





***The U.S. Pivot to Asia-Pacific:  
American Military Strategy and Selected Bilateral Alliances***

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## Obama's Vision of *Pivot to Asia-Pacific*



- Previous administration focus on the **Global War On Terrorism** but since 2009 Obama's officials began to stress in their speeches need for reengagement in Asia-Pacific.
- In the White House's **National Security Strategy (NSS)** 2010 rather standard references to Asia, described after the Greater Middle East, Europe and post-Soviet area. *NSS* recognized alliances with Japan, the ROK, Australia, Philippines and Thailand as a core of security in Asia.
- Pentagon's **Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG)** 2012: *US economic and security interests are inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia. While the U.S. military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.*
- Follow-up to *DSG* in **Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)** 2014 with observed rising military expenditures in region, greater risk of disputes and tensions, as well modernization of the Chinese PLA and growing threat from the DPRK. *QDR* stressed need for rebalancing military posture, including robust footprint in North East Asia and enhancing presence in Oceania and South East Asia. Traditional „anchors“ of security are Australia, Japan and the ROK.
- Latest **NSS 2015** is also clear about „*Pacific First*“ approach, it stress need of American leadership in Asia-Pacific and continuing relocation of troops there. Apart of alliances with Japan, the ROK, Australia and Philippines, the newest *NSS* also stress promotion of new partnerships with Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia.



## Official USG Perception of Military Threats in the Asia-Pacific Region

- **ODNI (2015) on China:** Firstly, highly-sophisticated cyber-threat and economic and traditional espionage from China. Secondly, modernization of nuclear missile forces (new nuclear mobile ICBM and SLBM). Thirdly, potential threat of ASAT and satellite jamming capabilities of China. Regionally, active Chinese diplomacy in territorial disputes of East and South China Seas.
- **DOD (2014) on China:** Continues to pursue a long-term and comprehensive military modernization. Preparing for potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait but also emphasis on other contingencies. Growing focus on joint military operations and investments in other missions. More than two decades of sustained defense spending growth and investments in nuclear forces and Chinese *A2/AD* capabilities.
- **DOD (2014) on DPRK:** Remains one of the most critical security challenges for many reasons, including attacks on the ROK, pursuit of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, and its willingness to proliferate WMD. Large military with capability for serious damage on the ROK with willingness for smaller military provocations.
- **ODNI (2015) on DPRK:** Offensive cyber operations against private sector targets (Sony 2014) with potential for more disruptive intent in future. Nuclear weapons and missile programs pose a serious threat to the US and allies in Asia. Unknown nuclear doctrine but growing capabilities, sophistication, ranges and number of missiles (including ICBM, not tested *KN-08?*). Internally, solidified position of Kim Jong Un without clear successor.

Statement for the Record  
Worldwide Threat Assessment  
of the  
US Intelligence Community  
Senate Armed Services Committee



James R. Clapper  
Director of National Intelligence  
February 26, 2015



## U.S. Armed Forces Personnel in Asia-Pacific Region in 2009 and 2014

Forces	2009	2014	Comments
US Army	20,000	44,000	Changes after Iraq and ISAF. Idea of <i>Great Return</i> of Army units to Asia ( <i>Pacific Pathways</i> ), more Mil-to-Mil and separate role in deterring enemies. Strengthening missile defense in Japan, the ROK and on Guam ( <i>PAC-3+THAAD</i> ) and readiness for humanitarian/disaster aid.
USMC	21,000	24,000	<i>Great Return</i> of marines to Asia, with building 2,500 MAGTF unit in Australia. More Mil-to-Mil and exercises and readiness for humanitarian/disaster aid.
US Navy	11,000 (46 ships)	39,000 (50 ships)	67 combat ships (20% more) planned by 2020. Increase by operating more and new ships from forward locations and rotations. Together with USAF crucial role in <i>Air-Sea Battle vs. A2/AD</i> . Missile defense role of the Navy ( <i>Aegis/SM-3</i> ).
USAF	20,000	29,000	Current focus on relationship-building and on the new strategic capabilities and assets. Together with Navy crucial role in <i>Air-Sea Battle vs. A2/AD</i> .
Total	73,000	135,000	<b>In 2009-2014 almost double increase in total of the PACOM troops. Total personel of the U.S. Armed Forces is now 1,357,000, i.e. 10 % in the Far East</b>

## America's Forward Deployed Military Is Key to Regional Stability

Since the end of World War II, the U.S. military has remained forward deployed in the Western Pacific. It currently maintains dozens of bases in the region, most notably in South Korea and Japan.

### SOUTH KOREA


The U.S. is committed to maintaining a minimum of 28,500 troops on the Korean Peninsula to deter North Korean aggression. The two Korean nations are technically at war, having only signed an armistice in 1953.

### JAPAN

The U.S. military maintains dozens of bases in Japan, accommodating a total of 38,000 Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps personnel. The U.S. Seventh Fleet is home ported in Yokosuka.

### GUAM

Guam is a U.S. territory and growing security hub. It hosts two major bases and 12,000 American service personnel.



Sources: U.S. Department of Defense, "Military Installations," <http://www.militaryinstallations.dod.mil/pls/psgprod/f?p=MI:ENTRY:0> (accessed March 5, 2012), and Heritage Foundation research.

## Taiwan's Security, China and the U.S.

- Historically, close but informal military alliance with the U.S. Less visible commitment from the U.S., however, still influential pro-Taiwanese lobby in the U.S. Congress, Republican Party and arms industry.
- Main military threats for Taiwan from Chinese military modernization with growing asymmetry in military budgets, quantity of personnel and equipment. Risk of qualitative advantage of the PLAAF till 2020 (with current *Su-27*, *Su-30* and *stealth J-20* and *J-31*) plus coastal/naval SAM *S-300* with ranges covering whole Taiwan.
- China's missile arsenal advantage: 1,100-1,200 or even 1,500-1,600 SRBMs launchers targeting Taiwan and limits of missile defense.
- Problems with modernization of the ROC's Armed Forces. Refusal of delivery of *F-16C/D* and *Aegis BMD* by the U.S., but upgrades for 145 older *F-16A* and start of delivery of 30 *AH-64 Apache* attack helicopters.
- QDR (2013)* stress on investments in indigenous and credible conventional deterrent capabilities against China, i.e. SRBM *Hsiung Feng-2E* (800 km) and cruise missile (1,200-2,000 km). Need for more innovative and asymmetric capabilities of ROC versus Chinese anti-access capabilities.

	China		Taiwan
Population	1,35 bn \$		23,2 mln
Defense Budget (2013)	718 bn \$		10,3 bn \$
Total Armed Forces	2,33 mln		290,000
- Army Personnel	1,6 mln		200,000
- Air Force Personnel	398,000		93,000
- Navy Personnel	235,000		67,000
Tanks (MBT)	6,840		565
Infantry Fighting Vehicles	4,350		1,247
Heavy Artillery Systems	1,3014		1,924
Multiple Rocket Systems	1,842		330
Attack Helicopters	108		73
Transport Helicopters	351		84
Total Combat Aircraft	2575 in Total (928 modern)	480 in Range of Taiwan	431 in Total (186 modern)
- Fighters	1,700	130	388
- Fighter-Bombers	400	200	22
- Transport Aircraft	475	150	21
Total Navy Vessels	280 in Total	208 close to Taiwan	91 in Total
- Aircraft Carriers	1	0	0
- Destroyers	24	14	4
- Frigates	49	40	22
- Corvettes	8	6	0
- Heavy Landing Ships	29	26	12
- Small/Med. Landing Ships	28	21	4
- Diesel Submarines	51	32	4
- Nuclear Submarines	5	2	0
- Coastal Defense	85	67	45

## South Korea's Security and the U.S.

- The ROK-U.S. military alliance with formal treaty (1953), security guarantees and nuclear *extended deterrence*. Occasionally anti-American sentiments and frequently different approaches of Seoul and Washington to the DPRK and/or China.
- Reductions of the U.S. troops (to 28,500 now) and relocation of main bases further south from the DMZ but also problem with transition of *OPCON* till the end of 2015 from American to Korean hands. USF-K could be augmented by other units in Japan, on Guam, Hawaii and Alaska as well war reserve of 3 Army/USMC divisions in the USA.
- Military threat from DPRK but also potential risk of entanglement into the U.S. and Japan conflict with China. North's conventional forces big, weak and obsolete in contrast to the ROK. Main issues with the DPRK's nuclear arsenal (tests of 2006, 2009, 2013) and chemical arsenal (up to 5,000 tones) as well heavy artillery, MRLs and ballistic missiles in range of the whole Peninsula and Seoul (city just 40 km from DMZ).
- Modern South's defense industry and the *Plan of Modernization of the ROK Armed Forces to 2020*. Some programs unrealistic and mixed results in finding alternatives to the U.S. (still 80% of imported weapons). Tensions between Seoul and Tokyo so far prevented progress with architecture of *Asian Phased Adaptive Approach* to missile defense (2009, similar to NATO-EPAA).
- New South's concept of *Kill-Chain*, based on conventional deterrence and offensive weapons: current fleet of *F-16*, *F-15K* and in future *F-35*, projects of ballistic missile *HM-2* and cruise missile *HM-3C* with ranges covering whole North.

	DPRK	ROK	US Forces in Korea
Population	25 mln	49 mln	-
Defense Budget (2014)	?	34,4 bn \$	-
Total Armed Forces	1,19 mln (conscr.)	655,000 (conscr.)	28,500
- Army Personnel	1,02 mln	522,000	19,500
- Air Force Personnel	110,000	65,000	8,800
- Navy/Marines Pers.	60,000	68,000	500
Tanks (MBT)	3,500	2,400	?
Infantry Fighting Vehicles	2,500	2,790	?
Heavy Artillery Systems	16,100	1,800	?
Multiple Rocket Systems	5,100	185	?
Attack Helicopters	100	105	24
Transport Helicopters	202	246	62
Total Combat Aircraft	563	571-620	64
- Fighters	401 (modern 108)	164-174	20
- Fighter-Bombers	128	224	44
- Transport Aircraft	18	38	-
Total Naval Vessels	650-738	190	(See 7th Fleet)
- Aircraft Carriers	-	1	-
- Destroyers	-	6	-
- Frigates	3	14	-
- Corvettes	-	36	-
- Heavy Landing Ships	10	1	-
- Small/Med. Landing Ships	257	45	-
- Diesel Submarines	72	23	-
- Coastal Defense	382	80	-

## Japan-U.S. Alliance

- Bilateral alliance with formal treaty (1960), security guarantees and nuclear *extended deterrence*. PM Abe's wider ambition for *Democratic Diamond* with U.S., Australia and India, however what with full reconciliation with South Korea?
- Constitution (1947) limits for re-militarization of Japan but also inadequate for security in XXI Century. PM Abe's push for conceptual/organizational changes in national defense (2013/14): NSC, first *National Security Strategy*, new *National Defense Program Guidelines* and *Mid-Term Defense Program*.
- Since 1991 reductions/relocations of the U.S. troops (50,000 now) but main US Navy 7<sup>th</sup> Fleet bases (Yokosuka, Sasebo, Amori), USAF/USMC airfields (Kadena, Yokota, Misawa) and Army missile defense (PAC Yokota, EWR Amori). These could be augmented by other units on Guam, Hawaii, Alaska and U.S. Western Coast (25<sup>th</sup> Inf. Division, USMC).
- Location of main American bases means that Japan is willing and will support the U.S. in any contingency in the Taiwan Straits or Korean Peninsula. Most immediate threat comes from missile arsenal of the DPRK but real strategic and long-term challenge from modernization of the Chinese armed forces. Also in future unclear potential for tensions with Russia.
- Good prospects for even more U.S.-Japan joint military operations in region and defense industries cooperation (*Aegis BMD, SM-3 Blk. IIA, F-35 JSF*). Japan's new vision of *Dynamic Defense Forces* for wider spectrum of military missions till 2019. JSDF will be based on strong Navy for LOC as well more amphibious, coastal defense, rapid reaction and airborne units.

	Japan	US Forces in Japan
Population	127 mln	-
Defense Budget (2014 r.)	47,7 bn \$	-
Total Armed Forces	247,000	50,000
- Army Personnel	151,000	2,300
- Air Force Personnel	47,000	12,400
- Navy/Marines Personnel	45,000	19,600+15,700
Tanks (MBT)	752	-
Infantry Fighting Vehicles	790	-
Heavy Artillery Systems	1678	-
Multiple Rocket Systems	99	-
Attack Helicopters	116	-
Transport Helicopters	252	20
Total Combat Aircraft	522	130
- Fighters	201	24
- Fighter-Bombers	152	30
- Transport Aircraft	64	22
Total Naval Vessels	139	approx. 20
- Aircraft Carriers	2 (Heli.)	3
- Destroyers	34	8
- Frigates	8	2
- Corvettes	-	-
- Heavy Landing Ships	20	2
- Small/Med. Landing Ships	28	2
- Diesel Submarines	18	-
- Nuclear Submarines	-	?
- Coastal Defense/Others	6	-

## Final Observations and Conclusions

- Looking at main documents of the USG, *Pacific Pivot* was ambitious attempt to regain military initiative in region, especially after extensive and costly interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Pivot in strict military terms became even more irritating for China, perceiving it as a traditional containment strategy.
- Pivot became rather uncomfortable for Indonesia and Malaysia but welcomed by the politicians and militaries of Japan, ROK, Taiwan, Australia, Philippines, Vietnam and India. In total, clear increase in Mil-to-Mil cooperation as well U.S. Armed Forces presence in region.
- Potential for military cooperation in the Far East limited by politics: willingness of American decision-makers, status of Taiwan and U.S. interests there, and progress in Japanese-South Koreanese reconciliation.
- In military strategic, operational and tactical areas need for more creativity against counter-intervention/anti-access strategies of China and the DPRK so expect further corrections to *Air-Sea Battle* concept.
- Main challenge to the *Pivot* in the military-security domain are Pentagon's budget sequestration and slow-down of regional economic integration among allies.
- No easy and smart exit from the Middle East (Islamic State, Af-Pak, Iran) and renewed military threats from Russia to NATO. Contrary to authors of *Asia Pivot*, average American still knows more about the Western Europe, Middle East and Israel than about many countries in Asia.