithuanian government adopted, in September, a draft of a regulation of the spelling of Polish names and surnames in Lithuanian documents, which provides for a possibility of spelling them according to Polish spelling rules. The Director of the Lithuanian Department of National Minorities and Refugees, Antanas Petrauskas, stated that in line with the draft "if a Pole, living in Lithuania, expresses his desire that his name be spelled in Lithuanian documents according to Polish spelling rules and documents that this is the way it is spelled in its original form, he will be able to file for the change of the way it is spelled."<sup>1</sup> It was declared that if the draft act on spelling is approved by the

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<sup>1</sup> Polish Press Agency, 21 September 2005.

Sejm, the act will enter into force on 1 January 2007. At the same time, the Lithuanian authorities have undertaken negotiations with representatives of the Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Vilnius regarding the issue of the destroyed monument of Polish soldiers in Orany. The mayor of the city, Midas Mikalauskas express his regret regarding the fact that the monument had been destroyed and announced that his reconstruction would most probably begin in spring 2006. He emphasised that, as regards this issue, it is essential that a formula be found that could please both parties.

In September, parliamentary elections were held in Poland, which saw the success of the Law and Justice party (PiS). Lithuanian politicians judged the changes to the Polish political scene in a positive way. The victory of PiS was seen with particular satisfaction by conservatives, being in opposition. The deputy president of their party, Rasa Juknevičienė announced that though Poland would be ruled by right-wing politicians, and Lithuania was ruled by left-wing politicians, Polish-Lithuanian relations should not deteriorate.

The victory of Lech Kaczyński in presidential elections in October was also evaluated positively by Lithuanian politicians and media. It was universally emphasised that mutual relations would gain new dynamics.

On 4–5 November in Sejny and Druskininkai a meeting was held between the presidents of Poland A. Kwaśniewski and of Lithuania V. Adamkus. In Sejny, they held talks with representatives with the Lithuanian minority and participated in the ceremony of name-giving to a newly built Lithuanian school, financed from the Lithuanian budget. In Druskininkai in Lithuania, a meeting was held with the Polish minority. Adamkus thanked President Kwaśniewski for what he had done for the rapprochement of the two nations. Kwaśniewski, on his part, called Adamkus a friend and “a great European.” He also said that he perceived the last 10 years, i.e. his two terms of office, as time of very good cooperation between the two countries, which changed Poland and Lithuania for the better. As the most important achievements the incumbent President perceived the support of Poland for the Lithuanian efforts towards NATO accession and the joint accession of the two countries to the European Union. He also emphasised the fact that many issues regarding national minorities had been resolved and adequate standards of treatment of minorities had been adopted.

On 30 November the Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Antanas Valionis, paid a visit to Warsaw with his first working visit after the change of government in Poland. Issues regarding cooperation within the EU were discussed. Valionis, in his discussion with the Polish Foreign Minister Stefan

Meller, stated that Lithuania shared the same standpoint as Poland as regards the EU budget for 2007–2013 and emphasised that the two countries must support each other in this respect. The Federation of Borderland Organisations submitted to the hands of Minister Valionis a protest against “repeated and notorious violation of rights” of the Polish minority in Lithuania.

On December 22 the Polish Senate adopted a resolution on establishment of Parliamentary Assembly of the Sejm and Senate of the Republic of Poland, of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, whose aim would be to examine the issues being of interest for these parliaments, as well as adopting joint standpoints in this respect.”<sup>2</sup>

**2006.** The Lithuanian party had quite significant expectations as regards the change of president and government in Poland after the victory of PiS in presidential and parliamentary elections. What was expected first of all was an acceleration of activities regarding economic projects, such as the construction of Via Baltica highway and the energy bridge. The fact that President Lech Kaczyński, after having taken over his office, did not pay his first foreign visit to Lithuania was received, however, with disappointment. The Lithuanian political elite and media felt that it had been a symbolic gesture of renouncing the tradition commenced by Adamkus and Kwaśniewski, emphasising the importance of the Polish-Lithuanian partnership. The decision of Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz, who, admittedly, decided to pay a visit to Vilnius, but as part of a broader journey to the Baltic states, was also met with surprise. There was also much distrust surrounding the offer of the Polish company PKN Orlen of the purchase of Lithuanian Mažeikiu Nafta concern, submitted in late January.

Lithuanian authorities responded with discontent to the Polish veto on lower VAT rates in the EU. As regards this issue, the President of the Committee for the European Union of the Lithuanian Seimas, Vydas Gedvilas, called on the Polish government for solidarity with other EU states.

The need of return to Polish-Lithuanian dialogue and a revival of mutual relations was much discussed in March on the meeting of the Presidium of the Parliamentary Assembly of Poland and Lithuania.

On 14–15 March President Lech Kaczyński paid an official visit to Lithuania. His meetings with President V. Adamkus and Prime Minister

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<sup>2</sup> Resolution of the Senate of the Republic of Poland of December 2005 ([www.senat.gov.pl](http://www.senat.gov.pl)).

A. Brazauskas and Speaker of the Lithuanian Parliament A. Paulauskas made, first of all, an opportunity to make precise the standpoints of the two parties as regards regional policy and mutual relations. Most importantly, the talks helped establish a joint standpoint of Poland and Lithuania towards the EU's regional policy. Once again, the presidents returned to the problems in bilateral relations and declared their will to resolve them as soon as possible. President Adamkus proved his awareness of the controversies related to the rights of Poles in Lithuania and declared that the issue of spelling of Polish names would soon be resolved. He also assured that the issue of the return of land to Poles in the Vilnius region would be clarified by the end of 2008.

The major issue of talks was energy policy, including joint Polish-Lithuanian investments; the construction of the energy bridge aimed at linking the two countries, the sale of refinery in Mažeikiai that PKN Orlen intended to purchase, and the construction of a new nuclear power plant in Ignalina. The talks were of a break-through nature. Lech Kaczyński emphasised a few times that his visit to Vilnius passed in excellent atmosphere. Some of the Lithuanian observers understood, however, that President Kaczyński made Lithuanians understand clearly, that at that time the contacts of the two countries would be based on national interests.

In April, the governments of Poland and Lithuania returned to the issue of the monument of those killed in action in Orany. And once more the negotiations brought no particular results, as Lithuania did not accept the new solutions proposed by Polish negotiators.

Another opportunity for Polish-Lithuanian talks at the highest level was the visit of President Kaczyński to Vilnius on 3–4 May where he took part in the international conference “Common vision for common neighbourhood,” devoted to Central and Eastern Europe. The conference was attended primarily by presidents of post-USSR states, as well as US Vice-President Dick Cheney, who severely criticised Russia's policy towards the countries of the region, consisting in fact in energy blackmail. Poland and Lithuania attended the meeting as partner states, joint organisers of the conference and shared their experience in fostering democracy with other CEE states. Much attention was paid by the Presidents of Lithuania and Poland to fostering democratic processes in Belarus. During bilateral talks, the issues of energy security and joint Polish-Lithuanian initiatives were once again discussed.

The issue of the spelling of Polish names in Lithuania was opened once more by the Speaker of the Polish Senate, B. Borusewicz, during his visit to Vilnius in

May. The Speaker of the Lithuanian Seimas, Viktoras Muntianas, declared that an appropriate act will be discussed by the Parliament on autumn 2006.

Economic cooperation dominated another meeting of the Parliamentary Assembly of Poland and Lithuania, held in late May. The Lithuanians sought acceleration of joint investments in infrastructure, such as the Via Baltica highway and the Rail Baltica railway, as well as cross-border connection of a power grid. Polish MPs invariably returned to the issue of the rights of Poles in Lithuania, emphasising that all the time the same Polish demands concerning the minority had been negotiated in the Polish-Lithuanian Parliamentary forum since 1997.

In early June, the Lithuanian Parliament approved the sale of Mažeikiu Nafta shares to PKN Orlen. A few days earlier, PKN Orlen signed an agreement with Yukos on the purchase of 53.7% of shares of this Lithuanian enterprise owned by the bankrupt Russian concern. The Polish company agreed to purchase from the Lithuanian government another 30.66% of shares. It was agreed that the Lithuanian government would maintain 10% of the shares. The agreement marked the beginning of a new stage in economic cooperation, including the energy sector, and a new partnership. In the second half of 2006, Polish-Lithuanian relations were intensified on all levels, first of all, however, the economic cooperation between the two states accelerated. Both Poles and Lithuanians demonstrated the political will to carry out economic projects that had been discussed for many years.

On 27 July, shortly after the establishment of a new minority government in Lithuania, Prime Minister G. Kirkilas made his first foreign trip to Warsaw. He held meetings with President L. Kaczyński, Prime Minister J. Kaczyński and the Speakers of the Sejm and the Senate. With Polish authorities, he discussed first of all the issues of ethnic minorities, the construction of the Northern Gas Pipeline and cooperation in energy. Prime Minister Kirkilas declared that—irrespective of the change of governments in Poland and Lithuania—the strategic partnership between the two countries was to be continued, though its nature changed: previously, it had been “purely political” cooperation, and at present it concentrated on particular joint projects. Kirkilas emphasised that both he and the Polish Prime Minister saw the necessity to offer assistance to Belarus and Ukraine. Prime Minister Kaczyński said that the visit of the Lithuanian Prime Minister in Poland served well the rapprochement in Polish-Lithuanian cooperation.

On the occasion of the celebrations of the 15<sup>th</sup> anniversary of re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Poland and the Republic of Lithuania, on 5 September an official visit to Vilnius was paid by President L. Kaczyński. During the talks bilateral issues were discussed, *inter alia* 15 years of cooperation in the area of investments and infrastructure projects were summarised, the situation of national minorities as well as international issues, including energy security, European issues or the cooperation with the EU's Eastern neighbours. The Presidents emphasised that the two countries enjoy very close and strategic relations. According to President Adamkus Poland and Lithuania had overcome the dividing stereotypes: "We can rely on Polish friendship, and Poland can count on Lithuania,"<sup>3</sup> he said. The Presidents also related to particular initiatives. First of all, they declared the will to launch projects of the construction of the energy bridge between Poland and Lithuania and also road connections. President Kaczyński gave assurances that irrespective of shortages oil supplies to the Lithuanian refinery Poland does not intend to sell its shares in the Lithuanian oil company Mažeikiu Nafta, the purchase of which by PKN Orlen would strengthen the energy security of the two states. In the opinion of Adamkus the construction of international communication connections between the Baltic states—via Poland—and Western Europe (the Via Baltica highway and the Rail Baltica railway) should be finished rapidly. President Kaczyński, on his part, declared that he would seek the resolution of the problems of Polish minority in Lithuania. Andrzej Krawczyk, Undersecretary of State in the Chancellery of the President, responsible for international affairs, said, that the participation of the Polish Army in the celebrations of this kind is an outstandingly rare event and indicates the special relations that the two countries enjoy. Lech Kaczyński handed state orders to Polish and Lithuanian activists for contributions in the development of relations between Poland and Lithuania.

Many meetings and talks of state officials of the highest rank of Poland and Lithuania brought measurable results. In September in Warsaw, Deputy Ministers of Economy Tomasz Wilczak from Poland and Anicetas Ignatas from Lithuania signed a letter of intent concerning the construction of the energy bridge between Poland and Lithuania. Lithuania has been seeking the implementation of the project for 10 years, as it would give the Baltic states an energy connection with other EU countries. Poland did not demonstrate any

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<sup>3</sup> *Kurier wileński*, 6 September 2006.

greater interest in this. Its standpoint had changed, because, as stated by President Kaczyński, “It is in Poland’s strategic interest to be linked with various sources of energy from EU and NATO states.”<sup>4</sup> On 29 September, during the visit of the President of Lithuania to Warsaw, Presidents V. Adamkus and L. Kaczyński signed a joint declaration on energy cooperation of the two countries, particularly regarding the so-called energy bridge. The project involves construction of not only a cross-border line from Ełk to Alytus, but also a line within the Polish system, which would allow making the investment a part of the State Power System. Summarising his visit to Poland, President Adamkus said that Poland and Lithuania were demonstrating worldwide that they could build a safer Europe, and at the same time build their citizens’ future. During the visit of President Adamkus, the two Presidents participated in the celebrated opening of the new seat of the Embassy of Lithuania.

As part of the tightening of Polish-Lithuanian relations, the Lithuanian President invited the President of Poland to the summit of the Baltic states (held on 6 November). The Presidents of Poland Lech Kaczyński, of Latvia Vaira Vike-Freiberga, of Estonia Toomas Hendrik Ilves and of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus, discussed first of all regional energy cooperation and the forthcoming NATO summit in Riga, afterwards signing a joint declaration emphasising the significance of the energy sector in the cooperation of the four states.

In late November Lithuania gave its support to the Polish veto to the agreement on cooperation between EU and Russia. Prime Minister Kirkilas assessed this gesture as a natural one, as Poland and Lithuania are strategic partners, share many common interests and care that Russia, in its partnership relations with the EU, observes civilised norms. Prime Minister Kaczyński, on his part, judged the Lithuanian support as much more than valuable.

The 15<sup>th</sup> session of the Parliamentary Assembly, held in early December in Vilnius, was entirely devoted to the assessment of the implementation of the Polish-Lithuanian Treaty. The two parties assessed the Treaty as a model one and stated that strategic partnership was practically implemented in political, economic and cultural cooperation, except the provisions relating to ethnic minorities in the two countries. Poland has been appealing for many years now to Lithuanian authorities to implement the demands of the Polish minority concerning education, return of land and the spelling of names. In the adopted statement, Lithuania obliged itself to resolve the issue of the spelling of names

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<sup>4</sup> See [www.tvbiznes.pl](http://www.tvbiznes.pl).



by the end of March 2007. The Assembly also paid attention to unsatisfactory progress as regards the return of real estate in Vilnius and the Vilnius region and stated that it expected that Lithuanian government and the local administration to immediately undertake activities aimed at the return of property rights. In Lithuania, reprivatisation of land confiscated by the USSR authorities has (in some regions) come to an end. In the Vilnius region, however, where most Poles live, the land had been returned to only about 60% of those entitled to it. Lithuanian Prime Minister G. Kirkilas, participating in the meeting, gave assurances that the land reprivatisation process in Lithuania will come to an end by the end of 2008. In a statement of the Assembly, the educational problems of Polish minority in Lithuania and the Lithuanian minority in Poland were pointed out. It was emphasised that they required being immediately resolved, and the governments of the two states declared financial funding adequate to the needs. Co-Speakers of the Assembly, Deputy Speaker of the Polish Sejm Jarosław Kalinowski, and Deputy Speaker of the Seimas of Lithuania Česlovas Juršėnas expressed hope that tighter economic cooperation between the two countries will serve well the resolution of problems of ethnic minorities.

The tightening of Polish-Lithuanian economic cooperation was confirmed by the signing, in early December in Vilnius, in presence of Prime Ministers of Poland J. Kaczyński and of Lithuania G. Kirkilas, of the Agreement on the project of connection between the Lithuanian and Polish electrical energy systems. In the opinion of heads of governments of both states, the forthcoming construction was to improve energy security in the region. Owing to the linking with Poland, Lithuania, together with Latvia and Estonia, would make a part of European energy system. The heads of governments of the two countries also discussed the issue of participation of Poland in the construction of nuclear plant in Lithuanian town Ignalina. It was agreed that Poland would join the constructing consortium composed of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The new power plant will replace the present Lithuanian nuclear plant in Ignalina, built at the time of USSR and perceived by specialists as dangerous. Prime Minister Kaczyński emphasised personal involvement of Lithuanian Prime Minister Kirkilas in including Poland in the consortium.

An important moment of the visit of Prime Minister Kaczyński in Vilnius was the meeting with Prime Minister of Latvia Aigars Kalvitis and Estonia Andrus Ansip on the occasion of meetings of the Baltic Council. Polish Prime Minister was invited to participate in the talks at the request of Lithuania. The heads of governments of the four states accentuated the need for closer energy

cooperation, which has strategic significance for further integration of the three Baltic states on the EU energy market.

During the meeting with representatives of Polish social organisations in Lithuania, Prime Minister Kaczyński assured them that Poland will seek a more rapid resolution of problems of Polish minority in Lithuania, he also drew attention to some form of asymmetry in Polish-Lithuanian relations: on the one hand very good state relations with particularly dynamically developing economic cooperation, and on the other problems of Lithuanian Poles, its resolution not being brought to an end.

On 15 December, as a result of the largest privatisation transaction in the history of independent Lithuania, PKN Orlen became an owner of the Lithuanian oil company Mažeikiu Nafta. The Polish company took over a controlling stake of 84.36% of its shares for \$2.34 billion. Lithuanian authorities emphasised that the agreement confirms the strategic partnership with Poland. The takeover by PKN Orlen of the majority stake of shares makes the largest investment in the refinery-petrochemical industry in Central and Eastern Europe in recent years.

### **Cultural and Social Cooperation**

The cooperation of Lithuanian and Polish historians launched with the signing of the Polish-Lithuanian Treaty in 1994, bore its fruit in the following years in the form of new initiatives. On January 2004, the heads of Polish and Lithuanian state archives decided to make available the copies of some documents that might be necessary to gain some new insight into the history of the two countries. This important initiative was to help citizens of the two countries in their search of historical documents concerning the past of their families on the two sides of the border without the necessity of visiting the neighbouring country.

The 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the signing of the Polish-Lithuanian Treaty was an occasion to launch many cultural initiatives, for example on 26 April the Days of Polish Culture began, opened with a solemn concert in the Lithuanian National Philharmonic in Vilnius, with the works of *inter alia* Karol Szymanowski, Henryk Mikołaj Górecki and Wojciech Kilar being played. Apart from that, concerts of Polish musical bands, plenty of exhibitions and Polish film shows were held promoting Polish culture and Polish artists in Lithuania. Of great significance to cultural cooperation was the initiative of organising two exhibitions as part of one project—Vilnius in Warsaw-Warsaw in Vilnius—making part of

an international programme of cultural exchanges. In Warsaw a large exhibition of modern Lithuanian artists was opened, and a similar exhibition of Polish artists in Vilnius.

In late May the Vilnius spring festival was held in Warsaw. The programme of this event, organised under the patronage of local governments of the two capitals, encompassed meetings of businessmen and entrepreneurs, exhibitions, and the presentation of Lithuanian cuisine and concerts. The purpose of the festival was to promote Vilnius in Poland—for the first time on such a scale. On this occasion, a Business Forum for Polish and Lithuanian entrepreneurs was held. Apart from that, an exhibition was opened entitled Ancient Maps of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania from the collection of Vilnius University and a photography exhibition entitled The Baroque of Vilnius. Moreover, a concert by Konstantinas Čiurlionis and a jazz concert by the Vilnius Jazz Quartet were held. The festival was closed with a solemn concert of St. Christopher Chamber Orchestra from Vilnius in the Royal Castle.

In June, the Sejm of Poland and Seimas of Lithuania honoured with the Award of the two Nations, granted to persons with significant contributions to the culture of both countries, Professor Mieczysław Jackiewicz and Professor Edmundas Zavadskas. The award was presented in early July in Wrocław, where the 12<sup>th</sup> session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland and the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania was held under the slogan “Poland and Lithuania from the Treaty to the European Union.”

In July, the two states celebrated traditionally the anniversary of the Battle of Grunwald, celebrated with a staging of the combat.

The beginning of the new academic year saw the Universities of Vilnius and Toruń sign a partnership agreement. During the celebrations of the 425<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the establishment of Vilnius University it was emphasised that among co-creators of the Nicolaus Copernicus University in 1945 were many scientists of the former Stefan Batory University in Vilnius, who were repatriated to Poland after the war.

In 2005 the 6<sup>th</sup> Book Fair was held in Vilnius. 12 Polish publishing houses were presented on the occasion. One of the guests was the winner of 2004 Nike Book Award, Wojciech Kuczok. Polish books had been present at the Vilnius fair for six—years since the beginning. After the closing of the event, the books were handed over to the libraries of the Polish Institute in Vilnius and Chair of Polish Philology at Vilnius University. In April, as part of the 5<sup>th</sup> Polish Film Week in Vilnius, eight feature films were presented, such as *Warszawa* by

Dariusz Gajewski, *Pregi* by Magdalena Piekorz, *Żurek* by Ryszard Brylski, *Wesele* by Wojciech Smarzowski, *Ubu Król* by Piotr Szulkin, *Symetria* by Konrad Niewolski and two animated films. For the first time many films of younger generation directors were shown, films which show Polish reality, a modern Pole, his problems and moral dilemmas.

In late February of 2006, the 7<sup>th</sup> Vilnius Book Fair began, during which new publications of Polish publishing houses were presented, books on Polish-Lithuanian topics as well as Science Fiction books. The guest of the fair was Andrzej Sapkowski.

Another social and cultural initiative aimed at bringing the two societies closer were the Days of Polish Cities, held in April in Vilnius. During many events, the inhabitants of the city could get to know such cities as Warsaw, Kraków, Gdańsk and Łódź better. Moreover, Festival of Polish Film was held for the sixth time.

One of the most important cultural events were the Days of Lithuania in Poland, aimed at a broad presentation of Lithuanian culture, tradition, economy and opportunities for tourism development. First of all, however, the Days were to celebrate the 15<sup>th</sup> anniversary of establishment of diplomatic relations. The patronage of presidents of Poland L. Kaczyński and of Lithuania V. Adamkus added to the importance of the event. Between September and December, in 16 Polish cities 120 cultural events were held. 19 Polish writers, film directors, poets, artists, journalists and scientists were honoured with orders granted by the President of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus. Minister of Culture and National Heritage, Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski stated that through this initiative Poland intended to emphasise close contacts with its Lithuanian neighbour. Minister of Culture of Lithuania Jonas Jučas observed that Lithuania and Poland are linked not only by strong historic ties, but also by the political and economic partnership of the present time.

In October in Vilnius, on the occasion of the 15<sup>th</sup> anniversary of re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Poland and Lithuania, Ambassador of Poland Janusz Skolimowski presented 13 outstanding people of culture from Lithuania with high Polish state distinctions, granted by President Kaczyński, in recognition of their contribution to the development of bilateral cooperation. A month later in Warsaw, Krzysztof Zanussi and Izabella Cywińska were granted Lithuanian state awards for Poles who rendered great service to the development of political, cultural and social cooperation of the two states.

## Military Cooperation

In late April **2004** Polish-Lithuanian mechanised patrols began to control the common frontier, which—after 1 May—began an internal EU frontier. The dismantling of the barbed wire fence dividing the two states also began. Instead of entanglements, modern devices were used. On May 1 customs control on the Polish-Lithuanian border crossing was brought to a halt, with ID control being the only one left.

Military cooperation reflected first of all the events in political relations. In the beginning of the year, it was made difficult as a result of the unclear situation around President Paksas. An important meeting—the first one after the accession of the two states to NATO and the EU—was held only in late May. In Vilnius, Defence Minister Jerzy Szmajdziński was hosted by A. Paulauskas, as acting president of Lithuania. The topic of the talks was the participation of the two states in military operations in Iraq. Politicians spoke in favour of an increased role of the international community in political stabilisation and economic reconstruction in the country. They also expressed the unity of opinion as regards the creation of a rapid reaction force of the EU and a will to be part of joint actions as part of the EU, the expansion of the Polish-Lithuanian LITPOLBAT battalion, the integration of command systems and air defence of the two countries, as well as exchange of experience in reforming the armed forces. Moreover, Minister Szmajdziński held a meeting with Lithuanian Defence Minister Linas Linkevičius, who thanked the Polish government for its active support of his country in its NATO accession. Szmajdziński offered Polish assistance in the integration of the Lithuanian Navy with NATO and in modernising the Lithuanian Navy in cooperation with the Polish defence industry. Poland obliged itself to hand over to Lithuania 14 SET 53 anti-submarine torpedoes together with 918M anti-submarine boats. Both ministers confirmed continuation of the “open door” policy in NATO enlargement and agreed their opinions as regards NATO-Ukraine relations.

In **2005**, Polish-Lithuanian military cooperation was deepening through joint participation in various missions and military initiatives. In June, military manoeuvres (the largest after NATO accession) were held in Lithuania. The two-week manoeuvres (under the code name Amber Hope 2005) were attended by 2,200 soldiers from 12 states, including 230 soldiers from Poland, from the Polish-Lithuanian LITPOLBAT battalion, and 11 Polish staff officers.

On 10 June, during a Brussels meeting of NATO Defence Ministers, the minister of Poland, Jerzy Szmajdziński, of Lithuania Gediminas Kirkilas and of

Ukraine Anatoliy Hrytsenko, signed a letter of intent concerning the establishment of the Polish-Lithuanian-Ukrainian battalion POLUKRLITBAT. Thus, they confirmed the will of further development of military cooperation between the three states and declared continuation of actions for Euro-Atlantic stability and security.

In November Lithuanian Defence Minister Gediminas Kirkilas announced that Lithuania would decrease its forces in Iraq. He emphasised that his country would not send new soldiers to replace the 50-person sub-unit that would leave Iraq in January 2006, where it was serving in the Centre-South division, commanded by Poland. In the opinion of the minister, this was related to the withdrawal of Polish forces from Iraq. Kirkilas announced that another 50-person Lithuanian sub-unit would be left in Iraq, which was serving in a Danish battalion in the south of the country, in the British zone of responsibility. On 30 December the Polish Military Contingent Orlik began monitoring and defence of the air space of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The operation, carried out as part of the Air Policing NATO task, was planned to take three months. After its conclusions both Poland and Lithuania emphasised that the cooperation was going on very smoothly. Lithuanian Defence Minister Gediminas Kirkilas considered it to have been one of the best such exercises.

Another step on the road to reconciliation of the soldiers who had been fighting on opposite sides, was a joint July trip of ex-soldiers of Home Army and Lithuanian auxiliary corps of General Povilas Plechavičius to celebrate the 595<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Grunwald victory, being—as mentioned the advisor of the Lithuanian Prime Minister, Vilius Kavaliauskas—the symbol of brotherhood of the two nations.

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At the beginning, what could be seen in the relations between Poland and Lithuania, established after 1990, was mutual distrust, grounded in much historical trauma and complex problems related to mutual treatment of the Polish minority in Lithuania and of the Lithuanian minority in Poland. These issues weighed heavily on diplomatic contacts and contributed to the prolonging of negotiations of the Treaty on friendly relations and good-neighbourly cooperation, signed finally in 1994 (preceded by a Declaration on friendly relations and good-neighbourly cooperation of 1992).

The signing of the Treaty has been a breakthrough, giving a clear impulse to the joint activities of Poland and Lithuania on various platforms, first of all the

political one. In 1997, the two countries institutionalised the forms of political cooperation on a few levels, and established a Consultation Board with the Presidents of the Republic of Poland and of the Republic of Lithuania, the Polish-Lithuanian Parliamentary Assembly as well as the Intergovernmental Cooperation Council. Relations between the two countries in the political dimension became a positive example, a model even, for many countries with historical problems, not only in Europe, but also in Caucasus, where Lithuanian diplomacy is very active. Both countries shared their experience eagerly, both concerning the building of democratic societies and overcoming of historical traumas and shaping a partnership. The result of the signing of the Treaty was an agreement on strategic partnership, concluded after Poland's NATO accession. Thus, Lithuania was given support in its NATO ambitions, and Poland took over the role of Lithuania's advocate in this organisation.

Though political cooperation between Poland and Lithuania became a model one, its practical dimension was not always satisfactory. Joint decisions were of a declaratory nature and were not reflected in specific actions. Poland sought rights for Poles living in Lithuania, while Lithuanians stressed the need for development of energy cooperation, especially the construction of cross-border linking between electrical systems as well as for the support of Poland for the construction of the new nuclear power plant in Lithuania. The breakthrough came in 2006—the investment of Polish company PKN Orlen, supported by the new government in Poland, became an incentive for the expansion of cooperation and intensification of activities in favour of energy security. For the first time, the strategic partnership between Poland and Lithuania began to take on a practical dimension. Of vital importance for the positive character of strategic Polish-Lithuanian relations, however, will be the way in which Lithuania responds to Polish demands concerning the rights of the Polish minority. Though during Polish-Lithuanian talks at various levels the will of Lithuanians to resolve the issue is visible, every other date offered by them did not bring expected outcomes.

## Relations between Poland and Ukraine

The year 2006 brought important changes to the relations between Poland and Ukraine, which were largely a consequence of parliamentary and presidential elections held in Poland (2005), and parliamentary elections in Ukraine (2006). Economic cooperation was developing dynamically, although not without its problems. On the other hand, satisfactory progress was absent in such areas as border traffic or illegal employment of Ukrainians in Poland.

### Political Relations

Both the authors of Polish foreign policy and the representatives of the presidential camp in Ukraine declared in 2006 that the two states would remain strategic partners.<sup>1</sup> In the annual address on the Polish foreign policy objectives, delivered by Minister of Foreign Affairs Stefan Meller at the Sejm (Lower House of Parliament) in February, Ukraine was the state referred to most often, and transformations initiated by the “Orange Revolution,” Poland’s involvement in the process, as well as the development of relations with Ukraine were quoted as examples of accomplishments of the Polish diplomacy.<sup>2</sup> However, Ukraine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Borys Tarasyuk, in his November speech at Verkhovna Rada (the Parliament), mentioned Poland only twice in the context of Ukraine’s regional policy.<sup>3</sup>

In practice, the relations between the two countries became looser. This is best evidenced by the fact that in 2005, Presidents Aleksander Kwaśniewski and Viktor Yushchenko met at least seven times, while Lech Kaczyński had only four meetings with his Ukrainian counterpart in 2006. At the turn of March

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<sup>1</sup> Address by Y. Yehanurov at the meeting organised by the Centre for International Relations, Warsaw, 17 February 2006, Ukraine—Poland—Kowal, IAR Newswire of 15 November 2006 ([www.securities.com](http://www.securities.com)).

<sup>2</sup> See above, p. 24.

<sup>3</sup> Виступ Міністра закордонних справ України Бориса Тарасюка на засіданні Верховної Ради України, 15 November 2006 ([www.mfa.gov.ua](http://www.mfa.gov.ua)).



2006, L. Kaczyński took his first official visit to Ukraine. In May, Poland was visited by V. Yushchenko. Also in May, both presidents met at the conference “Shared vision for Neighbourhood Relations,” held in Vilnius, and subsequently in Kyiv, during the Summit of GUAM Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development, where President Kaczyński was invited as a guest. A drop in the number of meetings at the level of heads of state partially resulted from the fact that Prime Ministers of both countries, namely Jarosław Kaczyński and Viktor Yanukovich, started to play leading roles in the bilateral relations. In 2005, Prime Ministers of Poland and Ukraine met twice, and thrice in the subsequent year. In February, Warsaw hosted Ukraine’s Prime Minister Yuri Yehanurov. In September, Prime Minister Yanukovich attended the 16<sup>th</sup> Economic Forum in Krynica. In November, Jarosław Kaczyński made an official visit to Kyiv.

The new Polish authorities probably wanted to continue the previous policy on Ukraine, being aware of the need to strengthen democratic transformations in the country, to support its Euro-Atlantic aspirations, to develop bilateral cooperation in the area of energy, or to solve bilateral problems, such as border traffic.<sup>4</sup> This scenario is corroborated by the fact that L. Kaczyński cooperated on Ukraine with his predecessor, Aleksander Kwaśniewski—formerly one of the key authors of the Polish policy on Ukraine, currently the Chairman of the Supervisory Board of the International Centre for Policy Studies—a non-governmental think-tank located in Kyiv. We should also note here that, essentially, the Polish authorities did not criticise the policy on Ukraine of the previous government, unlike their European policy, or relations with Germany. In practice, however, relations with Ukraine were not sufficiently high on the priority list, which resulted from the lack of experience in foreign policy, unstable situation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and focus on domestic policies.

The situation in Ukraine at the beginning of 2006 was not conducive to developing bilateral relations, either. Ukrainian authorities underscored the importance of Poland’s support for the Ukrainian effort to join the EU and NATO, as well as expressed their intent to develop cooperation in the area of energy.<sup>5</sup> In real terms, however, they focused on restoring regular relations with Russia following the January gas crisis and on the parliamentary elections,

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<sup>4</sup> E.g. address of Minister of Foreign Affairs Stefan Meller—see above, p. 23–24.

<sup>5</sup> Address by Y. Yehanurov...

scheduled for March. The above factors had a destabilising impact on the Ukrainian political scene, which resulted in the dismissal by the Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council) of Y. Yehanurov's government in January 2006. The decision had no practical effects owing to inconsistencies in the provisions of the Ukrainian constitution.

An important challenge to the relations between Poland and Ukraine was the March parliamentary elections in Ukraine, a post-election political chaos in the country, and finally the emergence of the "anti-crisis coalition," with V. Yanukovich as the Prime Minister (August 2006). Polish authorities closely followed the developments in the election campaign in Ukraine. During his visit to Kyiv, President L. Kaczyński stated that he would prefer to see the reformist camp, i.e. the so-called Orange, in power. However, he emphasised that Poland would cooperate with any government in Ukraine.<sup>6</sup> The fiasco of negotiations among "Our Ukraine," Yulia Tymoshenko Block and Socialist Party of Ukraine, headed by Oleksandr Moroz, and the establishment of the "anti-crisis coalition," led by the Party of Regions (July 2006), met with negative reaction in Poland. In their unofficial statements, Polish diplomats voiced concerns that some people from the management of the Party of Regions showed anti-Polish sentiments. Officially, Polish authorities did not present a uniform position on the issue. Towards the end of July, when President V. Yushchenko attempted to block the election of V. Yanukovich as Prime Minister, J. Kaczyński declared that Poland would hold talks with any democratically chosen government in Ukraine.<sup>7</sup> Minister of Foreign Affairs Anna Fotyga, in her interview for *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, offered a similar statement, but also said: "essentially, we support Yushchenko." This statement, sincere as it was, showed that a real coordination of actions on Ukraine was missing. Moreover, it exposed Poland to accusations of interfering with the internal affairs of another state, and impeded the start of potential cooperation with the new Ukrainian government.

As a result of a compromise reached with President V. Yushchenko, V. Yanukovich assumed the duties of Prime Minister at the beginning of August. His position in the Ukrainian political system was markedly stronger than that of his predecessors, which is a consequence of the constitutional reform of December 2004, effective from 2006. The return to power of V. Yanukovich and

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<sup>6</sup> A. Kołodziejska, Kaczyński na Ukrainie, IAR Newswire of 1 March 2006 ([www.securities.com](http://www.securities.com)).

<sup>7</sup> We Will Talk with any Government in Ukraine—Polish Premier, BBC Monitoring of 26 July 2006 ([www.securities.com](http://www.securities.com)).

the Party of Regions represented an important change in Polish-Ukrainian relations. Polish authorities had to learn how to cooperate with a politician who, in 2004, was viewed as a former criminal, Russia's candidate, and a supporter of authoritarian government methods. They also had to come to terms with the fact that the heritage of the "Orange Revolution," would, from then on, be much less of a uniting experience for the Polish and Ukrainian authorities. Equally important was also the fact that V. Yanukovich, unlike V. Yushchenko, did not define his foreign policy objectives, prioritising in the first place the improvement of relations with Russia, ensuring energy security for the state and protecting economic interests of Donetsk oligarchs. Under these circumstances, a growing role in the bilateral relations started to be played by economic affairs. Increasingly more hypothetical prospects for Ukraine's accession to Euro-Atlantic structures vanished in the background.

### Historical Policy

One of the important dates of the May visit of V. Yushchenko in Poland was the meeting in Pawlokoma (Podkarpackie Province), where a monument dedicated to 366 Ukrainians who died in 1945 at the hands of the Polish resistance movement was unveiled, and a tribute was paid to the Polish and Ukrainian victims of the conflict between two nations. President V. Yushchenko emphasised on this occasion that Poland and Ukraine were giving evidence of the new policy of solidarity.<sup>8</sup> President L. Kaczyński did not apologise to Ukrainians (similarly, Leonid Kuchma failed to do so in 2003, in relation to the Volhynia tragedy), although he quoted the words of the Lord's Prayer: "and forgive us our trespasses as we forgive them that trespass against us."<sup>9</sup> The event in Pawlokoma met with good response of the majority of Polish politicians. Critical voices were heard from representatives of All-Poland Youth (Młodzież Wszechpolska), linked with the Polish Families' League (Liga Polskich Rodzin), member of the government coalition.<sup>10</sup>

In August, a burial location of Polish victims of NKVD, murdered in 1940, was discovered in Bykownia, near Kyiv. Buried there are probably some of 3.5 thousand officers, including police officers, officials and clerks, arrested at the

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<sup>8</sup> Ukrainian President Thanks Poland for Memory of War Victims, BBC Monitoring of 13 May 2006.

<sup>9</sup> Polsko-ukraiński gest pojednania ([www.prezydent.pl](http://www.prezydent.pl)).

<sup>10</sup> „Wszechpolacy: Prezydencie, nie przepraszaaj Ukraińców,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 11 May 2006.

beginning of the war by the Soviets and kept in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Research on the subject is being carried out by the Institute of National Remembrance as well as the Council for the Remembrance of Struggle and Martyrdom, in cooperation with Ukraine's Security Service. In December, in the presence of the Chairman of Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada Oleksandr Moroz, Sejm adopted by acclamation a resolution on declaring the Great Famine in Ukraine in 1932–1933 a crime of genocide.<sup>11</sup> This decision was a sign of support from the Polish MPs for the Ukrainian president, who wants the remembrance of the Great Famine to be one of important elements of the national identity of all Ukrainians. It should be remembered that few days before the resolution of the Polish Parliament, a similar resolution was adopted, not without controversies among Ukrainian political elites and with Russia's objection, by the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada.

### **Cooperation in Foreign Policy**

An important element of the bilateral cooperation at the declarative level remained foreign policy—notably the rapprochement between Ukraine and NATO and the European Union. In practice, however, cooperation in this area has failed to yield any significant accomplishments, which resulted from Ukraine's inconsistent policy, scepticism from the European Union and NATO about the prospects of accession for this country, and finally divergent priorities of Polish and Ukrainian authorities.

Polish authorities support further development of the Eastern European direction of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, as well as consistently advocate further enlargement of the Union to cover Ukraine, although they are aware that this will be a lengthy process.<sup>12</sup> Poland's efforts in 2006 for the rapprochement between Ukraine and the European Union focused on achieving advantageous provisions in the Ukraine-EU agreement, which should be signed in 2008, and replace the Partnership and cooperation agreement adopted in 1994. Poland suggested that the new document should resemble association agreements signed with countries of Central and Eastern Europe and reiterate "European prospects" for Ukraine. These proposals were rejected by the majority of Member States and the European Commission, which argued that the

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<sup>11</sup> Uchwała Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 6 grudnia 2006 r. w sprawie uczczenia ofiar Wielkiego Głodu na Ukrainie ([www.sejm.gov.pl](http://www.sejm.gov.pl)).

<sup>12</sup> Address by Minister of Foreign Affairs Stefan Meller, see above, p. 14.

enlargement is not among the objectives of the European Neighbourhood Policy at that moment.<sup>13</sup>

Support for Ukraine's accession to NATO is composed of political actions and military cooperation. Poland declared itself in favour of continued "open door policy" of the Alliance. As argued by the Polish Prime Minister, the accession of Ukraine and Georgia is indispensable to secure crude oil supplies from the Caspian Sea for NATO members.<sup>14</sup> Among specific actions intended to bring Ukraine closer to the Alliance, we should mention the signing in August by Chiefs of Staff of both countries, Franciszek Gągor and Serhey Kyruchenko, of the assistance scheme to align Ukrainian armed forces with the requirements of the "Partnership for Peace" Planning and Review Process.<sup>15</sup> Poland's policy on Ukraine's integration with NATO suffered a heavy blow in 2006. Although Prime Minister V. Yanukovich promised in Krynica in September that Ukraine would still strive to achieve membership status in the Alliance,<sup>16</sup> soon thereafter he announced in Brussels that Ukraine suspended its efforts to join the Membership Action Plan (MAP) and therefore to enter NATO.<sup>17</sup> This decision clearly showed weaknesses of the "strategic partnership" between Poland and Ukraine, and put a question mark over Polish efforts for Ukraine's accession to the Alliance. Irrespective of that, representatives of Polish authorities still expressed their hope that Ukraine would become a member of the organisation in the future.<sup>18</sup>

### Economic Cooperation

Although both countries are not the most important economic partners for each other, the cooperation between Poland and Ukraine in this area is developing dynamically. The value of Polish exports to Ukraine in 2006 totalled \$2.11 billion (50% more than in 2005), while imports from Ukraine were at

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<sup>13</sup> K. Niklewicz, "Polska walczy o Ukrainę," *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 18 October 2006.

<sup>14</sup> Polish President Says Ukraine, Georgia Should Join NATO, BBC Monitoring of 29 November 2006 ([www.securities.com](http://www.securities.com)).

<sup>15</sup> Poland to Help Ukraine in NATO Integration, BBC Monitoring of 10 August 2006.

<sup>16</sup> Polish, Ukrainian Premiers Discuss EU, NATO, Economy, BBC Monitoring of 6 September 2006.

<sup>17</sup> Yanukovich Buries Yushchenko's NATO Prospects, 14 September 2006 ([www.pravda.com.ua](http://www.pravda.com.ua)).

<sup>18</sup> Ukraine will Become NATO Member Sooner or Later, Says Polish Premier, BBC Monitoring of 14 September 2006 ([www.securities.com](http://www.securities.com)).

\$1.34 billion (growth by 33.1%). Poland was the fourth largest receiver of Ukrainian goods and fifth top supplier to the Ukrainian market.<sup>19</sup> Ukraine came eighth in the ranking of Polish export receivers, and was below the top ten in terms of exports to Poland.<sup>20</sup>

The key problem in trade relations was undoubtedly the ban on imports of Polish meat, introduced by Ukraine in March, officially for sanitary reasons. Initially, the ban also covered imports from Moldova and Belarus. Ukraine accused Poland of exporting, on numerous occasions, meat of low quality and missing veterinary documentation. The problem of meat smuggling from Poland to Ukraine was also referred to. In practice, however, Ukraine's decision was linked, as it seems, primarily with the ban on imports of meat products from Ukraine, introduced by Russia. Russia motivated their decision by the fact that Ukraine received meat of unknown origin and Ukraine subsequently decided to limit their imports of meat products. The ban on Polish meat imports introduced by Ukraine, and Russia, posed a serious problem for Polish producers. Despite several months of talks at the level of customs and veterinary services, as well as at the government level (Andrzej Lepper's visit to Kyiv in September 2006), inspections carried out by Ukrainians in Polish meat plants, as well as bilateral agreements made in November, the embargo on imports of Polish meat was not entirely lifted by the end of the year. Ukrainians informed Poland that the inspection held at Polish sites confirmed the charges concerning the quality of Polish meat products. As a response to these actions by Ukraine, Poland introduced stricter checks on Ukrainian imports, threatened that it would take appropriate action as a member of the European Union, as was the case with Russia (the threat did not translate into real actions) and finally announced the launch of embargo on some Ukrainian food products. It should be noted here, that the consequences of the Ukrainian embargo were contrary to those expected by Ukrainian authorities, as meat smuggling from Poland into Ukraine surged following introduction of the ban.

In 2006, Polish investment in Ukraine grew substantially. In January 2007, the aggregated value was at \$366 million (63.4% more than at the beginning of 2006).<sup>21</sup> Ukrainian investment in Poland did not experience a growth on such a

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<sup>19</sup> Географічна структура зовнішньої торгівлі товарами за 2006 рік ([www.ukrstat.gov.ua](http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua)).

<sup>20</sup> Obroty handlu zagranicznego ogółem i według krajów I–IX 2006 r., 13 November 2006 ([www.stat.gov.pl](http://www.stat.gov.pl)).

<sup>21</sup> Прямі іноземні інвестиції в Україну (на 1 січня 2007 року) ([www.ukrstat.gov.ua](http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua)).

spectacular scale and totalled, in October 2006, \$24.2 million (growth by 19.2%).<sup>22</sup> Nevertheless, Poland remained second largest, in terms of investment value, state for Ukrainian investors. Ukraine ranked eleventh in terms of the value of direct foreign investment in Poland. The growth in Polish investment in Ukraine can be traced back to the policies of at least a dozen or so Polish companies. Empik Media & Fashion Group (e.g. “Empik” bookshops, “Smyk” shops) entered into agreement on acquiring over 27 bookshops of “Bukva” company, and Kyiv children clothing shops “Kinderland.” The total value of the transaction was \$11.38 million. “Śnieżka,” Paint and Lacquer plant purchased shares in its proprietary factory “Śnieżka–Ukraina I,” located in Jaworowo (Lviv district). Significant investment project in western Ukraine was carried out by the Polish Meat Group “Duda,” purchasing a majority stake in the pig farm in Zoria (Volhynia District) for \$1.48 million. New factories in Ukraine were purchased by Cersanit S.A., a manufacturer of bathroom furnishings and sanitary ceramics, and by Grupa Barlinek, a manufacturer of natural, wooden floor panels. The decision on expanding its presence in Ukraine in the forthcoming years was taken by e.g. Pekao S.A. (UniCredit Bank Ukraine), PKO BP (Kredobank), Iberia Motor Capital Group, Infovide-Matrix S.A., Globe Trade Centre S.A., Inter Groclin Auto S.A. The aggregate value of investment projects planned by these businesses in the next five years totals at least \$400 million.

Ukrainian investors are also interested in Poland. Industrial Union of Donbas, that bought Huta Częstochowa S.A. steel works in 2005, intends to invest in the Polish shipbuilding industry. In accordance with agreements made in November and December, Ukrainians will probably become the majority stakeholder in Stocznia Gdynia S.A. shipyard, and will also acquire 5% of shares in Stocznia Gdańska S.A. shipyard. IUD also wanted to purchase shares in GCB Centrostal-Bydgoszcz S.A. (currently, Industrial Union of Donbas holds 50.91% of shares in the company through the Ukrainian Mining and Steel Processing Company), still with the Polish State Treasury. On this project, however, no agreement was reached. Centrostal’s privatisation was one of the items on the agenda of the talks held by Prime Minister J. Kaczyński during his visit to Kyiv in November 2006, as Prime Minister Yanukovich accused the Polish government of blocking the privatisation of GCB Centrostal-Bydgoszcz: “We are concerned about the fact that the Polish partners not only refused to

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<sup>22</sup> Прямі інвестиції з України в економіку країн світу (на 1 січня 2007 року), *ibidem*.

agree to sell the company to an Ukrainian investor, but also failed to justify that decision.”<sup>23</sup> Poland attempted to play down the problem and made a promise to clarify the issue.

In March 2005, Yulia Tymoshenko’s government decided on the withdrawal of concessions in special economic zones, where approx. 70 Polish companies were present. Cancellation of that decision was considered by Y. Yehanurov’s government, but it was only the government of V. Yanukovych that decided, immediately after his assumption of Prime Minister duties in August 2006, on partial restoration of preferential incentives for investors at SEZ. The relevant decision was incorporated into tax laws adopted in November by Verkhovna Rada.<sup>24</sup> The decision of the Ukrainian government was probably motivated by the interests of businesses linked with the Party of Regions, and met with positive feedback in Poland. In practice, the decision will be important for smaller businesses and those that want to enter the Ukrainian market. Large Polish companies already present in the county are faring well without concessions in special economic zones, which is best evidenced by the examples of new Polish investment projects in Ukraine, listed above.

A significant component of economic cooperation was the energy industry. Stopping gas deliveries to Ukraine by Gazprom on 1 January posed a serious threat to the country’s energy security. It also caused the limiting of gas supplies to Poland, since Ukraine started to collect gas pumped to the European Union countries. These limitations accounted for 14% of gas used in Poland.<sup>25</sup> Regular levels of gas supplies from Ukraine came back on 3 January. Presidents of Poland and Ukraine held telephone consultations during the gas crisis. During L. Kaczyński’s visit to Kyiv at the turn of Match, a declaration was signed on the development of cooperation in energy. The document expresses the will to upgrade the existing transmission infrastructure, and to explore opportunities for new natural gas transportation routes from Central Asia to Europe. The document also emphasised that cooperation in energy was “one of prioritised elements of strategic partnership between the Republic of Poland and

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<sup>23</sup> Ukraina—Janukowycz krytykuje Polskę za Centrostal, IAR Newswire of 15 November 2006 ([www.securities.com](http://www.securities.com)).

<sup>24</sup> Закон України про внесення змін до деяких законодавчих актів України з питань оподаткування, 30 листопада 2006 року ([www.rada.gov.ua](http://www.rada.gov.ua)).

<sup>25</sup> “Efekty ograniczenia dostaw gazu przez Gazprom dla Ukrainy,” *Raport Bieżący* (Polskie Gazownictwo i Górnictwo Naftowe S.A.), 2006, no. 1 ([www.pgnig.pl](http://www.pgnig.pl)).



Ukraine.”<sup>26</sup> Both countries considered the option of initiating cooperation on the upgrade and development of underground gas depots in Ukraine.

The most crucial question, however, remained to be the future of Odessa-Brody pipeline. The issue was discussed during the talks between Prime Ministers of Poland and Ukraine in February 2006. Y. Yehanurov insisted on extending the pipeline to Płock, announcing that if this proposal was not used, Ukraine would send the Caspian oil towards the Baltic Sea through Belarus and Lithuania.<sup>27</sup> Ukrainians also considered exporting crude oil to the Czech Republic, or building their own refinery in Brody. The Polish government came up with relatively positive response to the proposals for the extended pipeline Odessa-Brody to Płock, although the Ukrainian party complained about inertia of Polish partners. Prime Minister Y. Yehanurov made it very clear: “what we are missing here is real actions by the Polish.”<sup>28</sup> In March, a new, more advantageous from the financial standpoint, Brody-Płock pipeline project was presented. In summer, the issue of the pipeline’s future came to a standstill in connection with the political situation in Ukraine. Initially, the new Ukrainian authorities were ambiguous about the case. During the meeting in Krynica in September, Prime Ministers J. Kaczyński and V. Yanukovych jointly declared themselves in favour of the Odessa-Brody pipeline extension to Płock. According to the Polish Prime Minister, the project could be financed with the European Union funding, but the decision in this case is to be made by the European Commission.<sup>29</sup> In November, Prime Ministers of both countries agreed that the first step to lead to the joint undertaking would be the construction of a pipeline section connecting Brody and the Czech Kralupy. It is not certain whether Ukraine believes in the success of the project, or wants to motivate Poland to show more initiative in its actions for the extension of the existing pipeline to Płock. As argued by Ukraine’s Minister of Fuels and Energy Yuri Boyko, the Caspian oil could be pumped to Poland in 2008, with Russia playing a role in the pipeline construction. No clear-cut declarations in this respect were made by representatives of Poland.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Wspólna Deklaracja Prezydentów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i Ukrainy w sprawie rozwoju współpracy w energetyce, Kijów, 28 lutego 2006 r. ([www.bbn.gov.pl](http://www.bbn.gov.pl)).

<sup>27</sup> Y. Yehanurov, “Ukraina może na Polsce polegać,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 16 February 2006.

<sup>28</sup> T. Serwetnyk, “Rurociąg dzieli sojuszników,” *Rzeczpospolita* of 1 March 2006.

<sup>29</sup> M. Kuźmich, “Polska chce się połączyć rurą z Ukrainą,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 7 September 2006.

<sup>30</sup> M. Wojciechowski, “Ukraina: ocieplenie po spotkaniu premierów,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 16 November 2006.

### Other Areas of Cooperation

In May, in Cracow, presidents L. Kaczyński and V. Yushchenko officially closed the Ukrainian Year in Poland, which lasted from April 2005. Numerous exhibitions, concerts and other cultural events were held under the project. The Ukrainian Year in Poland, similarly to the preceding Polish Year in Ukraine, took place under the motto “Poland and Ukraine together in Europe.” The year 2006–2007 was declared Jerzy Giedroyc’s Year in Ukraine. It comprised a number of meetings devoted to the author of *Kultura*. Several written works on the magazine were also published. The climax of Jerzy Giedroyc’s Year in Ukraine was the conference entitled “Europe—Past and Future. Visions and Revisions” organised in Kyiv in November. It was attended by the collaborators of *Kultura*, historians and intellectuals from Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, Belarus, France, Germany and the United States. The discussions were accompanied by an exhibition devoted to J. Giedroyc. In spring, Polish Cinema Days were held in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Donetsk and Lviv, during which selected, recent Polish films were shown. In October, the 6<sup>th</sup> Ukrainian Culture Festival was held in Wrocław, with numerous concerts and meetings with Ukrainian writers. As a response to the growing interest in Ukraine, the Centre for Culture and Information with the Embassy of Ukraine in Poland was opened in Warsaw in December. The objective of the centre is to promote knowledge about Ukraine, organise cultural and scientific events, as well as to support bilateral cooperation and exchange in those areas.

In 2006, Poland and Ukraine continued its efforts to become hosts of the European Football Championship in 2012. In May 2006, Ministers of Sport of both countries, Tomasz Lipiec and Yuri Pavlenko filed the documentation required for the final stage of the selection process with the headquarters of the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) in Nyon. A social campaign was launched in Poland in October to promote the joint Polish-Ukrainian candidacy. The campaign comprised billboard advertising, press and electronic media presence, as well as various happenings. By the end of 2006, the idea of hosting Euro 2012 in Poland and Ukraine was supported by over 50 thousand citizens.<sup>31</sup> UEFA’s decision on the host of the European Championship in 2012 will be announced in April 2007.

Following the enlargement of the European Union in 2004, the Polish labour market, notably its construction and agricultural sectors, was afflicted by mass

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<sup>31</sup> Figure from the Internet site promoting Euro 2012 in Poland and Ukraine ([www.e2012.org](http://www.e2012.org)).

worker emigration. Therefore, Polish associations of employers, builders and farmers are demanding concessions that would allow legal employment of Ukrainians in Poland, the majority of whom have been so far working without the required permit. This proposal received favourable response from Polish authorities, notably its representatives from Self-Defence (Samoobrona) party. Representatives of the Polish government argued that liberalisation of the labour market would solve problems which Polish employers struggle against, limit illegal employment in Poland, as well as facilitate operation of Polish companies in Ukraine. In August, Minister of Labour Anna Kalata signed a regulation that allows Ukrainian citizens, as well as citizens of Russia, Belarus and Germany to take up seasonal employment (up to three months in a calendar year) in the agricultural sector without a permit.<sup>32</sup> At the same time, extension of these concessions to cover other professional groups in subsequent years was announced. However, the solutions introduced brought limited success only—both employers and their Ukrainian employees prefer to work illegally, as it reduces labour cost and offers greater freedom to both parties.

### Poles on Ukraine and Ukrainians

Today Ukraine does not enjoy as significant interest as it did two years ago. Nevertheless, positive feelings about Ukrainians, as expressed by Poles, remain at a relatively high level, which is largely a consequence of the “Orange Revolution.” In 2004, positive attitude was declared by 29% of the respondents, while 23% declared the same a year later, and 24% in 2006.<sup>33</sup> The sentiment that reconciliation between Poland and Ukraine is possible was also on the rise. In 2005, 74% of respondents believed it was “entirely possible” or “rather possible,” while in 2006 77% declared the same. What could have had an impact on these results were the events in Pawlokoma.<sup>34</sup> Level of support in Poland for Ukraine’s accession to the European Union also remains high. In May 2006, 38% of the respondents declared that it should happen as soon as possible, while 40% argued that Ukraine should be admitted to the Community, “but not as soon

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<sup>32</sup> Regulation by the Minister of Labour and Social Policy of 30 August 2006 on rendering work by foreign nationals without the requirement to obtain a work permit ([www.mps.gov.pl](http://www.mps.gov.pl)).

<sup>33</sup> M. Strzeszewski (ed.), *Stosunek Polaków do innych narodów. Komunikat z badań* (public opinion research centre: CBOS), Warszawa, October 2006, no. BS/148/2006, p. 5 ([www.cbos.pl](http://www.cbos.pl)).

<sup>34</sup> M. Strzeszewski (ed.), *Opinie o stosunkach z Rosją, Niemcami i Ukrainą. Na kim Polacy mogą polegać, a kogo się obawiać. Komunikat z badań* (CBOS), Warszawa, June 2006, no. BS/98/2006, p. 6 ([www.cbos.pl](http://www.cbos.pl)).

as possible.” It is worth noting here that young people (18–39 years of age) are less positively inclined towards Ukraine’s accession to the European Union, which might be related to concerns about stiffer competition on the labour market.<sup>35</sup>

This overall positive image is overcast by events that took place in autumn 2006. In Bartoszyce (Warmińsko-Mazurskie Province), an Ukrainian school was set on fire, in Biały Bór (Pomorskie Province) Taras Shevchenko’s monument was stained with paint, while in Komańcza (Podkarpackie Province), a historic orthodox church was burned down, and in Kruklanki (Warmińsko-Mazurskie Province), an Ukrainian church was robbed. There is no evidence that the acts were targeted at the Ukrainian community in Poland nor, even less so, that these were coordinated actions. Nevertheless, they aroused some concerns. The Union of Ukrainians in Poland requested Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration Ludwik Dorn to become personally involved in explaining those cases.<sup>36</sup> They were also an item on the agenda of the meeting between Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Paweł Kowal and Ukraine’s ambassador to Poland Oleksandr Mocyk.

In December, representatives of the Polish state-owned TV (Telewizja Polska) announced that, as of 1 January 2007, “Telenovyny,” the only nationwide TV programme in Ukrainian broadcast on TVP3 would no longer be aired. The decision was motivated also by the fact that “there is no room in the news television for a programme in Ukrainian.”<sup>37</sup> The decision on abandoning “Telenovyny” met with protests. A petition in the case, addressed to Bronisław Wildstein, was signed by 2,800 persons.<sup>38</sup> After few days, TVP’s president announced that this was a “misunderstanding,” as “Telenovyny” would still be aired on TVP3, and the only change was that of airing times.<sup>39</sup>

In the last years of his presidency, L. Kuchma attached significant importance to relations with Poland, which, despite being in minority among Western states, still wanted to cooperate with Ukraine. V. Yushchenko

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<sup>35</sup> “EU Enlargement covering Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Ukraine,” PBS DGA’s survey for *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 16 May 2006 ([www.pbsdga.pl](http://www.pbsdga.pl)).

<sup>36</sup> Apel do Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych i Administracji, n.d. ([www.zup.ukraina.com.pl](http://www.zup.ukraina.com.pl)).

<sup>37</sup> M. Kowalewski, “Ukraińskie wiadomości znikają z TVP3,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 18 December 2006.

<sup>38</sup> Petycja do B. Wildsteina, 13 December 2006 ([www.harazd.net](http://www.harazd.net)).

<sup>39</sup> M. Kowalewski, “‘Telenowyny’ zostają w TVP 3,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 19 December 2006.

appreciated Poland's help both during the Orange Revolution and afterwards, although it was when the "Orange" were ruling the country, that some decisions unfavourable for Poland were taken, just to mention the liquidation of special economic zones. V. Yanukovich approaches relations with Poland in a sober manner, looking at them from the standpoint of Ukraine's interest, and notably interests of Donetsk oligarchs (Industrial Union of Donbas of Serhiy Taruta, System Capital Management of Rinat Akhmetov). Of primary importance for Yanukovich are economic issues, and his policy is sometimes in line with Polish interests (restored preferential treatment for investors in special economic zones), and sometimes is not (dispute over further privatisation of Centrostal-Bydgoszcz). During the last few years, cooperation between Poland and Ukraine, at least at the top level, focused on shared, often painful history and attempts at cooperation in foreign policy. In the former area, Poland and Ukraine achieved certain tangible success. In the latter, however, there are few significant accomplishments, due to Ukraine's inconsistency, but also reluctance of Western countries. The return to power of the Party of Regions necessitates "a more specific mode"<sup>40</sup> for the strategic partnership between Poland and Ukraine, which L. Kaczyński referred to at the beginning of his presidential term.

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<sup>40</sup> Oath-taking ceremony of the RP President Lech Kaczyński, 24 December 2005 ([www.prezydent.pl](http://www.prezydent.pl)).

## **Relations between Poland and Asia and the Pacific Countries**

The most important task for Polish foreign policy on Asia and the Pacific region in 2006 was exploring the opportunities for enhanced economic cooperation, securing new markets for Polish products, and primarily generating a greater stream of foreign investments into the country. The potential that Asia offers in all these areas is massive. Among the prioritised relations were those with China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam. Based on preliminary data from the Ministry of the Economy, Poland's trade exchange with Asia and the Pacific states in 2006 grew by 30% in comparison with the previous year, and totalled approx. \$20 billion. The Polish trade deficit also grew, totalling approx. \$15 billion. The highest negative trade balance shows in our trade with China, the Republic of Korea, Japan and Taiwan.

An important element of actions taken by the Polish diplomacy in Asia and the Pacific was the security issues. In this context, Poland's involvement in Afghanistan was of significant importance. A valuable partner for political dialogue was also Pakistan, one of the most important members of the anti-terrorist coalition. Among states of the region, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Brunei actively participate in the Kraków Initiative (PSI). In 2006, their representatives took part in the international conference in Warsaw.

Actions by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs also provided support for Polish non-governmental organisations in the implementation of their development projects in Asia and the Pacific. Similarly as in the previous years, they focused primarily on Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and Vietnam.

Cultural cooperation represented another important aspect of Poland's foreign policy on Asia and the Pacific. In 2006, many events were held to promote Poland in the region, most of them taking place in India, the Republic of Korea and Australia.

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\* Beata Stoczyńska—Deputy Director at MFA Department of Asia and the Pacific.

Together with public and private universities, MFA offered learning opportunities in the Polish higher education system, primarily to China, Singapore, Malaysia and Taiwan.

Comprehensive promotion of Poland in Asia, including its economic, scientific, technical and cultural accomplishments, was the objective of the conference “Promotion of Poland in Asia” organised in autumn by MFA and the Centre for International Relations. The conference was attended by over 100 guests, including representatives of the government administration, entrepreneurs, scientists, researchers, publicity, culture and tourism experts. Four panels discussed the best and most efficient ways to promote Poland in Asia.

Interest in developing political, economic and cultural relations with Asia and the Pacific region was expressed by the President, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs in their addresses.

At the January meeting with the diplomatic corps, President Lech Kaczyński said: “It is obvious that a state like Poland is deeply involved in observing what the developments are in many Asian states. It is a fact that powerful centres of industry, scientific development and technology are emerging there. We are interested in economic cooperation with China, India, Japan and Pakistan in particular. We believe that our relations, good as they have been so far, will improve even further. Obviously, we do not wish to disregard other states of the region (...) we are truly interested in developing economic cooperation [with those states] on mutually rewarding terms.”

In his opening speech at the Parliament on 15 February, Minister of Foreign Affairs Stefan Meller emphasised that “We will continue to maintain good contacts with many partners, such as Japan, the Republic of Korea and the ASEAN states. We highly value the role that the investors coming from those countries play in the process of modernizing Poland. We are closely following the emergence in Asia of two supraregional powers: China and India, with which we intend to develop economic cooperation and political dialogue.”<sup>1</sup>

Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński gave much attention to the deeper cooperation with Asian countries during his opening address at the Parliament, on 19 June. He said: “Activation of our foreign policy in Asia plays a great role (...) These are important regions of today’s world. The significance of Asia, particularly Eastern Asia as a region requires no explanation does not need. We

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<sup>1</sup> See above, p. 24.

want to be mark our economic and cultural presence there (...). We can launch an offensive in this respect, even with our relatively limited resources (...) We should not shut ourselves away or pursue only local policies, because it does not lead anywhere. There is a sizeable potential in this part of the world. We will be involved in this, and I myself am also willing to be involved in such undertakings.”<sup>2</sup>

In September 2006, Prime Minister J. Kaczyński attended the 6<sup>th</sup> ASEM Summit—a forum for EU states and 13 Asian states (ASEAN states and China, Japan and the Republic of Korea).<sup>3</sup> Discussions of state leaders focused on topical issues in contemporary world politics—energy, environmental protection, combating terrorism, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and new threats. The situation in the Middle East, in Iraq and Afghanistan was also discussed, along with the progress of integration in Eastern and South-Eastern Asia, further enlargement of the European Union and the work on the treaty. The Polish Prime Minister had a number of bilateral meetings, among others with the President of the Republic of Korea, Prime Ministers of China, Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam.

Several days before leaving for the ASEM Summit, Prime Minister J. Kaczyński, in a meeting with heads of diplomatic posts accredited in Poland, said: “The objective for Polish foreign policy, which, in our opinion, has not been pursued actively enough so far, is relations with Asian countries. We want to intensify them. I hope that the next meeting in Helsinki will be conducive to this purpose. We will be determined to follow the path I referred to during my opening address, and I hope that we will meet with an appropriate response, understanding and a will to establish closer relations with us.”<sup>4</sup>

An analysis of the two years of Poland’s membership in the European Union indicates that it plays an increasingly more important role in the way Poland is perceived by Asian countries. It is an additional asset, next to well-developed networks of bilateral cooperation, for Poland’s relations with countries of Asia and the Pacific. In its foreign policy on Asia, Poland is using both, its traditional

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<sup>2</sup> See [www.kprm.gov.pl/1433\\_18017.htm](http://www.kprm.gov.pl/1433_18017.htm).

<sup>3</sup> The following Asian states became members of the forum during the 6th ASEM Summit in Helsinki: India, Pakistan, Mongolia, ASEAN Secretariat, while Bulgaria and Romania joined the forum on the European side. The next ASEM Summit will be held in Beijing in 2008.

<sup>4</sup> See Address by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers Jarosław Kaczyński at the meeting with heads of diplomatic posts accredited in Poland, 7 September 2006 ([www.kprm.gov.pl/1433\\_18404.htm](http://www.kprm.gov.pl/1433_18404.htm)).



tools and the new (EU ones) such as the already mentioned ASEM or EU-ASEAN dialogue, and the entire legal and treaty basis for the European Union's cooperation with Asia.

The September session of the UN General Assembly was another opportunity to talk with Asian politicians. Minister of Foreign Affairs Anna Fotyga had meetings with ministers of foreign affairs of China—Li Zhaoxing, Pakistan—Khurshid M. Kasuri, Thailand—Kantathi Suphamongkhon, while President Lech Kaczyński met with Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai.

### **Relations with Selected Asian Countries**

In 2006, many political, economic, cultural, scientific and technological initiatives were launched in the individual states of Asia and the Pacific region. They served the purpose of accomplishing the planned objectives and tasks, as well as enhancing and deepening of mutual relations.

**China.** The relations between Poland and the People's Republic of China were particularly vibrant. Actions were taken to promote the Polish economy, in order to overcome massive disproportion in trade exchange. In 2006, Poland's trade deficit with China totalled approx. \$7 billion. An intense political dialogue with PRC was also present.

In March, Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Meller visited China. He was accompanied by Deputy Minister of the Economy Paweł Poncyliusz, representatives of the Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency (PAIiZ), as well as a group of entrepreneurs. At the economic forum organised on the occasion of the visit, with representatives of over 300 Chinese companies present, visitors from Poland presented opportunities for cooperation on mining and energy industry, notably mining emergency and evacuation.

One month later, Deputy Prime Minister of PRC's State Council Hui Liangyu, responsible for agricultural affairs, visited Poland. A letter of intent was signed during the visit between agricultural ministries of both states on the establishment of the Poland-China Centre for Agricultural Science and Technology. The Chinese visitor was also received by Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz. Crucial issues concerning economic and industrial cooperation were discussed during the meeting. Addressing our concerns about the growing trade deficit, Deputy Prime Minister H. Liangyu assured PM Marcinkiewicz that the Chinese government would promote actions of Polish manufacturers on the Chinese market and encouraged mutual investments.

In April, a meeting of the Poland-China Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation was held, where agreements between businesses and government agencies were signed on economic relations, among others, one between PAiIZ and the Agency for Investment Promotion of the Chinese Ministry of Trade. The meeting was co-chaired by Deputy Ministers of the Economy from both states, Paweł Poncyliusz and Yu Guangzhou. The satellite economic seminar was attended by representatives of over 100 Polish and 40 Chinese companies.

Towards the end of June, China was visited by the delegation of the Parliamentary Physical Education and Sport Committee. The objective of the visit was to exchange ideas on, among other things, sport structure and financing in both countries in relation to the Olympic Games to be held in Beijing in 2008.

In the second half of 2006, Deputy Minister of the Economy Andrzej Kaczmarek visited China on three occasions. The objective of his meetings with Chinese partners was to find new ways of cooperation, e.g. in the energy sector, mining industry and the environmental protection.

In August, a meeting was held in Warsaw of the Poland-China Committee for Scientific and Technology Cooperation at the level of deputy ministers, where operational details of joint research projects were agreed on.

In September, Minister of Transport Jerzy Polaczek visited China on the occasion of the 55<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the establishment of Chipolbrok, a China-Poland marine shipping company. He held talks at the ministries of communication, railway, information technology and the civil aviation office.

In September, a member of PRC's State Council, Deputy Prime Minister Chen Zhili, responsible in the Chinese government for education, science and culture, visited Poland. She was received by President Lech Kaczyński, held talks with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Education Roman Giertych and attended meetings with representatives of the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage, and Science and Higher Education Ministry. This visit was a vital stimulus for cooperation in education and science. Deputy Prime Minister Chen Zhili also participated in the opening ceremony of the Confucius Institute at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków.

In November, China was visited by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture Andrzej Lepper. Next to Beijing, he visited the provinces of Yunnan and Hainan. During his visit, the establishment of the Poland-China Centre for Agricultural Science and Technology was sealed with the signing of an agreement between the ministries.

An essential element of Poland's cooperation with China are our contacts at the level of towns and regions. By 2006, 17 agreements on cooperation were signed, e.g. between Gdańsk and Shanghai, Kraków and Nankin, Gdynia and Haikou (the Hainan province), Katowice and Shenyang (the Waoning province). This mode of cooperation translates into joint projects, and has a positive impact on interpersonal contacts between citizens of the two countries.

**Japan.** In cooperation with Japan, the focus was, apart from encouraging more active investment, on developmental aid projects for third countries. Another important item on the agenda was cooperation on selected international issues (assistance for Iraq, the Kraków Initiative, support for Ukraine). Both parties strived for more meaningful declaration on establishing the status of strategic partnership for the bilateral relations.

The trade exchange in 2006 totalled approx. \$2.2 billion, of which Polish exports accounted for approx. \$200 million only. For over 20 years now, the Poland-Japan trade exchange has been characterised by a steady rise of imports from Japan. However, we should remember that it is the Japanese investment in Poland that is driving the growing imports from Japan of machinery and equipment, which is then purchased by Japanese companies operating in Poland. Products manufactured in Poland are then exported to other European countries. Therefore, we could say that in general terms, economic cooperation with Japan, despite the deficit, increases Polish exports to the remaining states.

This year was special in terms of increasing the stream of Japanese investments in Poland. The value of Japanese investments coming to our country in 2006 equalled the total value of Japanese investments in Poland for the last 15 years, estimated at approx. €1.6 billion. These investments created jobs for approx. 20 thousand people. Currently, approx. 145 Japanese companies are present on the Polish market. There are more than one thousand Japanese residents in Poland, and each year more tourists from the Land of the Rising Sun are visiting Poland (over 32 thousand in 2004).

Japanese investors in Poland focus on the automotive industry and, since recently, the sector of electronics. In April, a new investment agreement with the Sharp corporation was signed in the presence of Prime Minister K. Marciniewicz. It provides that at the beginning of 2007, a factory manufacturing modules for LCD monitors will begin to operate in Łysomice near Toruń, employing approx. 800 persons. Sharp's President Katsuhiko Machida announced that by 2010 the group will have invested approx. €150 million in Poland. In autumn, investment plans were also presented by companies that

intend to manufacture LCD TV sets in Poland—Toshiba in Kobierzyce near Wrocław, and Funai in Nowa Sól. Both projects, worth approx. \$100 million, are to offer 2,200 jobs. Bridgestone announced the launch of another tyre factory in Stargard Szczeciński. The value of this project is €200 million. In December, Toyota decided to build a gearbox factory in the Wałbrzych Special Economic Zone. The value of this investment project is estimated at \$150 million.

In December, PAIIZ and Bank Mizuko signed an agreement regarding the cooperation on investment promotion.

The inflow of the Japanese investment to Poland is accompanied by strong support from the Polish government. Prime Minister K. Marcinkiewicz received two Japanese business delegations: in April, he met representatives of Keidanren Business Federation, headed by Yonekura Hiromasa and the honorary chairman of Toyota, Shoichiro Toyoda in May. During the meetings, the Prime Minister announced plans of infrastructure improvement, mentioned reference to the new investment rules and the system of education for future IT, automotive, electronics and accounting specialists.

In April, Japan was visited by Minister for Foreign Affairs S. Meller. He met Minister of Foreign Affairs Taro Aso, chairman of the Upper House of Japan's Parliament, and was received by the heir to the Japanese throne, Duke Naruhito. Minister Meller was accompanied by a group of Polish businesspeople.

In May, Poland was visited by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Schotoraro Yachi, who held routine political consultations in Warsaw. He also visited the Polish-Japanese Centre for Energy Efficiency, a joint project of the Japanese International Cooperation Agency and the Polish National Energy Conservation Agency (KAPE).

Cooperation in science and technology also grew in 2006. An important stimulus in this respect was a visit to Japan of Michał Seweryński, Minister of Science and Higher Education, who participated in the international conference "Science and Technology in Society."

In February 2006, the Polish Tourism Organisation made a decision on opening their office in Tokyo. It is expected that the operation of the office will have a positive impact on the number of Japanese tourists visiting Poland. We are cooperating with the Visegrad Group countries in this respect, presenting to the Japanese partners our joint tourist offer.

A vital component of the relations between Poland and Japan was the November speech of Minister Taro Aso at the Japanese Institute for International Affairs, where he presented a new concept for Japan's foreign policy, referred to

as the “Arch of Freedom and Prosperity,” in which Poland plays a special role. Referring to our tradition of good relations, shared values as well as cultural, science and technology projects, he made reference to opportunities for cooperation in the promotion of democracy and civil societies in post-Soviet regions that experience political and economic change at present. Referring to this statement, Minister of Foreign Affairs Anna Fotyga handed over to Minister Taro Aso a letter with positive response to the Japanese proposals and, reminding that the celebration of the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of resumed relations between Poland is due in 2007, reiterated her invitation to Minister Taro Aso to attend the anniversary events in Poland. Such moves inspire the spirit of political cooperation, as well as encourage business representatives from both states to develop trade and investment relations.

**India.** In our relations with India, areas for economic cooperation were explored that reach beyond the present trade exchange, in particular in the area of advanced technologies and services. India’s rising significance in the world, in political as well as economic terms, brought the necessity of more active promotion of the Polish export offer. In 2006, trade exchange between Poland and India totalled some \$700 million, Poland being in deficit of approx. \$300 million. Defence industry products were again high on the list of products exported to India.

In 2006, important political events in the relations between Poland and India took place. In May, Poland was visited by Minister of Trade and Industry Kamal Nath. He was received by Prime Minister Marcinkiewicz. The visitor from India stated that Poland represented India’s gateway to the European Union, while India could be Poland’s bridge to Asia. He emphasised the readiness of Indian investors to operate on the Polish market, e.g. in the energy, biotechnology, IT and pharmaceutical sectors. These words are already turning into reality if we consider Indian investment in the steel processing industry, the acquisition of Thompson in Piaseczno, or Ranbaxy, a joint pharmaceutical undertaking. An Indo-Polish agreement on economic cooperation was also signed during Minister Kamal Nath’s visit.

Also in May, Undersecretary of State at MFA Witold Waszczykowski made an unofficial visit to India. Among partners in his political consultations were Minister of State Anand Sharma, and the talks centred around bilateral affairs, as well as security in the region, in particular in Afghanistan.

In June, the 6<sup>th</sup> meeting of the Indo-Polish Joint Committee on Scientific and Technological Cooperation was held in India. In the same month, representatives

of India's Ministry of Foreign Affairs visited Poland. A. Sharma and Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Fotyga discussed current issues in political and economic relations, as well as the international situation, e.g. in Afghanistan. Minister Sharma was also received by Deputy Speakers of both Houses of Parliament, as well as by Minister of Defence Radosław Sikorski.

Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Rafał Wiśniewski's November visit to India was connected with the inauguration of the Polish Days in India. The minister opened an inauguration gala concert. The visit received extensive media coverage by TV stations in Delhi, Bombay, Chennai and Calcutta. Press articles on the visit featured in the most important magazines of India, such as "Times of India" and "The Hindu." Polish Days in India began in November 2006 and will continue until November 2007. They comprise several dozen events of cultural, scientific, economic and political nature in largest Indian cities. The project is conceived as a "comprehensive promotional action," which aims to present the potential of contemporary Poland, member of the European Union, thus encouraging Indian partners to develop economic cooperation.

**Republic of Korea.** In terms of relations with the Republic of Korea, Poland attempted to maintain our country's positive image as an attractive place for investment. Approx. 55 Korean companies are currently operating in Poland. Mutual trade exchange in 2006 totalled approx. \$3 billion, and the Polish deficit was at approx. \$2.5 billion. However, similarly to Japan, we should underscore that imports from Korea transform well into overall exports from Poland. One of the most important products exported to the Korean market was Polish pork meat. Attempts were also made to sell poultry meat. Throughout the year, many events promoting Poland took place. In May, PAIiZ's Chairman Adam Żołnowski visited Korea and, jointly with the Korean Promotion Agency KOTRA, participated in an investment seminar. Prime Minister J. Kaczyński's meeting with President of the Republic of Korea Roh Moo-hyun during the 6<sup>th</sup> ASEM Summit in Helsinki in September sent a positive political message for continued political and economic cooperation.

Cooperation with the Republic of Korea is also important in the context of Polish involvement in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) on the Korean Peninsula. Poland declares itself in favour of a peaceful solution to the nuclear problem in North Korea, as well as consistently supports the maintaining of the sixparty talks mechanism.

**Afghanistan.** In relation to our increased military presence in Afghanistan, and preparations to take over command over NATO stabilisation mission in that country in 2006, Poland also re-established its diplomatic presence there. An official opening of the Polish embassy in Kabul is scheduled for the beginning of 2007. Throughout 2006, Poland took part in the international discussion on the future of Afghanistan. In January, Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Meller participated in an international conference in London on the situation in Afghanistan, assistance schemes for that country, as well as NATO and EU involvement there. In October, Minister of Foreign Affairs Regin Dadfar Spanta took an unofficial visit to Poland. During the talks held between the Afghan minister and Minister A. Fotyga, among the issues tackled were Polish actions towards stabilisation and reconstruction in Afghanistan, including developmental assistance projects implemented by Poland. The Polish military involvement in Afghanistan was the subject of talks between Presidents L. Kaczyński and H. Karzaj during the September session of the UN General Assembly.

**Pakistan.** Pakistan was a significant partner in political dialogue for Poland. The country is a potential support base for the actions of the Polish contingent in Afghanistan. In May, political consultations at the level of the Ministry of Defence deputy ministers from both countries were held. Undersecretary of State W. Waszczykowski participated in the talks. Cooperation with Pakistan was discussed specifically in the context of our involvement in Afghanistan. These issues were also the subject of an interview between Minister A. Fotyga and Minister K.M. Kasurin during the September session of the UN General Assembly. In November, delegation of the Ministry of National Defence, headed by Secretary of State Marek Zająkła, paid a visit to Pakistan. The objective of the visit, next to bilateral talks with Pakistani Minister of Defence Rao Sikander Iqbal, was the participation in the 4<sup>th</sup> International Defence Exhibition and Seminar IDEAS 2006.

**ASEAN.** Economic contacts were of paramount importance in Poland's relations with ASEAN states. Trade exchange with South-Eastern Asia countries reached \$2.8 billion in 2006, with the Polish trade balance deficit at approx. \$1.8 billion. The biggest export markets for Polish products in the region are Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam.

In 2006, efforts were made to increase exports to Indonesia and the Philippines. To that end, Minister of Defence R. Sikorski made an official visit to those countries. He discussed opportunities for Polish defence equipment supplies with Indonesian and Philippine politicians. In Indonesia, the Polish

minister was received by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Chairman of the Lower House of Parliament Agung Laksono. In the Philippines, Minister R. Sikorski confirmed the validity of the Polish offer for a credit intended to cover the purchase cost of weapons and military and police equipment. In November, Secretary of State M. Zająkła visited Indonesia and took part in the international defence equipment exhibition INDODEFENCE 2006. In December, General Director for Europe and America at the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Eddy Suryanto Hariyadhi came to Poland for consultations. Poland was represented by Undersecretary of State W. Waszczykowski. During his visit, Director E.S. Hariyadhi also met business representatives, e.g. from KOPEX and PZL Mielec.

In our contacts with Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam, we were particularly interested in establishing conditions for cooperation in production, and executing mutually beneficial transfers of technologies. High level of political dialogue was maintained. Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński and Prime Ministers of Malaysia (Abdullah Ahmad Badawi), Vietnam (Nguyen Tan Dung) and Singapore (Lee Hsien Loong) held bilateral talks on the occasion of the September ASEM Summit in Helsinki.

In June, Poland was visited by Princess Chulabhorn Walailak, daughter to the King of Thailand. The main objective of her visit was to attend a scientific symposium on pharmacology in natural medicine, organised by the Maria Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin. The Princess was received by President Lech Kaczyński and his wife. Although the visit did not have any political context, it resonated widely in the Thai media, which definitely had a positive impact on the promotion of Poland in Thailand.

**Australia and New Zealand.** In 2006, we continued our political consultations with Australia and New Zealand, both on bilateral matters and international security. Points of reference were our joint presence in missions to Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as participation in the Kraków Initiative (PSI).

In July, Poland was visited by New Zealand's Minister of Foreign Affairs Winston Peters, who held talks with Minister A. Fotyga, and was received by Speaker of the Senate Bogdan Borusewicz. The objective of his visit was, next to discussing bilateral issues, to encourage Poland to increase its presence in developmental projects in the South Pacific islands, as well as to express his acknowledgment for the first, general EU strategy for cooperation with the region.



In our contacts with Australia, we tried to negotiate lifting of the visa requirement for Polish citizens travelling as tourists for periods shorter than 90 days. It should be added here that the European Commission is also making efforts for the abolishment of the visa requirement for citizens of the new Community countries. Although the question remains unsolved, Australians announced certain concessions in terms of their visa requirements starting from 2008.

**Mongolia.** In September, Poland was visited by the delegation of the Mongolia-Poland parliamentary group, headed by Minister of Finance Nadmid Bayartsaikhan. This visit was vitally important due to the finalisation of the problem of Mongolian debt to Poland. In October, Mongolian Minister of Defence Mishing Sonompil visited Poland to meet Minister R. Sikorski. One of the important items on the agenda was the involvement in Iraq as well as cooperation in this respect between Poland and Mongolia.

**ASEM.** To achieve our political and economic objectives in 2006, Poland used both traditional instruments of bilateral cooperation and tools acquired owing to our membership in the European Union, including multilateral mechanisms of cooperation and the EU's legal basis. Important in this respect is the ASEM forum (Asia-Europe Meeting). Next to the participation in the 6<sup>th</sup> ASEM Summit, held in Helsinki in September, our involvement in initiatives taken by member states as part of the forum in 2006 also deserves a mention. In February, ASEM conference on human rights was held in Budapest, attended by Professor Roman Wieruszewski. At the April meeting of Ministers of Finance of ASEM states, held in Vienna, Poland was represented by Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Finance Jarosław Pietras). Polish experts on Islam (Agata Skowron-Nalborczyk, Ph.D., University of Warsaw), Christianity and Judaism (Marek Nowak, Ph.D., Dominican friar) took part in the 2<sup>nd</sup> ASEM conference on dialogue among religions, held in June in Cyprus. In the same month, Polish experts participated in ASEM's international conference in Copenhagen, devoted to combating terrorism. In September, at the meeting of ASEM's Ministers of Labour in Berlin, Poland was represented by Minister of Labour and Social Policy Anna Kalata. In December, the Polish delegation went to Kuopio, Finland, to attend ASEM's conference "Management of Migratory Flows between Asia and Europe." All topic tackled as part of ASEM's dialogue, i.e. human rights, combating terrorism, migrations, dialogue among cultures and religions, labour markets, are vitally important from the viewpoint of both, the European Union and Asia.

For the first time, Poland offered its initiative at the ASEM meeting. We suggested the establishment of a network of diplomatic academies of the European Union and Asian states. The initiative met with great interest of European and Asian states. As part of the initiative, a four-day seminar on “Regionalism vs. Universalism in Global Order” was held in September in Jachranka, at Lake Zegrze. The seminar was attended by over 40 young diplomats from ASEM countries. Open discussion on current international issues was an exceptional opportunity to meet and exchange ideas.

In terms of relations with ASEM, we cannot forget about its sole institutional entity, i.e. the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF) located in Singapore. The objective of the Foundation is to bring closer societies of European and Asian states by joint cultural, scientific, educational and economic projects, with increasing involvement of Polish citizens. So far, nearly 50 persons from Poland took part in the programmes managed and co-funded by the Foundation. In 2006, a contemporary dance workshop was held for the first time in Poland, with young dancers from the European Union and Asia as guests.

Owing to the presence of the Community aspect in Poland’s foreign policy in relation to Asia and the Pacific, the participation of representatives from Asia and the Pacific Department at the Polish MFA in the European Union Council Working Group for the Asia Pacific (COASI) is also important. The Group tackles such topics as guidelines and tasks for the European Union policy on the region.

Many political, economic, cultural, scientific and technological events related to our contacts with the countries of Asia and the Pacific region took place in 2006, both bilateral and within the European Union. All those events served the purpose of pursuing previously set objectives of Polish foreign policy on Asia and the Pacific, that is increasing trade exchange and attracting investment to Poland, developing cooperation in security, and promoting Poland in Asia through culture, science, education and tourism.

**III.**  
**Selected Problems**  
**of Poland's Foreign Policy**



## **Poland in the United Nations**

The 2005 summit of the United Nations resulted in the activities of the Organization becoming more energetic and in hopes for more effective tackling of the challenges facing it. However, the traditional divisions between the member states regarding the priorities and manners of implementing the adopted conclusions soon became clearly visible. Moreover, the Nations faced new challenges which often required solutions different from the commonly used patterns and practice. In addition, tensions occurred among the main cooperating entities resulting from the increasingly radical standpoints of some developed and developing states.

The differences concerned both new institutions and manners of easing the tensions connected with the activities of Israel in the Middle East, nuclear plans of Iran and North Korea, the sanctions of the Security Council, developmental disproportions, violations of human rights and financing of the United Nations. The process was particularly visible in the relations between the USA and the states aspiring to leadership among the developing states and in the movement of the non-involved ones. This complicated the situation of the European Union, which tried to play a constructive role and seek—not always successfully—solutions satisfactory to all concerned parties. Poland—an active EU member—did not limit its activities to participating in the development of the common EU standpoint, but also presented its own initiatives.

### **Main Challenges Facing the UN**

The works on the reform of the United Nations, commenced in 2005, were continued in 2006. For several months consultations were held regarding the ultimate shape of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Human Rights Council. The impasse regarding the reform of the UN Security Council was not broken. Reaching the decision on strengthening the Economic and Social Council required a lot of time. The lack of agreement regarding the elimination of

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\* Stanisław L. Stebelski—Ambassador ad personam, MFA Department of Strategy and Foreign Policy Planning.

restrictions on the spending from the Nations' budget for six months continued to pose a serious threat of a financial crisis in the organization. The package of compromise solutions involved a programme of further works on the reform of the United Nations.

The first year of the Peacebuilding Commission was dominated by organizational problems. The sessions of the Commission regarding Burundi and Sierra Leone indicated its being perceived by developing states as yet another entity grouping aid donors.

The resignation of the United States from its candidature to the membership in the Human Rights Council diminished the importance of the body. Moreover, attempts to exclude the participation of states notoriously violating human rights in the Council proved unsuccessful. Three regular sessions and four special sessions of the Council took place, two on the situation in the occupied Palestinian territories, one regarding the situation in Lebanon and one concerning Darfur. Asian and African states, being numerically superior, were able to force through any decision, particularly thanks to the support of Russia, China and Cuba.

The earlier projects regarding the reform of the Security Council were clearly abandoned. The reform continued to provoke divisions in the European Union, and the possibility of the EU being overrepresented in the Council was a source of concern for other UN states. Many months of works on two comprehensive resolutions on further action on the development and strengthening the Economic and Social Council confirmed the deep differences in standpoints between the developed and developing countries.

In February 2006 the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed the High Level Panel for cohesion in development, humanitarian aid and environment protection, whose task is to prepare the appropriate recommendations regarding the reform of the UN operational activity. In March he presented an analysis of the mandates' functioning in order to define the mechanism of their implementation and proposed changes to the structure of the Secretariat and the UN budget procedure. The Group of 77 regarded them as an attempt to limit its influence and decrease the spending on development programmes, which led to a serious crisis. The decision on the issue, based on the proposals of developing countries, was adopted by a vote.

The works on the reform were not any easier in the face of the end of the second and the last term of Kofi Annan on the position of the Secretary-General and the critical assessment of the manner in which he managed the UN Secretariat and his human resources policy. Kofi Annan himself tried to limit the

conflicts with member states in order to finish his mission in the best possible climate. Elections of the new Secretary became an opportunity to return to the discussion on the relations between the General Assembly and the Security Council in the process of candidates' selection.

The issue of international peace and security continued to remain the focus of the UN attention. The Security Council dealt with the conflict in the Middle East and the crisis situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Darfur, Ethiopia and Eritrea, in Haiti and East Timor. New issues included security of journalists in armed conflicts, the construction of the security sector in states leaving conflicts and sexual offences of participants of the UN operations. Differences in standpoints among the permanent members of the Security Council affected the functioning of the Council, due to which many of the adopted decisions failed to satisfy the expectations of the international community.

The Council focused primarily on the nuclear ambitions of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and on the Lebanese-Israeli conflict. The resolution on the sanctions against North Korea was adopted much more swiftly, thanks to which hexalateral talks were resumed and a positive climate appeared for passing sanctions against Iran, albeit limited.

The Security Council managed to lead to a ceasefire in the Lebanese-Israeli conflict, commence a peace operation and develop the concept of restoring peace in the region. No international decision was taken regarding the international mediating forces in Gaza. Monthly reports were submitted concerning the situation in Iraq. Due to the deteriorating internal situation in Afghanistan in mid-2006 the Security Council began to manifest greater interest in that country. It also twice prolonged the mandate of the UN peacekeeping forces in Cyprus.

With regard to Kosovo, the most important negotiations took place out of New York and they influenced the course of the discussion within the Security Council. Its members had different opinions concerning the future of the province. A worrying tendency was observed regarding the Russian attempts to combine the issue of Kosovo with the so-called frozen conflicts in the territory of the former USSR. Russia's success consisted in emphasising the importance of the peacekeeping forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States in reaching the compromise solution concerning the situation in Abkhazia.

Following the development of the UN peacekeeping missions in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and Sudan (UNMIS) as well as the establishment of a new mission in East Timor (UNMIT) the number of persons involved in the 18 UN missions increased to over 100 thousand soldiers, policemen and civilian workers from

113 countries. A component of marine forces was established for the first time. Sudan's objection made it impossible for the UN to take over the AMIS operation from the African Union. Cases of UN missions supporting each other were more numerous than in the previous years, primarily in Africa. Much attention was devoted to practical cooperation between the UN and regional organizations, particularly the African Union, the European Union and NATO.

The events of 2006 confirmed the regression of the disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction issues on the UN forum. In this context the discussion focusing on the substance undertaken at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva had most positive overtones, as the Conference had for a long time seen a standstill caused by the lack of political will on the part of the most important states and the problems being presented in packages.

The world position of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its Director General Mohamed El Baradei was strengthened by the Peace Nobel Prize granted to the organization in 2005. IAEA's main problem was exercising control over the nuclear installations in Iran and Democratic People's Republic of Korea and commencing cooperation with the countries.

The UN adopted the strategy to counter international terrorism together with an Action Plan addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, counteracting and combating the phenomenon, strengthening the capacities of states in this regard and ensuring respect for human rights and rule of law in the fight against terrorism.

Increasing the importance of the development issues in the UN works was not facilitated by the deteriorating climate of cooperation between the states of the South and North. The breakdown of the trade negotiations of the World Trade Organization in July 2006 had a negative impact on the process. The main topic of discussion within the UN was the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals and seeking new ways of financing them. The Economic and Social Council took a decision to hold a three-year comprehensive review of the UN system operation with the view to harmonize the actions of the specialized agencies. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) began the review of the implementation of the resolutions adopted during the 11<sup>th</sup> Conference.

The year 2006 saw the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). Its new Director-General Kande Yumkella (Sierra Leone) proposed that its operation should focus on reducing



poverty. In the Economic Commission for Europe the Committee on Economic Cooperation and Integration began its operation, and its tasks include creating conditions conducive to economic growth, particularly in countries with economies in transition. The Energy Committee dealt with sustainable energy policy as a key to energy security.

Works on the report of the Alliance of Civilizations High-level Group, headed by the Spanish and Turkish prime ministers, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and Recep Erdogan were ended. The initiative of the UN Democracy Fund developed dynamically. On the other hand, attempts to transform the Community of Democracies into a cohesive group failed. The 59<sup>th</sup> session of the Commission of the Status of Women became an opportunity to organize a session of the high level “round table” on including the equal rights issues in national development strategies. A priority issue for the Commission for Social Development was evaluating the UN Decade for the Eradication of Poverty (1997–2006).

The 49<sup>th</sup> Session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs dealt with the anti-supply strategy and concentrated its attention on Afghanistan. The Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, on the other hand, focused on the situation in African countries. The III session of the Conference of States-parties to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime verified the effectiveness of the established mechanism and technical assistance.

The International Law Commission finished works on documents concerning diplomatic protection and principles on international liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law. The 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the first session of the International Court of Justice was an opportunity to remind the international community of the Court’s importance for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

The agenda of the 61<sup>st</sup> session of the UN General Assembly included 150 items and was divided into 9 chapters: maintaining international peace and security, promotion of economic growth and sustainable development, development of Africa, promotion of human rights; effective coordination of humanitarian assistance; promotion of justice and international law, disarmament, combating drug trafficking, prevention of crime and counteracting international terrorism, organizational, administrative and other matters. The president of the session was Haya Rashed Al Khalifa from Bahrain.

The general debate was the first opportunity to review the implementation of the decisions taken during the UN summit of 2005 and evaluate the UN reform<sup>1</sup>. The intended central theme was an overview of the performance of the 8<sup>th</sup> Millennium goal: develop a global partnership for development. However, events preceding the 61<sup>st</sup> session directed the discussion towards other issues, i.e. international peace and security, whereas the Millennium Development Goals were debated upon to a lesser extent.

The works of the First Committee resulted in no breakthrough in international security and disarmament. Although the course of the discussion indicated the political will to overcome the continuing crisis of disarmament mechanisms, voting results concerning numerous resolutions provoked doubts as to the real interest in breaking the impasse. The works of the Committee were considerably affected by the nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone (the Semipalatinsk Treaty) signed by Central Asian states and attempts to initiate a treaty on trading in weapons.

The works of the Second Committee were affected by the further deterioration of the climate of economic talks between the states of the Group of 77 and China, and developed countries. The adoption of a resolution concerning migration and development by consensus should be regarded a success. Negotiation on the protection of global climate, on the other hand, ended in a failure. The Second Committee proclaimed the celebration of the International Year of Sanitation in 2008, the International Year of Natural Fibres in 2009, International Year of Biodiversity in 2010 and International Year of Forests in 2011, in spite of efforts aimed to rationalize the actions in this regard. Developed countries managed to persuade developing countries to resign from the idea of announcing the next Decade of Combating Poverty.

The debates in the Third Committee were influenced by the discussion on methods of work and functioning of the Human Rights Council. The issue of the interdependencies between the Third Committee and Human Rights Council were not decided upon. Most controversies were raised by the resolutions regarding respecting human rights in individual states. Adopting the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities by consensus should be considered a success. The adoption of the Declaration on Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was blocked by

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<sup>1</sup> See [www.un.org/ga/59/hl60\\_plenarymeeting.html](http://www.un.org/ga/59/hl60_plenarymeeting.html).

African states and countries with largest indigenous populations. (USA, Australia, Canada, Russia). On behalf of the EU and 60 other UN member states Finland called for a moratorium on the executions and eliminating death penalty in the longer perspective.

The Fourth Committee offered wide support for the concept of reforming UN peacekeeping operations. Much attention was devoted to the post-conflict reconstruction and cooperation with the Peacebuilding Commission as well as to staff security in the UN peacekeeping missions. The debate on decolonization focused on the issue of Western Sahara. The course of the discussion regarding the situation in the occupied Palestinian territories confirmed the lack of perspectives in the peace process.

The most important tasks of the Fifth Committee included defining the contributions to the regular UN budget for 2007–2009, the schedule and principles of financing regarding the renovation of the main UN seat in New York and assumptions of the UN reform with regard to human resources management and public purchases. The high degree of solidarity between developing states proved particularly effective during the negotiations regarding the volume of contributions. The EU often adopted the role of an intermediary between developing countries and the USA and Japan. Russia volunteered to increase its share in the contributions from 0.6% to 1.2%, which resulted in the proportional decrease of contributions from other states. The adoption of the scale and schedule of payments for the renovation of the residence of the UN Secretary-General in New York was considered a success.

The most important issue discussed by the Sixth Committee included combating international terrorism, rule of law and the report of the 58<sup>th</sup> session of the International Law Commission. An impasse in the works on the Convention on combating international terrorism persisted. All states regarded the rule of law as the basis of international cooperation, good governance and development.

From the very beginning following the retirement of Kofi Annan the position of the UN Secretary-General was most likely to be taken by an Asian candidate. Russia objected to the election of a candidate from Eastern Europe. During the 61<sup>th</sup> session of the Assembly it quite soon became clear that the greatest chances for election belonged to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, Ban Ki Moon, who obtained the support of both the Security Council and the General Assembly.

On 14 December 2006, during the ceremony of swearing Ban Ki Moon in as the new UN Secretary-General, a number of states related to the achievements of Kofi Annan, particularly with reference to the reform of the Organization. According to Ban Ki Moon, the most important tasks include restoring trust towards the UN, continuing the reform process, implementing the Millennium Development Goals and increasing the cohesion and coordination of the UN actions.

### **Poland in the UN**

The priorities of the Polish activity in the UN in 2006 included the implementation of the decisions taken during the 2005 UN summit, the UN reform, peace and security issues, disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, respecting human rights and development of international law. Discussions on the election of the UN new Secretary-General were followed in Poland with great interest, as the former president of the Republic of Poland, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, was mentioned as a potential candidate for the position.

Poland most actively participated in the implementation of the decisions regarding the adaptation of the UN to new challenges. In Poland's opinion, without a fundamental restructuring of the UN and improvement of its procedures, the organization will not be able to perform the tasks of the 21<sup>st</sup> century in an effective manner.

Poland welcomed the establishment of the new UN organizations: the Peacebuilding Commission and Human Rights Council with great expectations and actively participated in the works on the principles of their functioning. Its position and activity were confirmed by its election to the two bodies already during their first term. Poland's election to the Peacebuilding Commission from the number of seats at the disposal of the Economic and Social Council was possible thanks to the understanding with the Czech Republic, which will replace Poland after a year. In connection with its attempts to become a member of the Human Rights Council, Poland propagated the information on its having satisfied all international obligations regarding human rights.

Poland's membership in the Peacebuilding Commission in a way supplemented its activity in the UN peacekeeping operations and missions and in other international organizations. In the discussions over the methods and scope of the Commission's works, Poland defined the need to harmonize the activities of all the agencies involved in providing assistance to countries going out of conflicts.

From the beginning of its membership in the Human Rights Council<sup>2</sup> Poland endeavoured to contribute to such methods and functioning principles of the body which help increase the efficiency of the human rights protection and promotion system. Poland's priorities included creating an effective mechanism of the general review of these rights, and it was ready to undergo such a review as one of the first member states of the Council. During the last session before the establishment of the Council, i.e. during the 62<sup>th</sup> session of the Commission on Human Rights, Poland took efforts to have all the mandates of the so-called special procedures, including the mandate of the special rapporteur for Belarus, moved from the Commission to the Council.

In spite of the little progress in the discussions on the reforms of the Security Council, Poland consistently advocated the changes and broadening the composition of the Council in both membership categories. In particular, it supported the idea of granting an additional non-permanent seat in the Council to a representative of the regional group of Eastern Europe. At the same time, Poland objected to granting the power of veto to new permanent members of the body. Following the impasse regarding the reform of the Security Council and Japan's withdrawal from the proposal made jointly with Germany, India and Brazil, Poland did not continue to support specific candidates for permanent members.

The operation of the Security Council was the subject of Poland's continuing interest due to the importance of the Council decisions for international peace and security as well as the UN peacekeeping operations and missions. Poland, which has not been a member of the Council for several years, also cooperated closely with many of its member states, particularly over the efforts to end the Lebanese-Israeli conflict. Moreover, it actively cooperated with the Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee and in April 2006 provided its representatives with comprehensive answers to a number of questions asked in connection with the reports submitted by Poland in 2004. It also attached great importance to the works on the anti-terrorist strategy and its adoption by the UN General Assembly.

In 2006 Poland's term in the Economic and Social Council and in the UNDP/UNFPA Executive Board ended. Poland's participation in the works of those bodies coincided with the discussion on the UN reform, and Poland supported the efforts connected with the reform of the Economic and Social

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<sup>2</sup> For Poland's activity in the Human Rights Council see below pp. 298–302.

Council in order to increase the efficiency of its works and strengthen its role as a centre of coordination and progress assessment centre for activities undertaken within the development and social and economic issues in the broad sense. Poland participated in the negotiations on the two resolutions devoted to those matters. Its activity in the Economic Commission for Europe was facilitated thanks to Marek Belka's holding the position of its Executive Secretary.

Poland supported continuation of the reform process in the UN administration and management, believing that only the effective and efficient UN could face the challenges and maintain its international position. It participated in the works connected with the review of mandates. It strove to develop an effective and sustainable mechanism of monitoring the realization of the mandates by member states, as in Poland's opinion it would increase the transparency of the Secretariat operation and strengthened the principle of responsibility for the decisions and actions taken by the body.

Poland's most important task regarding security and disarmament in the early 2006 was chairing the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. As the works of the Conference had come to a standstill, a way to revive the discussion on the core issues had to be found which would lead to negotiations on new understandings. The pre-session consultations conducted by the Polish delegation indicated that arranging the ordinary agenda of works would not be possible. As a consequence, Poland proposed a package which became the basis of the Conference works and included: close cooperation of all states presiding in 2006 (Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russia, Senegal and Slovakia), undertaking structured thematic debates concerning every point on the agenda, holding parallel discussions on various planes and levels and establishing the Group of Friends of the Presidents. As a result, for the first time in a long period, the Conference on Disarmament undertook works on its core issues. New documents were presented along with the proposal to commence negotiations on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.

Poland continued to advocate a comprehensive analysis of the situation on global disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control in order to conduct the reform of the so-called international disarmament machinery, including the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and the UN Disarmament Commission in New York. The former Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Adam D. Rotfeld was invited by the UN Secretary-General to his Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. A Polish representative was also a member of the office of the Disarmament Commission.

Poland's participation in the actions aimed at strengthening the UNIFIL operations in order to put an end to the Lebanese-Israeli conflict had a certain importance for Poland's image in the UN. Poland was also one of the first states to declare its will to strengthen its contingent participating in the operation. As a result of intense efforts the consent of the UN Secretariat was also obtained to establish a Polish-Spanish battalion and a Polish officer was placed in the newly established strategic unit managing the operation. Although the number of the Polish personnel in 11 UN missions increased following the enlargement of the Polish contingent, Poland dropped to the 26<sup>th</sup> position among the contributing states, and consequently it had no possibility to participate in the meetings of the main contributors, during which the most important problems of the UN peacekeeping operations are discussed. Drawing on the experience from Lebanon, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan, Poland supported tighter cooperation between the UN and the EU and NATO in the course of the peacekeeping missions.

Poland's activity in the area of human rights and combating corruption was confirmed by the Conference on Anti-Corruption Measures, Good Governance and Human Rights convened on 8 and 9 November 2006 in Warsaw in cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louis Arbour. The conference was chaired by Anna Fotyga. In 2006 Poland also ratified the UN Convention against Corruption. Two Polish experts sat on the Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Poland also supported the development of cooperation between the states of the UN Community of Democracy.

On 1 January 2006 Poland became a member of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. It actively participated in the negotiations on a resolution concerning the control over chemical precursors. It regularly submitted information on narcotic substances being stopped at borders, chemical precursors and narcotic drugs used in the Polish industry and health care and on the realization of its international obligations regarding counteracting organized crime.

In the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Poland had the status of an observer. It voluntarily donated 150 thousand dollars for, *inter alia*, the realization of the global programme of combating corruption, thanks to which it kept its membership in the group of the so-called new aid donors. The Polish representative held the function of the rapporteur of the Conference of the parties to the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the vice chairman of the Conference of the parties to the Convention against Corruption.

Poland actively supported actions aimed at timely implementation of the obligations concerning fighting HIV/AIDS and its prevention. It participated in the preparations and debates of the High Level Meeting devoted to the assessment of the implementation of the Declaration on HIV/AIDS and obligations contained therein.

In January 2006 the World Committee on Disability and the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute honoured Poland with the prestigious international Franklin Delano Roosevelt International Disability Award for 2006. The ceremony was held at the UN during the opening of the 66<sup>th</sup> session of the General Assembly, in the presence of the Polish president Lech Kaczyński and the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

The relations between Poland and UNIDO were unfavourably influenced by Poland's terminating the agreement on the operation of the Warsaw Investment and Technology Promotion Office. The UNIDO Director-General, K. Yumkella, declared his intention to transform the Warsaw Office into a UNIDO centre for the whole Eastern Europe and Commonwealth of Independent States. The negative consequences of the decision on closing the Office were mitigated by Poland's donating 150 thousand dollars to developmental aid.

The Warsaw Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees will continue to reside in its present location.

Poland was ready to consider proposing the candidature of the former president Aleksander Kwaśniewski to the position of the UN Secretary-General if obtaining the necessary support was to prove feasible, particularly on the part of the permanent members of the Security Council. The ultimate decision was against the proposal, as most of the UN member states, including the permanent members of the Security Council, clearly supported a candidate from Asia. The UN Secretariat employed the total of 49 Polish citizens, including no more than 11 (out of the total of 2700) on positions subject to geographical division. The number of Poles employed was below the limit to which the Republic of Poland was entitled.

The Polish delegation to the 61<sup>st</sup> session of the UN General Assembly was headed by President L. Kaczyński. He delivered a speech on the first day of the general debate, on 19 September 2006,<sup>3</sup> and its leading element was international solidarity. The President declared that solidarity should be the

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<sup>3</sup> See [www.prezydent.pl](http://www.prezydent.pl).



response to the challenges of globalization and help build a new world based on the right of all nations and all peoples to live in dignity. He said that Poland, already a donor of development aid, should be even more active in this area. Aid efforts must be undertaken in such a way that not only brings temporary relief, but, above all, creates the prospect of long-term development. President Kaczyński emphasized that all actions of international community should focus on human rights and universal human principles and values. He also mentioned Poland's growing involvement in international cooperation and its participation in peacekeeping and stabilization missions. He ensured that Poland offered continuous support for lasting peace in the Middle East. In his reference to the UN reform, the President emphasized that the Organization must follow the pace of change and its activities should focus on human beings, defend their rights and freedoms and open opening the road to welfare and spiritual development for all.

The priority of the Polish delegation to the 61<sup>st</sup> session of the UN General Assembly was implementing the agreements and decisions adopted at the UN summit of 2005. Moreover, the Polish delegation actively promoted its traditional priorities: strengthening international security, disarmament, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and peace operations, human rights and democracy and development of international law. It participated in the following events preceding the general debate: the meeting of the High Level Dialogue on international development and migration as well as the High Level Meeting on mid-term review of the realization of the Programme of Action for the least developed countries.

The Polish delegation advocated the enforcement of the regime regarding multilateral agreements concerning arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. An issue of importance was counteracting the possibility of weapons of mass destruction being used by terrorists and supporting the attempts to obtain wide UN support for important international initiatives aimed at counteracting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: the Cracow Initiative and the G-8 Global Partnership. It offered support for actions aimed at strengthening and further implementation of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons. The success of the Polish delegation was the adoption by consensus of the resolution on the implementation on the Chemical Weapons Convention, as well as the adoption of the resolution—with no vote—on the report of the Conference on Disarmament.

In development issues Poland followed the principle of maintaining balance between the liabilities and interests of developed and developing countries. It

tried to achieve the situation in which the countries of the South should acknowledge the necessity to achieve the development goals in compliance with the principle of good governance and rule of law. However, it supported the actions for complete and timely implementation of the Monterrey Conference decisions. An important issue for Poland was ensuring that the needs of individual countries undergoing political transformation should not disappear from view. The text of the resolution concerning the integration of economies in transition with the world economy noted that some states had already left the group of such economies. When the document was being adopted, the Czech delegation presented the declaration of nine states, including Poland, on their having left the group. The participation of the former President of Poland, Lech Wałęsa in the International Human Solidarity Day on the forum of the Second Committee of the Assembly and his proposal of establishing a fund whose resources should be gathered from contributions of citizens of all UN member states received a warm welcome.

The Polish delegation focused also on avoiding the overlap of the works conducted in the Third Committee and the Human Rights Council. Poland strove to ensure that the Third Committee should continue to consider drafts of resolutions concerning the human rights situation in individual states. Poland also actively supported the adoption of the resolution on religious intolerance and undertook efforts to implement the Declaration on HIV/AIDS in a timely manner.

The Polish delegation actively participated in the discussion on peacekeeping operations in connection with the proposed reforms concerning this sector of the UN activity. It emphasized the necessity to create conditions conducive to post-conflict reconstruction in the context of the actions of the Peacebuilding Commission and the necessity to develop the cooperation between the UN and regional organizations.

Poland took efforts to achieve the adoption of the joint EU standpoint on the amount of membership contributions in the years 2007–2009. Its particular concern was that the methodology of the contributions scale should include two elements which many of the EU states would not consent to before: the six-year base period and concessions due to foreign debts. Following the decision of the UN General Assembly on increasing the budget for 2007 by over \$200 million, the Polish contribution will increase by approximately 28% from \$7,867,418 in 2006 to \$10,139,271 in 2007. The declaration of Russia on increasing its contribution over the limit set in the negotiations slightly decreased Poland's liability. Another issue of importance was gaining support for the five-year

period of repayment of the costs connected with the major renovation the UN seat in New York, which was the solution least troublesome for the budgets of member states.

Poland's priority regarding the prevention of terrorism was ending the negotiations and passing the Convention on international terrorism.

Poland supported the candidature of Ban Ki Moon to the position of the UN Secretary-General.

An important dimension of Poland's activity in the UN was its participation in the implementation of the common standpoint of the EU member states, whose priorities continued to focus on implementing the recommendations and decisions adopted in the UN summit of 2005. The cooperation of the EU states on seeking solutions to the Lebanese-Israeli conflict played a very important role, along with their cooperation on having the Security Council introduce sanctions against Iran. Negotiations headed by the Finnish presidency and the results of votes indicated, however, that the EU was in a difficult situation during the 61<sup>st</sup> session of the General Assembly. The Union's problems were indicated particularly by the results of the negotiations over the new scale of contributions to the UN budget, as well as the differences among the EU states in the voting over the politically controversial resolutions. The EU was also often lonely in its attempts to achieve compromise solutions meeting the expectations of the international community.

Poland's involvement in the works of the UN in 2006 strengthened its positive image of an active and responsible member of the international community. Its contribution to the UN reform and initiating the works of the newly established bodies was of particular importance along with the review of mandates as well as disarmament and non-proliferation, peacekeeping operations, human rights, development of international law or regional cooperation, which are the traditional spheres of the Polish activity. Poland's membership in the European Union increased its influence in the UN. Gaining the support of the EU states considerably increases the chance of pursuing the Polish interests. Our ability to cooperate with other countries is also of considerable importance.

In spite of the significant transformations which the UN undergo, both in terms of their functioning and structure, the organization continues to be perceived as excessively static and tardy in its efforts to adapt to the dynamically changing international reality. Differences in the perception of the UN and its role observed among the states of the developed North and the developing South deepen, and the fact that the latter outnumber the former impedes the process of

reaching an understanding with regard to the most important issues, which often leads to a “decision paralysis.” The increasing criticism of the UN functioning results in the further weakening of the organization, and consequently makes the necessary reforms even more difficult to implement. However, as a realistic alternative does not exist, the UN continue to be the only universal structure of global reach and potential which guarantees maintaining the relatively stable system of collective security, introducing order to the principles of international cooperation in the spirit of effective multilateralism. Strengthening the organization and its most important functions concerning international peace, security and development is thus in Poland’s interest.

## Poland's Foreign Economic Relations

Poland's economy recorded very good macroeconomic results in 2006. This applies to inflation, interest rates, results on the current account of the balance of payments and the inflow of foreign direct investment. Such a situation is considered to be resulted by previously implemented policy which was oriented towards cost reduction, restructuring of the economy and growth in the productivity as well as the favouring of innovation, i.e. conditions determining the competitiveness of exports. All economic forecasts for 2007 confirm that the existing trend will continue.<sup>1</sup>

### The Dynamics of the Economic Growth

The pace of the Polish economic growth in 2006 increased compared to the previous year. At the end of 2006 economic growth amounted to 6.3%. Throughout the entire year the dynamics of GDP increased, calculated as a 12-month average,<sup>2</sup> reached 5.7%, which makes it the best result in the last decade. More and more extensive export was the source of the economic growth, while an increase in domestic demand gained in importance. Increases in personal earnings and savings and attempts to invest those funds by legal persons, along with transfers of foreign direct investments (FDI) or income remittance of Poles working abroad, are also of great significance. Estimates of the scale of emigration for economic purposes varies depending on sources giving such information between 660,000 (Ministry of Labour and Social Policy) and 4 million (media).

The average of Poland's economic growth between 1990 and 2006 stood at 2.6%, whereas an aggregate growth in GDP was up to 56.1% in that period. This means a 50% increase in GDP despite the initial transitional crisis in 1990–1991. There is a difference of opinion between experts as to the future dynamics of

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
<sup>1</sup> Forecasts by: Institute of Economics of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Adam Smith's Centre, Gdańsk Institute for Market Economics, NIOBE and principal analysts in Polish banks.

<sup>2</sup> "Wyniki makroekonomiczne 2006 roku," *Rzeczpospolita* of 18 January 2007, p. 1. Supplement B.

economic growth. Some of them maintain that the economy reached a peak and consistent with the business cycle it will enter a slowdown phase and subsequently a recession. Other experts, who point to stable sources of economic growth (export, individual consumption and investments) and the announcement of tax reductions, believe that the dynamics of the GDP increase in Poland will not deteriorate. Additionally, it is worth mentioning that the most advantageous circumstances for tax reductions are during a boom in the economy and not when the dynamics of the economic growth is low.

Chart 1

**Poland's economic growth in 1990–2006**  
(in %)



a forecast

Source: Statistics of the Central Statistical Office.

### Inflation

The average annual inflation in Poland in 2006 amounted to 1.02%.<sup>3</sup> Such satisfactory results in the dynamics of the price increase are explained by competition-intensifying policy which in turn forced cost reduction, i.e. the main source of the increase in prices in Central and Eastern European countries which

<sup>3</sup> *Rzeczpospolita* of 18 January 2006.

successfully have overcome demand-induced inflation being the basis of the abrupt increase in prices in the first phase of systemic transformations. After accession to the EU, the trade policy which constituted the basis for competition intensification has been implemented within the frames of the common EU trade policy. Poland, however, had earlier prepared for intensive competition in the EU market by implementing the trade and foreign currency policy that was different than other countries of the region. Furthermore, Poland slowly lowered interest rates, thus regulating the demand (also for imported goods and collective consumption). Moderate inflation expectations are of great importance for curb the dynamics of inflation.<sup>4</sup>

Table 1

**Monthly inflation level in 2006**

Description	Months											
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X	XI	XII
December of the previous year = 100	100.2	100.2	100.1	100.8	101.3	101.0	101.0	101.3	101.5	101.6	101.6	101.4
Previous month =100	100.2	100.0	99.9	100.7	100.5	99.7	100.0	100.3	100.2	100.1	100.0	99.8
Respective month of the previous year = 100	100.6	100.7	100.4	100.7	100.9	100.8	101.1	101.6	101.6	101.2	101.4	101.4
Cumulative values of a respective period of the previous year = 100	100.6	100.6	100.6	100.6	100.7	100.7	100.7	100.8	100.9	101.0	101.0	101.0

Source: Central Statistical Office (quoted after National Bank of Poland).

In the case of tradables, the inflation level was relatively low, nevertheless, since the fourth quarter an increase in the dynamics of prices in the entire economy was observed which did not however cause an evident acceleration in the general dynamics of the prices. It was the prices of nontradables that caused their increase. This fact is confirmed by a relatively higher increase in demand for nontradables in relation to their supply as opposed to the tradables and it

<sup>4</sup> *Raport o inflacji, styczeń 2007*, Warszawa: NBP i RPP, 2007, p. 96.

constitutes indirect proof that the competition in the services sector is limited as compared with the commodities sector. Such a situation is reaffirmed in the EU economies such as Portuguese, Spanish, Greek and Irish.

### **Unemployment Rate, Reserves in the Level of Productivity**

Higher dynamics of the economic growth affected the dynamics of the unemployment rate which started to fall. The level of unemployment in 2006 closed at 15% while at the beginning of the year it was still at 18.3%.<sup>5</sup> The average salary in enterprises in December reached PLN 3,027, whereas in 2004 it was only PLN 2,290 and in 2005—PLN 2,500. Despite such growth dynamics, salaries in Poland are relatively low compared with other EU countries. They are stimulated by one of the higher dynamics of productivity growth which results from Poland's investment policy employed in the early phases of systemic transformation. In the country where full-time and permanent employment has become a thing of the past (hidden unemployment), increased investments become a solution which blocks the possibility to make use of simple reserves that are available in human resources, while economic growth with no investments facilitates the usage of the labour reserves. Poland applied such a solution in the early transformation phases which gave rise to two jumps in the increase in productivity. The first jump resulted from the usage of simple reserves, the other one—from the usage of complex reserves embedded in the labour factor which constitute a fixed element influencing the growth of the productivity in the Poland's economy—on parallel basis to other EU member states. The key difference, however, lies in the level of productivity from which complex reserves start to be used. Following the usage of simple reserves that level was higher in Poland than in other countries undergoing systemic transformation due to Poland's substantial supply in labour force. Therefore, increases in Poland's productivity were higher (greater hidden and simple reserves).

### **PLN Exchange Rate**

In 2006, PLN exchange rates were stable, which is demonstrated by slight fluctuations in the zloty value both against the US dollar (1.1 percentage points) and against the euro (0.9 percentage points), taking into account the greatest deviations from the base rate. At the end of 2006, the zloty demonstrated an

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<sup>5</sup> *Rzeczpospolita* of 16 January 2007.



upward trend both towards the US dollar and the euro. At the beginning of the year, the exchange rate against the dollar was more stable than against the euro, whereas in November an upward trend of the zloty against both currencies was observed. In 2006, a minimal strengthening of common European currency against the US dollar by 0.9% was recorded.<sup>6</sup> The stabilisation of the exchange rate is one of requirements of introducing the zloty into the Exchange Rate Mechanism-2 (ERM-2) to join the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In 2005 and 2006, the PLN exchange rate was stable despite some slight fluctuations caused mainly by political events which did not however exceed the permissible limit determined for the euro ( $\pm 15\%$ ). Some arrangements concerning the introduction of the Polish currency into ERM-2 in relation to, *inter alia*, the margin of exchange rate fluctuation must be made with the European Central Bank (ECB). The amplitude of fluctuations should not be greater than  $\pm 15\%$ , but it can be narrower and amount to  $\pm 2$  or  $\pm 6\%$  as demonstrated by the practice of the countries which have already stabilised their exchange rates in ERM-2 or are doing so now. Statistics for 2006 show that the zloty meets that requirement, therefore Poland can stabilise its currency in that mechanism without any unnecessary pressures.

### Interest Rate Level

2006 was marked by relatively low interest rates. The reference interest rate level in Poland falls within the limits of convergence criteria contained in Protocol 2 to Maastricht Treaty. This applies to the reference interest rate level both at the selection of first member states into the Monetary and Economic Union (3.82) and at present time. After 2005, the year in which the Monetary Policy Council often cut interest rates, 2006 may be considered to be more stable in this respect which is confirmed by dates of the introduction of each interest rate level by the National Bank of Poland (NBP).

High dynamics of the economic growth is likely to lead to a reversal of the downward trend of the NBP's interest rate. An interest rate which is higher than in the ECB can be considered a factor which additionally increases the attractiveness of the Polish market for foreign investments. The reference interest rate specified by the Maastricht criteria is a variable objective: in 1998, when the Economic and Monetary Union was founded, it was at 6.2%. It also falls within

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<sup>6</sup> Informacja o sytuacji w handlu zagranicznym w grudniu 2006 roku i po 12 miesiącach ub.r. (Ministry of Finance based on preliminary payment data from the National Bank of Poland transactions).

the permissible range determined by the interest rate levels of three countries where it is the lowest in the EMU. The interest rate of a country aspiring to join the EMU should not differ from the average of the three best results by more than 1.5 percentage points.<sup>7</sup> The average of the three best EU countries is 4.3 percentage points.<sup>8</sup> This means that the criterion is fulfilled by a country whose interest rate is less than or equal to 5.5%.

Table 2

**NBP base interest rates**

Interest rate	Rate	Effective since
Reference rate <sup>a</sup>	4.00	1.03.2006
Lombard rate	5.50	1.03.2006
NBP deposit rate	2.50	1.03.2006
Reduscount rate	4.25	1.03.2006
Reserve requirement		
– zloty demand deposits	3.5	31.10.2003
– zloty time deposits	3.5	31.10.2003
– foreign currency demand deposits	3.5	31.10.2003
– foreign currency time deposits	3.5	31.10.2003
_ funds from repo transactions	0	30.06.2004
Interest rate on required reserve	0.9 of rediscount rate	1.05.2004

<sup>a</sup> minimum yield on 7-day NBP money market bills

Source: [www.nbp.pl](http://www.nbp.pl).

**Budget Deficit**

The European Commission's standpoint is that the measures taken by the Polish government so far in order to reduce the budget deficit are insufficient and it recommended that the excessive budget deficit of public finance be reduced by the end of the year. "At present, the development of the macroeconomic and budgetary situation allows one to consider that Poland is not in a danger of exceeding the declared target"—announced the Ministry of

<sup>7</sup> Information on interest rates of UE and EMU member states and new member states is available at [www.ecb.int/stats/money/long/html/index.en.html](http://www.ecb.int/stats/money/long/html/index.en.html).

<sup>8</sup> Own calculations.

Finance in one of its press releases in January 2007. The Ministry of Finance stresses that the state budget deficit is lower than planned in the budget for 2006: "The following was assumed: PLN 30.5 billion (3.1% of GDP) and PLN 27.3 billion (2.6% of GDP) while preliminary data regarding the implementation point to the deficit of PLN 25.1 billion (2.4% of GDP)." Good results in the implementation of the planned budget are directly related to the dynamics of the economic growth which is accompanied by an accelerated increase in budget revenues. According to the Ministry of Finance, "the accomplishment of the deficit planned by Poland in the update of the convergence programme (3.4%) will mean that Poland met the deadline of 2007 recommended by the European Commission to be 2007 for the elimination of the excessive deficit, taking fully into account the adjustment of the so-called structural deficit by 0.5 percentage points." The Ministry of Finance emphasises that other European member states such as France, Germany, and Portugal were also subject to the excessive deficit procedure. The Ministry of Finance added that at present Hungary has to contend with the problem of the excessive deficit in the government and local government institutions sector; in 2006 that deficit went beyond 10% of GDP.

### Foreign Trade Performance

In 2006, 37% of the Polish GDP was generated by export. This share is high if we compare present performance with that from several years ago, and low if compared with results of such countries as Ireland (80%), Estonia (84%), the Czech Republic (73%) or Hungary (66%). Key consumers of Polish export are EU countries. In 2006 Poland's export increased as compared to the previous year by 22.5%, i.e. by €16.117 billion. Exports in 2006 reached €87.541 billion. At the same time, import went up by 23.1%, which means that its value stood at €99.992 billion (increase by €18.823 billion). The foreign trade balance in 2006 closed with the deficit of €12.451 billion, which is equivalent to a deficit increase of €2.705 billion compared with 2005.<sup>9</sup> The dynamics of both export and import expressed in EUR is higher than the dynamics of export and import increase expressed in PLN and USD.<sup>10</sup> NBP analysts connected the deterioration of the trade results with a growing tendency of the zloty's appreciation in the last

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<sup>9</sup> Central Statistical Office (GUS) data of 25 April 2007. The foreign trade balance by country groups.

<sup>10</sup> *Statystyki 2006*, attachment no. 1: "Obroty towarowe z zagranicą oraz saldo rachunku obrotów bieżących wg NBP w okresie 1.2004–12.2006 r. (w EUR, USD, PLN)," Warszawa: Narodowy Bank Polski, 2006.

three months of 2006. A year ago the deficit was reduced by 50%. The balance of sales with the European market improved, while it deteriorated as far as developing countries were concerned. The share of export in GDP increased, which is a long-term trend. Not long ago—in 2000 that share was 20.1%, whereas in 2006 it approximated 40%. Similarly, the ratio of commodity turnover to GDP improved: in 2000 it stood at 7.2%, whereas in 2006 it fell by 1%. In the same period, the current account balance in relation to GDP improved significantly, which is evidenced by a change from 5.8% of GDP to 1.5% of GDP.

Table 3

**Volume of foreign trade balance by country groups**  
(in EUR billion)

Period	Total	Country groups			
		Economically developed countries <sup>a</sup>		Developing countries	Central and East European countries <sup>b</sup>
		UE countries			
Export					
I–XII 2005	71,423.5	59,699.5	55,135.6	4553.8	7170.2
I–XII 2006	87,541.4	72,798.5	67,699.2	5317.5	9425.4
Import					
I–XII 2005	81,169.7	59,484.4	53,200.0	12,283.9	9401.4
I–XII 2006	99,992.9	69,954.5	62,903.9	17,558.6	12,479.8
Balance					
2005	-9746.2				
2006	-12,451.5				

<sup>a</sup> Canada, USA, European countries excluding developing countries and those listed in item b), Australia, New Zealand, Israel, Japan, the Republic of South Africa.

<sup>b</sup> Albania, Belarus, Croatia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine.

Source: Central Statistical Office data. Foreign trade volume by country group, 25 April 2007.

In trade, changes in the geographical structure caused by the EU membership may be observed. Poland's key trading partners are Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Alongside this, Poland's turnover with Portugal, Malta, Cyprus and Lithuania decreased. The share of the EU in Poland's exports approximates 80%, whereas it accounts for 66% of

Poland's imports. The trade balance with the EU member states is positive and a surplus achieved demonstrates an upward trend. In 2006, the surplus of Poland's exports over imports with the EU amounted to €4.8 billion.

However, the turnover with China decreased, what was caused mainly by fall of the Polish exports to that market. The negative trade balance with Russia is increasing. Poland's trade deficit with China and Russia constitutes more than 90% of total current account deficit.

The share of the largest countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States is as follows: Russia—4.5% exports and 8.9% imports; Belarus—0.8% exports and 1.0% imports; Ukraine—2.9% exports and 1.0% imports and Kazakhstan—0.2% exports and 0.5% imports. The share of European economic associations was as follows: CEFTA—1.7% exports and 0.7% imports; EFTA—3.0% exports and 2.7% imports; CIS collectively 8.7% exports and 11.7% imports. The share of each country in exports and imports was 9.4% and 19.4% respectively.

Among the most popular export commodities, means of transport came in first, followed by farm and food goods and products of animal origin, and furniture. Consequently, automobiles and their parts account for 13% of exports, common metals and metalware—12%, machinery and electric and electronic appliances—10.6%, furniture- 6.8%, engines—3.5%, and ships and boats—2.8%. The highest share in imports is demonstrated by fuels—11.5%, machinery—10.8%, machine vehicles, their parts and accessories—8.7%, whereas the share of pharmaceuticals is 2.6%.

It is striking that the same goods are on the list of the largest exported and imported commodity groups. In the case of export they include: automobiles and their parts; internal-combustion engines; sitting furniture; liners; furniture other than in the previous item; insulated wire, cables and electric wiring, TV receiving devices, radio sets and recording devices; coal, briquettes and solid fuel fire-starter; petroleum oils and bituminous mineral oils; refined copper and rough-plasticity copper alloys; constructions; coke and semi-coke from coal, lignite and peat coke; road vehicles for goods transportation; pneumatic tyres, new rubber tyres; other articles made from cast iron and steel; toilet paper, cellucotton or its bands; parts exclusively or mainly for engines of exported cars, electricity, and electrical equipment.

Goods on the imported goods list are taxonomised in a different way; traditionally the first place is occupied by sources of energy, however in general

the same groups are present: petroleum and bituminous mineral oils; automobiles and other vehicles; vehicle parts and accessories; natural gases and other gas hydrocarbons; pharmaceuticals; crude and petroleum mineral oils; automatic data processing machines; engine parts for imported vehicles; passenger liners; transmitting devices for radio-telephony and radio-telegraphy, radio broadcasting and TV sets and parts for those devices; tractors; liquid pumps, pump equipment; road vehicles; integrated circuits, electric microprocessors; flat cast iron or unalloyed steel rolled products; plastics and goods made from other materials, and line telephony and telegraphy devices, including wire telephones sets with earphones.

The structure of the trade exchange changes distinctively. In Poland's exports, the share of highly-processed goods rose significantly, reaching 52.8% in 2006, whereas in 2000, it was 45%.

The level of exports is mainly determined by the economic situation and commodity export offer. In 2006, business conditions were favourable and the range of products became even more attractive. Unit costs of exported commodities were being reduced which is a natural phenomenon for increasing productivity and expansion of the production range by foreign orders and increasing demand on the domestic market. The additional stimuli for the export increase were foreign investments owing to which companies acquired modern machinery. Foreign trade performance was influenced by foreign exchange rates since the currency appreciation caused exports to be more expensive, thus restraining the competitiveness of export goods. Such a situation can be, to a certain extent, balanced by growing productivity which contributes to a reduction of production unit costs. The import volume was determined by the demand flexibility and increasing prices as well as by the exchange rate of the currency whose appreciation made imports relatively less expensive in the domestic currency.

The list of top 500 Polish enterprises indicates that the largest income in foreign trade is yielded by the automotive industry, metallurgy, petrochemistry, electronics, electrical engineering, chemicals, air transport, timber manufacture and furniture-making, the confectionary and grocery industries, fuel production and power sector, cosmetics, tyre-making, pharmacy, papermaking and construction sectors, manufacture of household appliances, military equipment and weaponry.

Table 4

**15 largest exporters from the top 500 list**

Position on the top 500 list	Company	Export revenues in PLN thousands	Sector
13	Volkswagen Poznań Sp. z o.o., Poznań	8,179,236	automotive
7	KGHM Polska Miedź SA, Lublin	8,035,909	metallurgical
11	FIAT Auto Poland SA, Bielsko-Biała	798,023	automotive
1	PKN Orlen SA, Płock	7,297,611	petrochemical
20	LG Electronics Sp. z o.o., Mława	5,633,278	electronic
38	Węglokoks SA, Katowice	3,628,404	trade
31	Volkswagen Motor Polska Sp. z o.o., Polkowice	3,483,094	automotive
30	FIAT GM Powertrain Polska Sp. z o.o., Bielsko-Biała	3,476,471	automotive
9	Mitkal Steel Poland SA, Katowice	3,368,932	metallurgical
29	Tele-Fonika Kable SA, Kraków	3,083,106	electrical
22	Grupa Boryszew SA, Sochaczew	3,012,279	chemical
50	Philips Lightning Poland SA, Piła	2,722,823	electrical engineering
46	GK Delhi Poland SA, Kraków	2,648,041	automotive
34	Polski Koks SA, Kraków	2,482,700	trade
45	PLL LOT SA, Warszawa	2,354,437	air transport

Source: "Pięćsetka Polityki. Doroczny ranking krajowych przedsiębiorstw," *Polityka* of 28 April – 5 May 2007, p. 28.

Poland's largest export commodities are vehicles: motor cars, delivery trucks and buses. In 2006, the automotive branch achieved over €14 billion of income which constitutes a 22% increase in export value compared to the previous year.

Volkswagen Poznań has been the export leader for many years. This company sells Caddy delivery vehicles, Fiat Auto Poland (3<sup>rd</sup> place) exports city cars, whereas Volkswagen Motor Polska (7<sup>th</sup> place) exports Diesel engines.<sup>11</sup> Every fourth company on the Polish list of leading exporters belongs to the automotive branch. Domestic appliances and chemicals producers are also feature highly in exports: Grupa Boryszew SA in Boryszew (11<sup>th</sup> place), Zakłady Azotowe Puławy SA (37<sup>th</sup> place) and Zakłady Azotowe in Tarnów (51<sup>st</sup> place). The problem of the Poland's exports lies in the weakening of its traditional chief assets which determine its competitiveness, such as a great number of well-educated young people or relatively low cost of the labour force.

### **Inflow of Foreign Direct Investments**

In 2006 foreign direct investments in Poland amounted to \$15.269 billion, i.e. over \$7 billion more than the previous year.<sup>12</sup> Until recently, the best year in terms of direct foreign investments (excluding 2000 when Special Economic Zones were being closed) was 2004 in which they reached \$9.9 billion. However, it was an exceptional year, because of, *inter alia*, an acquisition by France Telecom of Telekomunikacja Polska SA shares worth well over \$2 billion. Except for 2000 and 2004, the value of direct foreign investments did not exceed \$10 billion. Liabilities in respect of loans and borrowing from foreign investors, other than trade loans, constituted 80% of total liabilities, whereas trade loan liabilities accounted for 20% of total liabilities. The share of the banking sector in loan liabilities was 11%. Foreign investors' income is estimated at €7.5 billion. The largest share of that income was contributed by financial intermediation, trade and repair services, followed by income from transportation, warehouse management, telecommunications, real estate management, information technology, education, machinery rental and other business activity-related services, while the lowest share came from other services. Financial results of companies with foreign capital demonstrate a jump in the increase in profits. This points to Polish market stabilization and its great attractiveness to foreign investors.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> "Pięćsetka Polityki. Doroczny ranking krajowych przedsiębiorstw," *Polityka* of 28 April – 5 May 2007, p. 29.

<sup>12</sup> See [www.nbp.gov.pl](http://www.nbp.gov.pl).


<sup>13</sup> *Zagraniczne inwestycje bezpośrednie w Polsce w 2005 r.*, Warszawa: Narodowy Bank Polski, 2007, pp. 23–31.



The National Bank of Poland's preliminary data for the 12 months of 2006 are optimistic. Poland's economy is the largest market among new EU member states, quite well equipped with the labour force and located in the centre of Europe, with good macroeconomic parameters attracts foreign investors. The intensification of international transfers is facilitated by the increase in the dynamics of economic development in the most developed countries and decisions concerning the new shape of international labour division. In the new labour division, the size of the internal market is less important (trade exchange liberalisation and capital flow as well as cheaper transport costs) than the availability of the skilled labour force, its costs, stable economy and properly functioning infrastructure. In this process, Poland's economy becomes a part of the global economy, both by importing foreign capital and exporting its own.

Chart 2

**Inflow of foreign direct investments to Poland between 2001 and 2006**  
(in \$billion)



Source: [www.nbp.pl](http://www.nbp.pl).

Foreign investors are still dominated (75%) by EU companies. The increased interest of Far East investors in the Polish market is a new trend. The largest investments in 2006 were made by, for instance, Japanese companies, such as Sharp, Bridgestone, Toyota and Toshiba. The investment projects of those

corporations whose brands are famous around the world totalled roughly €550 million. Investors expect that new plants will employ at least 5,000 workers.

The inflow of foreign direct investments into Poland's economy is not evenly distributed over each month of the year. The highest inflow of foreign investments occurred in the second half of the year, from September to December. For four months, \$7.6 billion was invested which constituted 52% of total investments made in 2006. Between January and April, direct foreign investments amounted to \$5.1 billion, i.e. 35%.

A new phenomenon in foreign investments is the selection of Poland as a location for research and development centres. In 2006 foreign corporations invested approximately \$100 million in them. Currently, about 40 such centres operate in all major cities in Poland such as the ABB Research Centre in Kraków, ADB in Zielona Góra, Alstom in Wrocław, Apriso in Kraków, Avio-Polska in Bielsko-Biała, Avon in Garwolin, Bombardier in Katowice, Bosch-Siemens in Łódź, CapGemini Poland in Wrocław, Compuware in Gdańsk, Delphi in Kraków, Hewlett Packard in Wrocław, IBM in Kraków, Microsoft in Poznań, Oracle in Warsaw, Philips in Piła, Pratt and Whitney in Rzeszów and Siemens and Volvo in Wrocław. The expansion of research and development centres with foreign capital is a mutual benefit both for Poland and the investor. Such investments provide to Poland guarantees for creating innovation potential for the economy which determines its future competitiveness. For foreign investors they constitute the source to improve the productiveness, improve production quality and the potential of its diversification.

The Polish Agency for Information and Foreign Investment (PAIiZ), which promotes Poland's economy abroad, launched an intensive campaign addressed to investors, including those from outside the EU. It can be expected that the Poland's market will attract more attention once Poland's macroeconomic results are widely known and the date of Poland's entry into the euro zone nears. Membership in the EMU confirms the stability of the economy and currency and determines the economy's openness to the market which is regarded as the largest consumer market in the world. Poland is a part of that market, however Polish wages determine the competitiveness of goods produced locally. Apart from the competitiveness resulting from the abundance of production factors, Poland systemically guarantees to investors certain advantages, such as proximity of markets, taxes, high efficiency and its growth. Together with an inflow of EU transfers aimed at economic development and elimination of inter-regional differences, infrastructure is expanding. Owing to those

conditions, Polish market should be a good target for foreign investors, provided that no unexpected events take place.

Poland invests abroad as it did in the previous years. In 2006, those investments were worth \$1.3 billion.<sup>14</sup> Poland started to export its capital later than the Czech Republic and Hungary, thus the value of its investments is lower than that of the above countries. Polish investors engage in investment activity in Western Europe (Germany, Great Britain, Holland and Sweden) and in Eastern Europe (Kaliningrad, Ukraine, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia), and China is a new market, too. Polish investors are expected to become interested in Latin American markets.

In eastern countries, investors focus on the processing and food industry, whereas in EU member states—on services: real estate agencies, trade, small catering business and hotel industry. A comparison of the capital export in 2006 with the earlier years shows an upward trend in this area. In 2000, Poland invested abroad capital worth \$74 million, in 2001 transfers from abroad exceeded the value of foreign investments which resulted in a positive balance on the latter's account (presented with a minus in the balance sheet as it they constitute an outflow of capital from the economy) of \$364 million. Since 2002, Poland's transfers of foreign investments exceeded the re-export of foreign profits by \$933 million, in 2003—by \$1.186 billion, in 2004—by \$2.810 billion, in 2005—by \$9.927 billion and in 2006—by \$2.478 billion.<sup>15</sup> The highest income was achieved by the Polish companies based in EU countries, mainly in the Netherlands, the Czech Republic as well as outside the internal market in Africa. This income was gained mainly by companies investing in trade, intermediation and all sorts of repair services as well as industrial processing and construction. The highest losses were incurred in companies located in Germany and Romania.<sup>16</sup>

### **Transfers between Poland and European Union**

Financial transfers between Poland and the European Union from the accession date, i.e. 1 May 2004, indicate that our country is a net recipient of

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<sup>14</sup> Central Statistical Office data, 2007.

<sup>15</sup> National Bank of Poland data—balance of payments statistics.

<sup>16</sup> *Polskie inwestycje bezpośrednie za granicą w 2005 roku*, Warszawa: Narodowy Bank Polski, 2006, pp. 19–20.

those flows. The difference between Polish and EU transfers is positive in favour of Poland.

Official projections of mutual transfers indicate that together with an increased usage of the EU funds, this result will improve. However, this is not a correct assumption because due to the membership in the EU and an upturn in the economy as well as an increase in employment, Poland's GDP is growing and this will translate into increased flows to the EU in respect of compulsory contributions. Nonetheless, the balance of transfers should be advantageous for Poland for a long time.

Table 5

**Financial flows of EU funds  
from 1 April 2004 to 31 December 2006**

No.	Fund	EUR	PLN
I	Transfers from EU to Poland	11,753,902,270.38	48,484,970,959.09
1.	Pre-accession funds	1,377,865,935.71	6,238,556,333.42
	of which:		
	Phare	92,048,364.07	4 010 446 611.25
	SAPARD	457,382,871.64	2,228,109,722.17
2.	Structural operations	4,200,427,675.00	17,386,923,288.72
	of which:		
	Structural funds	3,241,404,584.22	13,165,433,417.75
	Cohesion funds/ISPA	9,592,390.78	4,221,489,870.97
3.	Common agricultural policy	399,341,250.96	16,014,529,717.54
	of which:		
	Direct payments	1,514,254,958.69	5,953,204,450.02
	Market measures	359,350,351.72	1,407,257,113.84
	Rural development programme	2,098,296,136.00	8,570,986,124.69
	Other transfers	21,739,804.55	8,308,228.98
4.	Transition facility <sup>a</sup>	36,156,537.53	148,196,782.29

5.	Cash flow facility instrument <sup>b</sup>	1,616,632,480.00	6,598,520,411.01
6.	Schengen facility <sup>c</sup>	313,874,505.49	1,220,244,426.11
7.	Other transfers	215,303,885.69	878,000,000
II.	Own resources payments	6,250,814,651.46	25,108,802,916.23
8.	GNI (in respect of a share in the EU gross national income)	41,147,814.54	16,343,515,921.99
9.	VAT	1,481,329,626.12	5,980,991,161.05
10.	Traditional own resources	655,477,210.80	2,784,295,833.20
III.	Reimbursements of unused resources	270,016.54	108,466,493.86
(I–II–III)	RP—EU net balance	547,686,612.38	23,267,701,549.00

a Transition facility being a continuation of the assistance granted to candidate countries as part of the institutional development support component of the Phare programme to reinforce in 2004–2006 the administrative capacity of the new EU member states to implement and enforce the *acquis* and to support the exchange of best practices.

b Cash flow facility instrument—funds for 2004–2006 for the maintenance of the national budget liquidity in view of time differences in financial flows between Poland and EU.

c Schengen facility—funds to cover expenditures at the new external borders of the European Union for the implementation of the Schengen treaty and external border control from the date of the accession of the new member states until the end of 2006.

Source: *Finanse Unii Europejskiej. Przepływy finansowe między Polską a budżetem UE* ([www.cie.gov.pl](http://www.cie.gov.pl)).

An analysis of monthly flows between Poland and EU indicates that in 2006, with the exception of one month, mutual transfers between EU and Poland showed a credit balance in favour of Poland, i.e. €2,701,734,427.31 on cumulative basis. This means on the one hand that Poland was able to prepare appropriate projects which were approved by the European Union for financing under various programmes and on the other hand that the dynamic of the Polish economy is strictly linked with the usage of EU funds and stimulated by them.

Table 6

**Cumulative financial flows between Republic of Poland and the EU in 2006**  
(in euro)

Description	January	February	March	April
Phare	0.00	49,275.66	34,039,053.17	34,617,025.19
Sapard	0.00	0.00	12,481.10	12,481.10
ISPA (cohesion)	169,737,394.02	259,384,500.70	286,193,578.44	286,193,578.44
Structural funds	1,496,385.99	56,347,752.88	74,596,506.63	199,146,289.06
Revenues of the Agricultural Market Agency	19,973,256.44	33,791,738.77	46,938,619.55	68,664,097.41
Revenues of the Agency for Restructuring and Modernisation of Agriculture	375,189.16	375,189.16	27,042,021.54	199,650,210.55
Income of the Agricultural Market Agency	471,554.40	1,649,106.33	1,969,935.98	2,365,915.95
Income of the Agency for Restructuring and Modernisation of Agriculture	0.00	137,133.36	137,133.36	269,776.09
Rural development plan	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Other transfers under the Common Agricultural Policy	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Transition facility	0.00	0.00	0.00	8,586,338.00
Cash flow facility instrument	85,715,452.00	128,573,178.00	171,430,904.00	214,288,630.00
Schengen facility	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Other transfers	688,000.00	11,586,000.00	22,227,000.00	26,309,257.49
Total transfers	278,457,232.01	619,005,707.24	779,129,523.34	1,040,103,599.28
Membership contribution	-131,488,071.89	-615,953,228.74	-770,944,813.26	-925,470,794.09
Reimbursements of unused resources				
Balance	146,969,160.12	3,052,478.50	8,184,710.08	114,632,805.19

Description	May	June	July	August
Phare	34,617,025.19	59,818,032.04	71,483,793.04	71,483,793.04
Sapard	12,481.10	12,481.10	12,481.10	12,481.10
ISPA (cohesion)	304,982,473.86	326,415,017.98	346,675,755.22	353,850,751.63
Structural funds	334,284,911.89	453,597,508.28	656,829,634.36	764,489,234.96
Revenues of the Agricultural Market Agency	108,517,095.69	125,367,420.05	142,178,122.12	160,838,236.72
Revenues of the Agency for Restructuring and Modernisation of Agriculture	420,165,027.28	565,118,999.70	770,193,362.29	807,089,913.93
Income of the Agricultural Market Agency	2,798,100.94	3,904,415.52	4,552,229.93	4,995,563.69
Income of the Agency for Restructuring and Modernisation of Agriculture	269,776.09	3,219,164.73	3,296,285.66	3,296,285.66
Rural development plan	0.00	38,703.00	38,703.00	38,703.00
Other transfers under the Common Agricultural Policy	281,553,222.00	281,553,222.00	281,553,222.00	281,553,222.00
Transition facility	8,586,338.00	23,811,363.53	23,811,363.53	23,811,363.53
Cash flow facility instrument	257,146,356.00	300,004,082.00	342,861,808.00	385,719,534.00
Schengen facility	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Other transfers	37,595,360.19	49,546,361.09	73,814,562.24	78,684,608.89
Total transfers	1,790,528,168.23	2,194,406,771.02	2,717,301,322.49	2,935,863,692.15
Membership contribution		-1,214,928,203.74		-1,608,787,840.96
Reimbursements of unused resources	-3,632,967.61	-363,297.61	-3,632,967.61	-4,024,514.71
Balance	702,008,106.46	975,845,599.67	1,313,752,322.63	1,323,051,336.48

Description	September	October	November	December
Phare	154,276,484.87	165,632,803.16	222,629,489.74	222,629,489.74
Sapard	12,481.10	12,481.10	12,481.10	12,481.10
ISPA (cohesion)	379,487,591.63	396,806,433.72	439,389,357.42	520,761,997.27
Structural funds	1,037,994,635.94	1,077,198,204.15	1,303,194,874.16	1,624,939,594.07
Revenues of the Agricultural Market Agency	171,098,794.21	181,896,135.39	181,896,135.39	181,896,135.39
Revenues of the Agency for Restructuring and Modernisation of Agriculture	810,329,912.02	811,580,923.21	811,580,923.21	811,580,923.21
Income of the Agricultural Market Agency	5,784,329.09	6,175,935.42	6,175,935.42	6,175,935.42
Income of the Agency for Restructuring and Modernisation of Agriculture	3,346,964.68	3,347,005.98	3,347,005.98	3,347,005.98
Rural development plan	38,703.00	38,703.00	38,703.00	38,703.00
Other transfers under the Common Agricultural Policy	870,660,665.00	870,660,665.00	870,660,665.00	1,149,555,478.00
Transition facility	23,811,363.53	23,811,363.53	23,811,363.53	25,811,363.53
Cash flow facility instrument	428,577,260.00	471,434,986.00	514,292,712.00	514,292,712.00
Schengen facility	0.00	0.00	0.00	106,664,337.09
Other transfers	82,462,756.09	83,487,713.81	88,970,885.69	88,970,885.69
Total transfers	3,967,881,941.16	4,092,074,353.47	4,466,000,531.64	5,258,216,255.35
Membership contribution	-1,821,311,516.10	-2,032,536,037.43	-2,296,761,011.78	-2,552,450,097.65
Reimbursements of unused resources	-4,024,514.71	-4,031,730.39	-4,031,730.39	-4,031,730.39
Balance	2,142,545,910.35	2,055,506,585.65	2,165,207,789.47	2,701,734,427.31

Source: Przepływy finansowe między Unią Europejską a Polską ([www.mf.gov.pl](http://www.mf.gov.pl))



Table 7

**Financial flows between Republic of Poland and EU in 2006**  
(in euro)

Description	January	February	March	April
Phare	0.00	495,275.66	33,543,777.51	577,972.02
Sapard	0.00	0.00	12,481.10	0.00
ISPA (cohesion)	169,737,394.02	89,647,106.68	26,809,077.74	0.00
Structural funds	1,496,385.99	54,851,366.89	18,248,753.75	124,549,782.43
Revenues of the Agricultural Market Agency	19,973,256.44	13,818,482.33	13,146,880.76	21,725,477.86
Revenues of the Agency for Restructuring and Modernisation of Agriculture	375,189.16	126,666,832.38	14,542,289.57	58,065,899.44
Income of the Agricultural Market Agency	471,554.40	1,177,551.93	320,829.65	395,979.97
Income of the Agency for Restructuring and Modernisation of Agriculture	0.00	137,133.36	0.00	132,642.73
Rural development plan	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Other transfers under the Common Agricultural Policy	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Transition facility	0.00	0.00	0.00	8,586,338.00
Cash flow facility instrument	85,715,452.00	42,857,726.00	42,857,726.00	42,857,726.00
Schengen facility	0.00	0.0	0.00	0.00
Other transfers	688,000.00	10,897,000.00	10,642,000.00	4,082,257.49
Total transfers	278,457,232.01	340,548,475.23	160,123,816.10	260,974,075.94
Membership contribution	-131,488,071.8	-484,465,156.85	-154,991,584.52	-154,525,980.83
Reimbursements of unused funds				
Balance	146,969,160.12	-143,916,681.62	5,132,231.58	106,448,095.11

Table 7—continued

Description	May	June	July	August
Phare	0.00	25,201,006.85	11,665,761.00	0.00
Sapard	0.00	0.0	0.00	0.00
ISPA (cohesion)	1,878,895	21,432,544.12	20,260,737.24	7,174,996.41
Structural funds	135,138,622.83	119,312,596.39	203,232,126.08	107,659,600.60
Revenues of the Agricultural Market Agency	39,852,998.28	16,850,324.36	16,810,702.07	18,660,114.60
Revenues of the Agency for Restructuring and Modernisation of Agriculture	220,514,816.73	146,953,972.42	203,074,362.59	36,896,551.64
Income of the Agricultural Market Agency	432,184.99	1,106,314.58	647,814.41	443,333.76
Income of the Agency for Restructuring and Modernisation of Agriculture	0.00	2,949,388.64	7,120.93	0.00
Rural development plan	281,553,222.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Other transfers under the Common Agricultural Policy	0.00	38,703.00	0.00	0.00
Transition facility	0.00	15,225,025.53	0.00	0.00
Cash flow facility instrument	42,857,726.00	42,857,726.00	42,857,726.00	42,857,726.00
Schengen facilit	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Other transfers	11,286,102.70	11,951,000.90	24,268,201.15	4,870,046.65
Total transfers	750,424,568.95	403,878,602.79	522,894,551.47	218,562,369.66
b140Membership contribution	-159,416,300.06	130,041,109.57	-184,987,828.51	-208,871,808.71
Reimbursements of unused resources				-391,547.10
Balance	587,375,301.27	273,837,493.22	337,906,722.96	9,299,013.85

Table 7—continued

Description	September	October	November	December
Phare	82,792,691.83	11,347,318.29	57,005,686.58	0.00
Sapard	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
ISPA (cohesion)	25,636,840.00	17,318,842.09	42,582,923.70	81,372,639.85
Structural funds	273,505,400.98	39,203,568.21	225,996,670.01	321,744,719.91
Revenues of the Agricultural Market Agency	10,260,557.49	10,797,341.18	0.00	0.00
Revenues of the Agency for Restructuring and Modernisation of Agriculture	3,239,998.09	1,251,011.19	0.00	0.00
Income of the Agricultural Market Agency	788,765.40	391,606.33	0.00	0.00
Income of the Agency for Restructuring and Modernisation of Agriculture	50,679.02	41.30	0.00	0.00
owidctparRural development plan	589,107,443.00	0.00	0.00	278,894,813.00
Other transfers under the Common Agricultural Policy	0.00	0.00	0.00	1,539,213.86
Transition facility	0.00	0.00	0.00	2,000,000.00
Cash flow facility instrument	42,857,726.00	42,857,726.00	42,857,726.00	0.00
Schengen facility	0.00	0.00	0.00	106,664,337.09
Other transfers	3,778,147.20	24,957.72	5,483,171.88	
Total transfers	1,032,018,249.01	124,192,412.31	373,926,178.17	792,215,723.71
Membership contribution	-212,523,675.14	-211,224,521.33	-264,224,974.35	-255,689,085
Reimbursements of unused resources		-7215.68		0.00
Balance	819,494,573.87	-87,039,324.70	109,701,203.82	5,352,637.84

Source: As in table 6.

The information contained in the report on the status of the implementation of operating programmes co-financed with EU structural funds in 2006 indicates that the utilisation of the funds made available was different in each area. In general, programmes were developed which required twice as much funds than those made available, of which 87.64% may be used to cover costs of programs approved for the implementation. The implementation of the approved programmes led to a receipt of 27.44% of the funds made available by the EU.<sup>17</sup> The largest number of programmes concerned the improvement of the competitiveness of enterprises (261.32%; 79.14%; 20.55%),<sup>18</sup> the second place was occupied by projects covered by the integrated Operating Programme for the Regional Development (256.85%; 94.36%; 32.98%), third came projects concerning the development of human resources (172.21%; 88.49%; 30.54%), and subsequently: restructuring and modernisation of the food sector and the development of rural areas (140.52%; 93.5%; 36.90%), Equal (145.11%; 94.36%; 17.09%), transport (238.09%; 77.40%; 9.94%), Interreg (96.28%; 80.37%; 7.35%), technical assistance (104.4%; 90.79%; 17.06%), and finally fishing with fish processing (72.35%; 61.21%; 35.85%).<sup>19</sup>

As far as ministries are concerned, the level of programmes implemented by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education does not promise that the allocated funds will be used (6.9% of allocation for 2004–2006). The Ministry of Transport demonstrates a low, albeit exceeding the minimum, level of expenses (9.9% of the allocation in the same period). Among agencies and special funds involved in the implementation of each activity, the lowest level of expenditure of community funds was recorded in the National Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Management which managed to spend PLN 14.5 million out of more than PLN 600 million earmarked for 2004–2006, i.e. as little as 2.4% of the allocation. These are not good results, however they indicate a high activation in preparing applications for program financing with EU funds. A new financial prospect for 2007–2013 should lead to an improvement in the utilisation of the funds made available.

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<sup>17</sup> Ministerstwo Rozwoju Regionalnego, Informacja o stanie realizacji programów operacyjnych współfinansowanych z funduszy strukturalnych Unii Europejskiej za okres od 1 do 30 listopada 2006 ([www.fundusze-strukturalne.gov.pl](http://www.fundusze-strukturalne.gov.pl)).

<sup>18</sup> The first figure indicates the percentage of prepared programmes against the possibility of their financing specified under the EU budgetary prospect for 2000–2006, the second figure—the value of programmes approved for the implementation, while the third—amounts used under the programmes made available.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 3

### Poland's Debt

Poland's external debt demonstrates an upward trend, although some of its components have decreased. The debt decreases in a medium term in relation to GDP which proves that it does not pose a problem for the economy that cannot be dealt with in a long term. Taking into account the USD exchange rate (which has been falling for three years) and the appreciation of the zloty observed since the last year, one can conclude that the value of the debt expressed in zlotys has decreased. However, a comparison with Poland's debt in 1999 shows a distinct upward trend of the external debt of the Polish economy.

Table 8

#### Poland's external debt (in \$million<sup>a</sup>)

External debt item	1999			
	As of the end of 1Q	As of the end of 2Q	As of the end of 3Q	As of the end of 4Q
National Bank of Poland	2,041	1,562	1,884	1,844
Other foreign investments	2,041	1,562	1,884	1,844
Other loans and borrowings received	29	26	24	23
Current accounts and deposits	2,012	1,536	1,860	1,821
Central and local governments <sup>b</sup>	32,554	32,168	32,311	32,120
Debt securities held by non-resident portfolio investors <sup>c,d</sup>	6,880	6,942	6,601	6,921
Long-term debt securities	6,533	6,578	6,381	6,776
Money market instruments	347	364	220	145
Other foreign investments	25,674	25,226	25,710	25,199
Other loans and borrowings received	25,672	25,224	25,708	25,197
Other foreign liabilities	2	2	2	2
Banking sector	4,807	5,190	5,908	6,559
Loans from direct investors	136	137	138	145
Debt securities held by non-resident portfolio investors <sup>e</sup>	224	61	60	10
Long-term debt securities	217	61	60	10
Money market instruments	7	0	0	0
Other foreign investments	4,447	4,992	5,710	6,404
Other loans and borrowings received	2,001	2,404	3,052	3,681
Current accounts and deposits in Polish banks <sup>f</sup>	2,446	2,588	2,658	2,723
Other foreign liabilities	0	0	0	0

External debt item	1999			
	As of the end of 1Q	As of the end of 2Q	As of the end of 3Q	As of the end of 4Q
Non-governmental and non-banking sector	20,153	20,612	22,982	24,920
Loans from direct investors <sup>6</sup>	6,358	6,729	7,872	7,097
Trade loans	0	0	0	0
Other loans	6,358	6,729	7,872	7,097
Debt securities held by non-resident portfolio investors <sup>d</sup>	1,528	1,459	1,420	2,705
Long-term debt securities	1,421	1,386	1,391	2,682
Money market instruments	97	73	29	23
Other foreign investments	12,267	12,424	13,690	15,118
Trade loans received <sup>e, h</sup>	38,700	3,700	3,901	5,225
Other loans and borrowings received	8,293	8,705	9,769	9,777
Other foreign liabilities	4	19	20	116
Total external debt	59,555	59,532	63,085	65,443
of which:				
Long-term <sup>f</sup>	49,780	50,137	53,033	54,224
Short-term <sup>e</sup>	9,775	9,395	10,052	11,219

Table 8—continued

External debt item	2005			
	As of the end of 1Q	As of the end of 2Q	As of the end of 3Q	As of the end of 4Q
National Bank of Poland	1,393	756	1,526	1,945
Other foreign investments	1,393	756	1,526	1,945
Other loans and borrowings received	1	0	0	0
Current accounts and deposits	1,393	756	1,526	1,545
Central and local governments <sup>b</sup>	56,357	59,192	58,314	5,874
Debt securities held by non-resident portfolio investors <sup>c,d</sup>	40,118	44,883	45,168	45,630
Long-term debt securities	39,965	44,730	45,078	45,546
Money market instruments	153	163	90	84
Other foreign investments	16,239	14,309	13,146	13,244
Other loans and borrowings received	16,234	14,307	13,142	13,240
Other foreign liabilities	5	2	4	4

External debt item	2005			
	As of the end of 1Q	As of the end of 2Q	As of the end of 3Q	As of the end of 4Q
Banking sector	13,962	13,033	13,773	14,932
Loans from direct investors	424	398	399	412
Debt securities held by non-resident portfolio investors	1,213	1,478	1,606	2,275
Long-term debt securities	1,126	1,389	1,517	2,184
Money market instruments	87	89	89	91
Other foreign investments	12,325	11,157	11,768	12,245
Other loans and borrowings received	6,209	5,405	6,017	6,772
Current accounts and deposits in Polish banks	6,116	5,752	5,751	5,473
Other foreign liabilities	0	0	0	0
Non-governmental and non-banking sector	55,193	52,957	55,610	56,688
Loans from direct investors <sup>6</sup>	21,326	20,711	22,054	22,513
Trade loans	6,453	6,486	6,740	6,732
Other loans	14,873	14,225	15,314	15,781
Debt securities held by non-resident portfolio investors <sup>d</sup>	5,031	4,934	4,980	4,680
Long-term debt securities	4,931	4,806	4,836	4,524
Money market instruments	100	128	144	156
Other foreign investments	28,836	27,312	28,576	29,495
Trade loans received <sup>e, h</sup>	9,125	8,703	9,093	9,869
Other loans and borrowings received	18,967	17,939	18,688	18,664
Other foreign liabilities	744	670	795	962
Total external debt	126,905	125,938	129,223	132,439
Of which:				
Long-term <sup>f</sup>	101,787	102,323	103,831	10,5488
Short-term <sup>c</sup>	25,118	23,615	25,402	26,951

Table 8—continued

External debt item	2006			
	As of the end of 1Q	As of the end of 2Q	As of the end of 3Q	As of the end of 4Q
National Bank of Poland	1,118	1,604	2,430	3,571
Other foreign investments	1,118	1,604	2,430	3,571
Other loans and borrowings received	0	0	0	0
Current accounts and deposits	1,118	1,604	2,430	3,571

External debt item	2006			
	As of the end of Q1	As of the end of 2Q	As of the end of 3Q	As of the end of 4Q
Central and local governments <sup>b</sup>	63,125	64,412	64,496	197,726
Debt securities held by non-resident portfolio investors <sup>c,d</sup>	50,610	51,083	51,265	159,574
Long-term debt securities	50,588	51,064	51,254	159,565
Money market instruments	22	19	11	9
Other foreign investments	12,515	13,329	13,231	38,152
Other loans and borrowings received	12,514	13,329	12,231	38,152
Other foreign liabilities	1	0	0	0
Banking sector	15,442	18,442	19,537	67,520
Loans from direct investors	360	376	355	1,449
Debt securities held by non-resident portfolio investors <sup>e</sup>	2,921	3,385	3,192	10,041
Long-term debt securities	2,837	32,221	3,093	9,741
Money market instruments	84	164	99	300
Other foreign investments	12,161	14,681	15,990	56,030
Other loans and borrowings received	6,833	8,106	9,185	33,270
Current accounts and deposits in Polish banks <sup>f</sup>	5,326	6,375	6,805	22,760
Other foreign liabilities	0	0	0	0
Non-governmental and non-banking sector	59,299	64,101	67,611	216,653
Loans from direct investors <sup>g</sup>	24,900	26,623	30,004	94,608
Trade loans	7,421	8,323	8,372	25,071
Other loans	17,479	18,300	21,632	69,537
Debt securities held by non-resident portfolio investors <sup>d</sup>	4,173	4,247	4,271	10,358
Long-term debt securities	4,042	4,119	4,142	10,306
Money market instruments	131	128	129	52
Other foreign investments	30,226	33,231	33,336	111,687
Trade loans received <sup>e, h</sup>	9,718	11,425	10,780	35,476
Other loans and borrowings received	19,514	20,719	21,433	71,965
Other foreign liabilities	994	1,087	1,123	4,246
Total external debt	138,984	148,559	154,074	485,470
of which:				
Long-term <sup>f</sup>	112,162	117,201	121,588	387,859
Short-term <sup>e</sup>	26,822	31,358	32,486	97,611



<sup>a</sup> Compiled in accordance with the requirements of international organizations (IMF, OECD, BIS, World Bank), based on data available as of 28 March 2007.

<sup>b</sup> Starting from the fourth quarter of 1999 data are supplemented to include external debt of local governments.

<sup>c</sup> Starting from the fourth quarter of 1999 the value of securities issued in domestic market (Treasury bonds and Treasury bills) in accordance with the information of the Ministry of Finance: Zadłużenie Skarbu Państwa (The debt of the State Treasury).

<sup>d</sup> The value of securities issued on international markets (Brady Bonds and Eurobonds) was adjusted by the value of those securities held by Polish banks.

<sup>e</sup> Since information on the breakdown by maturity of up to and including 1 year and above 1 year of trade loans (up to the end of 2002) and current accounts and deposits of non-residents in Polish banks is not available, the total amount was included in short-term debt.

<sup>f</sup> Starting from the first quarter of 2003 the long-term debt includes trade loans with the maturity of above 1 year.

<sup>g</sup> Starting from the first quarter of 2003 the data includes trade loans from shareholders.

<sup>h</sup> Starting from the first quarter 2003 the data excludes trade loans from shareholders.

Source: [www.nbp.gov.pl/statystyka/zadl99\\_obkw](http://www.nbp.gov.pl/statystyka/zadl99_obkw).

The above detailed statistics show a change in the level of the external debt which mainly includes the external debt of foreign investors (banks and enterprises) and liabilities arising from a sale of long-term debt securities issued by the State Treasury and the National Bank of Poland in order to cover the budget deficit.


The total external debt constitutes 43% of Poland's GDP, the long-term debt 34% of GDP and the short-term debt—9.4%. As far as the aggregate value of the debt is concerned, comprising its internal and external components, short-term liabilities constitute 21% of the total debt while short-term liabilities account for 79%. Proportions between the short-term and long-term debt are correct and they result from the development of the economy where an investment effort is made leading to its structural changes. The debt structure indicates that between 1999 and 2006 the state increased its external debt by 32%, that is the local government sector increased it by approximately 50%, the banking sector by 200% and the non-governmental and non-banking sector (mainly enterprises)—by 135%. This constitutes a change in the external debt as compared to the 1990's of the 20<sup>th</sup> century when the state sector had the greatest share in it.

Poland declared its accession to the EMU in 2012 which means that the zloty will be introduced into the exchange rate mechanism probably two years earlier, i.e. in 2010. It explained that the readiness to become a member of the EMU should result from the preparedness of its economy, i.e. the fulfilment of the convergence criteria: monetary (interest rate and inflation) as well as fiscal criteria (public debt and budget deficit). Those conditions are not however required for the introduction of the currency of the country preparing for the

entry into the EMU to the ERM-2. If Poland's preparations for the introduction of the currency into ERM-2 are prolonged, the satisfaction of the inflation criterion may become increasingly difficult. As noticed earlier, countries with a relatively less developed services sector, thereby with a lower competitiveness on the nontradables market, observe in their markets an accelerated dynamics in the price increase with accelerated economic growth.

Chart 3

### Poland's external debt in 1999–2006



### Poland's Preparation for Membership in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)

This is not the only problem of being outside the single currency zone. The appreciation of the currency which occurs in all catching-up economies if a decision is made to open the economy (which in practice means the participation in the free trade zone, the customs union or joining the internal market as was the case with Poland and other new member states of the EU) involves several consequences. Positive consequences certainly include the fact that the value of the external debt of this state expressed in the national currency relatively decreases. Other consequences are of a slightly different nature. Firstly, transfers of funds from the EU decrease in the currency of a particular country. In addition, transfers of funds for the budget or contributed as part of liabilities resulting from the activity of individual EU institutions increase. Secondly, placement of exports on the market of countries whose currency is not subject to the appreciation may become more and more difficult. Thirdly, the

appreciation of the national currency causes changes in the value of imports and exports due to the fact that the former “becomes cheaper” and the latter “becomes more expensive.” The above issues should provide motivation for relatively fast accession to the single currency unless a particular country deliberately applies the policy of “limiting” transfers of EU funds to its economy, treating them as a form of unwanted “interventionism” and uses the mechanism of the appreciation of its currency as a stimulus to reduce production costs which facilitates an improvement of the competitiveness in a long term.

Currently, all macroeconomic parameters in the Polish economy indicate that the situation is stable and convergence criteria are mostly satisfied. 2009 plans also include a limitation of the excessive budget deficit. However, economists are sceptical about it given the implemented policy of increasing expenses. Such opinion is quite common despite declarations of the Ministry of Finance regarding its plans to reduce tax burden. It is easiest to reduce taxes in a situation of accelerated economic growth, and so a faster increase of budget revenue. Therefore, forecasts for a reduction of the budget deficit indicating a possibility of its reduction should be deemed correct. If there is no unpredictable market turbulence, gradual and slow interest rate adjustments should not do any harm to the Polish economy, influencing its growth dynamics and thus facilitating the implementation of the tax reform.

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Poland's economic results in 2006 can be deemed very good owing to the lowest inflation rate in Europe, strong dynamics of the economic growth and a record inflow of direct foreign investments. Admittedly, at the end of the year results of foreign trade deteriorated but this was associated with the zloty appreciation trend and was not deemed alarming. The structure of the Polish external debt is assessed similarly—it is increasing, however its value against GDP is decreasing. Current account deficit to GDP in Poland is -2.3%, while in Hungary it is -5.2% and in the Czech Republic -3.2%.<sup>20</sup> The above statistics show that in comparison with other countries of the region, Poland has an advantageous position. Those results are largely determined by the budget deficit of the three mentioned countries. In the Czech Republic and Hungary, the budget deficit to GDP ratio is higher than in Poland, which involves specific consequences for the capital market.

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<sup>20</sup> “Economic and Financial Indicators,” *The Economist* of 24 February 2007, p. 106.

Two years after the accession to the UE most of the macroeconomic indicators demonstrate that the Polish economy was well prepared for that step and is able to use EU funds for the development of the infrastructure, elimination of inter-regional development differences, support for competitiveness and a fight against unemployment. However, it does not mean that it could not have been better and that Poland could not have used more of the available UE funds which stimulate economic change.

## **Poland's Energy Policy** (Natural Gas: Tension between Diversification and Market Liberalisation)

Energy policy, often identified with its overriding objective, that is ensuring energy security for the country, has been a priority for subsequent Polish governments for years, and remains a focus of public debate. This applies primarily to the supply of, largely imported, energy resources. The government formed following the parliamentary elections of 2005 zeroes in primarily on the problem of gas, since despite greater diversification of supply sources for this fuel (owing to gas mined domestically),<sup>1</sup> Poland's gas supply security is assessed as lower than for crude oil. This results from the lack of gas transmission routes that could act as alternatives to the present gas pipelines from the east and stronger institutionalisation, that is regulation on the gas market.<sup>2</sup>

### **Poland's Energy Policy: General Remarks**

Since 1990, four subsequent documents on energy policy have been binding for Poland: the Republic of Poland Energy Policy Principles for 1990–2010 (of August 1990), issued by the Ministry of Industry; Polish Energy Policy Principles by 2010 (of 17 October 1995), issued by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce; and Polish Energy Policy Principles by 2020 (of 22 February 2000) by the Ministry of the Economy and Energy Regulation Office. An additional

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<sup>1</sup> In 2005–2006, over 20 million tons of crude oil were processed annually by refineries of PKN Orlen SA and Grupa Lotos SA. In addition, PKN Orlen could deep-process 4.8 million tons of oil in refineries of the Czech Unipetrol holding. Nearly 100% of the crude oil processed in Poland was REBCO mix, supplied via the “Friendship” pipeline. An alternative oil transport route (by sea) runs through the Naftoport oil terminal in Gdańsk. The annual consumption of gas in Poland comes to 13.5–14 billion cm. Imports account for approx. 70% of the total balance, of which 30% is domestic gas. In 2005–2006, over 90% of imported gas came to Poland through Ukraine and Belarus.

<sup>2</sup> Owing to the aspects tackled, the paper focuses on Polish energy policy on natural gas, notably the relation between the diversification of its supply to Poland and liberalisation of the Polish gas market.

document, entitled the Evaluation of Implementation and Adjustments to “Polish Energy Policy Principles by 2020” was published by the Ministry of the Economy on 2 April 2002. On 4 January 2005, the Team for Energy Policy published the Polish Energy Policy by 2025, which remains valid, as provided by the Law on Energy.<sup>3</sup>

Pursuant to the Law, the Minister of the Economy is competent for establishing and implementing the energy policy for Poland. Following the parliamentary elections in 2005, competencies concerning the supply of imported energy resources were handed over to the Government Representative for Diversification of Energy Resources for the Republic of Poland (secretary of state) at the Ministry of the Economy, supported in terms of expertise by the Department of Energy Resources Diversification. In addition, currently at the Ministry of the Economy there are: the Department of Power Engineering and the Department of Crude Oil and Gas, dealing respectively with shaping energy policy in terms of electrical power engineering and heat generation, as well as crude oil and gas.<sup>4</sup> This division of competencies clearly indicates the prioritised treatment of imports of those energy resources.

The currently binding document, that is the Polish Energy Policy by 2025, lists the following objectives for energy policy:

- 1) ensuring energy security for the state;
- 2) greater competitiveness of the economy and its energy efficiency;
- 3) protection of natural environment against consequences of actions related to the generation, transmission and distribution of energy resources, to include final fuels.

A novelty in the document (referred to by the authors as the energy policy doctrine) is in that it emphasises electrical energy and natural gas energy market liberalisation in the European Union, which Poland is a member of, and calls for more efficient implementation of market principles in the Polish energy industry (in comparison to documents of 1990–2000). The document does not contain a statistics section. From the moment of publication, it came under criticism for various reasons, e.g. the contents that fail to fully meet the requirements of the Law on Energy. At the same time, however, it was underestimated in its capacity as a modern state energy security doctrine, presenting, for example, the results of

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<sup>3</sup> Ustawa Prawo energetyczne z 10 kwietnia 1997 r. z późniejszymi zmianami, stan na 27 października 2006 r., *Dziennik Ustaw* (Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland) 1997, no. 54, item 348.

<sup>4</sup> Ministry of the Economy release ([www.mgip.gov.pl](http://www.mgip.gov.pl)).

the study on the division of responsibilities for energy security among bodies of state administration, businesses and receivers of resources and the final energy product.<sup>5</sup>

### Polish Energy Policy on Natural Gas

Poland's energy policy by 2025, similar to the preceding documents, also deals with utilising natural gas in the economy and ensuring its supply.

An important addition to the provisions of the present energy policy, applying to imported energy resources, including gas, are the documents of the Ministry of the Economy, adopted by the government in 2007: the Government of Poland Policy for Oil Industry in Poland (of 6 February) and the Policy for Natural Gas Industry (of 20 March). Formally, they replace the previous sectorial programmes, although they are of much broader significance. Notably, the second document essentially provides a formal framework for the government policy on gas, implemented after the 2005 parliamentary elections, and corresponds more to the selected provisions and proposals of the previous documents, rather than to the Energy Policy of 4 January 2005.

Post-1989 actions corresponding to the principles of the energy policy and applying to the gas sector were twice subject to comprehensive assessment by the Supreme Chamber of Control (NIK).<sup>6</sup> Insufficient progress of Poland's supply diversification and no reliable forecast on natural gas consumption were commented on with criticism. The legitimacy of it is exemplified by the situation in 2006 and 2007, which the present government is attempting to alleviate. In 2006, over 68% of gas came to Poland from Russia, 23% from Central Asia, less than 5% from Germany and about 4% from Norway. In accordance with the law in force, gas imports from a single source (outside the EU) may not exceed 72%.<sup>7</sup> However, owing to capital dependency of the company RosUkrEnergo, which supplies Central Asian gas, on Russian Gazprom, the compliance with this requirement appears debatable. What also raises doubts is forecasts for gas demand. Based on the 2004 estimates of the Energy Market Agency, it will rise

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<sup>5</sup> We should keep in mind here the polemics of the second half of 2004 concerning the result of work on the Polish Energy Policy by 2025, Cf. e.g. M. Gołębiwska, "W poszukiwaniu pewnej polityki", *Nowy Przemysł* 2004, no. 11.

<sup>6</sup> *Informacja o wynikach kontroli kierunków organizacji importu gazu do Polski*, NIK, February 2002; *Informacja o wynikach kontroli zaopatrzenia w gaz ziemny*, NIK, June 2004.

<sup>7</sup> Rozporządzenie Rady Ministrów z 24 października 2000 r. w sprawie minimalnego poziomu dywersyfikacji dostaw gazu z zagranicy, Dz.U. 2000, no. 95, item 1042.

by 2010 from the present 14 billion cm to 18.5–19.3 billion cm (depending on the variant of economy and energy industry development).<sup>8</sup> In turn, Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo SA (Polish Oil Mining and Gas Engineering) (PGNiG) expects that the consumption of gas in the next 4 to 5 years will rise by no more than 2 billion cm in relation to the present figures.<sup>9</sup>

Table 1

**Założenia dokumentów polskiej polityki energetycznej po 1990 r.**  
(w sferze gazu ziemnego)

	Gas supply security factors		Consumption forecast, in billions cm <sup>3</sup>				Gas consumption in year of document adoption, in billion cm <sup>3</sup>
	Diversification	Other	Scenario	2000	2010	2020	
The Republic of Poland Energy Policy Principles for 1990–2010 (1990), Ministry of Industry	a) of energy resources of the state balance (rise in gas consumption) b) import sources; ensuring several billion cm of gas from a source other than the USSR; option of importing approx. 5 billion cm of LNG (2000, "H")	Rise in domestic output	Low „L”	16.8	22.8		11.9 (domestic output—4.1)
			Medium „M”	20.9	27.7		
			High „H”				
			Comments: proposal to replace coke-oven gas with natural gas. In 1990, 1.5 billion cm of coke-oven gas entered the distribution network (only 0.21 in 1995)				
Polish Energy Policy Principles by 2010 (1995), Ministry of Industry and Commerce	a) of energy resources of the state balance (rise in gas consumption) b) import sources (North Sea, North Africa)	DETAILS: a) construction of transit gas pipeline Yamal-Western Europe b) long-term contract for gas from Russia  PROPOSALS: a) extension of warehouse b) rise in domestic output	Na podstawie prognozy IPPT PAN i „oceny branżowej”	Import: 8.8–1.0  Produkcja: 5–5.9	Import: od 17.4  Produkcja: 4.6–5.7		9.9 (wydobycie w kraju 3.5)
			Comments: Proposal for re-inclusion in the balance of gas from demethanisation of mines (in 1990, 0.21 billion cm <sup>3</sup> of gas from demethanisation of mines were used; by 2000, utilisation of gas from this source stopped)				

<sup>8</sup> Agencja Rynku Energii, *Bilans gazu i prognozy zapotrzebowania na gaz w Polsce*, paper delivered at the conference “Nowy gaz dla Polski” (New gas for Poland) organised by Adventure Consulting, 28 February 2007.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. e.g. Terminal LNG za 445 mln euro (www.wnp.pl) (after ISB agency).



	Gas supply security factors		Consumption forecast, in billions cm <sup>3</sup>				Gas consumption in year of document adoption, in billion cm <sup>3</sup>
	Diversification	Other	Scenario	2000	2010	2020	
Polish Energy Policy Principles by 2020 (2000), Ministry of the Economy	a) of energy resources of the state balance (rise in gas consumption) b) import sources (by infrastructural connection with an alternative deposit (target of 5 billion cm/year from 2005 and signing a long-term contract for alternative supply; also LNG import	DETAILS: a) launch of the 2 <sup>nd</sup> line of Yamal-Western Europe pipeline b) transborder connection with Germany c) "little" Norwegian contract  PROPOSALS: a) extension of warehouses b) rise in output c) adjustment of transborder connections for reverse transmission	Survival		19.7	26	11.1 (domestic output—3.7)
			Reference		22	29.3	
			Progress Plus		18.4	27.6	
			Forecast for 2005: 16.4, 17.9, 15.7 billion cm <sup>3</sup>				
			Comments: The need to delay the opening of the Polish gas market was indicated. Partial privatisation of PGNiG after implementation of TPA rule				
Evaluation of Implementation and Adjustments to "Polish Energy Policy Principles by 2020" (2002) Ministry of the Economy and ERO in agreement with the Ministry of Finance	Import sources	DETAILS: a) "little" Norwegian contract b) contract for gas supply from Denmark by the sea bottom pipeline (not executed, similarly to "big" supply from Norway c) plan for renegotiation of gas contract with Russia d) plan to finish 1 <sup>st</sup> line of Yamal-Western Europe pipeline and principles for the construction plan of the 2 <sup>nd</sup> line.	Forecast 2005: Base scenario—13.72 billion cm. Efficiency scenario—12.74 billion cm.				

	Gas supply security factors		Consumption forecast, in billions cm <sup>3</sup>				Gas consumption in year of document adoption, in billion cm <sup>3</sup>
	Diversification	Other	Scenario	2000	2010	2020	
		<p>PROPOSALS:</p> <p>a) extension of warehouses from 1.2 to 1.6 billion cm in 2005</p> <p>b) 90 days' stock (reg. of Ministry of the Economy of 1998)</p>	<p>Comments: No risks for energy security were identified—except for the threat resulting from the economic situation of businesses.</p> <p>It was stated that within the next dozen years of so, no changes in the structure of primary fuel consumption in professional electrical power engineering should be expected. It was stated that owing to the price levels, substitution of coal by gas would be limited.</p> <p>Diversification and import dependency indexes were used for energy security assessment.</p> <p>A tentative division of responsibilities for local and national energy security</p> <p>It was stated that changes in PGNiG would be stimulated by the EU requirements.</p> <p>Poland withdrew from attempts to be granted a transition period for implementing Directive 98/30/EC.</p>				
Polish Energy Policy by 2025 (2005), Team for Energy Policy appointed by the Chairman of CM	<p>a) as balancing out the structure of primary energy resources in the fuel and energy balance (“natural” advantage of coal)</p> <p>b) of supply sources (import is not a threat; the measure of advantageous diversification is the cost level (among others, import of LNG and CNG)</p>	<p>PROPOSALS:</p> <p>a) greater role of Poland in transporting resources from Russia to the EU</p> <p>b) extension of transborder connections (financed from sales of transmission capacities)</p> <p>c) drafting by 2008 of rules for storage as a security element (directive 2004/67/EC)</p> <p>d) rise in output level in order to utilise domestic gas to generate heat and energy</p>	RCSS*		17.5	26.4	13.6 (domestic output—4.3)
			<p>** Supply of energy resources and energy in a long-term perspective (GCSS—2004)</p> <p>The Policy does not contain a statistics section.</p> <p>Notes: Proposal was offered to divide responsibility for energy security among government and local administration, institutional receivers and suppliers, as well as transmission system operators in the short-, medium- and long-term perspective.</p>				

Source: author’s work based on the following documents: Republic of Poland Energy Policy Principles for 1990–2010 (1990), Polish Energy Policy Principles by 2010 (1995), Polish Energy Policy Principles by 2020 (2000), Evaluation of Implementation and Adjustments to Polish Energy Policy Principles by 2020 (2002), Polish Energy Policy by 2025 (2005), Supply of Energy Resources and Energy for the Country in the Long-term Perspective (GCSS, 2004). Quantifying Energy. BP Statistical Review of World Energy. June 2006, *Historia gazownictwa polskiego od połowy XIX wieku po rok 2000*, Zrzeszenie Inżynierów i Techników Sanitarnych, Zarząd Główny, 2002.

At present, the primary task of the Polish Energy Policy on natural gas should be, from the standpoint of market security and development, optimum correlation among the mutually dependent objectives, being the diversification of supply sources and liberalisation of the national gas market and its inclusion into the future, single EU market.

### **The Problem of the Correlation Between Supply Diversification and Gas Market Liberalisation**

From the mid-1990s, the principles of energy policy relied, in accordance with the European Union guidelines, on three pillars: energy security, greater competitiveness of the economy and its energy efficiency as well as meeting environmental safety requirements. Also in the Polish Law on Energy (1997), energy security was defined as the “state of the economy that allows coverage of the current and prospective demand of fuels and energy receivers in a technically and economically justified manner, while observing environmental requirements.”<sup>10</sup> Considering ineffective attempts to hone the definition, its present form should be regarded as optimum.<sup>11</sup> What deserves an explanation, however, is the hierarchy and mutual dependencies among the security paradigm and the remaining pillars of energy policy, while the analysis will primarily tackle the changes of the market model (restructuring and liberalisation).

Three objectives of energy policy—security, increased competitiveness and efficiency as well as environmental protection—are equally important and equipped with appropriate instruments for the natural gas sector. The diagram presented in Table 2 corresponds to the Polish Energy Policy principles for 1990–2000 (Stage 1). The main instrument to ensure energy security is the diversification of import sources of supply and sector restructuring in terms of competitiveness and efficiency, as the economic and financial situation of the “national” company Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo (PGNiG) was named as the primary threat to the state’s energy security.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Ustawa Prawo energetyczne...

<sup>11</sup> Cf. definition of energy security drafted by Nafta Polska company in the document for the Ministry of Treasury, and included in the communication of Nafta Polska of 24 May 2004: “Energy security of the country is a state of the economy that allows coverage of demand from receivers of fuels and energy in a defined time and size, in particular in the case of threat to product supply to the market, in a technically and economically justified manner, while observing environmental protection requirements.”

<sup>12</sup> Ocena realizacji i korekta “Założeń polityki energetycznej Polski do 2020 r.” wraz z załącznikami 1–4, Ministerstwo Gospodarki i Urząd Regulacji Energetyki, w porozumieniu z Ministerstwem Finansów, 2 April 2002.

Table 2

**Location of the Energy Security Paradigm in Post-1990  
Polish Energy Policy on Natural Gas**

Stage I	Energy policy		
Objectives	Security	Competitiveness and efficiency	Environmental protection
Instruments	Diversification of import sources of supply	Restructuring of energy sector  (from 2000) Liberalisation?	...

Stage II	Energy policy	
Main objective	Security	
Main instrument	Diversification of import sources of supply	
Other objectives	Competitiveness	Environmental protection
Instruments	Liberalisation (formal level)	...

Stage III	Energy policy		
Main objective	Security		
Instruments	Diversification of import supply sources	Tools of increased competitiveness and efficiency  Liberalisation as a competitiveness factor	Meeting environmental protection requirements

Source: author's own work.

Explanations.

Stage 1: state according to post-1990 Polish energy policy documents. Stage 2: hierarchy following the 2005 elections. Stage 3: proposed location of the overriding objective of energy security.

For the sake of simplifying the argument, we have left out the instruments for implementing the environmental protection objective. As regards the task of supporting the competitiveness of the economy and energy efficiency, we are limited here to the issue of the changed market model (restructuring and liberalisation), and shaping the balance of primary fuels and energy is not tackled.

Gas market liberalisation, imposed by the European Union and referred to in energy policy documents from 2000 onwards, was not originally linked with increased competitiveness, but with security, and the related argument was that liberalisation does not have to collide with supply sources diversification.<sup>13</sup> It was again contrasted with diversification at the turn of 2006, which was reflected for example by the Position of the Government of Poland on the Green Paper: A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy<sup>14</sup> which emphasised prioritised treatment of the energy security objective (together with diversification instrument) over the remaining two pillars of the discussed policy (Table 2, Stage 2). In the energy policy implemented from Q4 2005, understood as actions of the government (rather than documents), the task of gas market liberalisation actually ranked second, behind import sources diversification. This testifies to a tacit assumption that the development of the competitiveness of the gas market, which genuine liberalisation leads to, is of no fundamental importance for security. Formal liberalisation, required by the provisions of Directive 2003/55/EC, and tantamount to restructuring of PGNiG assets, is in progress.<sup>15</sup>

Today, the most important task is to redefine energy policy on gas and to establish it as energy security policy on natural gas, implemented through diversification, market liberalisation (some instruments for increased competitiveness and efficiency) as well as through environmental protection tools (Table 2, Stage 3). All these measures should be utilised in order to achieve, rather than three different objectives, a single objective of ensuring security for the gas market. The Energy Policy by 2025 comes close to this objective, and its authors went even further, superimposing a division of responsibilities matrix for the various aspects of energy policy in the short-, medium-, and long-term, on the above diagram of objectives and instruments. Owing to the role of investors, the implementation of the diagram requires previous market liberalisation. Energy policy on gas understood in this way

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<sup>13</sup> Założenia polityki energetycznej Polski do 2020 r., Ministerstwo Gospodarki i Urząd Regulacji Energetyki, 22 February 2000.

<sup>14</sup> Stanowisko Rządu RP do Zielonej Księgi: Europejska strategia na rzecz zrównowazonej konkurencyjnej i bezpiecznej energii—document of 11 September 2006, published on the Internet portal [www.wnp.pl](http://www.wnp.pl) on 17 October 2006. Cf. also: Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying Document to the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Prospects for the Internal Gas and Electricity Market (Implementation Report), Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 10 January 2007.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. M. Gołębiewska, "Raport Gaz," *Nowy Przemysł*, 2006, no. 9.

matches the tendency, existing for a long time now, of identifying it with ensuring security.

### **Diversification of the Gas Supply: General Remarks and Definition Problems**

Post-1990 energy policy documents define diversification as using different energy resources in the balance of primary fuels and different sources of (natural gas) imports to Poland. Currently, however, it appears reasonable to work out a concept of “multi-layer diversification” as the main precondition for gas energy security. The diversification applies to:

- 1) energy resources in the balance of fuels;
- 2) foreign and domestic sources of natural gas (methane);
- 3) market entities and projects in the natural gas sector, which such entities are involved in (here, diversification is a derivative of liberalisation).

Following 1990, however, a growing share of gas in the balance of primary fuels, and, first and foremost, a growing overall demand for gas, was linked, next to unrealistic price assumptions,<sup>16</sup> with changes on the market, including the development of areas with no gas supply. At present, we can see how important the activity of entities independent of PGNiG is for the country gas network coverage (and indirectly for the broadly understood diversification of the balance of fuels), which take advantage of gradual market liberalisation.<sup>17</sup> Connected with the genuine permit to utilise, based on the third party access principle, gas transport and storage infrastructure, will probably be the utilisation of alternative sources of methane, such as coal deposits. The production of gas from Polish coal deposits was abandoned in 2000.<sup>18</sup>

Diversification understood as using various sources of natural gas imports to Poland was presented in all documents as the main task of post-1990 Polish energy policy. From that year on, total, or almost total dependency of Poland on a gas supply from a single country, has been regarded as inadmissible. In fact, however, it was not clarified whether what was meant was the origin of gas or its

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<sup>16</sup> Założenia polityki energetycznej Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej na lata 1990–2010, Ministerstwo Przemysłu, August 1990.

<sup>17</sup> A good example is actions by the Media Odra Warta Company. Cf. e.g. M. Gołębiewska, “Gaz to tylko początek,” *Nowy Przemysł*, 2005, no. 9.

<sup>18</sup> *Historia gazownictwa polskiego od połowy XIX wieku po rok 2000*, Warszawa: Polskie Zrzeszenie Inżynierów i Techników Sanitarnych, Zarząd Główny, 2002.

supplier. The latter question became particularly prominent when Poland acceded the EU, whose objective is to establish a single gas market and foundations for the common system of preventing fuel shortages.<sup>19</sup> Equally difficult turned out to be defining diversification itself and clearly setting of its genuine objectives.

The only Polish definition of gas supply diversification, documented in the 2002 Polish Energy Policy Principles by 2020, described it as a diversification of sources of imports by permanent (infrastructural) connection with an alternative deposit and ensuring supply from that deposit on the basis of a long-term contract. This definition was additionally treated with a somewhat dogmatic zeal. Incompliance of the actions taken with the wording was officially revealed in 2002 as a reason for PGNiG's moving away from the project of importing liquefied gas by sea.<sup>20</sup>

Following the parliamentary elections of 2005, the diversification definition of 2000 was restored as binding, in particular in connection with the launch of the Northern Gas Pipeline (Nord Stream) construction project from Russia to Germany and the gas conflict between Ukraine and Russia. As a result, the construction of the gas pipeline connecting the Polish coast with Norwegian deposits in the North Sea was put on the priority list of the National Security Council of 22 May 2006.<sup>21</sup> At the same time, the government supported the project of the sea import of liquefied natural gas (LNG). Ultimately, both projects were prioritised in the Policy for the natural gas industry, adopted already in 2007. Despite previous discussions on the division of responsibilities for energy security, it is PGNiG SA Group, remaining a state-controlled entity (85% of shares) listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange that was tasked with implementing both projects mentioned above. This represents another stimulus for the discussion on the attitude to liberalisation and utilising the opportunities it opens up at the level of "big" (important for the country as a whole) import diversification. It should suffice here to refer to the interest of state-owned and private companies independent of PGNiG in the project for building a Polish

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<sup>19</sup> Cf. e.g. Green Paper: A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy, the Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 8 March 2006.

<sup>20</sup> *Informacja o wynikach kontroli kierunków...* Cf. also M. Gołębiwska, "Polski terminal LNG: przymiarki i kryzysy," *Nowy Przemysł*, 2005, no. 11.

<sup>21</sup> „Energetyczne wytyczne Rady Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego z 2.05.2006,” *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe*, 2006, no. 1. Cf. also resolutions of the Council of Ministers of 3 January and 31 May 2006, to which the document specifically refers.

terminal for imported liquefied gas.<sup>22</sup> In addition, understanding the diversification of the gas supply only as using various import sources is not sufficiently flexible for the present-day situation, notably in the face of changes on the international natural gas markets.

### **Principles of Polish “Multi-Layer Diversification” of the Natural Gas Supply**

The main assumption of the Polish diversification of the gas supply remains the reduction (or non-increase) in the share of gas imported from Russia, and via Russia, in the balance of primary fuels. In the light of the developments on the gas market in Europe, broadening this diversification concept appears justified.

During the last fifteen years, Russia (the main supplier of gas for Poland, and the largest exporter to Europe) has worked out, through Gazprom, a precise expansion strategy. The Russian “multi-layer diversification” consists in diversifying natural gas receiver markets, transport routes, product type (gas from the network or liquefied gas) and Gazprom’s actions on international markets, while maintaining a single export channel. Gazprom’s strategy on natural gas stipulates additional (next to increased exports) leverages on the markets of countries-importers, as well as an active approach to markets of countries-manufacturers and exporters of gas.<sup>23</sup> Simultaneously, representatives of Western groups and European industry organisations interested in the gas supply from Russia and the latter’s participation in opening new deposits (or even new “gas provinces,” such as the Arctic), at least partially approve the implementation of the Russian strategy.<sup>24</sup> The situation on the European gas

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<sup>22</sup> Cf. e.g. D. Ciepela, “Endesa—od biomasy po atom. Rozmowa z W. Tabisem, dyrektorem zarządzającym Endesa Polska,” *Nowy Przemysł*, 2007, no. 1.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Энергетическая стратегия России на период до 2020 г., 28 August 2003 and А.Ю. Воронин *Энергетическая стратегия России*, Москва: Издательский дом “Финансовый контроль” 2004. The forthcoming document on Russia’s new energy strategy by 2030 should represent a petrification of the current tendencies, as well as those provided for in the currently binding Strategy.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. materials from the conference “Russian LNG” (15–16 February 2007, Brussels, organiser C5) and warnings sent from research centres, concerning a potential shortage of gas in the Russian gas balance. According to a Russian think tank of the Energy Policy Institute, irrespective of supply from Central Asia and production of gas by independent manufacturers, the Russian gas balance will have a deficit of 100 billion cm. The Russian State Institute for Natural Resources Monopoly Issues shares this view: for 2010, the gas deficit is estimated at 124 billion cm. In 2020, the shortage, according to EPI will rise to 186 billion cm, with the exports (including to Asia and the Pacific) totalling 386 billion cm.



market in the foreseeable future will also be shaped within the triangle of dependencies among the interest of the West in Russian gas (also liquefied), investment opportunities of the parties, and Russia's prospects on new markets in the region of Asia and the Pacific.<sup>25</sup> Also from this viewpoint, we should consider the fact that the so-called contract of the century for gas supply from Russia to Poland expires already in 2022. In 2015–2022, the imports under the contract should reach 9 billion cm of gas a year.<sup>26</sup>

Insufficient flexibility of the definition of diversification, referred to above, may become a factor for the project of importing liquefied gas to Poland. However, we cannot discuss developments in this respect if we want to refer to the documents on energy policy, despite concrete actions taken by businesses, including PGNiG, in 1996–2005.<sup>27</sup> Four subsequent documents on energy policy after 1990 mentioned only the potential, “future” imports of liquefied gas. The Energy Policy Principles by 2010 are limited to extending the list of prioritised sources of imports to cover North Africa, which, for Poland, is equivalent to importing a liquefied form of gas by sea. The Energy Policy by 2025, which does not dwell in detail on the concept, includes compressed natural gas (CNG) on the list of gas imports. Only at the turn of 2006 was liquefied gas import considered as a priority.

In theory, imports of liquefied gas enable purchases from countries where the gas pipeline option is not viable. The prospects of such imports are sometimes linked by experts with gaining access by PGNiG to gas deposits abroad and, in consequence, with additional enhancement of energy security. Here, we should take into account, however, the above tendencies on the gas market, probable changes in the Atlantic region, connected primarily with the launch of liquefied gas deliveries from the Arctic (Norway and Russia), and the potential Russian trade in liquefied gas using the Baltic Sea as a transport route. It cannot be ruled out that the opening of Poland to a gas market with new deposits (not necessarily from new countries), and a market with a different technical, transport and, consequently, economic characteristics than the networked gas market in Europe, should already today be considered a result of

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<sup>25</sup> Cf. P. Hartley, K.B. Medlock, *The Baker Institute World Gas Trade Model, Geopolitics of Gas Working Paper Series*, Baker Institute—Energy Forum, CESP Stanford, March 2005.

<sup>26</sup> The so-called contract of the century (or “Yamal contract”) for long-term gas supply from Russia was signed in September 1996 and amended by the annex of 2003. Currently, the contract provides for deliveries until 2022. The annex stipulates increased gas supply, from 6.6 billion cm in 2003 to 9 billion cm in 2015–2022.

<sup>27</sup> M. Gołębiewska, “Polski terminal LNG...”

launching imports of liquefied gas, that is equivalent to diversifying sources of imports. Diversification through imports of liquefied gas may therefore lead, in the long term, to diversifying not so much countries-suppliers, by rather sources and terms of gas purchase (that is markets where Polish businesses make the purchases).

### **Gas Market Liberalisation and Diversification. A Balance of Interdependencies and Threats**

Natural gas market liberalisation means the implementation of the European Union regulations, and allows the utilisation of the technical instruments of freeing the market—notably the access to transport infrastructure, covered by the principle of third party access, although their actual implementation is being disputed over. The regulations of the European Union lay down the principles of market liberalisation and present a list of infrastructural elements that ensure supply security.<sup>28</sup>

Thus far, the liberalisation has shown that new players, independent of PGNiG, failed to threaten the position of the national gas company, and essentially have not grown to be its competitors. Their activity contributes to the development of the gas network in non-covered areas, which are regarded as unattractive from the standpoint of investment guidelines of PGNiG. In addition, those companies also distribute the product imported by PGNiG. As the date of complete opening of the market (1 July 2007) draws nearer, there is a growing interest of independent companies in utilising all opportunities of the liberal market and sourcing gas (methane) from abroad, notably from Russia,<sup>29</sup> but domestically as well.

So far, third parties have not essentially had access to the infrastructure. In the case of Poland, the implementation of the third party access principle will translate into opportunities to utilise resources of state-controlled companies: Gaz-System (transmission operator) and PGNiG itself (distribution system and storages).<sup>30</sup> This will lead to the loss of a portion of the market by the “national” gas company. It is not, however, officially presented as a threat. What actually is

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<sup>28</sup> Directives: 2003/55/CE concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and 2004/67/CE concerning measures to safeguard security of natural gas supply.

<sup>29</sup> A good example is the activity of CP Energia Company. Cf. e.g. A. Bytniewska, “CP Energia w trzy lata wyda na sieć gazową 300 mln zł,” *Puls Biznesu* of 8 February 2007.

<sup>30</sup> Separation of Distribution System Operators (six distribution companies from CG PGNiG) is to be completed by 1 July 2007. Making underground gas storage depots available under the third party access principle, provided for in the Law on Energy, raises a number of doubts, similarly to the possibility of separating Storage Operator from PGNiG. Cf. M. Gołębiewska, “Raport Gaz...”

depicted as such is upsetting the success of the “big” (acknowledged by the government) diversification of supplies, namely the process of making the country independent of the gas supply from Russia.

As a result, the position of the government on the implementation of infrastructural investment by independent entities, intending to import considerable volumes of natural gas, is also extremely cautious.<sup>31</sup> An example of such investment projects may be underground natural gas storage depots, the construction of which was unsuccessfully proposed in all documents on the state energy policy after 1990. The justified concern here is the too feeble involvement of entities on the liberated gas market in the project execution. It is also difficult to defend treating the activity of independent investors as a threat to diversification implemented by PGNiG. The document Policy for the Natural Gas Industry of 2006 also refers to the issue, analysed for many years now, of establishing (perhaps by independent entities) additional gas connections with systems of the neighbouring countries, primarily with Germany: “by the time of execution of decisions contained in resolutions of the Council of Ministers of 3 January and 31 May 2006, concerning the diversification of natural gas supply to Poland,<sup>32</sup> the establishment of connections that will result in further dependency of Poland on gas supply from a single manufacturer, or its subsidiaries, will contravene the principles of this Policy.”<sup>33</sup>

Formal decisions on the alignment of the Polish gas market with the EU requirements already offered to its potential, new players (irrespective of the source of gas they intend to sell) a tool to fight for their share in the market. Their pressure, notably on the genuine implementation of the third party access principle, is growing stronger.<sup>34</sup> It is those conflicts over the place in the Polish market, between independent distributors on the one hand, and the Energy Regulation Office, the Ministry of the Economy (responsible for energy policy) and EU bodies on the other, that may pose a new threat for the market position of the “national” PGNiG and at the same time for energy security. There is a well-founded concern that PGNiG will be affected by the conflict as a holder of assets that are important for the business activity of new competitors.

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<sup>31</sup> Emfesz NG Polska is preparing to import large volumes of gas to Poland. German VNG (which does not deal with mining at all) is also preparing its expansion on the Polish market. Cf. D. Malinowski, *Ambitne plany VNG* (www.wnp.pl), 20 February 2007. Currently, except PGNiG SA, small volumes of gas are imported by MOW (Germany) and CP Energia (Russia).

<sup>32</sup> This is about the construction of the pipeline from Scandinavia to Poland and the LNG terminal.

<sup>33</sup> *Polityka dla przemysłu gazu ziemnego...*, p. 14, subsection Połączenia systemowe.

<sup>34</sup> *Węgierski Emfesz skarży polski rząd* (www.wnp.pl), 4 November 2006, (after *Parkiet* newspaper).

Tabela 3

**Implementation of Gazprom’s Strategy in the States  
of the Baltic Sea Region, Poland’s Position**

	Poland	Lithuania	Lavia	Estonia	Sweden	Finland	Germany	Denmark
Share of gas from Russia and companies linked with Gazprom in the state balance	60%	100%	100%	100%	None	100%	45%	Not applicable. From 2011, 1 billion cm of gas from Russia via the Nord Stream
Import sources other than Russia	Central Asia, Germany, Norway <sup>a</sup>	None	None	None (underground storage in Latvia)	Denmark, Germany	None	Denmark, Holland, Norway, United Kingdom	
Gazprom strategy	Share in the national gas company and/or important import company							
	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No, E.ON is the owner of the national company	Yes	Yes	No
Gazprom strategy	Important importers created, through Gazprom/Import, by other Gazprom owner companies <sup>b</sup>							
	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Not applicable
Gazprom strategy	Access to the market of state-importer							
Access to final users.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
Access to the network and/or gas storages	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
Gazprom strategy	Common projects at the level of national companies and other companies of the gas sector							
In the country under discussion	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
In the group of states from the Baltic Sea region, plus Finland	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
In third countries	No	No data	No data	No data	No	No data	Yes	Yes
In Russia	Yes (through companies from outside CG PGNiG) <sup>d</sup>	No data	No data	No data	No	No data	Yes	No

Source: author’s own work, based on the article by M. Gołębiewska “Strategia Gazpromu w rejonie Morza Bałtyckiego” (in press).

<sup>a</sup> Import of gas from Central Asia means gas purchase from RosUkrEnergo, where Gazprom has a 50% stake. The so-called little Norwegian contract expired in 2006.

<sup>b</sup> Such companies as Dujotekana in Lithuania and industrial plants that import gas independently, where Gazprom has a stake.

<sup>c</sup> The note is made wherever current, or sufficiently reliable data were not available.

<sup>d</sup> CP Energia, which imports a small volume of liquefied gas from the Russian Kriogaz Company, purchased in 2007.

### **The Polish Gas Market Liberalisation and Implementation of Gazprom's Strategy in the Baltic Sea Region**

An evaluation that considers the implementation of Gazprom's foreign strategy in the states of the Baltic Sea region reveals the uniqueness of the Polish situation (Table 3).<sup>35</sup>

Poland, as the second largest importer of gas among the eight Baltic Sea region states, is at the same time a country where no primary modules of Gazprom foreign policy were implemented in co-operation with the "national" gas company PGNiG, excluding an unfinished, joint project of the Transit Gas Pipelines System.<sup>36</sup> On the other hand, in as many as five out of eight countries, Gazprom achieved one of its primary objectives—a stake in the national gas company or important import company. This is linked with another important objective of Gazprom's activity in foreign markets: access to final gas receivers. The above situation is directly linked with the advancing liberalisation on gas markets in individual EU states. We should emphasise, however, that all countries in the Baltic Sea region have failed to fully implement the recommendations of the so-called second EU gas directive (2003/55/EC),<sup>37</sup> which, according to some commentators, is actually conducive to Gazprom's expansion. Gazprom itself, failing to open the market in Russia to foreign competitors,<sup>38</sup> attempts to reap as many benefits from market liberalisation in the EU as possible.<sup>39</sup>

The determination to what extent purely formal liberalisation of the gas market in Poland has blocked the implementation of the Russian tycoon's strategy on the Polish market deserves a separate study. Another justified question concerns the list of profits (the development of the gas market) and losses (the potential increase in the number of importers from Russia or entities

<sup>35</sup> Owing to a negligible share of natural gas in its balance of primary fuels, Sweden is an exception in the discussed group of states (Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Germany). Poland is, however a sizeable importer of gas from Russia, raking among states of the Baltic Sea region. A detailed comparison of the situation of the Baltic Sea region states considering the implementation of Gazprom's strategy is made in an article approved for print at the World Economy Institute of the Warsaw School of Economics: M. Gołębiewska, *Strategia Gazpromu w państwach regionu Morza Bałtyckiego*.

<sup>36</sup> Project under EuRoPol Gaz (PGNiG and Gazprom 48% each, Gas Trading 4%).

<sup>37</sup> Cf. *Stan konkurencji na rynku energii elektrycznej i rynku gazy: raporty porównawcze Komisji Europejskiej*, Warszawa: URE—Biblioteka regulatora, January 2006.

<sup>38</sup> No ratification of the Energy Charter by Russia.

<sup>39</sup> *Безопасность России: правовые, социально-экономические и научно-технические аспекты. Энергетическая безопасность (газовая промышленность России)*, Москва: МГФ "Знание," 2005. И. Резник, "Отключение 'Газпрома,'" *Ведомости* of 24 November 2006.

authorised by Gazprom) derived from maintaining the present situation by slowing down gas market liberalisation, or voluntary abandonment of profits from it, which can be reaped mainly by independent companies interested in its diversification.

### **Poland as a Transit State in the Light of Liberalisation and Diversification**

Both a more active approach of the Polish government at the turn of 2006 as regards gas supply diversification projects in connection with the launch of the Nord Stream construction project from Russia to Germany, as well as the gas crisis between Ukraine and Moscow, are of vital importance for the transit of gas from Russia. The crisis revealed Russia's dependence as an exporter (and, in consequence, the dependence of Western receivers of Russian gas) on the situation in a transit country, which Ukraine is. The construction of the gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea bottom is intended to provide an additional transport route for the westbound Russian gas, without the need to use gas mains in transit countries. Decreased dependency on them is one of important principles of the Russian Energy Strategy by 2020, and the Russian strategy of "multi-layer diversification." At the same time, it is difficult to say whether the priority for Russia is to diversify transport routes and use them as a tool of influencing markets and countries, or to abandon specific transmission routes. The primary threat for Poland resulting from the establishment of the Nord Stream may be the diminished transit role of Poland, both by the decreased volume of transmitted gas and the reduced impact on Russian actions.<sup>40</sup>

Polish energy policy is not unambiguous in terms of Poland's role as a transit country for energy resources, which is not present in official documents. The role is decidedly shaped by the Transit Gas Pipelines System in the territory of Poland, The subject of completing the project resurfaced at the turn of 2006, and was jointly regarded during the public debate with experts as one of the unsolved Poland-Russia problems in terms of co-operation under EuRoPol Gaz.<sup>41</sup>

The Polish documents on energy policy emphasised the importance of transit of Russian gas for energy security on two occasions: when Poland achieved the status of the transit state for Russian gas, that is during the construction and

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<sup>40</sup> Cf. M. Gołębiowska, "Gorące pięć tygodni," *Nowy Przemysł*, 2006, no. 1.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Gazprom chce rury? ([www.wnp.pl](http://www.wnp.pl), after: [www.gazeta.pl](http://www.gazeta.pl)), 19 January 2007. On the conflict over EuRoPol Gaz: M. Gołębiowska, "Na gazowej szachownicy," *Nowy Przemysł*, 2005, no. 9.

launch of the first line of Yamal gas pipeline,<sup>42</sup> and in the new and unimplemented Energy Policy by 2025, where the subject of transit role was raised in the context of developing an infrastructure for gas transport within the EU along with the proposal to include Poland in the single market of gas. This can be interpreted as treating the connection of gas pipeline systems of different states as a substitute for the transit mains, owing to their significance for gas supply security. Polish Energy Policy by 2025 contains a proposal for the participation of independent entities in the construction of those connections, in exchange for the opportunity to use the transmission capacity.<sup>43</sup> The document stipulates linking liberalisation with Europe-wide security, but in essence, also with the establishment of the common gas market. Poland's energy policy, pursued from the 2005 elections, clearly favours diversifying suppliers of gas to PGNiG over building the flexibility of the Europe-wide gas system using opportunities that liberalisation offers.<sup>44</sup> This position conflicts, at least in the short and medium term, for example with lifting the ban on re-exporting the imported (Gazprom) gas, which is not possible without appropriate technical conditions.<sup>45</sup>

At the same time, regarding the transit role of the country as a priority for energy security is a double-edged sword, especially if we consider gas market liberalisation and the specific nature of the open crude oil market, as this offers potential domestic and foreign investors an argument to seek the execution of advantageous, from the business viewpoint, infrastructural projects. These projects are not necessarily in line with the genuine energy security of the country and with plans of the governments which, starting from the 2005 elections, attempt to reinforce the government role through State Treasury-owned companies, both in the natural gas and crude oil sectors.<sup>46</sup> The transit is, however, a type of

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<sup>42</sup> Założenia polityki energetycznej Polski do 2010 r., Ministerstwo Przemysłu i Handlu, 17 October 1995; Założenia polityki energetycznej Polski do 2020 r., Ministerstwo Gospodarki i Urząd Regulacji Energetyki, 22 February 2000.

<sup>43</sup> Transborder connections are on the list of instruments that enhance energy security, included in the Directive 2004/67/EC. The Yamal gas pipeline was to become a two-way transborder connection, according to the plans initiated following the gas crisis between Russia and Belarus in February 2004. So far, however, reverse utilisation is not possible.

<sup>44</sup> An example here may be abandoning the project stipulating the connection of northeast Poland with the German gas network at the turn of 2006, under the PGNiG and VNG project. A similar project, known as Bernau-Szczecin, was owned by A. Gudźowaty's Bartimpex.

<sup>45</sup> Stanowisko Rządu RP...

<sup>46</sup> Polityka rządu dla przemysłu naftowego w Polsce, Ministerstwo Gospodarki, 6 February 2007.

dependency as well, especially that in the case of Poland, it applies mainly to resources from Russia, or those transported through Russia.

Considering the present approach to the transit issue and no visible interest of the government in new projects in this respect (in particular with the participation of independent entities), it would be tricky to regard Poland's transit role as the mainstay of energy security.<sup>47</sup> However, the question about the prospects of effective, infrastructural connection of the Polish gas system with the EU system remains valid.

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Owing to impossible ultimate separation of liberalisation from both the “big” (important for the state balance) and “little” diversification (implemented at the regional level) of sources and means of the gas supply, the proposal, compliant with the European Union guidelines,<sup>48</sup> for the final acknowledgment of the two processes as complementary instruments of building energy security in Poland in terms of natural gas, appears reasonable. The promotion of either one of them only may, in turn, adversely affect its efficiency.

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<sup>47</sup> A. Łakoma, “Koniec wielkiego tranzytu,” *Rzeczpospolita* of 19 February 2007.

<sup>48</sup> Cf. Commission Staff Working Document...



## Poland in Peacekeeping and Stabilisation Operations

Similarly to previous years, 2006 marked intensive participation of Polish Armed Forces (both in terms of numbers and type of performed tasks) in peacekeeping and stabilisation operations. Although the total number of Polish soldiers deployed for missions dropped slightly in comparison to 2005 (2,200 soldiers deployed as on 18 December 2006<sup>1</sup>) it failed to impact the level of our involvement in this area substantially, and operations carried out outside Poland remained an important instrument of Polish security policy. In 2006, Poland continued its largest and most complex mission in history, as part of coalition forces in Iraq (Iraqi Freedom), although tasks performed by the Polish Military Contingent (PMC) were again modified. Also, Polish military contingents continued to be present in the Balkans (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo), Afghanistan, Lebanon (here, Polish troops were reinforced owing to the Israel-Lebanon crisis and reorganisation of UNIFIL-2 force) and in the Golan Heights. Until February 2006, the humanitarian aid mission for Pakistan also continued. The Polish Military Police force took part in a 4-month operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and performed security tasks during the elections there. The Polish Air Force took part, for the first time, in a NATO Air Policing operation intended to provide air security over Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. Furthermore, a decision was made in November 2006 concerning substantial reinforcement of the Polish Military Contingent in Afghanistan and a pivotal change in the nature of the Polish mission in the country.

Polish troops were involved in various (in terms of institutional framework) peacekeeping and stabilisation operations. These, however, were largely under the so-called *ad hoc* coalitions (approximately one thousand soldiers in total in Iraqi Freedom and Afghan Enduring Freedom operations). Poland was also relatively well represented in UN missions (over 600 soldiers) and EU missions (approximately 350 soldiers). Against these figures, our presence in NATO

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<sup>1</sup> Excluding 130 soldiers and civilian army personnel who took part in a mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo. If not otherwise indicated, figures on Polish military involvement come from the Internet site of the Polish Ministry of National Defence ([www.mon.gov.pl](http://www.mon.gov.pl)).

operations in 2006 appears exceptionally low: 250 soldiers in KFOR forces in Kosovo, a very small representation in the ISAF Command in Kabul and the frigate ORP Pułaski in the Active Endeavour operation in the Mediterranean Sea.

### **Iraqi Mission—a Continuation and Change<sup>2</sup>**

In 2006, the Polish Military Contingent continued its mission in Iraq under within? the Iraqi Freedom coalition operation.<sup>3</sup> The Polish force constituted a part of the International Stabilisation Force with the primary task of commanding the Multinational Division Centre-South. In total, approx. 1,800 soldiers and civilian army personnel served during the 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> rotation, which is an almost twofold decrease in the number of the Polish forces in comparison to the figures from the 5<sup>th</sup> rotation in 2005. The Division also included units from twelve more states.<sup>4</sup>

With this significant reduction in terms of numbers came the change in the nature of tasks performed by the Polish contingent: from training and stabilisation to training and advising, and their geographical reach: from mid-2005 the forces have been deployed in two (previously three) bases—Echo in Al Diwanayah (Al Qadisiyah Province), and Delta in Al Kut (Wasit Province). The main task of the division during the 6<sup>th</sup> (commanded by Gen. Edward Gruszka) and 7<sup>th</sup> rotation (commanded by Gen. Bronisław Kwiatkowski)<sup>5</sup> was to train Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), that is troops (in this particular case, the 8<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, including special forces from the 1<sup>st</sup> battalion of the 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade) as well as border guards and the police. The objective of a dozen or so Military Transition Teams (MiTT) was primarily to achieve ISF preparedness, so that it is able to carry out independent operations, with minimum support from the coalition forces. The assistance provided included command (consultancy in terms of coordinating combat systems and coordination of actions by Iraqi services at the

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<sup>2</sup> The paper discusses in detail only those operations, where major changes occurred in terms of the number of soldiers, or nature of involvement of the Polish military contingents in 2006.

<sup>3</sup> Decision on the extension of PMC's presence in the coalition operation was taken on 29 December 2005 by President Lech Kaczyński. Poland is also represented in NATO Training Mission (NTM-I) in Iraq, commenced in February 2006. Poland provides instructors and transport groups as well as is responsible for transporting helicopters deployed under PMC in Iraq.

<sup>4</sup> These were units from Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (from December 2006), Denmark, Lithuania, Latvia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Romania, Salvador (largest contribution—nearly 400 soldiers), Slovakia, the United States and Ukraine.

<sup>5</sup> 7<sup>th</sup> rotation of PMC Iraq was formed on the basis of 16<sup>th</sup> Pomeranian Mechanised Brigade of Elbląg. The force also included: manoeuvre group, CIMIC force from the Central Civil-Military Cooperation Support Group and a Military Police detachment.

province level, as well as further coordination of operational activities by Iraqi commanders) as well as logistics support for the operation (air transport and convoys, reconnaissance flights).<sup>6</sup> Poland also contributed to some extent to furnishing equipment for ISF, e.g. 10 Skorpion vehicles were overhauled and provided to the Iraqi military police, along with several hundred thousand rounds of ammunition and other combat equipment, as well as 16,000 litres of fuel, ration packs, etc.

In December 2006, the 9,000-men-strong Iraqi 8<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, trained by coalition forces, was authorised to take over the responsibility for supervising the region when the appropriate time came. On 26 January 2006, the Division Centre-South transferred its responsibility for the zone it operated in to Iraqi troops. As a result, Al Qadisiyah and Wasit became the first provinces in the country supervised by Iraqi, rather than coalition forces. The tasks of Iraqi Security Force primarily include support for checkpoints, patrols, searching and arresting suspected individuals, etc. Currently, the Multinational Division is to support ISF operations only at the latter's specific request.

Considering the dramatic deterioration of security situation in other regions of the country, the case of the Polish zone may be considered a success story, with an undisputed contribution of the Multinational Division Centre-South in terms of its ability to initiate good relations with the local population and administration. Clearly, this is not the only factor, though. Owing to its ethnic and religious structure, this region of the country is relatively unfertile ground for the development of the extremist movements that emerged in zones commanded by American and British forces. The arrangement of cooperation among the Iraqi Security Force, local authorities and the command of the Multinational Division was massively supported by the Provincial Joint Coordination Centre (PJCC) with Polish liaison officers, who contact local authorities and the office of the province governor. Not without its impact on the efficiency of actions by the Polish Military Contingent is also a positive attitude that some members of the Iraqi government show towards Poland.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> According to the Ministry of National Defence data, 19 operations were carried out during the 7<sup>th</sup> rotation, in cooperation with Iraqi Security Forces. Soldiers from the manoeuvre group took part in over 900 land missions (patrols, convoys, immediate response operations). Polish helicopters performed approximately 1,300 air missions.

<sup>7</sup> See shorthand record (270) of the 18<sup>th</sup> meeting of the Foreign Affairs Commission on 20 June, 2006 ([www.senat.gov.pl](http://www.senat.gov.pl)).

As already mentioned, against a backdrop of the dramatic deterioration of the general security situation in Iraq in 2006, the security status in the Polish zone remained relatively stable. One Polish soldier lost his life during the 7<sup>th</sup> rotation<sup>8</sup> (perpetrators of the attack were captured) and 6 soldiers from other national contingents died. Attacks on patrols and bases (Echo and Delta) intensified—with the total count of 56 missile and mortar attacks, in which 200 missiles and grenades were used. In December 2006 alone, the base in Al Kut was fired at 10 times. Also, soldiers were exposed to booby trap explosions, and Polish helicopters were shot at several times. The undisputed accomplishments of the Multinational Division include the fact that, owing to cooperation and exchange of information with the Iraqi police, the latter managed (November 2006) to capture perpetrators of the attack on Polish journalists, launched in May 2004, while soldiers of the 7<sup>th</sup> rotation PMC seized the killer of three Polish soldiers, who died in September 2004.

In 2006, demobilisation and disarmament processes continued, along with destroying ammunition and explosive stocks, mine clearing, etc. Next to purely military tasks, the Polish Military Contingent made its contribution in the area of nation-building, namely provided guidance for the establishment of new state structures and governing bodies of state administration, assisted in infrastructure and public utility facility (roads, power plants, sewage treatment plants, schools, hospitals, etc.) reconstruction, and supported humanitarian organisations operating in the Polish zone. Vitally important here was civil-military cooperation (CIMIC). In 2006, hundreds of such projects were completed, costing over \$12 million, and work continues on subsequent ones (whose value is even greater). Among more important projects where the staff of the Polish CIMIC was involved was the construction of the new seat for Al Diwaniyah TV channel. A proposal was also raised to establish a Polish Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Al Diwaniyah, similar to those being created at present in Afghanistan.<sup>9</sup> The concept, however, still remains a project for the future only, possibly due to the lack of funding (operational costs of such teams total from a few to several million dollars a year) and organisational problems.

Actions on the part of the Multinational Division Centre-South were in line with the 2006 strategy for the coalition forces, which stipulated a gradual hand-over of the responsibility for security in their country to Iraqi people

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<sup>8</sup> 18 soldiers have died since the mission began (as of December 2006).

<sup>9</sup> See shorthand record ...

themselves, while continuing to support their actions. However, starting next year, these assumptions might change. Owing to the deteriorating situation in Iraq, the United States is planning to deploy an additional 20,000 soldiers (the majority in Baghdad).<sup>10</sup> In connection with this, the American and Iraqi governments insisted on PMC's continued stay in Iraq. On 22 December 2006, President Lech Kaczyński signed a motion for the extension of the mission until the end of 2007. Probably, the size of the Polish Military Contingent, and the nature of its mission will not change, although the option of earlier withdrawal is also being looked into, on the condition that the developments in the Republic of Iraq so allow. It is worth noting that maintaining an advising and training nature of the Polish mission may prove difficult if the security situation in the region aggravates further.

### **Afghan Operation—Mission Impossible?**

By the end of 2006, the presence of Polish troops in Afghanistan was rather of a token nature, considering the size of the mission in the country. In December 2006, under the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a force of over 30,000 soldiers from 37 states was present in Afghanistan,<sup>11</sup> while Poland delegated only a dozen or so officers for ISAF command in Kabul. Slightly more active was Poland's involvement in operation Enduring Freedom, carried out simultaneously by the coalition force. From March 2002, the Polish participants included, among others, GROM rangers, sappers, logisticians as well as chemical warfare counteraction platoon, although the total number of soldiers in the Polish Military Contingent there failed to exceed 100. The majority of Poles were deployed to Bagram base near Kabul. Their key tasks include clearing the area around the base and airport of mines, development of camps of the coalition forces and road construction, as well as logistics actions.

The necessity to reinforce Poland's participation in NATO mission, which, starting from August 2003, took over the command over ISAF and has been extending its activities over subsequent Afghan provinces ever since, thus increasing both the headcount figures and scope of actions performed, was being discussed from 2005. Although from 2003, a very substantial, in terms of numbers, Polish Military Contingent participated in the stabilisation mission in

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<sup>10</sup> See A. Zdrada, "Nowa strategia Stanów Zjednoczonych wobec Iraku," *Biuletyn (PISM)*, no. 3 (417) of 15 January 2007.

<sup>11</sup> More on ISAF actions in Afghanistan in B. Górka-Winter, "Operacja stabilizacyjna NATO w Afganistanie," *Sprawy Międzynarodowe*, 2006, no. 3.

Iraq, the lack of political intent to expand the presence of our troops in ISAF met with severe criticism of our NATO allies. It was also pointed out in Poland that the “catalogue” of Polish involvement shows a marked imbalance at the expense of the missions carried out by the Alliance. The original concept of reinforcing Poland’s military presence in NATO operation in Afghanistan stipulated that the Multinational Corps Northeast, comprising units from Poland, Denmark and Germany, would take over the command over ISAF during the 9<sup>th</sup> rotation, that is from August 2006 to February 2007. The number of soldiers in the Polish contingent was also to be increased. These plans, however, failed to come true as NATO (in spring 2006), in accordance with the American proposal, decided to reorganise the command structure—which is to be permanent, rather than rotating, composite command, headed by an American general who supervises both operation Enduring Freedom and the NATO operation. The number of command positions filled by each country is to reflect the strength (in terms of numbers) of the contingent they have provided.

Finally, under the decision of the President of the Republic of Poland of 22 November, the Polish Military Contingent in Afghanistan will have up to 1,200 soldiers and civilian army personnel available from 1 December 2006 to 13 October 2007.<sup>12</sup> According to the announcement of the Ministry of National Defence, the transfer of troops to Afghanistan is planned for January-April 2007, while it should start to perform operational actions in May 2007. A planned dislocation of such a strong contingent under ISAF was from the very beginning accompanied by a heated debate, stemming primarily from soldier security concerns. 2006 was the year of NATO’s largest expansion in the territory of Afghanistan since the start of the mission. In July, International Security Assistance force took over the command over Southern and, in November, Eastern provinces of the country. Considering the fact that this is the area where the most intense fighting takes place, the risk associated with the NATO mission grew substantially. ISAF must face re-emerging Taliban units as well as other armed, illegal groupings, that increasingly often target coalition and NATO forces. However, the consent for those units to be used in an offensive against illegal groupings was not granted by too many states, among the consenting ones

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<sup>12</sup> Decision on a minor reinforcement of PMC in Afghanistan (from 120 to 190 soldiers and civilian army personnel) was taken already in August 2006. See “Postanowienie Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 30 sierpnia 2006 r. zmieniające postanowienie o przedłużeniu okresu życia Polskiego Kontyngentu Wojskowego w Islamskim Państwie Afganistanu,” *Monitor Polski* no. 59, item 623.

were the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada and Poland. Despite the awareness of how difficult the PMC mission in Afghanistan could be, there are justified reasons behind this decision. Firstly, the Republic of Poland Security Strategy of 2003 nominates NATO as the main organisation where Poland realises its interests in the area of security. We are also seeking substantial Alliance investment in the Polish defence infrastructure as well as location in our territory of the base with Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGC). Deploying a small contingent only for the Afghan mission looked as if Poland evaded its alliance obligations, which weakened our bargaining position in terms of those investment objectives. Secondly, NATO members are positive that by entering Afghanistan and commanding ISAF, NATO took over political responsibility for the success of the mission. In consequence, the North Atlantic Alliance would also be the one to take the blame for the potential failure, which is not in our interest, as Poland would like to maintain NATO's credibility and its deterring potential. Justifying their decisions, Polish authorities also referred to threats to the entire Western world that originate in Afghanistan as an exporter of terrorism and main supplier of opium for European markets. Not without their meaning for the decision on increasing our involvement in the Afghan mission were also symbolic aspects—the war campaign in Afghanistan in the eighties is referred to as one of the reasons for the collapse of the USSR.<sup>13</sup>

Plans for the Afghan operation are also accompanied by diplomatic actions. The opening of the Polish embassy in Kabul is scheduled for early 2007. So far, our interests in Afghanistan were represented by the Polish embassy in Islamabad (Pakistan). However, the role Poland intends to play in Afghanistan reaches far beyond the military dimension, therefore the establishment of a separate post there appears fully justified. Poland is a provider of development assistance for Afghanistan. In 2006, the value of the assistance, spent primarily on civil service reform (including training of staff), establishment of public institutions (schools, hospitals, water points), mine clearing, etc., totalled over PLN 8 million.<sup>14</sup> Many projects were implemented by Polish non-governmental organisations such as Polish Humanitarian Action (*Polska Akcja Humanitarna*), present in Afghanistan since June 2002, and the Polish Medical Mission. These

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<sup>13</sup> See the statement by R. Sikorski during the debate “A duel for world leadership” at the University of Warsaw on 26 January 2007.

<sup>14</sup> Figures from Informacja publiczna nt. kierunków i priorytetów polskiej pomocy zagranicznej i współpracy rozwojowej w 2006 r. finansowanej z rezerwy celowej budżetu państwa poz. 62, pp. 9–10 ([www.msz.gov.pl](http://www.msz.gov.pl)).

actions are as important as the success of NATO operation in Afghanistan, and thus the success of the Polish armed forces involved in the operation, will depend not only on military accomplishments. Equally important is the establishment of effective state administration, education and infrastructure, without which economic growth is impossible, and which helps to combat the narcotics business by offering alternative income opportunities to the farmers. Therefore, it appears a necessity for Polish military efforts in Afghanistan to be accompanied by a diplomatic offensive, intended to support that effort from the civilian side. Poland should primarily seek the greater involvement of the European Union in the country. Thus far, the EU is a reluctant participant in Afghan reconstruction projects. In 2002–2006, the European Commission earmarked a mere \$4 billion for that purpose, and planned for €600 million in aid for the subsequent four years. In addition, a small (approximately 200 persons) EU police mission will be present in Afghanistan from May 2007.

### **Military Police Mission to Democratic Republic of Congo**

In December 2005, the United Nations addressed the European Union asking for assistance in securing a proper course of the parliamentary and presidential elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo, held for the first time in 45 years. In April 2006, the European Council approved a plan of the Community force operation in DRC (EUFOR RD Congo). The primary task for the EU force of over two thousand soldiers was to support the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) for four months, starting on 29 July 2006. The responsibility for preparing and carrying out the operation of 21 states (including 2 from outside the EU) was with Germany. The Operational Command was located in Potsdam, and the Force Command, established by France, which deployed the largest number of troops, in Kinshasa.

The EUFOR mandate in Congo covered primarily the support for blue helmets deployed there (approx. 16,000 soldiers), in case they had any problems with performing their tasks, security protection for the airport in Kinshasa, as well providing security and the freedom of movement for the UN mission personnel and EU observers. EUFOR was also tasked with potential intervention in case of threats to the civilian population, if the Congo and UN forces were unable to handle the situation themselves. The majority of EU units (approximately 1,300 soldiers) were deployed to the capital of neighbouring Gabon, while the rest stayed in Kinshasa. A deterring factor for potential instigators of riots or armed attacks was therefore not the physical presence of EUFOR troops all over the territory of Congo, but rather their readiness to



respond immediately and use force in the event of security deterioration. Only once were EU units forced to launch a small-scale intervention (approximately 130 soldiers), which was on the day when the results of the first round of presidential elections were announced (20 August 2006).

The Polish contingent of approximately 130 soldiers and civilian personnel contributed significantly to the European Union operation in Congo.<sup>15</sup> The Polish force comprised primarily MPs from the special units of Military Police (approximately 100 persons, including a special platoon from Warsaw, and two manoeuvre platoons from Gliwice). Its tasks included primarily force protection of the EU Force Command and N'Dolo airport in Kinshasa, ensuring security and safety for UN and EU international personnel, and cooperation with the EU police mission (EUPOL).

The mission in Congo proved to be another important test for the capabilities of the Polish Military Police, which is preparing for an increasingly more active involvement in international missions. It is all the more important because police units with military status cope extremely well with the stabilisation mission environment, as their mandates cover tasks that reach far beyond purely military activities. Thus, units of this type may become a certain 'export product' of a state for the various operations.<sup>16</sup> Its own MP force is being established by NATO (Multinational Military Police Battalion) and the European Union (European Gendarmerie Force—EGF or EUROGENDFOR). The latter officially commenced their service in January 2006, and so far have included units from France, Spain, Holland, Portugal and Italy (approximately 800 soldiers in total). They are to be prepared for deployment to the conflict zone within 30 days of the notification date, first of all by the European Union, but also on request by other organisations (UN, NATO, OSCE). Owing to its specific nature, EUROGENDFOR stands a chance of becoming one of the most effective European Union instruments of civilian crisis management. Close cooperation with those forces is so far stipulated only for the Military Police Special Detachment of Mińsk, which (although formally a military unit) specialises in e.g. providing police support for armed forces in their operational area. The ultimate objective is for Poland to strive to achieve the quickest-possible membership in the European Gendarmerie Force, and positive evaluation of the Polish Military Contingent in Congo may be a decisive facilitator of that.

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<sup>15</sup> The PMC's participation in the EU operation was approved by President L. Kaczyński on 27 April 2006. Costs of the mission were estimated at PLN 16 million.

<sup>16</sup> More on this in B. Górka-Winter, "Europejskie Siły Żandarmerii—nowy instrument reagowania kryzysowego Unii Europejskiej," *Biuletyn* (PISM), no. 11 (351) of 9 February 2006.

### **Reinforced UNIFIL-2 in Lebanon**

At the turn of August 2006, in a response to attacks, Israel's armed forces entered Southern Lebanon and bombed Hezbollah hideouts, and established a sea, land and air blockade. Hezbollah responded with missile attacks on Israeli cities.<sup>17</sup> Escalation in hostilities resulted in the United Nations Organisation's decision to substantially reinforce UN interim force (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, UNIFIL), present in Lebanon for almost 30 years, and expand its scope of duties. Thus far, the mandate for the operation primarily covered monitoring of the observance of the armistice between Israel and Lebanon, as well as support for the Lebanese government in regaining authority in the southern regions. Also, UN force was involved in humanitarian aid, mine clearing, etc.

Despite UNIFIL's presence in southern Lebanon, the Islamic Resistance Movement, which provoked the aggravation of hostilities with Israel in summer 2006, solidified. Therefore, UN Security Council Resolution no. 1701 of 11 August 2006 provides for the deployment of Lebanese troops and international forces UNIFIL-2, up to 15,000 soldiers combined (which equals seven times UNIFIL's headcount) in the area between river Litani and Lebanon-Israel border, where Hezbollah's militant groups are particularly active. UNIFIL-2's tasks include supervision over the observance in the area mentioned above of the principle of "freedom from weapons, military personnel and equipment other than such used by the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL force" as well as assistance in controlling Lebanon's borders and preventing weapons smuggling. UNIFIL-2's mandate does not explicitly allow Hezbollah's disarmament, although it empowers the international force to take "any necessary actions" to achieve the objectives set. In fact, the force was granted substantial autonomy, and is allowed to confiscate weapons from illegal armed groups as well as organise armed operations under the so-called pre-emptive self-defence.

For the first time, in order not to duplicate chains of command, a strategic unit was established with the UN Headquarters in New York (the commander-in-chief of the operation reports to HQ), directly reporting to UN Secretary General (thus far, UNIFIL command reported to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations).

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<sup>17</sup> See J. Bury, "Izraelska operacja wojskowa w Libanie," *Biuletyn* (PISM) no. 42 (382) of 19 July 2006, M. Madej, "Perspektywy powodzenia misji międzynarodowych sił pokojowych w Libanie (tzw. UNIFIL-2)," *Biuletyn* (PISM) no. 50 (390) of 31 August 2006.

The largest contributors to UNIFIL-2 are European Union states (17 states currently participate in the operation). They declared their readiness to send approximately 7,000 soldiers to Lebanon, with the biggest number of soldiers so far coming from Italy, France and Spain. By February 2007, the commander of the UN force in Lebanon was a French General Alain Pellegrini, and, from February, the duties were taken over by Claudio Graziano of Italy.

It is worth reminding that Resolution no. 1701 was a compromise solution, and its provisions were negotiated in the air of a serious dispute between the United States and France. The United States, supporting the position by Israel, wanted the international force (up to 20,000 soldiers) to be located in the south of Lebanon during the conflict, and its mandate to include also disarming the Islamic Resistance Movement in cooperation with the Lebanese armed forces. France, on the other hand, wanted to see an armistice and a political solution first.

As a result of UNIFIL restructuring, the Polish Military Contingent (mostly logisticians), present in Lebanon since 1992, was also reinforced.. The present 26<sup>th</sup> rotation, serving since October 2006, has approximately 317 soldiers available (so far, each rotation had approximately 200 soldiers). Pursuant to the decision by President Lech Kaczyński of 14 September 2006, PMC may be reinforced to reach up to 500 soldiers and civilian army personnel, and its mandate was extended until 31 August 2007. The duties of the Polish logistics battalion (POLLOG) so far chiefly included fuel, food and water supply for other mission participants, as well as necessary repairs and maintenance of vehicles. The scope of PMC duties also included medical support (e.g. a UNIFIL field hospital was established, using the Polish medical company), protection and defence of designated areas. During military operations in summer 2006, the objective of PMC was also to help with evacuation from the territory of Lebanon of over 200 Polish and third country citizens, as well as to provide humanitarian aid for victims of the conflict.

Following the reinforcement of the Polish contingent,<sup>18</sup> PMC mandate will cover: patrolling and ensuring security in the area of responsibility, monitoring the observance of armistice conditions, protection of humanitarian aid convoys,

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<sup>18</sup> There were also opinions among military experts that Polish units in Lebanon should be reinforced to reach approximately 1,000 soldiers. See e.g. S. Koziej, "Misja w Libanie ważniejsza niż w Afganistanie," *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 8 September 2006. The discussion on the Polish involvement in Lebanon was held on 10 August 2006 at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, see "Misja sił wielonarodowych w Libanie. Jaka rola dla Polski?" ([www.pism.pl/wydarzenia\\_content/id/196](http://www.pism.pl/wydarzenia_content/id/196)).

support for the Lebanese army, and help with the implementation of programmes carried out by the UN.<sup>19</sup>

### **Evaluation and Prospects**

Considerable engagement of Poland in the various operations carried out under the aegis of the UN, NATO and the European Union, as well as international coalitions, has been a characteristic feature of Polish security policy for years, and represents its important instrument. Even before the accession to the North Atlantic Alliance and the EU, Poland was one of larger “exporters” of troops (as well as police and civilian personnel) for international operations (in 1998, Poland ranked first among country-force contributors for UN operations). At that time, the purpose was to build, and maintain following the accession to NATO and the EU, an image of Poland as a reliable partner which has both the required resources to strengthen peace and increase international security, and the will to use them. This objective has definitely been achieved. Currently, when the international situation requires us to maintain our involvement in these areas, or even intensify it (Afghanistan), it is worth considering what objectives, next to those already defined, should be the driving force behind our actions.

Undeniably, Poland’s participation in missions abroad was, and still is, a stimulus for modernisation in the Polish Armed Forces. It necessitates changes in the structure and organisation of the forces as well as contributes to new prioritisations as regards those reforms. The requirements stemming from greater involvement of Polish units in international missions clearly represented one of the most important reasons behind the decision to establish the Operational Command which, starting from 1 July 2005, commands the forces participating in peacekeeping operations and deals with forming future participating units. They were probably also a factor in the decision on changing the status of the Polish Armed Forces into fully professional by 2010 (e.g. Military Police soldiers will become professional soldiers in 2009–2012).<sup>20</sup> Also, special forces will have a greater role to play than before. Therefore, the headcount of special units will rise (the ultimate objective is 2% of the Polish

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<sup>19</sup> See *Udział Wojska Polskiego i Policji w misjach stabilizacyjnych i pokojowych*, memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ([www.msz.gov.pl/Udzial,wojska,w,misjach,stabilizacyjnych,i,pokojowych,9162.html](http://www.msz.gov.pl/Udzial,wojska,w,misjach,stabilizacyjnych,i,pokojowych,9162.html)).

<sup>20</sup> See e.g. *Informacja dotycząca działalności Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej od listopada 2005 do grudnia 2006 r.* ([www.mon.gov.pl/arttykul\\_wiecej.php?idartykul=2538](http://www.mon.gov.pl/arttykul_wiecej.php?idartykul=2538)).

army headcount), and they will be rearranged into one, separate entity (comprising GROM rangers, the Special Regiment of Lubliniec and the Navy Special Operations Section Formoza). They will report to a separate Special Forces Command, located in Bydgoszcz, formally operating since 1 January 2007. A threefold increase, in comparison to the previous year, in the spending on special forces development (to reach PLN 300 million), the establishment of the training centre for those forces as well as seconding a helicopter squadron to cooperate with them is planned for 2007.

Participation in peacekeeping operations necessitates upgrading and equipment supply. In 2006, the first F-16 aircraft arrived in Poland. According to the schedule of deliveries, the entire fleet of these multipurpose aircraft will reach Polish bases in 2008. Apart from this, the Ministry of National Defence is planning *inter alia* a purchase of unmanned aircraft and investment in precision artillery development. In 2007, nearly 27% of the MND budget will be spent on modern equipment, which is the biggest share ever.

One of the most important decisions in 2006 was also Poland's accession to NAPMO (NATO AEW & CF Programme Management Organisation)—an organisation within NATO appointed to lead and manage the early warning and control system. This means that Poland will become a co-owner and user of the fleet of AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft, which will allow us to co-decide on the development directions for the programme and utilisation method of the aircraft.

In October 2006, an agreement package was signed with the Satellite Regional Operations Centre, dealing with e.g. providing high resolution satellite imaging (maps, terrain models, development visualisations). The acquired data may come in very useful for soldiers participating in international operations.

The participation in peacekeeping operations is a source of upgrade stimuli for the Polish military, and undeniably contributes to its higher combat value. The variety and complexity level of tasks performed during the missions (notably commanding the Multinational Division in Iraq), the requirement to undergo specialised training (also language training), the cooperation with units from other armed forces, the ability to verify combat value of units that are still being formed (e.g. special units of the Military Police), all offer experience that no domestic training can match. Peacekeeping missions are also an instrument for building a positive image of Poland in the world. This image is being created by the ability of military and civilian participants of the operations to establish and maintain positive relations with local communities. Of paramount importance

here is also the humanitarian aid (supply of food, medication, medical equipment, learning aids, etc.) that accompanies every mission.

Despite unquestionable benefits brought by Poland's involvement in missions beyond its borders, we should note, however, that they entail a heavy burden on the state budget. A significant increase in budget spending in this area was planned for 2007, to reach nearly PLN 500 million, of which almost half will be eaten up by the mission in Afghanistan. In 2006, the total spending on all undertakings of this type came to approximately PLN 230 million. Greater involvement of Poland in NATO and EU operations would therefore be facilitated by reforming the financing for the operations. However, despite numerous debates on the issue, no agreement was reached with NATO allies on the change of the present international mission financing principles.<sup>21</sup>

We should also remember that social consent for subsequent obligations of Poland in this respect significantly dwindled during the last year. 77% of Polish society (62% in December 2003) are against continued Iraqi mission. 75% of Poles disagree with sending additional units to Afghanistan.<sup>22</sup> These concerns reveal an acute need for a discussion over the strategy for Poland in respect of peacekeeping operations.

From the standpoint of the polish *raison d'état*, the most advantageous option would be the involvement in operations carried out under NATO and the European Union, since our presence in decision-making bodies of the two organisations empowers Polish authorities to influence operational strategies for individual missions. A significantly less intense is Poland's share in building operational concepts for coalition missions. This may lead to such situations as in Iraq right now, where Poland, although it did not take part in formulating general strategies for the coalition forces, is forced to bear the consequences of mistakes made at that time. If a country becomes a "supplier" of troops, without the ambition or potential to influence general operational planning, this in consequence weakens, rather than strengthens, its political position. Participation in forming operational concepts is possible only if a country offers considerable

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<sup>21</sup> More on the subject in *Prymat NATO i stosunki transatlantyckie—polski punkt widzenia. Raport Forum Bezpieczeństwa Centrum Europejskiego Natolin*, p. 20 ([www.pism.pl/zalaczniki/FN\\_5\\_2006\\_raport\\_nato.pdf](http://www.pism.pl/zalaczniki/FN_5_2006_raport_nato.pdf)) and its English version.

<sup>22</sup> See reports from the opinion poll centre CBOS research: *Skutki przedłużenia obecności Polskich żołnierzy w Iraku. Komunikat z badań*, February 2006; *Opinia publiczna o udziale polskich żołnierzy w misjach poza granicami kraju oraz o ostatnich wydarzeniach w Iraku*, February 2007 ([www.cbos.pl](http://www.cbos.pl)).

personal or property contribution (in proportion to the size of the operation) for mission planning. This contribution also enables the state to demand commanding positions in the operation hierarchy, which significantly raise the country's status. Considering the above, it is worth declaring our involvement in a smaller number of operations, but using a bigger force.

In this context, we should think about our participation in the EU Battlgroups, and ask the question whether the potential of Poland and its armed forces does not predestine us to form a national group. Larger states of the European Union, such as France, the United Kingdom, Spain and Italy do so, and such a substantial quantitative contribution to these forces clearly enhances the position of those countries in a discussion over its future. It also opens upon opportunities for playing a bigger role in terms of commanding operations, which automatically raises the state's prestige and solidifies its political position. The physical process of forming the Polish Battlegroup should also be accompanied by a considerable conceptual contribution to the discussion on future developments in joint operational involvement. There are important indications that future EU missions (excluding a continuously reduced presence in the Balkans) will be launched in unstable African countries (another operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo cannot be ruled out, or reinforcement of EU forces in Darfur) and the Middle East region (Lebanon, Palestinian Authority). The discussions on these issues should be held with the objective in mind that the geography of potential involvement of EU Battlgroups should match Polish interests (e.g. in the case of a new crisis emerging, or any of the old conflicts in the East of Europe unfreezing). It is also in Poland's interest for the actions of the European Union and NATO in terms of establishing Battlgroups and NATO Response Force respectively, to be compatible, and not to duplicate, as both formations should be able to work together, which will require *inter alia* joint training, working out joint standards for unit certification, and agreeing on rotation plans for individual units.

Another issue that definitely requires comprehensive analysis is the problem of potential economic benefits that Poland's participation in peacekeeping operations offers. The Iraqi case proved that, in reality, we cannot speak of a direct link between the participation in a given mission and reaping economic benefits. Clearly, stabilisation in a region is conducive to greater security of business activities performed there, and allows protection of projects already in progress (as is the case with Congo, where KGHM invests), although whether a country is able to engage itself effectively in a given region in the economic dimension is a function of circumstances much more complex than military

participation in an operation there. Much more important here is the ability to promote businesses and their will to take investment risks. Despite the opportunity to win contracts, for example in Lebanon for a total of \$1.5 billion, there is a shortage of companies in Poland that would be willing to enter that market.<sup>23</sup> Ideas on how the development assistance that reaches conflict-ridden regions could, even slightly, return to the country in the form of contracts for some Polish businesses, are also scarce. Relatively disappointing, and definitely negatively affecting the support for the participation of Polish military in the Iraqi operation, is the lack of declared economic benefits. So far, except for contracts signed by Bumar, no other trade contracts on a large scale have been signed, which also applies to planned energy deals.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> See K. Orłowski, "Nie palimy się do odbudowy," *Rzeczpospolita* of 6 September 2006.

<sup>24</sup> For plans in this respect see shorthand record...



## **Poland's Cooperation for Development**

With its accession to the European Union, Poland became a donor of development assistance funds. Being a recipient of such assistance, the country had an opportunity to learn how needed it might be. In spite of that, the issues concerning cooperation for development make their way to the agenda of public debate very rarely, as Polish society, living in one of the poorest EU states, easily forgets that Poland is in fact a rich country of the north. This self-absorption with the level of one's own poverty makes Polish politicians seem to have little time to raise socially unpopular issues.

The little involvement of political elites in promoting the idea of cooperation for development is a big mistake, as development assistance means not only the necessity of finding funds in the state budget for this purpose, but it is also a tool that makes it possible to alleviate tensions between the north and the south, to reduce international conflicts and increase global security.

### **International Factors of Polish Cooperation for Development**

Since May 2004, Poland, as an EU member, has been bound by the rules of granting development assistance established by Community law, as well as the EU obligations concerning the size and quality of this assistance. EU member states transfer more than a half of global amount of official development assistance (ODA)<sup>1</sup> to developing countries. In the assistance system, the

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
<sup>1</sup> Official Development Assistance (ODA), consists of donations and loans aimed at supporting the economic development of developing countries, transferred to those countries by official governmental institutions of states or by international organisations; in case of loans there is a requirement that 25% of it should be a donation (with the exception of donations and loans for military purposes, which are not included in ODA). Moreover, classifying a given development assistance as ODA depends on the state-recipient of the assistance, i.e. the country who is given this assistance must be on the list drawn up by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development. In relation to that, since 2005, the official development assistance does not comprise funds allotted for the support of states that became European Union members in 2004 and later, as well as those having the status of candidate states with real prospects of EU membership. This involves G8 countries. The list of recipient countries is updated every three years. Recently, Belarus, Libya and Ukraine have been added.

European Community plays the role of both donor of development assistance (on the very same principles as other donors) and a co-ordinator of the assistance activities of 27 member states.

Poland is committed to a systematic increase of development assistance funds, so as in 2010 the ratio of official development assistance to the GDP amounts to 0.17%, and in 2015—to 0.33% (Figure 1). Considering the fact that before the country’s accession to the EU this ratio amounted to 0.02% on average (between 1999 and 2003),<sup>2</sup> these obligations create quite a large challenge. Given the GDP forecasts of the Ministry of Finance, Poland, in order to carry out its obligations, will have to increase the amount of development assistance funds to PLN 2.3 billion in the next four years (Figure 2). However, the hitherto developments in this area call for optimism. Already in 2004, the size of this assistance grew to 0.05% of the GDP, and in the next two years it doubled, reaching 0.1% of the GDP in 2006.

Figure 1

**Planned Official Development Assistance of Poland in 2007–2015**  
(in % of GDP)




Source: *Polska współpraca na rzecz rozwoju. Raport roczny 2005*, Warszawa: Departament Współpracy Rozwojowej, Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, August 2006, p. 10.

<sup>2</sup> *Polska współpraca na rzecz rozwoju. Raport roczny 2005*, Warszawa: Departament Współpracy Rozwojowej, Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, August 2006, p. 10.

Figure 2

**Planned Official Development Assistance of Poland in 2007–2015**  
(in PLN billion)



Source: as in Fig. 1.

The document which establishes the purposes and principles of EU cooperation for development is the “European Consensus on Development”,<sup>3</sup> adopted in 2005. The most important purpose of EU development assistance is to decrease the level of poverty while maintaining the principles of sustainable development and taking into account the previously adopted international obligations, especially the Millennium Development Goals.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, the EU policy in this respect is to focus on the observance and protection of human rights and the propagation of good management practices.

When analysing the international factors of Polish development assistance, we cannot ignore the membership of Poland in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Poland became a member in 1996 and strives to meet the criteria of membership in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which co-ordinates activities as regards assistance offered by OECD member states and establishes the principles of its transfer.<sup>5</sup> Membership in the Committee requires, *inter alia*, approval of all guidelines adopted by DAC

<sup>3</sup> The European Commission and the Council adopted this document [resolution no. P6-TA-PROV (2005) 0528] at the meeting of General Affairs and External Relations Council on 22 November 2005 (document 14820/05), and the Parliament approved it at its plenary meeting on 15 December 2005.

<sup>4</sup> Millennium Development Goals form part of the Millennium Declaration, adopted by the leaders of 189 states of the world at the United Nations forum in 2000, see United Nations Millennium Declaration, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, 18 September 2000 ([www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.pdf](http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.pdf)).

<sup>5</sup> The members of DAC are at present 22 OECD member states and the European Commission.

since its establishment, yearly provisions of statistical information concerning the size of foreign assistance and reports on the state's assistance policy. It should be emphasised here, that although the size of assistance offered does not constitute a formal criterion of membership, DAC member countries, at the moment of their accession to the Committee, offered official development assistance at the level of at least 0.2% of the GDP.<sup>6</sup>

Major international commitments concerning the development assistance offered by Poland also result from the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, signed in March 2005,<sup>7</sup> which makes an agreement between around 100 states—representing both recipients and donors of the assistance<sup>8</sup>—and over 25 development agencies. It is aimed at transferring assistance funds in a way supporting the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals by the year 2015.<sup>9</sup> In this declaration, its signatories committed themselves to the following: mutual responsibility of donors and recipients of the assistance in achieving the planned results; alignment of the donors' activities to national development frameworks of partner states; mutual accountability of recipient states for their development policy; co-ordination of development activities; managing results; and the harmonisation of donors' activities.

### **Priorities and Directions of Polish Foreign Assistance**

The document setting priorities and directions of Polish development assistance is *Strategia polskiej współpracy na rzecz rozwoju* (The Strategy of Polish Cooperation for Development) adopted by the Council of Ministers on 21 October 2003.<sup>10</sup> In light of this strategy, the basic aim of Polish development assistance is to support sustainable development, including the eradication of

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<sup>6</sup> The source of all statistical data and information of projects carried out in 2006 by NGOs, the central government and local administration agendas is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ([www.polskapomoc.gov.pl](http://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl)).

<sup>7</sup> Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness ([www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf)).

<sup>8</sup> The declaration was signed both by EU member states and the European Commission.

<sup>9</sup> Annual Report 2006 on the European Community's Development Policy and the Implementation of External Assistance in 2005, European Commission ([http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/reports/europeaid\\_annualreport\\_highlights\\_2006\\_pl.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/reports/europeaid_annualreport_highlights_2006_pl.pdf)).

<sup>10</sup> At present, works are underway on the new strategy of Polish foreign assistance, which is to take into account—in the light of data of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—the activities undertaken by Poland that go beyond the traditionally understood development dimension and consist in promoting democracy in Eastern European countries. The Development Assistance Act is also underway in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

poverty in recipient countries. Among the major tasks of cooperation for development are: “support of sustainable economic growth, observance of human rights, democracy, rule of law and good governance principles, promotion of global security and stability, transfer of experience in political transformation, development of human potential, support of development of public administration and local structures, protection of environment, prevention of environmental problems as well as offering extraordinary humanitarian and food assistance.”<sup>11</sup>

In the budget act of 2006, contrary to previous years, the expenditure planned from the especially established special-purpose provision fund concerned not only those activities that are universally understood as official development assistance, but also those that do not qualify as ODA as a result of the method of offering assistance or offering it to countries not being ODA recipients.<sup>12</sup> All activities financed from the aforementioned provision fund are described as Polish foreign assistance.

Among priority tasks of Polish foreign assistance are cooperation for development, support for democracy and the development of civic society, especially in countries undergoing political change.<sup>13</sup> The activities aimed at supporting democracy and developing civic society involve, *inter alia*, promoting good governance principles and the rule of law, monitoring the observance of human rights and civic and labour freedoms, strengthening the independence of civic society institutions as well as social and international solidarity and supporting free and independent media.

According to preliminary data, in 2006 Poland spent ca. PLN 930 million on foreign assistance, i.e. PLN 260 million more than in 2005. A major part of this amount was transferred as a contribution to the EC budget. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs could thus freely dispose of the amount of PLN 85 million to spend on activities related to Polish foreign assistance.

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<sup>11</sup> Strategia polskiej współpracy na rzecz rozwoju, Warszawa: Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych 2003, p. 5.

<sup>12</sup> Informacja publiczna nt. kierunków i priorytetów polskiej pomocy zagranicznej i współpracy rozwojowej w 2006 r. finansowanej z rezerwy celowej budżetu państwa poz. 62: „Wsparcie międzynarodowej współpracy na rzecz demokracji i społeczeństwa obywatelskiego, w tym na dofinansowanie Specjalistycznych Studiów Wschodnich Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, oraz implementacja polskiego programu współpracy na rzecz rozwoju,” Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, 2006 ([www.msz.gov.pl/files/docs/konkursy/dwr/IPKPPOLPZWR2006.pdf](http://www.msz.gov.pl/files/docs/konkursy/dwr/IPKPPOLPZWR2006.pdf)).

<sup>13</sup> *Ibidem*.

### Bilateral Assistance of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs


Bilateral assistance is one of the main channels of distributing funds allotted by Poland for foreign assistance. As part of it, both Official Development Assistance and other forms of foreign assistance are financed. This assistance also comprises projects carried out by Polish diplomatic posts, financed from the so-called Small Grants Fund.

#### Projects and Tasks Carried out by Non-Governmental Organisations in 2006

Assistance funds that the Foreign Ministry had at its disposal in 2006 for the projects submitted by non-governmental organisations exceeded the amount of PLN 21 million, which means that they doubled the amount in 2005 (see Figure 3). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs made efforts to ensure that these funds were accessible for all NGOs (the small ones as well, of local reach), and thus no obligatory contribution from them was required.

Figure 3

#### Size of Subsidies Granted to NGOs for Assistance Projects in 2005–2006



\* Year 2005: subsidy granted for projects in Armenia, Serbia and Montenegro, Tajikistan and projects that involved more than one country.

Year 2006: subsidy granted for projects in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kyrgyzstan, Serbia and Tajikistan.

Source: Own compilation on the basis of information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006—preliminary data).

Finally, 210 projects were submitted to the competition, of which 125 were approved for execution (Table 1). Most of the projects concerned Ukraine (almost one third of applications submitted).

Table 1

**The List of Project Applications in Foreign Assistance and International Development Cooperation Submitted by Non-governmental Organisations and of Applications Approved for Execution in 2006**

State/Group of states	Amount granted for funding of the project (in PLN)	Number of projects submitted	Number of projects accepted
Ukraina	6,450,000	83	41
Belarus	4,490,000	35	24
Moldova	1,860,000	17	12
Russia	2,010,000	23	16
The Balkan states	1,500,000	8	5
Iraq	1,140,000	2	1
Afghanistan	1,690,000	4	3
Georgia	640,000	16	7
Central Asia and South Caucasus	500,000	14	12
The Palestinian Authority	870,000	6	3
Angola	450,000	2	1
Total	21,550,000	210	125

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

**Ukraine.** Poland perceives Ukraine as its strategic partner and is ardently supporting the process of social and economic reforms that have commenced in this country. At the same time, Poland is capable of offering something more than purely material assistance, as it has its own rich experience in systemic transformation and European integration. In 2006, the priorities of Polish assistance to Ukraine were: European and Euro-Atlantic integration, economic transformation, development of local government, education (cooperation among schools, youth exchange), cross-border cooperation and building of local partnerships and the development of the non-governmental sector (media, NGOs). The projects approved for execution involved all of those priorities.

Most of the projects concerned the support of local government and the integration of Ukraine with the EU structures (see Annex).

**Belarus.** It was Poland's intent to make the assistance for the Belarusian society one of its priorities in foreign assistance in 2006.<sup>14</sup> Among the main goals of the Foreign Ministry were the support of democratic transition, building of the state of law and the development of civic society in Belarus. The Ministry distributed exceptionally large funds for its implementation (Figure 3), which partially stemmed from the fact that Belarus was included in the list of countries-recipients of ODA, thus the assistance for this country could be treated as an execution of Poland's commitments related to the increase (by 2006) of the official development assistance to the level of 0.1% of the GDP.

The projects of NGOs for Belarus approved for execution in 2006 related to all of the assistance areas outlined by Poland. The following areas received the most attention: development of local communities, training and youth exchange and the support of local and regional press. Among other projects accepted a few concerned economic development (e.g. support of SMEs), European integration and the support of activities for the dissemination of objective information in the civic society (see Annex).

**Moldova.** In 2006, Poland almost doubled its assistance funds for Moldova. In the competition announced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, NGOs could submit projects in three areas: strengthening administration structures on the central and local level; supporting the execution of tasks provided for in the EU/Moldova Action Plan (especially in the sectors of agriculture, SMEs, financial services and environment protection); and strengthening civic society institutions. The project applications approved for execution related to all of those areas. The largest number of projects concerned the strengthening of administration structures (especially on the local level) and civic society institutions.

**Georgia.** In 2006, Poland granted the amount of PLN 0.64 million for the execution of NGO projects in Georgia. Owing to these funds, seven projects were financed, aimed at supporting social and economic reforms in this country. The projects concerned the building of civic society institutions and the democratic state of law, the revitalisation of conflict areas and environmental protection.

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<sup>14</sup> *Ibidem.*



**Iraq, Afghanistan, the Palestinian Authority, Angola.** From among the projects submitted by NGOs, the Ministry approved seven projects for execution for Iraq, Afghanistan, the Palestinian Authority and Angola, with the total amount of PLN 4 million (see Table 1). The projects concerned the construction of infrastructure, including the water supply infrastructure (Iraq, Afghanistan, the Palestinian Authority) and healthcare (the Palestinian Authority, Angola).

**The Balkan states.** The Ministry of Foreign Affairs approved five projects for execution concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia (including a separate project for Kosovo) with the total amount of PLN 790,000. They were mostly aimed at the transfer of Polish know-how in the area of systemic transformation and EU integration (especially with regards to regional policy, self-government and environmental protection) and the economic activation of women.

**Russia, Central Asia and South Caucasus states.** For the projects of NGOs for Russia<sup>15</sup> and Central Asia and South Caucasus states, Poland allotted a total of PLN 2.5 million. The majority of this amount (PLN 2.01 million) went to Russia in the form of projects concerning the development of Russian NGOs, the organisation of training (*inter alia* for academic teachers and students), youth integration, dissemination of knowledge on public administration reform, local government, credit co-operatives as well as the development of regional tourism, environment protection, voluntary work and the restructuring of SMEs.

The remaining assistance funds went to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and were mostly aimed at institutional support for NGOs, the development of local press, and the organisation of training for journalists and study tours and workshops for various professional groups and young people.

**Projects and tasks executed by central government agendas in 2006.** The Ministry of Foreign Affairs approved 45 projects for execution submitted by government agendas, involving activities in foreign assistance and international cooperation in Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Angola and the Balkan states (see Table 2).

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<sup>15</sup> Subsidies granted for the projects for Russia are not classified as official development assistance.

Table 2

**The List of Project Applications in Foreign Assistance and International Development Cooperation Submitted by Central Governmental Agendas and of Applications Approved for Execution in 2006**

Country	Number of applications submitted	Number of applications approved	Units executing the projects
Ukraine	36	28	The Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Treasury, the Ministry of Regional Development, the Ministry of National Defence, District Courts, General Police Headquarters, National Border Guard, Civil Service Department of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, State Fire Service, Department of the European Union of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of Security Policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Polish Agency for Enterprise Development, Agricultural Market Agency, Pomerania Agricultural Advisory Centre, Agricultural Advisory Centre in Brwinów
Moldova	4	4	Department of the European Union of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Central Headquarters of Prison Service, Ministry of the Treasury, Agricultural Market Agency
Georgia	4	4	National Border Guard, Central Headquarters of Prison Service, Department of the European Union of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Belarus	5	1	East European Studies of Warsaw University,
Kazakhstan	2	2	Agricultural Advisory Centre in Brwinów, the Civil Aviation Office
Iraq	2	1	Ministry of Culture and National Heritage
The Balkan states	2	1	Office of the Committee for European Integration
Kyrgyzstan	1	1	Ministry of the Environment
Angola	1	1	Polish Geological Institute
Projects involving more than one country	6	2	East European Studies of Warsaw University, Centre for the Study of Classical Tradition in Poland and East-Central Europe
Total	63	45	

Source: see Table 1.

A large majority of projects approved concerned Ukraine. The assistance offered involved all priorities related to support given to this country, i.e. the transfer of the Polish experience and institutional solutions in public administration, especially in respect to adjusting the Ukrainian administration to EU standards, support of economic transition, activities for a common Polish-Ukrainian security and combating organised crime, support of regional development and the agricultural sector (*inter alia* restructuring of agriculture, development of agricultural advisory services and environmental agriculture in Ukraine).

Projects executed by central government agendas for Moldova concerned, first of all, the support of the institutional development of public administration, including issues related to integration with EU structures, privatisation processes, public property management, functioning of intervention mechanisms on agricultural markets and the adjustment of domestic solutions to EU law.

In the case of Georgia, projects approved involved such activities as: support of the processes of modernising the Georgian Border Police, the system of prisons in Georgia by the Polish Prison Service, employees of the Georgian public administration in the area of development of cooperation with the EU, the Georgian Ministry of Defence in order to increase its interoperability with NATO and public trust vis-à-vis NATO integration, as well as preparations for Euro-Atlantic integration.

Apart from that, in 2006 seven projects for Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Iraq, Angola and the Balkan states were approved (see Table 2). They concerned the support of: systemic and economic transition in Belarus (a project aimed at representatives of Belarusian public administration, legislative power, NGOs and business people); the restructuring of the agriculture and civil aviation sector in Kazakhstan (including adjustment of Kazakhstan's aviation supervision to international standards); the State Forestry Service of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan in implementing the forestation programme and of Convention on Climate Change; for Iraqi archaeologists (creation of a specialist library), as well as improving professional qualifications of employees of geological service in Angola in the area of modern technologies and working tools and effective management of mineral resources; finally, the support of European integration process in the Balkan states.

Moreover, the Ministry approved two projects which involved two countries at one time. The first one had the task of supporting systemic and economic transition processes in Moldova and Ukraine. The second one aimed at

transferring Polish experiences related to the adjustment of higher education system to EU standards to appropriate authorities in Belarus and Ukraine.

An important initiative was the Konstanty Kalinowski Scholarship Programme, launched in March 2006, aimed at Belarusian students, who “for the reasons of their involvement in the defence of democratic values have been expelled from universities in Belarus.” The programme is carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Science and Higher Education (Eastern Europe Studies of Warsaw University is the co-ordinator of the programme). Scholarships offered to Belarusian students allow them to continue their studies in Poland.

**Projects and tasks carried out by local administration units in 2006.** In this period, local administration units had—for the first time—a possibility to apply for project financing from assistance funds of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The financing could be granted for projects in foreign assistance and international development cooperation concerning Afghanistan, Angola, Belarus, Georgia, Iraq, Moldova, Ukraine, Vietnam, Russia, Central Asia and South Caucasus states and the Balkan states. The scope of assistance activities, outlined by the Ministry, encompassed, *inter alia*: institutional support for public and local administration, support for cross-border cooperation and local partnership, and support of economic transition, the agricultural sector and environmental protection. In the end, local administration units submitted only 12 project applications (Table 3). From among them, the Ministry approved 10 projects for further execution. Nine of them concerned assistance for Ukraine, which involved activities in the area of: strengthening local administration, regional development and the agricultural sector, cooperation between local administrations and cross-border cooperation, economic transition, and integration with EU structures.

An assistance project for Kyrgyzstan was also approved. It aimed at supporting the environmental protection sector in the area of implementing the partnership programme for sustainable energy development and the development of ecological districts.

Table 3

**The List of Project Applications in Foreign Assistance  
and International Development Cooperation Submitted by Local  
Government Units and of Applications Approved for Execution in 2006**

Country	Number of applications submitted	Number of applications approved	Applicant and title of the project
Ukraine	12	9	<p>City of Warsaw: "Cooperation of local governments as a catalyst for developing local democracy and building of civic society in partner cities of Eastern Europe"</p> <p>Marshal's Office of Małopolskie Voivodeship: "Development of investment potential of the Lviv Oblast—study visit and publishing of multimedia presentation 'Investment Offering of Lviv'"; "Support of the agricultural sector through the infrastructure of rural areas"</p> <p>Municipal Office of Łódź—Promotion, Tourism and Foreign Cooperation Bureau: "Partnership for Democracy"</p> <p>Marshal's Office of Dolnośląskie Voivodeship: "Local governmental meetings between Lower Silesia and Ukraine"</p> <p>Marshal's Office of Pomorskie Voivodeship: "Support for the institutional capabilities of employees of local administration in the Odessa Oblast in the area of development and implementation of cross-border projects through participation in an on-the-job training session in the Marshal's Office of Pomorskie Voivodeship"</p> <p>Marshal's Office of Lubelskie Voivodeship: "Local government of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Exchange of experiences between the Lubelskie Voivodeship and the Odessa Oblast"</p> <p>District Authorities in Lubaczów: "Cross-border cooperation in preventing the bad posture of children in the Jaworów Region"</p> <p>District Authorities in Słupca: "Poland-Ukraine. Common Past—Common Future"</p>
Kyrgyzstan	1	1	Raciechowice Municipality: "Model local partnership for sustainable energy development"
Russia	1	0	—
Total	14	10	—

Source: see Table 1.

It is worth noting that most of the local government units filed projects concerning cities, districts and regions with which they had been having long-term cooperation. This increases the chances of accurate knowledge of the partner's needs, and—as a result—effective assistance.

**Small Grants Fund.** The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also finances assistance undertakings from the so-called Small Grants Fund. Small projects are usually financed, such as a school renovation, purchase of PCs or well construction. It is Polish diplomatic posts that apply for the funds for these types of projects. Owing to that, Polish assistance can reach a larger group of countries, especially in Africa. Sometimes, the execution of such a project opens doors to further contacts in the area of politics, economy and culture.<sup>16</sup>

In 2005, projects financed from the Small Grants Fund were carried out in Senegal, Kenya, Rwanda, Zambia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Sierra Leone and Cambodia.

In 2006, on the other hand, the Small Grant Funds, beside African and Asian countries, also involved all the priority countries of the Polish assistance (i.e. Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Vietnam, Angola, the Palestinian Authority), the Balkan states and South Caucasus and Central Asia states.

### **Humanitarian Assistance**

Humanitarian assistance has an ad hoc nature, aimed at satisfying the basic needs of persons who have suffered as a result of disasters and military conflicts. In 2006, Poland focused its activities in this area on the aid given to victims of the military conflict between Israel and Hezbollah forces and of the 2006 earthquake in Indonesia.

The number of victims in the Indonesian earthquake exceeded 6,000 people. In response to the appeal of the authorities of this country for humanitarian aid, the Polish government made a decision to assign an amount of PLN 1 million for victims of the disaster. Polish assistance funds were transferred to organisations offering such an aid directly in Indonesia (i.e. to Indonesian Red Cross, United Nations Children's Fund, International Organisation for Migration, Polska Akcja Humanitarna). A Polish medical team with a field clinic were also sent to the place of the tragedy.

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<sup>16</sup> Informacja..., p. 13.

The Polish humanitarian aid for Indonesia was co-ordinated by National Centre for Co-ordination of Rescue and Civil Protection.

In early August 2006, Poland handed over an amount of PLN 1 million as humanitarian assistance for Lebanon, which was spent on necessity goods. Later, at the conference of donor states for Lebanon on 31 August 2006, it declared its will to give further support for the people of this country and committed itself to assign a further PLN 4 million. These funds were spent on activities aimed at ensuring temporary shelters for the people and on the removal of mines and unexploded bombs left after the conflict. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs financed other undertakings of this type as well, e.g. the visit of Lebanese children to Poland.

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There is no doubt that the idea of cooperation for development is a good cause and it is worth supporting. Developmental discrepancies in the global economy do not have to be a source of conflict and misunderstanding. It may constitute a pro-growth incentive for both developing and developed countries. It requires, however, the development of adequate assistance mechanisms, permanent cooperation between countries and appropriate identification of mutual needs. Bilateral projects described above seem to provide a very good introduction to the development of further cooperation with partner countries, building a positive image of Poland in the world and mutual understanding between states.

#### Annex

#### **NGO Projects Approved for Execution by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2006**

Title of the project	Area	Organisation executing the project
<b>Afghanistan</b>		
Reconstruction and development of an operating bloc in Mazar-e-Sharif	Healthcare	Stowarzyszenie Polska Misja Medyczna
Construction of a school complex and water reservoirs in Afghanistan	Access to drinkable water	Stowarzyszenie "Szkoły dla Pokoju"
Easier access to drinkable water for inhabitants of the Kapisa Province in Afghanistan	Access to drinkable water	Polska Akcja Humanitarna

Title of the project	Area	Organisation executing the project
<b>Angola</b>		
Education, prevention, diagnostics and care of people with HIV/AIDS/TB among inhabitants of Kifangondo in Angola	Healthcare	Centrum Animacji Misyjnej Księży Werbistów
<b>Armenia</b>		
Civic society—opportunity and challenge. Institutional support of NGOs in Armenia	Civic society, NGOs	Fundacja Aktywności Obywatelskiej
Implementation of the Polish experience in the training of journalists in Armenia—“Independent media”	Information access, free media	Fundacja Solidarności Polsko-Czesko-Słowackiej
Study visit to Poland of youth club representatives from Armenia	Democratisation	Fundacja Inicjatyw Międzynarodowych i Obywatelskich “Centrum Europy”
<b>Azerbaijan</b>		
Strengthening of field structures of the Azerbaijan Red Crescent through the participation approach in developing local communities	Equal rights of women	Polski Czerwony Krzyż
<b>Belarus</b>		
“Flying School”—study visit of the Belarusian Humanistic High School in Krzyżowa	Cross-border cooperation	Foundation “Krzyżowa dla Porozumienia Europejskiego”
Belarusian Publishing Project	Information access, free media	Kolegium Europy Wschodniej in Wrocław
Support for civic sector activities in Belarus	Democratisation	Europejski Dom Spotkań—Fundacja Nowy Staw
School of social animators in Belarus	Democratisation	Bełchatowskie Stowarzyszenie Samorządowe “Plus”
Support of the development of SMEs in Belarus through an improved climate for entrepreneurship and strengthening of the business infrastructure	Development of SMEs	CASE—Centrum Analiz Społeczno-Ekonomicznych—Fundacja Naukowa
“Be active!”—Belarusian School of Local Leaders	Democratisation	Stowarzyszenie “Szkoła Liderów”



Title of the project	Area	Organisation executing the project
Europeinform	Information access, free media	Fundacja Centrum Twórczości Narodowej
Training for journalists of the independent Belarusian local press	Information access, free media	Fundacja Centrum Prasowe dla Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej
The geopolitical place of Belarus in Europe and the world	Information access, free media	Wyższa Szkoła Handlu i Prawa im. Ryszarda Łazarskiego in Warsaw
Development of centres of local democracy support in Belarus	Democratisation	Fundacja Europejski Instytut na rzecz Demokracji
Belarusian School of Journalism 2006. Project combined with specialist training for candidates for the positions of spokespersons	Information access, free media	Fundacja Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych
Support of independent publishing activities in Belarus	Information access, free media	Białoruskie Stowarzyszenie im. Roberta Schumana
Information Centre "Infobel@rus"	Information access, free media	Fundacja "Wolność i Demokracja"
"A weekend in Poland"—weekend study visits of young Belarusians in Poland	Information access, free media	Klub Inteligencji Katolickiej
Civic Belarus—local activity as a way of strengthening civic society	Democratisation	Wschodnioeuropejskie Centrum Demokratyczne
Workshops for young Belarusians on the "role of street art in building democracy"	Information access, free media	Stowarzyszenie "Pomarańczowa Alternatywa"
The Belarusian Underground—Musical Forum of Independent Belarus	Democratisation	Białoruskie Zrzeszenie Studentów
Club of Journalists Poland-Belarus	Information access, free media	Centrum Edukacji Obywatelskiej Polska-Białoruś
Experience of local NGOs in Poland on the basis of activities of the Regional European Information Centre Network—perspectives for Belarus	Democratisation	Stowarzyszenie "Towarzystwo Amicus"
Development of an economic education system and credit unions in support of SMEs	Development of SMEs	Wyższa Szkoła Finansów i Administracji in Gdańsk

Title of the project	Area	Organisation executing the project
Open Educational Project “EuroUniver”	Euro-Atlantic integration	Towarzystwo Edukacyjne “Wiedza Powszechna”
Regional tourism—opportunity for local development in Belarus. Training for local activists	Democratisation	Fundacja Rozwoju Demokracji Lokalnej—Training Centre in Szczecin
Easier together—internship programme for young Belarusian democrats	Democratisation	Fundacja Instytut Studiów Strategicznych
Support of the independent regional press in Belarus	Information access, free media	Wschodnioeuropejskie Centrum Demokratyczne
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia</b>		
Common Voice	Local government	Wyższa Szkoła Europejska im. ks. Józefa Tischnera w Krakowie
<b>Montenegro</b>		
Integration—European development direction for Montenegro	Local government	Fundacja Rozwoju Demokracji Lokalnej—Małopolski Instytut Samorządu Terytorialnego i Administracji
It can be difficult for you, too—let’s make this process easier, i.e. a study visit of representatives of administration and environmental NGOs from Montenegro in Polish institutions supporting European integration	Strengthening of administration structures	Fundacja Instytut na rzecz Ekorozwoju
<b>Georgia</b>		
The rolling stone gathers no moss... Support of civic society institutions in Georgia	Democratisation	Fundacja Aktywności Obywatelskiej
Civic Caucasus	Democratisation	Wyższa Szkoła Europejska im. ks. Józefa Tischnera w Krakowie
Ossetia-Georgia-Poland. Good practices in cooperation with minorities and in solving social conflicts—the example of Poland	After-conflict rehabilitation	Towarzystwo Demokratyczne Wschód
Let’s clean up Georgia—environment protection in a big city	Local government	Polska Fundacja im. Roberta Schumana
Agrotourism at Kists’ in Pankisi	Democratisation	Fundacja Edukacji Międzykulturowej

Title of the project	Area	Organisation executing the project
Better informed inhabitants—better relation of authorities with the local community	Local government	Stowarzyszenie “Partnerzy dla Samorządu”
<b>Iraq</b>		
Water infrastructure development—construction of water treatment station in the Babil Province	Public utility infrastructure	Polska Akcja Humanitarna
<b>Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan</b>		
Support of independent local press in the Fergana Valley and in the Talas Province	Information access, free media	Wschodnioeuropejskie Centrum Demokratyczne
<b>Kosovo</b>		
Development of the economic activity of women in the Dukagjini Region	Development of SMEs	Fundacja “Partners” Polska
<b>Moldova</b>		
Voluntary work across borders. Support of NGOs in Moldova through the development of voluntary work	Civic society, NGOs	Fundacja Aktywności Obywatelskiej
The Academy of Local Government on the banks of the Dniester	Local government	Fundacja Rozwoju Demokracji Lokalnej—Małopolski Instytut Samorządu Terytorialnego i Administracji
The third sector as a foundation of civic society—internship programme for young employees of NGOs in Moldova	Civic society, NGOs	Fundacja Instytut Studiów Strategicznych
Support of a model partnership for sustainable development	Local government	Stowarzyszenie Gmin Polska “Sieć Energie Cités”
Polish assistance in reforming rural areas and agriculture in Moldova through the support of the development of Moldovan agricultural advisory institutions	Free market economy	Fundacja Programów Pomocy dla Rolnictwa (FAPA)
Together for development. Strengthening civic society institutions in Moldova on the basis of the Polish development of cooperation between local government and NGOs	Local government	Fundacja “Terra Humana”

Title of the project	Area	Organisation executing the project
Projections of future economic relations between Moldova and the European Union	Strengthening of administration structures	CASE—Centrum Analiz Społeczno-Ekonomicznych —Fundacja Naukowa
Helpful knowledge	Civic society, NGOs	Polski Czerwony Krzyż
Polish curator in Moldova	Strengthening of administration structures	Polskie Stowarzyszenie Edukacji Prawnej
Study programme for Moldovan public policy analysts	Civic society, NGOs	Fundacja Instytut Spraw Publicznych
Support of the human and technical potential of credit unions in Moldova through developing the financial education system for building a market economy	Free market economy	Wyższa Szkoła Finansów i Administracji in Gdańsk
The role of the local government and NGOs in building civic society—study visits from Moldova	Democratisation	Centrum Współpracy Młodzieży
<b>The Palestinian Authority</b>		
Improvement of water supply for Palestinian schools in the Bethlehem District	Access to drinkable water	Polska Akcja Humanitarna
Expansion of water supply network in Idhna city, Hebron Governorate	Public utility infrastructure	Polska Akcja Humanitarna
New faces of drama	Education	Stowarzyszenie Teatralno-Edukacyjne “Wybrzeżak”
<b>Russia</b>		
Polish-Russian School of International Journalism	Information access, free media	Toruńska Szkoła Wyższa
Education as a way to democracy. Support of NGO leaders as a factor stimulating the development of civic society in the Russian Federation	Civic society, NGOs	Fundacja “Terra Humana”
Civic society and local initiatives in practice. The Polish experience	Local government	Fundacja Instytut Studiów Wschodnich

Title of the project	Area	Organisation executing the project
Seminar on public administration and local government reform in Poland for students of the Moscow School of Political Studies	Local government	Collegium Civitas in Warsaw
Exchange of experiences and training of academic teachers and students of the Ecology Department of Chechen State University in Grozny through the common evaluation of water projects of Polska Akcja Humanitarna in Chechnya	Access to drinkable water	Polska Akcja Humanitarna
Integration of youth NGOs in southern oblasts of the Russian Federation	Civic society, NGOs	Wschodnioeuropejskie Centrum Demokratyczne
Support of local NGOs in activities for developing tenant communities and the tenant rights movement in Russia—on the basis of the Polish experience	Local government	Fundacja Rozwoju Demokracji Lokalnej
The school as a centre of civic activities	Civic society, NGOs	Spoleczno-Oswiatowe Stowarzyszenie Pomocy Pokrzywdzonym i Niepełnosprawnym "Edukator" in Łomża
Conference of consumer credit co-operatives of natural persons and their role in solving social and economic problems of the region and in combating poverty. The contemporary experiences of Poland and Russia	Free market economy	Wyższa Szkoła Finansów i Administracji in Gdańsk
Building of the institutional potential of NGOs in the Kaliningrad Oblast for partnership in Polish-Russian cross-border cooperation	Cross-border cooperation	Elbląskie Stowarzyszenie Wspierania Inicjatyw Pozarządowych
<b>Serbia</b>		
The Świętokrzyskie voivodeship for Serbia—best practices of the local government	Local government	Świętokrzyskie Centrum Fundacji Rozwoju Demokracji Lokalnej
<b>Tajikistan</b>		
Monitoring of presidential elections in Tajikistan	Democratisation	Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego

Title of the project	Area	Organisation executing the project
<b>Ukraine</b>		
Professional administration and effective office as a showpiece of the city. Seminars and study visits for representatives of the Ukrainian administration in Wrocław	Local government	Fundacja "Krzyżowa dla Porozumienia Europejskiego"
The Polish experience of local government—a seminar and internships for employees of Ukrainian local government	Local government	Kolegium Europy Wschodniej
Disabledness is what we have in common—programme of support of Ukrainian organisations working in the area of disabledness	Equal rights, inclusion of women	Chelmskie Stowarzyszenie na rzecz Integracji Osób Niepełnosprawnych ze Środowiskiem "O godne życie"
A course of social entrepreneurship for young people entering the labour market	Free market economy	Fundacja "Szczęśliwe Dzieciństwo"
A transparent local government in Ukraine—education of the Ukrainian local government in the modern management of public administration	Local government	Fundacja Rozwoju Demokracji Lokalnej—Regional Centre in Lublin
Support for initiatives of the exchange of young people in Ukraine	Cross-border cooperation	Europejski Dom Spotkań—Fundacja Nowy Staw
Roztocze—cross-border region of development	Cross-border cooperation	Wyższa Szkoła Administracji i Zarządzania in Zamość
European School of Local Government	Euro-Atlantic integration	Centrum Promocji i Rozwoju Inicjatyw Obywatelskich "Opus"
Support of the partnership between social organisations and the administration of Ukraine in creating the concept of mountain tourism development	Environmental protection	Polskie Towarzystwo Turystyczno-Krajoznawcze—Centralny Ośrodek Turystyki Górskiej PTTK in Cracow
Ukraine should be transparent—an autumn school for leaders of local communities and local media journalists from eastern Ukraine	Local government	Fundacja Kultury Chrześcijańskiej "Znak"

Title of the project	Area	Organisation executing the project
Ukraine has its voice! The partnership of NGOs and media in monitoring the process of building a civic society in Ukraine	Access to information, free media	Fundacja "CracoVitalia"
Europe in school	Euro-Atlantic organisation	Małopolskie Forum Europejskie
Professionalisation of environmentalist NGOs in western Ukraine	Environmental protection	Polski Klub Ekologiczny—Zarząd Główny
Closer Europe—Polish-Ukrainian workshops	Euro-Atlantic integration	Instytut Integracji Europejskiej—Instytut Kościuszki
What does NATO membership mean? Polish experiences in the Euro-Atlantic integration process	Euro-Atlantic integration	Instytut Integracji Europejskiej—Instytut Kościuszki
Dura lex, sed lex	Cross-border cooperation	Małopolskie Towarzystwo Oświatowe
Establishment of CSS in Ukraine	Civic society, NGOs	Stowarzyszenie BORIS (Biuro Obsługi Inicjatyw Społecznych)
Ukrainian School of NGO Leaders	Civic society, NGOs	Stowarzyszenie "Szkoła Liderów"
Cooperation, citizen, development—the experience of the Polish local government and NGOs as a factor stimulating the development of civic society in Ukraine	Local government	Caritas Diecezji Warszawsko-Praskiej
Together to Europe—school exchanges between Poland and Ukraine	Cross-border cooperation	Polska Fundacja im. Roberta Schumana
Support of private regional news press in eastern Ukraine	Access to information, free media	Wschodnioeuropejskie Centrum Demokratyczne
Together—youth exchange—school partners	Education	Fundacja Współpracy Polsko-Ukraińskiej PAUCI
Overcoming non-tariff barriers to the development of Ukrainian exports to the EU	Development of SMEs	CASE—Centrum Analiz Społeczno-Ekonomicznych—Fundacja Naukowa

Title of the project	Area	Organisation executing the project
Our Bieszczady—support of the process of institutional and social protection and the promotion of the mountain areas of Ukrainian Bieszczady as mountains that are interesting from the point of view of tourism, nature and culture	Cross-border cooperation	Stowarzyszenie “Klub Otrycki”
Support of the economic transition of Ukraine through the development of ICT technology education—the e-economy	Free market economy	Polsko-Japońska Wyższa Szkoła Technik Komputerowych w Warszawie
Study visit with elements of training for representatives of Ukrainian NGOs and student self-government	Civic society, NGOs	Fundacja Inicjatyw Międzynarodowych i Obywatelskich “Centrum Europy”
Preparation of local administration and the Regional Development Agency for the debate on the reform of local government and decentralisation of the state in Ukraine	Local government	Wschodnioeuropejskie Centrum Demokratyczne
Ukraine on its way to the European Union	Euro-Atlantic integration	Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego
Płast—development on the basis of the Polish experience	Civic society, NGOs	Związek Harcerstwa Polskiego
Eco-construction—energy-saving and ecologic construction in economic transition	Development of SMEs	Stowarzyszenie na rzecz Innowacyjności i Transferu Technologii “Horyzonty”
Building a civic community of the regions of southeastern Ukraine, in the area of European and Euro-Atlantic integration based on the example of activities of Regional European Information Centres Network	Euro-Atlantic integration	“Amicus” society
The role of private education institutions in civic society. A conference with the participation of Polish and Ukrainian MPs, representatives of the local government, education authorities and Odessa region schools (public and private)	Local government	Gdańska Fundacja Oświatowa



Title of the project	Area	Organisation executing the project
Building a security system and protection of deposits in Ukrainian credit unions	Free market economy	Wyższa Szkoła Finansów i Administracji in Gdańsk
The role of local government and NGOs in building a civic society—study visits from Ukraine	Local government	Centrum Współpracy Młodzieży
Social partnership in environmental planning and management on the local level—training programme	Local government	Kaszubski Uniwersytet Ludowy
Environment-friendly agriculture in support of sustainable development	Environmental protection	Polski Klub Ekologiczny—Koło Miejsce in Gliwice
Building civic society with our own hands	Local government	Centrum Kształcenia i Dialogu “Theotokos”
From Ukraine to a united Europe—improving the quality of the way schools work	European integration	Świętokrzyskie Centrum Fundacji Rozwoju Demokracji Lokalnej
Polish-Ukrainian academy of youth societies a “New Tomorrow”	Civic society, NGOs	Stowarzyszenie “Tratwa”
Improving the capabilities of regional administration in Ukraine in the strategic management of the region	Local government	Stowarzyszenie Organizatorów Ośrodków Innowacji i Przedsiębiorczości w Polsce
rsid11417668 Ukraine on its way to European Union—European workshops	Euro-Atlantic integration	Wyższa Szkoła Administracji Publicznej w Szczecinie

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

## **Poland in the UN Human Rights Council**

The establishment of the Human Rights Council was to be one of the key elements in the process of the United Nations reform. Poland joined the group of proponents of the solution. Replacement by the new UN intergovernmental body of the Human Rights Commission, operating since 1946 and commonly criticised in the last years of its existence (for the lack of proper response to cases of mass and aggravated human rights violations, and for excessive focus on the political aspect in its actions, as well as for using double standards), was to restore the credibility of the UN system of human rights protection, and the image of the institution itself.

Irrespective of the unanimous decision reached in the Final Document on the establishment of the Human Rights Council<sup>1</sup> by the UN Summit of heads of states and governments, held in September 2005 in New York, several months of negotiations held by the Chairman of the UN General Assembly, Jan Eliasson, revealed marked differences in perceptions on the role of the future Council. Slow pace of negotiations, sometimes even delaying them, was largely due to the resistance of states that were not convinced of the idea of an effective and smoothly operating UN body, established to monitor the status of observing human rights worldwide. Not only were many of the proposals made (e.g. withdrawal of the resolutions criticising the status of human rights adherence in individual countries) at variance with the spirit of the reform, but even weakened the Council's mandate in comparison with the mandate of the then-existing Human Rights Commission. It turned out that the UN reforms, even within a single sector, namely human rights, cannot be separated from the dominant political and geographical divides. Fundamental issues, such as the number of the Council members, mode of their appointment, division of seats among regional groups, membership requirements (criteria and obligations that should be met by applicant countries), passing by the Council of resolutions related to

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\* Mirosław Łuczka—Deputy Director at the MFA Department of the United Nations System and Global Problems.

<sup>1</sup> Resolution of the UN General Assembly No. 60/1: 2005 World Summit Outcome, items 157–160.

the status of human rights observance in individual countries; the number of sessions and total working time of the Council in a year—all these stirred controversy, and not all of them were successfully resolved at that stage of negotiations.

Expectations of the Polish government towards the Council were specified in its position on the supremacy of universal, inherent human rights, in its acknowledgement of the principle of humanitarian intervention in international relations (save for the exceptionality and finality of its application), and protests against using the principle of state sovereignty and non-interference with its internal affairs for impudent violations of rights of the state's own citizens. Poland declared itself in favour of the establishment of a strong Human Rights Council, that could effectively counteract all cases of human rights violation in the world. The Council, conceptually a body more efficient than the Commission, should, however, take over and carry forward many of the latter's functions and actions (including cooperation with non-governmental organisations, and the system of special reporters working on the situation in individual countries where the status of human rights adherence raises serious concerns).

As argued by Poland and many other states, the significance of the Summit decision on the establishment of the Human Rights Council required its appointment as a UN main body. This would increase the importance of human rights in the UN system, as it would become one of three pillars of the UN operation, next to security and development. However, in the face of vehement resistance from some states, the Council will only be an auxiliary body of the General Assembly. Under such circumstances, the incorporation of a clause providing for assessment of the Council's operation after 5 years should result in a decision on raising its status. As a permanent body, the Council should meet regularly and at short intervals, and its mandate should allow e.g. responding in sudden emergency situations related to blatant cases of human rights violations (limited potential to act is a serious weakness of the UN system of human rights protection). Therefore, the provisions of the resolution establishing the Human Rights Council,<sup>2</sup> determining time brackets for its discussions at no less than 10 weeks, with at least 3 sessions held annually, should be viewed as a necessary minimum from Poland's standpoint.

Poland opted for voting for members of the Council by a majority of two-thirds and rejected the proposal for regional groups' internal arrangements

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<sup>2</sup> Resolution of the UN General Assembly, no. 60/251.

on submitting candidates in the number equal to the number of seats assigned to a given group, and abandoning voting altogether. According to the Polish position, voting is the only way to participate in the Human Rights Council. This solution would improve the quality of the membership in the Council. States that make serious infringements on human rights, and fail to demonstrate good will in solving those problems and developing international cooperation in this respect, should have limited possibilities to enter the Council. The number of members is undoubtedly of importance for proper operation of any institutional body. The proposal for universal membership in the Council, correct at first glance, would lead to the political aspect holding sway and, as a consequence, to paralysing the work of the Council. However, a significant reduction in the number of members in the Council, compared against the membership in the Human Rights Commission, stood no chance of approval. Therefore, the adopted solution should be linked with higher requirements for states that aspire for membership. They should assume voluntary commitments to raise human rights protection standards and submit their implementation for review. These proposals were partially taken into account in points 8 and 9 of Resolution 60/251.

The decision on submitting Poland as a candidate to the Human Rights Council did not arouse any controversies. Protection and promotion of human rights have been permanent and important fixtures in Polish foreign policy. This primarily results from the experience of modern history (e.g. international solidarity and pressure had their role in the collapse of the communist system, and opened up opportunities for democratic transformations in Poland), and the membership in the European Union, for which human rights are one of the most important issues in its relations with third countries. Since point 8 of the resolution establishing the Human Rights Council provides for presenting by candidate states their voluntary commitments in the area of human rights protection, the following justification was presented in the application documents for Poland as a candidate:

1. Poland is party to all six most important conventions on human rights protection and additional protocols to those conventions. It cooperates actively with all treaty bodies that monitor the state's compliance with the provisions of those conventions (e.g. drafts periodical reports on a given subject and approves competencies of the proper, independent expert committees on examining individual complaints).

2. Already in 2001, Poland, as one of 40 states, presented the so-called Standing Invitations for all special procedures of the then Human Rights

Commission. This means that the government automatically accepts every requests of the special reporter for a visit to our country, and commits itself to full cooperation and provision of any help required in his or her performance of duties.

Poland also undertook in the same document to:

- implement the provisions of world conferences on human rights (e.g. combating HIV/AIDS consequences, rights of women and children, as well as preventing racism);
- broaden cooperation with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and other competent UN agencies;
- continue to make voluntary payments towards programmes implemented by the office of the High Commissioner.

The first vote on the membership in the Human Rights Council, held on 9 May 2006 in New York, proved a success for Poland. Although as many as 14 states competed for 6 seats assigned to Eastern Europe region, our country received the required majority of votes in the first voting round already. A worrying development was that competition was present in only one more group—the West. Sweeping majority of the UN member states stand for pre-voting regional arrangements that ensure safe and regular acquisition of the membership status, whereas the voting procedure should, as intended by authors of the reform, secure the Council against the presence of states that seriously infringe on human rights. The vote, treated as a test for the above solutions, failed to bring clear-cut outcomes. On the one hand, some states that received negative assessment from the international public opinion did not take part in the vote, or did not receive sufficient support. On the other, however, other states, thanks to their strong political backing, easily won membership in the new Council.

The operation of the Human Rights Council in its first few months failed to live up to initial expectations. Solving procedural and organisational issues as well as preparing foundations for the future work of the Council (the resolution establishing the body failed to regulate in detail the ways of working, regulations, etc.) dominated the course of subsequent sessions, leaving little time to matters of real substance. Few decisions only (e.g. adoption of the Convention against Enforced Disappearances or Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples) were the outcome of previous work.

A worrying message was convening special sessions to examine the situation in the occupied Palestinian territories. One of the proposals on appointing a new

body to monitor the observance of human rights worldwide was linked with ensuring flexible and immediate response capabilities for that body. However, as argued by the majority of observers, the states that initiated the Palestinian topic carried the debate in the Council to a point where it became strictly political, thus repeating the no-longer-desired operational mode of the dissolved Human Rights Commission, which essentially undermined the purpose of the reform. A special session on the situation in Darfur, held towards the end of 2006, offered some hope for proper direction for the Human Rights Council's work, as the decision was made to send the Council's special mission there. Notwithstanding problems with realising the mandate for this mission (no consent from Sudan's authorities to enter the conflict zone), this proves that it is possible to identify problems that build broader coalitions in the Council. Poland has always emphasised that the Council's success depends on the ability to overcome regional divides and to look for partners among states that can be convinced of the vision of the Council as a body restoring credibility in the UN and designed to protect human rights worldwide in an effective manner.

**IV.**

**Views on Polish Foreign Policy**





## Polish Foreign Policy in the Domestic Press

Even a brief look at the bibliography of the Polish foreign policy of 2006 indicates that the debate on the issue was most vigorous if not stormy. The high dynamics of the public debate is accompanied by the low recognition of its state.<sup>1</sup>

A hypothesis could be adopted that press column writing, including opinions on topical issues, important from the social viewpoint, interpreted and assessed in order to shape public opinion, is a certain image of the public discourse. Without disputing the opinion that “public discourse to a certain extent reflects and contributes to the relationships between the entities shaping the foreign policy in a direct manner;”<sup>2</sup> press publications must not be treated as an observatory of views on foreign policy. Also researching the public debate from the perspective of experts usually distorts its view. Media often participate in the political fight, and consequently research of the press for the influence of public debate on the political position of the state and its foreign policy should be of multidimensional character and to the greatest possible extent take into account both factors and conditions determining the creation of a press work (as well as the very process of creation), the opinions voiced therein, as well as their context and social circulation and the function of the opinions.<sup>3</sup>

Analysts and political scientists usually focus on the analysis of the opinions with direct political or ideological implications, whereas deeper genealogy of the text and its social function are frequently treated as marginal, unless the press work is directly accused of being embroiled in politics, not necessarily connected with its substance or contents. Deeper research of the connections between the shape of the state policy (also foreign) and the press discourse seems to require the application of the directive formed by Andrzej Paczkowski for a different purpose as “the need to use ‘total analysis,’ go beyond the

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<sup>1</sup> As indicated by R. Stemplowski in: *Wprowadzenie do analizy polityki zagranicznej RP*, Warszawa, 2006, p. 187.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 188.

<sup>3</sup> A. Paczkowski, “Badania historyczno-prasowe w zastosowaniu do badań nad dziejami myśli politycznej,” in: *Na warsztatach historyków polskiej myśli politycznej*, Wrocław, 1980, pp. 9–10.

exegesis of verbal constructions used in opinions of ideological and political character, and include the wide range of contexts and conditions, both those relating to the origin of the communications and their circulation.”<sup>4</sup>

In the conditions of fierce political fight media cease to be “observers” of politics. The statement of Marcin Król, made in June 2005, still seems to hold true: “Media, which do nothing but antagonize, fundamentally fail to perform their basic task, i.e. to provide reliable information.”<sup>5</sup> For the purpose of this text, I wish to disregard the heuristic level of press statements and focus on reviewing the political journalism on the following planes: persuasive, explanatory, analytical and that of propaganda. The postulate of “total analysis” presented above, due to the large scope of the subject and the necessarily brief character of this study, is satisfied herein only to the extent necessary for the general sketch of certain characteristics of the public discourse, relating to those issues present in the Polish foreign policy which were most often discussed by journalists.

### **The End of Consensuality. The Changed Style of Politics and Public Discourse**

In the early 2003 the general acceptance of the Polish political class for the government actions regarding foreign policy could still be observed.<sup>6</sup> This consensuality, visible in the behaviours of actors directly shaping the foreign policy, translated also to the attitudes of the public opinion and the shape of the public discourse. This resulted from the agreement on the direction of the Polish foreign policy as a part of the political transformation of the state, connected with Poland’s joining NATO and the EU. The degree of this unanimity, closely connected with the degree of generality present in the opinions on the purposes of the economic transformation and integration, dropped successively as Poland’s accession to the EU drew closer.<sup>7</sup> The necessity to take increasingly specific steps regarding Poland’s presence in the EU and NATO was bound to lead to progressing differentiation on attitudes, particularly as the opinion that the foreign policy of the III Republic of Poland was tailored well above the

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<sup>4</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 21.

<sup>5</sup> M. Król, “Media judzą,” *Tygodnik Powszechny* of 19 June 2005; quoted after: R. Stemplowski, *op.cit.*, p. 194.

<sup>6</sup> See B. Wizimirska, “Polityka zagraniczna w debacie publicznej,” *Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 2004*, p. 51.

<sup>7</sup> R. Stemplowski, *op.cit.*, p. 188.

available means in a masterly way, as our accession to the Euro-Atlantic structures proved, was in fact never commonly shared.<sup>8</sup>

The acute need to reform the state, growing during the rule of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) (2001–2005) was connected with a critical reflection on the achievements of the III Republic of Poland, also in foreign policy. The victory of Law and Justice (PiS) in the parliamentary and Presidential elections of 2005 was accompanied by numerous commentaries on the necessity of changes in this area. A statement of a political journalist, who claimed that the “passive” or “harmful” policies of the former cabinets were due to “Poland’s being anchored in the Western world, the unquestioned success, looks like an elegant tailcoat in the wardrobe of someone who never goes to parties”<sup>9</sup> seems most characteristic. Law and Justice advocated the programme of firm defence of Polish national interests. President Lech Kaczyński explained that “a certain softness of the Polish former elites, which to a large extent treated the path to the European Union as a way to preserve their domination in the economic and political life, must be replaced by a readiness to defend the Polish interests in a more definite way.”<sup>10</sup> Although the achievements such as Poland’s membership in the EU and NATO, good relations with neighbours and support for the democratic changes in Ukraine were not questioned, the new Polish political elites decided that the existing manner of pursuing the foreign policy did not match new challenges (such voices could be heard both from the PiS circles and the Civil Platform (PO)—a member of the opposition<sup>11</sup>). Right-wing political columnists often indicated the need for a different approach to foreign and European policy, more assertive and firm, particularly on the EU forum. Some intellectuals also believed that the necessity to change the style of the presidency was obvious, as the “conciliatory style and Teflon-like softness” manifested by President Kwaśniewski “had long ceased to be a policy helping us effectively pursue our interests.”<sup>12</sup>

The concept of “toughening” our foreign policy was criticized as a limitation of its room for manoeuvre. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs Krzysztof

<sup>8</sup> See R. Bobrowski, “O polityce zagranicznej Polski lat 1989–2006,” *Przegląd Środkowo-europejski*, 2006, no. 43/44, pp. 7–12.

<sup>9</sup> J. M. Nowakowski, “Cztery pogrzeby i wesele,” *Wprost* of 25 September 2005.

<sup>10</sup> “Historia stosowana. Z Lechem Kaczyńskim, Prezydentem RP, rozmawia Andrzej Nowak,” *Arcana*, 2006, no. 4–5, p. 16.

<sup>11</sup> See e.g. J. Saryusz-Wolski, “Zagrajmy w europejskiej pierwszej lidze,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 11 January 2006.

<sup>12</sup> Z. Krasnodębski, “Polski kompleks zagraniczny,” *Wprost* of 30 April 2006.

Skubiszewski opposed: “There is no choice between a ‘tough’ and ‘soft’ foreign policy. Such policy is supposed to be effective.”<sup>13</sup> The criticism of the foreign policy of the III Republic of Poland raised deep objections of some authors, nostalgic about the times of consensuality. For instance, Aleksander Smolar emphasized that those times had ended during the electoral campaign, “when the whole period of the III Republic of Poland was brutally attacked, along with its foreign policy,” but also before. The temporary consensus over the slogan “Nice or death” was already regarded by Smolar as the “beginning of neo-nationalism in the foreign policy, with effects visible today.”<sup>14</sup> In his opinion the announcements of “tough defence of national interests” excluded “consideration for common interests of the EU.” On the other hand, his opponents claimed that this was an anachronistic manner of thinking in the face of the increasing re-nationalization of the policies of large EU states, particularly Germany and France.

Some columnists were ready to admit that an understanding between the right and left wings was no longer possible with regard to the main directions of the Polish foreign policy. Particularly left-wing journalists advocated an opinion that the dispute over the European policy was transforming into a rivalry of different visions—the right wing criticizing the federal and social EU model and regarding it as a threat to the sovereignty and a battlefield of national particularisms, and the left wing advocating the tightest possible integration and failing to see a contradiction between the national and European interests.<sup>15</sup> The debate on the Polish policy within the EU indicated, however, that the dichotomy was not justified.

### Policy within the EU

The success in the negotiations of the New Financial Perspective for 2007–2013, achieved in the early 2006, had a positive impact on the opinions of the foreign policy of the Polish government. It calmed the observers, ready to see a burden for the Polish activities on the EU forum in the platform announcements of PiS, and to those hopeful with regard to the policy of the party it confirmed the opinion that the policy had successfully gone through the “European baptism of fire.” The reserve with which the political elites of the EU Member States had approached the new cabinet in Poland decreased, which was positively received by many Polish commentators. Some admitted that the Prime

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<sup>13</sup> K. Skubiszewski, “Nieobecni się nie liczą,” *Rzeczpospolita* of 17 April 2006.

<sup>14</sup> A. Smolar, “Polityka chorobliwie nieudolna,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 10 July 2006.

<sup>15</sup> S. Popowski, “Dyplomacja (bez)partyjna,” *Rzeczpospolita* of 19 August 2006; M. Syska, “Europa to nie układ,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 8 August 2006.

Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz enjoyed a “surprisingly favourable<sup>16</sup> opinion” in Europe, yet, nevertheless, it was often claimed that the image of Poland was adversely affected by some of the actions, thus strengthening the stereotype of a government with an unfavourable attitude towards European integration and with no experience in European issues.

On 31 January Poland was the only state not to consent to the application of lower VAT rates.<sup>17</sup> The opposition press indicated that the tactic of the Polish party in negotiations was affected by individual departmental actions, which resulted in a crisis “completely unnecessary and incomprehensible for Poland’s partners.”<sup>18</sup> The ineffective, though full of “dignified stubbornness” attempts to block the reform of the European sugar market undertaken by the Polish Minister of Agriculture, Kazimierz Jurgiel, were also criticized. Many commentators in Poland also found it hard to comprehend the dispute which the Polish government entered with the Italian bank UniCredito, questioning the decision of the European Commission on issuing the consent regarding the merger of two large Polish banks. Particularly in the latter case Polish authorities failed to present their arguments in a convincing manner, due to which critical notes prevailed in press comments. Commentators emphasized that “multiplying controversies” weakened Poland’s position in the EU and its future negotiation possibilities, and the disputes proved that Poland had difficulty building a coalition and convincing other states to accept its arguments.

Observers perceived the activities as an emanation of the “indomitable attitude” in the international arena, announced by PiS. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Stefan Meller, distancing himself from the rhetoric, on 1 April published an article in which he criticized the “absolutization of the principle of national egoism” and the instrumental manner in which the European integration was treated. In his opinion, “this type of mental attitude, transferred into the area of political diagnoses and actions, leads straight to the Machiavellization of international relations,” which may result in Poland’s suffering losses, as it would lead it to the (self-)isolation and clientelism, clad in the attire of “national

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<sup>16</sup> J. Żakowski, “Kwiatek żegna się z kozuchem,” *Polityka* of 15 April 2006.

<sup>17</sup> The objection towards the more favourable taxation of five types of labour intensive services until 2010 resulted from the Polish postulates being rejected, as it demanded similar regulations for itself, also with regard to construction services.

<sup>18</sup> In the opinion of the government veto was agreed upon with the Council of Ministers, and the delay resulting from the activities of the Polish party did not exceed 48 hours, while Poland’s objections have been consistently presented since mid-2003. Letter from the government’s spokesman to the editor of *Polityka* of 21 April 2006 ([www.kprm.gov.pl/16904\\_16353.html](http://www.kprm.gov.pl/16904_16353.html)).

interest.”<sup>19</sup> Similar appeals for “enlightened egoism” were also later made by e.g. Roman Kuźniar, who wrote: “The EU is a European public good, which should be cherished out of egoism, if nothing else, if we have not been blessed with the gift of faith ‘in Europe.’”<sup>20</sup>

As Minister S. Meller resigned, negative publicity became more intense. *Gazeta Wyborcza* published opinions claiming that “the Polish foreign policy, particularly European, has lost its direction”<sup>21</sup> and that the concepts of PiS regarding foreign policy had suffered “complete defeat.”<sup>22</sup> Although the greatest critics were ready to admit that “PiS has withdrawn from many elements of its nationalist heroics,” and its policy “is much less confrontational than in the beginning,” “it has become completely invisible due to a lack of alternative. There is no positive concept of Poland’s place in the world.”<sup>23</sup> Those who advocated strengthening the relations with the French-German “EU engine” were glad to note that the dispute with Great Britain regarding the new Financial Perspective led Poland to a rapprochement with France. They had great hopes connected with the renewed consultation within the Weimar Triangle and indicated that it could be a “tool of our presence in Europe, a place of a privileged dialogue with the central states of the EU,”<sup>24</sup> an instrument helping prevent the danger of marginalizing Poland in certain situations, of pushing it aside, not only in transatlantic matters.<sup>25</sup> Consequently, the Polish President cancelling his participation in the meeting of the Triangle (explained with health problems) was perceived as a major catastrophe.<sup>26</sup> Critics of the government speculated that in fact Poland may not be interested in joint talks with France and Germany. Lech Kaczyński said before the visit in Paris that the “issue of benefits coming from Weimar to Poland is an open question” (AFP). Some experts and political journalists did raise the issue. For example Marek A. Cichocki regretted that the German attempts to reactivate the Weimar

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<sup>19</sup> S. Meller, “Język polityki i racja stanu,” *Rzeczpospolita* of 1–2 April 2006, reprinted by *Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny*, 2006, no. 2 (30), pp. 5–13.

<sup>20</sup> R. Kuźniar, “Premier przeprosi się z Unią,” *Dziennik* of 26 July 2006.

<sup>21</sup> A. Hall, “Prezes Kaczyński wódz bez wizji,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 18 July 2006.

<sup>22</sup> A. Smolar, “Polityka...”

<sup>23</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>24</sup> A. Smolar, “Świat i Polska według braci Kaczyńskich,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 3 April 2006.

<sup>25</sup> K. Skubiszewski, “Nieobecni...”

<sup>26</sup> Political journalists with an unfavourable attitude towards the government maintained that the President’s sickness was of diplomatic character and that the real reason for his absence was the publication of an offensive article about the President and his family in the German newspaper *Tageszeitung*. See e.g. M. Ostrowski, “Choroba dyplomatyczna,” *Polityka* of 18 February 2006.

Triangle were “the only idea regarding the policy towards Poland” and that it did not lead to real partnership.<sup>27</sup>

Particular commotion could be observed after the open letter of eight former ministers of foreign affairs of the Republic of Poland to the President, in which the ministers expressed their “concern and surprise,” regarding the cancellation of the President’s participation in the summit as “disrespectful towards the partners.”<sup>28</sup> The letter was presented by the opposition media as a proof of the foreign policy being badly conducted, particularly within the EU.<sup>29</sup> The *Polityka* weekly indicated that “Poland does not present any initiatives in the so-called non-paper form, does not express its standpoints on the most important issues (for Poland rather than its partners!), does not tell its partners if it supports the deepening of the integration or not, if it wants to join the euro zone or not, does not explain its position on the Constitutional Treaty. There is no telling what economic strategy we have, if we favour competitiveness or a more developed model of social security.”<sup>30</sup>

Political writers accused the cabinet of failing to propose a vision of the Polish membership in the European Union and of not taking sufficient efforts to define the strategic directions of the Polish European policy. It seemed that the deeper public debate would be improved by the lesser intensity of political processes, connected with the “reflection period” over the institutional future of the European Union. In 2006 Poland tried to avoid defining its position on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, offering only quite general statements on the process of the institutional reform, which was criticized as a passive attitude.<sup>31</sup> The criticism was observed not only in opposition and left-wing circles, the passive approach of the authorities to defining the goals of foreign policy was also criticized by conservative groups, which emphasized that general assurances on the invariably important role of the national state were insufficient. For example Paweł Lisicki noted that the Presidential centre should present a future-oriented vision of the state and Poland’s place in Europe, whereas the speeches of the PiS leader contained “no reflection on globalization, the future of the EU, the place of the Polish right-wing in the map of the whole

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<sup>27</sup> M.A. Cichoński, “Niemiecka polityka wobec Polski na nowych drogach?,” *Dialog*, 2005/2006, no. 72–73, p. 33; see also: R. Bobrowski, *op.cit.*, p. 10.

<sup>28</sup> “Oświadczenie,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 6 July 2006.

<sup>29</sup> E.g. M. Bosacki, “Polska bez polityki zagranicznej,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 10 July 2006.

<sup>30</sup> M. Ostrowski, “Po co nam zagranica,” *Polityka* of 15 July 2006.

<sup>31</sup> See e.g. W. Sadurski, “Polska nieobecna,” *Rzeczpospolita* of 5 June 2006.

Europe.”<sup>32</sup> An element which right-wing columnists found particularly worrying was the uncertainty regarding the economic strategy of the government. They believed that Poland should be particularly interested in the liberalization of the European market, as restrictions were mostly favourable for rich states.

The critics of the circumspect attitude of PiS towards the EU indicated that the manner of thinking about Europe prevailing among the representatives of the party was anachronistic. A national states “cannot ensure security, development, influence on the fate of Europe and the world,” argued A. Smolar, observing “a certain return to the traditional Polish geo-politics with the threat posed by Germany and Russia being its main problem.”<sup>33</sup> Aleksander Hall regretted that Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński “fails to see the EU as a plane of common interest” and believed that the “threat that the party in power would treat the Polish foreign policy as a tool used for the purposes of domestic policy was most real. The party may attach the most attention to prestige and separate standpoints rather than to developing a joint political and institutional plan for Europe, truly serving the Polish national interests.”<sup>34</sup> Proponents of deep integration particularly criticized the objection voiced by President Lech Kaczyński towards the idea of the “European federation.” They did not like the priority importance attached to the visit in the “Euro-sceptical” Prague and the demonstrated closeness with President Václav Klaus, warmly greeted by the right-wing political commentators.<sup>35</sup> On the other hand, some statements of the authorities refuting the thesis on their reluctant attitude towards the EU were met with appreciation, e.g. Lech Kaczyński’s speech at the Humboldt University, in which he not only paid his homage to the founding fathers of the European Union, but also called it an immense success. Proponents of the Constitutional Treaty were glad to hear the President’s words on the necessity to seek solutions which would “increase the efficiency of the European Union and give it new dynamic.”<sup>36</sup>

The government failed to play the role of an active initiator of the public debate on European issues. However, it can hardly be blamed for the modest intellectual output of the “reflection period,” as the original assumption that the “EU was efficient” in terms of its institutional order was not—by definition—a very strong incentive for discussion, and consequently the more conservative

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<sup>32</sup> P. Lisicki, “Pułapka na Kaczyńskich,” *Wprost* of 16 July 2006.

<sup>33</sup> A. Smolar, “Świat...”

<sup>34</sup> A. Hall, “Prezes Kaczyński—wódz bez wizji,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 19 July 2006.

<sup>35</sup> D. Kos, “Krucjata eurosceptyków,” *Najwyższy Czas!* of 22 February 2006; V. Petrilák, “Bliskość poglądów obu prezydentów,” *Gazeta Polska* of 1 March 2006.

<sup>36</sup> A. Smolar, “Świat...”



vision of the integration, presented by the circles close to the authorities did not have the imperative of change embedded in it.<sup>37</sup> On the other hand, its critics often believed in the dogmatic qualities of the concept according to which integration was like cycling (“you ride or you fall”), thus generating the need of continuous discussion and “progress.” The moderation of the cabinet in their definition of the Polish standpoint towards the future of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (which in fact indicated great flexibility in the context of the initial thesis that the Treaty was dead) gave rise to criticism of the government for failing to work on the strategic goals of the Polish policy in the EU. Many columnists and experts, reproaching the Polish authorities for their not participating in the discussion, were in fact blaming the authorities for opposing the process of further ratification of the Treaty rejected by France and Holland.<sup>38</sup>

The attitude towards the Treaty observed in many circles became a certain type of litmus paper of “Europeanness.” Thus “the reflection period” helped reinforce the opinion on the Polish European policy as Euro-sceptical, particularly as introduction of the euro was another disputable issue and the government manifested moderate enthusiasm for it. The trust towards European integration in Poland, as well as the directly related reinforcement of its Euro-sceptical image abroad was also influenced by the actions of the European Parliament, which in its resolution of 15 June expressed its concern regarding the growing intolerance caused by racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and the so-called homophobia, which placed Poland in the same position as states where racial conflicts are a truly serious problem. Both the resolution and the Parliament imposing the concept of homophobia, forcing the so-called reproductive rights as well as the EU legislative projects regarding biotechnology, which breached the sovereignty of Member States in moral and ethical issues, provoked the response of the Polish Sejm which reinforced the opinions observed in many circles, including those in power, that the idea of deepening the European integration should be approached with caution.<sup>39</sup>

### Energy Security

A challenge facing the Polish foreign policy as well as a very important issue for Poland in the European Union in 2006 was energy security. In the media

<sup>37</sup> See e.g. M.A. Cichoński, “Niepotrzebna konstytucja,” *Rzeczpospolita* of 4–5 March 2006; M. Cichoński, “Konstytucja UE nie ożyje,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 10 March 2006.

<sup>38</sup> See e.g. W. Sadurski, *op.cit.*; K. Bobiński, K. Kucharczyk, “Polska powinna dyskutować o eurokonstytucji,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 5 July 2006.

<sup>39</sup> See e.g. M. Jurek, “Brutalny atak na Polskę,” *Niedziela* of 2 July 2006 r.; W. Roszkowski, “Lobby homoseksualne atakuje,” *Rzeczpospolita* of 19 January 2006; cf. I. Krzemiński, “Wbrew cywilizacji Zachodu,” *Rzeczpospolita* of 1 February 2006.

discussion the importance of the problem was never questioned. In the first days of January, when the Russian Gazprom suspended gas transport to Ukraine, many observers indicated that the fears of Poland had materialized, as it had long drawn attention to the increasing Russian tendencies to treat the deliveries of fuels as an instrument used for political purposes. Commentators mentioned that the unsatisfactory security of the state in the area was the responsibility of the previous government, which had failed to act and withdrew from infrastructural projects thanks to which gas deliveries from the North Sea would have been possible. Also those political journalists who advocated tighter relations with Russia admitted that “we will be able to initiate partner-like relations with the Russians only if we achieve independence in terms of energy, so important for the sovereign existence of the Republic of Poland.”<sup>40</sup> The development of nuclear power sector was increasingly often mentioned as a way to achieve the purpose.<sup>41</sup>

The fears concerning the developments in Russia lay at the foundations of the very negative reaction of the Polish public opinion to the German-Russian agreement on the construction of a pipeline bypassing the Baltic states and Poland. Advocates of the deeper European integration expressed the opinion that it should induce Poland to strengthen its joint foreign and security policy with the EU and counteract the decentralist tendencies and processes. Most commentators believed that maintaining the objection against the investment was the right thing to do, some, however, mentioned that the Northern Pipeline was on the list of the 42 priority power projects of the European Union and consequently further resistance on the part of Poland was pointless.<sup>42</sup> P. Świeboda even suggested that “instead of opposing the Northern Pipeline project, which is of little significance for the energy security of our country (...), we should propose to the Germans a joint construction of a port for liquid natural gas (LNG) in Szczecin.”<sup>43</sup>

Most commentators, on the other hand, emphasized the threats following from the construction of a gas pipeline bypassing Poland on the bottom of the Baltic Sea. The public discussion was dominated by the view that Poland should attempt to take advantage of the favourable economic situation to strengthen the cooperation of the interested states on power security. When Premier

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<sup>40</sup> M. Ryba, “Polska ofensywa dyplomatyczna,” *Nasz Dziennik* of 19 September 2006.

<sup>41</sup> K. Mika, “Przyszłość Polski nie zależy od rury na dnie Bałtyku,” *Życie Warszawy* of 8 August 2006.

<sup>42</sup> J. Engelgard, “Zbudujemy Gazociąg Północny,” *Mysł Polska* of 9 July 2006.

<sup>43</sup> P. Świeboda, “Polska–Niemcy: pokonać Freuda,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 14 August 2006.

Marcinkiewicz published an article in *Rzeczpospolita* and *The Financial Times*, in which he explained the assumptions of the Polish initiative, labelled as “the package of Musketeers,”<sup>44</sup> it was mostly greeted with satisfaction. However, due to the similarity of the mechanism of mutual assistance proposed by Poland to the obligations of the allies following from Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, Polish politicians presenting the project began to relate to NATO in the opinions they voiced. When the innovative proposal of the Polish government ended in a fiasco, the Polish press presented various evaluations of the fact. Many observers believed that the concept itself was good, it was the performance that failed, particularly the concept of having the idea implemented “apart from the EU.” A. Smolar noted that “the idea of establishing a new international organization going beyond Europe was perceived as another manifestation of the reluctant attitude towards the European integration on the part of the Polish authorities.” In his opinion a belief can be observed that integration in the area of the energy policy may only occur in close connection to the common foreign and defence policy of the EU, it may even become one of the focal axes of the EU foreign policy, which Poland should strive to have happen.<sup>45</sup> The left-wing *Polityka* even claimed that the Ministry of the Economy “forced [the idea] through as a paramilitary form of an anti-Russian and pro-American energy-centred NATO.”<sup>46</sup> According to speculations, the ineffectiveness of the Polish diplomatic efforts was the result of the fact that the initiative had been prepared outside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and consequently the Ministry officials were not really convinced or properly prepared to promote it in the international arena. The manner in which the initiative was proposed was also criticized. Commentators noted that the foreign entities to which the project was targeted found about its specific assumptions from the media rather than from Polish diplomats.

Though the proposal to conclude a European treaty of energy security did not receive a warm welcome, its positive results were noted. After the Green Paper was announced by the European Commission, the decided actions taken by Poland were commented upon as a factor which had contributed to the increased importance of the energy security in the discussions on the future of the European integration and the EU reform, and to the topic being discussed during the NATO summit in Riga. Although specific actions of the authorities were criticized, the importance attached by the government to the energy

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<sup>44</sup> K. Marcinkiewicz, “Jeden za wszystkich, wszyscy za jednego,” *Rzeczpospolita* of 10 February 2006.

<sup>45</sup> A. Smolar, “Świat...”

<sup>46</sup> J. Żakowski, *op.cit.*

security was never questioned. Even the greatest critics of President L. Kaczyński were glad to note his “sensitivity” to the issue. Media were also enthusiastic about the purchase of the Lithuanian refinery in Mazeikiu by PKN Orlen, emphasizing its considerable importance for the energy security of the states of the region and praising the Polish-Lithuanian rapprochement.<sup>47</sup>

### Policy towards the USA

The United States are considered as Poland’s main partner in the foreign and security policy regardless of the changes of governments. However, the absolute priority of the good allied relations with the United States was increasingly often questioned in the public discussions, as some researchers believed that it “contributed to the slow atrophy of a broader debate on the issues of key importance for the future of our country.”<sup>48</sup> The public discourse underwent considerable changes in this area. The government consisted of two parties which had a critical attitude towards many actions of the American administration, parties which reserved the right to entertain their separate opinions on certain symptoms of the cooperation, particularly military, with that state. However, the two parties were not the main critics of the Polish “Atlantism.” The previously somewhat academic discussion on whether we should stick to the United States or to Europe became increasingly sharp and visible in the press. Many political columnists believed that Poland did not take the right steps seeking to strengthen the transatlantic ties, because in the situation of choice it would somewhat automatically support the United States.

The pro-American course represented by Law and Justice, combined with its caution towards deepening the European integration made the Minister of Foreign Affairs Stefan Meller publicly call for moderation. In his text in *Rzeczpospolita* he claimed that “we should not put (...) into the very good Polish-American relations more than there is to them. Washington is ready to offer strong support to Warsaw wherever the common interest is clear and visible,” and it is not in the interest of the American authorities “to see the process of European integration materially weakened, particularly in the face of the new global threats,” the same holds true for “the lesser political importance of the main EU states, including Germany.”<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> See e.g. J. Darski, “Szczere i konkretnie: Lech Kaczyński na Litwie,” *Gazeta Polska* of 22 June 2006; cf. A. Grzeszak, “Polska od morza do Możejek,” *Polityka* of 31 May 2006.

<sup>48</sup> D. Mielczarek, “Między Waszyngtonem a Brukselą—możliwe kierunki rozwoju polskiej polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa,” *Studia Europejskie*, 2006, no. 2, p. 10.

<sup>49</sup> S. Meller, “Język...”

After the change on the position of the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, the criticism of the European policy of the government was increasingly often accompanied by appeals for moderation in the pro-American attitudes. For the decided and expressive representative of the “continental” camp, R. Kuźniar, it had reached “pathological dimensions,” as Poland was uncritically accepting all actions of the United States, even those harmful to it, though it should not accept the role “of a mere assistant in the global military strategy of the USA.” Kuźniar emphasized that the relations with America “must not breach the cohesion of NATO and the EU” and though the alliance was an issue of extreme importance for Poland, it must not be an asymmetrical relation, in which the reward for real political actions is no more than a pat on the shoulder.<sup>50</sup> Aleksander Hall was concerned with the fact that “the support for the American policy in Poland, both on the left and the right, is often automatic and uncritical.”<sup>51</sup> Scepticism was also present in the opinions voiced in the *Nasz Dziennik* daily, usually friendly towards the government. It warned that it was unfavourable to “base all the foreign policy on a single, distant superpower.” According to Mieczysław Ryba, “for Americans we are not a partner important enough to have them willing to get involved in all disputes and conflicts which concern our country,” and consequently, it was “not in Poland’s interest to enter all disputes and conflicts in which the United States engage,” as “Washington needs Poland to serve its truly short-term goals.”<sup>52</sup> The conclusions presented by the *Wprost* weekly in its report, favourable towards the diplomatic actions of the Polish highest authorities, seem worth a mention: “the position of Poland in Washington is not really strong, as it is the function of our reputation in the EU and the quality of our contacts with the European partners. For the diplomatic success in the USA successes in Berlin and Brussels are most desirable, particularly as the position of Germany in the USA has considerably strengthened.”<sup>53</sup> The commonly shared opinion that the American-German rapprochement decreased the importance of the American alliance with Poland led to various conclusions. According to some observers, it was yet another premise to strengthen the pro-EU course, for others—to tighten the relations with the USA.

An issue which in 2006 gained considerable importance for the Polish policy towards the United States and focused the disputes regarding the scope of the

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<sup>50</sup> R. Kuźniar, “USA jako sojusznik. Przyjaźń bez serwilizmu,” *Dziennik (Europa supplement)* of 23 September 2006.

<sup>51</sup> A. Hall, “Polityka zagraniczna na cenzurowany,” *Rzeczpospolita* of 17 August 2006.

<sup>52</sup> M. Ryba, *op.cit.*

<sup>53</sup> “Ofensywa Kaczyńskich,” *Wprost* of 24 September 2006.

Polish “Atlantism” like a convergent lens was the matter of the American anti-missile system being placed in Poland. Roman Kuźniar was probably the most sceptical Polish expert and in the late 2005 he coined a maxim saying “We can remain safe as ORP ‘Polska’ and do not have to turn into USS ‘Poland.’” Originally Kuźniar believed that the possible consent on the part of Poland to the localization of the American base in its territory should depend on clear benefits for Poland and on its influence on the manner in which the Polish component of the system would be used.<sup>54</sup> Later he went on to reject the project believing that it would decrease Poland’s security. He noted that “Poland was not facing threats which would require a response in the form of an anti-missile system” and that its security would decrease as the base “may become the target of the missile attacks on the part of those states which may want to ‘pierce’ the shield.”<sup>55</sup> He also criticized the very idea of an anti-missile system as a wrong response to the contemporary security problems.<sup>56</sup> In her article in *Rzeczpospolita* Beata Górka-Winter indicated that “we should strive to have the anti-missile shield cover all the allies in the nearest possible perspective.” This would strengthen transatlantic ties and contribute to the growing importance of NATO as an instrument of the American security policy.<sup>57</sup> Antoni Podolski in his text published by *Gazeta Wyborcza* proposed that Poland should give its consent to the project under certain conditions.<sup>58</sup> Stanisław Koziej, the former vice minister of national defence and the head of the anti-missile defence team of the Ministry, emphasized, on the other hand, that the perspective of the Polish interests required going in the direction of a global anti-missile defence system, and Poland should consider the American proposal only under this condition, particularly as it was connected with a “further risk of complicating our relations with the European partners and allies from NATO and the EU.” Without satisfying the condition, “the Americans would have to offer extraordinarily broad, permanent and hard bilateral guarantees of security and cooperation, which could balance the risk of worse relations with the natural European partners.” Apart from “balancing the risk to zero,” Poland would also have to try to obtain a certain “added value” in the form of stronger military, scientific and

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<sup>54</sup> R. Kuźniar, “Czy Polsce potrzebna jest tarcza raketowa?,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 15 December 2005.

<sup>55</sup> R. Kuźniar, “USA jako sojusznik...,” p. 14.

<sup>56</sup> In the opinion of R. Kuźniar, the shield breaches the principle of strategic balance and leads to the global domination of the United States with the burden of “the security of the single, absolute superpower, which can lead to the sense of impunity.”

<sup>57</sup> B. Górka-Winter, “Sojusze z tarczą w tle,” *Rzeczpospolita* of 27 February 2006.

<sup>58</sup> A. Podolski, “Tarcza antyraketowa. Tak, ale...,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 14 September 2006.

technological cooperation.<sup>59</sup> The fundamentals of the discussion regarding the shield were thus defined already in 2006, and it was clear that it would include a broad scope of attitudes, from a decided “no” to an enthusiastic, though not unconditional “yes.”

### Military Involvement Abroad

The fundamental disputes concerning the increasingly distinct line between “continentalism” and “Atlantism” were also seen in the lively discussions and polemics on the Polish military involvement abroad. The debate on the Polish presence in Iraq and its consequences for Poland’s position in the world was not over. Both the proponents of the intervention and some of its opponents admitted that the participation of the Polish troops had given us a privileged position in the relations with the United States and contributed to the stronger position of Poland in Europe. Others continued to believe that the participation in the “bad war” damaged Poland’s position, particularly in the EU, and often demanded that the Polish contingent be withdrawn, more or less hastily. At the beginning of the year S. Koziej (then still the vice minister of national defence) argued in *Rzeczpospolita* that a quick withdrawal of the Polish troops from Iraq would have dangerous consequences for international security and Poland, heading an international division, could not do it, as other states might follow its example. “Terminating the mission right now would mean an irrational waste of opportunities and the loss of the efforts, costs and sacrifices made so far”—he wrote.<sup>60</sup> The decision to remain in Iraq was particularly criticized by left-wing circles. Jarosław Makowski claimed that “Poland, agreeing to be present in the post-Saddam country for yet another year, has the role of a ridiculous and unnecessary ornament” and helps the Americans maintain a fictitious image of the Iraqi project as an enterprise of an international coalition. He believed that Poland “should engage in the construction of the strong and politically united Europe,” and its withdrawal from Iraq would only help.<sup>61</sup> Opinions on the Polish presence in Iraq had a certain impact on the discussion of the Polish military involvement in other parts of the world.

The most important issue connected with Poland’s participation in NATO operations was the preparation to increase its military contingent in Afghanistan. The former government had made the commitment in 2005 and in 2006 during

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<sup>59</sup> S. Koziej, “Polska i USA z tarczą,” *Rzeczpospolita* of 7 September 2006.

<sup>60</sup> S. Koziej, “Bezpieczny świat—bezpieczna Polska,” *Rzeczpospolita* of 4 January 2006.

<sup>61</sup> J. Makowski, “Racje konia trojańskiego Ameryki,” *Rzeczpospolita* of 4 January 2006.

his visit in the United States the Minister of National Defence Radosław Sikorski informed the public opinion that the main element of the Afghan contingent would be the mechanized battalion equipped, *inter alia*, with the “Rosomak” armed modular vehicles. Some commentators regarded the Minister’s statement as a tactic error, others believed that it confirmed the thesis that Poland took its decisions under the pressure of the United States or solely for the purpose of maintaining good relations with them. The public debate showed that the image of Poland’s involvement in the ISAF mission was strongly influenced by the negative Iraqi experience. Questions appeared about the justifiability of Poland financing the contingent on its own, about the benefits possibly resulting from the participation in the Afghanistan operation and the purposefulness of sending additional units there. The debate also showed that some politicians and specialists had little knowledge in the principles of NATO operation outside its area of responsibility, including the informal principle of the contribution of member states to the missions of the Alliance proportional to their potential. For example, *Newsweek Polska* claimed that the only sensible argument for sending the Polish troops to Afghanistan was the opportunity to gain experience in combat.<sup>62</sup>

Some experts indicated that Poland’s prestige in the world would grow if we became one of the leading forces in Afghanistan, as in this way “we hew our place in Europe, we show that we can act independently” (Zbigniew Lewicki). Sceptical opinions could also be heard. Stanisła Koziej emphasized that the possibilities of our army’s operation abroad are almost exhausted. Paweł Świeboda noted that the decision to send the troops to Afghanistan would intensify the impression in Europe that Poland was more willing to engage in NATO operations than in European ones.

### **Policy towards Germany**

In 2006 the Polish-German relations and the Polish policy towards Germany raised much controversy and were the subject of the broad public debate. Contacts between the authorities of the two states were marked with certain distrust, and in the early 2006—according to the public perception—the relations deteriorated further, which surprised many observers. Before the parliamentary elections in Poland and Germany in the autumn of 2005 hopes that the expected rule of CDU and CSU in Germany and PO and PiS in Poland would bring rapprochement and improvement in the relations between the two states were

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<sup>62</sup> W. Rogacin, “Polacy w piekle,” *Newsweek* of 24 September 2006.



common. The relations had been tense for years over the dispute regarding the war in Iraq, the system of voting in the Council of the European Union, the policy of Gerhard Schröder's cabinet towards Russia and the issue of the post-war resettlements. The results of the elections in the two states were different from those expected, but the so-called budget summit of the European Council in December 2005, during which some of the funds due to the eastern German lands were transferred to development assistance for Poland thanks to the mediation of Chancellor Angela Merkel, made political commentators hopeful as regards the possible tightening of the cooperation between Poland and Germany.

The governments established by Law and Justice did not change their opinions on fundamental matters. They expected Germany to close the issues connected with World War II and its consequences in a definite manner, to abandon the project of establishing the Centre against Expulsions and to withdraw its support for the construction of the Baltic pipeline, they also failed to share the German opinion on the necessity to revive the Constitutional Treaty. Efforts were made to improve the situation of the Polish community living in Germany. Commentators who had favourable opinions on the actions of the [Polish] government and the manner in which the Polish postulates were articulated (in Germany perceived as confrontational), expressed the view that the foreign policy pursued by the former cabinets had not sufficiently protected the Polish *raison d'état*, and the relations between Poland and Germany had not been partner-like. The strongest accusations in this regard were made by Mariusz Muszyński and Krzysztof Rak, who blamed the former ministers, who, "charmed with the vision of being admitted to the European company," allowed themselves to be convinced that Germany "was pursuing the EU goals rather than the German *raison d'état*," while in fact Germany was trying to obtain the hegemony in the EU and Central Europe.<sup>63</sup> Irena Lipowicz rejected the accusations in a decided manner and stated that the authors had questioned the fundamentals of the Polish foreign policy and derided reconciliation, offering the idea that "Poland had no friends, Poland had interests" in lieu of a "policy of values."<sup>64</sup>

Many Polish authors claimed that Germany was witnessing increasing tendencies to reinterpret history, alter the remembrance and historic policy, which were dangerous for Poland.<sup>65</sup> Considerable tension was provoked—

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<sup>63</sup> M. Muszyński, K. Rak, "Dyplomacja niemocy," *Rzeczpospolita* of 29 August 2006.

<sup>64</sup> T. Lipowicz, "Niech moc będzie z wami," *Rzeczpospolita* of 6 September 2006.

<sup>65</sup> See e.g. Z. Krasnodębski, "Samotność Polski w wojnie o pamięć," *Rzeczpospolita* of 12 December 2006.; M. Cichocki, D. Gawin, "Nowa przeszłość Niemiec," *Rzeczpospolita* of 4–5 November 2006.

somewhat traditionally—by the actions of the German compatriots' associations: their efforts to build the centre commemorating expulsions in Berlin, the ambivalent attitude of the government of the Federal Republic of Germany towards these efforts as well as the actions of the Prussian Trust, which made claims towards the Polish state with regard to the property taken over by Poland after the war, and filed suits for compensation with the European Court of Human Rights. Zdzisław Krasnodębski warned that in response to the deepening dangerous trends in Germany we should influence “that part of the German society which had not yet lost the sense of proportion and decency,” intensify historical research on the German occupation, tighten the international cooperation in the area and try to influence the United States so that they would encourage the German government to “undertake energetic actions to prevent the dangerous tendencies and to return to the partner-like cooperation with Poland.”<sup>66</sup>

For some commentators the deterioration in the Polish-German relations was considerably influenced by the policy of Law and Justice, which had used the anti-German rhetoric before the elections. The opposition journalists claimed that the cabinet of Jarosław Kaczyński used the language of “hostility and exasperation.” A. Smolar pointed out to the “extravagant decision to have the ‘historical policy’ occupy the central place in the mutual relations,” as it began to “replace the real foreign policy in the situation when the nation’s future and interests are at stake.”<sup>67</sup> Critics of the government called for a separation of the historical debate from the process of shaping and pursuing the foreign policy. “Tasks of historians and political commentators cannot be identified with the tasks of state bodies”—emphasized Krzysztof Skubiszewski, who demanded that in our relations with Germany we should pragmatically “focus on what we share rather than what separates us.”<sup>68</sup> Some experts and journalists warned that we should not expect from Germany a declaration on overtaking the possible claims of the expelled, as this would question the joint standpoint, according to which the claims had no legal basis.<sup>69</sup>

Marek A. Cichocki pointed out that in the Polish foreign policy Germany had been an overvalued element, whereas the importance of Poland in the

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<sup>66</sup> Z. Krasnodębski, “Kto w Niemczech przeciw nam,” *Rzeczpospolita* of 3 January 2007.

<sup>67</sup> A. Smolar, “Polityka...”

<sup>68</sup> K. Skubiszewski, “Nieobecni...”

<sup>69</sup> J. Barcz, “Ręka w rękę ze Steinbach,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 22 December 2006.

German policy was underestimated.<sup>70</sup> In his opinion, some of the critics of the current direction taken by the government, the former policy towards Germany and our treating the state as a strategic partner on our path to the EU had us used to underestimating the real problems in the Polish-German relations, now perceived not as difference of interests, but as the result of the rhetoric used by politicians. Inevitably, though, in some issues the Polish and German policies may clash and consequently the “Polish-German relations will be healthier if Poland has good contacts with various EU states.”<sup>71</sup>

The press disputes on the Polish-German relations in Poland and Germany influenced each other and contributed to the intensification of the mutual dislike. The fierce criticism of Germany in the Polish media was perceived in Germany as the manifestation of the confrontational attitude and failure to understand the processes occurring in Germany. On the other hand, the attacks of the German media on the Polish authorities, full of patronizing advice and somewhat unbalanced opinions presenting the situation in Poland appalled some Polish political journalists, who did not hesitate to respond to them. The conflict reached its apogee in July 2006, when the *Tageszeitung* daily published a distasteful satire on the Kaczyński family. Many commentators regarded the sharp reactions of the PiS politicians as hysterical and excessive and criticized the fact that a grudge against a private newspaper was elevated to the level of official interstate relations.<sup>72</sup> Columnists with a more positive attitude towards the PiS cabinet tended to justify the nervous reaction of the Polish authorities. For example Piotr Semka decided it was proper to raise the question whether the vulgar text in the German newspaper was “a criticism of an unpopular conservative or the old tradition of sneering at the ‘Polish warlords’” and whether “anti-Polish stereotypes were not concealed under the post-modernistic ridicule.” P. Semka was not surprised by the nervous reaction to the tactic of “benign shaming,” as Poles remain sensitive to such historical parallels.<sup>73</sup>

### Policy towards the Russian Federation

The Polish policy towards the Russian Federation in 2006 was not only an element widely commented upon, but also an important component of its policy within the EU. As the process of Poland’s settlement within the European

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<sup>70</sup> M.A. Cichoński, “Niemiecka polityka...,” p. 33.

<sup>71</sup> M.A. Cichoński, “Wymagające sąsiedztwo,” *Rzeczpospolita* of 5 September 2006.

<sup>72</sup> See e.g. D. Rosati, “Awantura niedyplomatyczna,” *Wprost* of 16 July 2006.

<sup>73</sup> P. Semka, “Czy znów mamy się bać Niemców?,” *Wprost* of 16 July 2006.

structures progressed, Poland began to see the opportunities of a more effective use of the membership in relations with third parties and was ready to influence Russia via the EU to a greater extent. This fact, however, also indicated the exhaustion of the bilateral instruments of influence, which proved ineffective also due to the passive attitude of the Russian partner. Poland saw a supra-party consensus over the EU policy towards Russia, which was reflected by a considerable unanimity of press opinions. Most expressed the opinion that Poland may be isolated within the EU due to the opinion on the anti-Russian policy of the Polish authorities, disseminated by Russia itself. The authorities were usually not blamed for the chilly relations with Russia, as this fact was regarded as a price being paid for the independent foreign policy, which manifested itself by e.g. the support for the pro-Western efforts of Ukraine, inevitably leading to a dispute with Russia. Intellectuals connected with the opposition, however, indicated that pursuing “the policy of dignity and remembrance” towards the Russian Federation was harmful, as for relations with a large country “constant pillorying and asking it to acknowledge its crimes and apologize” is not a helpful element. A. Smolar also wrote that Russia needed time to find the language and ability to speak of its own pain, tragedies and crimes committed.”<sup>74</sup>

The Russian embargo on the Polish food became a widely discussed matter. After a year of fruitless efforts to solve the problem, it became a key element of the European policy for the Polish authorities. According to most commentators, the Polish government could not accept its reminders and requests for an intervention being ignored by the European Commission. In those circumstances a clear demonstration of our disagreement to Member States’ being treated differently according to vague criteria was necessary. By blocking the adoption of the EU mandate for negotiations with Russia on the new agreement on partnership, Poland showed other Member States what insults and disproportionate repressions it encountered in its trade relations with Russia.<sup>75</sup>

The arguments of the Polish authorities were accepted by most experts and political columnists. Even *Gazeta Wyborcza*, strongly connected with the opposition, admitted that persistence combined with “excessive suspiciousness towards the partners” was completely justified with regard to the present cabinet of the Kremlin.<sup>76</sup> The veto was regarded as appropriate, because it concerned issues important not only for Poland, but also for the whole of Europe. Also

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<sup>74</sup> A. Smolar, “Świat...”

<sup>75</sup> L. Kaczyński, “Polska broni swych interesów,” *Dziennik* of 15 November 2006; J. Kaczyński, “Walczymy o nasze prawa,” *Dziennik* of 25–26 November 2006.

<sup>76</sup> See A. Podolski, “Na wschodzie wciąż mróz,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 12 June 2006.

opposition politicians emphasized that “being tough about the issue was necessary,” that Poland was right and the government “simply had not other option” (D. Rosati).<sup>77</sup> Different opinions, such as that of P. Świeboda, who believed that the “government had overkilled it” and claimed that the EU would perceive Poland as a classic troublemaker, or a reason of its problems,<sup>78</sup> were rare. Some commentators, however, regretted that Poland had been unable to build a coalition and involve other states in an effective defence of its policy without using the drastic measure of a veto. It was also noted that the EU partners should have been better prepared for that and the alleged element of surprise, possibly avoidable, was criticized. The government clearly rejected the objections stating that Poland had exhausted the possibilities to exert influence, and the decision of the veto could come as no surprise to anyone in the EU.<sup>79</sup>

### **Coordination and the Institutional and Human Resources Background**

The more balanced opinions on the Polish foreign policy in the first months of 2006 were the result of the moderate human resources policy, particularly entrusting the position of the minister of foreign affairs to Stefan Meller. Many commentators identified him with the circles of the former Union of Freedom and the environment of its activist, the former minister of foreign affairs, Bronisław Geremek. Nevertheless having S. Meller head the department was presented as a nomination of an expert, which could be tolerated by the opposition and could help establish a government coalition in the later period, when the Civic Platform would shake off the emotions connected with the defeat in the parliamentary elections. The personnel changes in the ministry were of limited scope, but nevertheless they were widely commented upon in the media. When about a dozen ambassadors were dismissed in the beginning of the year, the opposition press called it a purge with disastrous effects for the Polish position in the world. In *Polityka* Daniel Passent claimed that Poland gave an impression of “an unstable country, shaken by convulsions, (...) incompetent, unable to appoint its representatives, (...) with an arrogant attitude towards the host countries, where it sent inappropriate persons, failing to gain the trust of their superiors.”<sup>80</sup> The argument that among the dismissed ambassadors there

<sup>77</sup> See A. Słojewska, “Embargo bez zmian,” *Rzeczpospolita* of 25 November 2006.

<sup>78</sup> P. Świeboda, “Polski rząd przeszarżował,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 25 November 2006.

<sup>79</sup> A. Fotyga, “Nie jest prawdą, że kogokolwiek zaskoczył nasz sprzeciw wobec Rosji,” *Rzeczpospolita* of 5 December 2006.

<sup>80</sup> D. Passent, “Dyplomacja i łowy (na głowy),” *Polityka* of 14 January 2006.

were activists of the communist state apparatus failed to convince the opposition, which even claimed that since there was no vetting act in force, the dismissals were unlawful. In the opinion of the right-wing commentators, such reactions only confirmed that there existed a group of people who believed they had special rights to hold positions in the diplomatic service. When the successor of Minister S. Meller, Minister Anna Fotyga, after several months dismissed another group of ambassadors involved in the cooperation with the communist regime, the emotions in the media were somewhat more subdued, probably because the dismissal revealed another examples of pathologies involving the representatives of the PRL (Polish People's Republic) apparatus. Some commentators believed that the exchange of diplomats was a simple continuation of the process whose fundamental assumption was that the independent and democratic Poland should be represented by credible diplomats, whereas in the previous period, during the SLD rule, diplomatic posts abroad were manned with people connected with the Polish United Workers' Party and secret services of PRL. Both during Minister Meller's term of office and during the time of Anna Fotyga critical voices could be heard from people who claimed that personnel changes in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were but cosmetic alterations and demanded that "social control" over the Ministry be reinstated, that the personnel be reviewed and that the whole department reconstructed.<sup>81</sup>

Although the appointment of S. Meller had a positive influence for the press opinions of the government both in Poland and abroad, it did not mean significant changes in the Ministry. However, it initiated a lively discussion on the coordination of foreign policy, which was connected with the increased activity of President Kaczyński in the area of the constitutional responsibility of the government and the minister of foreign affairs, accompanied by the marginalization of Minister S. Meller, frowned upon by opposition commentators. An alleged stark example of the dispute over the "localization of the centre coordinating the foreign policy" was the fact that the Minister of Foreign Affairs was not included among the newly appointed members of the National Security Council. Commentators emphasized that it was a symptom of bad cooperation among the state bodies bearing the constitutional responsibility for foreign policy. The Minister of Foreign Affairs was originally not included in the preparations for the visit of the Polish President in the United States, which the media

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<sup>81</sup> See e.g. M. Krajewska, "MSZ czeka na Macierewicza," *Gazeta Polska* of 22 November 2006; D. Zdort, "Czas przewietrzyć dyplomatyczne salony," *Rzeczpospolita* of 20 November 2006.

interpreted as another signal of Lech Kaczyński's distrust towards Minister S. Meller.<sup>82</sup>

Admittedly the programme of foreign policy presented by the Minister in the *Sejm* did obtain the approval of the President, but nevertheless the most important initiatives in the area continued to be undertaken beyond the Ministry. The tensions between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the President, widely commented upon by the media, undermined the effectiveness and credibility of the Polish diplomacy. When on 1 April 2006 *Rzeczpospolita* printed the famous article of Minister S. Meller, appealing for refraining from transferring the confrontational rhetoric of the internal politics into the international arena, for rationality, moderation and better coordination of international affairs, some commentators regarded it as a signal that “after a series of crises in the relations with the President and Prime Minister, the Minister felt strong enough to preach to the winners about how they should behave with regard to international issues.”<sup>83</sup>

For many observers, also those critical towards the government, the appointment of Anna Fotyga meant a promise of a better coordination of actions between the Ministry, the government and the President. Commentators noted that A. Fotyga enjoyed the trust of the President and Prime Minister, which was a good sign for the cohesion of the Polish foreign policy. The very fact of strengthening the position of the President in this area was not excessively criticized (it had been advocated by Daniel Tusk, the rival of President Kaczyński, during the electoral campaign). Some commentators believed, however, that the changes had gone too far and that the appointment of A. Fotyga was but a cover for the idea of “transferring the foreign policy out of the government.” Regrets were thus expressed that the increasing role of the President in the shaping of the foreign policy meant diminishing the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which could not be replaced by the experts' teams of the President and Prime Minister. A certain excuse for the officials' passivity in the Ministry was also found—*Polityka* wrote, *inter alia*, that “the inertia and hesitation are most likely, because the officials will not have a minister as a lightning arrester in case the President or the Prime Minister happen not to like something. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an entity generating ideas and concepts, as a centre stimulating the other two to act may not be functioning”.<sup>84</sup> According to other commentators, the problems in the cooperation of the old apparatus with the

<sup>82</sup> See e.g. “O co chodzi w wojnie o MSZ?,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 16 February 2006.

<sup>83</sup> J. Żakowski, *op.cit.*

<sup>84</sup> M. Ostrowski, R. Socha, “Dama PiS,” *Polityka* of 20 May 2006.

head of the Ministry and the government should be an argument not so much for the increased role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as for its through reform.<sup>85</sup> The media discussed the strengthened role of the National Security Bureau as the President's expert team. According to Antoni Podolski, it should be expected that the new National Security Council "would evolve from a body co-deciding upon the directions of the national security policy and influencing its implementation, informally at first, and then, after the appropriate legal changes have been made, quite formally."<sup>86</sup> Andrzej Zybertowicz, on the other hand, emphasized the need to establish a monitoring centre for strategic threats—"an institution gathering all the information of key importance for the security of the country, from secret services, both civilian and military, diplomacy, media and researchers."<sup>87</sup>

Starting from mid-2006, the foreign policy of the government became more coherent. Although the competence and personnel-related problems disappeared, media continued to speculate about the rivalry among the power centres. The President gradually took an increasing number of functions, for example he began to represent Poland at meeting of heads of state and government of the European Union, in which Prime Ministers had usually participated before. According to observers, a division of work could be noted between the Prime Minister and the President—the Prime Minister focused on the internal policy, whereas the President on foreign affairs. A. Fotyga was perceived by political journalist as a person implementing the ideas of the President. The Polish foreign policy, for which it meant a breach of the environmental and personnel-related policy, became the object of the most fierce media criticism since 1989, which was closely related to the image of Poland abroad.

### **The domestic Discourse and the Image of Poland Abroad**

Columnists close to the opposition created the image of Minister S. Meller as "the only European in the government" and the man of the moment on whom saving the international position of Poland under the PiS rule depended.

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<sup>85</sup> M. Krajewska, "Co odzyskaliśmy w MSZ, czyli Jurassic Park—i Dudek," *Niezależna Gazeta Polska*, 2006, no. 6, pp. 14–16.

<sup>86</sup> A. Podolski, "Bezpieczeństwo polityczne zamiast narodowego," *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 11 January 2006.

<sup>87</sup> A. Zybertowicz, "Intelektualny rdzeń państwa," *Życie Warszawy* of 7 June 2006; cf. P. Nisztor, "Stratedzy od prezydenta," *Gazeta Polska* of 13 September 2006.



Consequently, it came as no surprise that his leaving and the ultimate establishment of the governing coalition between PiS, Self-defence of the Republic of Poland (Samoobrona RP) and League of Polish Families (LPR) got a lot of publicity and provoked numerous disputes on the image of Poland abroad. For opposition politicians and some journalists, the image was the most important measure of Poland's position and the barometer of the quality of our foreign policy.<sup>88</sup> Others pointed out that pursuing the foreign policy compliant with the Polish *raison d'état* did not have to be accompanied with the shaping of a positive image of Poland abroad. Some commentators, also those not particularly favourable towards the government, admitted that the negative image in the European Union resulted also from factors for which the Polish authorities were not to blame. For example, A. Hall indicated that the image "was shaped by various left-wing and lefty circles, where the measure of Europeanness means the full approval of the state for manifestations of homosexual attitudes or considering the death penalty as a symptom of barbarianism." In his opinion, if in the European Union "in all influential and opinion-forming circles homosexual marriages, abortions and euthanasia are considered normal, and discussing the admissibility of death penalty for the most serious crimes is regarded as scandalous," "the spiritual climate definitely does not make the work of people presently responsible for the Polish foreign policy any easier."<sup>89</sup>

Although the establishment of Jarosław Kaczyński's cabinet, holding a majority in the Parliament, had a positive impact on the power and political effectiveness of the government in terms of the domestic policy, the participation of the coalition members complicated the situation, particularly in the European policy and with regard to the United States.<sup>90</sup> LPR was remembered to have opposed Poland's membership in the European Union, and the standpoint of Samoobrona on the issue was ambiguous. This was also reflected in negative

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<sup>88</sup> E.g. Bronisław Komorowski emphasized: "The image of Poland in foreign media has never been as bad as it is now, not since 1989. As a result, the cabinet of Jarosław Kaczyński has led to the deterioration of Poland's international position" ("PiS działa na szkodę Polski," *Dziennik* of 22 November 2006).

<sup>89</sup> A. Hall believed that the reaction of the representatives of the European Commission and the Council of Europe to the personal opinion of President Kaczyński, declaring himself a supporter of death penalty in individual cases was a symptom of hysteria. See A. Hall, "Polityka zagraniczna na cenzurowanym," *Rzeczpospolita* of 17 August 2006.

<sup>90</sup> The politicians of LPR (League of Polish Families) and Samoobrona (Self-defence) tried to dispel the apprehensions concerning their international orientation and stereotypes attributing xenophobia and anti-European attitudes to those parties. See interviews with Roman Giertych for *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 15–16 July 2006 and "Haarec" (Israel) of 26 July 2006. See also M. Piskorski, "Samoobrona jest bardziej proeuropejska niż PiS," *Życie Warszawy* of 17 August 2006.

opinions of political columnists: some even declared their concern for the continuation of the fundamental, pro-Western orientation of Poland. The opposition media frightened the Polish public opinion with ostracism in the EU. For example Jacek Żakowski writing for *Polityka* alarmed that “expecting Samoobrona’s presence in the government, the European Commission is already preparing a declaration expressing its concern and reminding [Poland] of its duty to satisfy the adopted obligations.”<sup>91</sup>

The black scenario did not occur, but the foreign policy of the new government was under a constant attack, in which the “bad image of Poland abroad” was an important element. Opposition columnists emphasized that the EU was “increasingly concerned with the composition of the government,” not regarded as credible, which resulted from the “anti-European parties in Warsaw saying they will pursue a pro-European policy.”<sup>92</sup> Some Polish authors went as far as to indicate that Poland (and other new EU Member States) had difficulties filling the principles of democracy and rule of law with genuine contents and consequently the EU should cover them with special monitoring principles. However, when during his visit in Brussels Jarosław Kaczyński presented himself as a conservative prime minister, who—in spite of the pragmatic problems and tensions—wishes Europe and the European Union well, some of the criticism stopped.<sup>93</sup> Karol Szymański, the PiS deputy of the European Parliament ensured in *Dziennik* that “Europe will get used to the conservative Poland in the EU, just as it once got used to the conservative Italy and Euro-sceptical England. It is the opposition that must now find a new, better model of confrontation over European issues—the attempts to completely discredit the government taken so far have completely backfired.”<sup>94</sup>

During the meetings in Brussels the confrontation of the media image of the Polish representatives with reality proved favourable, which did not change the general negative trend in the media vision of the Polish reality. For some commentators the fierce criticism of the Polish authorities transferred by some opposition politicians and columnists (including some newly dismissed diplomats) to foreign media, was outrageous. The active participation of Poles in shaping the “black image of Poland” was noted, along with the opinions of those

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<sup>91</sup> J. Żakowski, *op.cit.*

<sup>92</sup> M. Ostrowski, “Po co nam zagranica,” *Polityka* of 15 July 2006.

<sup>93</sup> See e.g. J. Pawlicki, “Kaczyński euronarodowiec,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 24 March 2006.

<sup>94</sup> K. Szymański, “Dzięki opozycji,” *Dziennik* of 1 September 2006.

Poles, supporting the thesis of the “reactionary” character of the Polish authorities, popularized by the European left-wing.

Much controversy was raised by the open letter of the former ministers of foreign affairs after the cancellation of the Weimar Triangle summit, which the Prime Minister and the President regarded as “disloyalty on the part of the considerable group among influential circles towards their own country.” According to some commentators the ministers should not have held “a public demonstration,” they could have presented their comments and objection to the head of state in a different form.<sup>95</sup> Andrzej Nowak in a discussion with L. Kaczyński emphasized that the phenomenon of “slandering the Polish state and its authorities in the international arena was growing (...) together with the phenomenon, increasingly serious in its consequences, of waging private battles for maintaining the influence in Poland—the influence which the democratic verdict of voters took away from the initiators of the defamatory campaign.”<sup>96</sup> A columnist of *Rzeczpospolita* in his analysis of the tendency said that “the growing group of public persons connected with the opposition, when voicing their opinions for foreign media, crosses the thin line” between “representing a different viewpoint in the West and harming their own country.”<sup>97</sup>

### Conclusion

One difficult task which the Polish foreign policy faced in 2006 was the necessity to counteract, particularly among the EU Member States, the negative image of Poland, as it affected our possibilities to undertake effective political and diplomatic actions. The domestic discussion about foreign policy showed that there were strong mutual connections between the image of Poland abroad and the criticism of the government present in the Polish media. The main problem was not posed by the lack of debate, though it was often mentioned, or its alleged superficiality, but the limited circulation of standpoints among various circles and environments as well as the often unfavourable—in the opinion of the critics—direction of the discourse, avoiding the expected subjects and sometimes ordinary frustration, resulting from the changing political

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<sup>95</sup> B. Geremek maintained that President L. Kaczyński would not meet with the former ministers of foreign affairs, thus suggesting that if the meeting had been held, the letter would not have been published. However, one of the signatories, D. Rosati said that he had not heard of such an initiative. The claim of B. Geremek was also denied by the head of the President’s office, Elżbieta Jakubiak. See *Dziennik* of 10 July 2006.

<sup>96</sup> “Historia stosowana...,” p. 16.

<sup>97</sup> R.A. Ziemkiewicz, “Ze skargą na Polskę,” *Rzeczpospolita* of 1 February 2007.

conditions and the media circles. Problems and dilemmas of the foreign policy became an integral part of the public disputes, and the policy itself occupied an equal place among other areas of the government's activity and ceased to be an area of special importance, where restraint in voicing current opinions was advisable due to the higher interest of the state. Consequently, improving the information policy, influencing the Polish public opinion, propagating knowledge on the Polish interests and informing the society about foreign policy goals and general strengthening of the public diplomacy should be a long-term, well-planned goal of state institutions.

# **V.**

## **Annexes**



## **Chronicle of Poland's International Relations in 2006**

### **General Affairs**

25–26.01. Chairman of the Council of Ministers Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz attended the annual World Economic Forum in Davos, where the main items on the agenda were the economic significance of India, the stability of China's high rate of economic growth and its banking system, and global energy security.

24.02. Prime Minister Marcinkiewicz addressed a letter to 32 heads of governments of EU and NATO member states with a proposal to sign a European Energy Security Pact.

28.04. Minister of Foreign Affairs Stefan Meller handed in his resignation.

9.05. President Lech Kaczyński dismissed S. Meller from the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs.

27–29.06. Minister A. Fotyga visited Moscow, where she attended the On drug smuggling routes from Afghanistan conference, and met the member of the European Commission for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov.

28.06. A commemoration ceremony of the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Poznań June 1956 was held in Poznań. Among the attendees invited by President Lech Kaczyński were the presidents of the Czech Republic Václav Klaus, the Federal Republic of Germany Horst Köhler, the Republic of Slovakia Ivan Gašparovič and the Republic of Hungary László Sólyom.

6–9.09. The 16<sup>th</sup> Economic Forum in Krynica Górská, organised under the motto "European challenges: questions about Europe's new identity" was attended by approximately 1,800 politicians, scientists and entrepreneurs from over 40 countries of Europe, Asia and America. Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński met Ukraine's Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich, with whom he discussed bilateral cooperation between the countries and deeper relations with the European Union and NATO, as well as the construction of the Odessa–Brody–Płock pipeline. Prime Minister Kaczyński also met Georgia's President Mikheil Saakashvili, assuring him of Polish support for Georgia's efforts for integration with Euro-Atlantic structures.

7.09. Prime Minister J. Kaczyński set out principles of Polish foreign policy at the meeting with diplomats accredited in Poland. The primary objectives named by the Prime Minister included an enhanced international position of Poland and actions for stabilisation and peace in the world.

19.12. Speaker of the Sejm Marek Jurek met the delegation of the European Jewish Congress headed by Pierre Besnainou. The Speaker familiarised his guests with Poland's position on matters including combating international terrorism and

the security of Israel and Lebanon. The guests tackled the topic of restitution of former Jewish property in Poland and compensation for their owners.

## **Multilateral cooperation**

### **Baltic Sea Cooperation**

21.03. Minister R. Sikorski met heads of Defence Ministries of Denmark—Søren Gade, Germany—Franz Jozef Jung, Lithuania—Gediminas Kirkilas, Latvia—Linda Mūrniece, and Estonia—Juergen Ligim, in Riga. The topics tackled covered, among others, achievement of full operational capabilities of the Multinational Corps Northeast and preparations of the unit to take over command of the ISAF operation in Afghanistan.

7–8.06. Prime Minister K. Marcinkiewicz attended the meeting of heads of governments of the Council of Baltic Sea states in Reykjavik. One of the key subjects of the discussions was Europe's energy security. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers also met Iceland's Prime Minister Halldór Ásgrímsson, with whom he discussed bilateral cooperation, Polish staff employed in Iceland, and energy security. He also met Norway's Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg and Denmark's Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen.

5–6.11. President L. Kaczyński attended the meeting of Presidents of Baltic Sea states in Vilnius, where he attended the plenary session, met the Presidents of Lithuania—Valdas Adamkus, and Latvia—Vaira Vike-Freiberga, and also took part in the opening of the exhibition devoted to the 15<sup>th</sup> anniversary of initiating diplomatic relations between Poland, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. The talks focused on cooperation among Baltic Sea states in an international forum, as well as the transportation network plans—Via Baltica and Rail Baltica. A joint declaration was signed emphasising the importance of the energy sector for the cooperation of Baltic Sea states.

### **Central European Cooperation**

18–19.05. President L. Kaczyński attended the meeting of Central Europe presidents, held in Varna, where he attended a plenary session under the motto The Present and Future of Central Europe and a meeting with representatives of business circles devoted to public-private partnership. He also attended the opening of the Gold of the Thracians exhibition.

25–26.06. the 6<sup>th</sup> Meeting of Parliamentary Presidents of Regional Partnership States Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia was held in Warsaw. Parliamentary presidents from Bulgaria and Romania—candidate countries for the European Union, were also invited to attend the meeting. The



topics included the discussion on the results of the June meeting of the European Council in Brussels and Community affairs.

23–24.11. Deputy Speaker of the Senate Maciej Płażyński attended the 7<sup>th</sup> Meeting of Parliamentary Presidents of Regional Partnership States in Vienna. The items on the agenda included the completion of the European Union enlargement process, as well as accession to the Schengen area and Euro zone, as well as EU foreign policy on energy.

### **Council of Europe**

30–31.05. Speaker of the Sejm Marek Jurek and Deputy Speaker of the Senate Marek Ziółkowski attended the European Conference of Presidents of Parliament, held in Tallinn, organised bi-annually at the initiative of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly. On 1.06. the conference attendees left to Helsinki to attend the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the parliamentary reform.

18.10. Speaker of the Senate B. Borusewicz visited Moscow to attend the 2<sup>nd</sup> Council of Europe Forum for the Future of Democracy, devoted to the rôle of political parties in building democracies in European states.

### **European Union**

30.01. Minister S. Meller attended the meeting of the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), devoted, among others, to the discussion on the operational programme for the Council for 2006 as well as the situation in Western Balkans, Kosovo, Belarus and Palestinian Autonomy.

6–7.03. An informal meeting of EU Ministers of Defence was held in Innsbruck, where key aspects of the European Security and Defence Policy operation were discussed. Minister R. Sikorski, representing Poland, held bilateral talks with Defence Ministers of Sweden and France.

23–24.03. Prime Minister K. Marcinkiewicz attended the meeting of the European Council in Brussels. The items on the agenda were EU energy policy, the liberalisation of labour markets and problems related to the future of the Union and the Constitutional Treaty.

10–11.04. Minister S. Meller attended the GAERC meeting in Brussels, where the situation in Ukraine following the parliamentary elections, the situation in the Middle East and Iraq were discussed, among other topics.

11–13.05. Prime Minister K. Marcinkiewicz visited Vienna to attend the 4<sup>th</sup> summit European Union—Latin America and the Caribbean, held under the theme of Strengthening of Bi-regional Strategic Associations. Items on the summit's agenda were, among others, protection of democracy, combating terrorism, energy resources management, fighting poverty, inequality and social isolation. The

Chairman of the Council of Ministers met, among others: President of Mexico Vicente Fox Quesada, President of Chile Michelle Bachelet Jeria, and Vice-President of Colombia Francisco Santos Calderón. Minister A. Fotyga, accompanying the Prime Minister, took part in a working meeting of 41 Ministers of Foreign Affairs, as well as held bilateral talks with heads of diplomacy of Mexico—Luis Ernesto Derbez Bautista and Brazil—Celso Luiz Nunez Amorim.

27–28.05. Minister A. Fotyga attended an informal meeting of the Community Foreign Affairs Ministers on the future of Europe, organised by the Austrian presidency at Klosterneuburg Abbey, near Vienna.

12–13.06. Minister A. Fotyga represented Poland at the GAERC meeting in Luxembourg.

15–16.06. Prime Minister K. Marcinkiewicz attended the meeting of the European Council in Brussels, where such topics as EU capacity to absorb subsequent states, Polish proposal for the Energy Charter for Europe, and EU action plan for subsequent years were discussed.

28.06. Minister A. Fotyga attended the GAERC meeting in Brussels.

29.06.–2.07. The annual Conference of Speakers of European Union Parliaments was held in Copenhagen, attended by the parliamentary speakers of 25 Member States, the President of the European Parliament, as well as the heads of parliament of EU candidate countries as well as Norway and Liechtenstein. Poland was represented by Speaker of the Sejm Marek Jurek as well as Deputy Speaker of the Senate Marek Ziółkowski. The main topic of the discussion was parliamentary cooperation among EU states and the future of Europe.

17.07. Minister A. Fotyga attended the GAERC Meeting, where the programme and priorities of the European Union were presented, and the problem of illegal immigration, the situation in the Middle East, relations with Western Balkan states and results of trade negotiations under the Doha Round were discussed.

1.08. Minister A. Fotyga attended the GAERC meeting in Brussels, where a joint declaration was adopted on the situation in Lebanon, and readiness was expressed for the European Union to participate in the UN stabilisation mission.

25.08. Minister A. Fotyga attended an extraordinary meeting of GAERC, during which the role of the European Union in solving the Middle East conflict was discussed.

30.08. Jarosław Kaczyński took his first foreign visit as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. He visited Brussels, where he met Belgium's Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, head of the European Commission José Manuel Durão Barroso, President of the European Parliament Joseph Borrell and High Representative of the European Union for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana. The issues

discussed were, among others, the European constitution, energy security, participation in peacekeeping missions, the situation in Ukraine and the Iranian nuclear programme. Prime Ministers G. Verhofstadt and J. Kaczyński discussed cooperation between the Benelux countries and the Visegrád Group as part of the European Union. Prime Minister L. Kaczyński also met delegates of the Association of the Polish War Veterans of Stanisław Maczek's 1<sup>st</sup> Armoured Brigade, as well as representatives of the Polish community in Belgium.

1–2.09. Minister A. Fotyga attended an informal meeting of European Union Foreign Affairs Ministers in Lappeenranta, Finland, under the called Gymnich formula. The topics discussed were peace road map for the Middle East, position on Iran's nuclear programme, as well as preparations for the new cooperation agreement with Russia.

1–5.09. Minister R. Sikorski took a working visit to the United States, where he met the Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, visited the Allied Command Transformation at Norfolk, and delivered a lecture at the conference entitled U.S.—European Forum on Global Issues.

10–11.09. Prime Minister J. Kaczyński and Deputy Prime Minister Ludwik Dorn attended the 6<sup>th</sup> Asia–Europe summit (ASEM) in Helsinki, attended by representatives of 39 states of Asia and Europe. Prime Minister Kaczyński held bilateral talks with 12 heads of states and governments of Europe and Asia, including President of Republic of Korea, Prime Ministers of China, Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam on cooperation and future of the EU, as well as on energy security.

13–14.10. The President of the European Commission J.M. Barroso visited Poland, where he met Prime Minister J. Kaczyński. The topics discussed covered preparations for the approaching informal EU summit in Lahti. J.M. Barroso attended an official inauguration of the academic year at the Warsaw School of Economics.

17.10. Minister A. Fotyga attended the GAERC meeting, where, among others, issues related to the European Union enlargement and Strategy on Africa were discussed.

19–20.10. President L. Kaczyński attended an informal meeting of EU heads of states and governments, held in Lahti. Items on the agenda included EU relations with Russia in the area of energy, the situation in Georgia and the border protection issue. EU heads of states and governments met at an official dinner with Russia's President Vladimir Putin.

13.11. Minister A. Fotyga attended the GAERC meeting in Brussels, where the agenda of the December European Union summit was discussed. At the joint meeting with Defence Ministers, heads of diplomacy listened to the report on the

progress of work on the development of EU civilian crisis management capabilities under the European Security and Defence Policy. At the meeting, Minister R. Sikorski and heads of the Defence Ministries of Germany, Lithuania, Latvia and Slovakia signed the Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of the joint Poland-Germany-Lithuania-Latvia-Slovakia combat group.

27–28.11. Speaker M. Jurek visited Brussels, where he met, among others, with the President of the European Parliament J. Borrell, the leaders of all parliamentary political groups, as well as the President of the House of Representatives of the Kingdom of Belgium Herman De Croo.

1–12.12. Minister A. Fotyga headed the Polish delegation at the GAERC meeting in Brussels.

14–15.12. President L. Kaczyński visited Brussels, to attend the meeting of the European Council, where he participated in the 1<sup>st</sup> working session and held meetings with the Presidents of the European Commission J.M. Barroso and the European Parliament J. Borrell. He also met Finland's Prime Minister Matti Vanhannen, who submitted "compromise solutions" on the Polish veto on EU–Russia agreement.

## NATO

16.02. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer visited Poland, holding talks with Minister S. Meller, Prime Minister K. Marcinkiewicz, and was received by President L. Kaczyński. The topics tackled included current issues concerning the Alliance policies, NATO transformation, energy and international security. The Secretary General also talked with Minister of National Defence Radosław Sikorski on the present missions of the Alliance in which Polish soldiers take part.

22–26.04. Chairman of NATO Parliamentary Assembly Pierre Lellouche visited Poland, and met in Warsaw with Minister S. Meller, visited the Sejm and delivered a lecture at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, entitled *Conducting War, How to Win or Lose the Peace*, and subsequently left for Gdynia to attend the meeting of the Standing Committee of NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

27–28.04. Minister S. Meller attended an informal meeting of NATO Foreign Affairs Ministers in Sofia, also attended by representatives of six European Union states that are not members of the Alliance, as well as Russia and Ukraine. Among issues discussed were those related to the 21<sup>st</sup> century global partnership, enlargement of Euro-Atlantic integration as well as allied operations, e.g. in Afghanistan.

8.06. Minister R. Sikorski visited Brussels, where he attended the meeting of NATO Defence Ministers and the session of the North Atlantic Council, devoted primarily to issues of the Alliance transformation, as well as review of the present situation in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan.

28–30.09. Minister R. Sikorski attended the meeting of NATO Defence Ministers in Portoroz, Slovenia. The ministers discussed topics connected with current NATO military operations. A meeting of the NATO-Russia Council was also held, the main topic of which was further development of cooperation. Minister R. Sikorski held bilateral talks with Ministers of Defence of France—Michèle Alliot-Marie, Latvia—Atis Slakteris, and Great Britain—Des Brown.

13–17.11. Over 300 parliamentarians from 26 NATO Member States, including the delegation of the Sejm and Senate of the Republic of Poland, attended an annual session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Quebec. They discussed, *inter alia*, the situation in Afghanistan, energy security, and relations between Russia and Georgia.

28–29.11. A meeting of the North Atlantic Council was held in Riga, at the level of NATO heads of states and governments. The meeting was attended by Javier Solana—High Representative of the European Union for Common Foreign and Security Policy, EU Council Secretary-General. The Polish delegation was headed by President L. Kaczyński, who also met Canada's Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Romania's President Traian Basescu. The sessions were devoted primarily to the Alliance's mission to Afghanistan, NATO enlargement and energy security of its member states.

### **Visegrád Group**

3–4.02. A summit of parliamentary chairpersons of Visegrád Group states, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland, was held in Prague. Poland was represented by Speaker of the Sejm Marek Jurek and Deputy Speaker of the Senate Ryszard Legutko. The main topic was liberalisation of labour market in European Union member states.

15.09. Presidents of Visegrád Group states, Poland—Lech Kaczyński, Czech Republic—Václav Klaus, Slovakia—Ivan Gašparovič, and Hungary—László Sólyom met at the castle of Lány (Czech Republic). The items on the agenda were the EU and the Euroconstitution, as well as accession of the Group's states to the Schengen area.

10.10. A meeting of Prime Ministers of the Visegrád Group was held in Visegrád on the occasion of the 15<sup>th</sup> anniversary of cooperation: Prime Ministers of: Poland—J. Kaczyński, Slovakia—Robert Fico, Hungary—Ferenc Gyurcsány and Czech Republic—Mirek Topolánek reviewed the cooperation and emphasised the need to agree common positions as regards energy, foreign and defence policies of the European Union

13.11. Speaker of the Senate Bogdan Borusewicz took part in the 3<sup>rd</sup> meeting of parliamentary chairpersons of the Visegrád Group states, held in Kosice, Slovakia.

The attendees signed a declaration on threats related to a potential delay in enlarging the Schengen area to cover new EU member states.

### **Weimar Triangle**

25.07. A meeting of Defence Ministers of France—Michèle Alliot-Marie, Germany—Franz Josef Jung, and Poland—R. Sikorski was held in the salt mine in Wieliczka, near Kraków. The ministers discussed directions of future cooperation of the Weimar Triangle states in the area of security and defence as well as declared the intent to establish a common Weimar European Union Combat Group in 2013.

4–5.12. A meeting of Weimar Triangle heads of states of: Poland—L. Kaczyński, Germany—Angela Merkel, and France—Jacques Chirac, was held in Mettlach, Germany. Military cooperation was evaluated positively: namely support to the elections in Congo, as well as involvement in Lebanon under UNIFIL operation; declarations were also made on continued cooperation under NATO, including ISAF force in Afghanistan. A joint declaration was also signed to commemorate the 15<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Triangle's existence.

### **Other**

17–24.09. The 61<sup>st</sup> session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York was attended by the Polish delegation, headed by Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Fotyga. On 19.09. President L. Kaczyński, who was visiting the United States at that time, delivered a speech during the general debate, emphasising the need for solidarity of nations, and met the Presidents of France, Iraq, Macedonia, Latvia and Afghanistan, as well as the Prime Minister of Norway. Minister A. Fotyga met with the Chairman of the Assembly Haya Rashed Al Khalifa, and held talks with Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China—Li Zhaoxing, Lebanon—Fawzi Shalloukh, Pakistan—Mian Khurshid Kasuri, Georgia—Gela Bezhushvili and Croatia—Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović. She also attended the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers of member states of Communities of Democracy Convening Group. Foreign Affairs Ministers of new European Union members from Central and Eastern Europe, including Poland, agreed in New York that they would act together seeking the lifting of visa requirements for travel to the United States. Minister A. Fotyga also attended an informal meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers of NATO member states, and the ceremony of adoption of the Ministerial Declaration on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

28–29.09. Speaker of the Senate B. Borusewicz attended the extraordinary (9<sup>th</sup>) meeting of the Association of European Senates, held in Prague, established at the initiative of the chairman of the French Senate in November 2000 with a view to developing cooperation, supporting the dual-chamber principle in parliamentary democracies, and increasing European awareness and identity.

5.10. the Presidents of Poland—L. Kaczyński, Lithuania—V. Adamkus, and Ukraine—Viktor Yushchenko, presented their common statement on the situation in Georgia, calling for “both parties to show moderation and composure, refrain from mutual accusations, and initiate dialogue and negotiations”.

23.11. Chairman of the Council of Ministers J. Kaczyński met OECD Secretary General Angel Gurría. The head of government expressed his satisfaction at the visit, which overlapped with the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Poland’s accession to OECD.

4–5.12. The 14<sup>th</sup> session of the Ministerial Council of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe was held in Brussels. Poland was represented by Minister A. Fotyga. The heads of diplomacy of OSCE member states adopted a number of decisions concerning the three dimensions of OSCE operation (human, economic and political-military).

## **Bilateral Relations**

### **Afghanistan**

2–3.10. Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Rangin Dadfar Spanta took a working visit to Poland. During his talks with Minister A. Fotyga he discussed bilateral political and economic relations, as well as actions taken by Poland for stabilisation and reconstruction in Afghanistan.

### **Albania**

14–16.11. Albania’s President Alfred Moisiu visited Poland. At the meeting with President L. Kaczyński the situation in the Balkans was discussed, along with problems related to Albania’s accession to NATO and the country’s EU aspirations. The main topic of the discussion, however, was bilateral relations. The President of Albania and the delegation of Albanian parliamentarians also met Speaker of the Senate B. Borusewicz.

### **Australia**

2–7.07. A delegation of Australia’s parliament visited Poland and met Speaker of the Senate B. Borusewicz, Deputy Speaker of the Sejm Marek Kotlinowski as well as representatives of Polish MPs. The topics discussed included problems connected with the work of both parliaments and cooperation between them. In Kraków, the Australian delegation met the authorities of Małopolskie province.

### **Austria**

20–21.01. Minister S. Meller took a visit to Austria, where he attended the European Strategies for Promoting Democracy in Post-communist Countries conference, met Chancellor Wolfgang Schäussel, whom he awarded with the Great Cross of the Order of Merit of the Republic of Poland for his actions for the

Reconciliation Fund, and held talks with Minister of Foreign Affairs Ursula Plassnik.

4–5.05. Speaker of the Sejm M. Jurek took an official visit to Austria, where he held talks with, among others, the President of the National Council Andreas Khol and the President of the Bundesrat Sissy Roth-Halvax, and met President Heinz Fischer and Minister U. Plassnik. Among the topics discussed were key issues related to the development of bilateral relations, European Union enlargement, the future of the Constitutional Treaty as well as opening of labour markets.

### **Belarus**

25.01. President L. Kaczyński received at a private meeting a Belarusian candidate for presidency Alaksandr Milinkevich, who presented the current political and economic situation in the country.

30.03. President L. Kaczyński received the leader of Belarusian opposition A. Milinkevich, who was visiting Poland.

### **Belgium**

5–7.05. the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Belgium Guy Verhofstadt visited Kraków, where he met the Chairman of the Council of Ministers K. Marcinkiewicz. He also visited the former concentration camp Auschwitz.

22–23.05. Belgium's Minister of Foreign Affairs Karel De Gucht visited Poland, met the Speaker of the Sejm M. Jurek, and also delivered a lecture at the University of Warsaw entitled European Union Enlargement—Past and Future.

### **Bosnia and Herzegovina**

29–30.06. Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina Mladen Ivanic took a working visit to Warsaw, where he met Minister A. Fotyga and Speaker of the Sejm M. Jurek.

### **Bulgaria**

8–9.01. Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria Ivailo Kalfin visited Poland and discussed the most important issues of bilateral relations, preparations of Bulgaria for the membership in the European Union as well as problems of regional and global security with Minister S. Meller. At I. Kalfin's meeting with Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration L. Dorn, situation in the Balkans was discussed, as well as the need expressed for intensified cooperation in the area of combating organised crime.

19.04. Prime Minister K. Marcinkiewicz took a visit to Bulgaria, where he held talks with the Head of Government Sergey Stanishev and President Georgi Pырванов. The topics tackled included the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the



EU, the need to work out a common energy policy in Europe, and the gas project cooperation.

### **Canada**

23–24.10. Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada Peter G. MacKay visited Poland. At his meeting with Minister A. Fotyga, bilateral relations and international security issues were discussed. The talks focused in particular on the involvement of Poland and Canada in Afghanistan, as well as the situation in the Middle East.

### **Chile**

26–29.01. The delegation of the Senate of Chile took a visit to Poland, headed by the Senate Speaker Sergio Romero Pizarro. The delegation was received by Speaker of the Senate B. Borusewicz, and Deputy Speaker of the Sejm Jarosław Kotlinowski. The items on the agenda were economic cooperation, parliamentary diplomacy and direct relations between the countries. S.R. Pizarro was also received by Minister S. Meller, and took a courtesy visit to Archbishop Stanisław Dziwisz.

12.10. Speaker of the Sejm M. Jurek met the delegation of the House of Deputies of the National Congress of the Republic of Chile, headed by its chairman Antonio Leal Labrín. The topics discussed included interparliamentary and economic cooperation, as well as social and family policy in both countries.

### **China**

28–30.03. Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Meller took an official visit to China, where he met Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and head of Chinese diplomacy Li Zhaoxing. One of the most important topics of the talks held in Beijing was economic cooperation. Minister S. Meller attended Poland-China forum on coal mining problems and work safety at coal mines, opened the exhibition presenting the potential of Polish companies, and delivered a lecture at the Chinese International Studies Institute entitled Poland–European Union–China in the Contemporary World, and also attended a discussion with Chinese political scientists.

12–14.04. Deputy Prime Minister of the State Council of the PRC Hui Liangyu took a visit to Poland, where he met Prime Minister K. Marcinkiewicz and was received by President L. Kaczyński. The topics discussed were international politics and bilateral relations, notably economic relations. In the presence of Deputy Prime Ministers of both states, Hui Liangyu and Zyta Gilowska, a letter of intent between the Ministries of Agriculture of China and Poland was signed concerning the establishment of the Poland-China Centre for Agricultural Science and Technology, intended to enhance cooperation and exchange in this respect.

14.09. Minister of Transport Jerzy Polaczek visited China, where he held talks with Minister of Railway Liu Zhijun, Deputy Minister of Information Technology

Industry Jiang Yaoping, Minister of the Central Civil Aviation Office Yang Yuanyuan as well as Minister of Communication Li Shenglin. The topics discussed covered, among others, restoration of regular and direct air communication between Poland and China prior to the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing. The Polish delegation attended the celebration of the 55<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the establishment of the China-Poland Ship Society Chipolbrok S.A, in Shanghai.

27.09. President L. Kaczyński received the counsellor of state at the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Deputy Prime Minister Chen Zhili. Topics of bilateral and international relations were discussed, including issues relating to UN reform and the situation in the Middle East.

27.11. During his visit to China, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture Andrzej Lepper signed an Interministerial agreement on the establishment of the Poland-China Centre for Agricultural Science and Technology.

### **Costa Rica**

21–24.03. Minister of Foreign Affairs and for Religions Tovar Faja took an official visit to Poland, holding talks with Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Meller, and visiting the Senate, where he met Speaker B. Borusewicz. The topics tackled were, among others, the contribution of populations of Polish descent to the political, social and economic development of Costa Rica.

### **Croatia**

26.04. Croatia's Prime Minister Ivo Sanader visited Poland, and met President L. Kaczyński, Chairman of the Council of Ministers K. Marcinkiewicz and Speaker of the Senate B. Borusewicz. The politicians discussed bilateral relations, political situation in the Balkans, and NATO and EU membership prospects for Croatia. Prime Minister I. Sanader attended the opening ceremony of the new seat of the Embassy of the Republic of Croatia in Poland.

### **Czech Republic**

16.01. Prime Minister K. Marcinkiewicz visited Prague, where he held talks with Prime Minister Jiří Paroubek, as well as met President Václav Klaus. Heads of governments discussed further cooperation under the Visegrád Group, greater opportunities for the free movement of employees in the European Union, as well as cooperation on energy. During the visit, an agreement was signed on mutual recognition of university studies and equivalence of documents, scientific titles and degrees.

16–17.02. President L. Kaczyński took a visit to the Czech Republic, where he met President Václav Klaus and Prime Minister Jiří Paroubek. The politicians from

both states shared their views on the most important issues, such as the European constitution.

6.10. Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic Alexandr Vondra took a visit to Warsaw, where he met Prime Minister J. Kaczyński and held talks at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the meetings, the politicians discussed energy security, potential location of American missile defences system, NATO's involvement in ISAF mission in Afghanistan, as well as current affairs from the European agenda.

### **Denmark**

19.10. Denmark's Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen visited Poland. The main topics of his talks with Prime Minister J. Kaczyński were European Union energy policy as well as the EU constitutional treaty.

### **Estonia**

8.03. The delegation of the Riigikog of the Republic of Estonia, headed by the Speaker Ene Ergma, visited the Polish parliament. The delegation was received by Speaker of the Senate B. Borusewicz, and Speaker of the Sejm M. Jurek. Issues discussed at the meetings included political and economic relations between Poland and Estonia as well as issues related to EU and NATO enlargement, cooperation between Poland and Estonia in the Baltic Sea region, as well as building the eastern policy of the European Union.

30.03. Prime Minister K. Marcinkiewicz paid a visit to Estonia, where he talked with Prime Minister Andrus Ansip on the European Union energy security, mutual economic relations, infrastructural and cultural projects. Among other items on the meetings' agenda were cooperation in the EU, liberalisation of services market as well as foreign policy, in particular on the situation in Eastern Europe following the elections in Ukraine and Belarus. Prime Minister K. Marcinkiewicz also met President Arnold Rüütel and the Speaker of the Riigikog E. Ergma.

8.12. Minister A. Fotyga took a working visit to Tallinn at the invitation of Minister of Foreign Affairs of Estonia. Talks at the MFA focused on bilateral and international issues, notably the Community affairs, cooperation in the Baltic Sea region and NATO, as well as energy security. Minister A. Fotyga also met Estonia's President Toomas H. Ilves and Speaker of the Riigikog Toomas Varek, and opened a new seat of the Polish embassy in Tallinn.

### **Finland**

16–17.05. Minister A. Fotyga paid a working visit to Finland, where she held talks with Head of Finnish diplomacy Errki Tuomioja, and met Speaker of the Eduskunta Paavo Lipponen.

30.05. Prime Minister K. Marcinkiewicz paid a visit to Helsinki. The main items on the agenda of his meeting with the Head of the Finnish Government Matti Vanhanen were the approaching Finnish presidency of the European Union, energy security, internal policy and EU enlargement.

28.06. Minister of National Defence R. Sikorski met the Finnish Head of Defence Ministry Seppo Kääriäinen, who was taking a working visit to Poland. The politicians primarily discussed the European Security and Defence Policy as well as further development of cooperation between the European Union and NATO.

17.11. Finland's Prime Minister M. Vanhanen visited Poland, where he met Chairman of the Council of Ministers J. Kaczyński. The talks focused primarily on the cooperation of both countries in the European Union and relations between the EU and Russia.

### **France**

23–24.02. President L. Kaczyński visited France, where he held talks with President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin on the Constitutional Treaty, Europe's energy security and the possibility of complete opening of the French labour market for Poles.

3.04. Prime Minister K. Marcinkiewicz took a working visit to France. He met Prime Minister D. de Villepin and President J. Chirac. The talks were held on, *inter alia*, bilateral cooperation, international and security policies as well as possibilities of opening the labour market. The discussions focused in particular on energy security. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers also met representatives of French businesses, associated in Mouvement des Entreprises de France (MEDEF)—the largest association of French employers.

14.06. At her working visit to Paris, Minister A. Fotyga met Minister of Foreign Affairs Philippe Douste-Blazy and Minister for European Affairs Catherina Colonna.

24–25.06. Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of France P. Douste-Blazy visited Warsaw.

7.07. President L. Kaczyński received the former President of the Republic of France Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. The talks revolved mainly around the European Constitution.

3.11. At the invitation of Minister A. Fotyga, Head of French diplomacy P. Douste-Blazy and Minister for European Affairs C. Colonna visited Warsaw. The state of bilateral relations, cooperation of both countries in the European Union forum, and topical international issues were discussed. The French visitors were received by Prime Minister J. Kaczyński, who discussed with them energy security, economic cooperation and EU affairs.

## Georgia

1–2.08. Georgia's President M. Saakashvili visited Poland, where he held talks with Minister A. Fotyga, Prime Minister J. Kaczyński and President L. Kaczyński. The topics included bilateral cooperation, energy security, situation in the Caucasus, the Middle East and Ukraine, as well as Georgia's accession to NATO. President M. Saakashvili also met Speaker of the Senate B. Borusewicz.

24.11. Speaker of the Sejm M. Jurek attended the celebration in Tbilisi connected with the 3<sup>rd</sup> anniversary of the Rose Revolution, which deposed President Eduard Shevardnadze. The Speaker met, among others, President M. Saakashvili and Speaker of the Georgian Parliament Nino Burdjanadze. Jointly with Presidents of Ukraine and Estonia, V. Yushchenko and T.H. Ilves, Speaker M. Jurek attended the unveiling ceremony of the Statute of Freedom.

30.11–1.12. Speaker of the Senate B. Borusewicz paid an official visit to Georgia, where he met President M. Saakashvili, Prime Minister Zurab Nougaideli, Speaker of the Parliament N. Burdjanadze and Minister of Foreign Affairs Gela Bejushvili. He also talked with representatives of the parliamentary opposition and trade unions. The situation in the region, relations with Russia and interparliamentary cooperation were discussed. Speaker B. Borusewicz also attended the conference entitled Promotion of Democracy: Enhancing the Role of Parliamentary Diplomacy.

## Germany

8–9.03. President L. Kaczyński paid a visit to Germany where he held talks with President Horst Köhler and Chancellor Angela Merkel on, among others, problems related to the establishment of the Centre against Expulsions. L. Kaczyński also met the Head of German diplomacy Frank-Walter Steinmeier, President of the Bundestag Norbert Lammert and the Convention of Polish Organisations in Germany, and delivered a lecture entitled Solidarity in Europe at the Humboldt University.

9.05. The most important challenges and tasks facing the enlarged European Union were discussed at the annual, 7<sup>th</sup> Forum Europe in Berlin by Prime Minister K. Marcinkiewicz and Chancellor Angela Merkel. Beforehand, both heads of governments had a face-to-face meeting devoted to bilateral cooperation, the situation in the European Union and the Baltic Sea gas pipeline.

18.05. President H. Köhler paid a working visit to Poland, where, together with President L. Kaczyński, he presided over the talks between the two delegations. The Presidents also attended the opening of the 51<sup>st</sup> International Book Exhibition and the concert of the Munich Philharmonic Orchestra conducted by Krzysztof Penderecki, on the occasion of the end of the Polish-German Year events.

14.06. President L. Kaczyński watched a football match in Dortmund, played between the national sides of Poland and Germany at the football World Cup.

28.06. Presidents L. Kaczyński and H. Köhler visited the Multinational Corps Northeast in Szczecin. Following the welcome ceremony, they met commanders of the unit. The topics discussed were, among others, preparations of the Corps for the mission in Afghanistan.

28–29.08. Speaker of the Sejm M. Jurek paid an official visit to the Federal Republic of Germany, the main purpose of which was to maintain a partner dialogue serving the purpose of the development of good neighbourhood relations between the two states. Speaker M. Jurek met the President of the Bundestag Norbert Lammert.

23–24.10. Minister R. Sikorski took a working visit to Berlin, where he attended the session of the 5<sup>th</sup> Congress on European Defence and the 17<sup>th</sup> Bundeswehr and the Society Forum.

30.10. Headed by Chancellor A. Merkel and Prime Minister J. Kaczyński the 8<sup>th</sup> Polish-German intergovernmental consultations were held in Berlin. Items on the agenda were the energy policies of both states and the European Union, claims of German citizens against Poland, and the Poland-Germany youth exchange. Talks at the ministerial level were also held, including at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where Minister A. Fotyga discussed bilateral relations, energy policy and international affairs, including the situation in Lebanon, Afghanistan, Iran and North Korea, with F-W. Steinmeier.

19–20.12. At the invitation of the Speaker of the Senate, the President of the Bundestag Harald Ringstorff visited Poland, where he met Speaker of the Senate B. Borusewicz, Speaker of the Sejm M. Jurek and Minister A. Fotyga. Talks revolved around the issue of Poland-Germany relations, including relations between the parliaments and the cooperation in the European Union.

### **Hungary**

17.01. Prime Minister K. Marcinkiewicz visited the Republic of Hungary. At the meeting with Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány, he presented the Polish proposal for the EU Energy Charter. Bilateral relations and possibility of closer cooperation within the Visegrad Group were also discussed.

24.03. President L. Kaczyński paid an official visit to Hungary, where he met President László Sólyom. Both Presidents attended the plenary session and a meeting of mayors of Polish and Hungarian partner towns, as well as the unveiling ceremony of the Poland-Hungary Friendship Statute. President L. Kaczyński also met Chairman of Fidesz party Viktor Orbán, as well as representatives of Polish

communities in Hungary. An intergovernmental agreement was signed on the protection of confidential information.

22–23.10. President L. Kaczyński attended the ceremony of the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution. Together with other heads of foreign delegations, he laid flowers under the Statute of Remembrance of the Victims of 25 October 1956 at Kossuth Square in Budapest and attended the Budapest Freedom Forum. President L. Kaczyński also talked with Germany's President H. Köhler.

24.10. Speakers of the Sejm M. Jurek and Senate B. Borusewicz visited Hungary, where they attended the remembrance ceremony of the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Hungarian Uprising in 1956. They also met President L. Sólyom and Chairman of the National Assembly Katalin Szili.

### **India**

18–20.05. Minister of Commerce and Industry of the Republic of India Kamal Nath visited Poland, where he met Chairman of the Council of Ministers K. Marcinkiewicz, Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Fotyga and Minister of Commerce Grzegorz Woźniak. An agreement on trade cooperation between Poland and India was signed.

7–11.05. Undersecretary of State at MFA Witold Waszczykowski took a working visit to India, where he held political consultations with, among others, Minister of State Anand Sharma, regarding bilateral relations and security in the region, economic cooperation between the two states, and the progress of work on the UN reform. Minister A. Sharma also met Minister of National Defence R. Sikorski.

### **Indonesia**

5–7.06. Minister R. Sikorski took an official visit to Indonesia, where he held talks on the development of cooperation between arms industries of both states, also with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and Minister of Defence Juwono Sudarson. The heads of Defence Ministries signed a cooperation agreement.

### **Iraq**

6.04. President L. Kaczyński visited the Republic of Iraq, where he held talks with President Jalal Talabani. At military base Echo in Al Diwaniyah, he met the commanders of the Multinational Division Centre-South, and soldiers of the Polish Military Contingent, and, in Baghdad, the acting Commander of the Multinational Corps Iraq, Brigadier General Peter Chiarelli.

6.09. At the meeting in Warsaw with Iraq's Minister of Defence Abede Al Kader Muhammad Jassem, Minister R. Sikorski expressed his satisfaction that Poland can contribute to stabilisation of the situation in Iraq.

20.12. Chairman of the Council of Ministers J. Kaczyński visited Iraq, where he met Prime Minister Nuri Kamil al-Maliki, and President D. Talabani. He also visited military base Echo in al Diwaniyah, where he exchanged traditional Christmas greetings with Polish soldiers. The Prime Minister was accompanied, among others, by Minister R. Sikorski.

22.12. President L. Kaczyński signed a motion for the extension of the mission of Polish soldiers in Iraq by the end of 2007 which would allow an earlier pulling out of Iraq of the Polish contingent, if the developments in the Republic of Iraq so allow.

### **Ireland**

22.05. Minister A. Fotyga visited Dublin, where she met Head of Irish diplomacy Dermot Ahern, with whom she discussed the future of the Constitutional Treaty, prospects for the European Union enlargement, including EU aspirations of Ukraine, Turkey and states of the Western Balkans. The issues related to employing Polish citizens in Ireland were also tackled.

2–4.10. At the invitation of the Chairman of the House of Representatives of Ireland Rory O'Hanlon, the Polish parliamentary delegation, headed by Speaker of the Sejm Marek Jurek, took an official visit to Dublin. The Speaker met with top Irish politicians, such as President Mary McAleese, Chairman R. O'Hanlon, Chairman of the Senate Rory Kiely and others. The talks focused on the future of European Union, in particular considering the position of both states on the continuation of the Community reforms following the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, bilateral relations and the situation of Polish people in Ireland.

### **Israel**

10–13.09. President L. Kaczyński visited Israel, where he held talks with President Moshe Katsav and Prime Minister Ehud Olmert on bilateral relations and situation in the Middle East. An agreement was signed on trips by Israeli youths to Poland. President L. Kaczyński also met the United Kingdom Prime Minister Tony Blair, who was visiting Jerusalem, and, in the Palestinian Autonomy, with President Mahmud Abbas, with whom he discussed the end of the conflict with Israel.

### **Italy**

18.05. On the 62<sup>nd</sup> anniversary of the battle of Monte Cassino, Prime Minister K. Marcinkiewicz laid a wreath at the cemetery where the Polish soldiers are buried.

25–26.01. President L. Kaczyński met in Rome with Italy's President Carlo Azeglio Ciampi.

12.10. Prime Minister J. Kaczyński visited Italy, where he met the Head of Italian Government Romano Prodi. The items on the meeting agenda were energy



security, bilateral relations, the current situation in the Middle East as well as cooperation in international organisations and the European Union. In Rome, the Prime Minister also met Polish citizens who live in Italy, and addressed them to maintain close relations with their homeland.

### **Japan**

30.03.–4.04. Minister S. Meller visited Japan, where, together with Head of Japanese diplomacy Taro Aso, he presided over talks between delegations of both countries. Bilateral relations were discussed, as well as the international situation (also in the European Union), relations with Russia, the situation in Asia, considering threats from North Korea, and the situation in Belarus. Minister S. Meller was also received by the Japanese heir to the throne Prince Naruhito, and visited the House of Counsellors of the Japanese parliament.

10–12.09. At the invitation of Koji Omi, Chairman of the Organising Committee of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Forum Science and Technology in Society, Minister of Science and Higher Learning professor Michał Seweryński visited Kyoto.

### **Kazakhstan**

9–12.01. Speaker of the Senate B. Borusewicz, together with the delegation of parliamentarians paid an official visit to the Republic of Kazakhstan.

### **Kuwait**

19.11. Speaker of the Senate B. Borusewicz, during his official visit to Kuwait, met, among others, the Amir of the country—Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Djabor al-Sabah, Prime Minister Nasir al-Sabah and Chairman of the National Assembly Jassem Mohammad Abdulmuhsen. He also opened the economic forum organised as part of the Polish Days in Kuwait.

### **Latvia**

29.03. Prime Minister K. Marcinkiewicz visited Latvia, where he held talks with Prime Minister Aigars Kalvitis and President V. Vike-Freiberga. Bilateral relations, cooperation in the European Union, energy policy in the Community states as well as common actions in this respect in the Baltic Sea region were discussed. Agreements on cooperation in culture and education were signed and on mutual transfer and admittance of persons who don't have valid permits to be in the territories of either state. Prime Minister K. Marcinkiewicz also met the President of the Parliament Ingrida Ūdre.

16.11. Prime Minister A. Kalvitis paid a working visit to Warsaw, where he discussed bilateral cooperation and common actions of both states in the European Union with Chairman of the Council of Ministers J. Kaczyński.

## **Libya**

18.11. Speaker B. Borusewicz and the delegation of the Ministry of National Defence attended the ceremony commemorating the 65<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the combat in defence of Tobruk by the Polish Independent Carpathian Rifle Brigade.

## **Lithuania**

13–14.03. President L. Kaczyński visited Lithuania, where he held talks with, among others, President Valdas Adamkus, on European energy security. He also met Prime Minister Algirdas Brazauskas and visited the Seimas, where he delivered a lecture entitled Poland and Lithuania in a United Europe. An intergovernmental agreement was signed on cooperation in combating organised crime and other crimes, as well as on cooperation in transborder regions, as well as the protocol on cooperation between the Foreign Affairs Ministries of both countries.

3–4.05. President L. Kaczyński visited Vilnius to attend the international conference entitled A Common Vision for a Common Neighbourhood. The President of the Republic of Poland and President of the Republic of Lithuania V. Adamkus held a reception on the occasion of the start of the conference, and also delivered a welcome speech. He also held a number of bilateral meetings, including one with the Secretary-General of the EU Council, the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy J. Solana, Georgia's President M. Saakashvili, President of the Republic of Estonia Arnold Rüütel, Vice-President of the United States Richard Cheney, Ukraine's President Viktor Yushchenko and President of the Republic of Latvia V. Vike-Freiberga.

19–21.05. Speaker of the Senate Bogdan Borusewicz paid an official visit to Lithuania, where he held talks, among others with Chairman of the Seimas V. Muntianas. He also attended the sessions of the 9<sup>th</sup> Convention of Poles in Lithuania.

1–3.06. The 14<sup>th</sup> session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland and the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania was held in Warsaw, under the motto Poland and Lithuania—Fifteen Years After Resumption of Diplomatic Relations; Cooperation Between Poland and Lithuania as Eastern Neighbours of the European Union.

12–14.06. Speaker of the Sejm M. Jurek took an official visit to Lithuania, where he met top politicians, including Chairman of the Seimas Viktoras Muntianas, and President V. Adamkus.

27.07. Lithuania's Prime Minister Gediminas Kirkilas visited Warsaw, meeting Prime Minister J. Kaczyński, Speakers of the Sejm and Senate, M. Jurek and B. Borusewicz. The discussions focused on bilateral relations, cooperation in the European Union, cooperation on energy, situation in Belarus and Ukraine, as well as the situation of Poles in Lithuania, and of Lithuanians in Poland. The Lithuanian

Prime Minister was received by President L. Kaczyński. He also met Lithuanian entrepreneurs in Poland and the management of PKN Orlen.

4–5.09. On the occasion of the 15<sup>th</sup> anniversary of resumption of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Poland and Republic of Lithuania, the commemoration event was held in Vilnius, attended by, among others President L. Kaczyński, Speakers of the Sejm and Senate M. Jurek and B. Borusewicz, Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Fotyga and Minister of National Defence R. Sikorski. The event was also attended by the delegation of Polish parliamentarians, representatives of the culture and science communities, as well as persons who rendered meritorious service for Poland-Lithuania relations. Presidents L. Kaczyński and V. Adamkus held talks on, among other topics, cooperation between Poland and Lithuania on energy. Minister R. Sikorski met with Lithuania's Minister of Defence Juozas Olekas.

29–30.09. President of Lithuania V. Adamkus visited Poland, where he held talks with President L. Kaczyński and Prime Minister J. Kaczyński on bilateral cooperation, relations of both countries with Belarus and Russia, as well as cooperation among Baltic Sea states and Visegrád Group states. The presidents signed a joint declaration and a letter of intent concerning the unification of electrical power systems of both countries and cooperation in developing the power engineering industry, as well as attended an official opening of the new seat of the embassy of Lithuania and the inauguration of the academic year at the University of Warsaw.

18.11. Lithuania's Prime Minister G. Kirkilas visited Poland, discussing with Prime Minister J. Kaczyński the so-called energy link project, to connect electrical power systems of Lithuania, Poland, Western Europe and Baltic Sea states. The Prime Ministers also discussed Poland's position on the EU-Russia agreement, and bilateral relations between Poland and Lithuania, Poland's participation in the construction of a nuclear power plant in Lithuania as well as development of mutual investment.

20–21.11. The session of the Consultative Committee of Presidents of the Republic of Poland and Republic of Lithuania was held in Warsaw. The future legal framework of the European Union, Common Foreign and Security Policy, the European Security and Defence Policy as well as international security were discussed.

30.11.–2.12. the 15<sup>th</sup> session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland and the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania was held in Vilnius on the subject of Implementation of the [Poland–Lithuania] Treaty—Common Concerns of Parliamentarians.

8.12. Prime Minister J. Kaczyński visited Vilnius. An agreement was signed on the establishment of the energy link.

15.12. Prime Minister J. Kaczyński attended the official finalisation of the largest Polish foreign investment—acquisition from the Lithuanian government by PKN Orlen of 30.66% of shares in the refinery in Mozejki, held in Vilnius.

### **Macedonia**

5–6.04. Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia Ilinka Mitreva visited Poland, where she held talks with the Head of Polish diplomacy S. Meller on Poland-Macedonia political and economic relations. An inter-state agreement was signed on social security, an intergovernmental agreement on transferring and admittance of persons who don't have a valid permit to be in either state and decisions were taken on lifting visa fees for citizens of Macedonia, and lifting visa requirements for Polish citizens. President L. Kaczyński received Minister I. Mitreva.

### **Monaco**

25–27.10. Prince Albert II of Monaco visited Poland. At the meeting with President L. Kaczyński, Prince Albert II gave an account of his personal experience with charity work, and for the Institute for Child Development Support in Gdańsk—a foundation established by Barbara Piasecka-Johnson.

### **Mongolia**

4–6.10. Mongolia's Minister of Defence Mishing Sonompil paid an official visit to Warsaw at the invitation of Minister R. Sikorski. Along with talks between the ministers, Minister M. Sonompil also attended a meeting with the head of the General Staff, General Franciszek Gągor.

### **Montenegro**

23–24.03. President of the Parliament of the Republic of Montenegro Ranko Krivokapić and his delegation visited Poland at the invitation of the Speaker of the Senate. At the meeting with Speaker B. Borusewicz the situation in the Balkans, the May referendum on the future of the federal state of Serbia and Montenegro, the future status of Kosovo and cooperation between Poland and Montenegro were discussed. Parliamentarians from Montenegro were also received by President L. Kaczyński and Speaker of the Sejm M. Jurek.

20.06. Poland recognised the Republic of Montenegro

12–13.11. Montenegro's President Filip Vujanović took an official visit to Poland, and met the Chairman of the Council of Ministers J. Kaczyński to discuss bilateral, notably economic, cooperation. The problems of the Balkans and Kosovo were also discussed, as well as issues related to NATO and the European Union.

### **Netherlands**

6.12. Minister A. Fotyga attended the 17<sup>th</sup> Utrecht Conference, held in Amsterdam. She met Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands Bernard Bot. Bilateral relations, energy and Community affairs were discussed.

### **New Zealand**

4–6.07. The Head of diplomacy of New Zealand Winston Peters visited Poland. At the meeting with Minister A. Fotyga, bilateral political and economic cooperation was discussed. Minister W. Peters also held talks at the Sejm and the Senate.

### **Norway**

22–23.11. Minister A. Fotyga took a working visit to the Kingdom of Norway, at the invitation of the Head of Norwegian diplomacy Jonas Gahr Støre, where she held talks on bilateral relations and international issues, including energy security, NATO and the EU. Minister A. Fotyga visited the Norwegian Parliament and, in Kongsberg, thanked the local authorities for the support provided for Poland in the eighties, and met representatives of Norwegian communities that supported the Solidarity trade union.

### **Pakistan**

20–22.11. A delegation of the Ministry of National Defence, headed by Secretary of State Marek Zająkła, paid a visit to Pakistan. The purpose of the visit was to hold talks with Pakistani Minister of Defence Rao Sikandar Iqbal and to attend the 4<sup>th</sup> International Defence Equipment Exhibition IDEAS 2006.

### **Philippines**

3–5.06. Minister R. Sikorski and a large delegation of businesspeople took an official visit to the Philippines. During his sojourn in Manila, he met, among others, Secretary of Department of Defence Avelino J. Cruz jr., with whom he discussed economic cooperation between defence sectors of Poland and the Philippines and also exchanged ideas on combating terrorism.

### **Romania**

4–6.06. The Senate delegation, headed by Speaker B. Borusewicz, visited Bucharest.

9–10.11. The Head of Romanian diplomacy Mihai Răzvan Ungureanu visited Warsaw at the invitation of Minister A. Fotyga. Cooperation prospects for both states in the European Union, cooperation in NATO and energy security were discussed. Minister M.R. Ungureanu was received by President L. Kaczyński and Prime Minister J. Kaczyński, visited the Sejm and opened the Romanian Cultural Institute in Warsaw.

### **Russia**

20.02. Advisor to the President of the Russian Federation, and his special representatives for relations with the European Union Sergey Yastrzhembsky visited Warsaw. During the talks with President L. Kaczyński and Minister S. Meller, the politicians from both states expressed their intent to improve Poland-Russia relations. S. Yastrzhembsky submitted a letter from President Vladimir Putin to the Polish president.

4–5.10. Russia's Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov visited Poland, where he met President L. Kaczyński, Prime Minister J. Kaczyński, and Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Fotyga. The development of bilateral and economic relations was discussed, including problems related to the construction of the Nord Stream gas pipeline and the ban on exports of Polish meat and food products to Russia, as well as international issues. Intensified regional and cultural cooperation was agreed on, as well as the consultation plan between Foreign Affairs Ministries for 2007.

### **San Marino**

23–25.06. Captain Regents of the Republic of San Marino (performing the function of heads of state), Gianfranco Terenzi and Loris Francini, visited Kraków.

### **Serbia**

28–29.06. Serbia's Minister of Foreign Affairs Vuk Draškovic visited Warsaw.

### **Slovakia**

16.01. Prime Minister K. Marcinkiewicz visited Slovakia, where he held talks with Prime Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda on energy security, bilateral relations between Poland and Slovakia, and cooperation in the Visegrád group.

11.02. Prime Minister of the Republic of Slovakia M. Dzurinda visited Warsaw, attending the Polish Business Leaders Grand Event, organised by the Business Centre Club.

22.03. President L. Kaczyński visited Slovakia, where he met President I. Gašparovič and Prime Minister M. Dzurinda, and delivered a lecture at J.A. Komenski University.

13–14.07. Slovakia's Minister of Foreign Affairs Ján Kubiš visited Poland, where he met Minister A. Fotyga. The most important components of Community and regional policy, cooperation in the Visegrád Group and security policy were discussed.

5.10. Slovakia's Prime Minister R. Fico visited Poland, where he met Prime Minister J. Kaczyński. The items on the meeting agenda included problems related with delays in extending the Schengen area and entry to the Euro zone.

### **Slovenia**

12–13.09. A parliamentary delegation, headed by Speaker of the Sejm M. Jurek took an official visit to Ljubljana. The Speaker visited President of the Republic of Slovenia Janez Drnovšek, and met Prime Minister Janez Janša as well as Minister of Foreign Affairs Dimitri Rupel. Talks were also held at the Slovenian Parliament.

### **Spain**

8–9.03. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Poland-Spain Intergovernmental Consultations were held in Grenada, headed by Prime Ministers K. Marcinkiewicz and José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero. Among items on the agenda were common energy policy, Community policy on Russia and Ukraine, security of the European Union external borders, and problems of illegal immigration. Spain announced its decision on lifting, as of 1 May 2006, limitations in the free flow of labour between Spain and the new EU states.

### **Sweden**

6.02. A delegation of the Riksdag of the Kingdom of Sweden, headed by the Chairman Björn von Sydow, visited the Sejm and Senate of the Republic of Poland. Talks with Speaker of the Sejm M. Jurek, and the Deputy Speaker of the Senate M. Płażyński focused on interparliamentary relations and EU issues.

13.03. Prime Minister K. Marcinkiewicz visited Sweden, where he talked with Prime Minister Göran Persson on cooperation between Poland and Sweden in the European Union, energy policy, and the need to work out a common EU policy on Russia. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers was received by King Karl Gustav XVI, and met the Chairman of the Riksdag B. von Sydow and representatives of the Polish communities in Sweden and Swedish communities supporting the Solidarity trade union.

23.05. Minister A. Fotyga visited Stockholm, where she met the Head of Swedish diplomacy Jan Eliasson. Topics of the meeting were enlargement of the European Union, the Constitutional Treaty, the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Community energy policy and cooperation in the Baltic Sea region as well as the UN reform. Minister A. Fotyga took part in the conference entitled European Union enlargement—the experiences of Poland, Ireland and Sweden.

31.08. Minister A. Fotyga attended the conference of states-donors for Lebanon, organised in Stockholm. She also met Sweden's Minister of Foreign Affairs J. Eliasson.

### **Switzerland**

20.02. Switzerland's Minister of Foreign Affairs Micheline Calmy-Rey visited Warsaw. Talks with Minister S. Meller revolved around bilateral relations and situations in neighbouring countries of the European Union and in the Middle East.

### **Thailand**

16–23.06. Princess Chullabhorn Mahidol, daughter of the King of Thailand Rama IX, visited Poland and President L. Kaczyński, and also attended a scientific conference organised by the Medical Academy in Lublin.

### **Turkey**

13–14.04. Minister S. Meller took an official visit to Turkey, where he met Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül. Bilateral relations were discussed, including possible intensified cooperation in the area of energy security, as well as issues related to Turkish efforts to achieve full membership of the European Union.

5–8.07. A delegation of the Sejm, headed by Speaker M. Jurek, took an official visit to Turkey, where they met, among others, Chairman of the Great Turkish National Assembly Bülent Arinc, President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and Prime Minister R.T. Erdoğan. Main items on the agenda were Europe's energy security, Turkey's negotiations with the European Union and the cultural exchange.

### **Ukraine**

9–10.01. Minister S. Meller visited Ukraine, where he held talks with Minister of Foreign Affairs Boris Tarasyuk and was received by President V. Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yuri Yehanurov. Bilateral relations and prospects for their development were discussed, along with key international issues. A consultations plan between Ministries of both countries for 2006 was signed. Minister S. Meller also met the chairman of the BjuT electoral bloc Yulia Tymoshenko.

16–17.02. Ukraine's Prime Minister Yuri Yehanurov visited Poland, holding talks with Prime Minister K. Marcinkiewicz on the possible invigoration of Poland-Ukraine economic cooperation, including in the area of energy and the project for the extension of Odessa-Brody oil pipeline. A joint economic declaration was signed, along the declaration on the establishment of the Council for Cooperation on Culture, Education and National Minorities. Prime Minister Y. Yehanurov was received by President L. Kaczyński, and also visited the Sejm and Senate., where he met Speakers M. Jurek and B. Borusewicz.

28.02.–1.03. President L. Kaczyński paid an official visit to Ukraine, where he met President V. Yushchenko and Prime Minister Y. Yehanurov. He also held talks with the chairman of Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, as well as other Ukrainian politicians.



Minister R. Sikorski, accompanying the president, met Ukraine's Minister of Defence Anatoliy Hrycenko, with whom he discussed Poland-Ukraine cooperation in European and Euro-Atlantic security structures.

1.04. President L. Kaczyński attended in Lviv the ceremony of 350<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Lviv oaths of King John Casimirus.

10–11.04. Minister of Foreign Affairs B. Tarasyuk attended the conference Ukraine and Euro-Atlantic policy, organised in Warsaw. He also met Minister S. Meller and President L. Kaczyński, who emphasised that Poland was ready to develop a strategic partnership with Ukraine and strongly support Ukraine in its efforts to integrate into the European Union and NATO.

12–13.05. Ukraine's President V. Yushchenko took an official visit to Poland and, together with President L. Kaczyński attended plenary sessions on bilateral relations and international issues, such as potential joint initiatives in the area of energy security, military and technology cooperation, and an improved border check situation. Both presidents attended the events to commemorate Polish and Ukrainian residents of Pawlokoma in the Rzeszów region, murdered in 1945. President Yushchenko also met Speakers of the Senate B. Borusewicz, and Sejm—M. Jurek.

20.05. Speaker of the Sejm M. Jurek visited Lviv, where he attended the Poland-Ukraine Personality Event, met local authorities and representatives of Polish communities in Ukraine as well as the Lviv Archbishop, Cardinal Marian Jaworski.

22.05. President L. Kaczyński visited Kiev. He met Presidents of the GUAM states: Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. The issues related to energy security and Poland's cooperation with the states of the group were discussed. Subsequently, the Polish president met President V. Yushchenko.

8.06. Minister A. Fotyga visited Kiev, where she held talks with Minister of Foreign Affairs B. Tarasyuk.

29.08. Minister B. Tarasyuk visited Poland, holding talks with the Head of Polish diplomacy A. Fotyga, as well as with Prime Minister J. Kaczyński and Minister R. Sikorski.

30.09. President L. Kaczyński attended the 750<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Lviv and talked with the Presidents of Lithuania and Ukraine on international issues. A joint declaration on the protection of Lviv's cultural heritage was signed.

15.11. Chairman of the Council of Ministers J. Kaczyński visited Kiev. He held talks with Prime Minister V. Yanukovych on energy security and development of cooperation in the area, economic and trade relations as well as implementation prospects for joint investment projects. He also talked with the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc chairman.

### **United Kingdom**

5.05. Minister R. Sikorski visited London, where he talked with the outgoing Minister of Defence John Reid on the common involvement of Polish and British Armed Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

6–8.11. President L. Kaczyński took an official visit to the United Kingdom. He was received by Queen Elizabeth II at a private audience, and held talks with Prime Minister T. Blair. In addition, he delivered a lecture entitled “What Vision Does Europe Need?” at the International Institute for Strategic Studies as well as met representatives of Polish communities in the United Kingdom, including veterans of World War Two, and the Confederation of British Industry. In Edinburgh, he talked with First Minister of Scotland Jack McConnell, and received an honorary membership in the Society of Writers to Her Majesty's Signet at the Scottish Parliament.

### **United States**

8–11.02. President L. Kaczyński visited the United States, where he held talks with President George W. Bush, also on the situation in Iraq, Ukraine and Belarus, visited the Senate and met representatives of American opinion leaders and the American Jewish Committee. President L. Kaczyński also attended a symbolic take-over of the library of Zofia and Stefan Korboński by the Warsaw Uprising Museum. During the visit, an agreement was signed on the training in F-16 planes for Polish military pilots, and a five-year agreement between the governments of Poland and the United States on cooperation in science and technology.

18.05. Minister of National Defence R. Sikorski, in a private visit to the United States, met Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld.

17–20.06. Minister A. Fotyga took a working visit to the United States. She met, among others, Vice-President D. Cheney, and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.

12–15.09. Prime Minister J. Kaczyński visited the United States, where he held talks with Vice-President D. Cheney, Secretary of State C. Rice and Secretary for Energy Samuel Bodman. The talks were dominated by the issue of energy security. J. Kaczyński also attended a short meeting with President G.W. Bush. Minister R. Sikorski, accompanying the president, announced in Washington that Poland would send 1,000 soldiers to Afghanistan.

1-4.11. Minister R. Sikorski visited the United States, where he met Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld. He also attended the conference entitled U.S.—European Forum on Global Issues.

### **Vatican**

25–26.01. President L. Kaczyński visited the Holy See, where he was received by Pope Benedict XVI at a private audience. He also met Secretary of State Cardinal

Angelo Sodano, with whom he discussed the May pastoral visit of the Pope to Poland.

10.04. Pope Benedict XVI granted a private audience to Speaker of the Sejm M. Jurek.

17–18.05. Prime Minister K. Marcinkiewicz visited the Holy See, where, on the eighty-sixth anniversary of the birth of John Paul II and a week before Benedict XVI's visit to Poland, he was received by the Pope at a private audience. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers also met Secretary of State of the Holy See Cardinal A. Sodano.

25–28.05. Benedict XVI took a pastoral visit to Poland. Among other places, he visited the former concentration camp Auschwitz-Birkenau. The Pope met President L. Kaczyński, and the Polish diplomatic corps.

12.10. Prime Minister J. Kaczyński visited the Holy See. The main item on the agenda of the meeting with Benedict XVI at a private audience was international affairs and the situation of the Catholic Church in Poland.

Compiled by *Małgorzata Ławacz*

Sources: *Rzeczpospolita* 2006, *Kronika Sejmowa* 2006, [www.prezydent.pl](http://www.prezydent.pl), [www.kprm.gov.pl](http://www.kprm.gov.pl), [www.msz.gov.pl](http://www.msz.gov.pl), [www.mon.gov.pl](http://www.mon.gov.pl), [www.senat.gov.pl](http://www.senat.gov.pl).

## **Management Staff of Polish Foreign Service\***

### **I. Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

#### **Minister**

**Anna Fotyga.** Born on 12 January 1957 in Lębork. In 1981, graduated from the Gdańsk University (foreign trade) and took up employment with the Foreign Department of the National Executive Committee of "Solidarność" Independent Trade Union. During the martial law, she gave private English and Russian lessons. In 1987–1989, she worked for the "Modem" company (Board of Directors Member); in 1989–1991—at the Foreign Affairs Office of the National Committee of "Solidarność" Trade Union (head of office), and in 1992–1994 at the "Przekaz" company—coastal Poland press publisher. In 1999–2001, international affairs advisor to the chairman of the Health Insurance Supervision Office (UNUZ), and in 2000—international affairs advisor to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Acting Head of Foreign Affairs Department of the Office of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Local council member in Gdańsk (2001). In 2002–2004, Deputy Mayor of Gdańsk. European Parliament Deputy (2004–2005), UEN Group Coordinator at the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament.

#### **Secretary of State**

**Pawel Kowal.** Born on 22 July 1975 in Rzeszów. Graduated from the Faculty of History at the Jagiellonian University. In 1998–2000, Head of Department at the Foreign Affairs Department of the Office of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. In 2000–2001, acting Director of the International Cooperation and European Integration Department at the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage. Eastern policy expert at the Centre for International Relations (2001–2003); Chairman of the Council for the Warsaw district of Ochota, local council member (2002–2005), Director of Mazowieckie Centre for Culture and Arts (2003–2005). Since 2005, Director of the Press Office of the City of Warsaw Office. Since 25 September 2005, Member of Parliament, Deputy Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee for Culture and Media, and member of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee.

#### **Under-Secretaries of State**

**Janusz Józef Stańczyk.** Born in Tarnów in 1955. Graduated from the Faculty of Law at the Jagiellonian University (1977) and member of the academic staff of the university (1978–1980). Doctoral studies at the Institute of the State and Law

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\* As at 31 December 2006. Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs; [www.msz.gov.pl](http://www.msz.gov.pl).

(1980–1983) with the PhD Diploma in Law (1985). Senior lecturer at the Institute of Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences (1983–1993). Since 1992, employed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as Director of the Legal and Treaty Department (1992–1995), MFA General Director (1995–1996), Deputy Director of the Studies and Planning Department (1997), Undersecretary of State at MFA (1997–1999), Ambassador-Permanent Representative of the Republic of Poland to the United Nations (2000–2004); in 2002 appointed as ambassador *ad personam*. Director of the United Nations System and Global Problems Department (2004–2005). Since 4 November 2005, Undersecretary of State at MFA.

**Witold Jan Waszczykowski.** Born in 1957 in Piotrków Trybunalski. Graduated from the Faculty of Philosophy and History of the Łódź University (1980), the Department of International Affairs at the University of Oregon (1991) and received a postgraduate degree in international security and arms control from the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva (1993), PhD in humanities. Long record as an employee of MFA (including Head of RP Liaison Office to NATO, Deputy RP Representative to NATO, Poland's Ambassador to Iran). Since 4 November 2005, Undersecretary of State at MFA.

**Rafał Wiśniewski.** Born in Łódź in 1965. Graduate of the Faculty of Modern Languages at the Warsaw University (1989). In 1988–1991, academic staff member at the Chair of Hungarian Language at WU. Author of papers and translations on contemporary Hungarian and Central European history. Co-founder of the Foundation for International Initiatives. Expert in Central European affairs at the International Studies Centre with the Polish Senate (1990–1991). Since 1991, employed at MFA. In 1991–1992, Secretary of the Embassy of Poland in Budapest, subsequently Director of the Polish Institute in Hungary (1992–1997), Head of MFA Central Europe Department (1997–1998). Foreign Affairs Minister's Representative for Polish Culture and Promotion (1998). Director and coordinator of departments under the public and cultural diplomacy division of MFA (1998–2001). In 2001–2006, Poland's Ambassador to Hungary. Since November 2005, Undersecretary of State at MFA.

### Director-General of Foreign Service

**Mariusz Kazana.** Born on 5 August 1960 in Bydgoszcz. Graduated from the Faculty of Law at the Warsaw University (1987). In September 1988, began his diplomacy traineeship at MFA and, following completion, was employed at its Europe Department (1989), where he dealt with Poland-France relations. In 1992, left Poland to work at the Polish Embassy in Paris. Following his return from France, employed again at MFA Europe Department, to return to work at the Polish Embassy in Paris after three years (1999). In 2003, appointed as Head of EU Common Foreign and Security Policy Department at the European Union

Department. From March 2005 till July 2006—Deputy Director at the Foreign Policy Strategy and Planning Department. Since July 2006, Head of the General Director Office, since August until 25 November—acting as General Director.

### **Secretariat of the Minister**

Director: Jarosław Lindenberg

Deputy Directors: Mikołaj Karłowski, Zbigniew Zaręba

### **Bureau of the Director-General**

Director: Przemysław Czyż

Deputy Director: Mikołaj Kwiatkowski

### **Departments**

#### **1. Department of Strategy and Foreign Policy Planning**

Director: Jacek Czaputowicz

Deputy Director: Jarosław Bratkiewicz

#### **2. Department of the European Union**

Director: Jarosław Starzyk

Deputy Directors: Małgorzata Banat-Adamiuk, Paweł Herczyński,  
Zbigniew Krużyński

#### **3. Department of Security Policy**

Director: Robert Kupiecki

Deputy Directors: Tadeusz Chomicki, Tomasz Łęcarski, Marek Ziółkowski

#### **4. Legal and Treaty Department**

Director: Marek Madej

Deputy Directors: Krzysztof Kocel, Andrzej Kremer, Janusz Łącki

#### **5. Department of the UN System and Global Affairs**

Director: Marcin Nawrot

Deputy Director: Mirosław Łuczka

#### **6. Department of Foreign Economic Policy**

Director: Katarzyna Skórzyńska

Deputy Directors: Grzegorz Gawin, Lidia Raciborska

#### **7. Department of Europe**

Director: Jerzy Margański

Deputy Directors: Jerzy Chmielewski, Tomasz Kozłowski

#### **8. Department of Eastern Policy (since 16 January 2006)**

Director: Wojciech Zajączkowski

Deputy Director: Henryk Litwin

#### **9. Department of the Americas**

Director: Andrzej Jaroszyński

Deputy Directors: Krzysztof Hinz

**10. Department of Asia and the Pacific**

Director: Jacek Najder

Deputy Directors: Jolanta Janek, Beata Stoczyńska

**11. Department of Africa and the Middle East**

Director: Michał Murkociński

Deputy Directors: Wojciech Bożek, Maciej Kozłowski, Andrzej Świeżaczyński

**12. Diplomatic Protocol**

Director: Tomasz Orłowski

Deputy Directors: Grzegorz Chmielewski, Małgorzata Łatkiewicz, Tadeusz Żyliński

**13. Department of Promotion**

Director: Agnieszka Wielowieyska

Deputy Director: Tomasz Niegodzis, Monika Zuchniak-Pazdan

**14. Department of Information System**

Director: Andrzej Sadoś

Deputy Directors: Przemysław Antoniewicz, Aleksandra Piątkowska

**15. Department of Consular and Polish Diaspora Affairs**

Director: Andrzej Jasionowski

Deputy Directors: Jacek Junosza-Kisielewski, Joanna Kozińska-Frybes, Zygmunt Matynia

**16. Development Co-operation Department**

Director: Jerzy Pomianowski

Deputy Director: Andrzej Skrzydło

**17. Archives**

Director: Henryk Szlajfer

Deputy Director: Małgorzata Mroczkowska

**18. Bureau of Personnel and Training**

Director: Andrzej Papierz

Deputy Directors: Beata Brzywczy, (acting) Ryszard Moroz

**19. Bureau of Administration and Finance**

Director: Leszek Brenda

Deputy Directors: Iwona Arkuszewska, Mariusz Skórko

**20. Bureau of Communications**

Director: Zbigniew Powąłka

Deputy Directors: Dariusz Toruń, (acting) Dariusz Torchała

**21. Bureau of IT**

Director: Grzegorz Pachulski

Deputy Director: Włodzimierz Marciński

**22. Office of the Plenipotentiary for Classified Information Security**

Director (acting): Monika Sudar

Deputy Director (acting): Przemysław Leśniak

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### **23. Maintenance Services Unit**

Director: Małgorzata Tyszkiewicz-Adamczyk

## **II. Ambassadors and Consuls Polish Diplomatic Posts (to States and International Organisations)**

### **States**

#### **Afganistan**

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Kabul  
Maghzan Street, Kharte Seh, Kabul  
phone: (0 093 20) 250 1353, (0 093) 772 215 032 (consul);  
fax: (0 093 20) 250 1351

**Head of the Mission: Robert Krzyżanowski—Counsellor**

#### **Albania**

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Tirana  
Rruga e Dureshit 123, Tirana  
phone: (0 0355 42) 34 190; fax: (0 0355 42) 33 364  
polemb@albaniaonline.net

**Ambassador: Artur Tomaszewski (since 29 August 2002)**

#### **Algeria**

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Algiers  
37, Avenue Mustapha Ali Khodja, 16 030 El-Biar, Algér BP 60  
phone: (0 0213 2) 1 923 474, 1 922 553; fax: (0 0213 2) 1 921 435  
marekmal@wissal.dz

**Head of the Mission: Sławomir Klimkiewicz—First Counsellor**

#### **Angola**

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Luanda  
Rua Comandante N'zaji 21/23, Alvalade, Luanda; C.P. 1340  
phone: (0 0244 2) 323 088; mobile: (0 0244) 912 502 315; fax: (0 0244 2) 323 086  
www.embpolonia-ang.info; embpol@netangola.com

**Head of the Mission: Piotr Myśliwiec—First Counsellor**

#### **Argentina**

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Buenos Aires  
Calle Alejandro María de Aguado 2870  
1425 Buenos Aires phone: (0 054 11) 4802 96 81–82, 4802 54 11; fax: (0 054 11) 4802 96 83  
polemb@datamarkets.com.ar

**Head of the Mission: Tomasz Gos—Third Secretary**



**Honorary Consul: Juan Estanislao Stachnik**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Mar del Plata  
Calle La Roja 2773, 7600 Mar del Plata  
phone: (0 054 22 3) 491 52 94

**Honorary Consul: Miguel Antonio Skowron**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Obera  
c. Gobernador Barreyro 1176, 3362 Obera, prov. Misiones  
phone/fax: (0 054 37) 55 42 17-63

**Honorary Consul: Bartłomiej Stanisław Moszoro**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Rosario  
Bv. Oirono 275, 2000 Rosario  
phone: (0 054 34 1) 425 19 64; fax: (0 054 34 1) 432 55 55

### Armenia

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Yerevan  
44A Hanrapetutyán Street, Erewan  
phone: (0 0374 1) 54 24 93; fax: (0 0374 1) 54 24 98  
polemb@arminco.com

**Ambassador: Tomasz Knothe (since 22 June 2004)**

### Australia

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Canberra  
7 Turrana Street. Yarralumla ACT 2600, Canberra  
phone: (0 061 2) 6272 1000, 6273 1208; fax: (0 061 2) 6273 3184  
www.poland.org.au; embassy@poland.org.au

**Ambassador: Jerzy Więclaw (since 30 December 2002), also accredited to Papua New Guinea**

**Consul General: Ryszard Sarkowicz**

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Sydney  
10 Trelawney Street, Woollahra NSW, 2025 Sydney  
phone: (0 061 2) 9363 9816, 9363 9817, 9363 9818; fax: (0 061 2) 9327 2216  
poland@bigpond.net.au

**Honorary Consul: Brian Patrick Kilmartin**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Brisbane  
270 Adelaide Street, 4000 Brisbane, Australia, P.O. Box 128, 4001 Brisbane  
phone: (0 061 7) 3221 9564; fax: (0 061 7) 3229 9482

**Honorary Consul: Keith James Aitken**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Darwin  
Lot 3005 Stuart Highway, Berrimach, N.T. 0828  
phone: (0 061 8) 8931 1966; fax: (0 061 8) 8932 342

**Honorary Consul: George John Zbigniew Łuk-Kozika**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Melbourne  
Level 12, 20 Collins Street, 3000 Melbourne  
phone: (0 061 3) 9706 7011, 9650 4736; fax: (0 061 3) 9654 5180

### Austria

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Vienna  
Hietzinger Hauptstrasse 42c, 1130 Wien, P.O. Box 17  
phone: (0 043 1) 870150-46, 87015-100; fax: (0 043 1) 87015-222  
www.botschaftrp.at; info@BotschaftRP.at

**Ambassador: Marek Jędryś (since 26 May 2004)**

**Honorary Consul: Gerold Ortner**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Graz  
Joannenumring 18/3, A-8010 Graz  
phone: (0 043 316) 33 82 51 00; fax: (0 043 316) 33 82 51 15

**Honorary Consul: Siegfried Resl**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Innsbruck  
Technikerstraße 1-3, A-6020 Innsbruck  
phone: (0 043 512) 28 63 14 00; fax: (0 043 512) 29 34 61 20

**Honorary Consul: Jürgen Hinterwirth**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Salzburg  
A-5020 Salzburg, Nonntaler Hauptstraße 1  
phone: (0 043 662) 84 00 33, 84 00 34; fax: (0 043 662) 84 00 33 14

### **Azerbaijan**

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Baku  
2 Kichik Gala Street, Icheri Sheher, AZ-1000 Baku  
phone: (0 0994 12) 492 01 14, 497 52 81, 497 47 08; fax: (0 0994 12) 492 02 14  
www.embpol.azeurotel.com; embpol@azeurotel.com

**Ambassador: Krzysztof Krajewski (since 3 June 2005)**

### **Bangladesh**

**Honorary Consul: Mumtaz Uddin Ahmed**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Chittagongu  
“Commercial Court”, 95 Agrabad Commercial Area, Chittagong – 4100  
phone: (0 0880 31) 72 15 23; fax: (0 0880 31) 71 00 66  
agrance@gononet.com

### **Belgium**

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**Ambassador: Henryk Kobierowski (since 29 July 2002)**

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**Honorary Consul: Michel Dorin**

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**Honorary Consul: Longin Fourdrinier**

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**Honorary Consul: Andrzej Władysław Dębski**

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## Georgia

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**Ambassador: Jacek Multanowski (since 23 December 2004)**

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**Ambassador: Marek Prawda (since 18 August 2006)**

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**Honorary Consul: Bernd Kobarg**

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**Holy See (Vatican)**

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**Ambassador: Hanna Suchocka (since 22 October 2001)**

**Honduras**

**Honorary Consul: Roberto Larios Silva**

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**Ambassador: Joanna Stempińska (since 17 August 2005)**

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**Ambassador: Krzysztof Majka (since 14 September 2001), also accredited to Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Maldives**

**Honorary Consul: Radhe Shyam Goenka**

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**Ambassador: Tomasz Łukaszuk (since 16 February 2005)**

**Honorary Consul: Maria Jolanta Pawłowska-Budiman**

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**Ambassador: Witold Śmidowski (since 29 August 2002)**

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**Ambassador: Ryszard Krystosik (since 29 September 2004)**

### Ireland

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**Ambassador: Tadeusz Szumowski (since 2 August 2006)**

### Israel

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**Ambassador: Agnieszka Magdziak-Miszewska (since 29 May 2006)**

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**Honorary Consul: Jan Robinsohn**

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**Ambassador: Michał Radlicki (since 1 January 2002), also accredited to Malta and San Marino**

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**Consul General: Adam Szymczyk**

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**Honorary Consul: Irena Cousins**

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**Ambassador: Marcin Rybicki (since 14 May 2003)**

**Honorary Consul General: Kazuko Takashima**

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**Ambassador: Andrzej Biera (since 4 November 2003)**

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**Ambassador: Maciej Klimczak (since 22 September 2005)**

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**Ambassador: Józef Osas (since 17 September 2004)**

**Consul General: Krzysztof Smyk**

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### **Lithuania**

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**Ambassador: Janusz Skolimowski (since 21 February 2005)**

**Consul General: Stanisław Cygnarowski**

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### **Luxembourg**

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**Ambassador: Barbara Labuda (since 1 September 2005)**

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### **Macedonia**

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**Head of the Mission: Grzegorz Mazek—Second Secretary**

### **Madagascar**

**Honorary Consul: Zbigniew Kasprzyk**

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### **Malaysia**

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**Honorary Consul: Raziah Mahmud Geneid**

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### **Mauritius**

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**Honorary Consul: Luis M. Camara Patron**

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**Honorary Consul: José Manuel Gomez Vazquez Aldana**

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### **Honorary Consul: Hector Eduardo Webb Cruces**

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### **Ambassador: Joanna Wronecka (since 27 April 2005), also accredited to Mauritania**

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### **Ambassador: Lech Mastalerz (since 31 July 2004)**

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**Consul General: Ireneusz Makles**

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**Ambassador: Jerzy Bahr (since 19 June 2006)**

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**Ambassador: Adam Kułach (since 20 January 2004)**

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**Ambassador: Maciej Szymański (since 8 July 2005)**

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**Ambassador: Romuald Szuniewicz (since 31 July 2004), also accredited to Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia and Swaziland**

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**Ambassador: Michał Czyż (since 20 September 2005)**

### **Consul General: Wiesław Scholz**

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### **Consul General: Marek Bykowski**

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**Ambassador: Janusz Niesyto (since 7 June 2005), also accredited to Liechtenstein**

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**Ambassador: Jacek Chodorowicz (since 12 October 2001)**

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**Ambassador: Mirosław Gajewski (since 10 December 2003)**

**Consul General: Przemysław Jenke**

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Compiled by *Magdalena Zalewska*

# Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 2006

## WEKTORY

**Informacja rządu na temat polskiej polityki zagranicznej w 2005 roku**  
(przedstawiona przez ministra spraw zagranicznych

Adama Daniela Rotfelda)

**Niepewny świat 2005 roku** (Roman Kuźniar)

**Polska w Unii Europejskiej** (Małgorzata Banach, Urszula Pałasz)

**Główne aspekty polityki bezpieczeństwa Polski** (Robert Kupiecki)

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**Stosunki Polski z Niemcami** (Tytus Jaskułowski)

**Stosunki Polski z Francją** (Mariusz Kazana)

**Stosunki Polski z Rosją** (Adam Eberhardt)

**Stosunki Polski z Ukrainą** (Andrzej Szeptycki)

**Stosunki Polski z Państwem Izrael** (Krzysztof Bojko)

**Stosunki Polski z krajami regionu Azji i Pacyfiku** (Beata Stoczyńska)

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**Polityka regionalna Polski** (Jacek Gajewski)

**Polska w Organizacji Narodów Zjednoczonych** (Stanisław L. Stebelski)

## WYBRANE PROBLEMY POLSKIEJ POLITYKI ZAGRANICZNEJ

**Zaangażowanie Polski na rzecz stabilizacji Iraku** (Paweł Herczyński)

**Stosunki gospodarcze Polski z zagranicą** (Katarzyna Żukrowska)

**Kwestie historyczne w polskiej polityce zagranicznej** (Mateusz Gniazdowski)

**Polska a konflikt wokół Związku Polaków na Białorusi** (Adam Eberhardt)

**Od dyplomacji publicznej do marki dla Polski** (Jarosław Szczepankiewicz)

## OPINIE O POLSKIEJ POLITYKI ZAGRANICZNEJ

**Bilans polskiej polityki zagranicznej za rok 2005.**

Debata z udziałem Jarosława Bratkiewicza, Sławomira Dębskiego,  
Jerzego Kranza, Romana Kuźniara, Marka Madeja. Warszawa,  
16 marca 2006 r.

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**Informacja rządu na temat polskiej polityki zagranicznej w 2006 roku**  
(przedstawiona przez ministra spraw zagranicznych Stefana Mellera)

**Świat 2006 r. – powrót do wielobiegunowości?** (Jacek Czaputowicz)

**Aktywność Polski w Unii Europejskiej** (Małgorzata Banat-Adamiuk)

**Polityka bezpieczeństwa Polski** (Marek Ziółkowski)

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**Udział w operacjach pokojowych i stabilizacyjnych** (Beata Górka-Winter)

**Polska współpraca na rzecz rozwoju** (Joanna Stryjek)

**Polska w Radzie Praw Człowieka ONZ** (Miroslaw Łuczka)

## OPINIE O POLITYCE ZAGRANICZNEJ POLSKI

**Polska polityka zagraniczna w krajowej publicystyce prasowej**  
(Mateusz Gniazdowski)

## ANEKSY

**Stosunki traktatowe Polski** (Agata Stachura-Świeżawska)

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