


V4 – Russia – EaP

Dariusz Kałan


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17 April 2013, Embassy of Poland in Moscow
















Are the EaP countries really important for the V4?

IT DEPENDS

European policies



Eastern policies





V4 – EaP contacts at the bilateral level, I

				* * *
	DEMOCRACY!	* * * * * * * *	DEMOCRACY!	
	know your neighbour	* * * * * * *	No!	NO!
	know your neighbour	**** **** **	know your neighbour	No!
±	know your neighbour	* * * * * * *	No!	No!



V4 – EaP contacts at the bilateral level, II

TABLE 1: Value of Trade, 2011, in euros (€)

	CZECH REP.	HUNGARY	POLAND	SLOVAKIA
ARM.	20.1 mln^1	12.6 mln	17.2 mln	8.2 mln^1
AZE.	1,300 mln	48.1 mln	94.6 mln	14.8 mln^2
BEL.	340.1 mln	105.1 mln	2,300 mln	186.2 mln
GEO.	78.4 mln ³	22.8 mln	54.1 mln	11.6 mln ³
MOL.	54.9 mln^4	87.9 mln	198.8 mln	22.1 mln ⁴
RUS.	9,100 mln	8,100 mln	24,500 mln	8,300 mln
UKR.	1,900 mln	2,400 mln	5,400 mln	1,100 mln

Source: Author's calculations based on data from the national statistical offices of the V4 countries as well as Armenia $(^{1})$, Azerbaijan $(^{2})$, Georgia $(^{3})$ and Moldova $(^{4})$.




<u>V4 – EaP contacts at the bilateral level</u> <u>CONCLUSIONS</u>



- : time for the special relationship
- : almost excusively an EU-level problem
- : very limited or precisely economic attention



Russia as a moderating factor for the V4 in the East, I





Russia as a moderating factor for the V4 in the East, II

TABLE 1: Value of Trade, 2011, in euros (€)

	CZECH REP.	HUNGARY	POLAND	SLOVAKIA
ARM.	20.1 mln ¹	12.6 mln	17.2 mln	8.2 mln^1
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Source: Author's calculations based on data from the national statistical offices of the V4 countries as well as Armenia $(^{1})$, Azerbaijan $(^{2})$, Georgia $(^{3})$ and Moldova $(^{4})$.



Russia as a moderating factor for the V4 in the East, III

 TABLE 2. Dependence on Russian Energy Supplies, 2011

	CZECH REP.	HUNGARY	POLAND	SLOVAKIA
GAS	59%	85%	62%	98%
OIL	73%	80%	93%	98%


Source: Author's calculations based on data from Eurostat






V4 is unable to speak with one voice with Russia on any major issue, and no one wants to modify it






It is hard to find any humanitarian or pro-democratic accents in the V4 policies towards Russia





The V4 governments change, but the policy towards Russia remains unchanged






The very first commandment of each V4 country's eastern policy is not to alienate Russia




In a case of the confrontation: RUSSIA vs EaP






In a case of the confrontation: RUSSIA vs EaP





Case study: WAR IN GEORGIA, 2008





FINAL CONCLUSIONS



Thank you for your attention

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