

Editorial

What constitutes a setback?

Towards the end of summer in 2012, a rumour started to swell in both the Middle East and Europe that the Conference scheduled to take place in Helsinki on the thorny subject of a Weapons-of-Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East might be postponed. Many people started to caution that should this indeed prove to be the case it would amount to a diplomatic setback.

The Helsinki Conference could not have taken place at the end of 2012 for a certain number of evident reasons that do not call into question either diplomacy or any particular country. The political turbulence apparent in the Middle East, the worsening of the Iranian nuclear crisis, and the Israeli perception of growing insecurity are all reasons enough to necessitate the postponement of the conference, insofar as to ensure that the event is a productive one.

In this context, it is remarkable that the EU's support for a WMDFZ in the Middle East has not wavered. The EU Non-Proliferation Consortium was thus able to organise two international seminars in Brussels in July 2011 and November 2012, which were resounding successes, both in terms of the quality of the debate and the operational proposals put forward. All of the documentation pertaining to these two events can be freely accessed on a dedicated page of the Consortium's website:

<http://www.nonproliferation.eu/middleEastSeminar2012/>

While the Helsinki Conference Facilitator, Ambassador Laajava, will resume his consultations at the start of the new year, it is worth recalling that the majority of efforts undertaken to avoid a setback are concentrated in Europe. The postponement of the Helsinki Conference is a hiccup but not a setback. Besides, irrespective of the EU's support for the Zone project, it is up to the States in the Middle East to establish the necessary means to open negotiations.

Benjamin Hautecouverture
EU Non-Proliferation Consortium
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PISM research is meant to generate new ideas

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The PISM is the largest Polish strategic research centre and at the heart of the new security issues in which Poland is a stakeholder, notably via the matters of missile defence and the fight against proliferation.



Marcin Zaborowski is Director of the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM). Prior to that, he directed the transatlantic programme at the EUISS in Paris, was a lecturer at the University of Birmingham and Aston University, and directed the Transatlantic Programme at the Centre for International Relations in Warsaw. His fields of expertise include EU security policy and integration processes, transatlantic relations, and international security.

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What are Poland's and PISM's interest in non-proliferation and arms control issues?

Poland is aware that global threats related to WMD proliferation affect its security, and therefore supports international efforts in this area. The promotion of arms control measures related to conventional arms and non-strategic nuclear weapons is more specifically related to our geographic location. There are limits on how much Warsaw can do alone but we can be very effective when acting with like-minded countries, for example, in the PSI framework or through the NPT-focused Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI). Other opportunities arise through our membership in the European Union, NATO and OSCE. Regarding PISM's research activities, we realize that traditional approaches to non-proliferation and arms control may no longer be adequate. PISM research is meant not only to provide a deeper understanding of the current challenges but also to generate some new ideas. The Institute cooperates with partners in Europe, Russia and the United States, but it attaches particular attention to strengthening regional relationships with Central European think tanks and experts dealing with these issues.

In the context of NATO-Russia relations, what are the main challenges related to non-strategic nuclear weapons and missile defence, from a Polish point of view?

As Russia's neighbour, Poland is obviously interested in resolving the issues that negatively affect NATO-Russia relations and result in tough rhetoric and military posturing. The main challenge is to use wisely the arms control and confidence-building instruments at our disposal to improve the situation.

On non-strategic nuclear weapons, we hope they can be included in the next round of the U.S.-Russia talks. Meanwhile, we should commence the dialogue at the NATO-Russia Council on the transparency and confidence-building measures to be applied to these categories of weapons.

Territorial missile defence is already becoming part of NATO's "mix of capabilities". Poland is supporting this development and has agreed to host a base of SM-3 interceptors to defend Europe against limited ballistic missile threats. On a parallel track, though, we must try to address the Russian concerns. We should be ready to offer a high degree of transparency measures related to the missile defence systems, having in mind of course the requirements of reciprocity.

The PSI was born in Kraków in 2003. How would you assess the mechanism on the eve of its 10-year anniversary?

It is a source of pride that the initiative was launched in Poland, but it also brings increased responsibilities. Warsaw has been an active PSI participant, as a member of the Operational Experts Group and an organiser of exercises and outreach activities.

PSI has evolved into a vehicle for cooperation and experience-sharing, and the critics who feared that it would be used to breach international law have been proved wrong. Still, PSI's success is somehow qualified. We obviously lack the means to objectively assess its effectiveness because of the delicate nature of the interdiction operations. Some significant actors are still not involved in PSI and there are gaps in both the national legislations of the PSI participants and in the international legal frameworks.

Interview conducted by
Alexander Bramble
Research Assistant, FRS, Paris

EU Institutional news

The EU and the North Korean proliferation crisis

The EU's bi-annual report on the implementation of the 2003 Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, published in August 2012, devotes a paragraph to the North Korean crisis. Besides the official condemnation of the rocket launch on the 13th April 2012, the usual elements of the European position are visible: support for definitive and verifiable dismantling of the North's nuclear and ballistic programmes, a call for the return of IAEA inspectors, support for the resumption of six-party talks, active participation in the international sanctions regime initiated by Security Council Resolution 1718 (October 2006) and reinforced by Resolution 1874 (June 2009). The report also states that an approach was made to Pyongyang last June in an effort to urge the regime to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Moreover, the North's rocket launch on the 12th December 2012 gave rise to condemnation from Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs & Security Policy, who stated that the EU will not exclude the possibility of reinforcing the sanctions regime currently in force. In this respect, the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 22nd January 2013 condemning North Korea's rocket launch, is itself a positive development, even if the text's value is largely symbolic.

In any case, the core of the European policy remains the support for the international sanctions regime that the EU has applied and reinforced. Few in Europe are currently in favour of more direct engagement.

Statement by EU High Representative, Catherine Ashton, concerning the DPRK's «satellite» launch, December 12, 2012

The EU renews its support for the Arms Trade Treaty

Council Decision 2013/43/CFSP, adopted on the 22nd January 2013, tasks the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium with the organization of two closed seminars bringing together 30 to 40 governmental experts in order to facilitate the successful completion of negotiation of an ATT at the March 2013 UN Conference, on the basis of the draft Treaty text of 26th July 2012, to identify the means of bringing the Treaty swiftly into force, the best practices at both national and regional level, and the facets of international assistance with the Treaty's implementation.

The EU has encouraged the ATT negotiation process since 2006 and two decisions have

previously been adopted, in 2009 and 2010, in support of the on-going process. It is worth recalling that the United Nations conference, which took place in July 2012, did not manage to bring negotiations to a conclusion. A draft Treaty was nonetheless submitted by the president of the conference on the 26th July, the day before its closing. Negotiations will resume in New York from the 18th to the 28th March 2013.

Read the [Council Decision 2013/43/CFSP](#) on continued Union activities in support of the Arms Trade Treaty negotiations, in the framework of the European Security Strategy, 22nd January 2013

HCoC 10th anniversary

As the sole international agreement that seeks to fight against ballistic-missile proliferation, the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC), which currently counts 134 Subscribing States, has celebrated its tenth anniversary. The Code was adopted in November 2002, entitled the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICoC), with 93 initial signatories. In November 2004, it became the Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC).

The EU, which adopted a decision in support of HCoC in 2008 (2008/974/CFSP), adopted a further decision to this effect on the 23rd July 2012, whose implementation started last December. The three principal objectives of this new initiative comprise the universalization of the Code, assistance with its implementation, and an attempt to increase the Code's profile centring around on its 10th anniversary. In this regard, various outreach seminars, regional conferences, and expert missions will be or-

ganised over the next two years. Two events have already been organised by the Foundation for Strategic Research (Paris), including a conference in Vienna commemorating the 10th anniversary of the Code. This event was supported by the HCoC chair, Mr Hyun Cho, Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to the International Organizations in Vienna, and the HCoC Executive Secretariat and Immediate Central Contact at the Austrian Ministry for European and International Affairs.

[Council Decision 2012/423/CFSP](#) in support of ballistic missile non-proliferation in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against proliferation of WMD and of the Council common position 2003/805/CFSP, 23rd July 2012

[HCoC Subscribing States](#)

[The Non-Proliferation Monthly N° 74 HCoC Special Issue](#)

Upcoming events

January 21 - March 29, 2013: First Part of the 2013 Session of the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, Switzerland

January 30 - February 01, 2013: 24th UN Conference on Disarmament Issues, Shizuoka, Japan

February 27 - March 01, 2013: UN Secretary General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, 59th Session, New York, USA

March 04 - 08, 2013: IAEA Board of Governors, Vienna, Austria

Network News

Publications and web resources

The European Union's Involvement In Negotiating an Arms Trade Treaty, Sara Depauw, NP paper, No.23, December 2012, 16p.

Combating Proliferation Financing: A European Banking Perspective, Indranil Ganguli, Julien Ernoult, NP paper, No.24, December 2012, 22p.

The European Union, its Overseas Territories and Non-Proliferation: the Case of Arctic Yellowcake, Cindy Vestergaard, NP paper No.25, January 2013, 12p.

North Korea: a year into the reign of Kim Jong-un, Strategic Comments, Volume 18, Comment 48, December 2012, 3p., International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Statement by VERTIC to the 2012 Meeting of States Parties to the 1972 BTWC, 10 December 2012, 8p., Verification Research, Training and Information Centre.

Measuring International Arms Transfers, Paul Holtom, Mark Bromley, Verena Simmel, SIPRI Fact Sheet, December 2012, 8p., Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

UNSCR 1540 and the EU: reinforcing national responsibilities, Charlotte Beaucillon, Policy Brief - No10 - 18 December 2012

EUBARnet – European Biosecurity Awareness Raising network coordinated by the Landau Network --- Centro Volta

The Second EU Non-Proliferation Consortium Middle East Seminar

Following on from the first EU Non-Proliferation Consortium (EUNPC) Middle East Seminar in July 2011, in accordance with Council Decision 2012/422/CFSP the EUNPC organised a second “Seminar to Promote Confidence Building and in Support of a Process Aimed at Establishing a Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Means of Delivery in the Middle East [MEWMDFZ]”, which took place in Brussels on the 5th & 6th November 2012.

This EUNPC academic event brought together around 140 participants from the Middle East, EU Member States, other interested countries, and international organisations, with the aim of fostering debate on the concrete means of furthering the MEWMDFZ project. Preparation for the Seminar was based on the publication of 23 specific background papers (see right hand column), and on the launch of a dedicated Seminar web page on the EUNPC website (<http://www.nonproliferation.eu/middleEastSeminar2012/>).

The Seminar was held under the Chatham House rule and was divided into 3 plenary sessions and a series of working groups focusing on the issue of nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic confidence-building measures, as well as on the reinforcement of the regional security architecture.

The Seminar’s preparation was hampered not only by the well-versed clash of approach on the subject of an MEWMDFZ between Israel and the Arab States, but was also marred by the uncertainty surrounding both the preparation and the date of the Helsinki Conference, and by the fact that the regional security environment has become tangibly more tense over the last two years.

Yet, in spite of these impediments all participants agreed that the exchanges during the Seminar were plentiful and fruitful. Besides productive discussions on the nature and scope of confidence-building measures, the thematic debates gave rise to a certain number of practical solutions firmly grounded in an incremental approach. On the nuclear front, participants agreed on the need to fight against the proliferation of materials, technologies, and knowledge to non-State actors. Given this kind of consensus, discussions should be initiated to address the issue of ensuring nuclear security in the Middle East.

It is also worth noting the following ideas as examples: a suggested zone free of nuclear tests, a zone free of production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the involvement of powerful actors from outside the region in any future zone (notably via negative security assurances), the creation of a voluntary forum for a security dialogue between States in the region, the assessment of ballistic transparency measures, the implementation of a moratorium on rocket transfers, fighting against the flow of weapons to non-state actors, the use of existing initiatives such as the Middle East Consortium on Infectious Disease Surveillance (MECIDS), the use of the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence currently under construction, and the involvement of civil society experts in the debate.

The Seminar demonstrated that the nature of debate on an MEWMDFZ is starting to change precisely because it has been stuck for so many years. The recognition of the idea that the issue of a MEWMDFZ should be dealt with via a multilayered approach seems to constitute a positive development.

Without a doubt, the event’s success is due in no small part to its academic format. By tasking the EUNPC to organise the Seminar, the EU demonstrated a realistic and long-term approach aiming to more clearly identify the security conditions that are likely to lead to the establishment of an effectively verifiable MEWMDFZ in the future. In an extremely tense regional strategic and diplomatic context the choice of an academic format should be accompanied by a multitude of other “bottom up” initiatives (scientific and technical cooperation, the exchange of best practices, the adaptation of public policies to the specific context and to States’ capabilities and specificities), as such initiatives will be at the core of any future MEWMDFZ.

Links:

[Seminar agenda](#)

[Seminar reader](#)

[Interactive map of the region](#)

[Chronology of the WMDFZ process in the Middle East \(1962 – 2012\)](#)

[First EU Consortium Middle East seminar \(July 2011\)](#)

[United Nations official documents](#)

[European Union official documents](#)

[Treaties, conventions and other instruments](#)

Upcoming events

February 06, 2013: Discussion meeting – watching and worrying about North Korea, IISS, London, UK

February 18, 2013: Launch of the SIPRI Top 100 - the 100 Largest arms producing companies worldwide

February 27 - March 01, 2013: The 2014 Nuclear Security Summit: Challenges and Opportunities, Wilton Park Conference, The Clingendael Institute, The Hague, Netherlands

Spotlight on...

Latest publications

Lukasz Kulesa (ed.), *The future of NATO's defence and deterrence posture: views from Central Europe*, PISM Report, December 2012.

Jacek Durkalec, *After the DDRP: Central and Eastern European Perspectives*, in: "A Problem Deferred? NATO Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons after Chicago", RUSI Whitehall Report 4-12, October 2012, pp. 45-53.

Kacper Rękawek, *Central European Approaches to the Protection of Civil Nuclear Programmes*, PISM Policy Paper no. 33, July 2012

Jacek Durkalec, *The Proliferation Security Initiative: Evolution and Future Prospects*, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, Non-proliferation Papers No. 16, June 2012.

Jacek Durkalec, *NATO Defence and Deterrence Posture: Central and Eastern European Perspectives*, PISM Policy Paper no. 29, May 2012

Lukasz Kulesa, *The Consequences of North Korea's Failed Unha-3 Rocket Launch*, PISM Bulletin, April 2012

Lukasz Kulesa, *Global Zero: Implications for Europe*. in: J.P. Zanders (ed.), "Europe and the 2010 NPT Review Conference", Chaillot Paper No. 120, EU Institute for Security Studies, 2010, pp. 87-102.

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The Polish Institute of International Affairs



The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) is a leading Central European think tank and independent expert public research institution that carries out the mission of promoting Polish foreign policy and exploring international relations. Positioning itself between the world of politics and independent analysis, PISM provides analytical support to Polish decision-makers and diplomats, initiates public debate and disseminates expert knowledge about contemporary international relations. The Institute carries out its own research, cooperates on international research projects, prepares reports and analyses and collaborates with institutions with a similar profile in many countries.

PISM's Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Project focuses on the main contemporary challenges in the area: proliferation concerns, the state of WMD and conventional weapons regimes, arms-control related developments in the United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and security of sensitive materials and technologies. The project's scope of research includes also the evolution of the deterrence posture of NATO.

The team

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Jacek Durkalec is an analyst with the Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Project. He has been working at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) since July 2010, specializing in nuclear and conventional arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation issues. Mr. Durkalec has published articles and analyses and has participated in several seminars on subjects related to this field. Before joining PISM, he was a specialist at the Missile Defence Office at the Polish Ministry of National Defence from February 2009 to June 2010.