Regardless of the adopted perspective of an observer or analyst, and optimism/pessimism related to NATO-Russia relations, they will remain a key aspect of international security. This necessitates the search for “source knowledge” and “decoding” numerous stereotypes and simplifications that these relations have overgrown for the last quarter century. One must not forget the calculated and deliberate disinformation that Russia has been practising regarding its relations with the Alliance. It consistently uses the myth of “betrayal of the West”, blaming NATO nations for being the primary cause of the current state of NATO-Russia relations.

It is not our task in this volume to explain the nature of these problems exhaustively, nor to discuss the structure of modern Russian political mythology. However, the significant dispersion of “first-hand” sources raises the bar of problems confronting researchers of NATO-Russia relations. Therefore, this volume attempts at gathering key open-source documents produced by both sides and arranging them into a representative whole to provide a better understanding of the “big picture” (…). The emerging picture of political thinking and policy justifications offers the power of beating back many stereotypical opinions (…).
DOCUMENTS TALK.
NATO–RUSSIA RELATIONS
AFTER THE COLD WAR
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AFTER THE COLD WAR

EDITORS
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INTRODUCTION

NATO-Russia relations are of keen interest to researchers and practitioners of contemporary international politics as they are both a pillar of Euro-Atlantic and global security and an arena of major controversy. These relations involve many fundamental issues, including power politics, nuclear policy, hybrid warfare, broadly understood Euro-Atlantic relations, and problems of the post-Soviet space, observance of international law and political obligations of states, issues of disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, crisis resolution, cooperative security, combating terrorism, or confidence-building measures.

Such a broad basis for NATO-Russian contacts is only to a limited extent a natural legacy of the past Cold War East-West relations. Above all, it was deliberately and gradually shaped by both sides after 1989 (although, more precisely, this timeline should be moved forward at least by two years). However, it was neither a continuous process, nor an awareness of the high stakes programmed permanently into the behaviour and attitudes of Moscow and Brussels, removing from their mutual relations the rivalry or traditional components of their respective strategic cultures. The evolution of these relations, and to a large extent their current state, proves this. As a result of the 2013–14 illegal Russian annexation of Crimea and the aggression in Donbas—in both cases, the sovereign territory of Ukraine—NATO-Russia relations are probably at their lowest point since the end of the Cold War and lack any predictable prospect of their gradual improvement.

After the end of the Cold War, NATO-Soviet Union/Russia relations expressed the (unrealised) idea of a partnership based on mutual predictability and military security supported by lower levels of readiness and offensive capabilities, observance of international law and the promotion of democratic values and practices, individual freedom, and market economy. In the background remained, in a sense, logical, the Huntingtonian forecast (formulated more than two decades ago in his seminal *Clash of Civilizations*) of an alliance between Moscow and the West. Such was certainly NATO’s idea guiding the deliberate construction of its partnership with Russia. It also contained resolute support for the build-up of Russian democracy modelled after liberal democracies and making it a predictable, constructive participant in international relations, willing to take responsibility commensurate with its own international roles. To make this vision a reality, the Alliance was ready to go very far,
offering serious cooperation to the other side, self-limiting its military strength and giving up many of its attributes that had built up an allied standard of collective defence and deterrence for decades. This was evidenced by NATO military absence on its new Eastern Flank, following the accession of new member states, which started in 1999. The developments did not confirm these expectations, which does not change the fact that for more than 20 years, the Alliance has always been the source of strategic initiatives in its relations with Russia.

However, no expected response was received to the extent of the presented offer and political gestures indicating a lack of hostile and aggressive intentions. Although, the Russian objectives regarding NATO had evolved—in proportion to Moscow’s changing power over time (the more power, the more assertiveness)—the geopolitical imperatives of Russian state strategy continuously guided its actions. These included stopping NATO’s enlargement and minimising “losses” in Central and Eastern Europe, considered its sphere of influence, hedging against Western involvement on the territory of Russia and the former Soviet Union, including “zero tolerance” towards its criticism of Russian actions conducted there (e.g., the war in Chechnya). As an alternative to NATO enlargement, Russia—with interruptions, but consistently since the 1990s—has promoted various arrangements regarding mutual relations of existing international security organisations or their actual replacement by new institutional constructs better positioning Russia and other powers. Its real goal, however, was to become a privileged co-decision-maker in the process of creating a post-Cold War security order in Europe. It also included the legitimacy of the Commonwealth of Independent States (and, since 2003, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation) as NATO’s “equivalent” and the subordination of both organisations to external oversight exercised by a new authority in which Moscow would be a party with other powers. The aim was therefore to paralyse the Alliance’s activities.

The Russian objective was also to “push” the U.S. military out of Europe, i.e., to destroy NATO and to divide the allies. And the method to achieve that objective was to utilise its contacts with NATO, to weaken the Alliance’s integrity from within, to bilateralise cooperation with the member states and, if possible, to influence the allied decision-making processes. Therefore, throughout the post-Cold War period, there was a mixture of Russian (tactical) cooperation and (strategic) assertiveness. Moscow, though hesitantly, entered the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and Partnership for Peace programme. It also participated (with its chain of command) in
the IFOR/SFOR peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Alliance’s readiness to accept the Central European countries that were considered Moscow’s sphere of interests became, in the view of Russian elites, key evidence of NATO’s aggressive and expansionist nature. The consistency that can be found in Russia’s policy towards the Alliance (regardless of periods of detente, or necessary cooperation in periods of greatest weakness at the turn of the centuries) is an important factor contributing to the reflection on Russian state strategy.

However, regardless of the adopted perspective of an observer or analyst, and optimism/pessimism related to NATO-Russia relations, they will remain a key aspect of international security. This necessitates the search for “source knowledge” and “decoding” numerous stereotypes and simplifications that these relations have overgrown for the last quarter century. One must not forget the calculated and deliberate disinformation that Russia has been practising regarding its relations with the Alliance. It consistently uses the myth of “betrayal of the West,” blaming NATO nations for being the primary cause of the current state of NATO-Russia relations. It is not our task in this volume to explain the nature of these problems exhaustively, nor to discuss the structure of modern Russian political mythology. However, the significant dispersion of “first-hand” sources raises the bar of problems confronting researchers of NATO-Russia relations. Therefore, this volume attempts at gathering key open-source documents produced by both sides and arranging them into a representative whole to provide a better understanding of the “big picture.” Judging by its content, it is worthwhile to read collections of documents as monographs. The emerging picture of political thinking and policy justifications offers the power of beating back many stereotypical opinions.

NATO-Russia relations developed at an uneven pace after the end of the Cold War. There were periods of optimism (the decade of the 1990s) but also of crises and dramatic moments (cooperation was suspended several times), and the overall balance is heavily burdened by the events of the last few years since Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Moscow’s violations of international law and its political obligations towards foreign partners, as well as a full-scale information war against the West, combined with provocative military behaviour at NATO’s borders (land, air, sea, and cyber) led to another suspension of practical cooperation with Brussels.

The detailed periodisation of NATO-Russia relations between the two parties after the end of the Cold War, done separately from
the NATO and Russian perspectives, could look different. In general, however, four stages can be distinguished:

– The first is the extended transition from the Cold War context to one of relations between the West and the Soviet Union, and then with the countries that attempted to build their independence after its dissolution, and with Russia. This period is undoubtedly heterogeneous, as it links (in a certain simplification) NATO’s relations with both the USSR and later with Russia. It involves the formalisation of these contacts and the consolidation of Moscow’s position as a special partner—the first among all other successors of the USSR building institutional relations in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (then the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council) and the Partnership for Peace.

– In 1997, it smoothly enters a second stage, symbolically expressed by the signing of the “NATO-Russia Founding Act” containing the principles of mutual cooperation and by the creation of a joint institution, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council.

– It operated until 2002, and its transformation into the NATO-Russia Council opened the third stage of mutual relations.

– The Russian annexation of Crimea, followed by the aggression in the Ukrainian Donbas in 2014, combined with the suspension of cooperation with the Alliance, means opening the last stage, marked by uncertainty and unpredictability.

In each of these stages, extensive documentation was produced, the systematic analysis of which helps to reconstruct the dynamics of mutual relations and ideas shaping policies of both sides. It is available in print, electronic form, audio or film recordings. Nevertheless, it exists in great dispersion and various languages, both in Russia and NATO (systematically documenting its cooperation with Moscow). It is, therefore, reasonable to make an effort to gather in one place a collection of documents that presents the evolution of NATO-Russia relations after the end of the Cold War in a possibly impartial way.

Editorial notes

This volume, according to our knowledge, is so far the most comprehensive edited collection of documents regarding NATO-Russia relations. Its content was produced either by NATO or by Russia, and sometimes by common structures of both sides. The authors made efforts to use the original records of documents in English, Russian, or Polish. When necessary, they were carefully translated into English. Wherever other (published or not) translations could be referred to,
they were reviewed, edited and, if necessary, corrected by the authors of this edition. In each case, the source of the base text was carefully noted.

Some comments should be made on the chronology of the documents published in this volume. Generally speaking, it covers the period 1991/1992–2020. We have made an exception to this structure with regard to a few documents relating to the declining period of the Cold War and the Alliance's relations with the Soviet Union and, more broadly, with the Soviet republics/states emerging after its collapse. We considered this necessary for a proper understanding of the political context and the intentions of both sides that were developed in the following years.

The aforementioned chronology was also connected with the dilemma of selecting the method of presenting the documents contained in the volume. They form a collection, homogeneous within the general subject matter, but also separable into several groups from the point of view of their provenance and the originator. This allowed for several possible presentation approaches, from which the authors selected—in their understanding—the most user-friendly chronological system. Thus, the reader will find in this volume, given in chronological order (and if not, it has been indicated), primarily three distinct groups of documents concerning NATO-Russia relations.

The first of them are the materials (communiqués, statements, declarations, strategic concepts) produced by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, especially its highest authorities—the North Atlantic Council. It met in a regular working composition of ambassadors, occasionally at political levels: foreign affairs or national defence ministers, as well as “at a top-level,” i.e., in the formula of heads of state and government. From a formal point of view, regardless of the political level, the documents have the same binding nature. However, it is a tradition that the most important ones for NATO policy were announced at the highest level.

The second group includes documents (statements, communiqués, declarations and work plans) issued jointly by NATO and Russia. They are the result of contacts—with different political and institutional bases—between the two parties over three periods: (a) ad hoc meetings (until 1997) aimed at shaping the organisational framework and principles of mutual relations, (b) the work of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC), operating from 1997 to 2002 under the “Founding Act,” (c) the work of the NATO-Russia Council, into
which the PJC was transformed under the Rome Declaration signed in 2002 as “NATO-Russia Relations. New quality.”

Finally, a third, separate group of documents are produced by Russia. They bring Moscow’s positions in the form of public speeches by politicians, correspondence, declarations or texts of a conceptual and doctrinal nature.

A careful reader will also find in this volume individual documents concerning Poland’s aspirations for membership in the Alliance, Moscow’s reaction, a situation in the Warsaw Pact and the summary of NATO-Russia relations made in 2013 by officials of the International Secretariat in Brussels. All of them, however, do not so much illustrate the particular issues of national security policy, but rather provide a detailed background to the issue addressed in this collection.

The authors/editors wish to present to the readers in this volume the 89 documents, either as a full text or the passages directly related to the topic. Each omission is carefully marked in the text, and the issues covered by the omitted passage are appropriately described in the footnotes. The documents are additionally annotated to explain more difficult concepts, political complexities of the issues discussed or their consequences if they have not been noted in subsequent materials.

**A brief overview of the documents contained in this volume**

The volume is introduced by the Declaration of the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 29–30 May 1989, which officially celebrated the 40th anniversary of the Alliance. The document is deeply immersed in the Cold War view of security and defence issues and East-West relations. In addition to confirming the principles of NATO’s collective defence and readiness for dialogue with communist countries, the political changes at its eastern borders were also noted. Progress was therefore expected in democratisation and a more open economic policy of the USSR and emancipating satellites. However, all attention in this and many subsequent NATO documents was focused on the consequences of the events taking place in Moscow. On mutual relations, they called for cooperation in overcoming the divisions of Europe, continuing work on disarmament agreements, and respecting the principles contained in the documents of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

In a similar spirit, but much more radically formulated were the speeches of the Soviet party at the time. In one of them, the Address by
the Secretary General of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Supreme Council of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, July 6, 1989, an outline of the concept of a “common European home” was presented. It assumed the strengthening of cooperation between the USSR and the West based on common (declared) values and interests, and the gradual creation of common structures by two European blocs: Western and Eastern. This was linked to a gradual revision—initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev after he came to power in 1985—of the existing USSR policy, both internal and economic, as well as foreign and security policy, under the slogans of perestroika (reconstruction) and “new thinking.” The main objective was to overcome the deepening crisis of the Soviet system and détente in relations with the West, allowing for easing the burden regarding the arms race. In foreign and security policy, Gorbachev and his advisors developed a political-propaganda campaign to convince public opinion and Western governments that the Soviet authorities sought radical changes in European and global security. These were to gradually lead, i.a., to complete nuclear disarmament, cooperation and, most importantly, the dissolution of existing military alliances—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—and building a new formula of European security based on the principles of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The signal of NATO’s work on a more serious political offer to former opponents came only when changes in Eastern Europe reached “critical mass.” Message from Turnberry, published at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Turnberry, United Kingdom, 7–8 June 1990, contained the famous phrase “a hand of friendship and cooperation [extended] to the Soviet Union and all other European countries” as a sign of readiness for closer relations. It was to be based on respect for the sovereign political choices made by the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, the principles of freedom, democracy and justice.

The plan of the expected changes in NATO’s internal policy and the outline of the directions of cooperation with former opponents were brought by London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance. Issued by the Heads of State and Governments Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in London on 5–6 July 1990. It contained a proposal for the USSR and the countries of the collapsing Warsaw Pact to build partnership relations through direct contacts, political dialogue and the development of military cooperation. It appeared at the peak of the ongoing political
debate in Europe on the future of the Alliance and new institutional security architecture. Although the London Declaration did not offer a coherent vision of future relations with former NATO opponents, it was a breakthrough accelerating the course of subsequent events. It introduced an idea of direct partnership relations with non-Allied states, perceived as a way of strengthening security and stability in Europe.

The dissolution of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Pact and the subsequent withdrawal of Soviet troops from Central-Eastern Europe were of crucial importance for freeing the policies of the former communist states from the Moscow-run structures limiting their sovereignty. In the long run, this opened-up the problem of ensuring security for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Some of them saw this as a way to declare their will to join the Alliance. Meanwhile, a letter from USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev to Polish President Lech Wałęsa concerning the liquidation of the military structures of the Warsaw Pact (forwarded in Warsaw on 12 February 1991) formally notified the member states of this issue (the others received correspondence identical to that of Poland). The Warsaw Pact finally ceased to exist on 1 July of that year and was accompanied by warnings from Moscow against any closer links between the former satellites and NATO.

In the Soviet Union itself, the situation seemed to be far from settled, and the attempt to stop the decay of the state, the breakdown of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the emancipation of the republics took the form of the so-called Moscow coup (also known as the Yanayev coup). It lasted three days in August 1991 and was a prelude to the final disintegration of the state. A series of declarations of sovereignty (or independence, as in Ukraine, Latvia, and Estonia) in those republics that had not previously adopted such acts, marked a turning point in the process of the dismantlement of the USSR. The situation in Moscow at the time became the subject of a Statement Issued by the North Atlantic Council Meeting in Ministerial Session, Brussels, 21 August 1991. It called for the restoration of state authorities and the maintenance of security in the country. It also reiterated NATO’s willingness to develop a partnership with Moscow and Central and Eastern European countries. The dynamic development of events in the Soviet Union soon resulted in the Statement on Developments in the Soviet Union Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Rome, 7-8 November 1991. It summarised NATO’s policy towards the USSR to date and
formulated the expectation of its further peaceful and pro-democratic transformation and the fulfilment of its security obligations as the foundations of world peace and security in Europe.

Declaration on Peace and Cooperation. Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Rome, 7–8 November 1991, confirmed the directions of NATO’s post-Cold War adaptation. The process was described in detail in the so-called “new strategic concept.” It exposed the organisation’s ongoing deepened military and political transformation, reflecting the new realities in Europe. It announced the continuation of the allied core mission of collective defence and the dynamic development of dialogue and partnership with non-NATO countries. The declaration also indicated an institutional breakthrough in relations with the Soviet Union and its former satellites. Sustaining its earlier declarations of cooperation and readiness to overcome the outcomes of the Cold War divisions and to work together for security, it announced the creation of a new structure for permanent political cooperation and consultation (North Atlantic Cooperation Council).

The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept Agreed by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Rome 7–8 November 1991, was the first NATO strategy amendment since 1967 and the first such document agreed upon by the allied states after the end of the Cold War. It brought a great project of political and military transformation of NATO under new security conditions. It also included new relations and dialogue with the Soviet Union/Russia and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

The North Atlantic Council, Final Communiqué, Brussels, 19 December 1991 and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement on Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation, Brussels, 20 December 1991, issued the following day, brought long-awaited details of the objectives, tasks, and forms of activity regarding this forum announced a few weeks earlier. Importantly, it was to be a common offer for Moscow and the former communist states—without distinguishing any of them. The written record of the Statement, apart from the above-mentioned details, illustrated the dramatic development of events connected with the collapse of the USSR.

The Russian reaction to the new NATO proposals was reflected in the Letter from the President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin to the Participants of the Inaugural Meeting of the North Atlantic
Cooperation Council (NACC), Moscow, December 21. After the failed attempt of the Yanayev coup, the fate of the Soviet state was sealed. The political initiative, also in foreign affairs, was taken over by Gorbachev’s rival, one of the leaders of the democratic movement and the president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin. One of the objectives of the authorities of the Russian Federation, arising on the ruins of the USSR, was to establish fully-fledged relations with the western states and international structures. NATO was also among them. Although the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was co-founded by the Soviet Union, its ambassador in Brussels, who read Yeltsin’s letter at the inaugural meeting of this forum, stated that he represented not the USSR but Russia (as noted in the NACC founding document). The letter included a far-reaching declaration of Russia’s willingness to become a member of NATO, although later-on the Kremlin—defending itself against political assaults by the communist and nationalist opposition—claimed that as a result of a typo, the word “not” was left out of the relevant sentence, obviously changing the essence of the declaration.

The Council for Foreign and Defence Policy (SVOP), which was founded in 1992 and headed for many years by political scientist Sergei Karaganov, was one of the first analytical centres of the new Russia in the 1990s and the most influential of them. Although it formally was (and remains) a non-governmental structure, the participation of many of the leading experts of the time, as well as politicians, officials and businessmen, made it an important conceptual centre, influencing decision-making in the field of Russian foreign and security policy. In the absence of other strong structures of this kind, the SVOP reports were an important source of insight into the thinking about the world of some moderately pro-western Russian elites. The first major report, Strategy for Russia, Theses of the Foreign and Defence Policy Council (SVOP), August 19, 1992, was an attempt to formulate the state strategy of the Russian Federation and was discussed worldwide. In its content, it points out, on the one hand, the will to gradually integrate with the Western world and, on the other hand, the inability to get rid of the ambition to have a sphere of influence in the post-Soviet area and to create a buffer zone in Central Europe. The text is interesting because of its relative openness and sincerity in formulating Russian policy objectives.

Already in the first year following the dissolution of the USSR (1992), the Russian authorities made an effort to formulate the official conceptual basis of Russian foreign and defence policy. Due to the
then turbulent political disputes, this took quite a long time. The first to appear was a draft military doctrine (in June 1992), which was finally adopted in a revised version after a year and a half of discussion, as Basic Principles of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation Approved by the Decree of President Boris Yeltsin of November 2, 1993. It reflected the focus on internal threats and the Commonwealth of Independent States. It was not until January 1993 that the first official draft of the “Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation” was ready, published in a special volume of Diplomaticheskiy Vestnik (official Russian series of diplomatic documents). The final version, which did not differ in any significant way, Basic Principles of the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, Approved by Decree of President Boris Yeltsin of April 23, 1993, reflected the then rather pragmatic and pro-Western line of Russia’s foreign policy, however, also the superpower’s claims and aspirations to retain influence in the post-Soviet area and in the former Eastern Bloc countries.

This was so vital that some of Moscow’s former allies (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary) openly declared their desire to join NATO, supporting their initiatives in this respect with cooperation within the so-called Visegrad Group. The sequence of events from the late summer and autumn of 1993, described in four subsequent documents published in this volume, was important for the later expansion of the Alliance and its parallel establishment of relations with Russia. Chronologically, the first of them is The Polish–Russian Joint Declaration, Warsaw, August 25, 1993, published during the Warsaw meeting of the presidents of Poland and Russia. This is particularly true of its key phrase, almost hidden at the end of the document: “The presidents raised the issue of Poland’s intention to join NATO. President Lech Wałęsa explained Poland’s known position on this issue, which was accepted with understanding by President Boris Yeltsin. Over the time horizon, such a decision of sovereign Poland, aiming at European integration, is not contrary to the interests of other countries, including Russia.” The way of obtaining this declaration, adopted against the prepared position of the Russian delegation to the Warsaw summit, is covered in secrecy, but—according to the report of Yeltsin’s Polish partner—fatigue and drunkenness of the Russian interlocutor had a great role to play. No wonder then that the declaration was disavowed in Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s Letter to U.S. President Bill Clinton, 15 September 1993, sent to the “own hands” of the leaders of the U.S., France, the UK, and Germany. It conveys the basic elements of Russia’s permanent (negative) position
on NATO enlargement. This volume contains a version of the letter addressed to U.S. President Bill Clinton, which comes from recently declassified documents of the U.S. State Department. Earlier, this letter was (in 1994) published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI Yearbook in 1994) by the efforts of its then head, Adam D. Rotfeld. The two versions of the English translation are slightly different linguistically while conveying the same message. The arguments cited there were summarised in the Statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland Krzysztof Skubiszewski on National Policy Issues, In Particular Concerning the Letter of Russian President Boris Yeltsin of September 15, 1993, Addressed to the Leaders of France, Germany, the USA, and UK, Warsaw, October 4, 1993. It confirmed Poland’s aspiration to become a NATO member, the compliance of this process with international law, and its non-threatening nature to Russia.

The above sequence of events was commented on in an extensive Russian document, Problems of NATO Expansion. Report Presented by the Head of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Evgeny Primakov, at a Press Conference in Moscow on November 25, 1993. It was a strong voice against the enlargement of the Alliance to include Central European countries. The publication and publicity of the civil intelligence report in November 1993 was an important part of the Russian diplomatic and propaganda campaign to undermine the process. In fact, it was addressed to the elite and public opinion of Western countries, presenting, i.a., developed major Russian arguments against NATO enlargement. Among them was the emphasis on the allegedly negative influence of this process on the internal political dynamics in Russia. It was supposed to weaken the “democrats” and strengthen the communist and nationalist opposition, whose growth was then very worrying for the Western elite. However, the “democratic” authorities of Russia at that time largely shared the vision of the geopolitical interests of the state of their internal opponents. The comparison of Yeltsin’s letter and Primakov’s report described earlier shows a close affinity of the two documents in terms of their political content.

Pressure from Central European nations declaring their interest in NATO membership prompted the Alliance to expand its offer of institutional cooperation with a new military cooperation programme called the Partnership for Peace. Its details were announced in the Declaration of the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 10–11 January
1994, and a document issued simultaneously, Partnership for Peace: Invitation and Framework Document Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 10–11 January 1994. Although it offered more than NATO's previous proposals, it did not satisfy the main addressees: neither the countries of Central Europe seeking a quick path to membership, nor Russia, willing to make sure that the Partnership for Peace would be its permanent substitute and additionally would offer Moscow special treatment in its partnership with the Alliance (more privileged than the one of the Central Europeans). From NATO's point of view, the primary goal of the new programme open to all CSCE countries was to include Russia in the system of partnership cooperation and to mitigate its opposition to enlargement. This was outlined in a programme that did not, however, specify the time, criteria, or method of implementation.

Meanwhile, the course of Russian policy towards the West was toughening. The authors of the first SVOP report of 1992, on the wave of its popularity, decided to prepare another one in changed political conditions. It was announced as the Strategy for Russia (2), Theses of the Foreign and Defence Policy Council (SVOP), May 27, 1994. The political camp centred around President Yeltsin won an internal political conflict with the opposition-dominated parliament in 1993, changing Russia’s political system to a quasi-presidential one. On the other hand, its foreign policy became increasingly assertive and critical of the West. The 1994 SVOP report shows signs of clear concern regarding the possible return of political conflict with the West, on the one hand, and calls for the joint construction of new security architecture in Europe (in line with the demands of Russian diplomacy at the time), on the other.

This was formulated in a hard way, as an alternative towards NATO’s eastward “expansion.” In response to the ongoing debate in the member states on the Alliance’s enlargement, Russian diplomacy promoted its own idea of European security architecture—the “concept of pan-European partnership”—since early 1994. The concept was presented in subsequent speeches by the head of Russian diplomacy: Poland in Russia’s Foreign Policy. Speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Andrei Kozyrev at the Polish-Russian Conference “Towards a New Partnership,” Krakow, April 23, 1994 and Address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Andrei Kozyrev at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in Istanbul, June 10, 1994. The
assumption of this concept was strengthening of those international structures that involved Russia’s full participation: the CSCE (which was proposed to be reformed and given the role of the main body responsible for coordinating security policy in Europe) and the NACC (which was to become the leading structure for coordination in the field of military security). The then head of Russian diplomacy, Andrei Kozyrev, used his visits to Central European countries to promote these visions on behalf of Russia (proposing, i.a., “cross-tiled security guarantees”) namely a concept of joint U.S.-Russian political assurances offered to Central and East Europeans instead of them seeking NATO membership (this was also the case during his visit to Poland in April 1994), as well as at the NACC forum (one of the first occasions to do so was the meeting in Istanbul in June 1994).

With this in mind, Russia joined the Partnership for Peace. This fact is confirmed by the document Discussions Between the North Atlantic Council, and the Foreign Minister of Russia, Andrei Kozyrev, Brussels, 22 Jun. 1994. Summary of Conclusion and Speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Andrei Kozyrev at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, June 22, 1994. As part of the campaign against the eastward expansion of NATO, Russian diplomacy positively responded to the U.S.-German initiative of the Partnership for Peace, treating it as an alternative. However, Russia’s status as a PfP ordinary participant, of equal status to the countries of Central Europe and the CIS area did not correspond to its superpower ambitions and strategic identity. For this reason, it demanded an agreement on a special, privileged partnership with NATO and formal or informal guarantees of its non-enlargement. Discussions on this issue ended in a compromise. On the one hand, Russia agreed to sign the PfP Framework Document and, on the other hand, signed a short political document with the Alliance, which was an introduction to the NATO-Russia strengthened partnership, emphasising its de facto separate status in comparison to other PfP participants.

The progress of the NATO enlargement process systematically provoked angry reactions from the Russian authorities. One of the manifestations was the emotional and at times quite aggressive tone of the Address by the President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin at the Plenary Session of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Budapest, December 5, 1994. It was then that the Russian president spoke, i.a., of the threat of political conflict—describing it as a “cold peace” (a new form of the Cold War,
one of Russia with the West). For the Alliance’s authorities, however, the situation was quite clear - the chances of withdrawing the Russian veto on the enlargement process did not exist, which did not have to mean, however, giving-up plans to constructively cooperate with Moscow. Nonetheless, NATO’s enlargement required, first, clear rules and justifications for the process to be worked-out, second, a solid consensus among the Allies for them (and some of them considered an agreement with Russia a priority), and third, a parallel “package” of cooperation initiatives with Russia.

Also, the following year Russia continued its efforts to undermine the eastward expansion of NATO. It undertook a twofold strategy. On the one hand, these were threats (mainly in the form of “controlled leaks” to media with the announcement of “retaliatory steps” against Central European countries). On the other hand, there was growing pressure on the Alliance for an agreement on special relations and political-military cooperation, which went much further than the proposal for the Central European and post-Soviet states participating in the PfP programme. The Alliance agreed to a general political act called Areas for Pursuance of a Broad Enhanced NATO–Russia Dialogue and Cooperation. Issued at the Meeting Between Ministers of the North Atlantic Council and the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, Noordwijk am Zee, The Netherlands, 31 May 1995.

A broad list of the recommendations for Russian policy on NATO enlargement is contained in another SVOP document: Russia and NATO. Theses of the Foreign and Defence Policy Council (SVOP), June 1995. It presents, as we read, a “deromanticised vision of the West” and a strategic approach to the problem, conscious of Russia’s strengths and weaknesses.

The determination of aspirants for NATO membership, the gradually growing support of the member states, and Russia’s increasing opposition threatening the cooperation showed the need for clear explainable grounds for future decisions. The idea was two-pronged: to make NATO’s enlargement objectives and methods transparent, thus reducing Moscow’s concerns, and to use Allied discussion on them to strengthen the internal political consensus. The outcome of this work was the extensive Study on NATO Enlargement, Brussels, September 3, 1995. It described in six chapters the objectives and principles of this process, the purpose to strengthen European security and the role of the NACC and the PfP, how this process will strengthen NATO, the outcomes for new members, and conditions under which it will take place. The enlargement was to comply with
the UN Charter and Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. This meant that, first, the relevant decision will be made solely by the NATO countries, based on an assessment of the willingness and ability to carry out membership duties, second, no other country can veto it. This was a clear political suggestion to Russia. Most of all, it was addressed to Russia—as a gesture of goodwill—that decisions on this matter will be made openly and without any surprises (no veto, no surprise). Passage of this document, today frequently neglected, was a provision allowing for the creation of NATO bases and military infrastructure on the territories of new members, which, however, was not made a condition of membership. However, these issues were put in a different light by subsequent documents.

The document Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers Session. The Final Communiqué, Brussels, 17-18 December 1996, reaffirming the will to enlarge NATO, indicated, however, that NATO states “have no intention, plan or reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of the new member states, nor the need to change any aspect of the nuclear state or NATO's nuclear policy, nor do they foresee the need to do so in the future.” This was a far-reaching declaration with major political implications. Although in those circumstances there were no reasons to move these weapons to the East and NATO ostentatiously exposed the “denuclearisation” of its strategy, it somewhat blindly limited the allied policy of deterrence.

A further step in this regard was taken with the Statement by the North Atlantic Council on Collective Defence and other Missions, Brussels, Belgium, 14 March 1997, announcing that significant combat forces and military infrastructure will not be deployed on the new allies’ territories. Thus, the provisions of both cited documents represented an unequivocal withdrawal from the non-binding provisions of the 1995 “NATO Enlargement Study” concerning this issue. From today’s perspective, they are (rightly) assessed as a concession to Moscow and a unilateral action hindering the implementation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. At the time, however, they were key components of a double compromise: with Russia, as a condition for basing mutual relations on a new political provision and between Allies, fearing the implications of NATO enlargement for relations with Russia. In this form, they paved the way for the enlargement of the organisation. At the end of 1996, the Russian authorities realised two things: that the admission of new members from Central Europe to NATO was unstoppable and would take place quickly, and that Moscow would not succeed (at least in the short term) in getting European states...
to create an alternative to NATO in the form of European security architecture based on the CSCE/OSCE institutions. This made Russia determined to intense negotiations on a new document regulating its relations with the Alliance.

The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, Signed in Paris, France, May 27, 1997, brought a new political basis for mutual relations. It symbolically preceded the decisions on NATO’s enlargement but indicated the willingness of the Alliance to maintain a uniform pace of development in its relations with Moscow. The form and legal status of the future document strongly divided both sides from the beginning of discussions. The North Atlantic Council considered a politically binding act to be the appropriate form of agreement. Russia demanded an international treaty that would guarantee that NATO’s nuclear forces would not be deployed on the territories of the new member states, foreign troops and equipment would not be stationed there, and allied infrastructure would not be developed. The essence of the Russian political action was to make NATO abandon its plan to admit new members, or to obtain assurances that enlargement would include only a narrow group of Central European countries—without the Baltic States and Ukraine. The document finally adopted was politically binding. Both sides stated in the document that they do not consider each other as opponents and have a common goal: to overcome previous differences and build mutual trust and cooperation. The first part of the act specified that the partnership between NATO and Russia was to be based on the indivisibility of security and respect for the general principles of international coexistence under international law, OSCE and UN standards. Among the specific principles of NATO’s cooperation with Russia, respect for democracy, political pluralism, human rights and civil liberties, a market economy, respect for the sovereignty of third countries, their independence, the right to choose how to ensure their security, as well as the peaceful resolution of disputes and abstention from the threat or the use of force were considered to be paramount. The second part of the document, devoted to consultation and cooperation mechanisms, established the new institution of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) as an instrument for building consensus in areas of mutual interests. In the case of unanimity, joint action may be taken on a case-by-case basis. This section also contains an important provision that neither party will have a right of veto on issues reserved for sovereign decisions of a partner. The third chapter defined the thematic scope of the Council’s activities
related to the stability and security of the Euro-Atlantic area. The issues of conflict prevention and resolution were raised in detail, especially preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping operations, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the safety of nuclear installations, arms control, conversion of armaments industries, emergency planning, environmental protection, combating organised crime, exchange of information related to defence and security, as well as information activities leading to the improvement of the partners’ image. The fourth part of the Act dealt with political-military matters, reiterating the unilateral declarations of the NAC on the lack of intentions, plans and reasons for deploying or storing nuclear weapons on the territories of the new member states as well as making revisions in its nuclear policy, and on the unwillingness to deploy there major NATO forces and military infrastructure. In this way, the basis for expressing its opinion in the areas defined in Chapter III of the document was created for Russia, which was to be taken into account by NATO in a non-binding manner. Moscow, therefore, might have felt that over time it would achieve “through the back door” a level of influence in allied decisions. NATO, on the other hand, had reason to believe that it was given an important instrument to influence Russia’s international behaviour and indirectly its systemic transformation. The course of time, however, negatively verified such expectations.

Preparations for NATO enlargement were also accompanied by an extended offer of cooperation addressed to partner countries. It was developed in 1997 and it aimed to replace the NACC with a new structure—the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The principles and objectives of its work were laid down in the Basic Document of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, adopted on 30 May 1997 in Sintra. It broadened the scope of the consultation and increased the participation of partners in the planning and evaluation of civil and military joint ventures. The new rules of cooperation did not give formal security guarantees to participants outside the Alliance, and partners were not allowed to work on collective defence. A clear distinction was maintained between statuses: membership, meaning full rights and obligations, and partner, which granted privileges in cooperation but not hard obligations on members. To date, the EAPC organises political-military cooperation between the Alliance and interested Euro-Atlantic countries.

Important events in the sphere of security, especially the so-called First Chechen War (December 1994–August 1996), which cooled down Russia’s relations with the West, signing the NATO-Russia Founding
Act of May 1997, and the invitation to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to join NATO (July 1997), led the Russian authorities to indicate their assessment of the situation by adopting The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation Approved by the Decree of President Boris Yeltsin of December 17, 1997. The document showed the dual nature of the Russian authorities’ thinking: on the one hand, accusing Western states of moving military infrastructure to the East or interfering, by criticism of the war in Chechnya, with Russia’s internal affairs, and on the other hand, maintaining readiness for dialogue and cooperation with the West, provided that the interests of the Russian Federation are taken into account, which was reflected in the fact that the rules of participation of the Russian contingent in the operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina were agreed with NATO.

NATO’s decision of March 1999, taken in the face of the humanitarian disaster in Kosovo, to start bombing (former) Yugoslavia in order to force its authorities to halt the pacification action, caused outrage in Russia, for which it was a shock, showing the scale of its helplessness. Additionally, Moscow was concerned that the Alliance granted itself the right to use force without a UN Security Council mandate. A symbol of the Russian attitude towards these events was the decision of the then Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov, who was flying to the U.S., to order the plane to return to Moscow. It was accompanied by President Yeltsin’s extremely aggressive TV speech, which contained a clear suggestion of possible war between Russia and the West. Its content was expanded, also very strongly, in the Speech by the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation at the UN Sergey Lavrov at the Security Council Meeting on the Situation in and Around Kosovo, New York, 24 March 1999. Russia accused NATO of violating international law and froze mutual relations. They resumed in July after the allied air attacks had ended. However, at Russia’s request, all discussions were limited to the issue of Kosovo, and subsequent meetings revealed differences of opinion on the KFOR operation, which also included a contingent of Russian military forces. NATO’s attempts to extend the discussion to include the topics provided for in the previously agreed work plan were consistently rejected by Moscow. The subsequent (second) war in Chechnya (since August 1999) further cooled the climate of contacts. However, the Kremlin’s firm opposition did not become a subject matter of discussion at the PJC forum. The willingness to return to dialogue with Russia, and its involvement in the stabilisation process in the Balkans, made it more complicated for NATO to take a more
resolute stance on the Caucasus. Such a course of action hardened Moscow’s attitude towards cooperation with the Alliance.

The Washington Summit on 23–24 April 1999 summarised the post-Cold War transformation of NATO, setting new directions for the process. These were largely based on earlier decisions to adapt military capabilities, develop partnerships with Russia and other countries, accept new allies and keep an “open door to membership” in the future and NATO’s participation in peacekeeping operations. These directions were summarised by the Washington Summit Communique Issued by Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Washington DC, 24 April 1999., An Alliance for the 21st Century and The Alliance Strategic Concept. Approved by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington DC on 23 and 24 April 1999.

An important event for Russia’s relations with NATO was the Istanbul Summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe of 19 November 1999. The documents adopted at that time, especially the Charter for European Security and the Final Act of the Conference of States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, were important reference points for these relations. The former set out the principles on which they were to be based, while the latter, due to Russia’s failure to meet its commitments to withdraw its troops from Transnistria and Georgia, was soon to prove a bone of contention in relations between NATO and Moscow. As part of its attempts to promote an alternative (to NATO-based) construction of European security, Russia postulated in the 1990s that the CSCE states (since 1994, the OSCE) should sign a legally binding international agreement that would grant Moscow the ability to influence decisions concerning these issues (including de facto the right of veto over NATO enlargement). Based on the Russian proposals of 1994, Moscow succeeded, two years later, in launching a formal discussion in the OSCE on “a comprehensive model of European security for the 21st century.” This resulted in the compromise Charter for European Security Signed at the OSCE Summit in Istanbul on November 18, 1999, which confirmed, on the one hand, the key political principle for Russia of “indivisibility of security,” but on the other hand, the key principle to the future of NATO enlargement of free choice of political-military alliances, also embedded in international law. Contrary to Russia’s demands, the document only took the form of a political declaration (not a legally-binding treaty) containing a set
of norms and postulates and did not play an important role in the development of European security institutions.

On the other hand, fundamental geopolitical and geostrategic changes in Europe in the 1990s, and especially the dissolution of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact, necessitated a revision of the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). It was decided by means of The Final Act of the Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Istanbul, November 19, 1999. Difficult negotiations were held in 1996–1999 in Vienna. In particular, the negotiations involved moving away from formal block provisions in the established limits on military equipment. Russia also wanted to change the restrictions (in the so-called flank zones) on the deployment of troops on its European territory and to neutralise the military consequences of NATO’s enlargement to Central European countries. In an adapted treaty, Russia succeeded in partially limiting the size of the possible deployment of foreign armed forces to the territories of future Central European NATO members (except for the Baltic states). Nevertheless, Russia made commitments (the so-called Istanbul commitments) to withdraw its troops from Moldova and Georgia. The failure to fulfil some of these commitments became the reason why the adapted CFE treaty could not enter into force.

Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, Belgium, 15 December 1999, was an attempt to evaluate NATO’s position on cooperation with Russia following the Washington Summit and the resumption of mutual contacts. This evaluation included maintaining cooperation with Russia based on previous arrangements, cooperation in peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, the need for Moscow to comply with international agreements (including the commitments of the adapted CFE Treaty), and the will to peacefully resolve the conflict in Chechnya.

Within a few months after the takeover on 31 December 1999 of the responsibilities of the president of Russia from the outgoing Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin signed a series of basic documents on Russian foreign, security and defence policy: The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation Approved by Decree of the Acting President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin of January 10, 2000, The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation Approved by Decree of the Acting President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin of April 21, 2000, and The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation Approved by the Decree of the President
of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin of June 28, 2000. These documents were to show the political change that had taken place in Russia, present a new diagnosis of the international situation and, consequently, a new interpretation of Russian policies. They differed from those adopted in the Yeltsin era (in 1997 and especially in 1993) with a more pessimistic picture of the international situation and threats to Russia. More critical were, i.a., the provisions concerning the U.S. and NATO and more assertive definition of the Russian strategic goals was given. These provisions clearly referred to Russian criticism of NATO: enlargement to the East, bombings in Yugoslavia and the new strategic concept (all events took place in 1999).

After Prime Minister Vladimir Putin suddenly and unexpectedly took up his duties as president of Russia, a certain era in Russian domestic and foreign policy, symbolised by his predecessor, came to an end. Foreign observers (especially in the West) were then asking themselves the question: “Who is Mr Putin?” In the spring of 2000, he gave a series of interviews to Western opinion-forming media to present himself and his views. Among other things was the Interview of the Acting President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin for the BBC on March 5, 2000. It is remembered mainly because of the unexpected declaration of the new president that he did not rule out the future membership of Russia in NATO. This was then interpreted as evidence of the Russian leader’s pragmatism, even though the same interview also included criticism of the West. The main idea of the conversation was Russia’s willingness to form a partnership with the West, but only on equal terms, i.e., taking into account its key interests. This was an announcement of Russia’s more assertive foreign policy.

The first year and a half of President Putin’s term were characterised by a certain discrepancy between his rather pragmatic rhetoric and his attempts to rebuild relations with countries hostile to the West, especially to the U.S. (such as Cuba, Libya, Syria, Iran, Iraq, or North Korea). However, the assertive policy of the new U.S. President George W. Bush prompted Putin to change his tactics to a more conciliatory one, which took place around mid-2001. He then returned to formulating his offers to the West, which also concerned NATO. During the long Press Conference of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, Moscow, July 18, 2001, he suggested, i.a., several options for the arrangement of relations with NATO. One of them was Russia’s membership in its political structures. This was to be understood as a “test case.”
The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 against the U.S. caused a shock and led to a redefinition of the security situation in the entire Western community. Putin’s Russia saw this as a unique opportunity to bring about a breakthrough in relations with the West and to implement its former demands in the sphere of European security. The symbol of Russia’s “pro-western turn” at the time was the limited support given to the U.S. in the retaliatory attack on Afghanistan and the offer to strengthen cooperation with NATO and the EU. One of the elements of this Russian tactic was the major policy statement

**Address by the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin in the German Bundestag, Berlin, September 25, 2001**, which contained a general vision of a “multidimensional, gradual integration of Russia and Europe,” referring to Mikhail Gorbachev’s “Common European Home” from the late 1980s and Boris Yeltsin’s “Greater Europe” (presented by him in October 1997 in Strasbourg). This concept, to which Putin returned in the following years, was intended to lead to the recognition of the division of Europe into two zones: the western, dominated by Germany, and the eastern, dominated by Russia—with *de facto* limitation of U.S. presence and influence.

The change of climate was also conducive to establishing cooperation with NATO in the fight against terrorism and to correcting the institutional basis of the Alliance’s relations with Russia. It was brought by a joint declaration, **NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality**, signed by Heads of State and Government of NATO Member States and the Russian Federation on 28 May 2002, at the summit in Pratica di Mare (near Rome). It established the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) as the successor of the former PJC. The Council was to work under new rules, according to which Russia was no longer to confront a pre-coordinated joint NATO position (which had long been its demand). Over the next few years, the cooperation developed without changing the Russian attitude towards the Alliance. It covered a wide range of security issues, although it was usually not particularly comprehensive. It is worth mentioning: Moscow’s consent to the transit of supplies to ISAF forces in Afghanistan, the exchange of intelligence information related to the anti-terrorism campaign and data on air traffic, the fight against maritime piracy, drug production and trafficking, training of Afghan security forces, destruction of surplus ammunition, conventional disarmament, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, crisis management or the transformation of the defence sector. Consultations were also undertaken on international crises—from the Balkans through
North Africa, to the Caucasus and Afghanistan—and on air-defence cooperation. However, the most advanced cooperation developed based on the NATO-Russia Council Action Plan on Terrorism. The Strategic Objectives, agreed on 9 December 2004.

The U.S.-led coalition military intervention in Iraq in 2003 (made without an explicit mandate from the UNSC), followed by a series of so-called “colour revolutions” in the post-Soviet states (in Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, and Kyrgyzstan in 2005) were interpreted in the Kremlin as an attempt, supported by the West, to forcefully make fundamental geopolitical changes against Russia. This was accompanied by a tightening of the authoritarian course of domestic policy and a growing sense of strength resulting from the boom in the market for energy resources, the main source of Russia’s growing GDP. When Washington ignored Russian warnings and calls for a strategic agreement on the delimitation of interests, in 2006 the Kremlin decided to increase the offensive stance in Russian policy towards the West (and especially towards the U.S. and NATO). Symbolic manifestation of this new policy was the Speech and Q and A of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin at the Security Policy Conference in Munich, February 10, 2007. Although from today’s perspective its content does not sound particularly radical, it was then a real shock to the West, which was not used to such harsh accusations against it.

Guided by the spirit of this “new assertiveness,” the Russian authorities took several practical steps, demonstrating its disagreement with the current global and European security order. The NATO countries did not want to ignore Russia’s failure to meet some of the so-called Istanbul commitments and rejected its demand for another revision of the adapted CFE Treaty. This gave Russia an excuse to suspend implementation of the treaty and to blame NATO for the whole situation. This decision and its justification are contained in the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin of July 15, 2007, on Suspension of the CFE Treaty with Explanatory Information.

Russia quite early pointed out to the West that the recognition of Kosovo’s independence, the deployment of elements of the American missile defence shield in Central Europe, and the further enlargement of NATO (by adopting Ukraine and Georgia) will be perceived as crossing “red lines” and responded with unspecified retaliatory actions. The NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008 was particularly relevant to the latter issue. Although it declared political
support for the membership of Ukraine and Georgia, it did not specify a deadline, nor did it decide to offer these countries participation in the Membership Action Plan (MAP). Russia had already decided to actively counteract this possibility. The signal of its determination was given in the Speech of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin at the NATO Summit in Bucharest, April 4, 2008 (during the closed part of the meeting of the NATO-Russia Council). It is known to the international public for its (controlled?) “leak” in Ukraine. The Russian president, in a harsh way, threatened to destabilise Georgia and Ukraine (in the latter case, even break up the country), which four months later became a reality in the case of Georgia. Taking advantage of the formal change in political leadership (in May 2008, Putin’s close co-worker, Dmitry Medvedev became president of Russia, and the former took the position of prime minister, remaining de facto the main decision-maker), the Kremlin decided to once again introduce its ideas for revising the European security order. The first, general proposal on this issue—henceforth called the “Medvedev plan”—was made during the Speech of the President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev in Berlin, June 5, 2008. Its primary point was to convene a pan-European summit that would develop a new multilateral agreement on European security.

Russia initiated a successful provocation that led to the outbreak of a five-day Russian-Georgian war in August 2008. This was followed by Moscow’s recognition of the independence of the separatist Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Russian-Georgian war marked another serious crisis in NATO relations with Moscow. As a result of the Russian actions in the Caucasus, the Alliance suspended its cooperation in the NRC, and its position was included in the Statement on Georgia, Issued at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the Level of Foreign Ministers Held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, August 19, 2008. The interval in cooperation lasted until March the following year.

Russia’s aggression against Georgia and Moscow’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were a shock to the West. Russia decided to use the situation to present a general framework of its foreign policy to the West by making an offer of conditional partnership under new, more beneficial principles. This was the subject of an extensive Interview with the President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev for Russian TV, Moscow, August 31, 2008. It contained five principles of Russian foreign policy (then informally called the “Medvedev doctrine”). The most widely
commented point in the West was—though unspecified—Russia’s “privileged areas of interest,” which was a euphemistic definition of sphere of influence. Russia’s official policy at the time was twofold: on the one hand, it declared pragmatism and conditional partnership with the West, and on the other hand, it treated the West (especially the U.S. and NATO) as an essential source of potential threats and declared a strong defence of Moscow’s (vaguely defined) national interests. This was reflected in the new conceptual documents: The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation Approved by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev of July 15, 2008, The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2000 Approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev of May 12, 2009 and The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation Approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev of February 2, 2010.

In 2009, the Western countries attempted to engage constructively with “Medvedev’s Russia” (which included the “reset” policy of U.S. President Barack Obama and the “partnership for transformation” policy of the European Union). As they expected Russia to clarify their postulates, the Draft Treaty on European Security, November 29, 2009, was created in Moscow. It was developed by a group of experts cooperating with the Kremlin, gathered around Sergei Karaganov and the journal Rossiya w globalnoy politike (Russia in Global Politics). The document proved to be as concise as it was controversial. For example, it aimed to create a conflict-resolution system competitive not only towards NATO but also towards the UN, which had no chance to work efficiently.

After a decade of discussions and disputes over the priorities and balance of the NATO missions, the allies adopted the document Active Engagement, Modern Defence. Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon, 19 November 2010. It pointed to the low probability of a conventional threat of armed aggression against member states, shifting the burden of conclusions to the increase in risk resulting from the development and the proliferation of ballistic missile technologies. A catalogue of diverse challenges was added: from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, through energy security, availability of maritime transport routes, to cyberthreats. The main NATO objectives were described in three missions, related to a) deterrence and defence,
b) crisis management, and c) cooperative security. Relations with Russia based on mutual commitments (the third part of NATO missions), were identified as of strategic importance as a factor for peace and stability in Europe. It was made clear that Russia was not a threat to the Alliance and that its efforts to practical cooperation should be reciprocated by Russia.

The NATO Lisbon Summit was accompanied by NATO-Russia discussions at the highest level. These were summarised by the NATO-Russia Council Joint Statement. Meeting of the NATO-Russia Council Held in Lisbon on 20 November 2010. Almost half of the text was taken up by specifying the principles and goals of cooperation, which was important due to the repeated accusations of their violation on both sides. The remaining part of the document referred to priority areas of cooperation, including missile defence, maritime safety, combating terrorism and organised crime. The issues of counter-terrorism cooperation were addressed in detail in the subsequent NATO-Russia Action Plan on Terrorism of 15 April 2011. Its Executive Summary is contained in this volume.

The “thaw” in relations with the West under President Dmitry Medvedev finally ended after the beginning of a wave of political protests in Russia in December 2011 (which the Kremlin apparently considered an American attempted coup d’état) and after the return of Vladimir Putin to the office of president (May 2012). So as NATO and Russia celebrated the 10th anniversary of the renewal of relations, i.e., the Rome Declaration, it was in the Chairman’s Statement of the Meeting of the NATO-Russia Council at the Level of Foreign Ministers Held in Brussels on 19 April 2012 that summarised the dialogue and cooperation to date. The gradually growing, so far most serious crisis in Russia’s relations with the West was reflected, i.a., in the text of The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation approved by the decree of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin of February 12, 2013, which was amended under the leadership of the new head of state. The level of criticism of the West, its institutions, and policies was elevated. The political paranoia in the Kremlin was increasingly evident here.

The unsuccessful attempt to force the Ukrainian authorities to become a member of another economic and political integration structure initiated by Russia (initially called the Customs Union) and the successful one—to withdraw the country from concluding an Association Agreement with the EU—led to another Ukrainian revolution in late 2013 and beginning of 2014. Also, this time (as in
2004) the Kremlin treated it as Western anti-Russian subversion and decided to demonstrate its determination by military aggression. This was manifested by the occupation and illegal annexation of Crimea and then organising and supporting the rebellion in Donbas, which evolved into a low-intensity Russian-Ukrainian war. The solemn act of Crimea’s annexation in March 2014, held in a climate of a “patriotic boost,” allowed Putin to make a major policy speech. In the Address of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin of March 18, 2014, he de facto formulated the basis of the doctrine justifying Russia’s right to intervene in the defence of its default sphere of influence in the post-Soviet area under the slogan of defending the “Russian-speaking population” and the civilisation community of the “Russian world.” The text of the speech contains a whole catalogue of accusations against the West (especially the U.S. and NATO), reflecting the deep resentment and political paranoia of the Russian leader. The act of the annexation of Crimea was presented as an “act of historical justice against the background of Western aggression and hypocrisy.”

In their Statement by NATO Foreign Ministers of 1 April 2014, the Allies condemned the illegal military intervention by Russia and the violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. They refused to recognise the annexation of Crimea, calling on Russia to act in accordance with international law and its political obligations. In the face of the violation of the principles of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, all civil and military cooperation between NATO and Russia was suspended (while maintaining the diplomatic communication channel). This state of affairs has continued until now, and Russia’s subsequent actions do not provide any reason to believe that it will change quickly.

The Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales, 5 September 2014, states a complete perspective on NATO activities. The section on Russia, however, marks a major change in tone and assessment of the state of relations. Moscow’s aggressive actions against Ukraine (and the terrorist threat from the South) were described as “a turning point for Euro-Atlantic security and a hard test for the allied vision of a united, free and peaceful Europe.” The text of the declaration contains a catalogue of allegations against Russia considered as security threats: violation of international law, violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a foreign country, support for separatist groups, deterioration of the situation of civilians caused by their actions, discrimination against
ethnic groups, and the shooting down of a passenger plane. NATO supported international sanctions against Russia, calling on Moscow to restore the status quo ante. It upheld earlier decisions to suspend practical cooperation and their change depended on modification of Moscow’s attitude and its return to compliance with international law. However, it also expressed interest in the development of constructive mutual relations, declaring that it does not pose a threat to Russia. The described state of affairs also became the main premise for the decision to strengthen NATO’s military capabilities, including its presence on the Alliance’s Eastern Flank.

This was also reflected in a series of three Russian documents of a conceptual-doctrinal nature: The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin of December 25, 2014, The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation Approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin of December 31, 2015, and The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation Approved by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin of November 30, 2016. There was a clear sharpening of their language: The West, and especially the U.S. and NATO, became identified as opponents, accused of creating a direct threat to Russia and causing global and regional instability. The latter document also clearly suggested that if the West does not abandon its “anti-Russian” policy, Russia will deepen its cooperation (and even take steps towards limited economic and political integration) with China. In the last of these documents, NATO’s enlargement was considered a systemic problem of Euro-Atlantic relations, which could be solved by creating a pan-European security system. The document also accuses the West of pursuing a policy of containment and consistently shifting its military potential towards Russian borders.

The Warsaw Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8-9 July 2016, states in an unprecedentedly open manner that “Russia’s aggressive actions, including provocative military activity on NATO’s borders and the demonstrated willingness to pursue political objectives through threats or the use of force, are a source of instability in the region, pose a serious challenge to the Alliance, violate Euro-Atlantic security and threaten our long-term goal of an undivided, free and peaceful Europe.” This confirms not only the seriousness of the situation, which revises the allied security assessments but directly (at least for today)—an important failure of
the political project of institutional relations and practical cooperation
between NATO and Russia. They were not only to improve the security
of both sides but also to increase stability in Europe and be the basis
for international anti-crisis solutions. The text of the declaration brings
several detailed allegations against Russia and specifies the Alliance’s
position. It also indicates the steps NATO will take to strengthen the
deterrence and defence measures of the member states. In the political
sense, the message addressed to Moscow has explicitly formulated
that NATO does not seek confrontation and does not pose a threat to
Russia, but cannot and will not give way to the principles on which the
Alliance and security in Europe and North America are based, but will
remain transparent, predictable and decisive.

Russia, through its aggression against Ukraine and a whole series
of political and security actions against Western countries, has thus
provoked a limited response from the U.S. and NATO. Its component
included the decisions of the Wales (2014) and Warsaw (2016) summits to
strengthen the Eastern Flank through what has been termed “enhanced
forward presence” and increased military activity. Russia responded,
i.a., by disproportionately increasing the militarisation of its western
flanks bordering NATO and Ukraine, intensifying military exercises
and provocative behaviour in airspace and international waters. Nor
has it changed its behaviour in Ukraine. Moscow’s critical rhetorical
reaction to the decisions of the Warsaw Summit included speeches in
media by Russian diplomats and politicians, including the Interview
with the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation at
NATO Alexandr Grushko on Rossiya TV on July 24, 2016.

The NATO working Summit held in Brussels on 25 May 2017, did not
produce a formal communiqué. Despite the meeting’s other priorities,
the issue of relations with Russia was also present in the discussions of
the allied heads of state and government. The Doorstep Statement by
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg Ahead of the Meeting of
NATO Heads of State and/or Government, 25 May 2017, confirms
Brussels’ position on this issue as based on the intention to continue
the policy of strengthening collective defence and deterrence while
being open to political dialogue with Moscow.

The years following the beginning of the Russian aggression against
Ukraine in 2014 have not brought an end to the deep crisis in Russia’s
relations with the West, including the countries and NATO partners.
The Kremlin, recognising de facto the existence of confrontation, a
sui generis hybrid war, with them, resorted to point-based attacks
on individual states using various methods: cyberattacks, political
diversion, disinformation campaigns, armed demonstrations. Some of these actions took a drastic form. This was the case with the attempted murder with chemical weapons of a Russian immigrant, a former officer of the Russian secret service, Sergei Skripal, undertaken in the UK in March 2018 by two officers of Russian military intelligence. On the Russian side, this was a (not entirely successful) political demonstration of the potential for harm, but at the same time a test of the Western community’s cohesion and solidarity aimed against Russia. Contrary to Russian calculations, Western states, including EU and NATO members, reacted with decisions on the collective expulsion of Russian spies working under diplomatic cover (a total of 30 states expelled 122 Russian diplomats). Moscow rejected these allegations by condemning these decisions in a Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, March 26, 2018.

The NATO Summit in Brussels convened for July 2018, summed-up several years of intense work of the Alliance’s leaders (who met four times in the last four years). The Brussels Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 11–12 July 2018, contained a comprehensive summary of the organisation’s positions on security and defence, as well as indicated the directions of its development for the coming years. On Russian issues, it upheld the position presented by NATO in the recent period and assessed Moscow’s international conduct very harshly. In Point 4 of this document, we read: “Russia’s recent activities and policies have reduced stability and security, increased unpredictability, and changed the security environment. While NATO stands by its international commitments, Russia has breached the values, principles, and commitments which underpin the NATO-Russia relationship, as outlined in the 1997 Basic Document of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, and 2002 Rome Declaration, broken the trust at the core of our cooperation, and challenged the fundamental principles of the global and Euro-Atlantic security architecture;” a lengthy set of facts substantiating this claim was presented in Point 6: “The Euro-Atlantic security environment has become less stable and predictable as a result of Russia’s illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea and ongoing destabilisation of eastern Ukraine; its military posture and provocative military activities, including near NATO borders, such as the deployment of modern dual-capable missiles in Kaliningrad, repeated violation of NATO Allied airspace, and the continued military build-up in Crimea; its significant investments in the modernisation
of its strategic forces; its irresponsible and aggressive nuclear rhetoric; its large-scale, no-notice snap exercises; and the growing number of its exercises with a nuclear dimension. This is compounded by Russia’s continued violation, non-implementation, and circumvention of numerous obligations and commitments in the realm of arms control and confidence- and security-building measures. Russia is also challenging Euro-Atlantic security and stability through hybrid actions, including attempted interference in the election processes, and the sovereignty of our nations, as was the case in Montenegro, widespread disinformation campaigns, and malicious cyber activities. We condemn the attack using a military-grade nerve agent in Salisbury, United Kingdom, and note the independent confirmation by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) of the nerve agent used. The UK assesses that it is highly likely that the Russian Federation was responsible for the attack and that there is no plausible alternative explanation.”

During this period, there was also increasing evidence of Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty, one of the most important arms-control agreements for European security. The Alliance and, bilaterally, the U.S. repeatedly raised this problem directly with Moscow, to which it responded with denials. NATO’s position on Russia’s conduct is expressed in two further documents: Statement on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty Issued by the NATO Foreign Ministers, Brussels, 4 December 2018, and the Statement by the North Atlantic Council on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, 2 August 2019. The first one calls on Russia to return to compliance with the treaty and indicates its responsibility for the future of this agreement. The second addresses the situation created by the U.S. termination of the treaty due to Russian violations of its provisions.

Aggressive Russian actions towards the West resulted, i.a., from a specific perception of the world among members of the narrow ruling group in Russia, but also a specific understanding of recent history. One of its illustrations is Interview with the Defence Minister of the Russian Federation Sergey Shoigu for the Moskovskiy Komsomolets Daily, September 22, 2019, in which he points to the systemically anti-Russian nature of Western policy, including the U.S. and NATO after the end of the Cold War.

Interview with NATO Deputy Secretary General Rose Gottemoeller for the Kommersant Daily, 17 October 2019, is maintained in a completely different, constructive tone. The U.S. Deputy Secretary General, who is leaving her office, is giving a realistic review of the state
and prospects for NATO-Russia relations with a Russian journalist. It is in line with NATO’s position, signalling a dual-track approach to cooperation with Moscow: readiness for dialogue, but without compromising on principles and the expectation that the partner will observe its commitments.

The London Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in London, 3-4 December 2019, summarises NATO’s identity and the main directions of threats in its 70th year of existence. On Russian issues, there is an important reference to “Russia’s aggressive actions” as “a threat to Euro-Atlantic security.” The meaning of this phrase is more than just political rhetoric. The Allies indicated Russia’s conduct and its aggressive characteristics as the source of the threat, not Russia itself—thus presenting an open attitude towards dialogue if the cause of the threat was removed, i.e., in fact, the country would return to respecting its commitments and principles of international law.

The limited, defensive actions of NATO and its Member States were criticised in a document containing Speeches of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation Sergey Shoygu at the Defence Ministry Board Meeting, December 24, 2019, and provided an excuse for further intensive growth of Russia’s military (conventional and nuclear) capabilities. However, the process of accelerated militarisation of Russia, contrary to the claims of Russian politicians, began even before the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war and the decisions of the NATO summits in Newport and Warsaw. In the aforementioned, last document, one can also read a philippic of President Vladimir Putin against Poland which does not fit the circumstances. Part of Russia’s anti-Western activities was a “policy of memory” campaign, launched by the Kremlin in late 2019, mainly against Poland. The accusations of anti-Semitism and alleged collaboration of Poland with Nazi Germany were intended to cover the co-responsibility of the USSR (of which the current Russian leaders felt as continuators) for the aggression against Poland in 1939 and the then Soviet-German division of Eastern Europe, which was a manifestation of the Kremlin’s political exploitation of history.

The crisis in Russia’s relations with NATO has not only passed but has even deepened. There were further problems of contention. One of them was Russia’s violation of the Medium and Intermediate-Range Missile Ban Treaty (INF), which led to the U.S. decision to leave the treaty, to which Moscow responded with a similar step (in February
2019; the treaty expired in August 2019). Russia, blaming the U.S. for breaking the INF, tried to divide NATO by proposing a so-called moratorium on the deployment of missiles in Europe banned by the treaty (in a situation in which Russia had already started deploying them and NATO was only just beginning a long discussion on this issue). Minister Lavrov mentions the moratorium among the issues raised in Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Answers to Media Questions Following the 56th Munich Security Conference, Munich, February 17, 2020. Other issues mentioned in the document include Russian proposals aimed at limiting NATO’s activity in Russia’s neighbouring regions, including the Baltic Sea (on the pretext of avoiding incidents) while at the same time Moscow refused to talk to NATO countries about adapting the Vienna Document on confidence-building and security measures. In Minister Lavrov’s reply, one can also read the conditions that Moscow has set for the continuation of the dialogue on the forum of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) and certain hopes for the French President Emmanuel Macron’s initiatives, which were not agreed with his NATO allies, to start a dialogue on European security with Russia.

Further enlargement of NATO in the Western Balkans was also part of the Russian-NATO tensions. Russia tried to hinder this process in various ways (through political campaigns, information wars, and even subversion attempts). This was, however, ineffective. In June 2017, Montenegro became a new member of NATO (after the Russian attempt of political subversion organised in October 2016 on the occasion of the parliamentary elections in the country had failed), and in March 2020, Northern Macedonia joined NATO (despite the Russian disinformation-political campaign in 2018 aimed at blocking the Greek-Macedonian agreement, which had so far blocked the country’s accession to the Alliance). Moscow was only left to demonstrate its frustration and criticism of these decisions, which is reflected in the Comment by the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on North Macedonia Joining NATO, March 31, 2020.

Russia tried to preventively respond to any discussion about the possible departure of NATO states from the formal observance of selected provisions of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act and the 2002 declaration on NATO-Russia relations of Pratica di Mare, even though Moscow itself has broken almost all of the rules contained therein. This was also the case with the speculation that occurred in connection with the debate on the future of NATO’s nuclear sharing
programme (Allied cooperation in nuclear defence). Suggestions made publicly by the U.S. ambassador to Poland, Georgette Mosbacher, that Poland could also be covered by the programme, caused immediate criticism in Moscow, which is reflected, i.a., in the text of Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Statement and Answers to Media Questions at a News Conference Following a Ministerial Video Session of the Council of the Baltic Sea States, Moscow, May 19, 2020.

Another part of the conflict was the Open Skies Treaty (OST), which became one of the foundations of building transparency in the military activities of Russia and NATO following the end of the Cold War. It provided for mutual inspection flights over the territories of the parties’ countries (most of the countries of Europe and North America). Statement by the NATO Secretary General on the Open Skies Treaty, 22 May 2020, emphasises the alliance’s attachment to the arms-control regime, noting, at the same time, Russia’s long-standing behaviour, which is incompatible with the treaty, and disregard for NATO’s calls to correct such behaviour. The statement also notes the announcement of the U.S. withdrawing from the treaty as a result of Russia’s conduct and the fact that “the U.S. has declared that it may, however, reconsider its withdrawal should Russia return to full compliance with the Treaty.”

Although the Open Skies regime has been in crisis for years because of its violation by Russia, Moscow has not missed an opportunity to use this as another element of criticism of Washington and attempts to divide the NATO allies. In addition to the ongoing dispute over the conditions of dialogue within the NRC, this became the main topic of Deputy Foreign Minister Alexandr Grushko’s Interview with the TASS News Agency, June 6, 2020. It was also Moscow’s direct response to the NATO Secretary General’s statement of 22 May.

The Statement by the North Atlantic Council Concerning Malicious Cyber Activities, 3 June, 2020, does not apply, however, directly to Russia. It points to the growing threat from hacking attacks and harmful/criminal behaviour in cyberspace—especially in the era of the global fight against the COVID-19 pandemic. However, this position is indirectly addressed to all sponsors and executors of such activities. It is also important in this context the mention included in the text that “cyber defence is part of NATO’s core task of collective defence.”

The Statement by the North Atlantic Council on the poisoning of Alexei Navalny, 4 September, 2020, strongly condemns the attack on
the Russian oppositionist with the use of a nerve agent from the banned Novichok group, as an illegal act in clear violation of international norms. It also contains a call on Russia to bring those responsible for the act to justice, and to disclose any relevant information to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

This volume is complemented in the annex with the NATO-made NRC Practical Cooperation Fact Sheet (October 2013). It brings a collection of information on undertakings of the NATO-Russia Council since the signing of the Rome Declaration, developed by NATO Headquarters. It provides an overview not only of their nature and intensity (the reading is facilitated by the division of the described undertakings into areas of cooperation) but also of plans for the future. They were suspended after the Russian aggression in Ukraine.

* * *

The authors hope that this volume of documents will be of interest not only to readers seeking source knowledge on NATO-Russia relations but also to researchers of contemporary international relations, security experts, diplomats, students, journalists, and politicians. We address this book to them all.

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The history of NATO-Russia relations does not end, so this volume of documents is not the last one ....

Robert Kupiecki, Marek Menkiszak

Warsaw, October 2020
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NATO’s 40 Years of Success

1. As our Alliance celebrates its 40th Anniversary, we measure its achievements with pride. Founded in troubled times to safeguard our security, it has withstood the test of four decades, and has allowed our countries to enjoy in freedom one of the longest periods of peace and prosperity in their history. The Alliance has been a fundamental element of stability and co-operation. These are the fruits of a partnership based on enduring common values and interests, and on unity of purpose.

2. Our meeting takes place at a juncture of unprecedented change and opportunities. This is a time to look ahead, to chart the course of our Alliance and to set our agenda for the future.

A Time of Change

3. In our rapidly changing world, where ideas transcend borders ever more easily, the strength and accomplishments of democracy and freedom are increasingly apparent. The inherent inability of oppressive systems to fulfil the aspirations of their citizens has become equally evident.

4. In the Soviet Union, important changes are underway. We welcome the current reforms that have already led to greater openness, improved respect for human rights, active participation of the individual, and new attitudes in foreign policy. But much remains to be done. We still look forward to the full implementation of the announced change in priorities in the allocation of economic resources from the military to the civilian sector. If sustained, the reforms will strengthen prospects for fundamental improvements in East-West relations.

5. We also welcome the marked progress in some countries of Eastern Europe towards establishing more democratic institutions, freer elections and greater political pluralism and economic choice. However, we deplore the fact that certain Eastern European
governments have chosen to ignore this reforming trend and continue all too frequently to violate human rights and basic freedoms.

Shaping the Future

6. Our vision of a just, humane and democratic world has always underpinned the policies of this Alliance. The changes that are now taking place are bringing us closer to the realisation of this vision.

7. We want to overcome the painful division of Europe, which we have never accepted. We want to move beyond the post-war period. Based on today’s momentum of increased co-operation and tomorrow’s common challenges, we seek to shape a new political order of peace in Europe. We will work as Allies to seize all opportunities to achieve this goal. But ultimate success does not depend on us alone. Our guiding principles in the pursuit of this course will be the policies of the Harmel Report in their two complementary and mutually reinforcing approaches: adequate military strength and political solidarity and, on that basis, the search for constructive dialogue and co-operation, including arms control, as a means of bringing about a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe.

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1 The “Harmel Report” is a political document adopted in 1967 by NATO along with the strategy of “flexible response.” It developed two interrelated NATO functions. The first, which could be referred to as traditional, was the need to maintain military force and political solidarity as the primary conditions for credible deterrence of any possible aggression, and collective defence if it came down to it. Neither of these factors could be compromised nor undermined by efforts to improve relations with communist states. In view of the instability of East-West relations and the uncertain military situation, both factors hindering a balanced reduction of forces on the two sides of the Cold War confrontation, the North Atlantic Alliance was to fulfil another (new) fundamental function: “to seek the basis for a more stable relationship to solve existing problems” in order to reduce the risk of a “hot conflict.” However, both functions of the North Atlantic Alliance were to be performed in an organic way. Neither was an alternative to the other. In the allies’ view, the failure to secure the defence needs of the West would mean that the objectives to be achieved under the second component of NATO’s strategy would not be viable. Focusing solely on the former would petrify East-West relations at a constant level of hostility with no chance of positive changes in the international situation. This dual-track concept of NATO’s (collective defence and dialogue with opponents) was in force until the end of the Cold War, and after 1989 it became the foundation for the construction of the NATO partnership with the countries of Eastern Europe. The text of the Report is available at: www.nato.int. See also: R. Kupiecki, The Harmel Report and lessons from NATO’s dual-track policy, “Polish Diplomatic Review,” no 1, 2018, available at: www.researchgate.net/publication/335340367_Robert_Kupiecki_The_Harmel_Report_and_lessons_from_NATO’s_dual-track_policy_Polish_Diplomatic_Review_2018_no_1
8. The Alliance’s long-term objectives are:

– to ensure that wars and intimidation of any kind in Europe and North America are prevented, and that military aggression is an option which no government could rationally contemplate or hope successfully to undertake, and by doing so to lay the foundations for a world where military forces exist solely to preserve the independence and territorial integrity of their countries, as has always been the case for the Allies;

– to establish a new pattern of relations between the countries of East and West, in which ideological and military antagonism will be replaced with co-operation, trust and peaceful competition and in which human rights and political freedoms will be fully guaranteed and enjoyed by all individuals.

[...]

16. Historic progress has been made in recent years, and we now see prospects for further substantial advances. In our determined effort to reduce the excessive weight of the military factor in the East-West relationship and increasingly to replace confrontation by co-operation, we can now exploit fully the potential of arms control as an agent of change.

17. We challenge the members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization to join us in accelerating efforts to sign and implement an agreement which will enhance security and stability in Europe by reducing conventional armed forces.

[...]

Overcoming the Division of Europe

24. Now, more than ever, our efforts to overcome the division of Europe must address its underlying political causes. Therefore all of us will continue to pursue a comprehensive approach encompassing the many dimensions of the East-West agenda. In keeping with our values, we place primary emphasis on basic freedoms for the people

2 Omitted secs. 9–15 of the document concern an indication of NATO’s long-term objectives, guidelines for collective defence and a general approach to arms control.

3 It concerned the Treaty on the Reduction of Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), an agreement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, finally signed in Paris in November 1990.

4 Omitted secs. 17–23 of the document contain details of NATO’s disarmament proposals and general assumptions concerning the vision of indivisibility of security in Europe and the associated allied consultations.
in Eastern Europe. These are also key elements for strengthening the stability and security of all states and for guaranteeing lasting peace on the continent.

25. The CSCE process encompasses our vision of a peaceful and more constructive relationship among all participating states. We intend to develop it further, in all its dimensions\(^5\), and to make the fullest use of it. We recognize progress in the implementation of CSCE commitments by some Eastern countries. But we call upon all of them to recognize and implement fully the commitments which all CSCE states have accepted. We will invoke the CSCE mechanisms—as most recently adopted in the Vienna Concluding Document—and the provisions of other international agreements, to bring all Eastern countries to:

- enshrine in law and practice the human rights and freedoms agreed in international covenants and in the CSCE documents, thus fostering progress towards the rule of law;
- tear down the walls that separate us physically and politically, simplify the crossing of borders, increase the number of crossing points and allow the free exchange of persons, information and ideas;
- ensure that people are not prevented by armed force from crossing the frontiers and boundaries which we share with Eastern countries, in exercise of their right to leave any country, including their own;
- respect in law and practice the right of all the people in each country to determine freely and periodically the nature of the government they wish to have;
- see to it that their peoples can decide through their elected authorities what form of relations they wish to have with other countries;
- grant the genuine economic freedoms that are linked inherently to the rights of the individual;
- develop transparency, especially in military matters, in pursuit of greater mutual understanding and reassurance.

26. The situation in and around Berlin is an essential element in East-West relations. The Alliance declares its commitment to a free and prosperous Berlin and to achieving improvements for the city especially through the Allied Berlin Initiative. The Wall dividing the

\(^5\) It concerns the three so-called thematic “baskets” described in the 1975 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, i.e., military security, economic and environmental issues, and human rights and civil liberties.
city is an unacceptable symbol of the division of Europe. We seek a state of peace in Europe in which the German people regains its unity through free self-determination.

**Our Design for Co-operation**

27. We, for our part, have today reaffirmed that the Alliance must and will re-intensify its own efforts to overcome the division of Europe and to explore all available avenues of co-operation and dialogue. We support the opening of Eastern societies and encourage reforms that aim at positive political, economic and human rights developments. Tangible steps towards genuine political and economic reform improve possibilities for broad co-operation, while a continuing denial of basic freedoms cannot but have a negative effect. Our approach recognizes that each country is unique and must be treated on its own merits. We also recognize that it is essentially incumbent upon the countries of the East to solve their problems by reforms from within. But we can also play a constructive role within the framework of our Alliance as well as in our respective bilateral relations and in international organizations, as appropriate.

28. To that end, we have agreed the following joint agenda for the future

- as opportunities develop, we will expand the scope of our contacts and co-operation to cover a broad range of issues which are important to both East and West. Our goal is a sustained effort geared to specific tasks which will help deepen openness and promote democracy within Eastern countries and thus contribute to the establishment of a more stable peace in Europe;
- we will pursue in particular expanded contacts beyond the realm of government among individuals in East and West. These contacts should include all segments of our societies, but in particular young people, who will carry the responsibility for continuing our common endeavour;
- we will seek expanded economic and trade relations with the Eastern countries on the basis of commercially sound terms, mutual interest and reciprocity. Such relations should also serve as incentives for real economic reform and thus ease the way for increased integration of Eastern countries into the international trading system;
- we intend to demonstrate through increased co-operation that democratic institutions and economic choice create the best possible conditions for economic and social progress. The development of such
open systems will facilitate co-operation and, consequently, make its benefits more available;

– an important task of our co-operation will be to explore means to extend Western experience and know-how to Eastern countries in a manner which responds to and promotes positive change. Exchanges in technical and managerial fields, establishment of co-operative training programmes, expansion of educational, scientific and cultural exchanges all offer possibilities which have not yet been exhausted;

– equally important will be to integrate Eastern European countries more fully into efforts to meet the social, environmental and technological challenges of the modern world, where common interests should prevail. In accordance with our concern for global challenges, we will seek to engage Eastern countries in co-operative strategies in areas such as the environment, terrorism, and drugs. Eastern willingness to participate constructively in dealing with such challenges will help further co-operation in other areas as well;

– East-West understanding can be expanded only if our respective societies gain increased knowledge about one another and communicate effectively. To encourage an increase of Soviet and Eastern studies in universities of our countries and of corresponding studies in Eastern countries, we are prepared to establish a Fellowship/Scholarship programme to promote the study of our democratic institutions, with candidates being invited from Eastern as well as Western Europe and North America.

[...]6


6 Omitted secs. 29–37 concern global challenges for NATO security, non-military cooperation of NATO countries, and the future of the Alliance.
Address by the Secretary General of the CPSU Central Committee,
Chairman of the Supreme Council of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev,
at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe,
Strasbourg, July 6, 1989

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I wish to thank you for the invitation to address you here—in one of the centres of European politics and of the European idea. This meeting could, perhaps, be viewed both as evidence of the fact that the pan-European process is a reality and of the fact that it continues to evolve. Now that the twentieth century is entering a concluding phase and both the post-war period and the cold war are becoming a thing of the past, the Europeans have a truly unique chance—to play a role in building a new world, one that would be worthy of their past, of their economic and spiritual potential. Now more than ever before, the world community is experiencing profound changes. Many of its components are currently at the turning point of destinies. Both, the material foundations of life and its spiritual dimensions are changing dramatically. There are new, and increasingly more powerful factors of progress emerging.

But alongside these factors and in their wake, there continue to persist and even escalate the threats emanating from this very progress. There is an inevitable need to do everything within the power of modern intellect so that Man would be able to continue the role assigned to him on this earth, perhaps in the universe at large, so that he would be able to adapt himself to the stress-inducing newness of modern existence and win the fight for the survival of the present and next generations.

This applies to all mankind. But it applies three times as much to Europe—both in the sense of its historic responsibility and in the sense of the urgency and immediacy of problems and tasks at hand, and in the sense of opportunities. It is also the specific feature of the situation in Europe that it can cope with all this, live up to the expectations of its peoples and do its international duty at the new stage of world history, only by recognising its wholeness and by making the right conclusions.

The 1920s saw the theory of “a declining Europe” gain wide currency. But that theme seems to be in vogue with some people even today. As far as we are concerned, we do not share the pessimism
regarding the future of Europe. Europe experienced, before everyone else, the consequences of the internationalisation first and foremost of economic and subsequently of the whole public life.

The interdependence of countries, as a higher stage of the process of internationalisation, made itself felt here before it did in other parts of the world. Europe experienced more than once the attempts at unification by force. But it also experienced lofty dreams of a voluntary democratic community of European peoples. Victor Hugo said that “the day would come when you, France, you, Russia, you, Italy, you, England, you Germany—all of you, all the nations of the continent—will, without losing your distinguishing features and your splendid distinctiveness, merge inseparably into some high society and form a European brotherhood (...). The day would come when the only battlefield would be markets open for trade and minds open to ideas.”

Nowadays it is no longer enough merely to ascertain the commonality of destiny and interdependence of European states. The idea of European unification should be collectively thought over once again in the process of the cocreation of all nations—large, medium and small.

Is it realistic to raise the question in these terms? I know that many people in the West perceive that the main difficulty lies in the existence of two social systems. Yet the difficulty lies elsewhere—it lies in the rather widespread belief (or even in the political objective) that what is meant by overcoming the division of Europe is actually overcoming socialism. But this is a course for confrontation, if not something worse. There will be no European unity along these lines.

The fact that the states of Europe belong to different social systems is a reality. The recognition of this historical fact and respect for the sovereign right of each people to choose their social system at their own discretion are the most important prerequisite for a normal European process. The social and political order in some particular countries did change in the past, and it can change in the future as well. But this is exclusively a matter for the peoples themselves and of their choice. Any interference in internal affairs, any attempts to limit the sovereignty of states—whether of friends and allies or anybody else—are inadmissible.

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7 Quoted from Victor Hugo’s speech at the Paris Peace Congress on 21 August 1849.
8 This argument is a clear rejection by Gorbachev of the so-called Brezhnev doctrine (of limited sovereignty of the Soviet bloc countries and the USSR’s readiness to intervene in defence of the communist system). Gorbachev had been making similar arguments in public since 1986.
Differences between states cannot be eliminated. In fact, they are even salutary, as we have said on more than one occasion—provided, of course, that the competition between different types of society is aimed at creating better material and spiritual conditions of life for people. Thanks to perestroika⁹, the Soviet Union will be in a position to take full part in such an honest, equal and constructive competition. For all our present shortcomings and lagging behind, we know full well the strong points of our social system which follow from its essential characteristics. And, we are confident that we shall be able to make use of them both to the benefit of ourselves and of Europe.

It is time to consign to oblivion the cold war postulates when Europe was viewed as an arena of confrontation divided into “spheres of influence” and someone else’s “forward-based defences., as an object of military confrontation—namely a theatre of war. In today’s interdependent world the geopolitical notions, brought forth by a different epoch, turn out to be just as helpless in real politics as the laws of classical mechanics in the quantum theory. In the meantime, it is precisely on the basis of the outmoded stereotypes that the Soviet Union continues—although less than in the past—to be suspected of hegemonistic designs and of the intention to decouple the United States from Europe. There are even some people who are not unwilling to put the USSR outside of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals by confining it to the space “from Brest to Brest.” To them, the Soviet Union is ostensibly too big for joint living; the others will not feel very comfortable next to it, or so they say.

The realities of today and the prospects for the foreseeable future are obvious: the Soviet Union and the United States are a natural part of the European international and political structure. Their involvement in its evolution is not only justified, but also historically conditioned. No other approach is acceptable. In fact, it will even be counterproductive.

For centuries Europe has been making an indispensable contribution to world politics, economy, culture and to the development of the entire civilisation. Its world historic role is recognised and respected everywhere. Let us not forget, however, that the metastases¹⁰ of colonial slavery spread around the world from Europe. It was here that fascism came into being. It was here that the most destructive wars started. At the same time Europe, which can take a legitimate pride in

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⁹ Perestroika (reconstruction of the Soviet state and society) had been a political slogan publicly promoted by Gorbachev since mid-1986.

¹⁰ To mean: secondary changes, metastasis.
its accomplishments, is far from having settled its debts to mankind. It is something that still has to be done. And it should be done by seeking to transform international relations in the spirit of humanism, equality and justice and by setting an example of democracy and social achievements in its own countries.

The Helsinki process\textsuperscript{11} has already commenced this important work of world-wide significance. Vienna and Stockholm\textsuperscript{12} brought it to fundamentally new frontiers. The documents adopted there are today’s optimal expression of the political culture and moral traditions of European peoples. Now it is up to all of us, all the participants in the European process, to make the best possible use of the groundwork laid down through our common efforts. Our idea of a common European home serves the same purpose too. It was born out of our realisation of new realities, of our realisation of the fact that the linear continuation of the path, along which inter-European relations have developed until the last quarter of the twentieth century, is no longer consonant with these realities. The idea is linked with our domestic, economic and political \textit{perestroika} which called for new relations above all in that part of the world to which we, the Soviet Union, belong, and with which we have been tied most closely over the centuries.

We also realised that the colossal burden of armaments and the atmosphere of confrontation did not just obstruct Europe’s normal development, but at the same time prevented our country—economically, politically and psychologically—from being integrated into the European process and had a deforming impact on our own development. These were the motives which impelled us to decide to pursue much more vigorously our European policy which, incidentally, has always been important to us in and of itself. In our recent meetings with European leaders questions were raised about the architecture of our “common home,” on how it should be built and even on how it should be “furnished.” Our discussions of this subject with President François Mitterrand in Moscow and in Paris were fruitful and fairly significant in scope. Yet even today, I do not claim to carry a finished blueprint of that home in my pocket. I just wish to tell you what I believe to be most important. In actual fact, what we have in mind is a restructuring of the international order existing in Europe that would put the European common values in the forefront.

\textsuperscript{11} It concerns a process relating to the negotiation, signature, and implementation of the 1975 CSCE Helsinki Final Act.

\textsuperscript{12} It concerns the CSCE review conferences in Vienna and Stockholm in 1984-1989 (also continued later) and the documents adopted during those meetings.
and make it possible to replace the traditional balance of forces with a balance of interests.

What are the questions that deserve specific mention in this context? First and foremost, these are security issues. As part of the new thinking, we began with a critical reassessment of our perceptions of the military confrontation in Europe, of the dimensions of the external threat and of the factor of force in strengthening security. This did not come easy, sometimes it was downright painful. But as a result, decisions were made that have made it possible to break the vicious circle of “action-reaction” in East-West relations.

No doubt, joint Soviet-US efforts in the area of nuclear disarmament played a major starting role in the process. The INF Treaty\(^ {13} \) got something more than just approval from the Europeans. Many contributed to its conclusion. The Vienna talks opened a fundamentally new stage in the arms reduction process. Twenty-three states, rather than just two powers are participating in it. All the thirty-five participants in the CSCE process continue to work out military confidence-building measures. Although the two negotiating processes are going on in different rooms, they are closely interrelated.

There are no “bystanders,” nor can there be any, in peace-building in Europe; all are equal partners here, and everyone, including neutral and non-aligned countries, bears his share of responsibility to his people and Europe.

The philosophy of the concept of a common European home\(^ {14} \) rules out the probability of an armed clash and the very possibility of the use or threat of force, above all military force, by an alliance against another alliance, inside alliances or wherever it may be. It suggests a doctrine of restraint to replace the doctrine of deterrence. This is not just a play on notions, but a logic of European development imposed by life itself. Our objectives at the Vienna talks are well-known. We believe—and the US President has also spoken in favour of it—that substantial reductions within two or three years in the level of armaments in Europe can well be achieved, naturally, given the elimination of all asymmetries and imbalances. I emphasise, all asymmetries and imbalances. No double standards are admissible there.

\(^{13}\) It concerns the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, signed on 8 December 1987 in Washington by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev.

\(^{14}\) The expression in the Russian language originally used by Gorbachev is closer to English “all-European home.”
We are convinced that it is high time talks on tactical nuclear systems were initiated among all interested countries. The ultimate objective is to completely eliminate those weapons. Only Europeans who have no intention of waging war against one another are threatened by those weapons. What are they for then and who needs them? Are nuclear arsenals to be eliminated or retained at all costs? Does the strategy of nuclear deterrence enhance or undermine stability? On all these questions the positions of NATO and the Warsaw Pact appear to be diametrically opposed. We, however, are not dramatising our differences. We are looking for solutions and invite our partners to join us in this quest. After all, we see the elimination of nuclear weapons as a stage-by-stage process. Europeans can travel part of the distance separating us from complete destruction of nuclear weapons together, without backing away from their positions—with the USSR remaining faithful to its non-nuclear ideals, and the West to the concept of “minimum deterrence.” However, there is merit in figuring out what lies behind the concept of “minimum” deterrence and where the limit is, beyond which nuclear retaliation capability is transformed into an attack capability. Here much remains unclear, and ambiguity breeds mistrust.

Why shouldn’t experts from the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom and France, as well as from the states who have nuclear weapons on their territories, hold an in-depth discussion of those questions? If they arrive at some common views, the problem would become simpler at the political level, too. If it becomes clear that NATO countries are ready to join us in negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons, we could, naturally after consulting our allies, carry out without delay further unilateral reductions in our tactical nuclear missiles in Europe.

The Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries, notwithstanding the Vienna talks, are already unilaterally reducing their armed forces and armaments in Europe. Their posture and operational structure are changing in line with the defensive doctrine of reasonable sufficiency. That doctrine—both in terms of quantities of armaments and troops and in terms of their deployment, training and all military activities—makes it physically impossible to launch an attack or to conduct large scale offensive operations. In any case, as was declared at the USSR Supreme Soviet, we intend, if the situation permits, to cut sharply—by

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15 The aim was to maintain the ability to provide credible military deterrence with a minimum of nuclear arsenals.
16 This concept began to be publicly formulated by Gorbachev in spring 1986.
one and a half to two times—the share of our defence expenditure in national income by 1995.\textsuperscript{17}

We have seriously addressed conversion of the military industry. All CSCE participating countries will come to face this problem one way or another. We are ready to exchange views and share experience. We think that the opportunities offered by the United Nations can also be used and, say, a joint working group can be set up within the Economic Commission for Europe to look into conversion problems. Facing the European parliamentarians, and consequently the whole of Europe, I should like to say once again a few words about our straightforward and clear-cut positions on disarmament. These positions are the result of the new thinking and they were laid down on behalf of our entire people in the Resolution of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR\textsuperscript{18} according to which:

– we are in favour of a nuclear-free world and in favour of eliminating all nuclear weapons by the turn of the century;

– we are in favour of complete elimination of chemical arms at the earliest possible date, and we favour the destruction, once and for all, of the production base for the development of such arms;

– we are in favour of a radical reduction in conventional arms and armed forces down to a level of reasonable defence sufficiency that would rule out the use of military force against other countries for the purposes of attack;

– we are in favour of complete withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territories of other countries;

– we are absolutely opposed to the development of any space weapons;

– we are in favour of dismantling military blocs and launching immediately a political dialogue between them to that end; we are in favour of creating an atmosphere of trust that would rule out any surprises;

– we are in favour of a deep, consistent and effective verification of all treaties and agreements that may be concluded with respect to disarmament issues.

\textsuperscript{17} The USSR's defence spending numbers were classified, and with a centrally planned economy, its proportion to GDP was even impossible to determine. Western specialists estimated it (in the 1970s and 1980s) at between 3\% and 25\% of GDP.

\textsuperscript{18} The Congress of People's Deputies, held in sessions convened every few years, was formally the highest parliamentary body of the USSR. In fact, until the political changes initiated by Gorbachev, it played a symbolic role, formally approving political decisions made by the Soviet Political Bureau (Politburo).
I am convinced that it is high time the Europeans brought their policies and their conduct into line with a new common sense—not to prepare for war, not to intimidate one another, not to compete with one another either in improving weapons, or, especially, in attempts to offset the initiated reductions, but rather to learn to make peace together and to lay jointly a solid basis for it.

If security is the foundation of a common European home, then all-round co-operation is its bearing frame. What is symbolic about the new situation in Europe and throughout the world in recent years, is an intensive inter-state dialogue, both bilateral and multilateral. The network of agreements, treaties and other accords has become considerably more extensive. Official consultations on various issues have become a rule.

For the first time contacts have been established between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, between the European Community and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), not to mention many political and public organisations in both parts of Europe. We are pleased with the decision of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe to grant the Soviet Union the status of a special guest state. We are prepared to co-operate. But we think that we can go further than that.

We could accede to some of the international conventions of the Council of Europe that are open to other states—on the environment, culture, education, television broadcasting. We are prepared to co-operate with the specialised agencies of the Council of Europe. The Parliamentary Assembly, the Council of Europe and the European Parliament are situated in Strasbourg. Should our ties be expanded in the future and be put on a regular basis, we would open here, with the French Government's consent, of course, a Consulate General.

Interparliamentary ties are of major importance for making the European process more dynamic. An important step has already been made: late last year a first meeting of the parliamentary leaders of thirty-five countries was held in Warsaw. We have duly appreciated the visit to the USSR of the delegation of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe headed by its President, Mr. Björck. The delegation could, I hope, feel directly the potent and energetic pulse of the Soviet perestroika.

We regard as particularly important the recently initiated contacts with the European Parliament. Inter alia, we took note of its resolutions on military-political issues which are seen by the Parliament as the core of the Western European consensus in the area of security. In this
connection I cannot but mention the plans for “the Western European defence.” Of course, any state or any group of states have the right to take care of their security in the forms they consider most appropriate. It is important, though, that these forms are not in contradiction with the prevailing positive trends, that is, the trend towards a military détente, that they do not lead to the reappearance of confrontational tendencies in European politics and hence to a renewed arms race.

The need to convene within the next eighteen to twenty-four months a second Helsinki-type meeting is coming to the fore with ever increasing urgency. It is time for the present generation of the leaders of the European countries, the USA and Canada to discuss, in addition to the most immediate issues, how they contemplate future stages of progress towards a European Community of the twenty-first century.

As far as the economic content of the common European home is concerned, we regard as a realistic prospect—though not a close one—the emergence of a vast economic space from the Atlantic to the Urals where Eastern and Western parts would be strongly interlocked. […]\(^19\)

Ladies and gentlemen,

Europeans can meet the challenges of the coming century only by pooling their efforts. We are convinced that what they need is one Europe—peaceful and democratic, a Europe that maintains all its diversity and common humanistic ideas, a prosperous Europe that extends its hand to the rest of the world. A Europe that confidently advances into the future. It is in such a Europe that we visualise our own future. Perestroika, which seeks to radically renew Soviet society, determines our policy aimed at the development of Europe precisely in that direction. Perestroika is changing our country, advancing it to new horizons. That process will continue, extend and transform Soviet society in all dimensions: economic, social, political and spiritual, in all domestic affairs and human relations.

We have firmly and irreversibly embarked on that road. This was confirmed by the resolution passed by the Congress of People’s Deputies on the “Basic guidelines of domestic and foreign policies of the USSR.”\(^20\) That document confirmed in the name of the people our choice, our path of perestroika. I commend this resolution to your attention. It has a fundamental and revolutionary significance for the

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19 Omitted sections concern proposals for Soviet-European cooperation in the economic and humanitarian spheres.
destinies of the country to which you yourselves refer as a superpower. As a result of its implementation, you and your governments, your parliaments and peoples will soon be dealing with a socialist nation totally different from what it has been up to now.\textsuperscript{21} And this will have and cannot but have a favourable impact on the entire world process.

Thank you very much.

Translated by Robert Kupiecki / Marek Menkiszak


\textsuperscript{21} In a sense, this prediction came true—29 months later, the Soviet Union ceased to exist as a state, and instead, 15 new independent states were created, no longer considering themselves socialist.
3.

Message from Turnberry. Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Turnberry, United Kingdom, 7–8 June 1990

We, the Foreign Ministers of the Alliance, express our determination to seize the historic opportunities resulting from the profound changes in Europe to help build a new peaceful order in Europe, based on freedom, justice and democracy. In this spirit, we extend to the Soviet Union and to all other European countries the hand of friendship and cooperation.

True and enduring security in Europe will be best assured through mutual acknowledgement and understanding of the legitimate security interests of all states. We are ready to contribute actively to building confidence and closer relations between all European countries, including the members of the two alliances. We welcome the statement issued by the members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in Moscow on 7th June.

We are encouraged by the positive spirit conveyed in this declaration and in particular by the readiness on the part of the countries issuing it for constructive cooperation.

The CSCE process, which will become even more important as an instrument for cooperation and security in Europe, should be strengthened and given effective institutional form. We are committed to work for a rapid and successful conclusion of the Vienna negotiations on conventional forces. The arms control process must be vigorously pursued.

We are convinced that German unification is a major contribution to stability in Europe.

Recognising the eminently political importance of these tasks, we are ready to do our utmost for their accomplishment.


22 It concerns the declaration of the Warsaw Pact’s Political Advisory Committee, issued on 7 June 1990 during a one-day meeting in Moscow. It expressed the need to rethink and reorganise the functions of the Pact and the readiness to develop cooperation with the West.

23 This was achieved through the provisions of the Paris Charter for a New Europe, adopted by the CSCE countries in November 1990. It launched a long-term process of institutionalisation and development of the Conference’s areas of activity and its transformation from an irregular political process into an international organisation.
4.

London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance.
Issued by the Heads of State and Governments Participating
in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council
in London on 5–6 July 1990

1. Europe has entered a new, promising era. Central and Eastern Europe is liberating itself. The Soviet Union has embarked on the long journey toward a free society. The walls that once confined people and ideas are collapsing. Europeans are determining their own destiny. They are choosing freedom. They are choosing economic liberty. They are choosing peace. They are choosing a Europe whole and free. As a consequence, this Alliance must and will adapt.

2. The North Atlantic Alliance has been the most successful defensive alliance in history. As our Alliance enters its fifth decade and looks ahead to a new century, it must continue to provide for the common defence. This Alliance has done much to bring about the new Europe. No-one, however, can be certain of the future. We need to keep standing together, to extend the long peace we have enjoyed these past four decades. Yet our Alliance must be even more an agent of change. It can help build the structures of a more united continent, supporting security and stability with the strength of our shared faith in democracy, the rights of the individual, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. We reaffirm that security and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension, and we intend to enhance the political component of our Alliance as provided for by Article 2 of our Treaty.²⁴

3. The unification of Germany means that the division of Europe is also being overcome. A united Germany in the Atlantic Alliance of free democracies and part of the growing political and economic integration of the European Community will be an indispensable factor of stability, which is needed in the heart of Europe. The move within the European Community towards political union, including the development of a European identity in the domain of security, will also contribute to Atlantic solidarity and to the establishment of a just and lasting order of peace throughout the whole of Europe.

²⁴ The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.
4. We recognise that, in the new Europe, the security of every state is inseparably linked to the security of its neighbours. NATO must become an institution where Europeans, Canadians and Americans work together not only for the common defence, but to build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe. The Atlantic Community must reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to them the hand of friendship.

5. We will remain a defensive alliance and will continue to defend all the territory of all our members. We have no aggressive intentions and we commit ourselves to the peaceful resolution of all disputes. We will never in any circumstance be the first to use force.

6. The member states of the North Atlantic Alliance propose to the member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization a joint declaration in which we solemnly state that we are no longer adversaries and reaffirm our intention to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or from acting in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and with the CSCE Final Act. We invite all other CSCE member states to join us in this commitment to non-aggression.

7. In that spirit, and to reflect the changing political role of the Alliance, we today invite President Gorbachev on behalf of the Soviet Union, and representatives of the other Central and Eastern European countries to come to Brussels and address the North Atlantic Council. We today also invite the governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Hungarian Republic, the Republic of Poland, the People's Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to come to NATO, not just to visit, but to establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO. This will make it possible for us to share with them our thinking and deliberations in this historic period of change.

8. Our Alliance will do its share to overcome the legacy of decades of suspicion. We are ready to intensify military contacts, including

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25 It is a repetition of the rhetoric of “a hand of friendship and cooperation extended to former opponents,” referring to the Message from Turnberry, where it appeared for the first time as an expression of the will of NATO countries.

26 In fact, such visits began as early as spring 1990. The call included in the NATO London Declaration must therefore be understood as an incentive to continue this process.

27 The official name of the country was in force in the years 1990–1992.

28 In the summer of 1990, they became national liaison missions to NATO. They usually operated within the structures of their embassies in Brussels.
those of NATO Military Commanders, with Moscow and other Central and Eastern European capitals.

9. We welcome the invitation to NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner to visit Moscow and meet with Soviet leaders.

[...]29

14. As Soviet troops leave Eastern Europe and a treaty limiting conventional armed forces is implemented, the Alliance’s integrated force structure and its strategy will change fundamentally to include the following elements:

– NATO will field smaller and restructured active forces. These forces will be highly mobile and versatile so that Allied leaders will have maximum flexibility in deciding how to respond to a crisis. It will rely increasingly on multinational corps made up of national units.

– NATO will scale back the readiness of its active units, reducing training requirements and the number of exercises.

– NATO will rely more heavily on the ability to build up larger forces if and when they might be needed.

15. To keep the peace, the Alliance must maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces, based in Europe, and kept up to date where necessary. But, as a defensive Alliance, NATO has always stressed that none of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defence and that we seek the lowest and most stable level of nuclear forces needed to secure the prevention of war.

16. The political and military changes in Europe, and the prospects of further changes, now allow the Allies concerned to go further. They will thus modify the size and adapt the tasks of their nuclear deterrent forces. They have concluded that, as a result of the new political and military conditions in Europe, there will be a significantly reduced role for sub-strategic nuclear systems of the shortest range. They have decided specifically that, once negotiations begin on short-range nuclear forces, the Alliance will propose, in return for reciprocal action by the Soviet Union, the elimination of all its nuclear artillery shells from Europe.

17. New negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the reduction of short-range forces should begin shortly

29 Omitted secs. 10–13 of the document refer to the continuation of the significant presence of U.S. conventional and nuclear forces in Europe as a linchpin of transatlantic relations and to NATO’s efforts to develop confidence-building measures, conventional disarmament, and relevant negotiations with Warsaw Pact countries. It was then the main platform for East-West military dialogue. These activities were reflected in the soon-to-be-signed Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE, 1990) and Open Skies Treaty (1992).
after a CFE agreement is signed. The Allies concerned will develop an arms control framework for these negotiations which takes into account our requirements; for far fewer nuclear weapons, and the diminished need for sub-strategic nuclear systems of the shortest range.

18. Finally, with the total withdrawal of Soviet stationed forces and the implementation of a CFE agreement, the Allies concerned can reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons. These will continue to fulfil an essential role in the overall strategy of the Alliance to prevent war by ensuring that there are no circumstances in which nuclear retaliation in response to military action might be discounted. However, in the transformed Europe, they will be able to adopt a new NATO strategy making nuclear forces truly weapons of last resort.

[…]30

20. In the context of these revised plans for defence and arms control, and with the advice of NATO Military Authorities and all member states concerned, NATO will prepare a new Allied military strategy moving away from “forward defence” where appropriate, towards a reduced forward presence and modifying “flexible response” to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. In that connection NATO will elaborate new force plans consistent with the revolutionary changes in Europe. NATO will also provide a forum for Allied consultation on the upcoming negotiations on short-range nuclear forces.

[…]31

23. Today, our Alliance begins a major transformation. Working with all the countries of Europe, we are determined to create enduring peace on this continent.


30 Omitted sec. 19 concerns the North Atlantic Council’s activities related to the supervision of the Alliance’s adaptation.

31 Omitted secs. 21–22 concern the increasing political role of the CSCE in strengthening European security.
5.

Letter from Mikhail Gorbachev, President of the USSR, to Lech Walesa, President of the Republic of Poland, concerning liquidation of the Warsaw Treaty military structures delivered in Warsaw on February 13, 1991

Dear Mr President,

It is my impression that all members of the Warsaw Treaty are agreed that implementation of the decisions reached in June 1990 at the session of the Political Consultative Committee should be viewed in the light of the outcome of the Paris summit Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The results of the work of the Government Commissioners have opened the way to the taking of steps leading to the liquidation of the Warsaw Treaty military structures and to concluding this process by April 1, 1991. Such a decision would promote a further decrease in military tension in Europe and movement from bloc to bloc-free security structures in the spirit of the Paris Meeting. It would also require the appropriate response of the NATO member States.

To discuss the results of the work of the Commissions we consider it advisable to organize, in February for example, a meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs and the ministers of defence of the member States who could automatically take the relevant decisions concerning the military structures of the Warsaw Treaty.

As regards the future development of relations among the States-members of the Warsaw Treaty, they should in our opinion be quickly switched onto a track of bilateral relations, taking in account, in each individual case, the new internal and international conditions.

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32 Such letters were, at the same time, sent by the president of the USSR to all heads of Warsaw Pact member states.
34 It concerns the Paris meeting of the CSCE, held on 21 November 1990. The CSCE adopted the so-called Paris Charter for a New Europe, a political document presenting the principles of cooperation between countries in post-Cold War Europe. It is regarded as a symbolic end to the inter-bloc competition.
35 This took place on the basis of the Protocol on the repeal of military agreements concluded under the Warsaw Pact and on the dissolution of its bodies and military structures, signed in Budapest on 25 February 1991. For the text, see: Zbiór Dokumentów, no. 2, 1992, pp. 221–224. Subsequently, on 1 July 1991 in Prague, the Protocol on the expiry of the Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Agreement, signed in Warsaw on 14 May 1955, and the Protocol on its extension, signed in Warsaw on 26 April 1985, was signed. For the text, see: Zbiór Dokumentów, no. 2, 1992, pp. 144–147.
Should it prove necessary to hold multilateral political consultations of some particular composition, meetings at different levels could be organized, including the highest level. We are ready to participate in them on an equal footing.

Mikhail Gorbachev
February, 1991

6.

The Situation in the Soviet Union. Statement Issued by the North Atlantic Council Meeting in Ministerial Session, Brussels, 21 August 1991

1. We, the Foreign Ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have, met in extraordinary session today to discuss the grave developments in the Soviet Union.

We are encouraged and heartened by the reports from the Soviet Union that are reaching us as we are assembled. We will follow the unfolding of events with the closest attention and highest hopes. We reaffirm our position of principle in respect of the attempted coup d'état as set out in this Statement.

We strongly condemn the unconstitutional removal of President Gorbachev, the attempted coup d'état, and the use of violence to intimidate members of the reform movement and to suppress democratic institutions. We deeply deplore the loss of life that occurred last night.

2. In the space of only a few short years, Europe has been transformed. The historic events reflected in the Charter of Paris heralded a new era of European democracy, peace and unity based on the rule of law. The process of transformation, so clearly threatened

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36 On 23 August 1991 the Council issued the following statement on the suspension of measures concerning the Soviet Union. “Today the Council decided that in the light if the reinstatement of President Gorbachev and the restoration of constitutional order in the Soviet Union, the measures taken by the Council of Foreign Ministers on 21 August have ceased to operate, as the conditions attached to them no longer prevail.”

37 On 19 August 1991, the announcement of the so-called State Committee on the State of Emergency (GKChP)—an unconstitutional body consisting of eight members of the highest leadership of the USSR, headed by Vice President Gennady Yanayev—was made that Gorbachev was temporarily unable (allegedly for health reasons) to perform the duties of president, that the GKChP would take over the management of the state and introduce a state of emergency in the entire Soviet Union. At the same time, Gorbachev was interned at his residence in Foros, Crimea. The decisions of the GKChP were not followed by the authorities of the Russian Soviet Federative Soviet Republic headed by President Boris Yeltsin, who barricaded himself with his colleagues in the parliament building in Moscow. At his call, tens (and later hundreds) of thousands of Russians came to the Parliament. The military’s incompetent attempt to storm the building on the order of the putschists broke down in the face of active resistance from the demonstrators (three people were killed). After more units of the army, militia and special services started to pass to Yeltsin’s side (the majority remained neutral), the coup broke down on 21 August. The members of the GKChP were arrested and Gorbachev was released.
by those who have tried to seize power in Moscow, must continue to move forward.

3. We call for immediate restoration of President Gorbachev to his rightful office and for the renewal of the process of political and economic reform in the Soviet Union. We support the democratically elected leaders in the Soviet Union and their opposition to the unconstitutional seizure of power. We demand that Boris Yeltsin, the democratically elected President of Russia, and other democratically elected leaders, be able to exercise their legitimate functions. We attach the utmost importance to the safety and liberty of the members of the reform movement and others who may be opposed to recent events, and hold the authorities responsible for their personal well-being. We oppose the use of force throughout the Soviet Union and particularly against the governments of the Soviet Republics. The Allies are deeply concerned with the continuing reports of repression and violence by the military in the Baltic states. We urgently appeal to those responsible to refrain from all threat or use of force against the democratically elected governments and representatives of the Baltic peoples and elsewhere.

4. This attempted removal of President Gorbachev, in direct contravention of the rule of law, raises serious questions about the future of the Soviet Union, in relations with Europe and with the world at large. The subordination of the military authorities to the democratic process is a point of particular concern to us in this context. We insist that the Soviet Union abide by all its international commitments and treaties, including those concerning troop withdrawals and disarmament. The suspension of civil liberties, especially the freedom of assembly and expression, are incompatible with the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter for a New Europe. The democratic principles and human rights enshrined in these documents must be observed. To do otherwise would be a grave setback which could seriously undermine the emerging peaceful order in Europe. We are determined not to do anything which could imply the conferral of any legitimacy on those responsible for the unconstitutional acts in the Soviet Union. We will, therefore, refrain from contacts with them at the political level. We demand that representatives of states that have signed the Paris Charter are enabled to see and speak to the elected President of the Soviet Union, who has also signed the Paris Charter.

5. In these circumstances, we believe that until constitutional order and democratic freedoms have been restored in the Soviet Union, our participation in the Moscow meeting of the Conference on the
Human Dimension\textsuperscript{38} cannot be justified and that that meeting should be postponed. We believe that an emergency meeting of CSCE senior level officials should be called as soon as possible to discuss the events in the Soviet Union. We are also considering whether other actions should be taken within the CSCE framework in respect of events in the Soviet Union.

6. Last June in Copenhagen,\textsuperscript{39} we stated that the consolidation and preservation throughout the continent of democratic societies and their freedom from any form of coercion or intimidation are of direct and material concern to us. Noting the enhanced concern of Central and Eastern European states, we reiterate our conviction that our own security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe, particularly to that of the emerging democracies. We expect the Soviet Union to respect the integrity and security of all states in Europe. As a token of solidarity with the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, we will develop ways of further strengthening our contribution toward the political and economic reform process within these countries. Our diplomatic liaison arrangements, with the Central and Eastern European democracies\textsuperscript{40} now take on added significance. We strongly support the resolution by dialogue and peaceful means of all conflicts, both internal and international, that could threaten European security. In this respect, we also urge all parties to exercise the utmost restraint in the current crisis in Yugoslavia. The Allies express their support for efforts by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the European Community to resolve this crisis.

7. At our meeting in London and Copenhagen, we offered a new constructive partnership with the Soviet Union, as with the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The illegitimate actions currently being taken in the Soviet Union are bound to have a negative effect on the Alliance’s relationship with that country. Liaison will remain as a channel of communication to the Soviet Union, but we must re-examine, as a matter of urgency, other liaison activities. We

\textsuperscript{38} It concerns the so-called human dimension of the CSCE, one of the three thematic “baskets” of the work of this body (along with the security and socio-economic dimensions).

\textsuperscript{39} At the meeting of 6–7 June 1991, Texts of Communication of the North Atlantic Council—see: Texts of Final Communiques Issued by Ministerial Sessions of the North Atlantic Council, The Defence Planning Committee, the Nuclear Planning Group, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and Joint Meetings with NATO Partner Countries, Vol. 5, Brussels, [sine anno], pp. 22–25. A declaration on NATO’s main security tasks was also issued there, \textit{ibidem}, pp. 26–27.

\textsuperscript{40} It concerns the liaison missions of these states to NATO created on the basis of the London Declaration.
have agreed to suspend our programme of official exchange with the
Soviet Union pending a clarification of the situation in that country.
We underline that the Soviet Union can only count on further
Western assistance if it continues to move toward genuine democracy
and market reform and returns to constitutional government. Allied
governments will act individually and jointly in this light.

8. The Atlantic Alliance remains determined to help build a Europe
whole and free with all European states, including the Soviet Union.
To this end, normal relations can only be restored if the Soviet
Union returns to constitutionality and to the strict observance of all
principles of the Charter of Paris.

Source: The Situation in the Soviet Union. Statement Issued by the North Atlantic
Council Meeting in Ministerial Session, Brussels, 21 August 1991, “Texts of Statements,
Declarations and Communiques Issued at Meetings of the North Atlantic Council,
the Defence Planning Committee, the Nuclear Planning Group, The North Atlantic
Cooperation Council, and at Joint Meetings with NATO Partner Countries during

1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, warmly welcome the historic events that are fundamentally transforming the Soviet Union as we have known it and the relationships among the republics. By their resolute and courageous stand against the illegal coup of the 19th of August, the men and women of the Soviet union have affirmed their determination to build a new future based upon democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and economic liberty. The nations of the Atlantic Alliance pledge themselves to assist in this great endeavour. We are prepared to build our relationships with the Soviet Union and the republics on the basis of the following fundamental principles that have guided our own policies and practices for decades.

2. It is for the peoples of the Soviet Union to decide their future relationship through peaceful and democratic means. At the same time, we encourage them to progress towards a common ground of cooperation, both among themselves and with us. In this process, there is no place for threats, intimidation, coercion or violence. Authorities at all levels should respect international norms and international obligations, especially those embodied in the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris, and other CSCE documents. Consistent with these commitments, government must be based on democracy through free and fair elections, and on the rule of law. Inalienable human rights must be guaranteed, including full respect for the individual and protection of the rights of persons belonging to minorities.

3. In a period of dramatic political change, it is important also to the development of our relations that leaders of the Soviet Union and the republics implement policies that contribute to international peace and security. in this respect, it is critical that the Soviet Union and the republics take all necessary actions to ensure that international agreements signed by the USSR, especially the START Treaty, the NATO Press Service on 12 November 1991 issued a statement that France does not feel bound by this declaration.

CFE Treaty, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Biological Weapons Convention⁴³ are respected, ratified, and implemented. We call upon all authorities to refrain from any steps that could lead to proliferation of nuclear weapons or other means of mass destruction. We therefore welcome the intention of the Soviet leadership to ensure the safe, responsible and reliable control of these weapons under a single authority. This matter affects the security interests of the entire Atlantic Alliance, as well as those of the international community as a whole. The Soviet and republic governments should adopt firm measures to prevent the export of nuclear or other potentially destabilising military technologies. We urge restraint in the development of conventional military forces that by their size and character could exacerbate political tensions, retard market economic reform, and contradict efforts toward lower and more stable levels of forces as embodied in the CFE Treaty. Because it reduces the dangers of instability and enhances openness, the CFE Treaty is in everyone’s interest, including those of the Soviet union and the republics.

4. The Allies are firmly convinced that political change should be accompanied by economic liberty and the building of market economies. We support the development of economic policies that promote trade and economic cooperation among republics in the interest of growth and stability. In this context, it is essential that all the republics assume their appropriate responsibilities vis-à-vis Soviet international obligations, which would facilitate integration of the Union and the republics into the world economy. Newly established links with the international financial institutions should facilitate rapid reform towards the development of a market economy as the basis for economic recovery and prosperity for the Union and the republics. The Allies stand ready to assist in this historic undertaking, including through technical assistance in key sectors. In addition, we are providing humanitarian support to the Soviet peoples as they cope with the political and economic crises that confront them. We consider such assistance a vital contribution to the future security of Europe and of the world as a whole.

5. We hope that leaders and authorities at all levels throughout the Union and the republics will demonstrate their commitment to the values and principles we have reaffirmed in this statement.

⁴³ The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, signed on 10 April 1972, in London, Moscow and Washington DC.
6. The North Atlantic Council will continue to consult actively on developments in the Soviet Union, with a view to harmonising our approach towards unfolding events.

8.

Declaration on Peace and Cooperation. 
Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating 
in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 
Rome, 7–8 November 1991

1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Rome to open a new chapter in the history of our Alliance. The far-reaching decisions we have taken here mark an important stage in the transformation of NATO that we launched in London last year.

2. The world has changed dramatically. The Alliance has made an essential contribution. The peoples of North America and the whole of Europe can now join in a community of shared values based on freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. As an agent of change, a source of stability and the indispensable guarantor of its members’ security, our Alliance will continue to play a key role in building a new, lasting order of peace in Europe: a Europe of cooperation and prosperity.

A New Security Architecture

3. The challenges we will face in this new Europe cannot be comprehensively addressed by one institution alone, but only in a framework of interlocking institutions tying together the countries of Europe and North America. Consequently, we are working toward a new European security architecture in which NATO, the CSCE, the European Community, the WEU [Western European Union] and the Council of Europe complement each other. Regional frameworks of cooperation will also be important. This interaction will be of the greatest significance in preventing instability and divisions that could result from various causes, such as economic disparities and violent nationalism.

The Future Role of the Alliance: Our New Strategic Concept

4. Yesterday, we published our new Strategic Concept. Our security has substantially improved: we no longer face the old threat of a massive attack. However, prudence requires us to maintain an overall strategic balance and to remain ready to meet any potential risks to our security which may arise from instability or tension. In an environment of
uncertainty and unpredictable challenges, our Alliance, which provides the essential transatlantic link as demonstrated by the significant presence of North American forces in Europe, retains its enduring value. Our new strategic concept reaffirms NATO's core functions and allows us, within the radically changed situation in Europe, to realise in full our broad approach to stability and security encompassing political, economic, social and environmental aspects, along with the indispensable defence dimension. Never has the opportunity to achieve our Alliance's objectives by political means, in keeping with Articles 2 and 4 of the Washington Treaty, been greater. Consequently, our security policy can now be based on three mutually reinforcing elements: dialogue; cooperation; and the maintenance of a collective defence capability. The use, as appropriate, of these elements will be particularly important to prevent or manage crises affecting our security.

5. The military dimension of our Alliance remains an essential factor; but what is new is that, more than ever, it will serve a broad concept of security. The Alliance will maintain its purely defensive purpose, its collective arrangements based on an integrated military structure as well as cooperation and coordination agreements, and for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear forces. Our military forces will adjust to their new tasks, becoming smaller and more flexible. Thus, our conventional forces will be substantially reduced as will, in many cases, their readiness. They will also be given increased mobility to enable them to react to a wide range of contingencies, and will be organised for flexible build-up, when necessary, for crisis management as well as defence. Multinational formations will play a greater role within the integrated military structure. Nuclear forces committed to NATO will be greatly reduced: the current NATO stockpile of sub-strategic weapons in Europe will be cut by roughly 80% in accordance with the decisions taken by the Nuclear Planning Group in Taormina. The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies remains political: to preserve peace, and prevent war or any kind of coercion.

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44 The NPG meeting mentioned in the Communiqué was held on 17–18 October 1991. The public record of its conclusions broadly justified the political and military rationale for unilateral NATO decisions on nuclear arms reductions in Europe, see: Texts of Statements, Declarations and Communiques Issued at Meetings of the North Atlantic Council, the Defence Planning Committee, the Nuclear Planning Group, The North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and at Joint Meetings with NATO Partner Countries during 1991 to 1995, Vol. 5, Brussels, NATO Office of Information and Press, pp. 31–32.
Relations with the Soviet Union and the Other Countries of Central and Eastern Europe: A Qualitative Step Forward

9. We have consistently encouraged the development of democracy in the Soviet Union and the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. We therefore applaud the commitment of these countries to political and economic reform following the rejection of totalitarian communist rule by their peoples. We salute the newly recovered independence of the Baltic States. We will support all steps in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe towards reform and will give practical assistance to help them succeed in this difficult transition. This is based on our conviction that our own security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe.

10. The Alliance can aid in fostering a sense of security and confidence in these countries, thereby strengthening their ability to fulfil their CSCE commitments and make democratic change irrevocable. Wishing to enhance its contribution to the emergence of a Europe whole and free, our Alliance at its London Summit extended to the Central and Eastern European countries the hand of friendship and established regular diplomatic liaison. Together we signed the Paris Joint Declaration. In Copenhagen last June, the Alliance took further initiatives to develop partnership with these countries. Our extensive programme of high level visits, exchanges of views on security and other related issues, intensified military contacts, and exchanges of expertise in various fields has demonstrated its value and contributed greatly to building a new relationship between NATO and these countries. This is a dynamic process: the growth of democratic institutions throughout Central and Eastern Europe and encouraging cooperative experiences, as well as the desire of these countries for closer ties, now call for our relations to be broadened, intensified and raised to a qualitatively new level.

11. Therefore, as the next step, we intend to develop a more institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on political and security issues. We invite, at this stage of the process, the Foreign Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Poland,

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45 Omitted sections (pp. 6–8) concern the European security identity and its defensive role. The wording is repeated in other documents of this volume.

46 CSCE Charter of Paris for a New Europe.
the Republic of Romania, and the Soviet Union to join our Foreign Ministers in December 1991 in Brussels to issue a joint political declaration to launch this new era of partnership and to define further the modalities and content of this process. In particular, we propose the following activities:

– annual meetings with the North Atlantic Council at Ministerial level in what might be called a North Atlantic Cooperation Council;
– periodic meetings with the North Atlantic Council at Ambassadorial level;
– additional meetings with the North Atlantic Council at Ministerial or Ambassadorial level as circumstances warrant;
– regular meetings, at intervals to be mutually agreed, with:
  – NATO subordinate committees, including the Political and Economic Committees;
  – the Military Committee and under its direction other NATO Military Authorities.

12. Our consultations and cooperation will focus on security and related issues where Allies can offer their experience and expertise, such as defence planning, democratic concepts of civilian-military relations, civil/military coordination of air traffic management, and the conversion of defence production to civilian purposes. Our new initiative will enhance participation of our partners in the “Third Dimension” of scientific and environmental programmes of our Alliance. It will also allow the widest possible dissemination of information about NATO in the Central and Eastern European countries, inter alia through diplomatic liaison channels and our embassies. We will provide the appropriate resources to support our liaison activities.

[...] 47

Arms Control

15. We strongly support President Bush’s initiative of 27th September 1991 which has opened new prospects for nuclear arms reduction. We also welcome President Gorbachev’s response. We particularly applaud the decision of both sides to eliminate their nuclear warheads for ground-launched short-range weapons systems. The Allies concerned, through their consultations, have played a central role in President Bush’s decision which fulfilled the SNF arms control objectives of the London Declaration. They will

47 Omitted secs. 13–14 concern the strengthening of the CSCE process.
continue close consultations on the process of the elimination of ground-based SNF warheads until its completion. We will continue to work for security at minimum levels of nuclear arms sufficient to preserve peace and stability. We look forward to the early ratification of the recently signed START agreement.

[[...]]

20. The North Atlantic Alliance was founded with two purposes: the defence of the territory of its members, and the safeguarding and promotion of the values they share. In a still uncertain world, the need for defence remains. But in a world where the values which we uphold are shared ever more widely, we gladly seize the opportunity to adapt our defences accordingly; to cooperate and consult with our new partners; to help consolidate a now undivided continent of Europe; and to make our Alliance's contribution to a new age of confidence, stability and peace.


\footnote{Omitted secs. 16–19 discuss arms control and conventional disarmament, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and confidence-building measures.}
9.

The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept Agreed by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Rome 7–8 November 1991

At their meeting in London in July 1990, NATO’s Heads of State and Government agreed on the need to transform the Atlantic Alliance to reflect the new, more promising, era in Europe. While reaffirming the basic principles on which the Alliance has rested since its inception, they recognised that the developments taking place in Europe would have a far-reaching impact on the way in which its aims would be met in future. In particular, they set in hand a fundamental strategic review. The resulting new Strategic Concept is set out below.

Part I—the Strategic Context

The new strategic environment

1. Since 1989, profound political changes have taken place in Central and Eastern Europe which have radically improved the security environment in which the North Atlantic Alliance seeks to achieve its objectives. The USSR’s former satellites have fully recovered their sovereignty. The Soviet Union and its Republics are undergoing radical change. The three Baltic Republics have regained their independence. Soviet forces have left Hungary and Czechoslovakia and are due to complete their withdrawal from Poland and Germany by 1994. All the countries that were formerly adversaries of NATO have dismantled the Warsaw Pact and rejected ideological hostility to the West. They have, in varying degrees, embraced and begun to implement policies aimed at achieving pluralistic democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and a market economy. The political division of Europe that was the source of the military confrontation of the Cold War period has thus been overcome.

2. In the West, there have also been significant changes. Germany has been united and remains a full member of the Alliance and of European institutions. The fact that the countries of the European Community are working towards the goal of political union, including the development of a European security identity, and the enhancement of the role of the WEU are important factors for European security. The strengthening
of the security dimension in the process of European integration, and the enhancement of the role and responsibilities of European members of the Alliance are positive and mutually reinforcing. The development of a European security identity and defence role, reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will not only serve the interests of the European states but also reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Alliance as a whole.

3. Substantial progress in arms control has already enhanced stability and security by lowering arms levels and increasing military transparency and mutual confidence (including through the Stockholm CDE agreement of 1986,\(^49\) the INF Treaty of 1987\(^50\) and the CSCE agreements and confidence and security-building measures of 1990). Implementation of the 1991 START Treaty will lead to increased stability through substantial and balanced reductions in the field of strategic nuclear arms. Further far-reaching changes and reductions in the nuclear forces of the United States and the Soviet Union will be pursued following President Bush's September 1991 initiative. Also of great importance is the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), signed at the 1990 Paris Summit; its implementation will remove the Alliance's numerical inferiority in key conventional weapon systems and provide for effective verification procedures. All these developments will also result in an unprecedented degree of military transparency in Europe, thus increasing predictability and mutual confidence. Such transparency would be further enhanced by the achievement of an Open Skies regime. There are welcome prospects for further advances in arms control in conventional and nuclear forces, and for the achievement of a global ban on chemical weapons, as well as restricting de-stabilising arms exports and the proliferation of certain weapons technologies.

4. The CSCE process, which began in Helsinki in 1975, has already contributed significantly to overcoming the division of Europe.

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\(^{49}\) The document re-confirmed the prohibition of the use of force or the threat of its use as a means of resolving international conflicts, established rules for information exchange between the Warsaw Pact countries and NATO concerning their respective military activities, and for the verification of the information provided. In the following years, its provisions were developed in subsequent editions of the Vienna Document, which gave the name to the agreements of European countries related to confidence-building measures and military transparency.

\(^{50}\) The Treaty signed by the USSR and the U.S. on 8 December 1987 prohibited the testing and production of missiles (and their launch systems) with a range of 500 to 5,500 km and ordered the destruction of the parts of these weapons contained in the arsenals of both countries. It also set out mechanisms to verify compliance with this agreement.
As a result of the Paris Summit, it now includes new institutional arrangements and provides a contractual framework for consultation and cooperation that can play a constructive role, complementary to that of NATO and the process of European integration, in preserving peace.

5. The historic changes that have occurred in Europe, which have led to the fulfilment of a number of objectives set out in the Harmel Report, have significantly improved the overall security of the Allies. The monolithic, massive and potentially immediate threat which was the principal concern of the Alliance in its first forty years has disappeared. On the other hand, a great deal of uncertainty about the future and risks to the security of the Alliance remain.

6. The new Strategic Concept looks forward to a security environment in which the positive changes referred to above have come to fruition. In particular, it assumes both the completion of the planned withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Central and Eastern Europe and the full implementation by all parties of the 1990 CFE Treaty. The implementation of the Strategic Concept will thus be kept under review in the light of the evolving security environment and in particular progress in fulfilling these assumptions. Further adaptation will be made to the extent necessary.

Security challenges and risks

7. The security challenges and risks which NATO faces are different in nature from what they were in the past. The threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of NATO’s European fronts has effectively been removed and thus no longer provides the focus for Allied strategy. Particularly in Central Europe, the risk of a surprise attack has been substantially reduced, and minimum Allied warning time has increased accordingly.

8. In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess. NATO must be capable of responding to such risks if stability in Europe and the security of Alliance members are to be preserved. These risks can arise in various ways.

9. Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in central
and eastern Europe. The tensions which may result, as long as they remain limited, should not directly threaten the security and territorial integrity of members of the Alliance. They could, however, lead to crises inimical to European stability and even to armed conflicts, which could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect on the security of the Alliance.

10. In the particular case of the Soviet Union, the risks and uncertainties that accompany the process of change cannot be seen in isolation from the fact that its conventional forces are significantly larger than those of any other European State and its large nuclear arsenal comparable only with that of the United States. These capabilities have to be taken into account if stability and security in Europe are to be preserved.

11. The Allies also wish to maintain peaceful and non-adversarial relations with the countries in the Southern Mediterranean and Middle East. The stability and peace of the countries on the southern periphery of Europe are important for the security of the Alliance, as the 1991 Gulf war has shown. This is all the more so because of the build-up of military power and the proliferation of weapons technologies in the area, including weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles capable of reaching the territory of some member states of the Alliance.

12. Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, coordination of their efforts including their responses to such risks.

13. From the point of view of Alliance strategy, these different risks have to be seen in different ways. Even in a non-adversarial and cooperative relationship, Soviet military capability and build-up potential, including its nuclear dimension, still constitute the most significant factor of which the Alliance has to take account in maintaining the strategic balance in Europe. The end of East-West confrontation has, however, greatly reduced the risk of major conflict in Europe. On the other hand, there is a greater risk of different
crises arising, which could develop quickly and would require a rapid response, but they are likely to be of a lesser magnitude.

14. Two conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of the strategic context. The first is that the new environment does not change the purpose or the security functions of the Alliance, but rather underlines their enduring validity. The second, on the other hand, is that the changed environment offers new opportunities for the Alliance to frame its strategy within a broad approach to security.\(^5\)

### Part II—Alliance Objectives And Security Functions

#### The purpose of the Alliance

15. NATO’s essential purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty and reiterated in the London Declaration, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has worked since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. This Alliance objective remains unchanged.

#### The nature of the Alliance

16. NATO embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North America is permanently tied to the security of Europe. It is the practical expression of effective collective effort among its members in support of their common interests.

17. The fundamental operating principle of the Alliance is that of common commitment and mutual co-operation among sovereign states in support of the indivisibility of security for all of its members. Solidarity within the Alliance, given substance and effect by NATO’s daily work in both the political and military spheres, ensures that no single Ally is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges. Without depriving member states of their right and duty to assume their sovereign responsibilities in the field of defence, the Alliance enables them through collective effort to enhance their ability to realise their essential national security objectives.

18. The resulting sense of equal security amongst the members of the Alliance, regardless of differences in their circumstances or in

\(^5\) The so-called broad approach to security in NATO’s view meant inclusively defining it as a combination of military and non-military factors.
their national military capabilities relative to each other, contributes to overall stability within Europe and thus to the creation of conditions conducive to increased co-operation both among Alliance members and with others. It is on this basis that members of the Alliance, together with other nations, are able to pursue the development of co-operative structures of security for a Europe whole and free.

The fundamental tasks of the Alliance

19. The means by which the Alliance pursues its security policy to preserve the peace will continue to include the maintenance of a military capability sufficient to prevent war and to provide for effective defence; an overall capability to manage successfully crises affecting the security of its members; and the pursuit of political efforts favouring dialogue with other nations and the active search for a co-operative approach to European security, including in the field of arms control and disarmament.

20. To achieve its essential purpose, the Alliance performs the following fundamental security tasks:

I. To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force.

II. To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members’ security, and for appropriate co-ordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.

III. To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state.

IV. To preserve the strategic balance within Europe.

21. Other European institutions such as the EC, WEU and CSCE also have roles to play, in accordance with their respective responsibilities and purposes, in these fields. The creation of a European identity in security and defence will underline the preparedness of the Europeans to take a greater share of responsibility for their security and will help to reinforce transatlantic solidarity. However the extent of its membership and of its capabilities gives NATO a particular position in that it can perform all four core security functions. NATO is the essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the
forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of its members under the Washington Treaty.

22. In defining the core functions of the Alliance in the terms set out above, member states confirm that the scope of the Alliance as well as their rights and obligations as provided for in the Washington Treaty remain unchanged.

Part III—A Broad Approach To Security

Protecting peace in a new Europe

23. The Alliance has always sought to achieve its objectives of safeguarding the security and territorial integrity of its members, and establishing a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe, through both political and military means. This comprehensive approach remains the basis of the Alliance's security policy.

24. But what is new is that, with the radical changes in the security situation, the opportunities for achieving Alliance objectives through political means are greater than ever before. It is now possible to draw all the consequences from the fact that security and stability have political, economic, social, and environmental elements as well as the indispensable defence dimension. Managing the diversity of challenges facing the Alliance requires a broad approach to security. This is reflected in three mutually reinforcing elements of Allied security policy; dialogue, co-operation, and the maintenance of a collective defence capability.

25. The Alliance's active pursuit of dialogue and co-operation, underpinned by its commitment to an effective collective defence capability, seeks to reduce the risks of conflict arising out of misunderstanding or design; to build increased mutual understanding and confidence among all European states; to help manage crises affecting the security of the Allies; and to expand the opportunities for a genuine partnership among all European countries in dealing with common security problems.

26. In this regard, the Alliance's arms control and disarmament policy contributes both to dialogue and to co-operation with other nations, and thus will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives. The Allies seek, through arms control and disarmament, to enhance security and stability at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with the requirements of
defence. Thus, the Alliance will continue to ensure that defence and arms control and disarmament objectives remain in harmony.

27. In fulfilling its fundamental objectives and core security functions, the Alliance will continue to respect the legitimate security interests of others, and seek the peaceful resolution of disputes as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations. The Alliance will promote peaceful and friendly international relations and support democratic institutions. In this respect, it recognizes the valuable contribution being made by other organizations such as the European Community and the CSCE, and that the roles of these institutions and of the Alliance are complementary.

Dialogue

28. The new situation in Europe has multiplied the opportunities for dialogue on the part of the Alliance with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The Alliance has established regular diplomatic liaison and military contacts with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as provided for in the London Declaration. The Alliance will further promote dialogue through regular diplomatic liaison, including an intensified exchange of views and information on security policy issues. Through such means the Allies, individually and collectively, will seek to make full use of the unprecedented opportunities afforded by the growth of freedom and democracy throughout Europe and encourage greater mutual understanding of respective security concerns, to increase transparency and predictability in security affairs, and thus to reinforce stability. The military can help to overcome the divisions of the past, not least through intensified military contacts and greater military transparency. The Alliance’s pursuit of dialogue will provide a foundation for greater co-operation throughout Europe and the ability to resolve differences and conflicts by peaceful means.

Co-operation

29. The Allies are also committed to pursue co-operation with all states in Europe on the basis of the principles set out in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. They will seek to develop broader and productive patterns of bilateral and multilateral co-operation in all relevant fields of European security, with the aim, inter alia, of preventing crises or, should they arise, ensuring their effective management. Such partnership between the members of the Alliance and other nations
in dealing with specific problems will be an essential factor in moving beyond past divisions towards one Europe whole and free. This policy of co-operation is the expression of the inseparability of security among European states. It is built upon a common recognition among Alliance members that the persistence of new political, economic or social divisions across the continent could lead to future instability, and such divisions must thus be diminished.

**Collective Defence**

30. The political approach to security will thus become increasingly important. Nonetheless, the military dimension remains essential. The maintenance of an adequate military capability and clear preparedness to act collectively in the common defence remain central to the Alliance’s security objectives. Such a capability, together with political solidarity, is required in order to prevent any attempt at coercion or intimidation, and to guarantee that military aggression directed against the Alliance can never be perceived as an option with any prospect of success. It is equally indispensable so that dialogue and co-operation can be undertaken with confidence and achieve their desired results.

**Management of crisis and conflict prevention**

31. In the new political and strategic environment in Europe, the success of the Alliance’s policy of preserving peace and preventing war depends even more than in the past on the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy and successful management of crises affecting the security of its members. Any major aggression in Europe is much more unlikely and would be preceded by significant warning time. Though on a much smaller scale, the range and variety of other potential risks facing the Alliance are less predictable than before.

32. In these new circumstances there are increased opportunities for the successful resolution of crises at an early stage. The success of Alliance policy will require a coherent approach determined by the Alliance’s political authorities choosing and co-ordinating appropriate crisis management measures as required from a range of political and other measures, including those in the military field. Close control by the political authorities of the Alliance will be applied from the outset and at all stages. Appropriate consultation and decision making procedures are essential to this end.
33. The potential of dialogue and co-operation within all of Europe must be fully developed in order to help to defuse crises and to prevent conflicts since the Allies’ security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe. To this end, the Allies will support the role of the CSCE process and its institutions. Other bodies including the European Community, Western European Union and United Nations may also have an important role to play.

Part IV—Guidelines For Defence

Principles of Alliance strategy

34. The diversity of challenges now facing the Alliance thus requires a broad approach to security. The transformed political and strategic environment enables the Alliance to change a number of important features of its military strategy and to set out new guidelines, while reaffirming proven fundamental principles. At the London Summit, it was therefore agreed to prepare a new military strategy and a revised force posture responding to the changed circumstances.

35. Alliance strategy will continue to reflect a number of fundamental principles. The Alliance is purely defensive in purpose: none of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defence, and it does not consider itself to be anyone's adversary. The Allies will maintain military strength adequate to convince any potential aggressor that the use of force against the territory of one of the Allies would meet collective and effective action by all of them and that the risks involved in initiating conflict would outweigh any foreseeable gains. The forces of the Allies must therefore be able to defend Alliance frontiers, to stop an aggressor’s advance as far forward as possible, to maintain or restore the territorial integrity of Allied nations and to terminate war rapidly by making an aggressor reconsider his decision, cease his attack and withdraw. The role of the Alliance's military forces is to assure the territorial integrity and political independence of its member states, and thus contribute to peace and stability in Europe.

36. The security of all Allies is indivisible: an attack on one is an attack on all. Alliance solidarity and strategic unity are accordingly crucial prerequisites for collective security. The achievement of the Alliance’s objectives depends critically on the equitable sharing of roles, risks and responsibilities, as well as the benefits, of common defence. The presence of North American conventional and US nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe, which
is inseparably linked to that of North America. As the process of developing a European security identity and defence role progresses, and is reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, the European members of the Alliance will assume a greater degree of the responsibility for the defence of Europe.

37. The collective nature of Alliance defence is embodied in practical arrangements that enable the Allies to enjoy the crucial political, military and resource advantages of collective defence, and prevent the renationalisation of defence policies, without depriving the Allies of their sovereignty. These arrangements are based on an integrated military structure as well as on co-operation and co-ordination agreements. Key features include collective force planning; common operational planning; multinational formations; the stationing of forces outside home territory, where appropriate on a mutual basis; crisis management and reinforcement arrangements; procedures for consultation; common standards and procedures for equipment, training and logistics; joint and combined exercises; and infrastructure, armaments and logistics co-operation.

38. To protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of coercion, the Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe and kept up to date where necessary, although at a significantly reduced level. Both elements are essential to Alliance security and cannot substitute one for the other. Conventional forces contribute to war prevention by ensuring that no potential aggressor could contemplate a quick or easy victory, or territorial gains, by conventional means. Taking into account the diversity of risks with which the Alliance could be faced, it must maintain the forces necessary to provide a wide range of conventional response options. But the Alliance’s conventional forces alone cannot ensure the prevention of war. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of any aggression incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace.

The Alliance’s new force posture

39. At the London Summit, the Allies concerned agreed to move away, where appropriate, from the concept of forward defence towards a reduced forward presence, and to modify the principle of flexible response to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. The changes stemming from the new strategic environment and the altered risks now facing the Alliance enable significant modifications to be made in the missions of the Allies’ military forces and in their posture.
The Missions of Alliance Military Forces

40. The primary role of Alliance military forces, to guarantee the security and territorial integrity of member states, remains unchanged. But this role must take account of the new strategic environment, in which a single massive and global threat has given way to diverse and multi-directional risks. Alliance forces have different functions to perform in peace, crisis and war.

41. In peace, the role of Allied military forces is to guard against risks to the security of Alliance members; to contribute towards the maintenance of stability and balance in Europe; and to ensure that peace is preserved. They can contribute to dialogue and co-operation throughout Europe by their participation in confidence-building activities, including those which enhance transparency and improve communication; as well as in verification of arms control agreements. Allies could, further, be called upon to contribute to global stability and peace by providing forces for United Nations missions.

42. In the event of crises which might lead to a military threat to the security of Alliance members, the Alliance’s military forces can complement and reinforce political actions within a broad approach to security, and thereby contribute to the management of such crises and their peaceful resolution. This requires that these forces have a capability for measured and timely responses in such circumstances; the capability to deter action against any Ally and, in the event that aggression takes place, to respond to and repel it as well as to re-establish the territorial integrity of member states.

43. While in the new security environment a general war in Europe has become highly unlikely, it cannot finally be ruled out. The Alliance’s military forces, which have as their fundamental mission to protect peace, have to provide the essential insurance against potential risks at the minimum level necessary to prevent war of any kind, and, should aggression occur, to restore peace. Hence the need for the capabilities and the appropriate mix of forces already described.

Guidelines for the Alliance’s Force Posture

44. To implement its security objectives and strategic principles in the new environment, the organization of the Allies’ forces must be adapted to provide capabilities that can contribute to protecting peace, managing crises that affect the security of Alliance members, and preventing war, while retaining at all times the means to defend, if necessary, all Allied territory and to restore peace. The posture of
Allies’ forces will conform to the guidelines developed in the following paragraphs.

45. The size, readiness, availability and deployment of the Alliance’s military forces will continue to reflect its strictly defensive nature and will be adapted accordingly to the new strategic environment including arms control agreements. This means in particular:

a. that the overall size of the Allies’ forces, and in many cases their readiness, will be reduced;

b. that the maintenance of a comprehensive in-place linear defensive posture in the central region will no longer be required. The peacetime geographical distribution of forces will ensure a sufficient military presence throughout the territory of the Alliance, including where necessary forward deployment of appropriate forces. Regional considerations and, in particular, geostrategic differences within the Alliance will have to be taken into account, including the shorter warning times to which the northern and southern regions will be subject compared with the central region and, in the southern region, the potential for instability and the military capabilities in the adjacent areas.

46. To ensure that at this reduced level the Allies’ forces can play an effective role both in managing crises and in countering aggression against any Ally, they will require enhanced flexibility and mobility and an assured capability for augmentation when necessary. For these reasons:

a. Available forces will include, in a limited but militarily significant proportion, ground, air and sea immediate and rapid reaction elements able to respond to a wide range of eventualities, many of which are unforeseeable. They will be of sufficient quality, quantity and readiness to deter a limited attack and, if required, to defend the territory of the Allies against attacks, particularly those launched without long warning time.

b. The forces of the Allies will be structured so as to permit their military capability to be built up when necessary. This ability to build up by reinforcement, by mobilising reserves, or by reconstituting forces, must be in proportion to potential threats to Alliance security, including the possibility—albeit unlikely, but one that prudence dictates should not be ruled out—of a major conflict. Consequently, capabilities for timely reinforcement and resupply both within Europe and from North America will be of critical importance.

c. Appropriate force structures and procedures, including those that would provide an ability to build up, deploy and draw down forces
quickly and discriminately, will be developed to permit measured, flexible and timely responses in order to reduce and defuse tensions. These arrangements must be exercised regularly in peacetime.

d. In the event of use of forces, including the deployment of reaction and other available reinforcing forces as an instrument of crisis management, the Alliance's political authorities will, as before, exercise close control over their employment at all stages. Existing procedures will be reviewed in the light of the new missions and posture of Alliance forces.

Characteristics of Conventional Forces

47. It is essential that the Allies' military forces have a credible ability to fulfil their functions in peace, crisis and war in a way appropriate to the new security environment. This will be reflected in force and equipment levels; readiness and availability; training and exercises; deployment and employment options; and force build-up capabilities, all of which will be adjusted accordingly. The conventional forces of the Allies will include, in addition to immediate and rapid reaction forces, main defence forces, which will provide the bulk of forces needed to ensure the Alliance's territorial integrity and the unimpeded use of their lines of communication; and augmentation forces, which will provide a means of reinforcing existing forces in a particular region. Main defence and augmentation forces will comprise both active and mobilisable elements.

48. Ground, maritime and air forces will have to co-operate closely and combine and assist each other in operations aimed at achieving agreed objectives. These forces will consist of the following:

a. **Ground forces**, which are essential to hold or regain territory. The majority will normally be at lower states of readiness and, overall, there will be a greater reliance on mobilization and reserves. All categories of ground forces will require demonstrable combat effectiveness together with an appropriately enhanced capability for flexible deployment.

b. **Maritime forces**, which because of their inherent mobility, flexibility and endurance, make an important contribution to the Alliance's crisis response options. Their essential missions are to ensure sea control in order to safeguard the Allies' sea lines of communication, to support land and amphibious operations, and to protect the deployment of the Alliance's sea-based nuclear deterrent.

c. **Air forces**, whose ability to fulfil their fundamental roles in both independent air and combined operations—counter-air, air interdiction
and offensive air support—as well as to contribute to surveillance, reconnaissance and electronic warfare operations, is essential to the overall effectiveness of the Allies’ military forces. Their role in supporting operations, on land and at sea, will require appropriate long-distance airlift and air refuelling capabilities. Air defence forces, including modern air command and control systems, are required to ensure a secure air defence environment.

49. In light of the potential risks it poses, the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction should be given special consideration. Solution of this problem will require complementary approaches including, for example, export control and missile defences.

50. Alliance strategy is not dependent on a chemical warfare capability. The Allies remain committed to the earliest possible achievement of a global, comprehensive, and effectively verifiable ban on all chemical weapons. But, even after implementation of a global ban, precautions of a purely defensive nature will need to be maintained.

51. In the new security environment and given the reduced overall force levels in future, the ability to work closely together, which will facilitate the cost effective use of Alliance resources, will be particularly important for the achievement of the missions of the Allies’ forces. The Alliance’s collective defence arrangements in which, for those concerned, the integrated military structure, including multinational forces, plays the key role, will be essential in this regard. Integrated and multinational European structures, as they are further developed in the context of an emerging European Defence Identity, will also increasingly have a similarly important role to play in enhancing the Allies’ ability to work together in the common defence. Allies’ efforts to achieve maximum co-operation will be based on the common guidelines for defence defined above. Practical arrangements will be developed to ensure the necessary mutual transparency and complementarity between the European security and defence identity and the Alliance.

52. In order to be able to respond flexibly to a wide range of possible contingencies, the Allies concerned will require effective surveillance and intelligence, flexible command and control, mobility within and between regions, and appropriate logistics capabilities, including transport capacities. Logistic stocks must be sufficient to sustain all types of forces in order to permit effective defence until resupply is available. The capability of the Allies concerned to build-up larger, adequately equipped and trained forces, in a timely manner and to
a level appropriate to any risk to Alliance security, will also make an essential contribution to crisis management and defence. This capability will include the ability to reinforce any area at risk within the territory of the Allies and to establish a multinational presence when and where this is needed. Elements of all three force categories will be capable of being employed flexibly as part of both intra-European and transatlantic reinforcement. Proper use of these capabilities will require control of the necessary lines of communication as well as appropriate support and exercise arrangements. Civil resources will be of increasing relevance in this context.

53. For the Allies concerned, collective defence arrangements will rely increasingly on multinational forces, complementing national commitments to NATO. Multinational forces demonstrate the Alliance’s resolve to maintain a credible collective defence; enhance Alliance cohesion; reinforce the transatlantic partnership and strengthen the European pillar. Multinational forces, and in particular reaction forces, reinforce solidarity. They can also provide a way of deploying more capable formations than might be available purely nationally, thus helping to make more efficient use of scarce defence resources. This may include a highly integrated, multinational approach to specific tasks and functions.

Characteristics of Nuclear Forces

54. The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war. They will continue to fulfil an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies’ response to military aggression. They demonstrate that aggression of any kind is not a rational option. The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.

55. A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration of Alliance solidarity and common commitment to war prevention continue to require widespread participation by European Allies involved in collective defence planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangements. Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link
between the European and the North American members of the Alliance. The Alliance will therefore maintain adequate nuclear forces in Europe. These forces need to have the necessary characteristics and appropriate flexibility and survivability, to be perceived as a credible and effective element of the Allies’ strategy in preventing war. They will be maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and stability.

56. The Allies concerned consider that, with the radical changes in the security situation, including conventional force levels in Europe maintained in relative balance and increased reaction times, NATO’s ability to defuse a crisis through diplomatic and other means or, should it be necessary, to mount a successful conventional defence will significantly improve. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated by them are therefore even more remote. They can therefore significantly reduce their sub-strategic nuclear forces. They will maintain adequate sub-strategic forces based in Europe which will provide an essential link with strategic nuclear forces, reinforcing the trans-Atlantic link. These will consist solely of dual capable aircraft which could, if necessary, be supplemented by offshore systems. Sub-strategic nuclear weapons will, however, not be deployed in normal circumstances on surface vessels and attack submarines. There is no requirement for nuclear artillery or ground-launched short-range nuclear missiles and they will be eliminated.

Part V—Conclusion

57. This Strategic Concept reaffirms the defensive nature of the Alliance and the resolve of its members to safeguard their security, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Alliance’s security policy is based on dialogue; co-operation; and effective collective defence as mutually reinforcing instruments for preserving the peace. Making full use of the new opportunities available, the Alliance will maintain security at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with the requirements of defence. In this way, the Alliance is making an essential contribution to promoting a lasting peaceful order.

58. The Allies will continue to pursue vigorously further progress in arms control and confidence-building measures with the objective of enhancing security and stability. They will also play an active part in promoting dialogue and co-operation between states on the basis of the principles enunciated in the Paris Charter.
59. NATO’s strategy will retain the flexibility to reflect further developments in the politico-military environment, including progress in the moves towards a European security identity, and in any changes in the risks to Alliance security. For the Allies concerned, the Strategic Concept will form the basis for the further development of the Alliance’s defence policy, its operational concepts, its conventional and nuclear force posture and its collective defence planning arrangements.

Source: Towards the New Strategic Concept. A Selection of Background Documents, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Brussels 2009, pp. 21–32.
1. We the Foreign Ministers of the Atlantic Alliance have met a time when dramatic developments are taking place in Europe. The Soviet Union and the republics are undergoing fundamental changes. Leaders there, like those in the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, are pursuing far-reaching political and economic reforms. In the endeavour, they expect support and cooperation from us. Against this background, the decisions taken by our Heads of State and Government at their Summit in Rome, which emphasise NATO's role as a source of stability for the whole of Europe, assume a special importance by adding the dimension of cooperation to the Alliance's traditional approach of dialogue and collective defence. At the same time, the member states of the European Community have taken decisive steps of the European Council meeting in Maastricht to deepen their integration and to establish their common foreign and security policy in order to assume greater responsibility in Europe. As all countries of Europe and North America draw more closely together in a community of shared values, and their relationship becomes increasingly one of partnership, we will be able to realise in full the new and broad approach to security which was set out in the Rome Declaration and the Alliance's new Strategic Concept.

Relations with the Soviet Union and the Other Countries of Central and Eastern Europe

2. The inaugural meeting tomorrow of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council will enhance our liaison relationship with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and launched a new era of partnership. Our consultations and cooperation will focus on security and related issues where Allies can offer their experience and

52 This section refers to the 1967 “Harmel Report,” which based NATO policy on credible collective defence and dialogue with the Eastern Bloc countries. The NATO decisions taken in the years 1990–1991 extended the Harmel’s dyad with a third element—cooperation with former opponents.

53 It concerns the decisions taken at the European Community summit (consisting of 12 countries at the time) in Maastricht, the Netherlands, on 9–10 December 1991. The text of the Treaty on European Union (signed on 7 February 1992) was adopted and the creation of a common European currency (the euro) was announced.
expertise. They are designed to aid in fostering a sense of security and confidence among these countries and to help them transform their societies and economies, making democratic change irreversible.

3. We have consulted closely on developments in the Soviet Union and the republics. In the interest of peace and security, we look to all the leaders to take matters forward in an orderly and democratic manner, as they develop towards a common ground of cooperation. We will lend our individual and collective support to help the Soviet Union and the republics move towards these objectives. The Allies have a legitimate interest in seeing viable arrangements established between the republics for implementing the Soviet Union's international arms control and disarmament obligations. We urge the leaders of the Union and the republics to respect the Soviet Union's commitments under the Helsinki Final Act, the Chapter of Paris and other CSCE documents. We call on them to comply fully with the provisions of arms control agreements to which the Soviet Union is signatory.

4. We expect the leaders of the Union and the republics to ensure the safe, responsible and reliable control of nuclear weapons and actively to prevent the proliferation of those weapons or other means of mass destruction. We are ready to respond as fully as possible to requests for practical assistance in achieving these objectives. In this context, we have discussed efforts and proposals made by individual Allies. We will monitor the situation in the Soviet Union and the republics, coordinate our efforts and contribute to the international effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. In particular, we will actively encourage the Soviet Union and the republics to take firm measures to prevent the unauthorised exports of nuclear or other destabilising equipment and technology. We will continue to consult actively on these and on other developments in the Soviet Union and the republics, with a view of harmonising our approach to these rapidly unfolding events.

5. We agreed upon the gravity of the problems being experienced by the peoples of the Soviet Union and the republics, as they grapple with the difficult transition to democracy and a market economy, in obtaining food, medicine and other basic necessities. We agreed that these problems pose a serious threat to the reform process, and to stability in Europe. We recognise the urgent nature of the humanitarian needs and stand ready to support peace as effectively as we have deterred aggression. In that spirit, the relevant bodies of the Alliance will now draw up plans to make its unique expertise and capabilities, such as the coordination capabilities in the Senior Civil Emergency
Planning Committee, available to assist in the urgent transportation and distribution of humanitarian assistance. Also, the efforts of the militaries of those NATO members participating in this enterprise, working jointly and with others, including the Soviet military, to alleviate human suffering in the Soviet Union and the republics, can help demonstrate again that the Cold War is behind us, and that a new community of shared values and interests is taking root.

6. We have also consulted closely on developments in the other nations of Central and Eastern Europe. We welcome the continuing progress towards democratic pluralism, respect of human rights and market economies. We encourage these nations to continue their reforms and contribute to the further implementation of CSCE commitments and arms control agreements.

[...]


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54 Omitted sections concern the conflict in the Balkans, cooperation of international organisations in Europe dealing with security issues, and conventional and nuclear arms control.
11.

North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement on Dialogue,
Partnership and Cooperation,
Brussels, 20 December 1991

1. We, the Foreign Ministers of the North Atlantic Alliance consisting of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States, and the Foreign Ministers of Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania, and the Representative of the Soviet Union\textsuperscript{55} have gathered in Brussels to develop further the process of regular diplomatic liaison and to build genuine partnership among the North Atlantic Alliance and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This inaugural meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council marks an historic step forward in our relationship.

2. In the new era of European relations where the confrontation and division of past decades have been replaced by dialogue, partnership and cooperation, we are determined to work towards a new, lasting order of peace in Europe. Aware of NATO’s positive influence as a source of stability, our common objective is to contribute to the enhancement of European security by promoting stability in Central and Eastern Europe. As stated in the Joint Declaration of Paris, security is indivisible and the security of each of our countries is inextricably linked to that of all States participating in the CSCE. The consolidation and preservation throughout the continent of democratic societies and their freedom from any form of coercion or intimidation therefore concern us all. In coming closer together, we wish to further the great progress that has been made across Europe in establishing solid democratic institutions, respect for human rights and economic liberty. The success of efforts to create modern competitive market economies is essential to overcoming grave economic disparities and

\textsuperscript{55} [The Soviet Ambassador in Brussels] Ambassador Nikolai Afanasevsky made the following statement in this connection: “We proceed from the assumption that the agreements concerning the contacts in the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council which is being created today are valid for the Sovereign States which are becoming legal successors of the Soviet Union.” Later in the session he made the following additional statement: “In accordance with the latest instructions received from Moscow which result from the consultations between the sovereign states, we request that all references to the Soviet Union be excluded from the text of the Statement.”
thus enhancing our common security and stability. We reaffirm the
need to continue to support these efforts with all available means.

3. We are determined to make another substantial contribution to
our shared goal: a Europe whole and free. Our new joint undertaking
will contribute to strengthening the role of the CSCE and to the
achievement of its objectives without prejudice to its competence
and mechanisms. We seek an architecture for the new Europe that
is firmly based on the principles and provisions of the Helsinki Final
Act and the Charter of Paris. Security is today based on a broad
concept that encompasses more than ever political, economic, social
and environmental aspects as well as defence. For this reason, an
interlocking network in which institutions such as the CSCE, the
Atlantic Alliance, the European Community, the WEU and the Council
of Europe complement each other, can best safeguard the freedom,
security, and prosperity of all European and North American states.
Frameworks of regional cooperation will also be an important part of
this comprehensive security architecture.

We welcome the progress made in the sphere of conventional and
nuclear arms control and disarmament. We are determined to achieve
full implementation of the CFE and START Treaties, as well as to
continue to seek security at the lowest possible level of arms.

We all recognise the need, and acknowledge the responsibility to
ensure full respect for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT), to refrain from any steps that could lead to the
proliferation of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction
and to take firm measures to prevent the unauthorised export of
nuclear or other destabilising military technologies. Authorities in
the Soviet Union have confirmed their intention to ensure the safe,
responsible and reliable control of these weapons under a single
unified authority. All members of the North Atlantic Cooperation
Council agree on the importance of this effort.

4. Following the proposal of the Alliance Summit in Rome, we
have agreed to build on our existing liaison and to develop a more
institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on political
and security issues, and in particular to:

1. hold annual meetings with the North Atlantic Council at
Ministerial level in a North Atlantic Cooperation Council;

2. hold bi-monthly meetings of the North Atlantic Council with
liaison partners at the Ambassadorial level, beginning in February
1992;
3. hold additional meetings of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council at Ministerial level, or of the North Atlantic Council in permanent session with Ambassadors of liaison partners, as circumstances warrant;

4. hold meetings at regular intervals of NATO subordinate committees with representatives of liaison partners. This will include inter alia meetings with the Political and Economic Committees, as well as with the Military Committee and under its direction other NATO Military Authorities, and NATO’s Atlantic Policy Advisory Group.

5. The focus of our consultations and cooperation will be on security and related issues, such as defence planning, conceptual approaches to arms control, democratic concepts of civilian-military relations, civil-military coordination of air traffic management and the conversion of defence production to civilian purposes. We will enhance participation of liaison partners in NATO’s “Third Dimension” scientific and environmental programmes. We will cooperate actively in disseminating as widely as possible information about NATO in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, inter alia through diplomatic liaison channels and embassies of NATO member countries.

6. The implementation of the process described above and in particular the practical arrangements for meetings with the North Atlantic Council at Ambassadorial level and with NATO committees will be determined by Ambassadors who will prepare a workplan.

7. The annual meetings of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council will, as a rule, take place in Brussels in conjunction with the Autumn Ministerial of the North Atlantic Council. Exceptions are not excluded. Our next annual meeting will take place in Oslo in June at the invitation of the Norwegian government.

12.

Letter from the President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin to the Participants of the Inaugural Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), Moscow, December 21, 1991

On behalf of the Russian authorities, I would like to greet the participants in the first session of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and express my conviction that the activities of this new institution of international cooperation will be conducive to creating a climate of mutual understanding and trust and to strengthening stability and security on the European continent. The development of these processes is undoubtedly facilitated by the deep changes taking place in our country, opening unprecedented opportunities for constructive cooperation between Russia and the outside world. Today, these relations can be based on the recognition of common values and a common vision of how to ensure international security.

From this standpoint, we also consider the prospects of our relations with NATO. We take them seriously and would like to develop our dialogue and contacts with the North Atlantic Alliance comprehensively at both political and military levels. Today, we are raising the issue of Russia’s accession to NATO, but we are ready to treat it as a long-term political objective.

The Russian authorities welcomed the outcomes of the Rome session of the NATO Council and the decisions taken there. We fully support efforts to build a new security system “from Vancouver

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56 It concerns the authorities of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (since 25 December 1991, the Russian Federation). The founding member of the NACC was to be the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, however, on 8 December 1991, the founding agreement of the Commonwealth of Independent States, signed in Viskuli residence in Belovezha Forest by the leaders of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, recognised, i.a., that “the Soviet Union as a geopolitical entity ceased to exist.” During the inaugural meeting of the NACC on 21 December 1991, the USSR ambassador to Brussels, Nikolai Afanasevsky, stated that he represented Russia and read the quoted letter from President Yeltsin. The dissolution of the USSR was confirmed by the Supreme Council (parliament) RSFSR by ratifying the Belovezha Accord on 12 December 1991. The same was done by the last USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev in his farewell speech on 25 December 1991 announcing his resignation. The dissolution of the USSR was formally concluded with the adoption of the relevant declaration by the Council of Republics of the Supreme Council (parliament) of the USSR on 26 December 1991.

57 In some later statements, the representatives of the Russian authorities claimed that the word “not” came out of this sentence as a result of a steno-typist’s error, and it should read: “Today, we do not raise the issue of Russia joining NATO.”
to Vladivostok.” It is now important to overcome the legacy of the confrontation and take decisive steps to reduce military arsenals on both sides.

Russia and other members of the now emerging Commonwealth of Independent States\(^{58}\) intend to work towards the consolidation of international peace and security. They will ensure that all international commitments under the treaties and agreements of the former USSR are fulfilled. They will pay particular attention to ensuring unified state control over nuclear weapons and preventing their proliferation.

We hope that Russia as well as other Member States of the Community will make a significant contribution to the activities of the Council.

Translated by Marek Menkiszak / Mirosław Łukawski


\(^{58}\) The Commonwealth of Independent States was established by decision of the leaders of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine on 8 December 1991 and joined by Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan on 21 December 1991, by signing the relevant declaration in Almaty.
1.3 Geopolitical situation. External threats

1.3.1. It is fairly obvious that the greatest challenges to Russia’s security are generated inside the country, in the former USSR. However, we will start our analysis of the threats from abroad as it is conventionally understood.

1.3.2. Despite all the difficulties and slowdowns in this process, a powerful international entity is emerging in Western Europe in recent months—the European Union. Within 8-15 years, it can develop into a quasi-federal structure with a common foreign, economic, and defence policy. Almost all European countries except the former USSR (and part of the former Yugoslavia, Albania, and possibly Romania) will be in or within the immediate neighbourhood of the Union. Its sphere of influence will include not only the countries of the Eastern Europe but also the Baltic states. The process of creating this structure—and it will in fact be a kind of superpower—can only be halted in one case: if there is a disaster in Eastern Europe. The creation of the European Union poses serious threats to Russia, namely isolation and loss of international significance. This could be prevented if the Russian Federation was able to move closer to the Union in the course of this decade and lay the foundations for a mutually beneficial, although unequal, relationship.

1.3.3. The construction of the Union will continue to consume a significant part of the political energy of those involved in this process, who will focus on their own affairs. Germany will also focus on itself. In this situation, it is difficult to count on assistance (economic or otherwise) from Europe. A differentiated approach will be needed. The policy of “Eurocentrism” (i.e., prioritising contacts with Western

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59 Preliminary and general remarks have been omitted.
60 The definition of Russia’s territory, at that point, as the area of the former USSR, is noteworthy.
61 The European Union was formally established 1 November 1993, following the entry into force of the Maastricht Agreement of 7 February 1992. The term “European Communities,” had been used before.
Europe) may prove to be unfounded. The related fears of German hegemony in Europe also seem pointless or at least premature. The economic, and hence, political drive of Germany to the East will become apparent in about 2–4 years.

1.3.4. What is happening in the United States and in North America as a whole shows the growth (though slow) of neo-isolationist tendencies in the U.S. The need for profound internal reforms, the creation of the North American common market, accompanied by efforts to reduce the burden of the United States’ foreign commitments, especially in relatively stable regions—Europe and the Far East—drive Washington towards a new strategy of their engagement on the international scene. Although the United States is de facto the only superpower today and intends to maintain its position as a world leader, this role will become increasingly difficult for economic reasons and, in the absence of real threats from the Soviet “evil empire,” it will enjoy less and less domestic support. Aware of these circumstances, the United States intends to maintain its current position not by maintaining an absolute hegemony and imposing a pax americana, but by sharing responsibility and costs with its allies. One way or another, the increase in neo-isolationist tendencies, and on the other hand, the internal difficulties that the United States is currently undergoing, apparently limit, in the long run, the possibility of its constructive participation in the recovery of the Russian economy. From this perspective, the policy of “Americentrism” can be seen as unfeasible. At the same time, one should note that the U.S. feels compelled to enter into a strategic (even if apparent only) partnership with Russia, which is mainly motivated by the desire to: maintain its current position in Europe and its intention to share with Russia the costs of controlling the situation in Asia and the Far East; to prevent the disintegration of the geopolitical space of the former USSR and to maintain overall control over weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Politically, mainly in terms of prestige, Russia can win on this partnership. However, one must not forget that in this case the Russian Federation has much less capabilities to define the conditions of such a partnership.

1.3.5. The fundamental change that took place in the military balance of power did not lead to an increase in the military threat to Russia from the West. This threat is miniscule, less than ever. Its reduction is facilitated by the new political relations in Europe and the fact that the poorly armed Central European countries that are not part of the Western security system have become a kind of buffer. The continued reduction of armaments in the West is happening, which,
however, is largely compensated by technological improvements in armaments. Russia’s relatively powerful nuclear capability will neutralise in a foreseeable future (10 years) any [Western] technological breakthroughs and advantages in the armaments sphere. Theoretically, however, this threat may increase if: the importance of the nuclear factor is reduced and the reduction in conventional armaments continues; effective global missile-defence systems will be created; and a new qualitative technological leap forward of the West in the areas of armaments, communications, intelligence, and command systems takes place. Even if only theoretical, such a threat can be minimised provided that allied relations with Western countries can be established. However, such a perspective seems to be a matter of a distant future.

Simultaneously, another type of threat remains valid, or even theoretically grows—that of intensification of the [Western] political-military pressure on Russia in case of worsening of political relations, e.g., in case forces come to power in Russia that are perceived in the West as hostile or threatening its interests. The necessity for Russia to maintain its nuclear potential—reduced (not necessarily evenly), but sufficient to play a deterrent function—is supported by unclear prospects for the future and a number of other arguments. Deep reduction of Russia’s nuclear potential, especially if it were to exceed certain qualitative parameters, could prove politically disadvantageous.

1.3.6. Despite the revival of its foreign contacts, Russia is threatened by, at least, partial isolation. We experience a significant reduction of foreign economic relations. Larger foreign investments keep facing serious obstacles in Russia, which are difficult to overcome. The crisis in the oil industry may complicate the already difficult situation. The geopolitical distance between Russia and Europe as well as the disappointment with Russia’s inability to open up economically and the decrease in Russia’s economic and political weight, to some extent make Western countries less interested in Russia (this is one of the biggest causes of the current weakening of relations with Germany). The weakening of the so-called nuclear factor will contribute to the loosening of interest in Russia. To some extent, Russia is now also less attractive as a geopolitical partner (which is reinforced by the Russian diplomatic retreat from various key countries). Russia has ceased to be an opponent, but has not become a desirable partner on a global scale.

Visible impatience with Russian disorder and lack of competence may now grow. It seems obvious that perspectives of economic
expansion and engagement in Russia are seriously limited for the next few years. Russia is threatened not so much by “economic enslavement” but rather by the deficit of interest in investment in its economy, which is a prerequisite for its economic rise. Potential economic partners are also held back by a fear that Russia either will enter a period of uncontrolled chaos or will disintegrate. If the Western security structures (NATO, the Western European Union) are extended to include the countries of Central and Eastern Europe without the participation of Russia, the isolation will be further increased.

The geoeconomic factor also contributes to neo-isolation (higher prices for exports and imports due to the removal of Russia from main markets, the loss of virtually free and unhindered access to most ports of the former USSR).

Neo-isolation is not inevitable if Russia does not stray from the path of reforms, does not go to rigidly authoritarian forms of government. But the threat exists and requires an adequate policy. If Russia breaks into neo-fascism or neo-communist restoration or begins to disintegrate, then, as already mentioned, almost complete hostile isolation is inevitable.\[^{62}\]

### 2.1 Recommendations

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### 2.2 Foreign policy

2.2.1. Despite the obvious need for further intensification of activities and an increase in staffing of Russia’s policy towards its near abroad\[^{64}\] the policy towards the external world, in its traditional meaning, should remain a priority. Without the opening of Russia to the world of developed states, without cooperation with them in economic and security spheres, it will be impossible to modernise Russia.

Even though Russia itself will have to undertake the effort of modernisation and find the necessary resources, Russia apparently will not be able to control the situation in the CIS area without

\[^{62}\] Sections concerning the situation in the post-Soviet area and in Asia have been omitted.

\[^{63}\] Sections on Russia’s domestic policy have been omitted.

\[^{64}\] The concept of “near abroad” (rus. blizhnyeye zarubyezhe), used in Russian official discourse in the 1990s (mainly in the first half), meant the post-Soviet states (outside Russia). It was later abandoned as politically incorrect (it suggested that these countries were not abroad in the true meaning of the word).
cooperation with [countries] abroad. Self-isolation, as well as any parochialism of Russia, will also limit its democratic development.

Being a weaker partner in a system of mutual dependence ("a raw material provider" or "a source of cheap labour") is not a threat for Russia. Such a model of development is inevitable for some time. Some "newly industrialised states" among the developing countries have also undergone a similar stage rather quickly. The level of education, science, and culture, and Russia's defensive potential, make it fear such a stage less than many other countries do.

2.2.2. The necessity [for Russia] to carry on an unambiguous long-term policy line of a strategic alliance with Western countries (including Japan and South Korea) is dictated by the need to eliminate any possible threat from the West (especially from the southeastern direction), [Russia's] tasks connected with the regulation of the situation in the CIS area, the worsening of the geopolitical situation of the Russian Federation, and the need to counterbalance the growing influence of Japan.

2.2.3. Capabilities of the United States and its role as Russia's partner will be decreasing in the longer term. In contrast, those of Western Europe will be increasing. However, this does not dictate the necessity of a transition to a "Eurocentric" model of politics. Forging as close cooperation with the U.S. as possible can only serve to strengthen Russia's position in European politics, a position which has been and will continue to be weakened in the decade to come. It is in Russia's interest to balance constantly the American and European directions in its foreign policy.

2.2.4. It is in Russia's long-term interest to get as close to the European Communities as possible and, ultimately, to join the single European economic and political area, of which the Communities are the centre. However, this does not mean that the interests of the European Communities and Russia are identical. Russia is interested in maintaining room for political manoeuvre and in the multi-polarity of European policy, and in limiting the military and political functions of the European Communities. That is why Russia has long-term interest in keeping NATO intact and in developing relations with it.

2.2.5. A sharp intensification of efforts is needed on the German direction—possibly the most failed among all Russia's diplomatic directions. Russia is quickly losing its inherited "German legacy." Today, there can no longer be any question of "special relations" [with Germany]. Nevertheless, this does not undermine the fact that Germany is considered to be an economic leader of Europe. Potentially,
it is a country that is the most interested—even to a lesser degree than before—in the stable development of Russia and the former USSR. The shape of bilateral relations between Russia and the former Soviet republics located in Europe will depend mostly on Russian–German cooperation.

2.2.6. Development of the purposeful strategy aimed at preventing the isolation of Russia from the developed countries is a timely task. It should involve the development of export-oriented industries, enabling the most developed countries of the West, East, and South to engage in Russia (leading to interdependence, however asymmetrical), and the creation of a strategic alliance in which Russia would be an important partner in controlling the situation in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Far East.

It is no less important for Russia to use skilfully also “negative factors” making the West interested in the successful development and modernisation of Russia in its transition period. The relatively large and effective nuclear potential [of Russia] is among those factors. Russia's purposeful policy, on the one hand, to enter the world and, on the other hand, to “bring” the world into the Russian province is also among its assets.

2.2.7. It is an obvious necessity for Russia to pursue a more active policy towards Central and Eastern European countries, especially in the sphere of economic, cultural, and personal contacts. In principle, Russia has no interest in the Central European countries becoming members of any broad European security system that would exclude the Russian Federation. At the same time, it should be realised that these countries will not play a primary role in Russian foreign policy. They strive to join the West, they are now separated from Russia geographically […] they do not have either [the financial] resources nor technology to contribute to Russia's economic revival. Therefore, any attempt to put those countries on a priority list of Russia's policy is unrealistic. If the geopolitical aspect is taken into account, Poland and, to some extent, Bulgaria (Slovakia can be further added here) are of greatest importance for Russia in this region.

2.2.8. The West’s limited capabilities and its unwillingness to participate in the revival of Russia and Russia's position on the international arena, the difficulties [for Russia] in entering western markets—all these factors dictate the necessity to diversify Russian foreign policy. Obviously, the Western direction will continue to be a priority for Russia, but a one-sided alignment with the West is counterproductive. Russia must consistently develop political
and economic relations with Asia—with politically important or economically attractive countries such as India, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Israel, and Iran. Good relations with these countries will strengthen Russia's position in its relations with the West. They will also help Russia to control the situation in the Central Asian republics and the Southern Caucasus.

2.2.9. Any attempt by Russia to pursue a global policy (especially in the military-political sense) is doomed to failure, it would contribute to a further waste of Russia's resources and to its disintegration.

2.4.9. The coordination of Russia’s military policy with that of other countries to the maximum extent possible; forging the strategic alliance with the countries of the Atlantic zone as well as with Japan and South Korea are in the long-term interest of Russia. However, Russia is not interested in this alliance being turned against any of its Southern neighbours.

Translated by Mirosław Łukawski. Verified with the Russian original by Marek Menkiszak.


65 Sections concerning the policy towards Asia, business support, policy towards the post-Soviet area, and general assumptions of defence policy have been omitted.

66 A section on the conversion of the arms industry has been omitted.
I. The Russian Federation in a changing world

The entry of one of the world’s largest countries onto the road to democratic changes has fundamentally changed the global balance of power. The withdrawal from the policy of the two systems’ confrontation, which affected all areas of international relations, not only removed the threat of the outbreak of world war and made a large part of the arsenal of the arms accumulated during the arms race useless but also laid the foundations for fruitful cooperation between countries on a regional and global scale, in the UN and other international organisations.

Russia appreciates the importance of the “new political thinking,” a concept that was the first attempt to break the deadlock of total confrontation. However, this concept had its drawbacks. On the one hand, it attached too much importance to an abstract kind of conflict-free globalism, while on the other hand, it reinforced old ideas about the struggle of the two systems as a determinant of Russian foreign policy. Although the importance of “new thinking” at a certain stage in the development of international relations cannot be overestimated, its weakness was hidden in its duality.

The democratic nature of the new Russian state made it possible to close this stage. The struggle of ideology has ended. The time has come to achieve Russia’s goals by economic, diplomatic, military means, etc. The foundations are being laid for equal, partnership relations with neighbouring highly developed democratic countries. The foundation for cooperation is to defend our values and interests through real cooperation and not by moving from confrontation to utopia.

We are in the process of learning how to eliminate differences and contradictions between Russia and other countries for our mutual benefit. It opens up the possibility of taking into account in practice the specificity of Russia’s historical geopolitical and economic interests within the framework of civilised inter-state relations.

What the world will look like at the end of the 20th century depends, to a large extent, on the success of reforms and the sustainability of civil society in Russia, on the federal structure of our country and
on its foreign policy. On the other hand, foreign policy cannot be effective without strengthening the democratic Russian state and realistic acceptance of processes taking place outside its borders.

This applies, primarily, to the former USSR republics. The noticeable difficulties of the post-totalitarian period have a direct impact on the state of security, the pace of reforms, and the chances of overcoming the economic and social crisis in Russia itself. Even if the most severe manifestations of the crisis are eliminated and the resulting national and territorial conflicts stop, the transition to democracy and a healthy market economy will still be long-lasting and burdensome for society. The nature of the foreign policy of many CIS states is influenced by the desire to become independent from Russia, typical of the period of independence formation—the territorial disputes and claims against Russia fuelled by nationalists as well as resentment towards everything that may be associated with the previous dependence on federation structures. A thought will not immediately arise in mind that contacts with the reborn Russia may help these countries solve their problems. Moreover, while searching for their own place in the world, some of the CIS countries, especially in the Asian part of the former USSR, turn to countries that are close to them in terms of ethno-social, religious, or economic aspects. Also, to those who once struggled for influence with Russia. A complex process of shaping the closest geopolitical environment to Russia is underway. Its outcome will largely depend on our ability to consolidate good neighbourly relations and the principles of international law, including respect for minority rights, through persuasion. In extreme situations, however, also by force.

The industrialised countries of the West are rapidly strengthening their economic and financial power and political influence thanks to the latest scientific and technical developments. With the end of the Cold War, the motivation for “Western solidarity,” formed in the environment of confrontation, disappeared. Conflicts of geopolitical and economic interests emerged between industrialised countries. However, their crucial convergence on the fundamental issues of the world order (market economy and civil society) lead the Western countries to seek solutions together in the areas of politics, the military, the economy, etc. There is also room for a democratic Russia in this process.

The West is no longer a military-political concept in the traditional sense. It remains, however, one of the main centres of the world economy, international relations and the global civilisation process.
Integration trends have been on the raise, especially in Western Europe, which is increasingly evident as a separate component of world order. The struggle of political polycentrism (the U.S., Western Europe, Japan, and states claiming to be regional centres) against the U.S. desire to remain a hegemon is also symptomatic. With the end of the Cold War, however, the basis for such claims, which was the military potential aimed against the USSR, lost its importance.

The states of Central and Eastern Europe that have moved away from totalitarianism have complex political, economic, and social problems to solve. The difficulties of the transition period create grounds for nationalism and social crises, the effects of which can also be felt beyond their borders. The next decade in these countries will be marked by instability and serious crises due to the difficult transition to democracy and market economy.

A complex process of building a new political identity for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe is underway. In addition to the predominantly Western-oriented attitude, the attempts to obtain a security guarantee, and join as a full or associate member of Western European integration organisations, many of them tend to reactivate their contacts with Russia under new conditions. It happens because a severing of these contacts, especially in the economic field, wouldn't be conducive to overcoming the crisis, consolidating market mechanisms, and modernising the economy.

The diversity of the Third World countries has been deepening. Some of them have managed to embark on the path of economic development, which is a guarantee of internal stability and their growing importance on the international scene. However, most of them are increasingly lagging behind the industrialised countries. The Third World, severely affected by socio-economic, national, and civilisational problems, will become a major source of regional and global threats over the coming decades. The danger of armed conflicts, the arms race, attempts to gain access to weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, social and ethnic conflicts, terrorism, drug trafficking, famine, and mass epidemics destabilising the international situation are all factors that pose a serious threat to the world and to Russia’s security, so they can’t leave Russia indifferent.

The coming decades, with all the complexity of the processes taking place, will be marked by a deepening gap between the industrialised North and the backward South, the North-South conflicts, crises and conflicts caused by the social-economic and nationality problems of post-totalitarian countries and the poorest developing countries. All
this will overlap with the aspirations of the most-developed countries or groups of countries to transform international political structures as well as the aspirations of emerging regional powers to build their own spheres of influence. The latter may even be accompanied by attempts to use violence.

The interaction of these factors in a relatively short period of time will bring about a fundamental change in the global situation. Its main features will be:
- discontinuation of the bipolar system on a global scale,
- diversification of international politics, as a consequence of this discontinuation, [and the]
- establishment of regional centres of power (multipolar world order).

The end of the Cold War does not automatically stabilise the international situation. Military factors continue to play an important role in the world. The devaluation of military power on a global scale is accompanied by a tendency to increase its importance on a regional and local scale. The military aspect continues to be decisive in provoking and escalating conflicts. Therefore, it continues to be important in conflict resolution as well as in shaping international relations. Russia, as a great power responsible, together with the other permanent members of the UN Security Council, for maintaining international peace and security, and as a state with an obligation to maintain peace in the CIS, takes all this into account.

In principle, Russia advocates the exclusion of military force from the arsenal of international policy measures. However, it allows its use, in accordance with the UN Charter and the standards of international law, in the event of threat to the security of the country and its citizens and as a means of preventing acts of aggression and eliminating other threats to international peace and security, including in peacekeeping operations.

In the future, the basic parameters of national and international development will increasingly be shaped by social and economic factors. The ability of the economy to accommodate the achievements of science and technology will become an indicator of a country’s position in the world. The former is the highest in conditions of democracy and market relations. Today more than ever, these factors also influence the effectiveness of the armed forces.

It is very important that Russia’s foreign policy is not based on ideological concepts or views of a particular party, but on fundamental national interests. Russia should immediately focus on expanding its
contacts with those countries with which cooperation can help in the most urgent tasks of national revival. Above all, it should focus on its neighbours, the economically strong and technologically advanced Western countries, but also on the new industrialised countries in various regions.

It is with this group of countries that Russia has a common understanding of the fundamental values of world civilisation and a convergence of interests on the most important issues related to the development of the international situation, in particular: maintaining peace and security, supporting Russia’s reforms, ensuring stability in regions struggling with difficulties in the post-totalitarian period, and preventing the destructive impact of Third World problems on the international situation.

The ability to see the limitations of any such cooperation is extremely important. Despite many common interests, the approach to specific issues and problems may be different or even contradictory. The willingness to cooperate should lead to a strengthening of our own position. Arrangements on one subject or another cannot be an end in itself or even more so, a payment for help. The scope and forms of all cooperation should correspond to Russia’s far-reaching goals.

Relations with all countries, free from the ballast of ideological patterns, should be shaped with consideration of the needs of our reforms and their importance for the security of the country in the new situation. By preserving everything that is rational in bilateral political, economic, and cultural relations, by filling them with new, time-consistent content, and by developing relations with countries that have so far been beyond the reach of our active policy, Russia will safeguard its interests and gain greater freedom in shaping foreign policy. At the same time, it will create the conditions for strengthening its position on the international scene.

[...]67

II. Arms control and international security

The end of the East-West confrontation has actually removed the threat of serious—not to mention, deliberately provoked—armed conflict. However, the risk still remains due to the existing powerful military potential. There are also new challenges: the threat of an uncontrolled escalation of regional conflicts has been growing, and

67 Sections on foreign policy priorities and principles; basic foreign policies in relation to the Commonwealth of Independent States have been omitted.
there is a danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

Under these conditions, we should first and foremost:

– take the necessary measures to make the process of rebuilding the international security system (both globally and regionally) by abandoning the principle of inter-bloc struggle and introducing the principle of cooperation, assuming a joint effort to maintain stability by political means, irreversibly; strive for international regulations on arms-reduction and disarmament processes; for building mutual understanding, trust and partnership with the world’s leading countries including cooperation with Western defence structures;

– adapt military capabilities to the new conditions by removing those means that are unnecessary (intercontinental and conventional weapons above limits set in the agreements and arrangements) from the arsenal, the maintenance of which places a strain on the economy and creates the risk of their accidental or unlawful use;

– maintain weapons at a level sufficient for defence purposes, allowing both the protection of the borderland and a response to possible threats from far abroad, taking into account the risk of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; Russia’s reorganised military potential will be, in the future, an important factor in defending its vital interests.

The basic lines of action and specific undertakings and measures to achieve the set objectives, contained in the concept of national security, should be taken into account in the course of the reform of the Russian Armed Forces and adapted to the social-economic conditions in Russia.

The basic directions of the disarmament process in the near future will be:

1. Fulfilling the agreements already concluded on conventional and nuclear arms reduction and taking actions to reduce expenditure related to arms reduction and control.

2. Implementation of the Russian-American START-II agreement after its ratification, continuation of work on the president’s project to create a global missile-defence system, i.a., by encouraging the participation of the countries with the greatest military potential.

3. Concentration of supervision over the nuclear arsenal of the former USSR in the hands of Russia through redeployment of missiles to Russia and their dismantling; implementation of the agreements on the nuclear-free status of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan and
the joining the NPT by these countries with a nuclear-free status; initiation of the non-proliferation control system within CIS.

4. Including Russia in the missile-technology export-control system as an equal participant.

5. Completion of works regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention and the elimination of difficulties in implementing the Biological Weapons Convention.

6. Continuing dialogue on approximation of the war doctrines of Russia and its main partners, above all the U.S.; strengthening the conviction that these countries do not regard each other as enemies.

7. To continue efforts to substantially reduce nuclear tests until they are completely banned.

8. Harmonisation of multilateral agreements on arms export rules to ensure stability and protection of Russia’s commercial interests; establishment of an internal legislative basis to control arms supplies in the new economic situation; improvement of the system of export control and licensing of the arms trade.

9. Making efforts to develop and implement a defence industry conversion programme, i.a., by developing contacts with foreign countries and attracting foreign investors.

10. Ensuring implementation of the intergovernmental agreement on the coordination of work in the field of export control of raw materials, materials, equipment, technologies and services which may be used in the production of WMD and their means of delivery (Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine); creating working bodies to coordinate the cooperation of CIS members in this field.

11. Achieving greater military transparency, i.a., declassification of the military budget, development of stabilisation, confidence-building and transparency measures in the framework of the CSCE process.

12. Harmonisation and implementation of cooperation plans with NATO and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council for 1993, development of bilateral and multilateral contacts; cooperation with NATO bodies for the consolidation of peace and security through the development of political and military contacts, exchange of visits, joint manoeuvres, exchange of experience and cooperation in crisis resolution.

[...]

68 The sections on economic reform efforts and the United States are omitted.
V. Europe

Relations with European countries, both bilateral relations and participation in the work of international organisations and fora, are of paramount importance in the process of Russia’s integration with the community of democratic countries and maintaining security under new conditions.

Russia’s contacts with European countries should be built considering the new qualitative stage of development, into which our continent is entering. This stage is characterised by the interpenetration of two trends: on the one hand, the desire to create a close European community and, on the other hand, the emergence of new challenges, many of which pose a serious threat to the traditionally high degree of stability in Europe. Negative phenomena include the growing threat of conflicts, the intensification of ethno-political antagonisms, difficulties in the process of Western European integration, crisis of federalism, the uncertainties related to the emergence of a new balance of power in Europe, deepening of the difficulties arising from the construction of a new European order, inability to keep up with the dynamics of life in contemporary Europe. All this, combined with Russia’s internal problems, threatens that Russia and Europe drift away of each other.

In view of the rapid political changes in Europe, it is essential for us to develop balanced and equal relations with all the European countries and to support the European integration processes. We should stay away from antagonisms between countries that do not directly concern us. They may be used to strengthen the position of Russia, but not against any of these countries or groups of countries. Attempts to profit from antagonisms on fundamental issues of European development may prove ineffective, provoke anti-Russian sentiment, and thus make it difficult to defend Russian interests in the region.

As far as Western Europe is concerned, the main objective is to strengthen the ties of the partnership and to shape them in a certain way so as to use the new relationship with Western Europe to ensure Russia's security, to solve our internal problems and to make the Russian economy a full-fledged part of the European market system as well as the global economy. Fruitful cooperation between the Russian Federation and Western European countries will create a favourable climate for the development of relations with Central and Eastern European and Baltic Sea countries on new terms. Such a trend is supported by the countries of the Western Europe, which rightly see
the democratic changes in Russia as a guarantee of security on the continent and overcoming the crisis in the former USSR.

The most urgent tasks of policy towards Western Europe:

1. The completion of negotiations on the conclusion of an agreement with the European Community concerning the development of contacts in all fields, including the political field; the establishment of efficient cooperation mechanisms (regular political consultations, establishment of joint committees and working groups of parliamentarians, etc.); the use of European experience in solving the problems of building the Commonwealth of Independent States.

2. Pursuit of stable cooperation with the Western European Union through political dialogue, exchange of delegations and development of conversion programmes; to consider the possibility of the WEU participating in the global missile defence system;

   to continue work towards the full participation of the Russian Federation in the Council of Europe.

4. Strengthening the political cooperation with Germany; implementation of adopted cooperation projects in economic, scientific, and technological fields; intensification of bilateral relations; cooperation in the new geopolitical realities of the European continent; solving existing problems in bilateral relations.

5. Development of comprehensive cooperation with France based on the treaty signed, including the exchange of experience in the field of economy, conversion, pricing policy, privatisation; development of the new legal bases for bilateral relations.

6. Moving from a neutral partnership to closer cooperation with the United Kingdom, as set out in the Russian-British Declaration of Partnership for the 1990s and the Agreement on the Principles of Relations between the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom; giving substantive formulas to this cooperation.

7. Strengthening relations with countries with significant economic and technical potential that have a decisive influence on the situation in regions of vital importance to Russia (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Greece, etc.); harmonious development of relations with the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland), particularly through the Council of Baltic Sea States and the Barents Council States. Implementation, in cooperation with the Northern countries, of joint projects in the fields of economy, environmental protection, protection against harmful effects of radiation, provision of military housing for troops withdrawing from the Baltic States, and infrastructure development.
Eastern Europe is important for Russia not only as a historical zone of its interests. The importance of maintaining good relations with the countries of the region increased significantly with the creation of a group of sovereign states—Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. The climate of relations with these countries depends on the conditions of our contacts with Eastern Europe.

The new strategy of Russia’s relations with the countries of this part of Europe, deprived of the imperial pride and egocentrism typical of the USSR, is based on the principles of equality and mutual benefit. In specific areas, however, this does not exclude the need to make maximum use of the positive experiences of cooperation from the past.

Currently, the strategic task is to counteract the transformation of Eastern Europe into a kind of buffer strip isolating us from the West. At the same time, we must not allow Western countries to drive Russia out of the Eastern European region, which seems a real threat. It is within our capacity, because the countries of Eastern Europe, despite a clear and somewhat artificially indicated desire for political independence from Russia, cannot turn their backs on Russia and other CIS countries in economic, and largely humanitarian and cultural terms.

The main task is to consolidate the progress achieved during the visits at the highest level in building mutual trust and de-ideologised, equal relations with the Eastern European countries.

It is particularly important to take vigorous action to renew economic ties. It is necessary to establish a model to settle payment obligations, eliminate our debt and finance current trade in goods, create conditions to facilitate the cooperation of economic entities, movement of goods, capital, technology as soon as possible, etc.

With regard to individual countries of the region it is necessary to:

1. Pursue a renewal of bilateral relations with Albania; to conclude work on a Russian-Albanian political agreement;

2. Break the deadlock in relations with Bulgaria; ensure fulfilment of the agreements concluded during Boris Yeltsin’s visit on the renewal of comprehensive cooperation; prepare an intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in the fields of education, culture, and science;

3. Strive for the fullest possible implementation of the agreements concluded with Hungary during Boris Yeltsin’s visit (including agreements on mutual settlements related to the removal of our troops, on solving the problem of mutual debt and property disputes
and other agreements opening a new stage in Russian-Hungarian relations);

4. Ensure the implementation of the agreements concluded during the visit of the President of Poland Lech Walesa to Moscow; to sign of new agreements, including those on cross-border cooperation;

5. Conclude the works on treaty of cooperation, friendship, and good-neighbourly relations with Romania; continue to work with the Romanian leadership to encourage them to take a constructive stance on issues relating to the normalisation of the situation in Moldova.

6. Due to the division of the CSR into two sovereign states, establish relations with their authorities; prepare inter-state agreements with the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

7. Actively participate in the efforts of the UN, the CSCE, the EU and other interested parties to restore peace in Yugoslavia on the basis of a realistic assessment of the situation there. Take measures to establish diplomatic relations with Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia. Establish political, economic, relations with them; proceed with the preparation of relevant bilateral agreements determining the procedure for resolving the crisis; work with the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to overcome the Yugoslav crisis.

The establishment of good neighbourly and mutually beneficial relations with the Baltic States corresponds to Russia’s long-term interests. It seems possible to achieve this goal. Efforts should also be made to resolve pressing issues, including defending the rights of Russians and withdrawing Russian troops, creating a climate of trust and developing regular inter-state cooperation to the benefit of all concerned.

This primarily involves:

1. Pursuing an establishment of a legal basis for mutual relations through political dialogue and consultation.

2. Seeking, through negotiations, compromise solutions to the problem of the legal status of Russian troops and the timetable for their withdrawal; striving for Russia’s maintenance of strategically important facilities; to continue work on engaging foreign countries, especially the Baltic Sea states, in the financial issues associated with the withdrawal of Russian troops.

3. Arranging border services and the network of border crossing points; negotiate on maintaining access to transport routes and ports of the Baltic States and, above all, physically connecting them with the region of Kaliningrad.
5. Continuing the struggle for the rights and civil liberties of the Russian-speaking population in the Baltic States to be respected and guaranteed in the relevant inter-state agreements (to seek the support of the international community, to use the institution of observers where necessary, respond to violations of minority rights); seek to conclude agreements regulating citizenship, respect for the rights of national minorities, social security, recognition of diplomas, etc.

6. Making further efforts to develop mechanisms of commercial-economic and scientific-technical cooperation based on the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and concern for the interests of all parties, which will contribute to the resolution of economic problems, i.a., in the fields of energy, communications, fisheries, environmental protection, as well as cooperation in the free economic zone in the region of Kaliningrad.

7. Using the capacity of the Council of the Baltic Sea States and the Barents Council to influence the Baltic States.

In a context of increasing instability in Eastern European countries and the near abroad, the CSCE Helsinki Process is becoming increasingly important as a significant factor in maintaining peace and security as well as a field for constructive inter-state cooperation in a number of fields in the area “from Vancouver to Vladivostok.” The development of this process is now a fundamental guarantee of Russia’s broad participation in Europe’s issues as well as in the shaping of the “Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian community.”

It is in Russia’s interest to support the development of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to further institutionalise the CSCE and to make it the foundation of the new international order.

Participation in the CSCE is an important factor in integrating Russia into Europe, suppressing the hotspots and giving specific shape to Russia’s partnership relations with European countries. It facilitates the adaptation of Russian legislation on many issues—especially in the field of human rights and national minorities—to global standards. The Russia’s interests favour a comprehensive participation of its Commonwealth of Independent States partners in the CSCE and the strict fulfilment of their obligations arising therefrom.

In the area of cooperation within the CSCE, it is necessary to:

– focus on the implementation of the Helsinki Summit, the implementation of consultation and political interaction mechanisms of the CSCE Council, the Committee of High Representatives, the Conflict Prevention Centre, the “troika”;
– work to use the capacity of the CSCE to resolve crisis situations and create an early warning mechanism on growing conflicts, i.a., by working with the High Commissioner for National Minorities, using the commission of inquiry procedure, reconciliation, mediation, arbitration, and peacekeeping operations;

– to use the bodies and mechanisms of the CSCE, the norms and principles of international law to achieve the European level of human rights protection and fundamental civil liberties by our CIS partners; where necessary, e.g., in case of violations of the rights of Russians and Russian-speaking people, use the assistance of the CSCE, including the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the High Commissioner for National Minorities;

– if necessary, involve the CSCE institutions and bodies in the process of conflict resolution in the former USSR area;

– take advantage of the CSCE Economic Forum initiated in March 1993 to develop measures to accelerate the introduction of a market economy in Russia and the integration of the Russian economy into the European and global economy.

Russia, which wants to maintain its role as an important element of the Helsinki security system, should strive to cooperate with NATO and other military and political organisations of the West as well as with the UN, which is helpful in resolving crises and conflicts, and creating an effective system of preventive diplomacy. At the same time, it is important to closely coordinate the activities of the EU, NATO, the WEU and the evolving CSCE security system.

We should make sure that the emerging sub-regional organisations are part of the security and cooperation system in Europe. At the same time, we should counteract the use of cooperation within the region to create confrontational alliances, including with the CIS countries. Russia can join in sub-regional cooperation if its interests so require.

[...]69

Translated by Mirosław Łukawski. Verified with the Russian original by Marek Menkiszak


69 Sections concerning the Asia-Pacific region, South and West Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, the UN and other international organisations, the Movement of Non-Aligned States, human rights and civil liberties, religions and religious associations, environmental issues, and the conclusion have been omitted.
Joint Polish-Russian Declaration,
Warsaw, August 25, 1993

The President of the Republic of Poland Lech Walesa and the
President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin

Considering that the deepening of Polish-Russian understanding
will work in favour of a further development of co-operation on the
basic on equal rights of principles of partnership and mutual benefits.

Prompted by the desire to continue democratic reforms and to
develop the economy on the basis of market principles, in the interest
of the nations of the two states,

Recognising the importance of Polish-Russian good neighbourly
relations to the maintenance of peace, stability and security in Europe
and in the world,

Note with satisfaction that the results of their Moscow meeting
in May 1992 and the signing of the Treaty on Friendly and Good
Neighbourly Co-operation market an important stage in the
building of relations between two states on the basis of the principles
of sovereignty and equal rights. That meeting also gave a significant
impulse to the process of overcoming the negative legacy of the past. The
circumstances of the Katyn massacre, the perpetrators of which will be
punished, were explained in an atmosphere of mutual understanding
and good will. Efforts are being made to provide compensation to the
victims of Stalinist repression and crimes. Progress has been made in
ensuring free access to archives in the territories of Poland and Russia.
The withdrawal of the Russian troops from Poland is coming to an
end ahead of schedule. A significant expansion of the legal and treaty
basis has taken effect in relations between Poland and Russia. The
review of the earlier concluded bilateral agreements and contracts is
coming to an end. Mutual trade and economic relationships are being
stimulated to greater activity.

Relations based on new principles are most visible in the
transboundary and regional co-operation which has developed
in the space of the last twelve-month period, especially in contacts
between the north-eastern voivodships of Poland and the Kaliningrad
Region of the Russian Federation. On the Polish-Russian Round Table
Conference has held two sessions which have borne fruit in a number
of practical initiatives and actions in the fields of economic and trade

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co-operation, ecology, building, agricultural co-operation, in the field of communications and telecommunications, transport, border crossing, tourism.

Co-operation in the human, cultural, scientific and educational dimension is being developed. Both Poland and Russia support the comprehensive expansion of dialogue between social organisations, the Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church and wide-ranging circles of society of the two states.

The positive climate in Polish-Russian relations, deepening mutual confidence between the two states and also agreements already achieved allow for the present relations between Poland and Russia to be ever more intensively permeated with qualitatively new elements.

* * *

The Presidents are pleased to note the outcome of the present meeting and hope that the settlements adopted and the documents signed in its course will work in favour of the deepening of co-operation and of extending it to new fields.

The Treaty of Trade and Economic Co-operation is an important instrument of the development of co-operation in the economic field. Good prospects for the economic development of the two states are provided by the Agreement on the Construction of Gas Pipelines to carry Russian gas across the territory of the Republic of Poland and on Russian gas deliveries to Poland.\(^71\) Also, the other signed agreements provide new opportunities of co-operation in the field of science, technology, environmental protection, prevention of industrial accidents and in other fields.

The Presidents emphasize the particular importance of the intergovernmental Agreement on Co-operation in the Field of Culture, Science and Education which has been signed in the course of the meeting as well as the importance of co-operation of government commissioners for cultural heritage abroad. They point to the necessity to broaden the exchange of information on the problems of democratic reforms and market transformations in the two countries and to make greater use for this purpose of the potential of the press, radio and television. To this end, it is necessary to establish appropriate telecommunications and light-pipe infrastructure as well as to utilize satellite broadcasting.

\(^{71}\) See *ibid.*, pp. 68–74.
Noting the existence of the unresolved problem of mutual debts, the Presidents agree that it is imperative to find a final solution as soon as possible. The Presidents also agree that the still unsettled problem of these debts should not affect current economic obligations and relations.

Appreciating the large potential capacities of the Polish and Russian fishing and shipbuilding industries, the Presidents point to the necessity to conclude a new Polish-Russian agreement on co-operation in these fields. The Presidents stress the importance of development of mutually satisfactory Polish-Russian co-operation in the field of fisheries and in the exploitation of sea resources on the basis of the principles of international law and impartial research, taking into account the necessity of resolving the issue of fishing in the Sea of Okhotsk.

The readiness of the Polish Party to establish co-operation with the Sakhalin region of Russia has been taken into account.

Recognising the great importance of co-operation in the field of utilization of the Pilava Straits and the Vistula Bay, inclusive of navigation, for regional development, the Presidents shall take steps to ensure that the competent ministries work out appropriate agreements on this matter by the end of 1993, giving consideration to economic, ecological, technical and navigational conditions and the well-known position of the Polish Party.

The Presidents believe that the competent ministries of the two states should take specific steps aiming at the establishment of institutions stimulating trade exchanges, especially in the field of transaction insurance and of government guarantees for projects of strategic economic importance.

The Presidents believe that economic co-operation between the two states should be expanded and should strive to re-institute mutually satisfactory cooperative links in industry and in other fields of interest to the two Parties.

The Presidents see wide-ranging opportunities of utilizing the capacities of Polish building contractor firms in co-operation with customers receiving their services in Russia, they express interest in the construction of the Warsaw–Moscow motorway. The competent ministries of the two states will examine the prospects of development of this co-operation.

The Presidents indicate the necessity to re-establish the traditional trade exchanges and for this purpose they recommend to return to the practice of conclusion of a Polish-Russian annual trade protocol, taking account of the earlier established mechanism. In addition, they
recommend conclusion of long-term trade contracts for the delivery of natural gas from Russia to Poland by means of the existing gas pipelines for a period of five years with a possibility of their extension.

The Presidents underline the necessity of a faster elaboration of a mechanism giving effect to mutual financial settlements regarding transactions between enterprises of the two states, inclusive of the opportunity to use national currencies. Deserving examination is the possibility of establishing clearing houses, pursuant to the provisions of law of the two states.

The Presidents point to the necessity to provide favourable conditions for the establishment of branches and sub-offices of Polish banks in Russia and of Russian banks in Poland.

The Presidents express themselves in favour of expanding and deepening of co-operation in the domain of labour relations and social welfare and they agree on the need to clear and regulate mutual payments in respect of the employment of nationals in the areas of the two states as well as to work out the principles of gainful employment of Polish nationals in Russia and of Russian nationals in Poland.

The Presidents stress mutual interest in tightening co-operation in the field of nuclear science, inclusive of conclusion of an intergovernmental agreement on nuclear and radiation safety.

A joint Polish-Russian commission for trade and economic matters will exercise permanent control over the implementation of the achieved agreements and joint decisions in the trade and economic field.

Realizing the enormous importance which the protection of places of remembrance dedicated to the victims of war and repression has for the Poles and the Russians, the Presidents underline the necessity of a rapid signing of the Agreement on the Protection of Graves and Places of Remembrance Dedicated to the Victims of War and Repression. They deem it advisable to examine the issue of establishing a Polish-Russian fund and how it will function in the protection of places of remembrance and rest.

* * *

The Presidents agree that endeavours being made by Poland and Russia at the United Nations and at other international forums work in favour of the strengthening of stability and security in Europe and in the world, of the solution of contemporary problems. Of the protection of human rights and national minorities.

The Presidents discussed the issue of Poland’s intention to accede to NATO. President Lech Walesa explained Poland’s well-known
position on this issue, which was received with understanding by President Boris Yeltsin. In perspective, a decision of this kind by sovereign Poland aiming at all-European integration is not contrary to the interests of other States, also including Russia.\footnote{This section of the document will then become the subject of the Russian president’s disclaimer expressed in a letter to the leaders of the U.S., France, Germany and the UK. See further in the document.}

The two states intend to continue active co-operation in the framework of CSCE and to promote co-operation with the Council of Europe, the EC, NATO and the WEU in order to ensure the irreversibility of democratic transformations in Central and Eastern Europe, to establish a climate of confidence and partnership on the continent.

The Parties agree that the growth of sub-regional co-operation in the framework of the Council of the Baltic Sea States, the Visegrad Group and the Central European Initiative is an important element of the emerging pan-European partnership.

Poland and Russia reaffirm their determination to strictly observe the international agreements in the field of disarmament and arms control as well as the agreements concerned with the non-proliferation of nuclear arms.

The Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the two states will continue the co-operation of Poland and Russia in the international arena, coordinating the principles of co-operation in international issues, improving the mechanism of mutual consultations related to world and European politics.

* * *

The Presidents express their conviction that the stable and comprehensive growth of Polish-Russian co-operation in all fields is fully in accord with the interests of the nations of the two states, with the cause of peace and security in Europe, and will work in favour of harmonious integration of Poland and Russia into the community of democratic states and into the world economy.

The Presidents request continuation of work on the idea of having them appoint a consultative committee for Polish-Russian relations.

The Presidents reaffirm their readiness to maintain regular dialogue at the highest level.

/–/? Lech Walesa
/–/? Boris Yeltsin

Source: Zbiór Dokumentów PISM, no. 3, 1993, pp. 57–64.
Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s Letter to US President Bill Clinton, 15 September, 1993

Dear Bill,

In the wake of our candid exchange of opinions on current international issues, I would like to share some impressions gleaned, in particular, from my recent conversations with the leadership of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia.

At issue is the rather explicit aspiration of these countries, as well as of a number of other states of Central and Eastern Europe, to get closer to NATO and to achieve integration, in one form or another, into the Alliance. Naturally, we expressed our appreciation of the sovereign right of any state to choose how it ensures its own security, including in participation in politico—military alliances. We are sympathetic to the less-than-nostalgic sentiments of the East Europeans about the past ‘cooperation’ within the framework of the Warsaw Pact. Our general impression is that they do have grounds for certain apprehensions about their security.

At the same time I cannot help but express our uneasiness as well over the fact that the discussion of how NATO might evolve is centring with increasing frequency on the scenario of quantitative expansion of the Alliance by adding East European countries.

I tell you plainly that we favour a different approach, one that leads to a truly pan-European security system. An approach predicated on collective (but not on the basis of bloc membership) actions to prevent and resolve the crises and conflicts that raging presently in Europe. Security must be indivisible and must rest on pan-European structures.

73 It was a classified (not intended for publication) letter with identical text addressed from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to the leaders of France, Germany, the U.S. and the UK as Moscow’s reaction to the provisions of the Polish-Russian declaration of 25 August 1993, and especially its final passage, which referred to Russia’s lack of objections to Poland’s accession to NATO. The title of the letter published in the SIPRI Yearbook points to the American diplomatic source of the “leak” of this document, indicating Russia’s consistent opposition to NATO enlargement, see SIPRI Yearbook 1994, Oxford University Press 1994, pp. 249–250. However, the original translation of the letter (written in Russian), disclosed in 2016 by the U.S. Department of State, differs from text published by SIPRI—apparently working translations of the text were made separately, however one cannot exclude that SIPRI additionally proofread the translated English text before its publication, or the editorial changes (not distorting the content of the letter) were introduced to it intentionally to protect the source of the “leak.”
The main threat to Europe now is posed not by the East-West confrontation, but by inter-ethnic conflicts of a new generation. A quantitative increase of NATO will hardly solve the problem of how to counteract these conflicts effectively. What needs to be done is augment crisis prevention and peace-making on a fully continental scale.

We understand, of course, that any possible integration of East European countries with NATO will not automatically lead to the Alliance somehow turning against Russia. NATO is not being viewed as a bloc in opposition to us. But it is important to take into account how our public opinion may react to such a step. Not only the opposition, but the moderates, too, would no doubt see this as a sort of neo-isolation of the country as opposed to its natural introduction into the Euro-Atlantic space.

I also want to call your attention to the fact that the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany signed in September 1990, especially its provisions that prohibit the deployment of foreign troops within the eastern lands of Federal Republic of Germany, excludes the option of expanding the NATO zone to the East.

We know that preparations are now under way for a special NATO summit meeting which intends to discuss strategic directions for the development of the Alliance and its role under new conditions. We in Russia have an interest in constructive decisions by this summit adequate to the radical changes which have occurred in Europe and in the world. We hope that just such a prudent, unhurried approach will also prevail in the selection of new bearings for an Eastern policy.

In general we advocate that relations between our country and NATO be several degrees warmer than those between the Alliance and Eastern Europe. Russia—NATO rapprochement, including their interaction in the peace-making area, should proceed on a faster track. The East Europeans, too, could be involved in this process. It would be possible to involve the East Europeans in this process as well.

In the long run, it should not probably be ruled out that even we would join NATO. But for the time being, this is a theoretical proposition. Today, I would like to suggest to you and our other NATO partners to jointly reflect about the possibilities to meet security needs of the East Europeans. For example, we would be prepared, together with NATO, to offer official security guarantees to the East European states with an accent on ensuring sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of frontiers, and maintenance of peace in the
region. Such guarantees could be embodied in a political statement or a cooperation agreement between the Russian Federation and NATO.

Naturally, we are open to discussing other proposals and would welcome intensification of dialogue in this respect during the period prior to the upcoming NATO summit.

Sincerely, Boris Yeltsin

Statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland
Krzysztof Skubiszewski concerning Poland’s policy towards NATO,
particularly in the context of the letter of Russian president Boris Yeltsin
to the leaders of France, Germany, the United States,
and the United Kingdom on September 15, 1993
Warsaw, October 4, 1993

Poland’s efforts to join NATO constitute a part of its policy
pursued since the breakthrough that took place in Poland in 1989, and
particularly since 1990 when the first significant contacts were made
with NATO (the foreign minister’s visit to NATO Headquarters).
This is a policy of integration with western defence and security
organisations, and making them, through Poland’s participation, more
European rather than maintaining their purely western character.
Otherwise, Europe will continue to be divided. This policy accords
with Poland’s most vital interests, with preservation of its hard-
won independence, and Poland will not give up this policy. The
charge that Poland’s policy is excessively western-oriented (so-called
Occidentalism) demonstrates a failure to understand our raison d’État,
or even take account of the prerequisites of Poland’s security and
the realities of security in Europe. Good relations with neighbours
constitute a premise and part of our European policy. Nevertheless,
we cannot, copying the example of pre-war Poland, limit ourselves to
good-neighbourly relations because these are different times. There
can be no safe, prosperous, and civilised Poland without close links
with the European Community and with NATO.

The joint position of Poland and Russia agreed by their presidents
on 25 August 1993, reflects the prerequisites of Euro-Atlantic security.
NATO is the pillar of security in this region, and it is not an alliance
aimed against anyone. This is the alliance that Poland is intent on
joining. The Cold War is over, and there are, therefore, no grounds
for perceiving NATO as directed against Russia or anybody. Poland’s
future participation in NATO does not conflict with the interests of
Russia or with the interests of any other country.

More than that, Poland’s entry into NATO will extend the Euro-
Atlantic security zone, which is to the benefit of all, including Russia.
Within NATO, Poland, as a country which is friendly towards Russia,
will contribute to good cooperation with Russia in the region. Thanks
to our reforms and the achievements of our considered foreign policy,
we will make a substantial contribution to a refurbished NATO. Not for nothing did the two presidents refer to pan-European integration in their declaration. In view of Poland’s geostrategic and geological situation, no one can replace Poland in carrying out this function. As this is a stabilising role conducive to democratic reforms, it is one that is definitely advantageous to Poland’s eastern neighbours.

We expect that, at the January summit (1994), NATO will create a prospect of the Alliance’s enlargement as the European Council (i.e., the European Community summit) did in Copenhagen (1993). We see a point in drawing such a parallel. One should build a single security level, not various security levels—that is what Poland advocates in light of its most vital interests. Through enlargement, NATO will maintain its vital and new role. It will avoid petrification of Cold War times. Thus, the Alliance will also provide America with the security America needs in Europe.

We are not pursuing a policy of isolation of Russia. In any case, such a policy would be impossible, as Russia’s great powerdom and ties with the United States rule out any idea of isolation. We believe that Russia’s participation in various European projects is necessary again from the point of view of common interests. Expansion of NATO will not result in Russia’s isolation. Therefore, to cite the risk of isolation is absolutely unfounded. The same applies to Russian chauvinistic and nationalistic forces: they are already combating NATO, and no appeasement will change anything; on the contrary, it will embolden these forces.

Just as we will oppose isolating Russia, we will equally resolutely reject the location of Poland in a buffer or grey zone between West and East. The idea of Russian guarantees implies such a zone and so, sooner or later, dependence. There is nothing to that effect in the Walesa and Yeltsin declaration. We have had unhappy experiences of such guarantees, as far back as the 18th century, before the partition of Poland, and, in the 20th century, in Teheran and in Yalta. Our policy is a policy of independence within a Euro-Atlantic security framework. The Yeltsin-Walesa declaration serves such security well. Poland’s drive to NATO is irreversible. It is a certain process, not an event that will take place overnight. The Polish government is preparing Poland’s entry into the European Community and NATO. The government is pressing forward with Poland’s gradual movement towards West European organisations.

18.

The Basic Principles of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation approved by the decree of President Boris Yeltsin of November 2, 1993

[...]75

Introduction

The “Basic principles of the military doctrine of the Russian Federation,” an integral part of the security concept of the Russian Federation is a document of the transition period—the creation of Russian statehood, the implementation of democratic reforms, and the formation of a new system of international relations. It constitutes a system of views officially adopted by the state on the prevention of wars and armed conflicts, building the armed forces, preparing for the defence of the country, organising measures to counteract threats to the military security of the state, as well as using the armed forces and other troops of the Russian Federation to defend vital interests of the state.

Political foundations of military doctrine

In this chapter:
– the approach of the Russian Federation to armed conflicts and the use of the Armed Forces and other troops of the Russian Federation is presented,
– the basic sources of military danger are identified,
– political principles and main directions of social and political security guarantees for the military security of the Russian Federation are formulated,
– the tasks of the state in the sphere of ensuring military security are formulated.

74 This document was not published in its entirety but only as a comprehensive summary that forms the basis of this translation.
75 The section containing the formal introduction has been omitted.
The approach of the Russian Federation towards armed conflicts, use of the Armed Forces and other forces of the Russian Federation

At the current stage of development of the international situation, under the conditions of overcoming the confrontation bred by ideological antagonism, broadening partnership and comprehensive cooperation, strengthening confidence in the military sphere, reducing nuclear and conventional arms—political and diplomatic, legal and international, economic and other non-military means—collective actions of the international community with regard to threats to peace, violation of peace, and acts of aggression gain priority in preventing wars and armed conflicts.

Ensuring the military security of the Russian Federation and its vital interests depends primarily:
- in the sphere of domestic policy, on the solution of economic, political, and social problems and on the effective implementation of reforms;
- in the sphere of foreign policy, on the state of relations with the surrounding world, especially with the nearest neighbours and leading powers.

Based on this assumption, the Russian Federation:
- is committed to the principles of peaceful settlement of international disputes, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, non-interference in their internal affairs, inviolability of State borders and other generally recognised principles of international law;
- does not treat any country as its opponent;
- will not use its armed forces or other troops against any State, except in the event of an armed attack on the Russian Federation, its citizens, its territory, its Armed Forces, other troops or its allies;
- supports the efforts of the international community, the various collective security entities to prevent wars and armed conflicts and to maintain or restore peace;
- contributes to the further development of international law and the development, adoption and implementation of effective measures by all countries to prevent wars and armed conflicts.

[...]

76 Sections concerning the attitudes towards WMD and principles of their use and the general objectives of the Armed Forces have been omitted.
The main existing and potential sources of external military danger to the Russian Federation are:

– territorial claims of other states against the Russian Federation and its allies;
– existing and potential hotspots of local wars and armed conflicts, especially in the immediate vicinity of Russian borders;
– possibility of using (including unauthorised) nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction found in many countries’ arsenals;
– proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and the latest military production technologies, in conjunction with attempts by countries, organisations, and terrorist groups, to implement their military and political aspirations;
– potential of undermining strategic stability as a result of violations of international arms limitation and reduction agreements and qualitative and quantitative increase in armaments of other countries;
– attempts to interfere in the internal affairs and to destabilise the internal political situation of the Russian Federation;
– suppression of rights, freedoms, and legitimate interests of citizens of the Russian Federation on the territory of foreign countries;
– assaults on military installations of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation located in foreign countries;
– expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the military security interests of the Russian Federation;
– international terrorism.

The document then lists the factors conducive to transforming military danger into an immediate military threat to the Russian Federation:

– concentration of military groupings (forces) next to the borders of the Russian Federation at a level undermining the established balance of power;
– assaults on facilities and installations at the state border of the Russian Federation and at the borders of its allies, initiation of border conflicts and armed provocations;
– training of armed formations and groups on the territory of other countries with the intention of their transfer to the Russian Federation and its allies;

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77 The document distinguishes two separate conceptual categories: military danger (военная опасность) and military threat (военная угроза).
– activities of other countries hampering the functioning of Russia’s strategic nuclear security, state and military command systems, and in particular its space component;

– entering foreign troops into the territory of neighbouring countries (unless it is related to peace-making or peacekeeping measures as decided by the UN Security Council or a regional collective security body, with the consent of the Russian Federation). [...]78

Translated by Mirosław Łukawski. Verified with the Russian original by Marek Menkiszak.


78 Sections concerning internal threats, general guidelines on how to ensure military security, main directions of social-political actions for military security, military foundations of military doctrine (including principles of use of armed forces, tasks of armed forces, development of their organisation), military-technical foundations of military doctrine and conclusions have been omitted.
19.

Problems of NATO expansion. Report presented by the Head of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Evgeny Primakov,\textsuperscript{79} at a Press Conference in Moscow on November 25, 1993

1.1 NATO’s position on the conditions for the admission of Central and Eastern European countries to the Alliance

There is every reason to believe that the admission of Central and Eastern European countries to NATO is treated in the U.S. and Western European countries as one of the most important issues, and the way it is solved will have an impact on the real development of international relations in the period following the confrontation. Here are the following arguments for the admission of these countries to NATO:

– after the end of the Cold War, a qualitatively new stabilisation in Europe requires removal of differences in the security systems of the Western and Eastern parts of the continent;

– the efforts of Central and Eastern European states to join NATO cannot be left unanswered without harming the pro-Western political forces in the leadership of these countries;

– it is very likely that NATO will not avoid involvement in conflict resolution in Central and Eastern Europe, and this entails the need to improve the mechanisms for controlling the situation in the region, including the extension of the proven system of political consultations, the preparation of a coherent infrastructure, and the development of a mode of cooperation in the field of defence and the development of armed forces;

– the membership of Central and Eastern European countries in NATO is treated as an alternative to the creation of their

\textsuperscript{79} Evgeny Primakov, Russian politologist (specialized in International Relations and Oriental Studies) and civil servant. He used to be heading several research institutes at the Russian Academy of Sciences. In the years 1989-1990 chairman of the Union Council (upper house) of the Supreme Council (parliament) of the USSR. Since August 1991 first deputy chairman of the KGB (USSR’s Committee for the State Security) and head of the First (Intelligence) Directorate of the KGB, transformed in December 1991 into Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR, civilian intelligence) of Russia. Between 1996 and 1998 the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation. In the years 1998-1999 the Prime Minister of Russia. Died in 2015.
own sub-regional security structures, which under the changed circumstances could tend towards similar structures as the CIS.

Discussions on the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation also focus on the purely military aspect. In particular, the issue of shifting NATO’s borders further to the east is raised, considering the geopolitical situation in which, according to the opinions of the NATO leadership, the possibility of the existence of several states with nuclear weapons from the former USSR and internal instability in the CIS countries should be considered. The shift of NATO’s borders in such conditions is regarded to be the end of the “security vacuum” in Central and Eastern Europe. NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner\(^{80}\) believes that it would be a “tragic mistake” to reject the request of Central and Eastern European states to provide guarantees of stability and security that only NATO can provide them with.

According to the experts of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation (SVR), a detailed analysis of the above-mentioned motivations for the enlargement of NATO’s composition is necessary to assess the real impact of the ongoing processes on Russia’s interests.

However, it can be concluded that the leadership of the Pact considers immediate accession of Central and Eastern European countries to NATO as full members, inappropriate. The NATO “people” are guided by the following reasons:

- hasty and ill-thought-out actions in this respect may lead to a return to the policy of confrontation on the European continent;

- the countries seeking NATO membership are embroiled in international disputes, including territorial ones, which would make the internal situation of the alliance more complicated. An alliance that is already weakened in the current composition due to the tense, if not to say hostile, relations between Greece and Turkey;

- enlargement of the alliance to include states that do not yet think about security issues in a Western way and are not accustomed to reconciling national interests with those of the allies may—because of the unanimity rule applied by the allies—reduce the effectiveness of steering the NATO mechanism and complicate the conduct of coordinated politics;

- Russia may revise its policy towards Europe by interpreting the enlargement of NATO to include Central and Eastern European countries as the creation of a *cordon sanitaire* hindering its integration into a united Europe;

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\(^{80}\) Manfred Wörner, former German Defence Minister, served as NATO Secretary General in the years 1988–1994 (until his death).
– the accession of the Central and Eastern European countries to NATO will also encourage other countries to submit similar wishes, which will be difficult to reject without detriment to relations with them; if, for example, if Ukraine is to be admitted to NATO and Russia is not, the new geopolitical situation will arise, to which Moscow could respond appropriately;

– reorganisation and change of the soldier training programmes and equipment systems of the armies of Central and Eastern European countries require considerable resources and a long time;

– Central and Eastern European countries are not prepared to bear the additional financial and material costs of NATO membership;

– NATO enlargement will make it necessary to revise agreed alliance development programmes in certain areas (theatre of warfare equipment, scientific research, joint military production, combat and operational training) and will create additional difficulties in developing a new military strategy, especially on such sensitive issues as the role of nuclear components, especially tactical ones.

Finally, purely legal issues are raised. Obstacles to the rapid admission of new members to NATO result, i.a., from the functioning of the allied cooperation mechanism and its international legal base. There are, in fact, no disagreements among NATO countries on the immediate extension of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which provides for the immediate action of the alliance to repel aggression.

The comparison of these two groups of arguments makes it possible to conclude that the accession of new members to NATO will be a multi-stage process. In the preparatory period, the countries seeking membership may be granted an intermediate status that differs from full membership in terms of the lower level of integration of national armed forces with allied structures, limited access to preparing and making joint decisions, flexible parameters of participation in financing and implementing joint programmes, and—most importantly—the scale of the Alliance’s defence guarantees.

The most likely option of NATO enlargement will consider first including the Visegrad Group countries in this process81. Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia have extensive experience of cooperation in the security sphere, both amongst themselves and

81 The Visegrad Group (V4), a forum for dialogue and cooperation initiated on 15 February 1991 at a meeting in Visegrad, Hungary, by the presidents of Poland (Lech Wałęsa), Czechoslovakia (Václav Havel), and Hungary (József Antall). Since the division of Czechoslovakia in 1993, the V4 has comprised the following countries: Poland, Czech Republic (Czechia), Slovakia, and Hungary.
with their western neighbours. These countries have created a tested mechanism for bilateral and multilateral consultations on many political and military issues. According to the West, the process of democratisation in the Visegrad countries is the most advanced and the Western values are best assimilated. Even this group of countries, however, cannot count on immediate admission as full members of the Alliance.

There was no agreement in NATO on the “evolutionary plan to shift the alliance to the East” proposed by the Alliance’s leadership, which provided for: first, granting the status of associate members to Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary; second, developing military cooperation with Bulgaria and Romania; and, third, strengthening strategic ties with Russia and Ukraine. There is an agreement that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, in one form or another, will be admitted to the alliance in the future, but the tendency is not to speed up this process.

In all likelihood, the ultimate decision to set out the prospect of NATO enlargement will be taken at the meeting of the heads of states and governments of the Alliance’s members announced for January 1994. An important element of the expected declaration may become a list of criteria that future NATO members or partners will have to meet: renunciation of territorial claims, respect for the rights of national minorities, attachment to the principle of peaceful dispute resolution, democratic principles of the state system and market reforms, establishment of civilian control of the armed forces, etc.

It should be taken into account, however, that the North Atlantic Alliance does not provide for differentiation of NATO membership, and the allies are not willing to revise the [North Atlantic] Treaty.

1.2 Differences in positions between NATO countries

The fundamental compatibility of the approach to the problem of NATO enlargement does not exclude certain differences in the positions of individual Alliance states. The focus is on the following issues:

– the deadline for taking a conclusive decision on the enlargement of NATO membership;
– the list of candidates and the procedure for their admission or association with the organisation;
– the legal and time frame of this process;
– the importance of the transition period for the admission of new countries to NATO;
– the mechanisms for the integration of countries applying for NATO membership, the issue of obligatory and modality of admission to intermediate structures (including European security institutions: European Union, Western European Union, North Atlantic Cooperation Council, CSCE);
– whether and to what extent the new organisation of European order in the post-confrontation period will take into account the Russian factor.

It is worth noting that the views of Western partners on these issues are constantly being corrected and clarified in light of new aspects of the international situation, including signals coming from Moscow.

Noting the differences in the views of individual NATO members on the enlargement of the Alliance, the experts considered that the most distinctive positions on this issue should be presented.

The U.S. position has not yet been finalised; nevertheless, Washington is inclined to believe that an ad hoc solution is the idea of a partnership with the North Atlantic Alliance, which provides an opportunity for all European countries to recover from the difficult situation caused by the persistence with which the Central and Eastern European countries call for their admission to NATO.

The main points of Washington’s position were set out in the Partnership for Peace initiative, presented at the meeting of NATO Defence Ministers in Travemünde [Germany] in October 1993. The American proposal is to establish cooperation with all interested European countries. As a matter of fact, the Americans are in favour of making the Pact an “open club.”

This does not preclude new members from joining the alliance. Secretary General Manfred Wörner interprets the U.S. Partnership for Peace initiative as an expression of acceptance of the very principle of future enlargement of NATO and strengthening strategic cooperation with those countries that are not among the “most likely candidates,” especially Russia and Ukraine.

The explanations received show that active and full participation in the Partnership for Peace in practice may become a prerequisite for future membership in NATO, but it does not guarantee admission to the alliance.

For example, Washington stresses that the Visegrad Group countries are better prepared for NATO membership. At the same time, when it comes to the deadlines, the admission of even these countries to the alliance turns out to be distant—this is in the perspective of the 21st century.
According to the prevailing opinion in the U.S., the transition period, which is needed, above all, to put into practice the idea of partnership with the North Atlantic Alliance, is an essential element of consolidating the reasons for political and military integration of the Central and Eastern European countries into NATO through specific plans for cooperation in the key areas.

This process, according to Washington, could be coordinated by the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). At the same time, however, it is considered that the NACC tools will not be sufficient to prepare the Eastern European countries to participate in NATO. An additional entity is needed, the tasks of which would include deepening cooperation with the countries applying for membership in NATO. In this context, the Partnership for Peace programme may be seen as consistent with the idea of introducing an indirect status for “promising” candidates. Such a possibility is taken into account. As far as the European concept of the entry of Central and Eastern European countries to NATO through the European Union is concerned, it is received with scepticism in the U.S., especially in Congress.

The Washington administration stresses that the admission of Central and Eastern European countries to NATO should not be an action against Russia. Moreover, it should be conducted in such a way that Russia does not get the impression of international isolation and there is no doubt that the West is ready to continue its cooperation with the Russian Federation in all spheres as long as it continues its reform policy. This is probably the reason why the American leadership has approached Russia with a proposal to consider the possibility of “partnership” with the Alliance.

The Washington’s intent focusing on an evolutionary expansion of NATO’s sphere of responsibility is most likely due to the fact that the U.S. has not yet made a clear assessment of the Alliance’s prospects. On the one hand, the extension of the Alliance’s tasks, including the resolution of conflicts that go beyond its current sphere of responsibility, would increase NATO’s importance in Washington. On the other hand, it would impose additional obligations and expenses on the U.S.

The position of the Western European NATO members and Canada on the American Partnership for Peace programme has not yet been formulated. The details of the programme can be clarified and adjusted. However, it is possible that the Partnership for Peace will become the basis for decisions that will be taken already at the NATO leaders’ summit in January 1994.
The UK considers it advisable to clarify the views on the relationship between NATO’s enlargement and the construction of a united Europe and will insist on doing so. Among other things, the British emphasise that the procedure for admitting new members should not be a mechanical sum of individual steps. NATO must have a general concept of European security, and the issues of expanding the membership of the alliance and the criteria for participation must be an integral part of such a concept.

At the same time, the UK believes that Central and Eastern Europe should not be approached selectively, in other words, it considers unreasonable to give preference to the Visegrad Group, as this may affect relations with other countries. Moreover, the English link the membership of Central and Eastern European countries in NATO with their prior accession to the Western European Union and the European Union. They believe that the gradual inclusion of these countries in cooperation with the West on security issues will “discipline” potential NATO participants and instil in them habits of “communicating in a civilised way.”

London believes that if the Europeans from the East prove that they can “meet the tough criteria for WEU and EU membership” they will not be a burden on the Pact. As an acceptable option for a transitional period is to deepen the political cooperation with Central and Eastern Europe, including participation in NATO governing bodies.

From the very beginning, France took the position that not only Central and Eastern European countries but also other European countries are entitled to apply for NATO membership. Therefore, the ultimate decision to extend the composition of the alliance does not have to include a list of countries applying for membership.

Paris would like to avoid setting specific deadlines for joining NATO. It assumes that Central and Eastern European countries should be gradually included in the Alliance’s activities. Particular importance is attached to the issue of linking the NATO enlargement process to the strengthening of pan-European security. The French are cautious about increasing the powers of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council to the detriment of the CSCE.

Recognising the need for a transitional period for states applying to join the Alliance, Paris warns against automatically granting them NATO security guarantees. The mere introduction of associate membership status or any other form of indirect participation of Central and Eastern European countries in the Alliance is seen as
a way of excluding these countries from the rules of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

Paris does not rule out the possibility that an alternative to NATO enlargement may be created by the initiative of French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur (the Stability Pact in Europe), if it is modified to include Russia. It is believed that such an approach will avoid duplication of the functions of the WEU and NATO, strengthen the European core of the alliance and accelerate the implementation of the Maastricht agreements on the common foreign and defence policy of Western Europe.

The Federal Republic of Germany is in favour of taking the final decision on NATO enlargement, which should be perceived as the beginning of the practical preparations for the admission of Central and Eastern European countries to the Alliance. Priority is given to the Visegrad Group.

Germany recognises the need to coordinate the integration process of this group of countries with the Western European and Atlantic structures, however, it does not exclude the possibility of their accession to NATO even before they have full membership rights in the European Union.

Bonn assumes that the Visegrad Group countries are unlikely to join NATO in the near future. However, when considering the matter on a practical level, Germany acknowledges the need to legally regulate their relations with the Alliance in such a way as to—in the interests of the West—guarantee security and stability in Central Europe and, at the same time, ensure the participation of the Visegrad states in the political-military undertakings of the alliance.

The reasonable directions of cooperation with the countries applying for accession to NATO during the transitional period were considered to be: harmonisation of military legislation, replacement of equipment, modernisation and change of methods of armed forces training, improvement of cooperation through joint exercises and modernisation of telecommunications and infrastructure. In Bonn's opinion, the best way to fulfil these tasks is to develop bilateral ties between Germany and each country applying for NATO membership. Germany, therefore, assumes the role of the driving force introducing the Central and Eastern European countries to the structures of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

Everything seems to indicate that the need for a transitional period is viewed in Bonn in the framework of the change in Germany's position in the international arena. It considers the possibility that new
serious tasks will be assigned to Bonn as part of the Western policy of ensuring peace and resolving conflicts, and thus Germany will cease to be an object and become a subject of the security policy. This will require a radical revision of Germany’s foreign policy priorities, competences, and legal basis, and the creation and improvement of relevant instruments, including military ones.

The transition period, understood as a time of intensive cooperation with the countries applying for NATO membership, is of particular practical importance for the German leadership. The German side strives to ensure its security already at the first stage of the enlargement process of the Alliance, removing potential military and political problems of the eastern part of the continent from its own territory by expanding the German sphere of influence based on mutual contacts.

The prevailing view in Germany is that the ability to find a common language with Moscow is conducive to the effectiveness of German foreign policy. Therefore, the possibilities of balancing the idea of NATO enlargement with initiatives aimed at strengthening cooperation with the Russian Federation, both bilaterally and within the framework of the NACC, including Russia in the work of the “Big Seven” and increasing economic, scientific and technical, and humanitarian aid are being thoroughly examined. In developing its partnership relations with Russia, Germany proposes, i.a., to focus on specific programmes that are important for the Russian Federation (it offers assistance in fulfilling the conditions of disarmament agreements, disposal of nuclear and fissile materials, declares organisational support in withdrawing troops from foreign countries’ territories and “accommodating” them in new dislocation areas, and wants to cooperate in converting the arms industry).

The Netherlands is working on an intermediate option to solve the problem of NATO enlargement. At the beginning, they decided to declare that Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation will be applied to the Visegrad Group states (consultations to be held at the request of one of the partners in the event of a threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security), and to undertake that in the event of aggression against one of the Visegrad Group states, the problem of possible forms of assistance will be resolved immediately.

The Hague supports a gradual process of moving closer to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, taking the view that before the Eastern European countries are admitted to NATO, they should

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82 This term concerns the G-7 Group.
deepen their cooperation within sub-regional structures (above all in the Visegrad Group) and to obtain membership in the EU and then in the WEU. However, it is not ruled out that the process of accession to NATO should be speeded up without the stage of EU membership, in the case of a “growing threat from the East.”

Italy and Spain believe that it is not appropriate at the current stage to go beyond a preliminary analysis regarding NATO’s enlargement because of Russia’s sensitivity and the risk of giving full Alliance guarantees to Central and Eastern European countries whose domestic and foreign policies are not yet settled. They consider that while the conditions of admission are being discussed, NATO’s support should be less binding.

The idea of NATO enlargement is of concern to Turkey, Greece, and Portugal, which receive substantial assistance from their Alliance partners and fear competition.

1.3 Position of Western European organisations

The prospect of the increasing role of Western European structures in the process of extending NATO’s responsibilities has forced the leadership of the EU (former EEC) and the WEU to gradually join the discussion on this issue. Their position is greatly influenced by the willingness to avoid additional problems in organisations that are at the stage of moving to a higher level of integration and adapting to new tasks. Concerns are expressed in the EU and the WEU by their authorities that the use of these institutions as a “transmission belt” to bring the Eastern European countries into NATO structures will make them more focused on the needs of the North Atlantic Alliance rather than on their own European policy.

In this respect, the need to make preparations for the admission of Central and Eastern European countries to Western European organisations is stressed. The aim is, therefore, not to prepare these countries to join NATO within the EU and the WEU, but rather to solve the problem with the participation of the EU and the WEU, but outside their framework.

The following objectives are formulated:

– strengthening (with the participation of the EU, acting as consultative body and arbitrator) the democratic system in Central and Eastern European countries;
– improving market mechanisms in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe until they reach a level that allows them to join the community;
– launching a system of political cooperation and mutual security.

1.4 Positions of Central and Eastern European countries on NATO membership

The driving force behind NATO’s enlargement are the candidates themselves—the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In applying for NATO membership, they put forward the following arguments:

– the Yugoslavia crisis has shown that in the new political conditions, Europe has become a zone of international conflicts, “tectonic shifts” fuelled by ethnic, religious, and economic contradictions may spread to other Central and Eastern European countries;

– developments in the area of the former USSR show that, on the one hand, the CIS crisis and armed conflict prevention activities are not effective enough and, on the other hand, that the “unpredictability of the situation” in the RF, Moldova, Ukraine, and the Baltic States is a real threat to Central and Eastern Europe;

– the existing international security structures, including the UN and the CSCE, are not a sufficiently effective instrument for guaranteeing peace and stability in Europe, and the idea of rapidly building a system of collective security on their basis in the Eurasian area has proved illusory;

– Eastern European countries are not able to form efficient structures on their own to protect themselves against the threat of war and possible external disturbances; even the [Central European] Visegrad Group countries, which have considerable military potential, have encountered political, economic, organisational and technical problems that are difficult to overcome when trying to create their own defence system;

– the entry of Central and Eastern European countries into NATO structures, due to the compatibility of political goals and social-economic conditions, may be a guarantee for the continuation of their policy of coming closer to the West;

– NATO membership status will provide the countries of Central and Eastern Europe with maximum economic benefits and will fully take advantage of the change of political line.

The differences in the positions of the Central and Eastern European countries are due to the fact that they are not equally prepared for the requirements of the Alliance and that the level of their cooperation with NATO varies. According to the experts of the Foreign Intelligence Service, conditions related to internal policy are less important.
Poland was the first country in Central and Eastern Europe to officially apply to join NATO—in September 1993, in an address by President Lech Walesa. Justifying the need to join the alliance, the Polish authorities mentioned, i.a., external threats and assessed the situation in neighbouring countries of the former USSR as unpredictable.

Warsaw stresses that its accession to NATO will remove the barrier that divides Europe. There are, however, grounds to assume that, by striving hard for NATO membership, Poland also wants to secure itself against German pressure on its post-war western border.

The Hungarian authorities consider joining NATO as the culmination of their entire pro-western policy. Budapest is quite sceptical about the idea of admitting Central and Eastern European countries to the EU first. The Hungarians are afraid of stalling the process of integration with NATO and are concerned about the slowdown in transforming the EU into the guarantor of international security in Europe. They do not exclude the possibility of the Visegrad Group countries joining NATO separately and that Hungary is accepted first.

One of the reasons for Hungary’s pro-NATO policy is its willingness to protect itself against a possible sharpening of the Hungarian-Romanian conflict over Transylvania and the Hungarian-Serbian dispute over Vojvodina.

Budapest stresses that it cannot be a member of an anti-Russian military-political grouping and therefore Hungary is interested in developing NATO’s partnership relations with the Russian Federation.

The Czech authorities consider it necessary to obtain a NATO guarantee, motivated by the existence of a “potential threat to state security” resulting from the events in the Russian Federation and Ukraine, the escalation of the Yugoslavia conflict and the Hungarian-Slovakian disputes. However, according to the Czech political elite, the Czech accession to NATO is a matter of the far future. At the first stage of its rapprochement with the Alliance, Prague is ready to settle for support on fundamental issues from the individual bloc countries and focus on the military and technical aspects of the transition period. The Czech authorities have particular hopes for Germany, which they believe is more interested than other NATO states in extending its responsibilities to the east, as far away from German territory as possible.

In its efforts to join NATO, Slovakia aims to activate the process of developing contacts with Western Europe, especially in the field of military and technical cooperation. As far as preparing the country
for NATO membership is concerned, Bratislava has the greatest hopes in the coordinating functions of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.

Romania is ready to cooperate with NATO to any extent convenient for the Alliance. Bucharest is moving towards full integration with the Atlantic Alliance. The Romanian government denies the advisability of the successive admission of individual Central and Eastern European countries to NATO and advocates their simultaneous admission to the alliance.

Bucharest counts on speeding up the process of Romania’s accession to NATO because of its “unique geostrategic location” in the Black Sea region. Romania is ready to assume the role of the Alliance’s “pillar” in Southern Europe.

The Bulgarian authorities have repeatedly declared their willingness to move closer to or even fully integrate with NATO. From Sofia’s point of view, the Alliance is interested in Bulgaria’s accession to its defence structures, as this creates real opportunities to strengthen its influence in the Balkans. However, the Bulgarian authorities are aware that the process of joining NATO will not soon enter the practical implementation phase: Bulgaria is not yet ready to reorganise its military structures in accordance with the requirements of the Alliance, nor does it have the necessary financial resources for this purpose. Moreover, due to Turkish-Bulgarian disputes, Sofia has doubts about the sustainability of the NATO guarantees.

Alongside their efforts to join NATO, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are working on developing multilateral ties with Russia.

2. Russian interests

From the perspective of Russia’s interests, the problem of NATO enlargement has several aspects that must be considered in the process of developing relations with the North Atlantic Alliance, Central and Eastern Europe, and the countries of the near abroad.

2.1 Prospects for the North Atlantic Alliance

According to experts from the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), the analysis of the impact of NATO enlargement process on Russia’s interests requires, above all, prognostic assessments related to the possibility of the alliance’s evolution after the end of the Cold War.
The officially formulated objectives and the logic of the events give rise to the idea of transforming the Alliance from a military-political grouping tasked with countering external threats into an instrument to guarantee peace and stability in accordance with the principles of collective security. In this context, the problem of extending NATO’s sphere of responsibility towards the east is being considered. The experts of the SVR believe that a significant part of Russia’s concerns about the entry of Central and Eastern European countries into NATO would become pointless or would be minimised if there were guarantees of a pre-development of the process of changing NATO’s functions or a parallel extension of its political functions and geographical scope. However, so far, such guarantees have not been presented.

Above all, it is uncertain whether and how the problem of NATO’s transformation prospects has been resolved. The Alliance has not yet developed a detailed interpretation of the role and place of NATO in the system of international relations after the confrontation period. The discussions on NATO’s political strategy are rather preliminary in nature. At the same time, there are fundamental differences within NATO itself as regards the division of tasks and responsibilities in the security sphere between the Alliance and other international organisations.

The fact is that stereotypes of bloc-thinking persist, typical of representatives of the military leadership of the Western countries and the Alliance as a whole. One such stereotype stems from the fact that the USSR, whose core was Russia, was for many years considered to be the main source of war danger, threatening the very existence of the Western civilisation.

NATO is, in principle, focused on strategic plans that take into account the worst-case scenario and which influence the style and details of operational documents, the nature and preparation of national and allied forces. These are relics that will last a long time. It should also be remembered that breaking old habits will not be painless and must meet resistance from prominent representatives of the ruling spheres and military establishment, academic circles, and the NATO countries’ military-industrial complex.

One should also take into consideration that the arms race—through force of inertia—requires an image of the enemy, or at least potential, to be kept in the public mind. This trend is reinforced by the genuine concern of the heads of the largest NATO countries, who are threatened by the decline of employment in the economic and
scientific branches associated with the army. They are also concerned about the future and opportunities regarding research programmes. There is a widespread fear, in the West, of losing technological level and sources of income achieved if the post-confrontational euphoria were to result in the collapse of the armaments complex.

The aspirations of Central and Eastern European countries, which intend to use their participation in NATO to involve the West in solving their domestic and foreign policy problems, may produce an unexpected effect. By engaging in complex and conflict-prone processes in Eastern European countries, the North Atlantic Alliance may be faced with an objective need to tighten its policies. The transformation of NATO into a universal force for peace and stability may take time. In any case, there is a danger that the process in question and the process of expanding the alliance will not proceed synchronously. This poses a threat to Russia’s interests, because such asynchrony may reduce the chances of overcoming the division of the continent and lead to a return of the bloc policy under the conditions of shifting NATO’s sphere of responsibility directly to the borders of the Russian Federation.

2.2 Geopolitical aspects

The proponents of the accession of Central and Eastern European countries to NATO are aware of the fact that the shifting of NATO’s sphere of responsibility to Russia’s borders causes some concern to the Russian Federation, and in order to mitigate it, they use the following arguments:

– the zone of international stabilisation guaranteed by NATO will include countries directly bordering the former USSR, so the North Atlantic Alliance will take responsibility for peacekeeping and conflict prevention in the region;

– if NATO decides on a policy of enlargement, it will have to take a clear stance on the fundamental problems of building a new European order in the post-Cold War period and to define the objectives and nature of future cooperation with Russia and other CIS countries, to speed up the process of verifying NATO’s political function and to act effectively to transform the bloc into an instrument of universal security;

– the enlargement of NATO to include Central and Eastern European countries will pave the way to membership of the Alliance to Russia as well.
The latter argument is being publicised especially on the eve of the NATO summit in January. Meanwhile, the experts decided that in the initial proposals submitted to Russia evaluating the chances of a partnership with NATO, it is difficult to see the desire to create mechanisms to strengthen international security, the structure and functions of which would be adequate to the conditions that emerged after the confrontation period. The idea of creating such a mechanism is under discussion in the West. For example, the specialists in the U.S. consider the possibility of establishing at this stage a collective-security organisation that would be an intermediate between NATO, on the one hand, and the CSCE and UN, on the other.

For Russia, of course, it is essential what kind of structure and upon what basis it could enter into or what type of partnership it could build with such an alliance.

NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner, speaking in Madrid on 29 October 1993 at the conference “Maintenance of Peace in Europe,” which was attended by NATO, the WEU, the EEC, and CSCE experts, addressed issues that could raise questions, if not concern. Among other things, Wörner stated that NATO’s main goal, along with ensuring collective defence, is to maintain strategic balance in Europe, which can be interpreted as a continuation (under new conditions) of one of NATO’s main functions since the Cold War period. If so, the shift of NATO’s borders towards Russia’s requires either its military reinforcement, which exceeds the current economic capabilities of the Russian Federation, or consent to asymmetry in the security field, which is contrary to its interests.

According to another statement by Wörner, one of the main functions of NATO is “projection” of stability into the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. If the “partnership” or another form of NATO enlargement is based on covering Central Asian countries with the Alliance’s sphere of responsibility, Russia may interpret this as an alternative to the collective-security system within the CIS. The extension of NATO’s sphere of responsibility to two areas directly bordering the Russian Federation from the west and south may raise justified suspicions that this new geopolitical situation is extremely unfavourable for Russia.

2.3 Military aspects

It is obvious that nowadays there should be no room for expressions referring directly to those used during the Cold War, e.g., as an argument for a fierce confrontation between the West and the
East, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the U.S. and the USSR. It is difficult to imagine, and would be wrong to assume that the geographical expansion of NATO will serve as an outpost for an attack on Russia or its allies. This does not mean, however, that the eastward shift of NATO does not harm Russia’s national security interests.

Recently there have been a number of comments in the West about the Russian army’s position on these problems. There has been speculation that the Russian general’s corps is seeking to use its “growing influence” on the Russian government and to “impose” a hard line in the sphere of national security. Such deliberations are speculative. However, one cannot ignore the fact that the objective and professional tasks of the armed forces make their views on the problem of expanding NATO’s sphere of influence specific. The Russian military authorities cannot ignore the fact that:

1. As a result of NATO enlargement, the world’s largest military grouping, with its huge offensive potential, will be located in the immediate vicinity of Russia’s borders, which makes it necessary to think through all defence concepts, to reform the armed forces, to review the operational theatre of warfare, to expand additional infrastructure, to deploy significant contingents of troops, to change operational plans and the nature of combat exercises and training. From the military point of view, these undertakings are objectively necessary and should be implemented regardless of the fact that NATO is no longer considered a political adversary. There is no doubt that the other party would act similarly in such situation.

2. The implementation of these undertakings—and they should be carried out in a short period of time—will certainly lead to an excessive burden on the state budget and weaken Russia’s defensive capabilities during the structural reconstruction and redeployment of the forward groupings of the Armed Forces.

3. It cannot be overlooked that, in such conditions, the threat of exceeding deadlines and failure of weapon reduction programmes, reorganisation and creation of a professional army and equipping it with modern and expensive weapon systems becomes real. The backwardness in these areas pose a threat for a qualitative reduction in the combat potential of the Russian Armed Forces compared to that of the major military powers.

4. If the Russian government is unable to provide the armed forces with normal conditions for financing, manning and equipping them with material and technical means and social protection, there may be
dissatisfaction among the military circles, which is clearly contrary to the interests of the political and military authorities and Russia as a whole.

Nor should it be underestimated that NATO enlargement will lead to the Alliance assuming responsibility for that part of the European continent where inter-state borders were changed after World War II. It must not be forgotten that as a result of the creation of new countries in Europe, the Helsinki Agreement, which defines the status quo, ceases to operate or loses importance. It can, therefore, be assumed that in the new conditions, an alternative guarantor of the European borders will be NATO. Such a concept has its advantages as well as disadvantages. Many experts see a close link between the “evolutionary expansion” of the North Atlantic Alliance and Germany’s growing importance in the Alliance. The preparatory period preceding the entry of Central and Eastern European countries into NATO as full members is connected with the enhancement of their bilateral military cooperation with Germany. Many foreign political scientists are of the opinion that the enlargement of NATO leads to Germany’s transformation from an “importer” of security into an “exporter” on the European continent. It is likely to assume that certain circles in Germany, in the context of NATO enlargement, look at the process from the point of view of further development of the post-war border issue.

Many problems in this area arise not only from the attitude of Germany but also from the attitude of other countries. For example, won’t certain forces in Romania, attached to the idea of unification with Moldova, force it, taking advantage of their presence in NATO and ignoring the interests of Transnistria? In any case, the conclusion that the admission of Central and Eastern European countries to NATO may increase the number of international disputes and conflicts, including territorial ones, is justified.

The enlargement of NATO’s membership to include the Visegrad Group is an incentive for the Baltic States to apply for admission to the Alliance. As a result, the centre of gravity of their cooperation with the West will shift to military ground. This could be seen as a challenge to Russia as the military presence of third countries on their territories is contrary to Russian interests.

The NATO leadership stresses that it is not its intention to create a cordon sanitaire in Central and Eastern Europe separating Russia from Western Europe. Nevertheless, this can take place regardless of the will of the Alliance’s leaders. In any case, with the admission of Central and Eastern European countries to this organisation, a barrier between Russia and the rest of the continent will appear in reality.
It should also be considered that a change in the composition of NATO members will inevitably lead to a breach of many international commitments under multilateral agreements and arrangements, including the Treaty on the limitation of Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), compliance with which is one of the factors of stability and security on the European continent.

As we know, the CFE treaty was based on the concept of equal security, and its aim was to achieve by 1995 a balance of conventional forces between the two groups of states (NATO and the former Warsaw Pact) by setting levels for the armament of land and air forces. If NATO membership was extended to include the former Warsaw Pact countries, the principle of balance of power would be violated. Thus, the limits of conventional armament would be questioned, not only in potential new NATO countries but also in the CIS countries, and above all in Russia on its flanks. In addition, there would be the problem of a significant revision of collective commitments on changes in arms levels and the re-negotiation of arms limits among the Visegrad countries (Article 7), on verification and inspection matters (Article 14) and others.

One should note that any revisions to the treaty sought by Russia at bilateral and multilateral meetings over the past two years have met with strong opposition and a negative reaction from NATO. Thus, the appeal of Russian President Boris Yeltsin (September 1993) to the leaders of NATO countries, which contained a proposal to revise the “flank” restrictions on Russia’s armed forces (Article 5) was in fact rejected by the leadership of the Alliance. There are strong indicators that such a NATO position will be maintained until the end of 1995 (deadline for completion of conventional arms reductions in accordance with the CFE Treaty).

2.4 Aspects of internal politics

The potential negative impact of NATO enlargement on the internal situation in Russia and the psychological state of its citizens must not be underestimated. Public opinion in the Russian Federation has long been shaped by an anti-NATO narrative. It cannot change in an instant. Due to the extension of the influence of the North Atlantic Alliance on the territory of the former Soviet republics, a significant part of the society will consider that “the danger is approaching the borders of the Motherland.” This would give additional impetus to anti-Western forces in the Russian Federation and equip them with arguments that can be used in attempts to discredit the government’s
political line. Under these circumstances, the “besieged fortress” syndrome and isolationist tendencies may revive in the country with all the resulting negative consequences for reform policy.

The public awareness in Russia should therefore mature to recognise NATO as a structure of European security and stability, not an enemy striving to consolidate political and military superiority over the main opponent in the Cold War.

Based on the analysis, which will be corrected as new data is received, the SVR experts came to the following conclusions:

– in the conditions that followed the end of the confrontation period, when so-called bloc discipline ceased to have effect after the Warsaw Pact was dissolved, Russia has no right to dictate to the sovereign states of Central and Eastern Europe whether to join NATO or other international organisations;

– it would be in Russia’s interests to synchronise the process of extending NATO’s sphere of responsibility with the change in the nature of this alliance and adapt its functions to the current stage of historical development;

– the process of admitting Central and Eastern European countries to NATO, its nature, timetable, rights and obligations of new members, should be shaped taking into account the opinions of all interested parties—including Russia—on the prospects for strengthening the foundations of collective security on the European continent, the development of European cooperation, as well as guarantees that all countries applying for membership of the North Atlantic Alliance will respect the international agreements they have concluded;

– only consideration of these factors would be conducive to creating the preconditions for the FR-NATO cooperation, bringing their relations to the level of a real partnership.

– at the current stage, there should be a multi-sectoral policy of developing comprehensive cooperation with all international institutions capable of creating a comprehensive collective security system in Europe.

Translated by Mirosław Łukawski. Verified with the Russian original by Marek Menkiszak.

20.


1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Brussels to renew our Alliance in light of the historic transformations affecting the entire continent of Europe. We welcome the new climate of cooperation that has emerged in Europe with the end of the period of global confrontation embodied in the Cold War. However, we must also note that other causes of instability, tension and conflict have emerged. We therefore confirm the enduring validity and indispensability of our Alliance. It is based on a strong transatlantic link, the expression of a shared destiny. It reflects a European Security and Defence Identity gradually emerging as the expression of a mature Europe. It is reaching out to establish new patterns of cooperation throughout Europe. It rests, as also reflected in Article 2 of the Washington Treaty, upon close collaboration in all fields.

Building on our decisions in London and Rome and on our new Strategic Concept, we are undertaking initiatives designed to contribute to lasting peace, stability, and well-being in the whole of Europe, which has always been our Alliance’s fundamental goal. We have agreed:

– to adapt further the Alliance’s political and military structures to reflect both the full spectrum of its roles and the development of the

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83 A political concept with a complex content and practical meaning as well as a broader anti-crisis definition, developed since the 1980s as an intent of the European NATO member states to more clearly mark their contribution to allied military solutions to enable them to conduct military operations, either in situations where the U.S. would not be interested in participating, or implemented under the auspices of the Western European Union (and, in the future, the European Union); related to the U.S. postulate to increase the financial and material resources of European states for the benefit of NATO's collective defence. The essence of the political debate within these concepts was the question of whether the aforementioned European identity should be created within the North Atlantic Alliance or as an autonomous solution (based on its capabilities and resources). The compromise was achieved by developing allied procedures enabling European operations using NATO solutions. The ambitions related to the development of autonomous European military capabilities (without duplication of NATO structures and capabilities) are currently implemented by the EU as part of the European Security and Defence Policy.
emerging European Security and Defence Identity, and endorse the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces,\textsuperscript{84}

– to reaffirm that the Alliance remains open to the membership of other European countries;

– to launch a major initiative through a Partnership for Peace, in which we invite Partners to join us in new political and military efforts to work alongside the Alliance;

– to intensify our efforts against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

2. We reaffirm our strong commitment to the transatlantic link, which is the bedrock of NATO. The continued substantial presence of United States forces in Europe is a fundamentally important aspect of that link. All our countries wish to continue the direct involvement of the United States and Canada in the security of Europe. We note that this is also the expressed wish of the new democracies of the East, which see in the transatlantic link an irreplaceable pledge of security and stability for Europe as a whole. The fuller integration of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and of the former Soviet Union into a Europe whole and free cannot be successful without the strong and active participation of all Allies on both sides of the Atlantic.

[...]\textsuperscript{85}

7. In pursuit of our common transatlantic security requirements, NATO increasingly will be called upon to undertake missions in addition to the traditional and fundamental task of collective defence of its members, which remains a core function. We reaffirm our offer to support, on a case by case basis in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise. Participation in any such operation or mission will remain subject to decisions of member states in accordance with national constitutions.

[...]\textsuperscript{86}

\textsuperscript{84} Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), a rapid response force in crisis situations, composed of all types of armed forces, high level of preparedness, ability to deploy rapidly and act independently in crisis areas. Its creation was decided by NATO at the end of 1993 and approved in January 1994 at the Brussels Summit.

\textsuperscript{85} Omitted secs. 3–6 of the document concern the sustainability of transatlantic relations and cooperation between NATO and the WEU in the development of a European identity in the field of security and defence.

\textsuperscript{86} Omitted secs. 8–9 of the document deal with the adaptation of NATO to the needs of new missions (participation in the resolution of international crises).
10. Our own security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe. The consolidation and preservation throughout the continent of democratic societies and their freedom from any form of coercion or intimidation are therefore of direct and material concern to us, as they are to all other CSCE states under the commitments of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris. We remain deeply committed to further strengthening the CSCE, which is the only organisation comprising all European and North American countries, as an instrument of preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, cooperative security, and the advancement of democracy and human rights. We actively support the efforts to enhance the operational capabilities of the CSCE for early warning, conflict prevention, and crisis management.

11. As part of our overall effort to promote preventive diplomacy, we welcome the European Union proposal for a Pact on Stability in Europe, will contribute to its elaboration, and look forward to the opening conference which will take place in Paris in the Spring.87

12. Building on the close and long-standing partnership among the North American and European Allies, we are committed to enhancing security and stability in the whole of Europe. We therefore wish to strengthen ties with the democratic states to our East. We reaffirm that the Alliance, as provided for in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, remains open to membership of other European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe.

13. We have decided to launch an immediate and practical programme that will transform the relationship between NATO and participating states. This new programme goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership—a Partnership for Peace. We invite the other states participating in the NACC, and other CSCE countries able and willing to contribute to this programme, to join with us in this Partnership. Active participation in the Partnership for Peace will play an important role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO.

87 Security and Stability Pact in Europe, known as the Balladur Plan, an initiative put forward by French head of diplomacy Edouard Balladur. It includes holding a pan-European conference with participation of the U.S. and Canada to discuss issues of border integrity in Europe, respect for human and minority rights. Agreed in 1995, it did not play a major international role.
14. The Partnership for Peace, which will operate under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, will forge new security relationships between the North Atlantic Alliance and its Partners for Peace. Partner states will be invited by the North Atlantic Council to participate in political and military bodies at NATO Headquarters with respect to Partnership activities. The Partnership will expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships by promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin our Alliance. NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security. At a pace and scope determined by the capacity and desire of the individual participating states, we will work in concrete ways towards transparency in defence budgeting, promoting democratic control of defence ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations, and others as may be agreed.

15. To promote closer military cooperation and interoperability, we will propose, within the Partnership framework, peacekeeping field exercises beginning in 1994. To coordinate joint military activities within the Partnership, we will invite states participating in the Partnership to send permanent liaison officers to NATO Headquarters and a separate Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons (Belgium) that would, under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, carry out the military planning necessary to implement the Partnership programmes.

16. Since its inception two years ago, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council has greatly expanded the depth and scope of its activities. We will continue to work with all our NACC partners to build cooperative relationships across the entire spectrum of the Alliance’s activities. With the expansion of NACC activities and the establishment of the Partnership for Peace, we have decided to offer permanent facilities at NATO Headquarters for personnel from NACC countries and other Partnership for Peace participants in order to improve our working relationships and facilitate closer cooperation.

[...]

88 Omitted secs. 17–19 of the document concern NATO activities related to non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and combating terrorism.
20. We reaffirm our support for political and economic reform in Russia and welcome the adoption of a new constitution and the holding of democratic parliamentary elections by the people of the Russian Federation. This is a major step forward in the establishment of a framework for the development of durable democratic institutions. We further welcome the Russian government’s firm commitment to democratic and market reform and to a reformist foreign policy. These are important for security and stability in Europe. We believe that an independent, democratic, stable and nuclear-weapons-free Ukraine would likewise contribute to security and stability. We will continue to encourage and support the reform processes in both countries and to develop cooperation with them, as with other countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

21. The situation in Southern Caucasus continues to be of special concern. We condemn the use of force for territorial gains. Respect for the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia is essential to the establishment of peace, stability and cooperation in the region. We call upon all states to join international efforts under the aegis of the United Nations and the CSCE aimed at solving existing problems.

[...]89

26. The past five years have brought historic opportunities as well as new uncertainties and instabilities to Europe. Our Alliance has moved to adapt itself to the new circumstances, and today we have taken decisions in key areas. We have given our full support to the development of a European Security and Defence Identity. We have endorsed the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces as a means to adapt the Alliance to its future tasks. We have opened a new perspective of progressively closer relationships with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and of the former Soviet Union. In doing all this, we have renewed our Alliance as a joint endeavour of a North America and Europe permanently committed to their common and indivisible security. The challenges we face are many and serious. The decisions we have taken today will better enable us to meet them.


89 Omitted secs. 22–25 of the document concern the security of the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Balkans.
Partnership for Peace: Invitation and Framework Document Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 10–11 January 1994

We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, building on the close and longstanding partnership among the North American and European Allies, are committed to enhancing security and stability in the whole of Europe. We therefore wish to strengthen ties with the democratic states to our East. We reaffirm that the Alliance, as provided for in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, remains open to the membership of other European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe.

We have today launched an immediate and practical programme that will transform the relationship between NATO and participating states. This new programme goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership—a Partnership for Peace. We therefore invite the other states participating in the NACC and other CSCE countries able and willing to contribute to this programme, to join with us in this partnership. Active participation in the Partnership for Peace will play an important role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO.

The Partnership for Peace, which will operate under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, will forge new security relationships between the North Atlantic Alliance and its Partners for Peace. Partner states will be invited by the North Atlantic Council to participate in political and military bodies at NATO Headquarters with respect to Partnership activities. The Partnership will expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened

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90 The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.
relationships by promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin our Alliance.

NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security. At a pace and scope determined by the capacity and desire of the individual participating states, we will work in concrete ways towards transparency in defence budgeting, promoting democratic control of defence ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations, and others as may be agreed.

To promote closer military cooperation and interoperability, we will propose, within the Partnership framework, peacekeeping field exercises beginning in 1994. To coordinate joint military activities within the Partnership, we will invite states participating in the Partnership to send permanent liaison officers to NATO Headquarters and a separate Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons (Belgium) that would, under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, carry out the military planning necessary to implement the Partnership programmes.

Since its inception two years ago, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council has greatly expanded the depth and scope of its activities. We will continue to work with all our NACC partners to build cooperative relationships across the entire spectrum of the Alliance’s activities. With the expansion of NACC activities and the establishment of the Partnership for Peace, we have decided to offer permanent facilities at NATO Headquarters for personnel from NACC countries and other Partnership for Peace participants in order to improve our working relationships and facilitate closer cooperation.

Annex

**Partnership for Peace: Framework Document**

1. Further to the invitation extended by the NATO Heads of State and Government at their meeting on 10\(^{th}\)/11\(^{th}\) January, 1994, the member states of the North Atlantic Alliance and the other states subscribing to this document, resolved to deepen their political and military ties and to contribute further to the strengthening of security within the Euro-Atlantic area, hereby establish, within the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, this Partnership for Peace.
2. This Partnership is established as an expression of a joint conviction that stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved only through cooperation and common action. Protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice, and peace through democracy are shared values fundamental to the Partnership. In joining the Partnership, the member States of the North Atlantic Alliance and the other States subscribing to this Document recall that they are committed to the preservation of democratic societies, their freedom from coercion and intimidation, and the maintenance of the principles of international law. They reaffirm their commitment to fulfil in good faith the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights; specifically, to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, to respect existing borders and to settle disputes by peaceful means. They also reaffirm their commitment to the Helsinki Final Act and all subsequent CSCE documents and to the fulfilment of the commitments and obligations they have undertaken in the field of disarmament and arms control.

3. The other states subscribing to this document will cooperate with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in pursuing the following objectives:
   a. facilitation of transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes;
   b. ensuring democratic control of defence forces;
   c. maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the CSCE;
   d. the development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed;
   e. the development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.

4. The other subscribing states will provide to the NATO Authorities Presentation Documents identifying the steps they will take to achieve the political goals of the Partnership and the military and other assets that might be used for Partnership activities. NATO will propose a programme of partnership exercises and other activities
consistent with the Partnership’s objectives. Based on this programme and its Presentation Document, each subscribing state will develop with NATO an individual Partnership Programme.

5. In preparing and implementing their individual Partnership Programmes, other subscribing states may, at their own expense and in agreement with the Alliance and, as necessary, relevant Belgian authorities, establish their own liaison office with NATO Headquarters in Brussels. This will facilitate their participation in NACC/Partnership meetings and activities, as well as certain others by invitation. They will also make available personnel, assets, facilities and capabilities necessary and appropriate for carrying out the agreed Partnership Programme. NATO will assist them, as appropriate, in formulating and executing their individual Partnership Programmes.

6. The other subscribing states accept the following understandings:
   – those who envisage participation in missions referred to in paragraph 3(d) will, where appropriate, take part in related NATO exercises;
   – they will fund their own participation in Partnership activities, and will endeavour otherwise to share the burdens of mounting exercises in which they take part;
   – they may send, after appropriate agreement, permanent liaison officers to a separate Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons (Belgium) that would, under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, carry out the military planning necessary to implement the Partnership programmes;
   – those participating in planning and military exercises will have access to certain NATO technical data relevant to interoperability;
   – building upon the CSCE measures on defence planning, the other subscribing states and NATO countries will exchange information on the steps that have been taken or are being taken to promote transparency in defence planning and budgeting and to ensure the democratic control of armed forces;
   – they may participate in a reciprocal exchange of information on defence planning and budgeting which will be developed within the framework of the NACC/Partnership for Peace.

7. In keeping with their commitment to the objectives of this Partnership for Peace, the members of the North Atlantic Alliance will:
   – develop with the other subscribing states a planning and review process to provide a basis for identifying and evaluating forces and
capabilities that might be made available by them for multinational training, exercises, and operations in conjunction with Alliance forces;

- promote military and political coordination at NATO Headquarters in order to provide direction and guidance relevant to Partnership activities with the other subscribing states, including planning, training, exercises and the development of doctrine.

8. NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.

1. The new elements of Russia's political situation on the international scene

1.1. The pursuit to keep up with the West, at all costs, in Russia's foreign policy has been replaced by the pursuit to defend actual national interests. This shift in emphasis, however, is accompanied by the great power rhetoric often used by those who hold the highest positions in the state and use it for domestic consumption. This rhetoric, which is not based on the real economic, political, and military capabilities of the Russian state, may only exacerbate suspicions of “imperial revenge” by Russia in foreign countries, both near and far. There is a concern that by withdrawing from the previous policy of unconditional keeping up with the West and the accompanying disregard for relations with neighbouring countries that emerged after the dissolution of the USSR, Russia may start to move towards a very dangerous policy of confrontation and distrust. On the other hand, it may be heading towards the pride of power.

1.2. There is no doubt that growing mistrust towards Russia exists abroad, accompanied by an apparent decline in interest in our country. At the same time, however, there are many indications that Russian interests are not being respected. The main reason for this is the growing weakening of the Russian economy, the lack of an explicit strategy capable of leading the country out of the crisis and giving rise to economic recovery. Russia is relatively weak. What's worse, there is no chance for stabilisation and strengthening. The West is afraid of a revival of Russian expansionism. There is a widespread opinion that even a limited revival of Moscow’s influence on world politics would be undesirable. The foreign interest in maintaining a strategic counterweight to Russian influence on the territory of the former USSR should also be stressed.

1.3. The clear change in Western countries' relations with Russia was partly due to internal reasons. Western Europe has largely lost,
temporarily, the ability to actively influence the situation abroad. This was mainly due to the problems in the wake of the Maastricht agreement and the fact that Germany is now focusing on the absorption of the eastern German Lands as well as economic recession and another wave of Euro-pessimism. There is a growing tendency not to engage in issues that would require political will and a lot of resources. Comparable processes—internal problems dominating state policy—are also intensifying in the U.S., although in this case the trend is less pronounced. It turned out that the West can neither provide significant assistance to Russian reforms nor effectively cooperate with Russia in preventing and resolving crises in the former Soviet Union (in both cases, Russia receives only limited assistance). The inevitable erosion of the security structures built during the years of the Cold War—and for the sake of the Cold War—has raised fears among the political elites in the West, who are willing to delay or even to turn back these processes. The revival of the sense of external threat, i.e., from Russia, would in this case serve as a “disciplinary factor.” Both in the West and in Russia itself, there are forces that would like us to “lose patience” and provoke a new Cold War.

1.4. Neither in Russia nor in the West are the forces that want to return to the Cold War dominant. Moreover, repeated analysis (including research conducted under the aegis of SVOP) has shown that the differences between the elementary vital interests of Russia and the largest Western countries are small. In general, these interests coincide or are not in conflict. The differences concern secondary issues. Thus, there are no serious grounds to exacerbate the relationship.

1.5. This does not change the fact that we are faced with the possibility of such a tightening of relations that could give rise to a third, “grotesque” one—the Cold War phase (the first one took place in the 1950s and 1960s, the second one in the early 1980s). This third phase will surely be quite mild. But for Russia, given the enormity of the tasks ahead of it and its general exhaustion, another confrontation with the West would be extremely costly and could inhibit economic reforms. At best, it would lead to stagnation and a significant deterioration of the general living conditions of at least one more generation of Russians, not to mention that it would hinder the course of integration processes on the territory of the former USSR. Moreover, if a new confrontation were indeed to take place, the West could isolate Russia in the international scene by rebuilding the former military-political system. Russia’s potential to influence the outside world would be significantly reduced. It would be difficult
for Russia to defend its own international interests. It is possible that the West also has the means to destabilise Russia internally. The new isolation will be much more disadvantageous to Russia than the one in which the USSR was in the first phase of the Cold War.

1.6. Even if there is no serious deterioration in relations, the threat of a qualitative, permanent deepening of Russia’s geostrategic isolation and weakening of its international position is real. Especially if a decision was taken on NATO enlargement excluding Russia.

1.7 Russia has broken free from confrontation. For the foreseeable future it has no enemies, and this is a huge advantage for its current geopolitical situation. At the same time, it became clear that hopes of finding new allies soon, especially in the West, would not come true for the time being. Attempts at building a new effective security system (replacing the two-bloc system that has collapsed) in which Russia could feel reasonably confident, are not succeeding. At least in the next few years, Russia will be forced to do without clear allies; geostrategically it will be in a state of suspension.

[...]

4. Policy towards the external world

4.1. A slow but unavoidable erosion of the security system built during the Cold War, the diversity and geographical extent of Russian economic and political interests, the current weakness, apparent obstacles preventing rapid rapprochement with the West require a flexible policy of balancing between the centres of power, creating a dynamic balance of power that is beneficial to Russia in relations with individual states and regions.

4.2. The abandonment of costly global policies is a very legitimate trend and should be maintained. Russia’s involvement in the international scene must be cost-effective and correspond with the current opportunities. At the same time, however, it should activate its policy of cooperation and presence in regions interested in such cooperation, wherever this can bring economic dividends and increase political influence. Such regions include: India, Greece, Bulgaria, the whole of Southeastern Europe and the Middle East. The policies aimed at developing as friendly and close a relationship as possible with China should be continued. The Asia-Pacific region is a reserve

92 Sections concerning the situation in the post-Soviet area and the problems of the internal decision-making system in the foreign policy as well as general remarks and policy towards the countries of the former USSR have been omitted.
of Russian foreign policy—strengthening the Russian presence in the region and cooperating with the U.S., China and Japan.

4.3. At the same time, given Russia’s historical, geographical, and cultural characteristics, the economic and technological potential of the West, and given that there is temporarily no sign of Russia having natural allies in the South and the East, it must not give up the forward-looking goal of building a stable, genuine partnership and, in the future, perhaps, a strategic alliance of a “northern belt” of countries, comprising the U.S., Canada, and Japan. Over time, this partnership could include China and other countries. Efforts should continue to involve Russia, and then perhaps China as well, in the work of the “big seven” [G-7], first in the political sphere.

4.4. A policy to avoid increasing unnecessary tensions with the West is needed. Close cooperation should be sought wherever possible. However, not at any cost. Russia must not give up its own interests; they must be more carefully agreed upon. The predominant content of the cooperation must be extending the partnership to those areas where our interests and ideas for solving problems converge (e.g., non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, other areas of military-strategic cooperation, especially with the U.S.). Limited and controlled competition in specific areas (e.g., arms trade) should not be excluded.

4.5. In order to avoid isolation, preserve influence in relations with Western Europe and prevent the return to a policy of confrontation in Europe, it will be necessary to build a system of pan-European security in the future in which Russia could be a full member. To achieve this, it is necessary to maintain a semi-demilitarised belt of states in the centre of Europe, preventing the enlargement of NATO, and to develop dialogue with the North Atlantic Alliance in such a way that in the future the problem of the enlargement of the bloc without the participation of Russia itself becomes obsolete. The extension of the zone of prosperity and stability to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and their accession to the European Union as soon as possible would serve the national interests of Russia.

4.6. It is necessary to quickly activate Russian policy in Europe, to step up efforts to build an effective pan-European system of collective security in the longer term, or at least prevent the creation of such a system more or less radically excluding Russian participation. In view of the possibility of NATO enlargement without its participation, the search for alternative ways to ensure Russia’s security and political interests in Europe needs to be activated.
4.7. Special concern is needed to maintain and develop dialogue and cooperation with the most powerful Western countries, especially Germany and the U.S.

4.8. To mitigate possible negative incentives in relations with the external world due to the activisation of integration processes on the territory of the former Soviet Union, a dialogue should be established with the West and other leading countries regarding these problems.

4.9. The necessary change in tone of Russian diplomacy in relations with the West, emphasising greater independence and equality, should not become an end in itself and lead to a feeling of alienation between Russia and the most progressive and powerful countries. Russia should strive to maintain its status as one of the major powers by rebuilding its economy, economic growth, and creating the means to influence the situation by taking real political action to strengthen its position on the territory of the former USSR and not by aggressive rhetoric that directly damages its interests.

[...]93

Translated by Miroslaw Lukawski. Verified with the Russian original by Marek Menkiszak.


93 The organisational measures sections have been omitted.
Poland in Russia’s Foreign Policy, Speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Andrei Kozyrev at the Polish-Russian Conference “Towards a New Partnership,” Cracow, April 23, 1994

Having regard to the fact that the conference, which aims to consider methods of developing a new partnership, takes place in Cracow—the historical and cultural centre of Europe—is symbolic. Cracow is dear not only for the Polish but also for the Russian people. Both nations paid with the lives of their people to save this unique city. We are grateful to the Poles for remembering those who were killed and for taking care of their graves. The memory of those who were killed, resting in this land, is a sacred thing. Similarly, the memory of the victims of totalitarianism on the territories of the former USSR is a sacred thing, including the memory of the sons of the Polish nation resting in Katyn and Mednoye.

The Russians and Poles are not only united by history with its light and dark sides. Our present and future are common. Both our nations are striving to free the economy from post-communist maladies, to build a democratic state, to provide our countries with a decent position in the world as soon as possible. For both our countries, the aggressive nationalism of Brezhnev’s doctrine or the Berlin Wall, as well as the pursuit of domination or cordon sanitaire are just as unacceptable. Both our countries strive to ensure stability and security throughout Europe in order to overcome ethnic conflicts.

To achieve these tasks, a consistent strategy must be developed to strengthen the unity of all democratic countries in Europe—a pan-European partnership. Today, we are dealing with declarations of intent and partnership agreements. But a well-structured, stable, and mature partnership with necessary means does not yet exist. This is evidenced by the difficulties faced by Russia and other post-communist countries

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94 The Brezhnev Doctrine, also known as the doctrine of limited sovereignty, is an informal definition of the dominant political position in the Soviet strategy, assuming that the Soviet Union is ready to defend, including by armed force, the communist system in the bloc countries. An example of the implementation of this doctrine was the USSR’s armed interventions against anti-government or anti-communist demonstrations in the GDR (June 1953), Hungary (November 1956), and Czechoslovakia (August 1968). The formal basis is usually considered to be an editorial article in the body of the CPSU, the newspaper Pravda, which was published in August 1969, on the anniversary of the suppression of the Prague Spring.
in negotiating with the Western partners on market access without discrimination and based on free competition. Today, for example, the European Union offers the maximum possible 10% share of exports of fissile materials to a democratic Russia while not so long ago the Soviet Union had a 16% share.

The partnership in the field of policy is still exposed to serious trials on the sharp turns of European politics. A recent example is the unilateral Sarajevo ultimatum. One can argue about purposefulness or futility concerning the threat of forceful solutions after a certain deadline. Today, this is a thing of the past, and there is no point to consider all pros and cons. It is obvious, however, that making such decisions without consultation and agreement with all leading politicians involved in the issue of resolving the Yugoslavia conflict, is impossible. Attempts to bypass Russia are dangerous, as such actions automatically introduce unnecessary tension, and even—let me put it straight—risk.

And this is why it is particularly important today not to miss the momentum obtained by the initiative of President Yeltsin, which led to significant progress in unblocking Sarajevo. Vigorous and joint actions are necessary. These may even be very decisive actions, but only jointly. In the context of joint efforts, individual states—Russia, the U.S., Germany, Poland, and other European states as well as state organisations, including NATO—will find a place for themselves and contribute.

The division into blocs and bipolar security system is being forever replaced by multipolar world realities. To succumb to illusions, as have some naive political scientists, that membership in a political and military alliance is a panacea for all misfortunes, means not perceiving the essence of the processes taking place in Europe, failure to understand the essence of “new generation” crises. Such an approach, by definition, implies the existence—if not a real—of an imaginary opponent. This may result in creating new divisions and splits in Europe. Not only do the nightmares of the past persist: aggressive nationalism, territorial claims, religious intolerance—moreover, the danger of them turning into real European policymaking factors increases.

It must not be accepted that Europe is currently experiencing another division of spheres of influence. We are convinced that it is important not to miss the opportunity to shape a single, common democratic Europe, which implies ensuring the same level of security
for all countries, a real partnership based on common democratic principles of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

I am genuinely concerned about the viability of some archaic dogmas and arguments. Some politicians try to present them as axioms of modern European politics.

Argument One:

Speeding up the accession of Eastern European countries to NATO will not only “remove the barriers that divide Europe,” but will also be a step towards strengthening democracy and stability, which will benefit Russia itself. The question is, for which Russia? Russia, the powerful state on the road to democratic change and open to the world, or a Russia isolated and, as a result, able to transform itself back into a military camp?

The second argument, not entirely inconsistent with the first one: “The enlargement of NATO to include the Eastern European countries is necessary because Russia is unpredictable and infected by neo-imperial ambitions.” Well, if new barriers and isolation of Russia emerge in Europe, Russia would become predictable: it would threaten its neighbours with missiles.

Argument three: “Russia intends to prevent Central and Eastern European countries from satisfying their need for stable security.” That’s not so either. We do not question a country’s sovereign right to defend itself, including by joining some military-political alliances. But if we want to live in peace for ourselves and our children, the criterion here should be the extent to which such an undertaking is conducive to the stability of the whole region and the world.

We assume that there are no grounds for dividing the countries of Europe into those that threaten and those that are threatened. Today, it is the Europeans who are on one side, and the problems that are to be overcome—economic, social, national—on the other. And this is what the three components of European security are, which cannot be separated. For decades, the dissident democrats in our countries have fought for common values, looking at CSCE, the only pan-European structure, as a polar star. And now “patriots,” nationalists, are undermining these values. But for the first time we have a rare opportunity to defend these values, using many European institutions. Hence, the concept of establishing a pan-European partnership proposed by Russia. Here are its main elements:

First, the development of Euro-Atlantic cooperation by transforming the CSCE into an efficient pan-regional political organisation and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council into an autonomous but closely
linked to the CSCE structure for military-political cooperation. The aim is to coordinate the efforts of NATO, the EU, the Council of Europe, the Western European Union, and the CIS in strengthening stability and security, peacekeeping activities and the protection of the rights of national minorities in Europe.

Second, extending the cooperation within the North Atlantic Cooperation Council to include European neutral countries, also for the purpose of implementing the Partnership for Peace programme based on equality. Transforming the North Atlantic Cooperation Council into an independent body with a small bureaucratic staff. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council could become a European laboratory for peace activities, transparency of military activities, conversion of military and industrial complexes.

Third, creating a network of complementary bilateral partnership, cooperation and consultation agreements, not only between NATO, on the one hand, and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, Ukraine and so on, on the other hand, but also between countries that are not members of the Alliance. We do not rule out the future membership of Russia in NATO, but for today the most important is the category of partnership. The advantage, or in other words, the evidence of far-sightedness of NATO leadership contained in the Partnership for Peace programme is that this proposal somehow opens up NATO and is the first step towards transforming it from a military alliance into another form of security organisation. In this way, it fully fits into our concept of a pan-European partnership. In the future we also see opening the CIS-NATO channel.

Fourth, providing Central European countries with a network of “crossing” security guarantees by Russia and its Western European partners. Such a network could be extended to the whole of Europe.

Fifth, increasing the peace potential of European countries. Searching for methods of European solidarity in response to “new generation” conflicts. Practical support for the peace efforts of Russia and the CIS in the former USSR.

Sixth, strengthened control of non-proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, missile technology, strengthening controls on trade in dual-use technologies, conventional weapons with the greatest destructive power, with particular attention to conflict zones.

Seventh, increase economic potential to ensure stability and security on the continent. Inclusion of Russia and the Eastern European countries in the international division of labour on an equal
and non-discriminatory basis. Ensure that all countries have access to European and world markets.

We are ready to cooperate closely with Poland and other countries from Eastern Europe in search of the most beneficial solutions and ways to implement the partnership programme.

Our proposals are in line with the views expressed in many European countries. I hope that the Cracow Conference will also make a constructive contribution to these discussions.

Translated by Mirosław Łukawski. Verified with the Russian original by Marek Menkiszak.

Mr President, Distinguished Colleagues,

We came to Istanbul with the conviction that the importance of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council will grow. Our concept of a pan-European partnership provides that, with the central role of the OSCE, it is the NACC that will coordinate cooperation in the military-political sphere and specifically in peacekeeping activities. Along this path the NACC can and should gradually develop into an independent body. Our proposals boil down to the following:

- strict orientation of the NACC towards the principles of equality of all members and not towards the “NATO plus partners” pattern,
- to include a significant number of the OSCE members in NACC activities,
- to establish a small secretariat and Member States’ representations to it,
- to create a permanent communication channel between NACC and OSCE,
- using the NACC capacity in implementing the Partnership for Peace programme.

We welcome the report developed by the NACC’s special group on cooperation and support for peace. We are in favour of its implementation as soon as possible. Taking into account the ever-growing burden of peace activities carried by Russia on the territory of the former USSR, we again raise the issue of support for us by the international community through directing observers and material support.

The growth of the collective potential of peacekeeping activities would undoubtedly be fostered by closer cooperation between the NACC and a number of neutral European countries with significant experience in peacekeeping activities. Close cooperation between the Council and the OSCE in the sphere of peace support operations should be organised, as provided for in the 1994 NACC work plan, and a joint working group should be set up for this purpose.

Another priority is the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.
The Partnership for Peace programme has begun. Russia strives to shape a deeper partnership with NATO. We intend to come to Brussels to inaugurate a programme of deepened Russia-NATO cooperation without mutual vetoes and surprises, including the Framework Document, as soon as the necessary preparatory work is completed at NATO Headquarters.

Translated by Miroslaw Łukawski. Verified with the Russian original by Marek Menkiszak.

25.

Speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
Andrei Kozyrev at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels,
June 22, 1994

Mr. Deputy Secretary General, Distinguished Members of the Council,

In President Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin’s address to the participants in the December 1991 founding session of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, it was noted that Russia’s relations with the outside world “may be based on the recognition of common values and a shared vision of how to ensure international security. From this point of view, we also treat the prospects of our relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.”

Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin stressed that “we take these relations seriously and would like to comprehensively develop dialogue and contacts with the North Atlantic Alliance on both political and military levels.”

We have to do justice—NATO, for its part, has responded to this call not only with its readiness to develop relations with Russia but also with specific steps to adapt to the realities of the post-confrontation period. NATO’s new approach was reflected in the communiqué of the Istanbul ministerial meeting, which, i.a., stated that “good cooperation relations between Russia and NATO will become a key element of the security and stability in Europe.”

In the past period, relations between Russia and NATO have been quite successful. Bilateral cooperation, an exchange regarding military aspect, today, one can say, is routinely implemented, which was unthinkable two years ago. The process of rapprochement is not without difficulties; some of them are objective, others are caused by inertia in a way of thinking, established stereotypes. There are also disagreements of a political nature when failure to agree on actions prevents finding appropriate solutions in serious international situations. Some people, both in the East and in the West, accept this not without malicious satisfaction—they rub their hands, hoping that a real partnership will not come about.

95 The meeting was held after the death of NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner and before the election of his successor. It was chaired by NATO Deputy Secretary General Sergio Balanzino.
I categorically declare: Russia is faithful to its principled choice to pursue national and state interests in the international scene through cooperation, not confrontation. There are no insurmountable obstacles to shaping the cooperation between Russia and its western partners. And the overall political climate in Europe is different nowadays, and the fundamental democratic ideals that we and NATO countries share objectively favour reaching out to each other. We belong to one—democratic—community.

Today, we are taking one more step in the intensification of the Russian Federation’s relations with NATO, in search of new formulas to ensure pan-European stability and security. Based on the proposals we have presented earlier, the process of preparing a programme of extended Russia-NATO cooperation is being launched. A special protocol states that it will be a programme corresponding to Russia’s size, significance, and potential. An agreement has been reached on a broad, in-depth dialogue and cooperation in those areas where Russia is able to make a unique and important contribution in line with its importance and responsibility as a European, global, and nuclear power.

At the same time, by accepting the NATO proposal, the Russian Federation officially joins the Partnership for Peace initiative. States that were opponents during the Cold War and the neutral states balancing between the blocs participate equally in its implementation. Such broad participation is a premise for further evolution of the European situation towards strengthening mutual understanding and ensuring an equal level of security for all states.

With all its importance, the Partnership for Peace is only one way to organise military-political cooperation.

Another direction, the potential of which should be used more actively, is cooperation in the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. We see an opportunity to increase the role and importance of the NACC in European affairs, its greater involvement in coordinating the military activities of the states and, more specifically, its peacekeeping activities.

Finally, the third direction is to develop a network of bilateral ties between Russia, NATO and NACC countries. These ties, expressed in joint peace activities, exercises, becoming familiar with the traditions and doctrines of national armies, cooperation in the conversion of military production, should continue to be intensively developed.

These directions are part of our overall choice for cooperation, shaping a truly unified security space from Vancouver to Vladivostok.
The military-political dimension of the process, in which East and West participate, will undoubtedly be corrected and its forms are not yet sustainable. We’re not going to fetish either of them. They are not alternative, but complement each other. Life will suggest the right combination of them and determine the real value of each.

Most importantly, the cooperation in the field of defence, which is only one of the issues on the European agenda, should not be confined to a geographically limited area, lead to the emergence of new barriers on the continent, [or] create a sense of isolation in anyone. Most importantly, all efforts should be subject to a broader, priority objective—the creation of a common Europe.

This objective is fully, comprehensively expressed in the fundamental standards and principles of the CSCE, the essence of which is to improve democracy, defend human rights and ensure security. The CSCE, victorious in the Cold War, best reflects the main idea of post-confrontational development. It plays and will play a major role on the continent. In this respect, our assessments and that of the Alliance are similar. We welcome the fact that in the communiqués of recent NATO and NACC meetings, the importance of the CSCE has been made very clear.

I see our cooperation with NATO in the context of further development of ideas that truly unite all Europeans. I am convinced that by opening a new chapter in its relations, the Russian Federation and NATO will be consistent and stubborn in creating a more stable and more secure Europe.

Translated by Mirosław Łukawski. Verified with the Russian original by Marek Menkiszak.

26.

Summary of Conclusion

1. Both the Alliance and Russia have contributions to make to European stability and security. Constructive relations of mutual respect, benefit and friendship between the Alliance and Russia are therefore a key element for security and stability in Europe and in the interest of all other states in the CSCE area.

Both the Alliance and Russia welcome the progress already made in their relations, including within the framework of the NACC, and seek to strengthen them further.

2. The signature of Partnership for Peace by Russia opens a further important opportunity to develop relations through practical cooperation in the fields included in the Partnership for Peace Framework Document.

The Alliance and Russia agreed to develop an extensive Individual Partnership Programme\(^{96}\) corresponding to Russia's size, importance and capabilities.

3. They agreed to set in train the development of a far-reaching, cooperative NATO/Russia relationship, both inside and outside Partnership for Peace. This relationship, aimed at enhancing mutual confidence and openness, will be developed in a way that reflects common objectives and complements and reinforces relations with all other states, and is not directed against the interest of third countries and is transparent to others.

4. The Alliance and Russia agreed to pursue a broad, enhanced dialogue and cooperation in areas where Russia has unique and important contributions to make, commensurate with its weight and responsibility as a major European, international and nuclear power, through:
   
   – sharing of information on issues regarding politico-security related matters having a European dimension;
   – political consultations, as appropriate, on issues of common concern;

\(^{96}\) An Individual Cooperation Programme with NATO agreed with the Alliance annually by each country participating in the Partnership for Peace programme, based on the PfP Framework Document.
– cooperation in a range of security related areas including, as appropriate, in the peacekeeping field.

27.

Address by the President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin at the Plenary Session of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Budapest, December 5, 1994

Mr. President, Distinguished Colleagues,

First of all, I would like to thank the Hungarian leadership for the excellent preparation of our meeting and for the hospitality. We treat the choice of Budapest for the meeting place as recognition of the growing role of Central European countries in European politics. Two years ago in Helsinki we reaffirmed our strategic goal of creating a common space of security and cooperation for free, democratic countries. The Helsinki arrangements stood the test of time. Today, they guarantee the inviolability of borders in Europe and form the basis for concerted action in the interests of security and democracy.

But let’s be honest: our actions often diverge from principles and declarations. Europe, before it has managed to free itself from the legacy of the Cold War, risks plunging into cold peace. How to avoid this? This is the question we have a duty to ask ourselves. History teaches us how dangerous it is to believe that the fate of continents, the whole world community, can be decided in one capital. Neither will the blocs and coalitions give real guarantees of security. It has become an urgent necessity in Europe to create a fully-fledged pan-European organisation with a solid legal basis. Russia believes that the basis for its activities should be a jointly developed programme for Europe on the road to the 21st century, and its essence, to create a comprehensive pan-European security system.

There are leaders of over 50 countries in this room. The CSCE is a unique structure in terms of the number of Member States and the potential of its members. It was established to be a strong and efficient instrument for peace, stability, and democracy. It is not an easy path, but it should not be long either. It would be good to discuss and approve the security model of the future Europe when we meet again in two years.

How is this model perceived by Russia, a country destined to be the eastern pillar of European security and stability? The basis of the pan-European security model could be a dense network of bilateral agreements on good neighbourliness and cooperation of the CSCE

97 It concerns the final document of the CSCE Helsinki Summit of 9 July 1992.
members in all areas. Mutual security cross-guarantees for individual states or groups of states are needed. Russia is ready to discuss such guarantees in a bilateral or multilateral format. On this basis, pan-European institutions can be established. Their task would be to settle disputes, prevent and manage conflicts at an early stage.

The decisions taken today are a good start to work together for a stable and democratic Europe. First of all, I mean the military and political sphere. For the first time, we build the foundation of a unified space of confidence in the military sphere, covering the area of three continents and the world ocean. For the first time, we adopt a code of conduct for states in the military-political sphere. It consolidates important principles of the rule of law, democratic political control over the armed forces and their use. Russia fully supports these decisions.

We, gathered in this room, are very different, but we share common values, we are faithful to the same principles. In respecting the positions of all members of the CSCE, Russia also expects its interests to be taken into consideration. Questions are raised in our country: for example, how will the process of changes in the CSCE relate to the transformation of the current security structures? We are concerned about the changes taking place in NATO. What will this mean for Russia? NATO was founded in the Cold War era. Today, it is seeking for itself, not without difficulty, a place in the new Europe. It is important that this search does not create new dividing lines, but brings European unity closer. This logic, in our opinion, is contradicted by NATO enlargement plans. Why sow a seed of mistrust? After all, we are no longer adversaries, we are practically all partners. We hear explanations: it is supposed to be an expansion of stability in case of unfavourable developments in Russia. If, for this reason, they want to shift the boundaries of NATO's responsibility to the borders of Russia, I will say one thing: It is too early to bury democracy in Russia! The mistakes of the past must not be repeated. No significant state will live in isolation—and it will reject such a game.

Mr. President,

Our best intentions to build a common, democratic Europe will be forgotten if they do not turn into real action. What should be the main goal of the CSCE efforts? First of all, the protection of human rights, the rights of national minorities, to subdue aggressive nationalism. Today such efforts are clearly insufficient. Millions of Russians are severely affected in some CIS countries, in some Baltic states. Violation of their rights take new and new forms. For example, recently in the Baltic
States, in particular Estonia, there has been discrimination against the Orthodox Church. It is essential that all CSCE states are guided by the letter and spirit of the UN declaration on the protection of persons belonging to national, ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities and the CSCE declaration on aggressive nationalism, racism, chauvinism, xenophobia, and anti-semitism. The Council of Europe plays an important role in guaranteeing human rights on the continent. According to the conference agenda, the Council is to become fully pan-European. Russia's imminent membership will contribute to this.

Our next task is to equip the CSCE with effective peace potential. Our country feels this need perhaps most of all in Europe. In fulfilling its duty to maintain peace, Russia is interested in sharing the political and material responsibility for peace-support operations with our partners in the UN and the CSCE, whether in Karabakh, Tajikistan, Georgia, or Moldova. But of course not at the expense of the effectiveness of the operation.

The CSCE should today take a strong position on strengthening the borders and territorial integrity of the Member States. Attempts to revise the fundamental principles of Helsinki may cost our continent dearly. Europe will become truly common, creating a common, pan-European economic space. We are moving in this direction. The membership of the European Union is expanding. Russia and the European Union have recently taken a big step towards each other by signing the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. It is in the common interest to make it truly binding. The time has come to attract Mediterranean countries to cooperation. Progress in regulating the situation in the Middle East offers new opportunities in this respect.

The effectiveness of the CSCE will depend on cooperation in the common interest of all European organisations and fora, the CIS, NATO, the WEU, the EU, the Council of Europe, and others. The Commonwealth of Independent States plays an increasing role in the life of Europe. We have no intention of creating a new bloc within the Community to compete with anyone. As president of the Council of CIS Heads of State, I declare: the principles of the CSCE are at the core of the CIS Statute. All decisions on Community integration issues are taken in strict compliance with them. The Community will continue to grow stronger. This is the will of our peoples. This is the most important condition for stability not only in the East of Europe but also on the whole European continent.

Mr. President, Distinguished Heads of the CSCE Member States, the year 1995 is the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II. Now, after
half a century, we become more and more aware of the true meaning of the great victory, the necessity of the historical reconciliation of Europe. There should be no more opponents, winners, and losers. For the first time in the whole history of our continent there is a real chance to achieve unity. To waste it would mean to forget the lessons of the past and to put into question the very future of this process. I invite all heads of state on May 9, 1995, to celebrate the great 50\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the victory over fascism. The memory of the victims, the lives of future generations require the highest responsibility today. Let us rise to the challenge.

Thank you, Mr. President.

Translated by Miroslaw Lukawski. Verified with the Russian original by Marek Menkiszak.

Areas for Pursuance of a Broad Enhanced NATO-Russia Dialogue and Cooperation. Issued at the Meeting Between Ministers of the North Atlantic Council and the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, Noordwijk am Zee, The Netherlands, 31 May 1995

At a meeting in Noordwijk am Zee on 31 May, ministers of North Atlantic Council and Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev of the Russian Federation formally approved two documents which had been jointly agreed: The NATO-Russia Individual Partnership Programme under Partnership of Peace, which Russia joined on 22 June 1994, and the document which follows. This latter document constitutes a concrete programme for implementing the “Summary of Conclusions of Discussions between the North Atlantic Council and Foreign Minister of Russia Andrei Kozyrev” dated 22 June 1994.

Areas for pursuance of a broad, enhanced NATO-Russia dialogue and cooperation in a transparent manner and in accordance with the attached Summary of Conclusions of 22 June 1994:

Section I. Sharing of information on issues regarding politico-security related matters having a European dimension.

1. Basic information about NATO’s and Russian Federation’s role in European security.

2. Specific issues of importance to European security, including evolving concepts of national security, military doctrines/strategies and the European architecture of security.

3. Preventive diplomacy and approaches to conflict prevention, conflict resolution and crisis management taking into account the role and responsibility of the UN and OSCE and the work of these organisations in these fields.


5. Transparency of defence budgets.

Methods of sharing of information

1. Dialogue through ad hoc “16 + 1” discussions in the North Atlantic Council and Political Committee as appropriate (timing and topic(s) to be agreed in advance).

2. Strengthening the NATO Contact Embassy in Moscow for the purpose of reinforcing information NATO activities.

Function held periodically (usually for two years), in accordance with a previously approved plan, by one of the embassies of NATO member states. It served as
3. Enhancement of information activities and contacts aimed at both civil and military audiences, including beyond official circles.

4. Contacts and exchange of information between the officers of International Staff and International Military Staff and Russian Embassy.

5. Exchange of views, briefings on significant developments in Alliance and Russian military doctrine and strategy.

6. Exchange of information and visits among civil and military specialists on defence expenditures, budgeting, defence conversion and related economic questions.

Section II. Political consultations on issues of common concern

1. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear proliferation, implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and strengthening of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

2. Nuclear safety issues, prevention of the nuclear pollution of the sea, safe dismantlement of nuclear weapons and prevention of smuggling and illicit traffic in nuclear materials.

3. Specific crises in Europe.

Methods of consultation

1. Ad hoc “16 + 1” discussions in the North Atlantic Council, Political Committee or other appropriate Alliance fora (timing and topic(s) to be agreed in advance).

2. Informal and instructed consultations.99

3. Exchange of high level visits and other appropriate visits.

Section III. Co-operation in a range of security-related issues including, as appropriate, in the peacekeeping field.

1. Peacekeeping.

2. Ecological security, including elimination of after-effects of military activities and disposition of dangerous materials.

3. Agreed aspects of civilian science and technology policy, including in the science/environment field.

4. Humanitarian aspects.

Methods of co-operation

1. Informal and instructed ad hoc meetings in “16 + 1” format (timing and topic(s) to be agreed in advance).

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99 That is, according to the instructions from the capitals of the participants in the discussion or a position previously consulted by NATO countries and binding them in discussions with Russia.
2. Co-operation and consultations, as appropriate, on specific peacekeeping operations mandated by the UN or the OSCE.

3. Joint exploration of feasibility and practical implementation, if possible, of pilot projects, seminars, collaborative research between Alliance and Russian specialists.

4. Consultations and co-operation by agreement on responding the humanitarian aid requirements in specific emergency situations.

Russia and NATO. Theses of the Foreign and Defence Policy Council (SVOP), June 1995

1. Political context: the interests of the West, Central and Eastern European countries, and Russia

The plans for the enlargement of NATO through the admission of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, that have provoked a lively and sometimes quite hot and intense discussion on both sides of the Atlantic, may lead to the first serious crisis in relations between the West and Russia after the end of the Cold War. Today, when Russia has already “recovered” from pro-Western romanticism, which only hinders the development of a normal partnership, another extremity has become a threat—sharply confrontational “Soviet” rhetoric, which will work against Russian national interests in all areas. The threat of isolation or self-isolation is quite real. In the West, there are political groups that would like us to lose our patience and start a new Cold War. There are also various forces in Russia that would like to provoke a crisis in our relations with the external world to restore a sense of hostility, to lock ourselves in a besieged fortress: for some it is the only way to power, for others it is the way to establish strong-arm rule that will strengthen their position.

The responsible political leadership of Russia and Russian society should not allow for freezing of cooperation with the West and a cold peace by pushing the country towards a new military-political confrontation with the West. The violation of long-term Russian interests that may occur in the event of NATO enlargement is also unacceptable. In this regard, we need to:

– understand others—the motivations and interests of our partners in NATO, the CEE, and CIS countries concerning the issue of NATO enlargement;
– understand ourselves—to explain our national interests on a given issue;
– choose the optimal options for our political conduct and propose to our partners the options of joint decisions acceptable to all.

The footnote of the source text containing the list of persons who signed the document has been omitted.
1.1. Western interests

1.1.1. There is a whole range of different interests behind the intention of some of the ruling elites in the West to bring about the enlargement of NATO, the main one of which (conventionally, its importance seems to exceed 50% of the total interests behind the enlargement effort) is an attempt to preserve the vitality of the North Atlantic Alliance and to strengthen the foundations of the Common Security and Defence Policy as defined by the Maastricht Treaty. The Western countries also share an interest in strengthening NATO as an instrument to keep the U.S. in the European system. Admittance of the CEE countries into NATO is treated as a way of controlling Germany’s actions in this region of Europe. Having lost its previous main objective—preventing the military and ideological threat from the USSR, NATO entered a period of inevitable systemic crisis. All attempts to find a new application for the Alliance—preventing a threat from the South, maintaining peace, etc.—failed to lead to a full replacement of its main objective. At the same time, there is a lack of political determination in NATO-related circles to initiate fundamental reform of the Alliance, as a consequence of which it would become the basis for a new system of collective security in Europe.

In this situation, a significant part of the political, bureaucratic, and academic circles connected with and dependent on NATO raised the slogan “enlargement or death,” recognizing that this would create new goals and prolong its existence. Such sentiments are strong, especially in the United States where the obligations arising from the North Atlantic Treaty are considered the most important justification of the American military and political presence in Europe and the main instrument for maintaining American influence on the continent in the event of a general decline of this influence and the strengthening of other centres, especially Germany.

Germany has special interests. The membership of the CEE countries in NATO for Germany is an ideal form of building its sphere of influence in the region, because the possibility of controlling Bonn’s actions in this regard through the Alliance’s mechanisms will give reassurance to the West and the CEE countries.

Moreover, there is also a conviction that the enlargement of the European Union (EU) and the Western European Union (WEU) is not acceptable without the simultaneous accession of new countries to NATO. However, those who are guided by this view do not press for the earliest possible enlargement of NATO.
Learning from the example of German reunification, with the enormous cost of “pulling up” former socialist economies to Western standards, the Western Europeans quietly revised the schedule of the CEE countries’ accession to the European Union that was promised at the end of the century. It is now in fact postponed for an unspecified future and, as compensation, NATO membership has been proposed to the eastern neighbours.

1.1.2. In Western European capitals, especially Bonn, we are also dealing with efforts to strengthen their immediate periphery, in conditions when reforms in Russia are delayed and the threat of instability increases.

1.1.3. There are also intentions (particularly evident in the U.S.) to secure geopolitical gains obtained thanks to the “victory” in the Cold War, so that Russia, even after recovering from the crisis in future, would not be able to adequately strengthen its political influence in Europe.

1.1.4. One should also take into account the hopes of an absolute minority of Western politicians to provoke a new Cold War, or even a parody of it, in order to restore, at least for a while, the main systemic principle of NATO—the claim about the threat from the East.

1.1.5. The mistakes in Russia’s domestic policy, in particular the armed conflict in Chechnya and the way the decision was made to start it, and then its course, were largely conducive to strengthening the position of supporters of NATO enlargement (both in the West and in the CEE countries) and weakening the position of Russian diplomacy.

1.2 Interests of Central and Eastern European countries

1.2.1. The interest of the highest political leadership of the CEE states to join NATO has been substantially initiated and has so far been encouraged by Western supporters of the enlargement.

1.2.2. At the same time, the CEE countries have their own reasons to seek accession to NATO. These include:

– the desire to integrate more quickly with the Western community, to “return to Europe” (if it does not succeed through the main door—through the EU—then by the side entrance, i.e., through NATO), to fill the vacuum created in the CEE (also caused by almost complete ignorance of the region by Russian diplomacy; the new Russia, having failed to appear in the region, was not able to change the image inherited from the USSR);
– hopes (let’s note straight away—almost certainly ephemeral) of achieving convergence with the main goal—EU membership—through NATO membership;
– striving, through membership of a joint alliance, to partially rebalance the dominant German position in the region;
– fear of aggressive transformation or destabilisation of Russia and Ukraine; there are also anti-Russian sentiments;
– the desire to provide at least partial protection in the event of internal social disruption;
– among a relatively small part of Central and Eastern European supporters of joining NATO, there may be vague hopes that enlargement of the Alliance, provoking confrontation with Russia, will make them “front” states, which will entail appropriate political support, economic assistance, etc.;
– finally, typical in such cases, the hopes of a small part of the elite for prestigious and well-paid positions within NATO structures.

1.2.3. Most of these interests are understandable and legitimate. The CEE countries’ aspiration to NATO membership or any other alliance is also fully legitimate. In principle, Russia has an interest in the stability of the countries in the region and in making their political leadership feel relatively comfortable. But further, the interests of Russia and the CEE countries are not the same: Russia does not consider the accession of these countries to NATO to be an optimal and balanced response to their concerns, because then the security of the CEE countries will be ensured by violating Russian security interests.

1.3. Russia’s basic interests

1.3.1. Russia’s main geostrategic interest is to maintain and develop good relations—if not a strategic alliance—with the most important Western countries and their institutions. In view of Russia’s current and especially prospective geostrategic situation, its economic interests, cultural and historical traditions, our country has a vital interest in a close strategic alliance with the rest of Europe and full participation in the pan-European system of collective security.

NATO enlargement may be the beginning of shaping a security system in which there will be no room for full Russian participation. However, an effective and efficient security system in Europe is impossible without the participation of both NATO and Russia.

1.3.2. The situation could change if Russia joins NATO as fully-fledged member. The prospects for real (rather than declarative)
cooperation between Russia and NATO would then open up. However, a reasonable assessment of reality makes this scenario unlikely:

– first, the NATO countries are not interested in this, at least as long as the situation in Russia remains insufficiently stable and not fully predictable;

– second, the political leadership of the CEE countries is against this, fearing they will remain in the shadow of Russia also in NATO;

– third, it must be acknowledged that many circles in Russian society are not ready for this either; a significant part of the military command does not accept this idea.

1.3.3. Nevertheless, Russia is interested in the existence of NATO as a guarantor of stability in the East-West relations, as well as in its reform and strengthening as an effective mechanism for European stability, capable of becoming one of the foundations of a new collective security architecture on the continent. The Organisation of the North Atlantic Treaty as a military-political defence alliance of democratic states does not carry a military threat to a democratic Russia.

However, Russia cannot neglect another fundamental interest—to achieve and strengthen social, political, and economic stability within the country. It is from this point of view—politically and psychologically—that NATO enlargement is contrary to Russia's national interest. The appearance of the impression regarding Russia's military and political isolation and the revival of anti-Western and militarist tendencies in the public awareness may be dangerous. The more so because the West has not found (and could not find) arguments capable of convincing Russian society that it is in its fundamental interest to bring NATO closer to Russia's borders as soon as possible by welcoming former allies of the USSR, who in turn actively use the argument of “Russian imperialism” for their particular purposes, although Russia itself remains outside the framework of the expanding Atlantic Alliance.

1.3.4. The decision to extend NATO to the east is likely to lead to many negative consequences, both for Russia and for international security:

– it can definitely encourage such political changes within Russia that will transform it into a “revisionist” power, interested in destroying rather than strengthening the political order in Europe that is being formed against its interests;

– it will fundamentally undermine Russia's confidence in the policy of the West, which, by deciding to enlarge NATO, will violate the self-explanatory commitments not to enlarge the Alliance after the USSR's
consent to German reunification, as well as the declarations of the CEE countries not to join it after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, which will lead not only to further strengthening of the position and arguments of radical anti-Western and isolationist forces in Russia but also to an anti-Western attitude of the majority of, traditionally pro-Western, elites;

– in this way the geopolitical, but also conceptual, basis for most of the arms limitation regimes will be violated, everyone loses, including Russia, the predictability of the military-political situation will decrease, the arms race may shift to new routes;

– the disappearance of a de facto neutral and fundamentally poorly armed belt of countries created in the centre of Europe as a result of the Warsaw Pact’s disintegration will deprive Russia of one of the main benefits it has achieved by abandoning the Cold War, which will not only increase the sense of injustice, but will also lead to a revival of fears and at the same time may strengthen the positions of militarists and militaristic narration on both sides;

– In Russia, there may be an excuse and additional impetus to seek strategic allies, even in the short term, in the South and the East; rivalry in Central Asia outside the former USSR and in the Middle East will return;

– Russia will have to step up its efforts to create an efficient system of collective security and defence within the CIS, which will not only further deepen the division of Europe, but may also entail additional military expenditure, which is disastrous, as Russia will remain with poor and weak allies;

– Russia’s tough opponents of NATO enlargement will gain the opportunity to blame the failure of reforms in Russia and its degrading position in the world on the “dishonesty” of the West—and most of all the U.S.;

– to neutralise the expected increase in the feeling of weakness as a result of an even more radical geostrategic imbalance, to safeguard against possible political pressure, and to dissuade partners from the temptation to take advantage of this change, Russia will probably have to consider the possibility of increasing its political reliance in Europe on nuclear “deterrence.”

1.3.5. If NATO enlargement takes place earlier than the qualitative improvement of Russia’s cooperation with the West on a wide range of issues, it is likely to lead to a further reduction of Russia’s capabilities on the international scene, above all in a dialogue with the West on political, economic, and other issues.
1.3.6. Finally, by partially solving one issue at the heart of Europe—removing the “strategic uncertainty” of part of the political authorities of the CEE countries—NATO enlargement will create much more dangerous problems. First and foremost, making the Baltic states and perhaps Ukraine a fierce strategic competition zone. The willingness of the Baltic states to join NATO, which will only increase if the Alliance is enlarged by including the CEE countries, just as any discussions and activities concerning further enlargement will create a potential source of a real crisis in the centre of Europe.

2 Recommendations

2.1 What should not be done

2.1.1. Above all, we should not be guided by the conviction imposed on us that the decision to enlarge NATO, thereby the enlargement itself, is inevitable. This is not the case. With active and sensible policy, enlargement of the Alliance can be postponed or even avoided altogether.

2.1.2. There should be no official or even semi-official negotiations on “compensation” for Russia in connection with NATO enlargement. Such negotiations would only give the impression that Russia agrees to enlargement and would clear the way for this decision. Most of the “compensatory” measures will almost certainly automatically be offered to Russia in case of enlargement. Moreover, such negotiations would encourage Western partners to collect bargaining chips, delay or postpone addressing problems that could be solved in a regular political dialogue process. Unfortunately, many statements made by Russian representatives in January and February 1995 were interpreted by the West as the beginning of negotiations on “compensation” and as the basis for Moscow’s consent to the Alliance’s enlargement. This has undermined the interests of the country.

2.1.3. One must not follow the strategy of enlargement supporters by gradually drawing Russia into cooperation with NATO until the Alliance has given, at least, clear guarantees that a specific enlargement decision will not be taken over the next 4-5 years.

2.1.4. It is unrealistic to hope to develop Russia-NATO cooperation in parallel with the Alliance’s enlargement process:

– first, attempts to develop cooperation make enlargement much easier, somewhat indirectly removing Russia’s opposition;
second, the intra-political reaction in Russia to the Alliance’s enlargement will ruin the possibility of such cooperation.

Already now, unfortunately, even the very distant prospect of the Alliance’s enlargement noticeably limits the possibility of Russia-NATO cooperation, mainly due to psychological and political reasons within Russia. Under these conditions it is even more counterproductive to reach an agreement on Russia-NATO cooperation without the Alliance’s commitment to postpone the decision to enlarge eastward for at least a few years, so that cooperation, and even more so, an agreement, can become reality. The Partnership for Peace programme can only play a positive role if it replaces NATO enlargement. If, on the other hand, a rapid decision on enlargement is taken within four or five years, the programme is doomed to be unproductive or even counterproductive.

2.1.5. It is clearly unrealistic to hope for a rapid transformation of the Alliance that could make its enlargement more acceptable to Russia psychologically, militarily, and politically.

First, NATO does not appear to be ready to fundamentally transform the alliance, focused on collective defence, into an organisation focused on collective security.

Second, Russian public opinion is apparently not yet ready to treat the enlargement of even the transformed Alliance as not hostile to Russian interests. Unfortunately, hasty statements about the Alliance’s intention to expand have reversed the positive trend of changing NATO’s image in the eyes of Russian society for the better. We may also fall into our own trap: we will receive assurances—even with well-meaning intentions—about the decision to transform the Alliance, but the real transformation will be delayed or will not take place.

2.1.6. Speaking of possible countermeasures, we must not bluff or announce steps that are impossible to take or would cost us too much, such as a significant build-up or redeployment of general-purpose forces. We can only ultimately destroy our economy with costly military countermeasures.

2.1.7. Statements distorting Russian intentions or interests towards CEE countries, including the desire to “keep them under our control,” are also unacceptable. Russia is interested not in control, but in good neighbourly relations with these countries.

2.1.8. Russia’s policy towards the West must not be over-focused on the problem of NATO enlargement. It is only part—though very important—of a much broader perspective. Excessive focus on this problem may narrow room for manoeuvre.
2.2 Resources at our disposal

2.2.1. There is no consensus in Western government circles on the advisability of NATO enlargement. It can even be assumed that the supporters of enlargement are in a minority. At the same time, they hold important positions in decision-making structures. They are also the most active so far. Their position that NATO must respond to the calls of the CEE countries that have suffered most from the Yalta Cold War policy, prevails on moral grounds. Finally, they have managed to take advantage of the passivity of the European policy of Russia in the Central and Eastern European area.

It should be noted that NATO is a consensual collective organisation. This nature of the Alliance gives significant opportunities to influence its development. As the opportunities for enlargement come closer and its costs are revealed—economic, military, and political for the unity of the Alliance—the group of opponents of enlargement may grow and their opposition may consolidate. This is definitely supported by debates in the political and academic circles of NATO countries, especially in the U.S. They can make it impossible to make a hasty political decision on enlargement.

The growing influence of the opponents of enlargement largely depends on Russia’s position, a reasonable combination of a hard and flexible approach in its diplomacy. Enlargement sceptics already prevail in the defence departments of most NATO countries, in the centre and moderately conservative political circles.

2.2.2. The positions of potential opponents to enlargement are particularly strong, if not predominant, in countries such as Portugal, Spain, probably Italy, the UK, France, and certainly Greece. In these countries, they fear either an outflow of resources or a diversion of the Alliance’s strategic attention from the most vital problems for them, in particular the threat of spreading instability in the former Yugoslavia, instability and migration from the North African countries, etc.

2.2.3. In the emerging situation, Russia may interact not with the opposition, often marginal as the USSR has done in the past, but with the main groups of ruling classes in the Western countries that consider the decision of enlargement to be dangerous or too costly. With a well-thought-out policy in its counter-enlargement strategy, Russia may act not against the West, but in open or silent alliance with a significant part of its ruling circles. We should not act against the West, but help it avoid a mistake that is dangerous for everyone, and above all—for itself.
2.2.4. Enlargement is a long process divided into, at least, three stages:
– until a decision is taken on enlargement,
– once a decision has been taken on when the accession negotiations will continue, preparations for signing and then ratifying the agreements will start,
– after ratification.
At each of these stages there will be opportunities to contribute to the problems that arise, to participate in the discussion, to impose it, to influence policy modification and to increase the potential political costs of enlargement.

2.2.5. Russia has enough experienced diplomats and specialists to develop and implement a flexible strategy. We are no longer bound by ideological dogmas—unless we create new ones. We just need to organise the existing potential. There is a kind of consensus in Russian ruling circles to reject NATO enlargement. This feeling of unity gives a significant potential advantage. There are several dozen people in Russian society—politicians, experts, businessmen—who are trusted and known in the ruling circles in the West. There is a wide network of contacts between social, political, and business organisations. A democratically elected parliament can now play a constructive role, especially if its leaders manage to communicate with the executive authority on the coordination of activities.

2.2.6. In the current situation, Russia, having quite good conditions to play an effective game in international politics, may not take advantage of them due to the disorganisation of the internal foreign policy mechanism. The main problem is the scandalous lack of coordination, both at the level of the entire executive and some ministries. Neither the president’s apparatus nor the apparatus of the Security Council\(^\text{101}\) have adequate staff and authorisations for efficient policy coordination. Another weakness in the resource base of Russian policy is the severely limited information impact.

2.3. What to do

2.3.1. The first and main condition for the implementation of all strategic and tactical plans is organisational—it is the fastest possible

\(^{101}\) The Security Council is an advisory body to the president of the Russian Federation for the coordination of state policy in the sphere of broadly defined security. It is composed of the highest state officials and heads of power structures. The Security Council has its own apparatus headed by the Secretary of the Security Council.
reform of the foreign policy mechanism. Without it we are doomed to failure. We need to return to the idea formulated by the president in his annual address to the Federal Assembly: to create a special body to deal with policy development and coordination directly at its own office. Within such a body it is necessary to create a special unit for European security policy towards NATO.

2.3.2. The strategic (long-term) objectives of Russian policy should be:

- elimination of the linkage between NATO enlargement and the development of our partnership with the West in general and with NATO in particular;
- creating a “window of opportunity” for establishing close military-political cooperation with NATO, other Western organisations and individual Western countries;
- preventing NATO enlargement while finding a compromise that could maximally satisfy the interests of Central and Eastern European countries, as well as those countries and circles in the West that are in favour of enlargement;
- if enlargement does take place, however, making it part of the process of shaping a new collective security system.

The medium-term objective is to make it more difficult and slow down the implementation of the enlargement decision, if it has been taken. The short-term objective is to postpone the decision to expand the Alliance as much as possible, to gain time to stabilise Russia’s economic and social-political development and to overcome the stereotypes of xenophobia and obsession of isolation. This will definitely foster the development of the Russia-West dialogue on a wide range of problems and will reduce the possible negative political and psychological consequences of NATO enlargement.

2.3.3. The strategy should not be directed against the West, and even less against CEE countries. The most important role should be played by an element of cooperation with those circles in the West that do not want new divisions, create new sources of conflicts, transform Russia into a revisionist power, which are afraid of weakening NATO, not strengthening it as a consequence of its enlargement, etc.

2.3.4. Russia should reaffirm that it is in its fundamental interest to belong to the European (Euro-Atlantic) security system and that its aim is to achieve a collective security system in Europe that responds

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102 A name of the joint meeting of the joint chambers of the Russian parliament: the State Duma and the Federation Council. It meets, i.a., to hear the president’s annual address.
to the real challenges to stability, coming primarily from Southeastern Europe and many regions of the former USSR, rather than from the region of Central and Eastern Europe with a high level of stability.

It is necessary to start a concrete dialogue with the West (primarily within the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence) on the criteria for NATO’s transformation, so as to transform this organisation into a political structure, the basis of a new European collective security system. In one option, such a system could be based on the development of the OSCE, with the prospect of being transformed into a regional UN organisation and possibly creating a directorate of this organisation composed of permanent members of the UN Security Council (Russia, the U.S., France, the UK) with the inclusion of Germany as well as representatives of the main European organisations (the EU, the WEU, NATO, the CIS). Russia should also propose other options for creating a collective European security system, for example, by means of special agreement or based on NATO’s transformation into a pan-European collective security system with the necessary involvement of Russia at first place.

2.3.5. Russia should prepare in advance in case NATO decides for rapid enlargement and thus limit its cooperation possibilities, Russia will have to compensate for this with increased cooperation with other organisations as well as bilateral cooperation with European powers.

2.3.5.1. In particular, it would already be worthwhile to develop political and military-political cooperation with the EU and the WEU. The time has come to start working towards expanding cooperation in the military-political sphere and even developing a series of bilateral military-political agreements with countries such as the U.S., the UK, Germany, France, Italy as well as Greece, Bulgaria, Romania. Such agreements could become the “building blocks” of a future new treaty on the system of collective European security, the real compensation in case of NATO enlargement.

2.3.5.2. Finally, it is necessary to start a serious and friendly military and political dialogue with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, so as to remove their concerns as far as possible, and to eliminate the “vacuum” that appeared in the region (security deficit) and to pave the way for a truly good neighbourly relationship in the future. As the problems in the CEE gradually ease, the need for NATO enlargement will be less and less necessary.

2.3.5.3 It may be worthwhile to put forward a proposal to some countries, in particular Germany, France, Italy, Greece, and Bulgaria, to strengthen cooperation in non-European regions, especially in Asia.
2.3.5.4. Active rapprochement with the Baltic States, supported by initiatives, seems very important. As an incomparably stronger country, Russia can afford not to notice some of the symptoms of “childhood illnesses” in these countries, which are quite predictable, though very unpleasant and seeming to be challenging for Russia. Of course, there can be no question of ignoring violations of minority and other human rights. The enlargement of NATO may make the Baltic states, as has already been mentioned, the object of a serious potential crisis. Preventive diplomacy is needed. Cooperation with the Baltic States is also needed for itself.

2.3.5.5. It is necessary to establish a permanent dialogue with key CIS members–Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan–to discuss attitudes towards NATO enlargement and, at best, to develop a common policy towards the Alliance, including a common response to its enlargement.

2.3.6. A constructive alternative to NATO's rapid enlargement, acceptable to all parties, must be put forward, taking into account the concerns of the Central and Eastern European countries and their desire to join European structures. These could be, for example, the following steps:

- provision of bilateral security guarantees by Russia and NATO,
- provision of unilateral NATO security guarantees,
- provision of unilateral security guarantees by the U.S., Germany, and other countries, possibly in the form of treaties,
- simultaneous but postponed enlargement of the EU, the WEU, and NATO,
- advanced enlargement of the WEU,
- finally, in an extreme case, the extension of NATO's political but not military structure to the CEE countries.

2.3.7. There is an urgent need to seek a unilateral or treaty-based solution to the flank problem with NATO countries or even a temporary revision (until the 1996 conference) of the provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The formal violation of this treaty by Russia can be harshly exploited by its opponents in the West and also by supporters of Alliance enlargement.

2.3.8. Russia-NATO and Russia-West cooperation must be given a chance and to open its “window of opportunity.” The statement by the president of the Russian Federation on his policy towards NATO seems appropriate. Such a statement could mention, i.a., that Russia is striving for a strategic alliance with NATO, also confirmed by the treaty. However, in order to decide on such rapprochement, to believe in its effectiveness, it will take at least 4–5 years, during which
time NATO will be obliged to refrain from making any decision on enlargement, either by cooperating with its eastern neighbours as part of the Partnership for Peace programme or in other ways (as above). During this period, every effort should be made to build a closer relationship between Russia and the EU.

Translated by Mirosław Łukawski. Verified with the Russian original by Marek Menkiszak.

Chapter 1: Purposes and Principles of Enlargement

A. Purposes of Enlargement

1. With the end of the Cold War, there is a unique opportunity to build an improved security architecture in the whole of the Euro-Atlantic area. The aim of an improved security architecture is to provide increased stability and security for all in the Euro-Atlantic area, without recreating dividing lines. NATO views security as a broad concept embracing political and economic, as well as defence, components. Such a broad concept of security should be the basis for the new security architecture which must be built through a gradual process of integration and cooperation brought about by an interplay of existing multilateral institutions in Europe, such as the EU, WEU and OSCE, each of which would have a role to play in accordance with its respective responsibilities and purposes in implementing this broad security concept. In this process, which is already well under way, the Alliance has played and will play a strong, active and essential role as one of the cornerstones of stability and security in Europe. NATO remains a purely defensive Alliance whose fundamental purpose is to preserve peace in the Euro-Atlantic area and to provide security for its members.

2. When NATO invites other European countries to become Allies, as foreseen in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty and reaffirmed at the January 1994 Brussels Summit, this will be a further step towards the Alliance’s basic goal of enhancing security and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area, within the context of a broad European security architecture. NATO enlargement will extend to new members the benefits of common defence and integration into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. The benefits of common defence and such integration are important to protecting the further democratic development of new members. By integrating more countries into the existing community of values and institutions, consistent with the objectives of the Washington Treaty and the London Declaration, NATO enlargement will safeguard the freedom and security of all its
members in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. Meeting NATO’s fundamental security goals and supporting the integration of new members into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions are thus complementary goals of the enlargement process, consistent with the Alliance’s strategic concept.

3. Therefore, enlargement will contribute to enhanced stability and security for all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area by:
   – Encouraging and supporting democratic reforms, including civilian and democratic control over the military;
   – Fostering in new members of the Alliance the patterns and habits of cooperation, consultation and consensus building which characterize relations among current Allies;
   – Promoting good-neighbourly relations, which would benefit all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, both members and non-members of NATO;
   – Emphasizing common defence and extending its benefits and increasing transparency in defence planning and military budgets, thereby reducing the likelihood of instability that might be engendered by an exclusively national approach to defence policies;
   – Reinforcing the tendency toward integration and cooperation in Europe based on shared democratic values and thereby curbing the countervailing tendency towards disintegration along ethnic and territorial lines;
   – Strengthening the Alliance’s ability to contribute to European and international security, including through peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the OSCE and peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council as well as other new missions;
   – Strengthening and broadening the Trans-Atlantic partnership.

B. Principles of enlargement

4. Enlargement of the Alliance will be through accession of new member states to the Washington Treaty. Enlargement should:
   – Accord with, and help to promote, the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the safeguarding of the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of all Alliance members and their people, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. New members will need to conform to these basic principles;
   – Accord strictly with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty which states that “the parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European
state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty ...”;

– Be on the basis that new members will enjoy all the rights and assume all obligations of membership under the Washington Treaty; and accept and conform with the principles, policies and procedures adopted by all members of the Alliance at the time that new members join;

– Strengthen the Alliance’s effectiveness and cohesion; and preserve the Alliance’s political and military capability to perform its core functions of common defence as well as to undertake peacekeeping and other new missions;

– Be part of a broad European security architecture based on true cooperation throughout the whole of Europe. It would threaten no-one; and enhance stability and security for all of Europe;

– Take account of the continuing important role of PfP, which will both help prepare interested partners, through their participation in PfP activities, for the benefits and responsibilities of eventual membership and serve as a means to strengthen relations with partner countries which may be unlikely to join the Alliance early or at all. Active participation in the Partnership for Peace will play an important role in the evolutionary process of the enlargement of NATO;

– Complement the enlargement of the European Union, a parallel process which also, for its part, contributes significantly to extending security and stability to the new democracies in the East.

5. New members, at the time that they join, must commit themselves, as all current Allies do on the basis of the Washington Treaty, to:

– unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security; settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;

– contribute to the development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being;

– maintain the effectiveness of the Alliance by sharing roles, risks, responsibilities, costs and benefits of assuring common security goals and objectives.
6. States which have ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes, including irredentist claims, or internal jurisdictional disputes must settle those disputes by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles. Resolution of such disputes would be a factor in determining whether to invite a state to join the Alliance.

7. Decisions on enlargement will be for NATO itself. Enlargement will occur through a gradual, deliberate, and transparent process, encompassing dialogue with all interested parties. There is no fixed or rigid list of criteria for inviting new member states to join the Alliance. Enlargement will be decided on a case-by-case basis and some nations may attain membership before others. New members should not be admitted or excluded on the basis of belonging to some group or category. Ultimately, Allies will decide by consensus whether to invite each new member to join according to their judgment of whether doing so will contribute to security and stability in the North Atlantic area at the time such a decision is to be made. NATO enlargement would proceed in accordance with the provisions of the various OSCE documents which confirm the sovereign right of each state to freely seek its own security arrangements, to belong or not to belong to international organisations, including treaties of alliance. No country outside the Alliance should be given a veto or droit de regard over the process and decisions.

8. NATO’s collective defence arrangements, as described in paragraphs 47 and 48, are a concrete expression of Allies’ commitment to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. Against the background of existing arrangements for contributing to collective defence, Allies will want to know how possible new members intend to contribute to NATO’s collective defence and will explore all aspects of this question in detail through bilateral dialogue prior to accession negotiations.

Chapter 2:
How to ensure that enlargement contributes to the stability and security of the entire Euro-Atlantic area, as part of a broad European security architecture, and supports the objective of an undivided Europe

A. Introduction—NATO Enlargement in its Broad Context

9. NATO plays an essential role within the developing European Security Architecture. NATO’s membership of like-minded Allies dedicated to working together has, over the course of its forty-five
year existence, helped fundamentally improve the nature of relations between member states. Moreover, the commitment by all Allies to defend one another’s territory has proven its value, over more than four decades, as an anchor of stability and confidence in Europe. This commitment has helped Allied countries develop powerful and flexible military capabilities, firmly under political control. NATO’s reliance on collective defence has ensured that no single Ally is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges. Sharing these benefits with new members can help extend security and stability in Europe. NATO’s enlargement will occur as one element of the broader evolution of European cooperation and security currently underway. NATO’s enlargement must be understood as only one important element of a broad European security architecture that transcends and renders obsolete the idea of “dividing lines” in Europe.

10. The current discussion on enlargement is taking place in very different circumstances than those which prevailed during the Cold War. In this context, the decision to admit new members must reflect the fact that the security challenges and risks which NATO faces now are different in nature from those faced in the past. In 1991, the Strategic Concept stated, “The threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of NATO’s European fronts has effectively been removed ....” Since then, the risk of a re-emergent large-scale military threat has further declined. Nevertheless, risks to European security remain, which are multi-faceted and multi-directional and thus hard to predict and assess. NATO must be capable of responding to such risks and new challenges as they develop if stability in Europe and the security of its members, old and new, are to be preserved. For their part, numerous countries aspire to NATO membership in the wider context of becoming part of existing European and Euro-Atlantic structures and strengthening their security and stability.

11. Stability and security in Europe will be strengthened through an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe. NATO enlargement will be part of that process, threaten no-one and contribute to a developing broad European security architecture based on true cooperation throughout the whole of Europe, enhancing stability and security for all.

12. The architecture of European security is composed of European institutions (such as the European Union (EU) and the Western European Union (WEU)) and transatlantic institutions (NATO). It also includes the OSCE, whose membership comprises all European
as well as North American countries and is thus the most inclusive European security institution, in whose framework agreements of particular importance for European security (the CFE Treaty and the Pact on Stability) have been concluded. For its part, NATO has developed cooperation arrangements: the NACC and PfP. NACC/PfP cooperation will continue to play an important role in the European security architecture both in enlarging the Alliance and in strengthening Alliance relations with partner countries which may not join the Alliance early or at all. This is addressed in Chapter 3.

13. Enlargement will have implications for all European nations, including states which do not join NATO early or at all. It will be important to maintain active, cooperative relations with countries which do not join the Alliance, in order to avoid divisions or uncertainties in Europe and to ensure broad, inclusive approaches to cooperative security. The Alliance should underline that there can be no question of “spheres of influence” in the contemporary Europe. NATO’s relations with other European states, whether cooperation partners or not, are important factors to consider in taking any decision to proceed with the enlargement process as is building security for states which may not be prospective NATO members. Any such decision will have a significant impact on the European security environment and its timing, therefore, will require careful consideration.

Implementation of Russia’s Individual Partnership Programme under the PfP and of our dialogue and cooperation with Russia beyond PfP will together renew and extend cooperation between the Alliance and Russia which we believe will enhance stability and security in Europe, as part of our broad approach to developing a cooperative security architecture in Europe. Equally, we want to develop further our relations with all newly independent states, whose independence and democracy constitute an important factor of security and stability for Europe. In this context, we attach particular importance to our relations with Ukraine which we will further develop, especially through enhanced cooperation within the PfP.

B. NATO Enlargement and Other European Security Institutions, in particular the OSCE, EU and WEU

14. There are several institutions with a critical role to play in the emerging European security architecture. It is important to assess NATO’s enlargement in terms of how it can contribute to stability and security in conjunction with these other institutions.
15. As the most inclusive institution in the European security architecture, the OSCE has a key role to play in maintaining security and transcending divisions in Europe and should continue to be strengthened independently of enlargement of NATO. A strengthened OSCE will help to provide reassurance to states which may not join NATO either early or at all. The OSCE has developed unique capabilities in its 20-year history to contribute to security and stability in such areas as early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management, confidence and security-building measures, economic cooperation and the advancement of democracy and human rights.

16. The activities of the OSCE and of NATO are complementary and mutually reinforcing. NATO provides an important forum for political consultations among like-minded Allies as well as unique military capabilities to respond to security challenges. NATO’s commitments to support, on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with Alliance procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the OSCE and peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council, will remain valid after enlargement. An enlarged Alliance would have greater capacity to support such peacekeeping activities and operations. OSCE discussions on a European security model for the 21st century should reflect the process of NATO enlargement but not delay it. A strengthened OSCE, an enlarged NATO, an active NACC and PfP would, together with other fora, form complementary parts of a broad, inclusive European security architecture, supporting the objective of an undivided Europe.

17. The Pact on Stability in Europe, which was entrusted to the OSCE and comprises numerous bilateral agreements and treaties between European countries, is a fundamental underpinning for security and stability in the whole of Europe. The Pact on Stability is aimed at developing good neighbourly relations, advancing respect for the human rights, including those of persons belonging to national minorities, and resolving disputes between European states. As noted in Chapter 1, the resolution of such disputes would be a factor in determining whether to invite a state to join the Alliance. Implementation of the Pact on Stability as well as of other international agreements already concluded can contribute to creating the conditions necessary for enlargement of NATO. In turn, enlargement of NATO’s membership will also facilitate the implementation of existing agreements and full compliance with the obligations they contain.
18. Enlargement of the Alliance is aimed at extending stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and enhancing long-term security for all NATO member countries and others as well. The enlargement of NATO is a parallel process with and will complement that of the European Union. Both NATO and the EU share common strategic interests as well as a broad approach to stability and security encompassing political, economic, social and environmental aspects, along with the defence dimension. Both enlargement processes will contribute significantly to extending security, stability and prosperity enjoyed by their members to other, like-minded, democratic European states. Through the conclusion of Euro-agreements, the EU has given a number of European states a perspective of eventual EU membership and integration into EU structures.

The enlargement of the two organizations will proceed autonomously according to their respective internal dynamics and processes. This means they are unlikely to proceed at precisely the same pace. But the Alliance views its own enlargement and that of the EU as mutually supportive and parallel processes which together will make a significant contribution to strengthening Europe’s security structure. Thus, each organization should ensure that their respective processes are in fact mutually supportive of the goal of enhancing European stability and security. While no rigid parallelism is foreseen, each organization will need to consider developments in the other.

19. European Union members are committed to a Common Foreign and Security Policy which shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance. The WEU is an integral part of the development of the Union. In its dual role as defence component of the EU and European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, the WEU brings an important additional dimension to European security. Acknowledging this dual role, and wishing to contribute to its further development, NATO Heads of State and Government, in January 1994, expressed their readiness to make collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy.

20. All full members of the WEU are also members of NATO. Because of the cumulative effect of the security safeguards of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty and of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the maintenance of this linkage is essential. Both enlargement
processes should, therefore, be compatible and mutually supportive. At the same time, the WEU is being developed as the defence component of the European Union, which strengthens the relationship between the two organisations. An eventual broad congruence of European membership in NATO, EU and WEU would have positive effects on European security. The Alliance should at an appropriate time give particular consideration to countries with a perspective of EU membership, and which have shown an interest in joining NATO, in order to consider, on the basis indicated in this study, how they can contribute to transatlantic security within the Washington Treaty and to determine whether to invite them to join NATO.

21. All CFE States Parties acknowledge the Treaty’s continued fundamental role in building and maintaining European stability and security. This is also shared by all other OSCE participating states. NATO Allies consider the CFE Treaty as the cornerstone of European security. Therefore, it is of fundamental importance to preserve the Treaty’s integrity and to ensure its full and timely implementation. NATO as such is not a signatory of the CFE Treaty, nor of any other arms control agreement. Therefore, from a legal point of view, NATO’s enlargement per se has no impact on the Treaty. In any case, possible implications of NATO’s enlargement for the CFE Treaty can only be assessed when the actual enlargement is taking place. Since there is no decision as yet on the timing and the scope of NATO’s enlargement, it would be premature to draw any conclusions at this stage.

22. The existing confidence-building, disarmament and arms control agreements are fundamental underpinnings for security and stability in the whole of Europe. NATO must contribute to their continuing validity and relevance in the course of its enlargement process. Enlargement could strengthen the Alliance’s ability to promote further arms control and disarmament measures and ways to control proliferation of WMD.

C. Relations with Russia

23. Russia has an important contribution to make to European stability and security. We have agreed that constructive, cooperative relations of mutual respect, benefit and friendship between the Alliance and Russia are a key element for security and stability in Europe. In June 1994, we agreed that such relations should be developed in a way that reflects common objectives and complements and reinforces relations with all other states, is transparent and is not directed against the interests of third countries. Cooperative NATO-Russia relations
are in the interest not only of NATO and Russia, but of all other states in the OSCE area.

24. NATO and Russia have agreed to pursue a broad, enhanced dialogue and cooperation in areas where Russia has unique and important contributions to make, commensurate with its weight and responsibility as a major European, international and nuclear power.

25. In June 1994, NATO and Russia agreed to set in train the development of a far-reaching, cooperative NATO-Russia relationship aimed at enhancing mutual confidence and openness. At that time Russia signed the PfP Framework Document. By December, agreement had been reached on Russia’s Individual Partnership Programme and areas for pursuance of a broad, enhanced NATO-Russia dialogue and cooperation beyond PfP, which were formally accepted by Russia on 31 May 1995.

26. The Alliance considers that it is desirable to develop the NATO-Russia relationship even further as part of our broad approach to developing a cooperative security architecture in Europe. NATO and Russia have initiated a dialogue, to be pursued in our newly established relationship beyond the PfP, on the future direction our relationship should take, with the aim of achieving by the end of this year a political framework for NATO-Russia relations elaborating basic principles for security cooperation as well as for the development of mutual political consultations. A stronger NATO-Russia relationship should form another cornerstone of a new, inclusive and comprehensive security structure in Europe. NATO-Russia cooperation can help to overcome any lingering distrust from the Cold War period, and help ensure that Europe is never again divided into opposing camps. This further development of the NATO-Russia relationship, and its possible eventual formalization, should take place in rough parallel with NATO’s own enlargement, with the goal of further strengthening stability and security in Europe. The substance and form of this enhanced relationship will be developed through a NATO-Russia dialogue.

27. NATO-Russia relations should reflect Russia’s significance in European security and be based on reciprocity, mutual respect and confidence, no “surprise” decisions by either side which could affect the interests of the other. This relationship can only flourish if it is rooted in strict compliance with international commitments and obligations, such as those under the UN Charter, the OSCE, including the Code of
Conduct\textsuperscript{103} and the CFE Treaty, and full respect for the sovereignty of other independent states. NATO decisions, however, cannot be subject to any veto or droit de regard by a non-member state, nor can the Alliance be subordinated to another European security institution.

28. Russia has raised concerns with respect to the enlargement process of the Alliance. The Alliance is addressing these concerns in developing its wider relationship with Russia and the Alliance has made it clear that the enlargement process including the associated military arrangements will threaten no-one and contribute to a developing broad European security architecture based on true cooperation throughout the whole of Europe, enhancing security and stability for all.

D. Effects of the decision-making process on European security and stability

29. The decision-making process on enlargement will be in accordance with the Washington Treaty. Each invitation will be decided on its own merits, case by case, and in accordance with the principles identified in this study, taking into account political and security related developments in the whole of Europe. It will be important, particularly in the meantime, not to foreclose the possibility of eventual Alliance membership for any European state in accordance with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty.

30. Countries could be invited to join sequentially or several countries could be simultaneously invited to join, bearing in mind that all Allies will decide by consensus on each invitation, i.e. new Allies must join consensus for subsequent invitations. There could be two or more sets of simultaneous invitations. Sequential accession could reduce the implication that others might be excluded and make it easier to begin with one or more countries but could also risk extending the calendar of accessions and thereby diverting attention from other important Alliance business. Simultaneous accessions would avoid the possibility of veto by new members on others joining at the same time; any decision on simultaneous accession should take into account relations among the prospective new members concerned and the impact on other states, including their relationship with NATO. Legislative/ratification considerations in Allied countries related to the accession of new member(s) to the Washington Treaty should also be taken into account.

\textsuperscript{103} It concerns the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, adopted by the OSCE at its meeting in Budapest in 1994.
Concerns have already been expressed in the context of the discussion of the enlargement of NATO that a new member might “close the door” behind it to new admissions in the future of other countries which may also aspire to NATO membership. Such a situation must be avoided; the Alliance rests upon commonality of views and a commitment to work for consensus; part of the evaluation of the qualifications of a possible new member will be its demonstrated commitment to that process and those values. We will invite prospective new members to confirm that they understand and accept this and act in good faith accordingly. The Alliance may require, if appropriate, specific political commitments in the course of accession negotiations.

Chapter 3: How NACC and PfP can contribute concretely to the enlargement process

A. Introduction

31. The PfP and NACC can help to ensure that, in accepting new members, the Alliance will contribute to enhanced security and stability in an undivided Europe, fundamental goals of the Alliance, as discussed in Chapter II. As the enlargement process proceeds, NACC/PfP will continue to provide the fundamental framework for developing relations with partner countries. Dynamic NACC/PfP cooperation is an integral part of the European security architecture, deepening interaction and extending security and stability throughout Europe, and as a means to strengthen relations with partner countries, whether possible new members or not. In the context of enlargement, this will require particular attention and effort by the Alliance.

32. PfP will play an important role both to help prepare possible new members, through their participation in PfP activities, for the benefits and responsibilities of eventual membership and as a means to strengthen relations with partner countries which may be unlikely to join the Alliance early or at all. There will be a need to ensure that appropriate human and financial resources are directed to support those activities in accordance with PfP funding policy.\(^{104}\)

33. NACC will continue, as it has since its inception in 1991, to play a significant role in building confidence and drawing NATO Allies and

\(^{104}\) Each participant in the Partnership for Peace bore the costs of the projects implemented within its framework, unless other mechanisms for financing were established.
cooperation partners closer together. In the context of enlargement, the importance of NACC will be enhanced, in particular, as a common forum encompassing NATO Allies and NACC/PfP partners for dialogue and consultation on political and security-related issues and for cooperation among its members to strengthen security.

B. The Continuing Role of the NACC and the PfP in Strengthening European Security

34. The Partnership for Peace is a key element in NATO’s political and military cooperation programmes with non-member OSCE countries which deepens interaction, cooperation and stability in Europe and contributes to the overall goal of transparency. PfP is only at the beginning of its development; its full potential has not yet been achieved; and its continuing importance will not be affected by enlargement.

35. Within the broader PfP framework, a critical aspect is that partners reaffirmed their commitment to the principles of the UN and the OSCE and their readiness to develop cooperative military relations with NATO to strengthen their ability to undertake peacekeeping and other missions under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the OSCE. The Alliance should ensure that PfP gets all due attention and credit in this regard.

36. For countries that do not become members, NACC/PfP must constitute: a continuing vehicle for active cooperation with NATO; concrete evidence of NATO’s continuing support and concern for their security; and their primary link to the Alliance, as a key Euro-Atlantic security institution, including for consultation with NATO in the event an active partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security. The Alliance will maintain the importance, vitality and credibility of NACC/PfP as enlargement evolves to retain their value for countries which may be unlikely to join the Alliance early or at all. Maintaining the vitality of NACC/PfP may require new approaches and mechanisms to be devised in parallel to the Alliance’s enlargement process. In this context, Ministers have instructed the Council to explore the scope for integrating the existing cooperative structures and procedures for NACC and the Partnership for Peace.

37. PfP cooperation should be further developed in order to:
   - help partners to further develop democratic control of their armed forces and transparency in defence planning and budgeting
processes, although this will largely depend on these countries’ own efforts;

- enhance the network of military and defence-related cooperation to provide effective support to partners in adapting their defence arrangements to the new security environment;

- develop the cooperative features of PfP, e.g., through enhancing partners’ involvement in developing, planning and implementing PfP activities, in particular by increasing their capability/readiness to contribute with others to peacekeeping, humanitarian, search and rescue and other activities to be agreed;

- strengthen the confidence-building and transparent character of defence-related and military cooperation, both with Allies and among partners;

- complement the development of interoperable forces by adequate mechanisms to duly involve partners in planning and carrying out joint peacekeeping operations.

C. The Role of PfP in Preparing for Membership

38. PfP activities and programmes are open to all partners, who themselves decide which opportunities to pursue and how intensively to work with the Alliance through the Partnership. This varying degree of participation is a key element of the self-differentiation process. Active participation in PfP will play an important role in possible new members’ preparation to join the Alliance, although it will not guarantee Alliance membership. Active participation in NACC/PfP will provide the framework for possible new members to establish patterns of political and military cooperation with the Alliance to facilitate a transition to membership. Through PfP planning, joint exercises and other PfP activities, including seminars, workshops and day-to-day representation in Brussels and at Mons, possible new members will increasingly become acquainted with the functioning of the Alliance, including with respect to policy-making, peacekeeping and crisis management. Possible new members’ commitment to the shared principles and values of the Alliance will be indicated by their international behaviour and adherence to relevant OSCE commitments; however, their participation in PfP will provide a further important means to demonstrate such commitment as well as their ability to contribute to common defence.

39. For possible new members, PfP will contribute to their preparation both politically and militarily, to familiarise them with
Alliance structures and procedures and to deepen their understanding of the obligations and rights that membership will entail.

PfP will help partners undertake necessary defence management reforms as they establish the processes and mechanisms necessary to run a democratically controlled military organisation, in areas such as transparent national defence planning, resource allocation and budgeting, appropriate legislation and parliamentary and public accountability. PfP will assist possible new members to develop well-established democratic accountability and practices and to demonstrate their commitment to internationally-accepted norms of behaviour. Within the scope of the Framework Document, PfP also provides a means to promote and develop interoperability with Alliance forces by familiarising possible new members with important elements for interoperability.

40. The PfP Planning and Review Process and PfP exercises will introduce partners to collective defence planning and pave the way for more detailed operational planning. A biennial PfP Planning and Review Process has been offered to all Partners on an optional basis and provides a means of self-differentiation. Participation in the process will be the most effective way to develop, in the longer term, Partner forces that are better able to operate with those of the NATO Allies. Cooperation between Partners and the Alliance in the process will be broadened and deepened over time as appropriate. Results of this process should be incorporated in Partner defence plans and reflected in PfP IPPs and the Partnership Work Programme as appropriate. While new members will not be required to achieve full interoperability with NATO before joining the Alliance, they will need to meet certain minimum standards essential to a functioning and credible Alliance. These standards will continue to be developed by NATO and will be based in part on conclusions reached through the Planning and Review Process. Partners’ own efforts will largely determine how quickly they progress in preparing for possible NATO membership, although outside assistance may facilitate progress.

41. The preparation of possible new members interested in joining NATO can be facilitated by an appropriate reinforcement and deepening of their Individual Partnership Programmes. Such a reinforcement and

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105 The notion of self-differentiation of participation in the Partnership for Peace, which was repeatedly evoked in the document, was connected with the principle of independent shaping of the schedule of activities and the list of adopted projects by the participants of this programme. This was to be the basis for the selection of candidates in terms of their political ambitions and actual involvement in the process of preparations for NATO membership.
deepening is a key to self-differentiation. Among other things, it would allow partners to distinguish themselves by demonstrating their capabilities and their commitment with a view to possible NATO membership and to contribute to Alliance missions. Concerning the process of preparing for membership, the premature development of measures outside PfP for possible new members should be avoided. A clear distinction should be maintained between participation in PfP and an eventual invitation to join the Alliance. There will come a point, after a country has been invited to join the Alliance, when specific measures for preparing the accession of that country will have to be devised.

**Chapter 4:**
How to ensure that enlargement strengthens the effectiveness of the Alliance, preserves its ability to perform its core functions of common defence as well as to undertake peacekeeping and other new missions, and upholds the principles and objectives of the Washington Treaty

**A. Maintaining the Effectiveness of the Alliance to Perform its Core Functions and New Missions**

42. In enlarging its membership, the Alliance will want to ensure that it maintains its ability to take important decisions quickly on the basis of consensus and that enlargement results in an Alliance fully able to carry out both its core functions and its new missions. In addition to being fundamentally important in its own right, the Alliance’s ability to act quickly, decisively and effectively is crucial to its role in the European security architecture and to its ability to integrate new members into it.

43. On joining the Alliance, new members must accept the full obligations of the Washington Treaty. This includes participation in the consultation process within the Alliance and the principle of decision-making by consensus, which requires a commitment to build consensus within the Alliance on all issues of concern to it. New members must also be prepared to contribute to collective defence under Article 5, to the Alliance’s new evolving missions and to Alliance budgets. This may include appropriate contributions to the Alliance’s military force and command structures and infrastructure. New members must accept and conform with the principles, policies and procedures adopted by all members of the Alliance at the time that new members join. In this respect, new members deciding to participate in the integrated military structure must accept the applicable policies and procedures.
44. NATO must ensure that all Alliance military obligations, particularly those under Article 5, will be met in an enlarged Alliance. This will require a case-by-case assessment of the military factors, including preparation time for NATO to take on new Article 5 commitments, for each prospective new member, taking into account the strategic environment, possible risks faced by potential new members, the capabilities and interoperability of their forces, their approach and that of the allies to the stationing of foreign forces on their territory, and the relevant reinforcement capabilities of Alliance forces, including strategic mobility. The Alliance will also have to ensure the accessibility of its forces to new members’ territory for reinforcement, exercises, crisis management and, if applicable, stationing. This issue will need to be considered in the context of deciding individual new members’ accession.

45. The Alliance will have to take a number of elements into account to ensure that NATO maintains its military credibility when it enlarges. Many of these elements may require further analysis and development by the Alliance in the course of the enlargement process. The Alliance bears the responsibility for determining the measures taken to maintain military credibility within each of these elements. These elements, which are developed further in later sections of this chapter and in chapter 5, fall into the following categories:

**Collective Defence**

A key principle of the enlargement process is that new members will be expected not only to benefit from, but also to contribute to, the Alliance’s collective defence. They should also be prepared to contribute to other Alliance missions;

**Command Structure**

All new members should participate in an appropriate way in the command structure of the Alliance. New members joining the integrated structure will need to be integrated into existing NATO headquarters. The Alliance will have to consider whether a limited number of new headquarters may be needed and any need for existing headquarters to cover new Areas of Responsibility. NATO operations will be controlled by existing or new NATO headquarters or, as appropriate, future CJTF headquarters;

**Conventional Forces**

Training and Exercises New members will need to participate in NATO exercises, including those designed to ensure the common defence. Exercises should be held regularly on new members’ territory;
Nuclear Forces

The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance. New members will share the benefits and responsibilities from this in the same way as all other Allies in accordance with the Strategic Concept. New members will be expected to support the concept of deterrence and the essential role nuclear weapons play in the Alliance’s strategy of war prevention as set forth in the Strategic Concept;

Force Structure

It is important for NATO’s force structure that other Allies’ forces can be deployed, when and if appropriate, on the territory of new members. The Alliance has no a priori requirement for the stationing of Alliance troops on the territory of new members. New members should participate in the Alliance’s force structure. How this will be achieved may require additional considerations to include: whether new members should develop specially-trained units capable of reinforcing NATO forces and of being reinforced by NATO units; the prepositioning of materiel in critical areas; how to ensure that infrastructure is adequate to meet planned missions; and whether there is a need to increase strategic and intra-theatre mobility;

Intelligence

New members will have the opportunity to participate to the fullest extent possible in the NATO intelligence processes;

Finance

New members will be expected to contribute their share to NATO’s commonly funded programmes. They should also be aware that they face substantial financial obligations when joining the Alliance;

Interoperability

All new members will be expected to make every effort to meet NATO interoperability standards, in particular for command, control and communication equipment. New members will have to incorporate NATO standard operational procedures in selected areas, including for their national headquarters.

46. A smooth and effective decision-making process in an enlarged Alliance will be key to preserving its effectiveness. Maintenance of the consensus principle will be essential in the political, military and defence areas. All Allies must therefore be willing to work constructively towards this. To this end, it will be important that prospective new members become familiar with the Alliance decision-making process, and the modalities and traditions of consensus and compromise, before joining. The highest priority should be given
to a new member’s involvement in the appropriate elements of the decision-making processes and military commands.

**B. The Military and Defence Implications of Enlargement**

**Collective Defence**

47. As stated in paragraph 37 of the Strategic Concept, “the collective nature of Alliance defence is embodied in practical arrangements that enable the Allies to enjoy the crucial political, military and resource advantages of collective defence, and prevent the renationalisation of defence policies, without depriving the Allies of their sovereignty. These arrangements are based on an integrated military structure as well as on cooperation and coordination agreements. Key features include collective force planning; common operational planning; multinational formations; the stationing of forces outside home territory, where appropriate on a mutual basis; crisis management and reinforcement arrangements; procedures for consultation; common standards and procedures of equipment, training and logistics; joint and combined exercises; and infrastructure, armaments and logistics cooperation.”

48. There are currently three forms under which Allies contribute to NATO collective defence: full participation in the integrated military structure and the collective defence planning process; non-membership of the integrated military structure but full participation in the collective defence planning process together with a series of coordination agreements providing for cooperation with the integrated military structure in certain defined areas; and non-participation in the integrated military structure and collective defence planning but cooperation with the integrated military structure in more limited defined areas under agreements between the Chief of Defence and the Major NATO Commanders (MNCs).\(^\text{106}\) As a general principle, we should avoid new forms of contribution to NATO collective defence which would complicate unnecessarily practical cooperation among Allies and the Alliance’s decision-making process.

49. Against the background of existing arrangements for contributing to collective defence, Allies will want to know how possible new members intend to contribute to NATO’s collective defence and will explore all aspects of this question in detail through bilateral dialogue prior to accession negotiations. In this context, the ability to contribute and the manner in which a possible new member intends to contribute to collective defence will be important criteria

\(^\text{106}\) At that time, France remained outside the NATO integrated military structure, and Iceland had limited links to it.
for Allies in deciding whether such a potential new member is capable and willing to contribute to security and stability in the trans-Atlantic area within the meaning of Article 10 of the Washington Treaty.

50. The Alliance will adopt a flexible approach to assimilating new members into its defence and military structures and its planning processes. The approach taken will ensure that an enlarged NATO maintains a credible military posture.

Command Structure

51. NATO’s command structure must be prepared for the probability that new members will want to join the integrated military structure. If enlargement takes place consecutively, considerable military flexibility will be required with regard to the establishment of new areas of responsibility and the related command structure. A broad plan will therefore be needed to ensure the maximum effectiveness and flexibility of the command structure following the accession of new members, bearing in mind the potential effect of the CJTF concept and of any structural adjustments.

52. NATO headquarters may be required on the territory of new members to cover the revised tasks and AORs resulting from their accession. Although it may be possible to upgrade new members’ existing headquarters if necessary to meet an as yet undefined NATO requirement, existing command, control and communications equipment and infrastructure is unlikely to meet minimum NATO standards. The establishment of headquarters on the territory of new members may also have implications for NATO’s existing command structure. The building of new headquarters and/or the upgrading of existing headquarters to NATO standards would involve significant costs although progress on the development of the CJTF concept may have a bearing on Alliance headquarters requirements. A country-specific review of the requirements and costs should be undertaken prior to a new member joining the integrated military structure.

53. Multinationality remains a key feature of Alliance policy. Any new NATO headquarters on the territory of a new member would therefore require multinational representation; this should reflect operational needs. New members will also have to be represented as appropriate at major headquarters (MSC and above),107 support elements, commonly-funded NATO Agencies, and on the International Military Staff. Enlargement would therefore probably require a review of the size of staffs at most NATO headquarters and

107 The two highest levels of then NATO military command structure: the strategic one (in Europe and in the U.S.) and their so-called main subordinate headquarters.
national representation. This process would inevitably be complicated if new members join consecutively.

**Conventional Forces—Training and Exercises**

54. The presence of Allied Forces on the territory of other members contributes to strengthening the Alliance’s ability to perform its fundamental security tasks, fostering Alliance cohesion and expressing solidarity and confidence. This presence could take various forms. The stationing of Allied forces offers specific military advantages in relation to collective defence. It allows a threat or an attack to be countered earlier, and provides more time to prepare and deploy reinforcements, enabling the most effective use to be made of mobility. Moreover, military forces operate more effectively when they are familiar with the terrain and conditions. However, the redeployment of existing Allied forces from their current locations or the prepositioning of equipment would be expensive. There also is a risk that it could give a misleading impression of Alliance concerns. The regular and frequent presence of Allied forces on exercise or when other situations demand is another way to demonstrate NATO’s commitment to collective defence. This option may not be adequate in all cases. It would in any event require effective rapid reaction and reinforcement capabilities and planning, and adequate warning time to allow for political decision making and the deployment of forces in time of crisis. Other options might include dual basing of air assets, or the prepositioning of equipment and ammunition (e.g., increased prepositioned materiel in key areas and increased storage sites for such materiel in key geographical areas).

55. Individual Allies’ policy on the stationing of other Allies’ forces on their territory in peacetime varies considerably, taking into account a range of national and broader factors. For new members, the peacetime stationing of other Allies’ forces on their territory should neither be a condition of membership nor foreclosed as an option. Decisions on the stationing of Allies’ conventional forces on the territory of new members will have to be taken by the Alliance in the light of the benefits both to the Alliance as a whole and to particular new members, the military advantages of such a presence, the Alliance’s military capacity for rapid and effective reinforcement, the views of the new members concerned, the cost of possible military options, and the wider political and strategic impact. All Allies must of course be prepared in times of crisis or war to allow other Allies’ forces to enter and operate on their territory, and to provide essential
host nation support as mutually agreed, to enable NATO to provide effective common defence.

56. Individual Allies’ policy on stationing their forces outside their borders in peacetime also varies considerably. Some Allies are, for example, legally constrained from doing so. For new members, the peacetime stationing of forces on other Allies’ territory should neither be a condition of membership nor foreclosed as an option. All Allies are, however, prepared in principle to deploy their forces outside their territory in the Treaty area as part of their contribution to NATO collective defence, taking into account factors such as operational capabilities and geographic limitations. New members should be expected to be similarly prepared.

57. Multinational training and exercises on the territory of new members will contribute significantly to maintaining Alliance military capability and effectiveness and enhance the ability of the Alliance to fulfil its full range of missions.

Such exercising and training would help familiarise the forces involved with the terrain and operating conditions, and would contribute directly to supporting Article 5 commitments. Reinforcement should also be exercised from time to time. The terms on which such activities currently take place vary between Allies and have to take account of national factors. However, as a general principle, new members should be ready to host multinational training and exercises relating to all Alliance missions.

**Nuclear Forces**

58. The coverage provided by Article 5, including its nuclear component, will apply to new members. There is no a priori requirement for the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of new members. In light of both the current international environment and the potential threats facing the Alliance, NATO’s current nuclear posture will, for the foreseeable future, continue to meet the requirements of an enlarged Alliance. There is, therefore, no need now to change or modify any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or policy, but the longer term implications of enlargement for both will continue to be evaluated. NATO should retain its existing nuclear capabilities along with its right to modify its nuclear posture as circumstances warrant. New members will, as do current members, contribute to the development and implementation of NATO’s strategy, including its nuclear components; new members should be eligible to join the Nuclear Planning Group and its subordinate bodies and to participate in nuclear consultation during exercises and crisis. Decisions on
the modalities and specifics of this contribution will be based on consultations, and agreements among Allies.

**Force Structures**

59. The Alliance’s military strength and cohesion depends on its multinational forces and structures, and the fair sharing of risks, responsibilities, costs and benefits. Current force structures are based primarily on the requirements of collective defence, but Alliance involvement in non-Article 5 operations will continue to influence future capabilities. All Alliance nations have a high degree of ability to operate together, although there is room for further improvement.

60. Subject to any changes in the security environment, the main characteristics of current NATO force structures will remain valid in an enlarged Alliance. However, the Alliance will need to pay special attention to the requirements of inter-regional reinforcement, and their potential impact on the various force categories. To ensure continued Alliance military effectiveness, current and prospective new members must be committed to developing, manning and supporting NATO’s new force structures. New members’ forces would be expected to take part in the full spectrum of Alliance missions to the extent appropriate to their capabilities, and taking into account the need for case by case consideration of non-Article 5 missions. The further development of Alliance military structures, including force levels and readiness, should facilitate such involvement across the spectrum of potential Alliance missions.

61. Multinational forces have an increased political and military importance. Thus the increasing need for mobility, flexibility and inter-service and multinational interoperability in undertaking both defence and new missions means that current Alliance policy on multinationality should apply when new members’ forces join NATO force structure, consistent with the need to maintain military effectiveness.

62. There is a continuing need to address current limitations in reaction force capabilities, which have to be taken into account to ensure that there is no reduction in military effectiveness. The principle of multinationality should also apply in integrating new members’ forces into main defence forces. No change of current policy towards augmentation forces would seem to be necessary as a result of enlargement. There will, however, be a substantial impact, the extent of which has yet to be determined, on contingency and reinforcement planning including force requirements and host nation support arrangements. Prepositioning of equipment, and both
intra-theatre and inter-theatre lift, can contribute to flexibility and military effectiveness. Further examination of these elements will be required when enlargement occurs.

**Intelligence Sharing**

63. Sharing of intelligence among Allies contributes to the effectiveness of the Alliance. New members will bring to the Alliance both increased requirements and capabilities in the intelligence field. Intelligence sharing is based on mutual trust and co-operation. New members must be able to safeguard NATO information according to Alliance standards.

**C. Security Investment Programme (SIP)**

64. The NATO Security Investment Programme should be used to accelerate the assimilation process of new members. The scope of this will depend upon the terms under which new members will participate. Procedurally and organisationally, the incorporation of new members into the Programme will not present problems although the process may take time. The renewed prioritisation and resource allocation mechanisms are well suited to deal with new requirements resulting from enlargement.

65. Financially, new members would be expected to contribute their share, as from the start, to all new programme activities, with a contribution level based, in a general way, on “ability to pay.” Because of the time needed in an investment programme to bring activities to implementation, and because of the limited absorption capacity of new members, financial implications will be limited in the early years. Enlarged participation in the programme should therefore be possible without impact on the implementation of existing commitments and programmes. It is important, however, to get prospective new members involved in the planning and preparatory processes as soon as possible and to ensure that they are fully aware of their prospective liabilities.

**D. Administration and Budgets**

66. Without knowing the number of prospective new members it is only possible to address management issues in a general manner. Enlargement will lead to new activities and a need for increased resources. Additional office space will be needed at NATO HQ to accommodate new members and possible increases to the staffs of the IS and IMS. Operating and capital costs in the Civil Budget
will grow. New members will be expected to contribute. Cost shares must be calculated and decisions taken concerning their obligations. Enlargement will also mean increases in the Military Budget, but the actual budgetary consequences will depend in large part on the new members’ level of participation.

67. It will be important to ensure that potential new members are fully aware that they face considerable financial obligations when joining the Alliance.

Chapter 5:
What are the implications of membership for new members, including their rights and obligations, and what do they need to do to prepare for membership?

68. New members will be full members of the Alliance, enjoying all the rights and assuming all the obligations under the Washington Treaty. There must be no “second tier” security guarantees or members within the Alliance and no modifications of the Washington Treaty for those who join. Possible new members should prepare themselves on this basis. Although this Chapter describes the principal rights and obligations of new member states, some more specific rights and obligations are covered elsewhere, in Chapters 2, 3 and 4.

A. What will be Expected Politically of New Members

69. Commitments entered into by new member states should be the same as for present Allies, including acceptance of the principles, policies and procedures already adopted by all members of the Alliance at the time that new members join. Willingness and ability to meet such commitments, not only on paper but in practice, would be a critical factor in any decision to invite a country to join.

70. Bearing in mind that there is no fixed or rigid list of criteria for inviting new members to join the Alliance, possible new member states will, nevertheless, be expected to:

- Conform to basic principles embodied in the Washington Treaty: democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law;
- Accept NATO as a community of like-minded nations joined together for collective defence and the preservation of peace and security, with each nation contributing to the security and defence from which all member nations benefit;
- Be firmly committed to principles, objectives and undertakings included in the Partnership for Peace Framework Document;
– Commit themselves to good faith efforts to build consensus within the Alliance on all issues, since consensus is the basis of Alliance cohesion and decision-making;

– Undertake to participate fully in the Alliance consultation and decision-making process on political and security issues of concern to the Alliance;

– Establish a permanent representation at NATO HQ;

– Establish an appropriate national military representation at SHAPE/SACLANT;

– Be prepared to nominate qualified candidates to serve on the International Staff and in NATO agencies;

– Provide qualified personnel to serve on the International Military Staff and in the Integrated Military Structure if and as appropriate;

– Contribute to Alliance budgets, based on budget shares to be agreed;

– Participate, as appropriate, in the exchange of Allied intelligence, which is based entirely on national contributions;

– Apply NATO security rules and procedures;

– Accept the Documents which provide the basis for the existing policies of the Alliance.\(^{108}\)

71. The Alliance expects new members not to “close the door” to the accession of one or more later candidate members, as referred to also in paragraph 30 of Chapter 2.

**B. What Prospective New Members will need to do Politically to Prepare Themselves for Membership**

72. Prospective members will have to have:

\(^{108}\) These include, in particular: The Agreement on the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, National Representatives and International Staff (Ottawa Convention, 1951); The NATO Agreement on the Mutual Safeguarding of Secrecy of Inventions relating to Defence, and for which applications for Patents have been made (Paris, 1960); The Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status on their Forces (London, 1951); The NATO Agreement on the Communication of Technical Information for defence Purposes (Brussels, 1970) as well as The Strategic Concept; Summit Declarations and NAC decisions in Ministerial and permanent session as reflect in NAC Communiques, including those issued in Oslo in June 1992 and Brussels in December 1992 in which the Alliance undertook to support, on a case-by-case basis in accordance with its own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the OSCE and peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise; Documents on cooperation between NATO and any partner state already agreed with new member(s) join the Alliance, recognizing that Alliance polices evolve over time and in the light of new circumstances.
– Demonstrated a commitment to and respect for OSCE norms and principles, including the resolution of ethnic disputes, external territorial disputes including irredentist claims or internal jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, as referred to also in paragraph 6 of Chapter 1;
– Shown a commitment to promoting stability and well-being by economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility;
– Established appropriate democratic and civilian control of their defence force;
– Undertaken a commitment to ensure that adequate resources are devoted to achieving the obligations described in section A and C.

C. What Will Be Expected Militarily of New Members

73. New members of the Alliance must be prepared to share the roles, risks, responsibilities, benefits, and burdens of common security and collective defence. They should be expected to subscribe to Alliance strategy as set out in the Strategic Concept and refined in subsequent Ministerial statements.

74. An important element in new members’ military contribution will be a commitment in good faith to pursue the objectives of standardization which are essential to Alliance strategy and operational effectiveness. New members should concentrate, in the first instance, on interoperability. As a minimum, they should accept NATO doctrine and policies relating to standardization and in addition aim at achieving a sufficient level of training and equipment to operate effectively with NATO forces. PfP cooperation, including the Planning and Review Process, can help to improve the interoperability of Partners’ forces with those of NATO Allies and aspiring new members should be expected to participate actively in PfP activities; but these are limited in scope to forces made available by Partners for cooperation in peacekeeping, humanitarian and SAR missions, and related training and exercises.

D. What Prospective New Members Will Need to do Militarily to Prepare Themselves for Membership

75. The ability of prospective members to contribute militarily to collective defence and to the Alliance’s new missions will be a factor in deciding whether to invite them to join the Alliance.

76. New members will need to adapt themselves to the fact that NATO’s strategy and force structure are designed to exploit multinationality and flexibility to provide effective defence at minimum
cost. NATO policy is therefore heavily dependent on standardization, particularly in the areas of operations, administration and material. Current NATO standardization priorities include commonality of doctrines and procedures, interoperability of command, control and communications and major weapon systems, and interchangeability of ammunition and primary combat supplies.

77. There are at present over 1200 agreements and publications that new members should undertake to comply with. Compliance should be an evolutionary and controlled process to enhance Alliance operational effectiveness. Although national participation in standardization is optional, there are a number of areas, such as communication and information systems and measures to facilitate reinforcements where military necessity requires participation. One way of achieving improved interoperability might be for new members to select units that can act as cornerstone units around which the rest of their forces can be developed with priority being given to maximizing these units’ interoperability with existing NATO units. To determine the minimum requirements necessary for operational effectiveness, a review of the STANAGs and Allied Publications is already under way. A country-by-country assessment of prospective new members’ standardization will also be required, based on levels of standardization displayed during the full range of PfP military and defence activities. A proposal should be developed by the Alliance in consultation with the prospective new member so that it will understand what will be expected of it. In addition, NATO schools and training will need to be developed so that the forces of new members can achieve interoperability with NATO in a reasonable time, and new members can adapt to NATO doctrine across a broad spectrum of activities.

78. Although the funding of new members’ enhanced interoperability is their responsibility, it poses important challenges for the Alliance as a whole. There is a military imperative to achieve the minimum level of interoperability required for military effectiveness as quickly as possible. There is also a political imperative to demonstrate intra-Alliance cohesion, to ensure that new members feel that they are participating fully in the Alliance and to enable them to make an equitable contribution to collective defence at an early stage. In principle, both objectives should be achieved within the existing arrangements for funding Allies’ development, procurement, infrastructure and other costs (i.e. using national resources and the Security Investment Programme as appropriate).
Chapter 6:
Modalities according to which the enlargement process should proceed

79. The modalities for enlargement flow from Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. Previous accessions in accordance with Article 10 need not be considered precise models for future accessions, since the general political and security context of future accessions will be different as well as the number, individual circumstances and characteristics of new acceding members. In this context, a process which is predictable and transparent with respect to new accessions may be required to provide reassurance to public and legislative opinion in existing member states. The modalities for future accession should avoid any suggestion of different classes of membership.

80. While each invitation to join the Alliance will be decided on its own merits, case by case, the timing of future accessions could be sequential or in one or more simultaneous sets. In any case, it will be important to make clear that the Alliance remains open to further accessions by countries not among the earliest to be invited to join. A declaration at the time of the first invitation(s) being issued which clearly stated this would both reassure those countries that would not be among the first to be invited and reduce the likelihood of some of those countries submitting unsolicited applications to join the Alliance.

81. The precise timing, sequence and content of the accession process need to be considered carefully, particularly with respect to talks and negotiations with countries to be invited to join. Detailed briefings to provide necessary information to such countries will be needed at an early stage of the accession process, prior to formal negotiations. The NAC will decide on beginning any necessary exploratory contacts, after which the following steps would be required for any future accession to the Washington Treaty:

- a decision by the NAC (at an appropriate level) to authorize the Secretary General to inform a country/countries that the Allies are favourably disposed to its/their accession, and to enter into talks with it/them;
- a formal notification from the country/countries to the Secretary General of its/their firm commitment, in accordance with domestic legal requirements, to join the Alliance;
- detailed consultations with the country/countries concerned about the protocol of accession;
- formulation by the Allies of the protocol of accession;
- approval and signature of the accession protocol by the NAC;
– ratification, acceptance or approval of the accession protocol by the Allies and entry into force;
– formal invitation to the country/countries to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty;
– deposition by the country/countries of its/their instrument(s) of accession with the U.S. Government.

It may not be feasible for countries invited to join to provide assurances that all domestic requirements for it/them to do so have been met together with formal notification of its/their desire to join. Precision may therefore be required on this point. It will be important, however, to avoid legislative ratification procedures for new accessions going forward in existing Allied countries without assurance that the country concerned wants to and will accede.

82. It will need to be decided to what extent preparations for membership by countries can be undertaken before formal accession or whether many of these can be left until after formal accession. When to deal with budgetary and administrative issues will need to be decided. Consultations regarding accession with any country concerned should not delay those with any other, i.e. the pace of movement towards accession by a number of invited countries should not be dictated by that of the slowest.

Source: Study on NATO Enlargement, 3/9/1995, www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_24733.htm (retrieved 08.07.2020). The English text on the NATO website contains the wrong numbering of chapters 46, 47, 48, which causes the rest of the text to be renumbered. The correct continuous numbering has been kept here.


31.

Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers Session.
Final Communique,
Brussels, 17–18 December 1996

[...]\textsuperscript{109}

External Adaptation

27. We attach great importance to the various aspects of the Alliance’s external adaptation, including the preparations for opening the Alliance to new members, the enhancement of the Partnership for Peace, and the quest for close and cooperative relations with all our Partners, and in particular Russia and Ukraine.

28. We look forward to the prospect of one or more countries being invited by our Heads of State and Government to begin accession negotiations, while recalling that the Alliance will remain open to the accession of further members as stated by Foreign Ministers last week\textsuperscript{110}. The Council in Permanent Session has been tasked to prepare comprehensive recommendations for decisions to be taken by the Summit on which country or countries to invite to begin accession negotiations. The accession of new members will, like other aspects of the Alliance’s adaptation, help to consolidate the security and stability of the entire Euro-Atlantic area. Against this background we reviewed the results of the intensified dialogue on enlargement conducted with interested Partners during the past year. In the course of these frank and detailed discussions, we have learned much about the

\textsuperscript{109} Omitted sections include the NATO position on its current work.

\textsuperscript{110} It concerns the Brussels’ session of the foreign ministers of the North Atlantic Council on 10\textsuperscript{th} December 1996, where it was announced that a NATO summit would be held in Madrid on 8\textsuperscript{th} and 9\textsuperscript{th} July. Its programme included, i.a.: “to invite one or more countries that have expressed an interest in joining the Alliance to start accession talks” and “to intensify and consolidate relations with Russia beyond the Partnership for Peace in order to reach agreement as soon as possible on the development of a strengthened and stable partnership in the area of security.” The heads of diplomacy of the allied countries confirmed, i.a., NATO’s support for reforms in Russia, welcomed the progress of the peace process in Chechnya, Russia’s involvement in the Partnership for Peace, cooperation with European institutions and its participation in IFOR activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Above all, NATO declared its willingness to develop a lasting partnership with Russia based on a document in the form of a charter that stipulates the principles, objectives, forms and mechanisms of cooperation. This was the announcement of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, signed even before the Madrid Summit on 27 May 1997.
contribution that individual Partners could make to the Alliance, and in turn have given a fuller understanding of the rights and obligations of membership to all those countries who have expressed an interest in NATO membership. We welcomed the decision to continue such a dialogue as agreed by Foreign Ministers last week. As part of a comprehensive process to prepare for the political decisions to be taken at the Summit, we direct the Council in Permanent Session, within the overall mandate from Foreign Ministers to elaborate political guidance, to task the NATO Military Authorities to carry out for those countries, on the basis of the general considerations set out in the Enlargement Study, analyses of the military factors associated with the accession of potential new members. At the same time, we direct the Council in Permanent Session to task the committees responsible for financial matters to assess the resource implications. This work should be completed as soon as possible.

29. We reaffirm that the nuclear forces of the Allies continue to play a unique and essential role in the Alliance’s strategy of war prevention. New members, who will be full members of the Alliance in all respects, will be expected to support the concept of deterrence and the essential role nuclear weapons play in the Alliance’s strategy. Enlarging the Alliance will not require a change in NATO’s current nuclear posture, and therefore, NATO countries have no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy -- and we do not foresee any future need to do so.\textsuperscript{111}


\textsuperscript{111} The provision of NATO’s unilateral commitment was then repeated in NATO’s Part IV—Russia Founding Act.
Statement by the North Atlantic Council on Collective Defence and Other Missions, Brussels, Belgium, 14 March 1997

At its meeting today, the North Atlantic Council, under the chairmanship of the Secretary General, Mr. Javier Solana, decided to issue the following Unilateral Statement:

“In the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defence and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.”


The concept of “substantial combat forces” has never been officially clarified in any document recognised by Russia and NATO. A statement in this form was repeated in many subsequent documents of the North Atlantic Council and was also included in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act. Two cases deserve special attention: 1) in section 16 of the Communiques of NATO Ministers of Defence issued on 12 June 1997 following the session of the North Atlantic Council, the quoted text was extended with an important comment: “It will be important to make sure that the military capabilities of the Member States will be able to meet the requirements of this unilateral declaration, which is fully in line with the NATO Strategic Concept on increased flexibility and mobility of forces,” see: Texts of Statements and Communiques Issued at Meetings of the North Atlantic Council, Defence Planning Committee/Nuclear Planning Group and North Atlantic Cooperation Council during 1997, NATO Office of Information and Press, 1997, p. 24. It was an important reservation on the need to develop the capacity to deal with military demands under the conditions imposed by political constraints, (2) in sec. 9 of the Statement by the North Atlantic Council and the three countries invited to join at the foreign minister level on the CFE Treaty of 8 December 1998, the text was supplemented by the provision: “The governments of the sixteen NATO member states uphold, and the governments of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary and the Republic of Poland subscribe to this declaration in its entirety,” see: Texts of Statements and Communiques Issued at Meetings of the North Atlantic Council, Defence Planning Committee/Nuclear Planning Group and North Atlantic Cooperation Council during 1998, NATO Office of Information and Press, 1998, p. 81. This was de facto commitment of the candidates for membership (at the beginning of their accession) to confirm acceptance of the allied declarations (previously made among the 16 NATO countries).

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its member States, on the one hand, and the Russian Federation, on the other hand, hereinafter referred to as NATO and Russia, based on an enduring political commitment undertaken at the highest political level, will build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy and cooperative security.\(^{113}\)

NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries. They share the goal of overcoming the vestiges of earlier confrontation and competition and of strengthening mutual trust and cooperation. The present Act reaffirms the determination of NATO and Russia to give concrete substance to their shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, whole and free, to the benefit of all its peoples. Making this commitment at the highest political level marks the beginning of a fundamentally new relationship between NATO and Russia. They intend to develop, on the basis of common interest, reciprocity and transparency a strong, stable and enduring partnership.

This Act defines the goals and mechanism of consultation, cooperation, joint decision-making and joint action that will constitute the core of the mutual relations between NATO and Russia.

NATO has undertaken a historic transformation—a process that will continue. In 1991 the Alliance revised its strategic doctrine to take account of the new security environment in Europe. Accordingly, NATO has radically reduced and continues the adaptation of its conventional and nuclear forces. While preserving the capability to meet the commitments undertaken in the Washington Treaty, NATO has expanded and will continue to expand its political functions, and taken on new missions of peacekeeping and crisis management in support of the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to address new security challenges in close association with other countries and international organisations. NATO is in the process of developing the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within

\(^{113}\) In simple terms, this is about security as a result of cooperation between states based on principles and mechanisms they recognise.
the Alliance. It will continue to develop a broad and dynamic pattern of cooperation with OSCE participating States in particular through the Partnership for Peace and is working with Partner countries on the initiative to establish a Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. NATO member States have decided to examine NATO’s Strategic Concept to ensure that it is fully consistent with Europe’s new security situation and challenges.

Russia is continuing the building of a democratic society and the realisation of its political and economic transformation. It is developing the concept of its national security and revising its military doctrine to ensure that they are fully consistent with new security realities. Russia has carried out deep reductions in its armed forces, has withdrawn its forces on an unprecedented scale from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic countries and withdrawn all its nuclear weapons back to its own national territory. Russia is committed to further reducing its conventional and nuclear forces. It is actively participating in peacekeeping operations in support of the UN and the OSCE, as well as in crisis management in different areas of the world. Russia is contributing to the multinational forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I. Principles

Proceeding from the principle that the security of all states in the Euro-Atlantic community is indivisible, NATO and Russia will work together to contribute to the establishment in Europe of common and comprehensive security based on the allegiance to shared values, commitments and norms of behaviour in the interests of all states. NATO and Russia will help to strengthen the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, including developing further its role as a primary instrument in preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict rehabilitation and regional security cooperation, as well as in enhancing its operational capabilities to carry out these tasks. The OSCE, as the only pan-European security organisation, has a key role in European peace and stability. In strengthening the OSCE, NATO and Russia will cooperate to prevent any possibility of returning to a Europe of division and confrontation, or the isolation of any state.

Consistent with the OSCE’s work on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century, and taking into account the decisions of the Lisbon Summit concerning a Charter on European security, NATO and Russia will seek the widest possible
cooperation among participating States of the OSCE with the aim of creating in Europe a common space of security and stability, without dividing lines or spheres of influence limiting the sovereignty of any state.

NATO and Russia start from the premise that the shared objective of strengthening security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area for the benefit of all countries requires a response to new risks and challenges, such as aggressive nationalism, proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, terrorism, persistent abuse of human rights and of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities and unresolved territorial disputes, which pose a threat to common peace, prosperity and stability.

This Act does not affect, and cannot be regarded as affecting, the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for maintaining international peace and security, or the role of the OSCE as the inclusive and comprehensive organisation for consultation, decision-making and cooperation in its area and as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter.

In implementing the provisions in this Act, NATO and Russia will observe in good faith their obligations under international law and international instruments, including the obligations of the United Nations Charter and the provisions of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights as well as their commitments under the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent OSCE documents, including the Charter of Paris and the documents adopted at the Lisbon OSCE Summit.

To achieve the aims of this Act, NATO and Russia will base their relations on a shared commitment to the following principles:

– development, on the basis of transparency, of a strong, stable, enduring and equal partnership and of cooperation to strengthen security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area;

– acknowledgement of the vital role that democracy, political pluralism, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and civil liberties and the development of free market economies play in the development of common prosperity and comprehensive security;

– refraining from the threat or use of force against each other as well as against any other state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence in any manner inconsistent with the United Nations Charter and with the Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States contained in the Helsinki Final Act;
– respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security, the inviolability of borders and peoples’ right of self-determination as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE documents;
– mutual transparency in creating and implementing defence policy and military doctrines;
– prevention of conflicts and settlement of disputes by peaceful means in accordance with UN and OSCE principles;
– support, on a case-by-case basis, of peacekeeping operations carried out under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE.

II. Mechanism for Consultation and Cooperation, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council

To carry out the activities and aims provided for by this Act and to develop common approaches to European security and to political problems, NATO and Russia will create the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. The central objective of this Permanent Joint Council will be to build increasing levels of trust, unity of purpose and habits of consultation and cooperation between NATO and Russia, in order to enhance each other’s security and that of all nations in the Euro-Atlantic area and diminish the security of none. If disagreements arise, NATO and Russia will endeavour to settle them on the basis of goodwill and mutual respect within the framework of political consultations.

The Permanent Joint Council will provide a mechanism for consultations, coordination and, to the maximum extent possible, where appropriate, for joint decisions and joint action with respect to security issues of common concern. The consultations will not extend to internal matters of either NATO, NATO member States or Russia.

The shared objective of NATO and Russia is to identify and pursue as many opportunities for joint action as possible. As the relationship develops, they expect that additional opportunities for joint action will emerge.

The Permanent Joint Council will be the principal venue of consultation between NATO and Russia in times of crisis or for any other situation affecting peace and stability. Extraordinary meetings of the Council will take place in addition to its regular meetings to allow for prompt consultations in case of emergencies. In this context, NATO and Russia will promptly consult within the Permanent Joint
Council in case one of the Council members perceives a threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security.

The activities of the Permanent Joint Council will be built upon the principles of reciprocity and transparency. In the course of their consultations and cooperation, NATO and Russia will inform each other regarding the respective security-related challenges they face and the measures that each intends to take to address them.

Provisions of this Act do not provide NATO or Russia, in any way, with a right of veto over the actions of the other nor do they infringe upon or restrict the rights of NATO or Russia to independent decision-making and action. They cannot be used as a means to disadvantage the interests of other states.

The Permanent Joint Council will meet at various levels and in different forms, according to the subject matter and the wishes of NATO and Russia. The Permanent Joint Council will meet at the level of Foreign Ministers and at the level of Defence Ministers twice annually, and also monthly at the level of ambassadors/permanent representatives to the North Atlantic Council.

The Permanent Joint Council may also meet, as appropriate, at the level of Heads of State and Government.

The Permanent Joint Council may establish committees or working groups for individual subjects or areas of cooperation on an ad hoc or permanent basis, as appropriate.

Under the auspices of the Permanent Joint Council, military representatives and Chiefs of Staff will also meet; meetings of Chiefs of Staff will take place no less than twice a year, and also monthly at military representatives level. Meetings of military experts may be convened, as appropriate.

The Permanent Joint Council will be chaired jointly by the Secretary General of NATO, a representative of one of the NATO member States on a rotation basis, and a representative of Russia.

To support the work of the Permanent Joint Council, NATO and Russia will establish the necessary administrative structures.

Russia will establish a Mission to NATO headed by a representative at the rank of Ambassador. A senior military representative and his staff will be part of this Mission for the purposes of the military cooperation. NATO retains the possibility of establishing an appropriate presence in Moscow, the modalities of which remain to be determined.

The agenda for regular sessions will be established jointly. Organisational arrangements and rules of procedure for the Permanent
Joint Council will be worked out. These arrangements will be in place for the inaugural meeting of the Permanent Joint Council which will be held no later than four months after the signature of this Act.

The Permanent Joint Council will engage in three distinct activities:
– consulting on the topics in Section III of this Act and on any other political or security issue determined by mutual consent;
– on the basis of these consultations, developing joint initiatives on which NATO and Russia would agree to speak or act in parallel;
– once consensus has been reached in the course of consultation, making joint decisions and taking joint action on a case-by-case basis, including participation, on an equitable basis, in the planning and preparation of joint operations, including peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE.

Any actions undertaken by NATO or Russia, together or separately, must be consistent with the United Nations Charter and the OSCE’s governing principles.

Recognizing the importance of deepening contacts between the legislative bodies of the participating States to this Act, NATO and Russia will also encourage expanded dialogue and cooperation between the North Atlantic Assembly and the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.

III. Areas for Consultation and Cooperation

In building their relationship, NATO and Russia will focus on specific areas of mutual interest. They will consult and strive to cooperate to the broadest possible degree in the following areas:
– issues of common interest related to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area or to concrete crises, including the contribution of NATO and Russia to security and stability in this area;
– conflict prevention, including preventive diplomacy, crisis management and conflict resolution taking into account the role and responsibility of the UN and the OSCE and the work of these organisations in these fields;
– joint operations, including peacekeeping operations, on a case-by-case basis, under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE, and if Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) are used in such cases, participation in them at an early stage;
– participation of Russia in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace;
– exchange of information and consultation on strategy, defence policy, the military doctrines of NATO and Russia, and budgets and infrastructure development programmes;
  – arms control issues;
  – nuclear safety issues, across their full spectrum;
  – preventing the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and their delivery means, combatting nuclear trafficking and strengthening cooperation in specific arms control areas, including political and defence aspects of proliferation;
  – possible cooperation in Theatre Missile Defence;
  – enhanced regional air traffic safety, increased air traffic capacity and reciprocal exchanges, as appropriate, to promote confidence through increased measures of transparency and exchanges of information in relation to air defence and related aspects of airspace management/control. This will include exploring possible cooperation on appropriate air defence related matters;
  – increasing transparency, predictability and mutual confidence regarding the size and roles of the conventional forces of member States of NATO and Russia;
  – reciprocal exchanges, as appropriate, on nuclear weapons issues, including doctrines and strategy of NATO and Russia;
  – coordinating a programme of expanded cooperation between respective military establishments, as further detailed below;
  – pursuing possible armaments-related cooperation through association of Russia with NATO’s Conference of National Armaments Directors;
  – conversion of defence industries;
  – developing mutually agreed cooperative projects in defence-related economic, environmental and scientific fields;
  – conducting joint initiatives and exercises in civil emergency preparedness and disaster relief;
  – combatting terrorism and drug trafficking;
  – improving public understanding of evolving relations between NATO and Russia, including the establishment of a NATO documentation centre or information office in Moscow.

Other areas can be added by mutual agreement.

IV. Political-Military Matters

NATO and Russia affirm their shared desire to achieve greater stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area.
The member States of NATO reiterate that they have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy—and do not foresee any future need to do so.\textsuperscript{114} This subsumes the fact that NATO has decided that it has no intention, no plan, and no reason to establish nuclear weapon storage sites on the territory of those members, whether through the construction of new nuclear storage facilities or the adaptation of old nuclear storage facilities. Nuclear storage sites are understood to be facilities specifically designed for the stationing of nuclear weapons, and include all types of hardened above or below ground facilities (storage bunkers or vaults) designed for storing nuclear weapons.

Recognising the importance of the adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) for the broader context of security in the OSCE area and the work on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century, the member States of NATO and Russia will work together in Vienna with the other States Parties to adapt the CFE Treaty\textsuperscript{115} to enhance its viability and effectiveness, taking into account Europe’s changing security environment and the legitimate security interests of all OSCE participating States. They share the objective of concluding an adaptation agreement as expeditiously as possible and, as a first step in this process, they will, together with other States Parties to the CFE Treaty, seek to conclude as soon as possible a framework agreement setting forth the basic elements of an adapted CFE Treaty, consistent with the objectives and principles of the Document on Scope and Parameters agreed at Lisbon in December 1996.

NATO and Russia believe that an important goal of CFE Treaty adaptation should be a significant lowering in the total amount of Treaty-Limited Equipment permitted in the Treaty’s area of application

\textsuperscript{114} The provision reiterated the NATO unilateral declaration contained in the North Atlantic Council communiqué issued after the meeting of NATO defence ministers in Brussels on 17–18 December 1996. The remainder of the paragraph of the Act extended the original commitments of the Alliance to include provisions on restrictions on military infrastructure.

\textsuperscript{115} The so-called Adapted CFE Treaty was signed in Istanbul on November 19, 1999 as an agreement between the participating states of the original CFE Treaty (which was an agreement between the then military blocs). It established national (and not bloc aggregate) and territorial ceilings for the armed forces stationed there verification mechanisms. The treaty (ratified by Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine) did not enter into force as ratification by NATO countries was conditional on Russia meeting its obligations as agreed at the OSCE summit in Istanbul. They concerned the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia and Moldova.
compatible with the legitimate defence requirements of each State Party. NATO and Russia encourage all States Parties to the CFE Treaty to consider reductions in their CFE equipment entitlements, as part of an overall effort to achieve lower equipment levels that are consistent with the transformation of Europe’s security environment.

The member States of NATO and Russia commit themselves to exercise restraint during the period of negotiations, as foreseen in the Document on Scope and Parameters, in relation to the current postures and capabilities of their conventional armed forces—in particular with respect to their levels of forces and deployments—in the Treaty’s area of application, in order to avoid developments in the security situation in Europe diminishing the security of any State Party. This commitment is without prejudice to possible voluntary decisions by the individual States Parties to reduce their force levels or deployments, or to their legitimate security interests.

The member States of NATO and Russia proceed on the basis that adaptation of the CFE Treaty should help to ensure equal security for all States Parties irrespective of their membership of a politico-military alliance, both to preserve and strengthen stability and continue to prevent any destabilizing increase of forces in various regions of Europe and in Europe as a whole. An adapted CFE Treaty should also further enhance military transparency by extended information exchange and verification, and permit the possible accession by new States Parties.

The member States of NATO and Russia propose to other CFE States Parties to carry out such adaptation of the CFE Treaty so as to enable States Parties to reach, through a transparent and cooperative process, conclusions regarding reductions they might be prepared to take and resulting national Treaty-Limited Equipment ceilings. These will then be codified as binding limits in the adapted Treaty to be agreed by consensus of all States Parties, and reviewed in 2001 and at five-year intervals thereafter. In doing so, the States Parties will take into account all the levels of Treaty-Limited Equipment established for the Atlantic-to-the-Urals area by the original CFE Treaty, the substantial reductions that have been carried out since then, the changes to the situation in Europe and the need to ensure that the security of no state is diminished.

The member States of NATO and Russia reaffirm that States Parties to the CFE Treaty should maintain only such military capabilities, individually or in conjunction with others, as are commensurate with
individual or collective legitimate security needs, taking into account their international obligations, including the CFE Treaty.

Each State-Party will base its agreement to the provisions of the adapted Treaty on all national ceilings of the States Parties, on its projections of the current and future security situation in Europe.

In addition, in the negotiations on the adaptation of the CFE Treaty, the member States of NATO and Russia will, together with other States Parties, seek to strengthen stability by further developing measures to prevent any potentially threatening build-up of conventional forces in agreed regions of Europe, to include Central and Eastern Europe.

NATO and Russia have clarified their intentions with regard to their conventional force postures in Europe’s new security environment and are prepared to consult on the evolution of these postures in the framework of the Permanent Joint Council.

NATO reiterates that in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defence and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces. Accordingly, it will have to rely on adequate infrastructure commensurate with the above tasks. In this context, reinforcement may take place, when necessary, in the event of defence against a threat of aggression and missions in support of peace consistent with the United Nations Charter and the OSCE governing principles, as well as for exercises consistent with the adapted CFE Treaty, the provisions of the Vienna Document 1994\(^{116}\) and mutually agreed transparency measures. Russia will exercise similar restraint in its conventional force deployments in Europe.

The member States of NATO and Russia will strive for greater transparency, predictability and mutual confidence with regard to their armed forces. They will comply fully with their obligations under the Vienna Document 1994 and develop cooperation with the other OSCE participating States, including negotiations in the appropriate format, inter alia within the OSCE to promote confidence and security.

The member States of NATO and Russia will use and improve existing arms control regimes and confidence-building measures to create security relations based on peaceful cooperation.

NATO and Russia, in order to develop cooperation between their military establishments, will expand political-military consultations and cooperation through the Permanent Joint Council with an

enhanced dialogue between the senior military authorities of NATO and its member States and of Russia. They will implement a programme of significantly expanded military activities and practical cooperation between NATO and Russia at all levels. Consistent with the tenets of the Permanent Joint Council, this enhanced military-to-military dialogue will be built upon the principle that neither party views the other as a threat nor seeks to disadvantage the other’s security. This enhanced military-to-military dialogue will include regularly-scheduled reciprocal briefings on NATO and Russian military doctrine, strategy and resultant force posture and will include the broad possibilities for joint exercises and training.

To support this enhanced dialogue and the military components of the Permanent Joint Council, NATO and Russia will establish military liaison missions at various levels on the basis of reciprocity and further mutual arrangements.

To enhance their partnership and ensure this partnership is grounded to the greatest extent possible in practical activities and direct cooperation, NATO’s and Russia’s respective military authorities will explore the further development of a concept for joint NATO-Russia peacekeeping operations. This initiative should build upon the positive experience of working together in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the lessons learned there will be used in the establishment of Combined Joint Task Forces.

The present Act takes effect upon the date of its signature.

NATO and Russia will take the proper steps to ensure its implementation in accordance with their procedures.

The present Act is established in two originals in the French, English and Russian language.

The Secretary General of NATO and the Government of the Russian Federation will provide the Secretary General of the United Nations and the Secretary General of the OSCE with the text of this Act with the request to circulate it to all members of their Organisations.

1. The member countries of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and participating countries of the Partnership for Peace, determined to raise to a qualitatively new level their political and military cooperation, building upon the success of NACC and PfP, have decided to establish a Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. In doing so, they reaffirm their joint commitment to strengthen and extend peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, on the basis of the shared values and principles which underlie their cooperation, notably those set out in the Framework Document of the Partnership for Peace.

2. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council will be a new cooperative mechanism which will form a framework for enhanced efforts in both an expanded political dimension of partnership and practical cooperation under PfP. It will take full account of and complement the respective activities of the OSCE and other relevant institutions such as the European Union, the Western European Union and the Council of Europe.

3. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, as the successor to NACC, will provide the overarching framework for consultations among its members on a broad range of political and security-related issues, as part of a process that will develop through practice. PfP in its enhanced form will be a clearly identifiable element within this flexible framework. Its basic elements will remain valid. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council will build upon the existing framework of NATO’s outreach activities preserving their advantages to promote cooperation in a transparent way. The expanded political dimension of consultation and cooperation which the Council will offer will allow Partners, if they wish, to develop a direct political relationship individually or in smaller groups with the Alliance. In addition, the Council will provide the framework to afford Partner countries, to the maximum extent possible, increased decision-making opportunities relating to activities in which they participate.

4. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council will retain two important principles which have underpinned the success of cooperation between Allies and Partners so far. It will be inclusive, in that opportunities for political consultation and practical cooperation will be open to all
Allies and Partners equally. It will also maintain self-differentiation, in that Partners will be able to decide for themselves the level and areas of cooperation with NATO. Arrangements under the Council will not affect commitments already undertaken bilaterally between Partners and NATO, or commitments in the PfP Framework Document including the consultation provisions of its article 8.

5. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council will meet, as required, in different formats:

– In plenary session to address political and security-related issues of common concern and to provide information as appropriate on activities with limited participation.

– In a limited format between the Alliance and open-ended groups of Partners to focus on functional matters or, on an ad hoc basis, on appropriate regional matters. In such cases, the other EAPC members will be kept informed about the results.

– In a limited format between the Alliance and groups of Partners who participate with NATO in a peace support operation or in the Planning and Review Process, or in other cases for which this format has been agreed. The other members of the EAPC will be informed as appropriate.

– In an individual format between the Alliance and one Partner.

Structure

6. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council will meet, as a general rule, at Ambassadorial level in Brussels and on a monthly basis.

7. The Council will meet twice a year at both Foreign Ministers and Defence Ministers level; additional meetings can be envisaged as required. It may also meet at the level of Heads of State or Government, when appropriate.

8. The Council will be chaired by the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Alliance or his Deputy. The representative of a member country will be named President d’Honneur for six months according to modalities to be determined.

9. The work of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council will be supported regularly by the Political-Military Steering Committee (PMSC) and the Political Committee (PC) in their configurations at Alliance with all Partners. On an ad hoc basis an EAPC Senior Political Committee would address issues referred to it, as required. The EAPC will consider, based on evolving practical experience, whether this support could be improved by an EAPC Steering Committee (EAPC-SC) which would integrate the functions of the former enlarged Political Committee and the PMSC in NACC/PfP format. The PMSC will meet,
as appropriate, in an Alliance with individual Partners or Alliance with groups of Partners (e.g. PARP) configuration. The PMSC and PC with Partners will meet at least once a month, or more frequently if required. Other NATO Committees will expand opportunities for work with Partners on cooperation issues and will inform the EAPC on their work in this regard. Their activities will become part of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council framework. An important part of this framework will be new opportunities for Partner consultations with the Military Committee. The Military Committee will also play a major role in the expanded range of opportunities for consultation and cooperation provided by the future support structure for the EAPC.

Substance

10. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council will adopt at the time of its establishment the NACC Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation and will replace it with an EAPC Work Plan as part of its future work. The activities included in the Partnership Work Programme (PWP) will also come under the general purview of the EAPC.

11. Specific subject areas on which Allies and Partners would consult, in the framework of the EAPC, might include but not be limited to: political and security related matters; crisis management; regional matters; arms control issues; nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) proliferation and defence issues; international terrorism; defence planning and budgets and defence policy and strategy; security impacts of economic developments. There will also be scope for consultations and cooperation on issues such as: civil emergency and disaster preparedness; armaments cooperation under the aegis of the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD); nuclear safety; defence related environmental issues; civil-military coordination of air traffic management and control; scientific cooperation; and issues related to peace support operations.

Eligibility

12. Present NACC members and PfP participating countries automatically become members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council if they so desire. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council is open to the accession of other OSCE participating states able and willing to accept its basic principles and to contribute to its goals. New
members may join the EAPC by joining the Partnership for Peace through signing the PfP Framework Document and by stating their acceptance of the concept of the EAPC as laid out in this document. The EAPC would be invited to endorse the accession of its new members.

35.

The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation
Approved by the Decree of President Boris Yeltsin
of December 17, 1997

[...]\(^{117}\)

I. Russia in the international community

At present, the international situation is mainly characterised by the strengthening of the trend towards a multipolar world. This is reflected in the strengthening of the economic and political positions of a significant number of countries and their integration groups, and in the improvement of mechanisms for multilateral management of international political, economic, financial, and informational processes. While military and power factors remain important in international relations, economic, political, scientific and technical, environmental, and informational factors play an increasing role. At the same time, international competition in gaining control over natural, technological, and information resources and distribution markets is increasing.

The emergence of a multipolar world will be long term. At the current stage of the process, recurrences of attempts to develop a structure for international relations based on unilateral, including military-force, solutions to key global policy issues are still strongly present.

The growing gap between developed and developing countries will also influence the pace and directions of shaping the new structure of international relations.

The current period in the development of international relations opens up new opportunities for the Russian Federation to ensure its security, but is linked to a number of threats related to Russia’s change of status in the world and to difficulties in carrying out internal reforms.

The preconditions for the demilitarisation of international relations, the strengthening of the role of law in resolving disputed inter-state problems, and the danger of direct aggression against the Russian Federation have decreased. All this opens up new possibilities for mobilisation of resources to address the country’s internal problems.

\(^{117}\) The formal introduction has been omitted.
There are prospects for wider integration of the Russian Federation into the world economy, including international credit and financial institutions—the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. There is a trend towards increased cooperation between Russia and CIS member states.

Russia’s community of interests with many countries in such international security issues as preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, resolving and preventing regional conflicts, preventing international terrorism and drug trafficking, and addressing serious global environmental issues, including nuclear and radiological security, has expanded. This significantly increases the ability to guarantee Russia’s national security by non-military means—through legal, political, economic and other treaties.

At the same time, Russia’s influence on resolving fundamental issues of international life affecting the interests of our country has significantly decreased. Under these conditions, the aspiration of a number of countries to weaken Russia’s position in the political, economic, and military spheres increased.

The process of creating a common and comprehensive security model for Europe, based on the principles largely initiated by Russia, has faced significant difficulties. The prospect of NATO’s enlargement to the East is unacceptable for Russia, because it is a threat to its national security. Multilateral peace and security mechanisms at global (UN) and regional (OSCE, CIS) levels are still insufficiently effective, which limits our ability to use such mechanisms to ensure national security interests through political and legal means. Russia is, to some extent, isolated from integration processes in the Asia-Pacific region. All this is unacceptable to Russia as an influential European-Asian power with national interests in Europe, the Middle East, Central and South Asia, and the Asia-Pacific region.

[...]

II. The threats to the national security of the Russian Federation

[...]

Threats to the national security of the Russian Federation in the international sphere are manifested in the attempts of other countries to counteract the strengthening of Russia as one of the influential centres

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118 Sections concerning the analysis of the situation in Russia and its national interests have been omitted.
119 Sections on internal threats have been omitted.
of the emerging multipolar world. This is reflected in actions aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, including the use of inter-ethnic, religious, and other internal contradictions, as well as in territorial claims, referring, in individual cases, to the lack of a specific legal and treaty regulation of state borders. With their policy, such states strive to reduce the significance of the Russian Federation in solving key problems of the international community and in the activities of international organisations. In general, this may lead to a reduction in Russia’s influence, a violation of its most important national interests and a weakening of its position in Europe, the Middle East, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia.

The threat of political, ethnic, and economic crises in the CIS countries, which may delay or destroy the integration process, is particularly important for our country. It is extremely important for the Russian Federation to strengthen these countries as friendly, independent, stable, and democratic.

Despite positive changes in the world, threats to the national security of the Russian Federation in the defence sphere remain. Given the profound changes in its relations with other major powers, it can be concluded that the threat of large-scale aggression against Russia in the foreseeable future practically does not exist. At the same time, attempts at violent rivalry with Russia cannot be ruled out. The most real threat to Russia in the defence sphere are existing outbreaks of local wars and armed conflicts near its national border.

The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their production technologies and means of delivery pose a serious threat, mainly in Russia’s neighbouring countries or regions.

At the same time, the spectrum of threats related to international terrorism, including the possible use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, is expanding.

The maintenance or establishment, by major powers, (and their coalitions) of strong groupings of armed forces in regions adjacent to Russian territory continues to pose a threat to its national security in the defence sphere. Even in the absence of aggressive intentions towards Russia, these groupings represent a potential military threat.

The enlargement to the East and the transformation of NATO into the dominant military and political power in Europe pose a threat of a new division of the continent, extremely dangerous in the situation of maintaining mobile strike groupings and nuclear weapons in Europe,
as well as in the face of the insufficient effectiveness of multilateral peacekeeping mechanisms.

The technological superiority of the world’s leading powers and the increase in their potential to develop next-generation weapons and military equipment can lead to a qualitative new stage in the development of the arms race.

[...] 120

There has been a tendency to increase the threat of human intelligence, operational and technical penetration of foreign intelligence in Russia. The state authorities, political parties and other social associations, banks and other credit organisations, industrial companies, scientific and research organisations and the mass media are the targets of their operation. The result of this operation may be intensified counteraction of the policy direction chosen by Russia, violation of its economy through involvement in unfavourable commercial-economic transactions, unreasonable military-technical cooperation, development of scientific and experimental research in areas with no prospects, drawing Russia into regional conflicts and destabilising the political situation in the country.

The analysis of the threats to the national security of the Russian Federation shows that the most important of them, now and in the foreseeable future, are not militarily directed and are mainly internal in nature, they focus on the domestic, economic, social, environmental, information and spiritual spheres.

The development of qualitatively new relations with the world’s most important countries and the absence of the threat of large-scale aggression against Russia, while maintaining its nuclear deterrent potential, make it possible to relocate state and society’s resources to solve serious internal problems in the first place.

III. Ensuring national security of the Russian Federation

[...] 121

Russia is also interested in equal participation in global, European, and Asian economic and political structures. Therefore, in seeking mutually beneficial cooperation, the Russian Federation will further develop a constructive partnership with the United States, the European Union, China, Japan, India, and other countries. This is in line with the political and economic interests of the Russian Federation and

120 Section on problems in the armed forces has been omitted.
121 Sections on activities in the internal sphere, economic activities, and actions towards the CIS countries have been omitted.
will ensure that it can be fully integrated into all organisations and institutions of collective management of global political processes.

An invariable condition for the implementation of Russia's foreign policy efforts should be the creation of a model for ensuring global, regional, and sub-regional security for the 21st century, based on the principles of equality and indivisibility of security for all. This implies the establishment of a fundamentally new Euro-Atlantic security system in which the OSCE will play a coordinating role; intensified efforts to establish multilateral structures to ensure cooperation in the sphere of international security in the Asia-Pacific and South Asia regions; active participation of Russia as a permanent member of the UN Security Council in regional crisis and conflict resolution and prevention; further improvement of international arms control and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; resolute defence of the legitimate rights and interests of Russian citizens living abroad, in strict compliance with the standards of international law.

An important direction of the Russian Federation in ensuring national security in the sphere of foreign policy is to help resolve regional and local conflicts through peacekeeping activities. In this process, it is necessary to make maximum use of the collective efforts of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the United Nations in this direction, and in the future also of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

[...]

Translated by Mirosław Łukawski. Verified with the Russian original by Marek Menkiszak.


Sections on defence policy, the system of state governance, and the conclusion have been omitted.
36.

Speech by the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation at the UN Sergey Lavrov at the Security Council Meeting on the Situation In and Around Kosovo, New York, 24 March 1999

The Russian Federation is profoundly outraged at the use by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) of military force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In recent weeks, when we were constantly hearing threats—detrimental to the negotiating process—that there would be missile strikes against Serbian positions in Kosovo and other parts of Serbia, the Russian Government strongly proclaimed its categorical rejection of the use of force in contravention of decisions of the Security Council and issued repeated warnings about the long-term harmful consequences of this action not only for the prospects of a settlement of the Kosovo situation and for safeguarding security in the Balkans, but also for the stability of the entire modern multipolar system of international relations.

Those who are involved in this unilateral use of force against the sovereign Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—carried out in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and without the authorization of the Security Council—must realize the heavy responsibility they bear for subverting the Charter and other norms of international law and for attempting to establish in the world, de facto, the primacy of force and unilateral diktat.

The members of NATO are not entitled to decide the fate of other sovereign and independent States. They must not forget that they are not only members of their alliance, but also Members of the United Nations, and that it is their obligation to be guided by the United Nations Charter, in particular its Article 103, which clearly establishes the absolute priority for Members of the Organization of Charter obligations over any other international obligations.

Attempts to justify the NATO strikes with arguments about preventing a humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo are completely

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123 The U.S. and NATO military operation against the former Yugoslavia, which involved bombing its territory (including the rebellious province of Kosovo), was aimed at enforcing peace and preventing humanitarian disaster. Its initiators failed to obtain UN Security Council Resolution. The air operations lasted from 24 March to 10 June 1999. They led to Belgrade’s agreement to stop its military actions and to settle politically the Kosovo problem and to introduce a NATO-led international peacekeeping force (KFOR) to Kosovo.
untenable. Not only are these attempts in no way based on the Charter or other generally recognized rules of international law, but the unilateral use of force will lead precisely to a situation with truly devastating humanitarian consequences. Moreover, by the terms of the definition of aggression adopted by the General Assembly in 1974, “No consideration of whatever nature, whether political, economic, military or otherwise, may serve as a justification for aggression.” (General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX), annex, article 5, para. 1)

We certainly do not seek to defend violations of international humanitarian law by any party. But it is possible to combat violations of the law only with clean hands and only on the solid basis of the law. Otherwise lawlessness would spawn lawlessness. It would be unthinkable for a national court in a civilized democratic country to uphold illegal methods to combat crime. Attempts to apply a different standard to international law and to disregard its basic norms and principles create a dangerous precedent that could cause acute destabilization and chaos on the regional and global level. If we do not put an end to this very dangerous trend, the virus of illegal unilateral approaches could spread not merely to other geographical regions but to spheres of international relations other than questions of peace and security.

The fact that NATO has opted to use force in Kosovo raises very serious questions about the sincerity of the repeated assurances that that alliance was not claiming the role of the world’s policeman and was prepared to cooperate in the interests of common European security. In the light of this turn of events, we shall draw the appropriate conclusions in our relations and contacts with that organization.

NATO’s decision to use military force is particularly unacceptable from any point of view because the potential of political and diplomatic methods to yield a settlement in Kosovo has certainly not been exhausted. The enormous quantity of complicated work done by the international community has now been dealt a very powerful, a very grave and probably an irrevocable blow.

The Russian Federation vehemently demands the immediate cessation of this illegal military action against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. We reserve the right to raise in the Security Council the question of the adoption by the Council, under the United Nations Charter, of appropriate measures with respect to this situation, which has arisen as a result of NATO’s illegal actions and which poses a clear threat to international peace and security.
Today, the President of the Russian Federation, Boris N. Yeltsin, issued the following statement.\footnote{President Boris Yeltsin read his statement on Russian state television and then it was published by his administration.}

"Russia is profoundly outraged by NATO’s military action against sovereign Yugoslavia, which is nothing less than an act of open aggression.

Only the Security Council can decide on what measures, including the use of force, should be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security. The Security Council did not take such decisions with regard to Yugoslavia. Not only the Charter of the United Nations has been violated; the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and The Russian Federation has been violated as well. A dangerous precedent has been created regarding the policy of diktat and force, and the whole of the international rule of law has been threatened.

We are basically talking about an attempt by NATO to enter the twenty-first century in the uniform of the world’s policeman. Russia will never agree to that.

The Security Council must discuss the situation that has emerged and demand the immediate cessation of NATO’s use of force.

For its part, the leadership of the Russian Federation will review its relationship with NATO as an organization, which has shown disrespect for the fundamental basis of the system of international relations.

As President and Supreme Commander, I have already given the following instructions: to cut short the visit to the United States of the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, Yevgeny Primakov; to demand an urgent convening of a meeting of the Security Council of the United Nations and to seek an immediate cessation of NATO’s military action; to recall to Moscow the chief military representative of the Russian Federation to NATO; to suspend our participation in the Partnership for Peace programme and to end the carrying out of the programme on Russia-NATO partnership; and to postpone talks for the opening of a NATO liaison mission in Moscow.

I have already appealed to the President of the United States, Bill Clinton, and to the leaders of other NATO member countries to put an immediate end to this military adventure, which threatens the lives of peaceful people and could lead to an explosion of the situation in the Balkans."
A settlement of the situation in Kosovo, as the settlement of other similar problems, is only possible through negotiations. The quicker they are resumed, the greater the possibility for the international community to find a political settlement to the situation. Russia is prepared to interact with other members of the Contact Group in order to reach that goal.

Those who decided upon military adventure bear the full responsibility to their peoples and to the world community for the dire consequences of this for international stability.

If the military conflict increases, then Russia reserves the right to take adequate measures, including military measures, to ensure its own and common European security.”

37.


1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Washington to celebrate the 50th anniversary of NATO and to set forth our vision of the Alliance of the 21st century. The North Atlantic Alliance, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, remains the basis of our collective defence; it embodies the transatlantic link that binds North America and Europe in a unique defence and security partnership.

2. Fifty years ago, the North Atlantic Alliance was founded in troubled and uncertain times. It has withstood the test of five decades and allowed the citizens of Allied countries to enjoy an unprecedented period of peace, freedom and prosperity. Here in Washington, we have paid tribute to the achievements of the past and we have shaped a new Alliance to meet the challenges of the future. This new Alliance will be larger, more capable and more flexible, committed to collective defence and able to undertake new missions including contributing to effective conflict prevention and engaging actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations. The Alliance will work with other nations and organisations to advance security, prosperity and democracy throughout the Euro-Atlantic region. The presence today of three new Allies—the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland—demonstrates that we have overcome the division of Europe.

3. The Alliance takes the opportunity of this 50th anniversary to recognise and express its heartfelt appreciation for the commitment, sacrifice, resolve and loyalty of the servicemen and women of all Allies to the cause of freedom. The Alliance salutes these active and reserve forces’ essential contributions, which for 50 years have guaranteed freedom and safeguarded trans-Atlantic security. Our nations and our Alliance are in their debt and offer them profound thanks.

4. The NATO of the 21st century starts today—a NATO which retains the strengths of the past and has new missions, new members and new partnerships. To this end, we have:

– approved an updated Strategic Concept;
– reaffirmed our commitment to the enlargement process of the Alliance and approved a Membership Action Plan\textsuperscript{125} for countries wishing to join;

– completed the work on key elements of the Berlin Decisions\textsuperscript{126} on building the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance and decided to further enhance its effectiveness;

– launched the Defence Capabilities Initiative;\textsuperscript{127}

– intensified our relations with Partners through an enhanced and more operational Partnership for Peace and strengthened our consultations and co-operation within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council;

– enhanced the Mediterranean Dialogue;\textsuperscript{128} and

– decided to increase Alliance efforts against weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

5. As part of the Alliance’s adaptation to the new security challenges, we have updated our Strategic Concept to make it fully consistent with the Alliance’s new security environment. The updated Concept reaffirms our commitment to collective defence and the transatlantic link; takes account of the challenges the Alliance now faces; presents an Alliance ready and with a full range of capabilities

\textsuperscript{125} The details of the MAP are explained in sec. 7 of the Communique. The Membership Action Plan is still considered to be the main instrument for preparing candidates, and the invitation to participate in a MAP means that the country in question has acquired the official status of a candidate for membership.

\textsuperscript{126} It regards the so-called NATO Berlin decisions taken by the North Atlantic Council in the German capital in June 1996. They concerned political-military cooperation between NATO and the WEU in the implementation of European operations in which NATO would not be involved, and above all the principles of using allied forces and military capabilities (such as the command system) and assigning them tasks related to the preparation of such operations. The essence of these decisions was not only to increase the ability of European states to conduct autonomous military operations but also to prevent unnecessary duplication of command and planning structures. The details are explained in secs. 8–10 of the Communique. For more, see: The Final Communiqués of the Berlin session NAC of 3 June 1996, in: Texts of Statements and Communiqués Issued at Meetings of the North Atlantic Council, Defence Planning Committee/Nuclear Planning Group and North Atlantic Cooperation Council during 1996, NATO Office of Information and Press, 1996, pp. 5–17, especially secs. 7–9.

\textsuperscript{127} Details of the DCI are explained in sec. 11 of the Communique. It was one of the first programmes to increase the military and operational capabilities of NATO forces, their ability to cooperate in possible operations related to the state of the international security situation.

\textsuperscript{128} NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue is one of the political-military partnership programmes developed by the Alliance after the end of the Cold War, addressed to the countries of the Mediterranean basin. It has been operating since 1994 with the participation of Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Mauritania, and Tunisia.
to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area; reaffirms our commitment to building the ESDI within the Alliance; highlights the enhanced role of partnership and dialogue; underlines the need to develop defence capabilities to their full potential to meet the spectrum of Alliance missions, including forces which are more deployable, sustainable, survivable and able to engage effectively; and provides guidance to the NATO Military Authorities to this end.

6. To achieve its essential purpose, as an Alliance of nations committed to the Washington Treaty and the United Nations Charter, the Alliance performs the following fundamental security tasks:

Security: To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other through the threat or use of force.

Consultation: To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as an essential transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members’ security, and for appropriate co-ordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.

Deterrence and Defence: To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty.

And in order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area:

129 The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

130 The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

131 For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack: on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer; on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.
– Crisis Management: To stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in conformity with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations.

– Partnership: To promote wide-ranging partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, with the aim of increasing transparency, mutual confidence and the capacity for joint action with the Alliance.

7. We warmly welcome the participation of the three new Allies—the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland—in their first Alliance Summit meeting. Their accession to the North Atlantic Treaty opens a new chapter in the history of the Atlantic Alliance.

We reaffirm today our commitment to the openness of the Alliance under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty and in accordance with Paragraph 8 of the Madrid Summit Declaration. We pledge that NATO will continue to welcome new members in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and contribute to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. This is part of an evolutionary process that takes into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe. Our commitment to enlargement is part of a broader strategy of projecting stability and working together with our Partners to build a Europe whole and free. The ongoing enlargement process strengthens the Alliance and enhances the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic region. The three new members will not be the last.

At the Summit in Madrid we recognised the progress made by a number of countries aspiring to join the Alliance in meeting the responsibilities and obligations for possible membership.

Today we recognise and welcome the continuing efforts and progress in both Romania and Slovenia. We also recognise and welcome continuing efforts and progress in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Since the Madrid Summit, we note and welcome positive developments in Bulgaria. We also note and welcome recent positive developments in Slovakia. We are grateful for the co-operation of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with NATO in the present crisis and welcome its progress on reforms. We welcome Albania’s co-operation with the Alliance in the present crisis and encourage its reform efforts.

132 This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

133 Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
We welcome the efforts and progress aspiring members have made, since we last met, to advance political, military and economic reforms. We appreciate the results achieved, and look forward to further progress by these countries in strengthening their democratic institutions and in restructuring their economies and militaries. We take account of the efforts of these aspiring members, together with a number of other Partner countries, to improve relations with neighbours and contribute to security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic region. We look forward to further deepening our co-operation with aspiring countries and to increasing their political and military involvement in the work of the Alliance.

The Alliance expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the Alliance and that the inclusion would enhance overall European security and stability. To give substance to this commitment, NATO will maintain an active relationship with those nations that have expressed an interest in NATO membership as well as those who may wish to seek membership in the future. Those nations that have expressed an interest in becoming NATO members will remain under active consideration for future membership. No European democratic country whose admission would fulfil the objectives of the Treaty will be excluded from consideration, regardless of its geographic location, each being considered on its own merits. All states have the inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security. Furthermore, in order to enhance overall security and stability in Europe, further steps in the ongoing enlargement process of the Alliance should balance the security concerns of all Allies.

We welcome the aspirations of the nine countries currently interested in joining the Alliance. Accordingly, we are ready to provide advice, assistance and practical support. To this end, we approve today a Membership Action Plan which includes the following elements:

- the submission by aspiring members of individual annual national programmes on their preparations for possible future membership, covering political, economic, defence, resource, security and legal aspects;
- a focused and candid feedback mechanism on aspirant countries’ progress on their programmes that includes both political and technical advice, as well as annual 19+1 meetings at Council level to assess progress;
- a clearinghouse to help co-ordinate assistance by NATO and by member states to aspirant countries in the defence/military field;
- a defence planning approach for aspirants which includes elaboration and review of agreed planning targets.

We direct that NATO Foreign Ministers keep the enlargement process, including the implementation of the Membership Action Plan, under continual review and report to us. We will review the process at our next Summit meeting which will be held no later than 2002.

8. We reaffirm our commitment to preserve the transatlantic link, including our readiness to pursue common security objectives through the Alliance wherever possible. We are pleased with the progress achieved in implementing the Berlin decisions and reaffirm our strong commitment to pursue the process of reinforcing the European pillar of the Alliance on the basis of our Brussels Declaration of 1994 and of the principles agreed at Berlin in 1996. We note with satisfaction that the key elements of the Berlin decisions are being put in place. These include flexible options for the selection of a European NATO Commander and NATO Headquarters for WEU-led operations, as well as specific terms of reference for DSACEUR and an adapted CJTF concept. Close linkages between the two organisations have been established, including planning, exercises (in particular a joint crisis management exercise in 2000) and consultation, as well as a framework for the release and return of Alliance assets and capabilities.

9. We welcome the new impetus given to the strengthening of a common European policy in security and defence by the Amsterdam Treaty and the reflections launched since then in the WEU and—following the St. Malo Declaration\textsuperscript{134}—in the EU, including the Vienna European Council Conclusions. This is a process which has implications for all Allies. We confirm that a stronger European role will help contribute to the vitality of our Alliance for the 21st century, which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members. In this regard:

a. We acknowledge the resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged;

\textsuperscript{134} Declaration announced after the meeting between the French president and British prime minister on 4 December 1998 in Saint-Malo. It is considered to be the beginning of the creation of European security and defence policy and represents the ambition to create European forces capable of conducting autonomous military operations.
b. As this process goes forward, NATO and the EU should ensure the development of effective mutual consultation, co-operation and transparency, building on the mechanisms existing between NATO and the WEU;

c. We applaud the determination of both EU members and other European Allies to take the necessary steps to strengthen their defence capabilities, especially for new missions, avoiding unnecessary duplication;

d. We attach the utmost importance to ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European Allies in EU-led crisis response operations, building on existing consultation arrangements within the WEU. We also note Canada’s interest in participating in such operations under appropriate modalities.

e. We are determined that the decisions taken in Berlin in 1996, including the concept of using separable but not separate NATO assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations, should be further developed.

10. On the basis of the above principles and building on the Berlin decisions, we therefore stand ready to define and adopt the necessary arrangements for ready access by the European Union to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance, for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily as an Alliance. The Council in Permanent Session will approve these arrangements, which will respect the requirements of NATO operations and the coherence of its command structure, and should address:

a. Assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations;

b. The presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations;

c. Identification of a range of European command options for EU-led operations, further developing the role of DSACEUR in order for him to assume fully and effectively his European responsibilities;

d. The further adaptation of NATO’s defence planning system to incorporate more comprehensively the availability of forces for EU-led operations.

We task the Council in Permanent Session to address these measures on an ongoing basis, taking into account the evolution of relevant arrangements in the EU. The Council will make recommendations to the next Ministerial meeting for its consideration.

11. We have launched a Defence Capabilities Initiative to improve the defence capabilities of the Alliance to ensure the effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full spectrum of Alliance
missions in the present and foreseeable security environment with a special focus on improving interoperability among Alliance forces (and where applicable also between Alliance and Partner forces). Defence capabilities will be increased through improvements in the deployability and mobility of Alliance forces, their sustainability and logistics, their survivability and effective engagement capability, and command and control and information systems. In this connection, we endorse the Council decision to begin implementing the Multinational Joint Logistics Centre concept by the end of 1999, and to develop the C3 system architecture\(^\text{135}\) by 2002 to form a basis for an integrated Alliance core capability allowing interoperability with national systems. We have established a temporary High-Level Steering Group to oversee the implementation of the Defence Capabilities Initiative and to meet the requirement of co-ordination and harmonisation among relevant planning disciplines, including for Allies concerned force planning, with the aim of achieving lasting effects on improvements in capabilities and interoperability. Improvements in interoperability and critical capabilities should also strengthen the European pillar in NATO.

12. We reaffirm our commitment to the 1995 Peace Agreement, negotiated in Dayton and signed in Paris, which established Bosnia and Herzegovina as a single, democratic and multi-ethnic state, and to the full implementation of the Peace Agreement. We reiterate our readiness to work constructively with all Parties that support the Peace Agreement and seek to implement it.

13. The Madrid Peace Implementation Council meeting in December 1998 confirmed that the next two years would be vital in strengthening the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina and recognised that SFOR’s presence remains essential, both to keep the peace and to provide the secure environment and support for civilian implementation. Return of refugees to areas in which they are a minority will remain vital for political stability and reconciliation. We will support efforts to take this process forward.

14. SFOR\(^\text{136}\) will continue to work closely and effectively with the High Representative, whose role we support, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the OSCE and other

\(^{135}\) C3 systems: command, control, communication.

\(^{136}\) Stabilisation Force (SFOR)—international military force (successor to the Implementation Force (IFOR) operating in the years 1995–1996), under a mandate of the UN Security Council in Bosnia and Herzegovina to oversee the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which put an end to armed conflict in the country.
major international organisations, the UN International Police Task Force and other agencies implementing the civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement. We commend the crucial contribution of men and women of both NATO and Partner countries serving in SFOR, who are helping to bring peace to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

15. SFOR's presence cannot, however, be maintained indefinitely. SFOR is being streamlined through efficiency measures. We note that the Council in Permanent Session is examining options on the future size and structure of SFOR.

16. The continuing crisis in and around Kosovo threatens to further destabilise areas beyond the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The potential for wider instability underscores the need for a comprehensive approach to the stabilisation of the crisis region in South-Eastern Europe. We recognise and endorse the crucial importance of making South-Eastern Europe a region free from violence and instability. A new level of international engagement is thus needed to build security, prosperity and democratic civil society, leading in time to full integration into the wider European family.

17. NATO is determined to play its full part in this process by contributing to the building of a more secure and co-operative relationship with and between the countries of the region. Given the differences in economic development and the diversity and complexity of the problems of each country in the region, international efforts to develop and stabilise the region must be comprehensive, coherent and well-co-ordinated. To achieve these ends, NATO, the WEU, the EU, the OSCE and the UN must work closely together. The international financial institutions also have a crucial role to play. The Alliance's efforts to enhance regional security and stability in South-Eastern Europe and to help resolve humanitarian problems, and the efforts by other international organisations, as well as those by the countries of the region, should be mutually reinforcing.

18. We will be meeting with colleagues from the countries of South-Eastern Europe tomorrow. We intend to build on that meeting by maintaining NATO's consultations with the countries of the region. Accordingly, we will propose to them a consultative forum on security matters which brings together all NATO members and countries of the region at an appropriate level.

19. We direct the Council in Permanent Session, building on, as appropriate, the existing EAPC and PfP framework, to give substance to this proposal, inter alia, in the following areas:

- 19+1 consultations where appropriate;
the promotion of regional co-operation in the framework of an EAPC co-operative mechanism, taking into account other regional initiatives;

– targeted NATO security co-operation programmes for the countries in the region, as appropriate;

– regionally focused PfP activities and exercises;

– better targeting and co-ordination of Allies’ and Partners’ bilateral assistance to the region.

20. The Alliance’s efforts to enhance regional security in South-Eastern Europe complement those by other international organisations, as well as those by the countries of the region. We welcome the forthcoming European Union conference on a Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe on 27th May 1999, and the South-Eastern Europe Co-operation process, as well as other regional efforts. Coherence and co-ordination between the various initiatives will be of great importance.

21. The security of the Balkan region is essential to achieving lasting stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. Our goal is to see the integration of the countries of the region into the Euro-Atlantic community. We want all the countries and peoples of South-Eastern Europe to enjoy peace and security and establish normal relations with one another, based on respect of human rights, democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

22. We reaffirm our commitment to consultation, partnership and practical co-operation through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace. We commit ourselves today to build an enhanced and more operational relationship with Partners for the 21st century that strengthens stability, mutual confidence, and security throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. The EAPC and the PfP have transformed political-military relations across the continent and have become the instruments of choice when the Alliance and its Partners consult and act together in the pursuit of peace and security. We look forward to consulting with our Partners at tomorrow’s EAPC Summit meeting.

23. The EAPC, founded in 1997, contributes substantially to stronger political consultation and practical co-operation between the Alliance and its Partners, for solutions to security issues. We applaud this expanded dimension of political consultations, which has enhanced transparency and confidence among all EAPC members. The Alliance and its Partners have consulted regularly on regional security issues, such as on Bosnia and Herzegovina and on Kosovo. We
have also developed new areas of co-operation such as peacekeeping, humanitarian de-mining, control over transfer of small arms, and the co-ordination of disaster relief and humanitarian assistance.

24. We welcome the successful fulfilment by the Alliance and its Partners of five years of Partnership for Peace and the full implementation of PfP enhancements launched in 1997. Enhanced PfP has ensured that NATO-Partner co-operation contributes concretely to Euro-Atlantic stability and security. The participation of 15 PfP Partners in IFOR/SFOR demonstrates the real-life benefits of PfP’s focus on interoperability and provides valuable lessons for future Alliance-Partner co-operation. The presence of Partner officers in an international capacity in NATO military headquarters enables Partners to participate in planning for NATO-PfP exercises and NATO-led PfP operations. Enhanced PfP has also permitted NATO to take action to assist Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with their unique security concerns.

25. We welcome and take special note of the initiatives designed to make the Partnership more operational and ensure greater Partner involvement in appropriate decision-making and planning, as we had envisioned in our Madrid Declaration. These steps will ensure that the Partnership will be better able to address its objectives, and will provide a solid foundation for its continuing evolution as the core of a co-operative security network between NATO and its Partners for the 21st century. To further this goal, we have today approved the following comprehensive package. We have:

- approved a Political-Military Framework for NATO-led PfP operations, which will enhance Partners’ roles in political guidance and oversight, planning, and command arrangements for such operations;
- endorsed the expanded and adapted Planning and Review Process, which will further enhance interoperability of Partner forces declared available for PfP activities, and will allow for more focused and increased Partner contributions of valuable forces and capabilities for future NATO-led PfP operations;
- endorsed the outline Operational Capabilities Concept for NATO-led PfP operations, which will provide for deeper military co-operation between the Alliance and Partners with the goal of improving the ability of Partner forces and capabilities to operate with the Alliance in NATO-led PfP operations and directed the Council in Permanent Session to pursue its further development;
- endorsed the outline programme on enhancing PfP training and education to optimise and harmonise NATO and national PfP activities.
in order to meet the current and future demands of an enhanced and more operational PfP. The outline programme includes the role of three new PfP tools—a PfP Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes, a PfP Exercise Simulation Network and PfP Training Centres. We directed the Council in Permanent Session to develop a PfP Training and Education Enhancement Programme.

26. We remain firmly committed to our partnership with Russia under the NATO-Russia Founding Act. NATO and Russia have a common objective in strengthening security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. Throughout the Kosovo crisis, NATO and Russia have shared the common goals of the international community: to halt the violence, to avert a humanitarian catastrophe, and to create the conditions for a political solution. These goals remain valid. Consultation and dialogue are even more important in times of crisis. NATO and its member countries are determined to build on the areas of common ground with Russia concerning the international response to the crisis in Kosovo and remain ready to resume consultations and co-operation in the framework of the Founding Act.

27. Close relations between NATO and Russia are of great importance to stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. Since the conclusion of the Founding Act in May 1997, considerable and encouraging progress has been made in intensifying consultation and co-operation with Russia. The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council has developed into an important venue to consult, to promote transparency and confidence-building, and to foster co-operation. Russia’s participation in the implementation of the peace agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina was a significant step towards a new co-operative relationship. We have developed an extensive dialogue on such matters as disarmament and arms control, including the adaptation of the CFE Treaty; peacekeeping and nuclear weapons issues. Strategy, defence policy and doctrines, budgets and infrastructure development programmes, and non-proliferation, are further examples of this increasing co-operation.

28. We attach great importance to a strong, enduring and distinctive partnership between NATO and Ukraine. Ukraine has an important role to play in enhancing security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and in particular in Central and Eastern Europe. We are pleased with the progress reached since the signing of the NATO-Ukraine Charter\textsuperscript{137} in Madrid, and will continue to strengthen our distinctive

\textsuperscript{137} The document signed by NATO and Ukraine in July 1997 during the Madrid Summit. It contained a declaration of objectives, principles and areas of
partnership. We continue to support Ukrainian sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity, democratic development, economic prosperity and Ukraine’s status as a non-nuclear weapons state as key factors of stability and security in Europe. We encourage Ukraine to carry forward its democratic and economic transformation, including its defence reform, and reaffirm NATO’s support for Ukraine’s efforts to this end. We applaud the progress made in the Joint Working Group on Defence Reform. We welcome the establishment of a NATO Liaison Office in Kyiv to further enhance Ukraine’s role as a distinctive Partner. We also look forward to today’s inaugural Summit meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission.

29. The Mediterranean Dialogue is an integral part of the Alliance’s co-operative approach to security since security in the whole of Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. We are pleased with the development of our Mediterranean Dialogue. The Dialogue is progressive in nature and we welcome the progress towards developing broader and deeper co-operation and dialogue with the countries in the Mediterranean region. We endorse the enhancements to the political and practical co-operation of the Mediterranean Dialogue agreed by the Council in Permanent Session and direct it to pursue their early implementation. We encourage Allied nations and Mediterranean Dialogue countries to organise events such as the Rome Conference in 1997 and the Valencia Conference in 1999 as positive steps to strengthen mutual regional understanding. We look forward to further opportunities to strengthen co-operation in areas where NATO can add value, particularly in the military field, and where Dialogue countries have expressed interest. The Dialogue and other international efforts, including the EU Barcelona process, are complementary and mutually reinforcing and thus contribute to transparency and building confidence in the region.

30. The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery can pose a direct military threat to Allies’ populations, territory, and forces and therefore continues to be a matter of serious concern for the Alliance. The principal non-proliferation goal of the Alliance and its members is to prevent proliferation from occurring, or, should it occur, to reverse it through diplomatic means. We reiterate our full support for the international non-proliferation regimes and their strengthening. We recognise progress made in this regard. In order to respond to the risks to Alliance security posed by the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery means, we have launched an Initiative...
that builds upon work since the Brussels Summit to improve overall Alliance political and military efforts in this area.

31. The WMD Initiative will: ensure a more vigorous, structured debate at NATO leading to strengthened common understanding among Allies on WMD issues and how to respond to them; improve the quality and quantity of intelligence and information-sharing among Allies on proliferation issues; support the development of a public information strategy by Allies to increase awareness of proliferation issues and Allies’ efforts to support non-proliferation efforts; enhance existing Allied programmes which increase military readiness to operate in a WMD environment and to counter WMD threats; strengthen the process of information exchange about Allies’ national programmes of bilateral WMD destruction and assistance; enhance the possibilities for Allies to assist one another in the protection of their civil populations against WMD risks; and create a WMD Centre within the International Staff at NATO to support these efforts. The WMD initiative will integrate political and military aspects of Alliance work in responding to proliferation.

32. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance’s security objectives. NATO has a long-standing commitment in this area. Allied forces, both conventional and nuclear, have been significantly reduced since the end of the Cold War as part of the changed security environment. All Allies are States Parties to the central treaties related to disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention, and are committed to the full implementation of these treaties. NATO is a defensive Alliance seeking to enhance security and stability at the minimum level of forces consistent with the requirements for the full range of Alliance missions. As part of its broad approach to security, NATO actively supports arms control and disarmament, both conventional and nuclear, and pursues its approach against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means. In the light of overall strategic developments and the reduced salience of nuclear weapons, the Alliance will consider options for confidence and security building measures, verification, non-proliferation and arms control and disarmament. The Council in Permanent Session will propose a process to Ministers in December for considering such options. The responsible NATO bodies would accomplish this. We support deepening consultations with Russia in these and other areas in the Permanent Joint Council as well as with Ukraine in the NATO-Ukraine Commission and with other Partners in the EAPC.
33. The CFE Treaty is a cornerstone of European security. We reaffirm our commitment to the successful adaptation of the Treaty reflecting the new security environment and paving the way to greater conventional security and stability in Europe. In the course of the negotiations so far, Members of the Alliance have already declared their intention to undertake reductions in their equipment entitlements or holdings, and we strongly encourage others to follow suit with similar substantial reductions. In this context, we are pleased that agreement has been reached by CFE States Parties in Vienna in March 1999 on the key outstanding issues, permitting drafting work to proceed without delay. Allies will do their utmost to complete an adapted Treaty for signature by the time of the OSCE Istanbul Summit in November 1999. Until the adaptation process is completed, the continued full implementation of the existing Treaty and its associated documents will remain crucial.

34. We call on Russia to ratify the START II Treaty without delay. This would pave the way for considerable reductions of nuclear arsenals and would allow negotiations on a START III Treaty aiming at further far-reaching reductions. We remain committed to an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and call upon all countries to accede to and implement the Treaty in due course. We support the early commencement of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.

35. We are determined to achieve progress on a legally binding protocol including effective verification measures to enhance compliance and promote transparency that strengthens the implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. We re-emphasise the importance of universal adherence to, and effective implementation of, the Chemical Weapons Convention. We support de-mining efforts in Bosnia, the development of practical initiatives under the auspices of the EAPC, and—for signatories—activities to meet obligations under the Ottawa Convention.138

36. We call on Belarus, Russia and Ukraine to ratify the Open Skies Treaty without delay.

37. We will seek to intensify on a mutually reinforcing basis the Alliance’s contacts and co-operation with other international organisations with a role to play in consolidating democracy and preserving peace in the Euro-Atlantic area.

38. As stated in the Washington Treaty, we recognise the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the

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138 Ottawa Convention signed in December 1997 (entered into force in 1999). It concerns the prohibition of the use, storage, production and trade of anti-personnel landmines and the destruction of their stocks.
maintenance of international peace and security. The Alliance and the UN have worked together effectively in implementing the Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We look forward to developing further contact and exchanges of information with the United Nations, in the context of co-operation in conflict prevention, crisis management, crisis response operations, including peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance. In the crisis in Kosovo, the Alliance is using its civil and military capabilities to work with the UNHCR, the lead agency in the field of refugee relief, and other relevant international organisations, in providing humanitarian assistance and refugee relief. The Alliance will consider on a case-by-case basis future co-operation of this kind.

39. Co-operation and co-ordination between the Alliance and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe has expanded considerably in the light of the support we have provided to the OSCE-led Kosovo Verification Missions. We hope to make use of these important bridges between our two organisations to work together in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation, in the spirit of the OSCE’s Common Concept for the Development of Co-operation between Mutually Reinforcing Institutions. We continue to support the efforts of the OSCE to develop a Document-Charter on European Security, worthy of adoption at the OSCE Istanbul Summit in November 1999.

40. The Alliance and the European Union share common strategic interests. Our respective efforts in building peace in the former Yugoslavia are complementary. Both organisations make decisive contributions to peace and stability on the European continent. Co-operation between the two organisations on topics of common concern, to be decided on a case-by-case basis, could be developed when it enhances the effectiveness of action by NATO and the EU.

41. The Alliance, in order to adapt its structures to better prepare it to meet future challenges, launched a comprehensive programme including the continuing adaptation of NATO’s command structure. Accordingly, Allies welcome the activation decision of the implementation phase of the Alliance’s new command structure. This will ensure NATO’s ability to carry out the whole range of its missions more effectively and flexibly; support an enlarged Alliance and our more operational relationship with Partners; and provide, as part of the development of the ESDI within NATO, for European command arrangements able to prepare, support, command and conduct WEU-led operations. After successful trials, we have embarked on the full
implementation of the CJTF concept, giving us an important new tool for crisis management in the next century. Allies also welcome the full integration of Spain into NATO’s military structure from January this year, another significant milestone for the Alliance.

42. Terrorism constitutes a serious threat to peace, security and stability that can threaten the territorial integrity of States. We reiterate our condemnation of terrorism and reaffirm our determination to combat it in accordance with our international commitments and national legislation. The terrorist threat against deployed NATO forces and NATO installations requires the consideration and development of appropriate measures for their continued protection, taking full account of host nation responsibilities.

43. NATO Heads of State and Government believe that a key to the future success of the North Atlantic Alliance is the efficient production and availability of advanced weapons and technology in support of security for all its members. We also believe that viable defence industries on both sides of the Atlantic are critical to the efficient functioning of NATO military forces. To that end, we welcome continued transatlantic defence industrial co-operation to help ensure interoperability, economies of scale, competition and innovation. We will seek to ensure that NATO’s armament activities meet the Alliance’s evolving military needs.

44. We welcome the presence in Washington of the President and other representatives of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NPA). The NPA plays a significant role in complementing NATO’s efforts to project stability throughout Europe. We therefore attach great importance to enhancing our relations with the NPA in areas of common concern. We also appreciate the contribution made by the Atlantic Treaty Association in promoting better understanding of the Alliance and its objectives among our publics.

45. We express our deep appreciation for the gracious hospitality extended to us by the Government of the United States on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Introduction

1. At their Summit meeting in Washington in April 1999, NATO Heads of State and Government approved the Alliance’s new Strategic Concept.

2. NATO has successfully ensured the freedom of its members and prevented war in Europe during the 40 years of the Cold War. By combining defence with dialogue, it played an indispensable role in bringing East-West confrontation to a peaceful end. The dramatic changes in the Euro-Atlantic strategic landscape brought by the end of the Cold War were reflected in the Alliance’s 1991 Strategic Concept. There have, however, been further profound political and security developments since then.

3. The dangers of the Cold War have given way to more promising, but also challenging prospects, to new opportunities and risks. A new Europe of greater integration is emerging, and a Euro-Atlantic security structure is evolving in which NATO plays a central part. The Alliance has been at the heart of efforts to establish new patterns of cooperation and mutual understanding across the Euro-Atlantic region and has committed itself to essential new activities in the interest of a wider stability. It has shown the depth of that commitment in its efforts to put an end to the immense human suffering created by conflict in the Balkans. The years since the end of the Cold War have also witnessed important developments in arms control, a process to which the Alliance is fully committed. The Alliance’s role in these positive developments has been underpinned by the comprehensive adaptation of its approach to security and of its procedures and structures. The last ten years have also seen, however, the appearance of complex new risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability, including oppression, ethnic conflict, economic distress, the collapse of political order, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

4. The Alliance has an indispensable role to play in consolidating and preserving the positive changes of the recent past, and in meeting current and future security challenges. It has, therefore, a demanding agenda. It must safeguard common security interests in an environment
of further, often unpredictable change. It must maintain collective
defence and reinforce the transatlantic link and ensure a balance that
allows the European Allies to assume greater responsibility. It must
deepen its relations with its partners and prepare for the accession of
new members. It must, above all, maintain the political will and the
military means required by the entire range of its missions.

5. This new Strategic Concept will guide the Alliance as it pursues
this agenda. It expresses NATO's enduring purpose and nature and
its fundamental security tasks, identifies the central features of the
new security environment, specifies the elements of the Alliance's
broad approach to security, and provides guidelines for the further
adaptation of its military forces.

Part I—The Purpose and Tasks of the Alliance

6. NATO's essential and enduring purpose, set out in the Washington
Treaty, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by
political and military means. Based on common values of democracy,
human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has striven since its
inception to secure a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. It will
continue to do so. The achievement of this aim can be put at risk by
crisis and conflict affecting the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. The
Alliance therefore not only ensures the defence of its members but
contributes to peace and stability in this region.

7. The Alliance embodies the transatlantic link by which the
security of North America is permanently tied to the security of
Europe. It is the practical expression of effective collective effort
among its members in support of their common interests.

8. The fundamental guiding principle by which the Alliance works
is that of common commitment and mutual co-operation among
sovereign states in support of the indivisibility of security for all of
its members. Solidarity and cohesion within the Alliance, through
daily cooperation in both the political and military spheres, ensure
that no single Ally is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone
in dealing with basic security challenges. Without depriving member
states of their right and duty to assume their sovereign responsibilities
in the field of defence, the Alliance enables them through collective
effort to realise their essential national security objectives.

9. The resulting sense of equal security among the members of the
Alliance, regardless of differences in their circumstances or in their
national military capabilities, contributes to stability in the Euro-
Atlantic area. The Alliance does not seek these benefits for its members
alone, but is committed to the creation of conditions conducive to increased partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with others who share its broad political objectives.

10. To achieve its essential purpose, as an Alliance of nations committed to the Washington Treaty and the United Nations Charter, the Alliance performs the following fundamental security tasks:

**Security:** To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other through the threat or use of force.

**Consultation:** To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, as an essential transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members’ security, and for appropriate co-ordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.

**Deterrence and Defence:** To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty.

And in order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area:

- **Crisis Management:** To stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in conformity with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations.

- **Partnership:** To promote wide-ranging partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, with the aim of increasing transparency, mutual confidence and the capacity for joint action with the Alliance.

11 In fulfilling its purpose and fundamental security tasks, the Alliance will continue to respect the legitimate security interests of others, and seek the peaceful resolution of disputes as set out in the Charter of the United Nations. The Alliance will promote peaceful and friendly international relations and support democratic institutions. The Alliance does not consider itself to be any country’s adversary.

**Part II—Strategic Perspectives**

**The Evolving Strategic Environment**

12. The Alliance operates in an environment of continuing change. Developments in recent years have been generally positive, but
uncertainties and risks remain which can develop into acute crises. Within this evolving context, NATO has played an essential part in strengthening Euro-Atlantic security since the end of the Cold War. Its growing political role; its increased political and military partnership, cooperation and dialogue with other states, including with Russia, Ukraine and Mediterranean Dialogue countries; its continuing openness to the accession of new members; its collaboration with other international organisations; its commitment, exemplified in the Balkans, to conflict prevention and crisis management, including through peace support operations: all reflect its determination to shape its security environment and enhance the peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.

13. In parallel, NATO has successfully adapted to enhance its ability to contribute to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability. Internal reform has included a new command structure, including the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, the creation of arrangements to permit the rapid deployment of forces for the full range of the Alliance’s missions, and the building of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance.

14. The United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), and the Western European Union (WEU) have made distinctive contributions to Euro-Atlantic security and stability. Mutually reinforcing organisations have become a central feature of the security environment.

15. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and, as such, plays a crucial role in contributing to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

16. The OSCE, as a regional arrangement, is the most inclusive security organisation in Europe, which also includes Canada and the United States, and plays an essential role in promoting peace and stability, enhancing cooperative security, and advancing democracy and human rights in Europe. The OSCE is particularly active in the fields of preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation. NATO and the OSCE have developed close practical cooperation, especially with regard to the international effort to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia.

17. The European Union has taken important decisions and given a further impetus to its efforts to strengthen its security and defence dimension. This process will have implications for the entire
Alliance, and all European Allies should be involved in it, building on arrangements developed by NATO and the WEU. The development of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) includes the progressive framing of a common defence policy. Such a policy, as called for in the Amsterdam Treaty, would be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within the framework of the Washington Treaty. Important steps taken in this context include the incorporation of the WEU’s Petersberg tasks\textsuperscript{139} into the Treaty on European Union and the development of closer institutional relations with the WEU.

18. As stated in the 1994 Summit declaration and reaffirmed in Berlin in 1996, the Alliance fully supports the development of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance by making available its assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations. To this end, the Alliance and the WEU have developed a close relationship and put into place key elements of the ESDI as agreed in Berlin. In order to enhance peace and stability in Europe and more widely, the European Allies are strengthening their capacity for action, including by increasing their military capabilities. The increase of the responsibilities and capacities of the European Allies with respect to security and defence enhances the security environment of the Alliance.

19. The stability, transparency, predictability, lower levels of armaments, and verification which can be provided by arms control and non-proliferation agreements support NATO’s political and military efforts to achieve its strategic objectives. The Allies have played a major part in the significant achievements in this field. These include the enhanced stability produced by the CFE Treaty, the deep reductions in nuclear weapons provided for in the START treaties; the signature of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the accession to it of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine as non-nuclear weapons states, and the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons

\textsuperscript{139} In 1992, during a meeting in Petersberg, Germany, the ministers of defence and foreign affairs of the WEU declared their willingness to prepare themselves to undertake common tasks, the so-called Petersberg missions. These were humanitarian, rescue, crisis-management, peacekeeping, and peace-enforcing missions. The catalogue of Petersberg missions was extended in the 2003 European Security Strategy and taken over as tasks of the European Union by the Lisbon Treaty. The threats that the Union has to face include regional conflicts, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and their possible use against EU territory, failing states and the conflicts that break out within and in their neighbourhood, and organised crime.
Convention. The Ottawa Convention to ban anti-personnel landmines and similar agreements make an important contribution to alleviating human suffering. There are welcome prospects for further advances in arms control in conventional weapons and with respect to nuclear, chemical, and biological (NBC) weapons.

**Security challenges and risks**

20. Notwithstanding positive developments in the strategic environment and the fact that large-scale conventional aggression against the Alliance is highly unlikely, the possibility of such a threat emerging over the longer term exists. The security of the Alliance remains subject to a wide variety of military and non-military risks which are multi-directional and often difficult to predict. These risks include uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of regional crises at the periphery of the Alliance, which could evolve rapidly. Some countries in and around the Euro-Atlantic area face serious economic, social and political difficulties. Ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, and the dissolution of states can lead to local and even regional instability. The resulting tensions could lead to crises affecting Euro-Atlantic stability, to human suffering, and to armed conflicts. Such conflicts could affect the security of the Alliance by spilling over into neighbouring countries, including NATO countries, or in other ways, and could also affect the security of other states.

21. The existence of powerful nuclear forces outside the Alliance also constitutes a significant factor which the Alliance has to take into account if security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area are to be maintained.

22. The proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery remains a matter of serious concern. In spite of welcome progress in strengthening international non-proliferation regimes, major challenges with respect to proliferation remain. The Alliance recognises that proliferation can occur despite efforts to prevent it and can pose a direct military threat to the Allies' populations, territory, and forces. Some states, including on NATO's periphery and in other regions, sell or acquire or try to acquire NBC weapons and delivery means. Commodities and technology that could be used to build these weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means are becoming more common, while detection and prevention of illicit trade in these
materials and know-how continues to be difficult. Non-state actors have shown the potential to create and use some of these weapons.

23. The global spread of technology that can be of use in the production of sophisticated military capabilities, permitting adversaries to acquire highly capable offensive and defensive air, land, and sea-borne systems, cruise missiles, and other advanced weaponry. In addition, state and non-state adversaries may try to exploit the Alliance’s growing reliance on information systems through information operations designed to disrupt such systems. They may attempt to use strategies of this kind to counter NATO’s superiority in traditional weaponry.

24. Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. The uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts, can also pose problems for security and stability affecting the Alliance. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, co-ordination of their efforts including their responses to risks of this kind.

Part III—The Approach to Security in the 21st Century

25. The Alliance is committed to a broad approach to security, which recognises the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defence dimension. This broad approach forms the basis for the Alliance to accomplish its fundamental security tasks effectively, and its increasing effort to develop effective cooperation with other European and Euro-Atlantic organisations as well as the United Nations. Our collective aim is to build a European security architecture in which the Alliance’s contribution to the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area and the contribution of these other international organisations are complementary and mutually reinforcing, both in deepening relations among Euro-Atlantic countries and in managing crises. NATO remains the essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of its members under the Washington Treaty.
26. The Alliance seeks to preserve peace and to reinforce Euro-Atlantic security and stability by: the preservation of the transatlantic link; the maintenance of effective military capabilities sufficient for deterrence and defence and to fulfil the full range of its missions; the development of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance; an overall capability to manage crises successfully; its continued openness to new members; and the continued pursuit of partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with other nations as part of its co-operative approach to Euro-Atlantic security, including in the field of arms control and disarmament.

The Transatlantic Link

27. NATO is committed to a strong and dynamic partnership between Europe and North America in support of the values and interests they share. The security of Europe and that of North America are indivisible. Thus the Alliance's commitment to the indispensable transatlantic link and the collective defence of its members is fundamental to its credibility and to the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.

The Maintenance of Alliance Military Capabilities

28. The maintenance of an adequate military capability and clear preparedness to act collectively in the common defence remain central to the Alliance's security objectives. Such a capability, together with political solidarity, remains at the core of the Alliance's ability to prevent any attempt at coercion or intimidation, and to guarantee that military aggression directed against the Alliance can never be perceived as an option with any prospect of success.

29. Military capabilities effective under the full range of foreseeable circumstances are also the basis of the Alliance's ability to contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management through non-Article 5 crisis response operations. These missions can be highly demanding and can place a premium on the same political and military qualities, such as cohesion, multinational training, and extensive prior planning, that would be essential in an Article 5 situation. Accordingly, while they may pose special requirements, they will be handled through a common set of Alliance structures and procedures.

The European Security And Defence Identity

30. The Alliance, which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members and through which common security objectives will
be pursued wherever possible, remains committed to a balanced and dynamic transatlantic partnership. The European Allies have taken decisions to enable them to assume greater responsibilities in the security and defence field in order to enhance the peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area and thus the security of all Allies. On the basis of decisions taken by the Alliance, in Berlin in 1996 and subsequently, the European Security and Defence Identity will continue to be developed within NATO. This process will require close cooperation between NATO, the WEU and, if and when appropriate, the European Union. It will enable all European Allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance as an expression of our shared responsibilities; it will reinforce the transatlantic partnership; and it will assist the European Allies to act by themselves as required through the readiness of the Alliance, on a case-by-case basis and by consensus, to make its assets and capabilities available for operations in which the Alliance is not engaged militarily under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed, taking into account the full participation of all European Allies if they were so to choose.

Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management

31. In pursuit of its policy of preserving peace, preventing war, and enhancing security and stability and as set out in the fundamental security tasks, NATO will seek, in cooperation with other organisations, to prevent conflict, or, should a crisis arise, to contribute to its effective management, consistent with international law, including through the possibility of conducting non-Article 5 crisis response operations. The Alliance’s preparedness to carry out such operations supports the broader objective of reinforcing and extending stability and often involves the participation of NATO’s Partners. NATO recalls its offer, made in Brussels in 1994, to support on a case-by-case basis in accordance with its own procedures, peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise. In this context NATO recalls its subsequent decisions with respect to crisis response operations in the Balkans. Taking into account the necessity for Alliance solidarity and cohesion, participation in any such operation or mission will remain subject to decisions of member states in accordance with national constitutions.

32. NATO will make full use of partnership, cooperation and dialogue and its links to other organisations to contribute to
preventing crises and, should they arise, defusing them at an early stage. A coherent approach to crisis management, as in any use of force by the Alliance, will require the Alliance’s political authorities to choose and co-ordinate appropriate responses from a range of both political and military measures and to exercise close political control at all stages.

**Partnership, Cooperation, And Dialogue**

33. Through its active pursuit of partnership, cooperation, and dialogue, the Alliance is a positive force in promoting security and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. Through outreach and openness, the Alliance seeks to preserve peace, support and promote democracy, contribute to prosperity and progress, and foster genuine partnership with and among all democratic Euro-Atlantic countries. This aims at enhancing the security of all, excludes nobody, and helps to overcome divisions and disagreements that could lead to instability and conflict.

34. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) will remain the overarching framework for all aspects of NATO’s cooperation with its Partners. It offers an expanded political dimension for both consultation and cooperation. EAPC consultations build increased transparency and confidence among its members on security issues, contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management, and develop practical cooperation activities, including in civil emergency planning, and scientific and environmental affairs.

35. The Partnership for Peace is the principal mechanism for forging practical security links between the Alliance and its Partners and for enhancing interoperability between Partners and NATO. Through detailed programmes that reflect individual Partners’ capacities and interests, Allies and Partners work towards transparency in national defence planning and budgeting; democratic control of defence forces; preparedness for civil disasters and other emergencies; and the development of the ability to work together, including in NATO-led PfP operations. The Alliance is committed to increasing the role the Partners play in PfP decision-making and planning, and making PfP more operational. NATO has undertaken to consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.

36. Russia plays a unique role in Euro-Atlantic security. Within the framework of the NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, NATO and Russia have committed
themselves to developing their relations on the basis of common interest, reciprocity and transparency to achieve a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area based on the principles of democracy and co-operative security. NATO and Russia have agreed to give concrete substance to their shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe. A strong, stable and enduring partnership between NATO and Russia is essential to achieve lasting stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

37. Ukraine occupies a special place in the Euro-Atlantic security environment and is an important and valuable partner in promoting stability and common democratic values. NATO is committed to further strengthening its distinctive partnership with Ukraine on the basis of the NATO-Ukraine Charter, including political consultations on issues of common concern and a broad range of practical cooperation activities. The Alliance continues to support Ukrainian sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity, democratic development, economic prosperity and its status as a non-nuclear weapons state as key factors of stability and security in central and eastern Europe and in Europe as a whole.

38. The Mediterranean is an area of special interest to the Alliance. Security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue process is an integral part of NATO’s co-operative approach to security. It provides a framework for confidence building, promotes transparency and cooperation in the region, and reinforces and is reinforced by other international efforts. The Alliance is committed to developing progressively the political, civil, and military aspects of the Dialogue with the aim of achieving closer cooperation with, and more active involvement by, countries that are partners in this Dialogue.

Enlargement

39. The Alliance remains open to new members under Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. It expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the Alliance, strengthen its effectiveness and cohesion, and enhance overall European security and stability. To this end, NATO has established a programme of activities to assist aspiring countries in their preparations for possible future membership in the context of its wider relationship with them. No European democratic
country whose admission would fulfil the objectives of the Treaty will be excluded from consideration.

Arms Control, Disarmament, And Non-Proliferation

40. The Alliance’s policy of support for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance’s security objectives. The Allies seek to enhance security and stability at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with the Alliance’s ability to provide for collective defence and to fulfil the full range of its missions. The Alliance will continue to ensure that—as an important part of its broad approach to security—defence and arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation objectives remain in harmony. The Alliance will continue to actively contribute to the development of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation agreements as well as to confidence and security building measures. The Allies take seriously their distinctive role in promoting a broader, more comprehensive and more verifiable international arms control and disarmament process. The Alliance will enhance its political efforts to reduce dangers arising from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The principal non-proliferation goal of the Alliance and its members is to prevent proliferation from occurring or, should it occur, to reverse it through diplomatic means. The Alliance attaches great importance to the continuing validity and the full implementation by all parties of the CFE Treaty as an essential element in ensuring the stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.

Part IV—Guidelines for the Alliance’s Forces Principles of Alliance Strategy

41. The Alliance will maintain the necessary military capabilities to accomplish the full range of NATO’s missions. The principles of Allied solidarity and strategic unity remain paramount for all Alliance missions. Alliance forces must safeguard NATO’s military effectiveness and freedom of action. The security of all Allies is indivisible: an attack on one is an attack on all. With respect to collective defence under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the combined military forces of the Alliance must be capable of deterring any potential aggression against it, of stopping an aggressor’s advance as far forward as possible should an attack nevertheless occur, and of ensuring the political independence and territorial integrity of its member states.
They must also be prepared to contribute to conflict prevention and to conduct non-Article 5 crisis response operations. The Alliance's forces have essential roles in fostering cooperation and understanding with NATO's Partners and other states, particularly in helping Partners to prepare for potential participation in NATO-led PfP operations. Thus they contribute to the preservation of peace, to the safeguarding of common security interests of Alliance members, and to the maintenance of the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. By deterring the use of NBC weapons, they contribute to Alliance efforts aimed at preventing the proliferation of these weapons and their delivery means.

42. The achievement of the Alliance's aims depends critically on the equitable sharing of the roles, risks and responsibilities, as well as the benefits, of common defence. The presence of United States conventional and nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe, which is inseparably linked to that of North America. The North American Allies contribute to the Alliance through military forces available for Alliance missions, through their broader contribution to international peace and security, and through the provision of unique training facilities on the North American continent. The European Allies also make wide-ranging and substantial contributions. As the process of developing the ESDI within the Alliance progresses, the European Allies will further enhance their contribution to the common defence and to international peace and stability including through multinational formations.

43. The principle of collective effort in Alliance defence is embodied in practical arrangements that enable the Allies to enjoy the crucial political, military and resource advantages of collective defence, and prevent the renationalisation of defence policies, without depriving the Allies of their sovereignty. These arrangements also enable NATO's forces to carry out non-Article 5 crisis response operations and constitute a prerequisite for a coherent Alliance response to all possible contingencies. They are based on procedures for consultation, an integrated military structure, and on co-operation agreements. Key features include collective force planning; common funding; common operational planning; multinational formations, headquarters and command arrangements; an integrated air defence system; a balance of roles and responsibilities among the Allies; the stationing and deployment of forces outside home territory when required; arrangements, including planning, for crisis management and reinforcement; common standards and procedures for equipment,
training and logistics; joint and combined doctrines and exercises when appropriate; and infrastructure, armaments and logistics cooperation. The inclusion of NATO’s Partners in such arrangements or the development of similar arrangements for them, in appropriate areas, is also instrumental in enhancing cooperation and common efforts in Euro-Atlantic security matters.

44. Multinational funding, including through the Military Budget and the NATO Security Investment Programme,\(^\text{140}\) will continue to play an important role in acquiring and maintaining necessary assets and capabilities. The management of resources should be guided by the military requirements of the Alliance as they evolve.

45. The Alliance supports the further development of the ESDI within the Alliance, including by being prepared to make available assets and capabilities for operations under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed.

46. To protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of coercion, the Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe and kept up to date where necessary, although at a minimum sufficient level. Taking into account the diversity of risks with which the Alliance could be faced, it must maintain the forces necessary to ensure credible deterrence and to provide a wide range of conventional response options. But the Alliance’s conventional forces alone cannot ensure credible deterrence. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace.

The Alliance’s Force Posture

The Missions of Alliance Military Forces

47. The primary role of Alliance military forces is to protect peace and to guarantee the territorial integrity, political independence and security of member states. The Alliance’s forces must therefore be able to deter and defend effectively, to maintain or restore the territorial integrity of Allied nations and—in case of conflict—to terminate war rapidly by making an aggressor reconsider his decision, cease his attack and withdraw. NATO forces must maintain the ability to

\(^{140}\) A separate item in the NATO common budget (in addition to the civil and military budgets) containing amounts from Member States’ contributions for investments in their defence infrastructure for the part used for allied purposes.
provide for collective defence while conducting effective non-Article 5 crisis response operations.

48. The maintenance of the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area is of key importance. An important aim of the Alliance and its forces is to keep risks at a distance by dealing with potential crises at an early stage. In the event of crises which jeopardise Euro-Atlantic stability and could affect the security of Alliance members, the Alliance’s military forces may be called upon to conduct crisis response operations. They may also be called upon to contribute to the preservation of international peace and security by conducting operations in support of other international organisations, complementing and reinforcing political actions within a broad approach to security.

49. In contributing to the management of crises through military operations, the Alliance’s forces will have to deal with a complex and diverse range of actors, risks, situations and demands, including humanitarian emergencies. Some non-Article 5 crisis response operations may be as demanding as some collective defence missions. Well-trained and well-equipped forces at adequate levels of readiness and in sufficient strength to meet the full range of contingencies as well as the appropriate support structures, planning tools and command and control capabilities are essential in providing efficient military contributions. The Alliance should also be prepared to support, on the basis of separable but not separate capabilities, operations under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed. The potential participation of Partners and other non-NATO nations in NATO-led operations as well as possible operations with Russia would be further valuable elements of NATO’s contribution to managing crises that affect Euro-Atlantic security.

50. Alliance military forces also contribute to promoting stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area by their participation in military-to-military contacts and in other cooperation activities and exercises under the Partnership for Peace as well as those organised to deepen NATO’s relationships with Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean Dialogue countries. They contribute to stability and understanding by participating in confidence-building activities, including those which enhance transparency and improve communication; as well as in verification of arms control agreements and in humanitarian de-mining. Key areas of consultation and cooperation could include inter alia: training and exercises, interoperability, civil-military relations, concept and doctrine development, defence planning, crisis
management, proliferation issues, armaments cooperation as well as participation in operational planning and operations.

**Guidelines for the Alliance’s Force Posture**

51. To implement the Alliance’s fundamental security tasks and the principles of its strategy, the forces of the Alliance must continue to be adapted to meet the requirements of the full range of Alliance missions effectively and to respond to future challenges. The posture of Allies’ forces, building on the strengths of different national defence structures, will conform to the guidelines developed in the following paragraphs.

52. The size, readiness, availability and deployment of the Alliance’s military forces will reflect its commitment to collective defence and to conduct crisis response operations, sometimes at short notice, distant from their home stations, including beyond the Allies’ territory. The characteristics of the Alliance’s forces will also reflect the provisions of relevant arms control agreements. Alliance forces must be adequate in strength and capabilities to deter and counter aggression against any Ally. They must be interoperable and have appropriate doctrines and technologies. They must be held at the required readiness and deployability, and be capable of military success in a wide range of complex joint and combined operations, which may also include Partners and other non-NATO nations.

53. This means in particular:

a. that the overall size of the Allies’ forces will be kept at the lowest levels consistent with the requirements of collective defence and other Alliance missions; they will be held at appropriate and graduated readiness;

b. that the peacetime geographical distribution of forces will ensure a sufficient military presence throughout the territory of the Alliance, including the stationing and deployment of forces outside home territory and waters and forward deployment of forces when and where necessary. Regional and, in particular, geostrategic considerations within the Alliance will have to be taken into account, as instabilities on NATO’s periphery could lead to crises or conflicts requiring an Alliance military response, potentially with short warning times;

c. that NATO’s command structure will be able to undertake command and control of the full range of the Alliance’s military missions including through the use of deployable combined and joint HQs, in particular CJTF headquarters, to command and control multinational and multiservice forces. It will also be able to support
operations under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed, thereby contributing to the development of the ESDI within the Alliance, and to conduct NATO-led non-Article 5 crisis response operations in which Partners and other countries may participate;

d. that overall, the Alliance will, in both the near and long term and for the full range of its missions, require essential operational capabilities such as an effective engagement capability; deployability and mobility; survivability of forces and infrastructure; and sustainability, incorporating logistics and force rotation. To develop these capabilities to their full potential for multinational operations, interoperability, including human factors, the use of appropriate advanced technology, the maintenance of information superiority in military operations, and highly qualified personnel with a broad spectrum of skills will be important. Sufficient capabilities in the areas of command, control and communications as well as intelligence and surveillance will serve as necessary force multipliers;

e. that at any time a limited but militarily significant proportion of ground, air and sea forces will be able to react as rapidly as necessary to a wide range of eventualities, including a short-notice attack on any Ally. Greater numbers of force elements will be available at appropriate levels of readiness to sustain prolonged operations, whether within or beyond Alliance territory, including through rotation of deployed forces. Taken together, these forces must also be of sufficient quality, quantity and readiness to contribute to deterrence and to defend against limited attacks on the Alliance;

f. that the Alliance must be able to build up larger forces, both in response to any fundamental changes in the security environment and for limited requirements, by reinforcement, by mobilising reserves, or by reconstituting forces when necessary. This ability must be in proportion to potential threats to Alliance security, including potential long-term developments. It must take into account the possibility of substantial improvements in the readiness and capabilities of military forces on the periphery of the Alliance. Capabilities for timely reinforcement and resupply both within and from Europe and North America will remain of critical importance, with a resulting need for a high degree of deployability, mobility and flexibility;

g. that appropriate force structures and procedures, including those that would provide an ability to build up, deploy and draw down forces quickly and selectively, are necessary to permit measured,
flexible and timely responses in order to reduce and defuse tensions. These arrangements must be exercised regularly in peacetime;
h. that the Alliance’s defence posture must have the capability to address appropriately and effectively the risks associated with the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery, which also pose a potential threat to the Allies’ populations, territory, and forces. A balanced mix of forces, response capabilities and strengthened defences is needed;
i. that the Alliance’s forces and infrastructure must be protected against terrorist attacks.

Characteristics of Conventional Forces

54. It is essential that the Allies’ military forces have a credible ability to fulfil the full range of Alliance missions. This requirement has implications for force structures, force and equipment levels; readiness, availability, and sustainability; training and exercises; deployment and employment options; and force build-up and mobilisation capabilities. The aim should be to achieve an optimum balance between high readiness forces capable of beginning rapidly, and immediately as necessary, collective defence or non-Article 5 crisis response operations; forces at different levels of lower readiness to provide the bulk of those required for collective defence, for rotation of forces to sustain crisis response operations, or for further reinforcement of a particular region; and a longer-term build-up and augmentation capability for the worst case—but very remote—scenario of large scale operations for collective defence. A substantial proportion of Alliance forces will be capable of performing more than one of these roles.

55. Alliance forces will be structured to reflect the multinational and joint nature of Alliance missions. Essential tasks will include controlling, protecting, and defending territory; ensuring the unimpeded use of sea, air, and land lines of communication; sea control and protecting the deployment of the Alliance’s sea-based deterrent; conducting independent and combined air operations; ensuring a secure air environment and effective extended air defence; surveillance, intelligence, reconnaissance and electronic warfare; strategic lift; and providing effective and flexible command and control facilities, including deployable combined and joint headquarters.

56. The Alliance’s defence posture against the risks and potential threats of the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery must continue to be improved, including through work on
missile defences. As NATO forces may be called upon to operate beyond NATO's borders, capabilities for dealing with proliferation risks must be flexible, mobile, rapidly deployable and sustainable. Doctrines, planning, and training and exercise policies must also prepare the Alliance to deter and defend against the use of NBC weapons. The aim in doing so will be to further reduce operational vulnerabilities of NATO military forces while maintaining their flexibility and effectiveness despite the presence, threat or use of NBC weapons.

57. Alliance strategy does not include a chemical or biological warfare capability. The Allies support universal adherence to the relevant disarmament regimes. But, even if further progress with respect to banning chemical and biological weapons can be achieved, defensive precautions will remain essential.

58. Given reduced overall force levels and constrained resources, the ability to work closely together will remain vital for achieving the Alliance's missions. The Alliance's collective defence arrangements in which, for those concerned, the integrated military structure plays the key role, are essential in this regard. The various strands of NATO's defence planning need to be effectively coordinated at all levels in order to ensure the preparedness of the forces and supporting structures to carry out the full spectrum of their roles. Exchanges of information among the Allies about their force plans contribute to securing the availability of the capabilities needed for the execution of these roles. Consultations in case of important changes in national defence plans also remain of key importance. Cooperation in the development of new operational concepts will be essential for responding to evolving security challenges. The detailed practical arrangements that have been developed as part of the ESDI within the Alliance contribute to close allied co-operation without unnecessary duplication of assets and capabilities.

59. To be able to respond flexibly to possible contingencies and to permit the effective conduct of Alliance missions, the Alliance requires sufficient logistics capabilities, including transport capacities, medical support and stocks to deploy and sustain all types of forces effectively. Standardisation will foster cooperation and cost-effectiveness in providing logistic support to allied forces. Mounting and sustaining operations outside the Allies' territory, where there may be little or no host-nation support, will pose special logistical challenges. The ability to build-up larger, adequately equipped and trained forces, in a timely manner and to a level able to fulfil the full range of Alliance missions,
will also make an essential contribution to crisis management and defence. This will include the ability to reinforce any area at risk and to establish a multinational presence when and where this is needed. Forces of various kinds and at various levels of readiness will be capable of flexible employment in both intra-European and transatlantic reinforcement. This will require control of lines of communication, and appropriate support and exercise arrangements.

60. The interaction between Alliance forces and the civil environment (both governmental and non-governmental) in which they operate is crucial to the success of operations. Civil-military cooperation is interdependent: military means are increasingly requested to assist civil authorities; at the same time civil support to military operations is important for logistics, communications, medical support, and public affairs. Cooperation between the Alliance’s military and civil bodies will accordingly remain essential.

61. The Alliance’s ability to accomplish the full range of its missions will rely increasingly on multinational forces, complementing national commitments to NATO for the Allies concerned. Such forces, which are applicable to the full range of Alliance missions, demonstrate the Alliance’s resolve to maintain a credible collective defence; enhance Alliance cohesion; and reinforce the transatlantic partnership and strengthen the ESDI within the Alliance. Multinational forces, particularly those capable of deploying rapidly for collective defence or for non-Article 5 crisis response operations, reinforce solidarity. They can also provide a way of deploying more capable formations than might be available purely nationally, thus helping to make more efficient use of scarce defence resources. This may include a highly integrated, multinational approach to specific tasks and functions, an approach which underlies the implementation of the CJTF concept. For peace support operations, effective multinational formations and other arrangements involving Partners will be valuable. In order to exploit fully the potential offered by multinational formations, improving interoperability, inter alia through sufficient training and exercises, is of the highest importance.

**Characteristics of Nuclear Forces**

62. The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war. They will continue to fulfil an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies’ response to military aggression. They demonstrate that aggression of any kind is not
a rational option. The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.

63. A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration of Alliance solidarity and common commitment to war prevention continue to require widespread participation by European Allies involved in collective defence planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangements. Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance. The Alliance will therefore maintain adequate nuclear forces in Europe. These forces need to have the necessary characteristics and appropriate flexibility and survivability, to be perceived as a credible and effective element of the Allies’ strategy in preventing war. They will be maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and stability.

64. The Allies concerned consider that, with the radical changes in the security situation, including reduced conventional force levels in Europe and increased reaction times, NATO’s ability to defuse a crisis through diplomatic and other means or, should it be necessary, to mount a successful conventional defence has significantly improved. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated by them are therefore extremely remote. Since 1991, therefore, the Allies have taken a series of steps which reflect the post-Cold War security environment. These include a dramatic reduction of the types and numbers of NATO’s sub-strategic forces including the elimination of all nuclear artillery and ground-launched short-range nuclear missiles; a significant relaxation of the readiness criteria for nuclear-roled forces; and the termination of standing peacetime nuclear contingency plans. NATO’s nuclear forces no longer target any country. Nonetheless, NATO will maintain, at the minimum level consistent with the prevailing security environment, adequate sub-strategic forces based in Europe which will provide an essential link with strategic nuclear forces, reinforcing the transatlantic link. These will consist of dual capable aircraft and a small number of United Kingdom Trident warheads. Sub-strategic nuclear weapons will, however, not be deployed in normal circumstances on surface vessels and attack submarines.
Part V—Conclusion

65. As the North Atlantic Alliance enters its sixth decade, it must be ready to meet the challenges and opportunities of a new century. The Strategic Concept reaffirms the enduring purpose of the Alliance and sets out its fundamental security tasks. It enables a transformed NATO to contribute to the evolving security environment, supporting security and stability with the strength of its shared commitment to democracy and the peaceful resolution of disputes. The Strategic Concept will govern the Alliance’s security and defence policy, its operational concepts, its conventional and nuclear force posture and its collective defence arrangements, and will be kept under review in the light of the evolving security environment. In an uncertain world the need for effective defence remains, but in reaffirming this commitment the Alliance will also continue making full use of every opportunity to help build an undivided continent by promoting and fostering the vision of a Europe whole and free.

1. At the dawn of the twenty-first century we, the Heads of State or Government of the OSCE participating States, declare our firm commitment to a free, democratic and more integrated OSCE area where participating States are at peace with each other, and individuals and communities live in freedom, prosperity and security. To implement this commitment, we have decided to take a number of new steps. We have agreed to:

- Adopt the Platform for Co-operative Security, in order to strengthen co-operation between the OSCE and other international organizations and institutions, thereby making better use of the resources of the international community;
- Develop the OSCE’s role in peacekeeping, thereby better reflecting the Organization’s comprehensive approach to security;
- Create Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams (REACT), thereby enabling the OSCE to respond quickly to demands for assistance and for large civilian field operations;
- Expand our ability to carry out police-related activities in order to assist in maintaining the primacy of law;
- Establish an Operation Centre, in order to plan and deploy OSCE field operations;
- Strengthen the consultation process within the OSCE by establishing the Preparatory Committee under the OSCE Permanent Council.

We are committed to preventing the outbreak of violent conflicts wherever possible. The steps we have agreed to take in this Charter will strengthen the OSCE’s ability in this respect as well as its capacity to settle conflicts and to rehabilitate societies ravaged by war and destruction. The Charter will contribute to the formation of a common and indivisible security space. It will advance the creation of an OSCE area free of dividing lines and zones with different levels of security.

I. OUR COMMON CHALLENGES

2. The last decade of the twentieth century has brought great achievements in the OSCE area, co-operation has replaced previous confrontation, but the danger of conflicts between States has not been eliminated. We have put Europe’s old divisions behind us, but new
risks and challenges have emerged. Since we signed the Charter of Paris it has become more obvious that threats to our security can stem from conflicts within States as well as from conflicts between States. We have experienced conflicts which have often resulted from flagrant violations of OSCE norms and principles. We have witnessed atrocities of a kind we had thought were relegated to the past. In this decade it has become clear that all such conflicts can represent a threat to the security of all OSCE participating States.

3. We are determined to learn from the dangers of confrontation and division between States as well as from tragedies of the last decade. Security and peace must be enhanced through an approach which combines two basic elements, we must build confidence among people within States and strengthen co-operation between States. Therefore, we will strengthen existing instruments and develop new ones to provide assistance and advice. We will reinforce our efforts to ensure full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities. In parallel, we will strengthen our capacity to enhance confidence and security between States. We are determined to develop the means at our disposal to settle peacefully disputes between them.

4. International terrorism, violent extremism, organized crime and drug trafficking represent growing challenges to security. Whatever its motives, terrorism in all its forms and manifestations is unacceptable. We will enhance our efforts to prevent the preparation and financing of any act of terrorism on our territories and deny terrorists safe havens. The excessive and destabilizing accumulation and uncontrolled spread of small arms and light weapons represent a threat to peace and security. We are committed to strengthening our protection against these new risks and challenges; strong democratic institutions and the rule of law are the foundation for this protection. We are also determined to co-operate more actively and closely with each other to meet these challenges.

5. Acute economic problems and environmental degradation may have serious implications for our security. Co-operation in the fields of economy, science and technology and the environment will be of critical importance. We will strengthen our responses to such threats through continued economic and environmental reforms, by stable and transparent frameworks for economic activity and by promoting market economies, while paying due attention to economic and social rights. We applaud the unprecedented process of economic transformation taking place in many participating States. We
encourage them to continue this reform process, which will contribute to security and prosperity in the entire OSCE area. We will step up our efforts across all dimensions of the OSCE to combat corruption and to promote the rule of law.

6. We confirm that security in areas nearby, in particular in the Mediterranean area as well as areas in direct proximity to participating States, such as those of Central Asia, is of increasing importance to the OSCE. We recognize that instability in these areas creates challenges that directly affect the security and prosperity of OSCE States.

II. OUR COMMON FOUNDATIONS

7. We reaffirm our full adherence to the Charter of the United Nations, and to the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris and all other OSCE documents to which we have agreed. These documents represent our common commitments and are the foundation for our work. They have helped us to bring about an end to the old confrontation in Europe and to foster a new era of democracy, peace and solidarity throughout the OSCE area. They established clear standards for participating States’ treatment of each other and of all individuals within their territories. All OSCE commitments, without exception, apply equally to each participating State. Their implementation in good faith is essential for relations between States, between governments and their peoples, as well as between the organizations of which they are members. Participating States are accountable to their citizens and responsible to each other for their implementation of their OSCE commitments. We regard these commitments as our common achievement and therefore consider them to be matters of immediate and legitimate concern to all participating States.

We reaffirm the OSCE as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations and as a primary organization for the peaceful settlement of disputes within its region and as a key instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. The OSCE is the inclusive and comprehensive organization for consultation, decision-making and co-operation in its region.

8. Each participating State has an equal right to security. We reaffirm the inherent right of each and every participating State to be free to choose or change its security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as they evolve. Each State also has the right to neutrality. Each participating State will respect the rights of all others in these regards. They will not strengthen their security at the expense of the
security of other States. Within the OSCE no State, group of States or organization can have any pre-eminent responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the OSCE area or can consider any part of the OSCE area as its sphere of influence.

9. We will build our relations in conformity with the concept of common and comprehensive security, guided by equal partnership, solidarity and transparency. The security of each participating State is inseparably linked to that of all others. We will address the human, economic, political and military dimensions of security as an integral whole.

10. We will continue to uphold consensus as the basis for OSCE decision-making. The OSCE's flexibility and ability to respond quickly to a changing political environment should remain at the heart of the OSCE's co-operative and inclusive approach to common and indivisible security.

11. We recognize the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security and its crucial role in contributing to security and stability in our region. We reaffirm our rights and obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, including our commitment on the issue of the non-use of force or the threat of force. In this connection, we also reaffirm our commitment to seek the peaceful resolution of disputes as set out in the Charter of the United Nations.

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Based on these foundations we will strengthen our common response and improve our common instruments in order to meet the challenges confronting us more efficiently.

III. OUR COMMON RESPONSE

CO-OPERATION WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS: THE PLATFORM FOR CO-OPERATIVE SECURITY

12. The risks and challenges we face today cannot be met by a single State or organization. Over the last decade, we have taken important steps to forge new co-operation between the OSCE and other international organizations. In order to make full use of the resources of the international community, we are committed to even closer co-operation among international organizations.
We pledge ourselves, through the Platform for Co-operative Security, which is hereby adopted as an essential element of this Charter, to further strengthen and develop co-operation with competent organizations on the basis of equality and in a spirit of partnership. The principles of the Platform for Co-operative Security, as set out in the operational document attached to this Charter, apply to any organization or institution whose members individually and collectively decide to adhere to them. They apply across all dimensions of security; politico-military, human and economic. Through this Platform we seek to develop and maintain political and operational coherence, on the basis of shared values, among all the various bodies dealing with security, both in responding to specific crises and in formulating responses to new risks and challenges. Recognizing the key integrating role that the OSCE can play, we offer the OSCE, when appropriate, as a flexible co-ordinating framework to foster co-operation, through which various organizations can reinforce each other drawing on their particular strengths. We do not intend to create a hierarchy of organizations or a permanent division of labour among them.

We are ready in principle to deploy the resources of international organizations and institutions of which we are members in support of the OSCE’s work, subject to the necessary policy decisions as cases arise.

13. Subregional co-operation has become an important element in enhancing security across the OSCE area. Processes such as the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, which has been placed under the auspices of the OSCE, help to promote our common values. They contribute to improved security not just in the subregion in question but throughout the OSCE area. We offer the OSCE, in accordance with the Platform for Co-operative Security, as a forum for subregional co-operation. In this respect, and in accordance with the modalities in the operational document, the OSCE will facilitate the exchange of information and experience between subregional groups and may, if so requested, receive and keep their mutual accords and agreements.

SOLIDARITY AND PARTNERSHIP

14. Peace and security in our region is best guaranteed by the willingness and ability of each participating State to uphold democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. We individually confirm our willingness to comply fully with our commitments. We also have a joint responsibility to uphold OSCE principles. We
are therefore determined to co-operate within the OSCE and with its institutions and representatives and stand ready to use OSCE instruments, tools and mechanisms. We will co-operate in a spirit of solidarity and partnership in a continuing review of implementation. Today we commit ourselves to joint measures based on co-operation, both in the OSCE and through those organizations of which we are members, in order to offer assistance to participating States to enhance their compliance with OSCE principles and commitments. We will strengthen existing co-operative instruments and develop new ones in order to respond efficiently to requests for assistance from participating States. We will explore ways to further increase the effectiveness of the Organization to deal with cases of clear, gross and continuing violations of those principles and commitments.

15. We are determined to consider ways of helping participating States requesting assistance in cases of internal breakdown of law and order. We will jointly examine the nature of the situation and possible ways and means of providing support to the State in question.

16. We reaffirm the validity of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security. We will consult promptly, in conformity with our OSCE responsibilities, with a participating State seeking assistance in realizing its right to individual or collective self-defence in the event that its sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence are threatened. We will consider jointly the nature of the threat and actions that may be required in defence of our common values.

OUR INSTITUTIONS

17. The Parliamentary Assembly has developed into one of the most important OSCE institutions continuously providing new ideas and proposals. We welcome this increasing role, particularly in the field of democratic development and election monitoring. We call on the Parliamentary Assembly to develop its activities further as a key component in our efforts to promote democracy, prosperity and increased confidence within and between participating States.

18. The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) and the Representative on Freedom of the Media are essential instruments in ensuring respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The OSCE Secretariat provides vital assistance to the Chairman-in-Office and to the activities of our Organization, especially in the field. We will also strengthen further the operational
capacities of the OSCE Secretariat to enable it to face the expansion of our activities and to ensure that field operations function effectively and in accordance with the mandates and guidance given to them.

We commit ourselves to giving the OSCE institutions our full support. We emphasize the importance of close co-ordination among the OSCE institutions, as well as our field operations, in order to make optimal use of our common resources. We will take into account the need for geographic diversity and gender balance when recruiting personnel to OSCE institutions and field operations.

We acknowledge the tremendous developments and diversification of OSCE activities. We recognize that a large number of OSCE participating States have not been able to implement the 1993 decision of the Rome Ministerial Council, and that difficulties can arise from the absence of a legal capacity of the Organization. We will seek to improve the situation.

THE HUMAN DIMENSION

19. We reaffirm that respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law is at the core of the OSCE’s comprehensive concept of security. We commit ourselves to counter such threats to security as violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief and manifestations of intolerance, aggressive nationalism, racism, chauvinism, xenophobia and anti-semitism.

The protection and promotion of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities are essential factors for democracy, peace, justice and stability within, and between, participating States. In this respect we reaffirm our commitments, in particular under the relevant provisions of the Copenhagen 1990 Human Dimension Document, and recall the Report of the Geneva 1991 Meeting of Experts on National Minorities. Full respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, besides being an end in itself, may not undermine, but strengthen territorial integrity and sovereignty. Various concepts of autonomy as well as other approaches outlined in the above-mentioned documents, which are in line with OSCE principles, constitute ways to preserve and promote the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities within an existing State. We condemn violence against any minority. We pledge to take measures to promote tolerance and to build pluralistic societies where all, regardless of their ethnic origin, enjoy full equality of opportunity. We emphasize that questions relating to national
minorities can only be satisfactorily resolved in a democratic political framework based on the rule of law.

We reaffirm our recognition that everyone has the right to a nationality and that no one should be deprived of his or her nationality arbitrarily. We commit ourselves to continue our efforts to ensure that everyone can exercise this right. We also commit ourselves to further the international protection of stateless persons.

20. We recognize the particular difficulties faced by Roma and Sinti and the need to undertake effective measures in order to achieve full equality of opportunity, consistent with OSCE commitments, for persons belonging to Roma and Sinti. We will reinforce our efforts to ensure that Roma and Sinti are able to play a full and equal part in our societies, and to eradicate discrimination against them.

21. We are committed to eradicating torture and cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment throughout the OSCE area. To this end, we will promote legislation to provide procedural and substantive safeguards and remedies to combat these practices. We will assist victims and co-operate with relevant international organizations and non-governmental organizations, as appropriate.

22. We reject any policy of ethnic cleansing or mass expulsion. We reaffirm our commitment to respect the right to seek asylum and to ensure the international protection of refugees as set out in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, as well as to facilitate the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons in dignity and safety. We will pursue without discrimination the reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons in their places of origin.

In order to enhance the protection of civilians in times of conflict, we will seek ways of reinforcing the application of international humanitarian law.

23. The full and equal exercise by women of their human rights is essential to achieve a more peaceful, prosperous and democratic OSCE area. We are committed to making equality between men and women an integral part of our policies, both at the level of our States and within the Organization.

24. We will undertake measures to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women, and to end violence against women and children as well as sexual exploitation and all forms of trafficking in human beings. In order to prevent such crimes we will, among other means, promote the adoption or strengthening of legislation to hold accountable persons responsible for these acts and strengthen the
protection of victims. We will also develop and implement measures to promote the rights and interests of children in armed conflict and post-conflict situations, including refugees and internally displaced children. We will look at ways of preventing forced or compulsory recruitment for use in armed conflict of persons under 18 years of age.

25. We reaffirm our obligation to conduct free and fair elections in accordance with OSCE commitments, in particular the Copenhagen Document 1990. We recognize the assistance the ODIHR can provide to participating States in developing and implementing electoral legislation. In line with these commitments, we will invite observers to our elections from other participating States, the ODIHR, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and appropriate institutions and organizations that wish to observe our election proceedings. We agree to follow up promptly the ODIHR’s election assessment and recommendations.

26. We reaffirm the importance of independent media and the free flow of information as well as the public’s access to information. We commit ourselves to take all necessary steps to ensure the basic conditions for free and independent media and unimpeded transborder and intra-State flow of information, which we consider to be an essential component of any democratic, free and open society.

27. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can perform a vital role in the promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. They are an integral component of a strong civil society. We pledge ourselves to enhance the ability of NGOs to make their full contribution to the further development of civil society and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

THE POLITICO-MILITARY DIMENSION

28. The politico-military aspects of security remain vital to the interests of participating States. They constitute a core element of the OSCE’s concept of comprehensive security. Disarmament, arms control and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) are important parts of the overall effort to enhance security by fostering stability, transparency and predictability in the military field. Full implementation, timely adaptation and, when required, further development of arms control agreements and CSBMs are key contributions to our political and military stability.

29. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) must continue to serve as a cornerstone of European security. It has dramatically reduced equipment levels. It provides a fundamental
contribution to a more secure and integrated Europe. The States Parties to this Treaty are taking a critical step forward. The Treaty is being strengthened by adapting its provisions to ensure enhanced stability, predictability and transparency amidst changing circumstances. A number of States Parties will reduce further their equipment levels. The adapted Treaty, upon its entry into force, will be open to voluntary accession by other OSCE participating States in the area between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains and thereby will provide an important additional contribution to European stability and security.

30. The OSCE Vienna Document 1999, together with other documents adopted by the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) on politico-military aspects of security, provide valuable tools for all OSCE participating States in building greater mutual confidence and military transparency. We will continue to make regular use of and fully implement all OSCE instruments in this field and seek their timely adaptation in order to ensure adequate response to security needs in the OSCE area. We remain committed to the principles contained in the Code of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security. We are determined to make further efforts within the FSC in order to jointly address common security concerns of participating States and to pursue the OSCE’s concept of comprehensive and indivisible security so far as the politico-military dimension is concerned. We will continue a substantial security dialogue and task our representatives to conduct this dialogue in the framework of the FSC.

THE ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL DIMENSION

31. The link between security, democracy and prosperity has become increasingly evident in the OSCE area, as has the risk to security from environmental degradation and the depletion of natural resources. Economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility are indispensable for prosperity. On the basis of these linkages, we will ensure that the economic dimension receives appropriate attention, in particular as an element of our early warning and conflict prevention activities. We will do so, inter alia, with a view to promoting the integration of economies in transition into the world economy and to ensure the rule of law and the development of a transparent and stable legal system in the economic sphere.

32. The OSCE is characterized by its broad membership, its comprehensive approach to security, its large number of field operations and its long history as a norm-setting organization. These qualities enable it to identify threats and to act as a catalyst for
co-operation between key international organizations and institutions in the economic and environmental areas. The OSCE stands ready to play this role, where appropriate. We will foster such co-ordination between the OSCE and relevant international organizations in accordance with the Platform for Co-operative Security. We will enhance the OSCE’s ability to address economic and environmental issues in ways that neither duplicate existing work nor replace efforts that can be more efficiently undertaken by other organizations. We will focus on areas in which the OSCE has particular competence. The OSCE’s efforts within the human dimension have significant economic effects and vice versa, for example by mobilizing human resources and talents and by helping to build vibrant civil societies. In the spirit of the 1998 Århus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, we will in particular seek to ensure access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters.

RULE OF LAW AND FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION

33. We reaffirm our commitment to the rule of law. We recognize that corruption poses a great threat to the OSCE’s shared values. It generates instability and reaches into many aspects of the security, economic and human dimensions. Participating States pledge to strengthen their efforts to combat corruption and the conditions that foster it, and to promote a positive framework for good government practices and public integrity. They will make better use of existing international instruments and assist each other in their fight against corruption. As part of its work to promote the rule of law, the OSCE will work with NGOs that are committed to a strong public and business consensus against corrupt practices.

IV. OUR COMMON INSTRUMENTS

ENHANCING OUR DIALOGUE

34. We are determined to broaden and strengthen our dialogue concerning developments related to all aspects of security in the OSCE area. We charge the Permanent Council and the FSC within their respective areas of competence to address in greater depth security concerns of the participating States and to pursue the OSCE’s concept of comprehensive and indivisible security.
35. The Permanent Council, being the regular body for political consultations and decision-making, will address the full range of conceptual issues as well as the day-to-day operational work of the Organization. To assist in its deliberations and decision-making and to strengthen the process of political consultations and transparency within the Organization, we will establish a Preparatory Committee under the Permanent Council’s direction. This open-ended Committee will normally meet in informal format and will be tasked by the Council, or its Chairman, to deliberate and to report back to the Council.

36. Reflecting our spirit of solidarity and partnership, we will also enhance our political dialogue in order to offer assistance to participating States, thereby ensuring compliance with OSCE commitments. To encourage this dialogue, we have decided, in accordance with established rules and practices, to make increased use of OSCE instruments, including:

- Dispatching delegations from the OSCE institutions, with the participation of other relevant international organizations, when appropriate, to provide advice and expertise for reform of legislation and practices;
- Dispatching Personal Representatives of the Chairman-in-Office, after consultations with the State concerned, for fact-finding or advisory missions;
- Bringing together representatives of the OSCE and States concerned in order to address questions regarding compliance with OSCE commitments;
- Organizing training programmes aimed at improving standards and practices, inter alia, within the fields of human rights, democratization and the rule of law;
- Addressing matters regarding compliance with OSCE commitments at OSCE review meetings and conferences as well as in the Economic Forum;
- Submitting such matters for consideration by the Permanent Council, inter alia, on the basis of recommendations by the OSCE institutions within their respective mandates or by Personal Representatives of the Chairman-in-Office;
- Convening meetings of the Permanent Council in a special or reinforced format in order to discuss matters of non-compliance with OSCE commitments and to decide on appropriate courses of action;
- Establishing field operations with the consent of the State concerned.
OSCE FIELD OPERATIONS

37. The Permanent Council will establish field operations. It will decide on their mandates and budgets. On this basis, the Permanent Council and the Chairman-in-Office will provide guidance to such operations.

38. The development of OSCE field operations represents a major transformation of the Organization that has enabled the OSCE to play a more prominent role in promoting peace, security and compliance with OSCE commitments. Based on the experience we have acquired, we will develop and strengthen this instrument further in order to carry out tasks according to their respective mandates, which may, inter alia, include the following:

  – Providing assistance and advice or formulating recommendations in areas agreed by the OSCE and the host country;
  – Observing compliance with OSCE commitments and providing advice or recommendations for improved compliance;
  – Assisting in the organization and monitoring of elections;
  – Providing support for the primacy of law and democratic institutions and for the maintenance and restoration of law and order;
  – Helping to create conditions for negotiation or other measures that could facilitate the peaceful settlement of conflicts;
  – Verifying and/or assisting in fulfilling agreements on the peaceful settlement of conflicts;
  – Providing support in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of various aspects of society.

39. Recruitment to field operations must ensure that qualified personnel are made available by participating States. The training of personnel is an important aspect of enhancing the effectiveness of the OSCE and its field operations and will therefore be improved. Existing training facilities in OSCE participating States and training activities of the OSCE could play an active role in achieving this aim in co-operation, where appropriate, with other organizations and institutions.

40. In accordance with the Platform for Co-operative Security, co-operation between OSCE and other international organizations in performing field operations will be enhanced. This will be done, inter alia, by carrying out common projects with other partners, in particular the Council of Europe, allowing the OSCE to benefit from their expertise while respecting the identity and decision-making procedures of each organization involved.
41. The host country of an OSCE field operation should, when appropriate, be assisted in building its own capacity and expertise within the area of responsibility. This would facilitate an efficient transfer of the tasks of the operation to the host country, and consequently the closure of the field operation.

RAPID RESPONSE (REACT)

42. We recognize that the ability to deploy rapidly civilian and police expertise is essential to effective conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. We are committed to developing a capability within the participating States and the OSCE to set up Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams (REACT) that will be at the disposal of the OSCE. This will enable OSCE bodies and institutions, acting in accordance with their respective procedures, to offer experts quickly to OSCE participating States to provide assistance, in compliance with OSCE norms, in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. This rapidly deployable capability will cover a wide range of civilian expertise. It will give us the ability to address problems before they become crises and to deploy quickly the civilian component of a peacekeeping operation when needed. These Teams could also be used as surge capacity to assist the OSCE with the rapid deployment of large-scale or specialized operations. We expect REACT to develop and evolve, along with other OSCE capabilities, to meet the needs of the Organization.

OPERATION CENTRE

43. Rapid deployment is important for the OSCE’s effectiveness in contributing to our conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation efforts and depends on effective preparation and planning. To facilitate this, we decide to set up an Operation Centre within the Conflict Prevention Centre with a small core staff, having expertise relevant for all kinds of OSCE operations, which can be expanded rapidly when required. Its role will be to plan and deploy field operations, including those involving REACT resources. It will liaise with other international organizations and institutions as appropriate in accordance with the Platform for Co-operative Security. The Centre’s core staff will, to the extent possible, be drawn from personnel with appropriate expertise seconded by participating States and from existing Secretariat resources. This core will provide
the basis for rapid expansion, to deal with new tasks as they arise. The precise arrangements will be decided in accordance with existing procedures.

**POLICE-RELATED ACTIVITIES**

44. We will work to enhance the OSCE’s role in civilian police-related activities as an integral part of the Organization’s efforts in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. Such activities may comprise:

- Police monitoring, including with the aim of preventing police from carrying out such activities as discrimination based on religious and ethnic identity;
- Police training, which could, inter alia, include the following tasks:
  - Improving the operational and tactical capabilities of local police services and reforming paramilitary forces;
  - Providing new and modern policing skills, such as community policing, and anti-drug, anti-corruption and anti-terrorist capacities;
  - Creating a police service with a multi-ethnic and/or multi-religious composition that can enjoy the confidence of the entire population;
  - Promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in general.

We will encourage the provision of modern equipment appropriate to police services that receive training in such new skills.

In addition, the OSCE will examine options and conditions for a role in law enforcement.

45. We shall also promote the development of independent judicial systems that play a key role in providing remedies for human rights violations as well as providing advice and assistance for prison system reforms. The OSCE will also work with other international organizations in the creation of political and legal frameworks within which the police can perform its tasks in accordance with democratic principles and the rule of law.

**PEACEKEEPING**

46. We remain committed to reinforcing the OSCE’s key role in maintaining peace and stability throughout our area. The OSCE’s most effective contributions to regional security have been in areas such as field operations, post-conflict rehabilitation, democratization,
and human rights and election monitoring. We have decided to explore options for a potentially greater and wider role for the OSCE in peacekeeping. Reaffirming our rights and obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, and on the basis of our existing decisions, we confirm that the OSCE can, on a case-by-case basis and by consensus, decide to play a role in peacekeeping, including a leading role when participating States judge it to be the most effective and appropriate organization. In this regard, it could also decide to provide the mandate covering peacekeeping by others and seek the support of participating States as well as other organizations to provide resources and expertise. In accordance with the Platform for Co-operative Security, it could also provide a co-ordinating framework for such efforts.

THE COURT OF CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION

47. We reiterate that the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes is at the core of OSCE commitments. The Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, in this respect, remains a tool available to those, a large number of participating States, which have become parties to the 1992 Convention of Stockholm. We encourage them to use this instrument to resolve disputes between them, as well as with other participating States which voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the Court. We also encourage those participating States which have not yet done so to consider joining the Convention.

V. OUR PARTNERS FOR CO-OPERATION

48. We recognize the interdependence between the security of the OSCE area and that of Partners for Co-operation, as well as our commitment to the relationship and the dialogue with them. We emphasize in particular the long-standing relations with our Mediterranean partners, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. We recognize the increased involvement in and support for the work of the OSCE by our Partners for Co-operation. Building on this interdependence, we are ready to develop this process further. Implementing and building on the Helsinki Document 1992 and the Budapest Document 1994, we will work more closely with the Partners for Co-operation to promote OSCE norms and principles. We welcome their wish to promote the realization of the Organization’s norms and principles, including the fundamental principle of resolving conflicts through peaceful means. To this end, we will invite the Partners for
Co-operation on a more regular basis to increased participation in the work of the OSCE as the dialogue develops.

49. The potential of the Contact Group and the Mediterranean seminars must be fully explored and exploited. Drawing on the Budapest mandate, the Permanent Council will examine the recommendations emerging from the Contact Group and the Mediterranean seminars. We will encourage the Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation to draw on our expertise in setting up structures and mechanisms in the Mediterranean for early warning, preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention.

50. We welcome the increased participation in our work by Japan and the Republic of Korea. We welcome the contribution by Japan to OSCE field activities. We will seek to strengthen further our co-operation with our Asian partners in meeting challenges of common interest.

VI. CONCLUSION

51. This Charter will benefit the security of all participating States by enhancing and strengthening the OSCE as we enter the twenty-first century. Today we have decided to develop its existing instruments and to create new tools. We will use them fully to promote a free, democratic and secure OSCE area. The Charter will thus underpin the OSCE’s role as the only pan-European security organization entrusted with ensuring peace and stability in its area. We appreciate the completion of the work of the Security Model Committee.

52. The original of the present Charter, drawn up in English, French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish, will be transmitted to the Secretary General of the Organization, who will transmit a certified true copy of this Charter to each of the participating States.

We, the undersigned High Representatives of the participating States, mindful of the high political significance that we attach to the present Charter and declaring our determination to act in accordance with the provisions contained in the above text, have subscribed our signatures below.

Done at Istanbul, on 19 November 1999, in the name of

40.


The Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, Georgia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Moldova, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of 19 November 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,

Having met in Istanbul from 17 to 19 November 1999,

Guided by Section III of the Final Document of the First Conference to Review the Operation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength, of May 1996,


Taking into account the Decision of the Joint Consultative Group No. 8/97 of 23 July 1997, concerning Certain Basic Elements for Treaty Adaptation,

Recalling their commitment at the OSCE Oslo Ministerial Meeting in December 1998 to complete the process of adaptation of the Treaty by the time of the OSCE Summit in 1999,

Taking into account the Decision of the Joint Consultative Group No. 3/99 of 30 March 1999,

Recalling the Decision of the Joint Consultative Group No. 8/99 of 11 November 1999 on the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, hereinafter referred to as the Agreement on Adaptation,
Have taken note of the Statement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe issued by the North Atlantic Council and the Representatives of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary and the Republic of Poland at the Ministerial Meeting held in Brussels on 8 December 1998, and have taken note of the commitments contained therein;

Have taken note of the statement by the Russian Federation, which is attached to this Final Act, concerning its commitments on restraint and the use of Treaty flexibilities in the region which includes the Kaliningrad oblast and the Pskov oblast;

Have noted with appreciation that in the course of the adaptation negotiations several States Parties have committed themselves to reducing their permitted levels of armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty, thus reflecting the fundamental changes in the European security environment since the signing of the Treaty in November 1990;

Have further taken note of the statements by the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Poland and the Slovak Republic, which are attached to this Final Act, concerning their commitments regarding the future adjustment of their territorial ceilings, and the relevant conditions;

Have taken note of the statements by the Republic of Belarus, the Czech Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Poland, the Slovak Republic and Ukraine, which are attached to this Final Act, concerning their commitments regarding their future use of the provisions on increasing territorial ceilings set forth in the Agreement on Adaptation, and the relevant conditions;

Have undertaken to move forward expeditiously to facilitate completion of national ratification procedures, so that the Agreement on Adaptation can enter into force as soon as possible, taking into account their common commitment to, and the central importance of, full and continued implementation of the Treaty and its associated documents until and following entry into force of the Agreement on Adaptation; and, in this context, have taken note of the statement by the Government of the Russian Federation on 1 November 1999, including its commitment, contained therein, to all obligations under the Treaty and, in particular, to agreed levels of armaments and equipment;

Have welcomed the joint statement by Georgia and the Russian Federation of 17 November 1999, which is attached to this Final Act;
Have taken note of the statement by the Republic of Moldova, which is attached to this Final Act, concerning its renunciation of the right to receive a temporary deployment on its territory and have welcomed the commitment of the Russian Federation to withdraw and/or destroy Russian conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty by the end of 2001, in the context of its commitment referred to in paragraph 19 of the Istanbul Summit Declaration;

Have expressed their intention to review the above elements, as appropriate, at the Second Conference to Review the Operation of the Treaty, which will take place in May 2001;

Have noted that, following entry into force of the Agreement on Adaptation, other participating States of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe with territory in the geographic area between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains will have the possibility to apply for accession to the Treaty;

Have noted that a consolidated version of the Treaty as amended by the Agreement on Adaptation is being produced for information and to facilitate implementation;

Have adopted this Final Act at the time of signature of the Agreement on Adaptation.

This Final Act, in all six official languages of the Treaty, shall be deposited with the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, as the designated Depositary for the Treaty, which shall circulate copies of this Final Act to all States Parties.

[...]

Annex 5. Statement on behalf of the Russian Federation

“In the context of the political commitments and efforts of other States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), in particular those aimed at further strengthening stability in Central Europe, the Russian Federation will show due restraint with regard to ground TLE levels and deployments in the region which includes the Kaliningrad oblast and the Pskov oblast. In the present politico-military situation, it has no reasons, plans or intentions to station substantial additional combat forces, whether air or ground forces, in that region on a permanent basis.

If necessary, the Russian Federation will rely on the possibilities for operational reinforcement, including temporary deployments, in a manner compatible with the CFE Treaty mechanisms.”

Annexes 1–4 containing the statements on behalf of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia have been omitted.
Annex 13. Statement on behalf of the Republic of Moldova

“The Republic of Moldova renounces the right to receive a temporary deployment on its territory due to its Constitutional provisions which control and prohibit any presence of foreign military forces on the territory of Moldova.”


The Russian Federation and Georgia,
guided by paragraphs 14.2.3 and 14.2.7 of the Decision of the Joint Consultative Group of 30 March 1999 concerning adaptation of the CFE Treaty,
confirming their intention to properly implement the adapted CFE Treaty as adopted,
wishing to promote the development and strengthening of cooperative relations between the Russian Federation and Georgia,
have agreed as follows.

1. The Russian Side undertakes to reduce, by no later than 31 December 2000, the levels of its TLE located within the territory of Georgia in such a way that they will not exceed 153 tanks, 241 ACVs and 140 artillery systems.

2. No later than 31 December 2000, the Russian Side will withdraw (dispose of) the TLE located at the Russian military bases at Vaziani and Gudauta and at the repair facilities in Tbilisi.

The Russian military bases at Gudauta and Vaziani will be disbanded and withdrawn by 1 July 2001.

The issue of the utilization, including the joint utilization, of the military facilities and infrastructure of the disbanded Russian military bases remaining at those locations will be resolved within the same time-frame.

142 The annexes containing declarations on behalf of Belarus, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Ukraine have been omitted.
143 This meant the withdrawal of recognition of the legality of the presence of Russian troops in the separatist area of the Transnistria region. However, a group of Russian forces are still stationed there today.
144 Russia fulfilled this obligation with regard to the Vaziani base. The Gudauta base, on the territory of separatist Abkhazia, was not dismantled but formally transformed into a base for so-called CIS peacekeeping forces (Russian only). Despite Georgia’s disagreement with this use, these troops are still stationed there today.
3. The Georgian Side undertakes to grant to the Russian Side the right to basic temporary deployment of its TLE at facilities of the Russian military bases at Batumi and Akhalkalaki.

4. The Georgian Side will facilitate the creation of the conditions necessary for reducing and withdrawing the Russian forces. In this connection, the two Sides note the readiness of OSCE participating States to provide financial support for this process.

5. During the year 2000 the two Sides will complete negotiations regarding the duration and modalities of the functioning of the Russian military bases at Batumi and Akhalkalaki and the Russian military facilities within the territory of Georgia.\(^{145}\)


\(^{145}\) The military bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki were evacuated and liquidated under the Russian-Georgian agreement of 2005 in June 2007. (Akhalkalaki) and in November 2007 (Batumi).
Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council. Final Communique, Brussels, Belgium, 15 December 1999

28. We continue to attach importance to consultations and practical co-operation with Russia. Our aim remains to establish a strong, stable and enduring partnership within the framework of the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

29. We note the progress made in recent consultations in the PJC framework on issues relating to the operation in Kosovo. We note with satisfaction the valuable experience of practical co-operation between NATO and Russian forces both in SFOR and KFOR.

30. We encourage Russia to resume co-operation on the broad range of issues foreseen in the Founding Act and to engage actively in the EAPC and the Partnership for Peace. At the same time, we emphasise that the further development of our co-operation depends on Russia's respect for international norms and obligations.

31. We are deeply concerned about the conflict in Chechnya, continuing reports of civilian casualties there and the plight of displaced persons. We condemn, in particular, Russian threats against unarmed civilians, such as those in Grozny. We acknowledge the right of Russia to preserve its territorial integrity and to protect its citizens against terrorism and lawlessness. We condemn terrorism in all its manifestations but believe that Russia's pursuit of a purely military solution to the conflict is undermining its legitimate objectives. The continuing disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force against the civilian population is incompatible with the commitments Russia has undertaken within the OSCE and its obligations as a member of the United Nations and the Council of Europe. In this context, we also recall the principles enshrined in the NATO-Russia Founding Act. We therefore urge Russia to exercise the fullest restraint, to refrain from...

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146 The part of the communiqué not directly related to NATO-Russia relations has been omitted. The text relating to the conflict in Chechnya contains elements typical of a political stance that appeared repeatedly in allied documents during the conflict. Until 2005, NATO issued official comprehensive communiqués (independently of summit meetings) after each of the meetings of foreign and defence ministers, which were held every six months. Earlier texts were frequently a source of reference for many repeated political assessments, which also concerned the conflict in Chechnya.

147 Implemented by NATO with Russian participation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo.
the use of force against civilians and protect their human rights, to facilitate the provision of humanitarian aid to those in need, and to cooperate fully with international relief agencies and to ensure security for their operations. Bearing in mind the importance of regional stability and respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of neighbouring states, we are deeply concerned about the impact of the crisis of the entire Caucasus region and stress the need to avoid steps that would further undermine regional security.

We urge Russia to open all avenues for a political solution to the conflict. To this end, it is essential that the Russian government and Chechen representatives take meaningful steps toward a renewed dialogue. We also urge the Chechen authorities to condemn terrorism and to take action against it. We expect Russia to respect the commitments made in Istanbul and to make good use of today’s visit by the OSCE Chairman-in-Office to the region in order to facilitate a political process to end the conflict.

 […]

40. We welcome the important political commitments contained in the CFE Final Act, in particular the bilateral agreements reached by Russia and Georgia, and Russia and Moldova, on withdrawal of Russian Forces. But it is essential that the CFE Treaty remains effective and credible. NATO countries are concerned about continued Russian non-compliance with the Treaty’s Article 5 (flank) limits. We note Russia’s commitment to comply with all the Treaty’s provisions and limitations. We also note Russia’s assurances that its exceeding of CFE limits will be of a temporary nature. NATO Allies expect Russia to honour its pledge to comply with CFE limits as soon as possible and, in the meantime, to provide maximum transparency regarding its forces and weapons deployed in the North Caucasus, in accordance with the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document. Entry into Force of the Adapted Treaty can only be envisaged in the context of compliance by all States Parties with the Treaty’s limitations. It is on this basis that we will work towards bringing the Adapted Treaty into force. Pending the completion of this process, the continued implementation of the existing Treaty and its associated documents remains crucial.

148 Sections on NATO relations with Ukraine and Mediterranean partners and the Alliance’s general support for arms control and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have been omitted.

149 See: previous document in this volume.

150 The so-called flank limitations were to deter the threat of a concentration of Russian troops (and armaments at their disposal) in strategically important regions neighbouring NATO countries. In negotiations on the adaptation of the treaty, Russia tried to eliminate the flank limitations.
41. The Alliance attaches importance to preserving strategic stability. In this respect, we call on Russia to ratify the START II Treaty without delay. This would pave the way for considerable reductions of nuclear arsenals and would allow negotiations on a START III Treaty aiming at further far-reaching reductions on nuclear weapons stockpiles [...]\textsuperscript{151}


\textsuperscript{151} Sections on various aspects of arms control and weapons of mass destruction, civil planning, and combating terrorism have been omitted.
42.

The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation
Approved by Decree of the Acting
President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin
of January 10, 2000

[...]152

I. Russia in the world community

The world situation is characterized by a system of international relations undergoing dynamic transformation. Following the end of the bipolar confrontation era, two mutually exclusive tendencies came to prevail.

The first of these tendencies manifests itself in the strengthened economic and political positions of a significant number of states and of their integrative associations and in improved mechanisms for multilateral governance of international processes. Economic, political, science and technological, environmental and information factors are playing an ever-increasing role. Russia will help shape the ideology behind the rise of a multipolar world on this basis.

The second tendency manifests itself in attempts to create an international relations structure based on domination by developed Western countries in the international community, under US leadership and designed for unilateral solutions (primarily by the use of military force) to key issues in world politics in circumvention of the fundamental rules of international law.

The formation of international relations is accompanied by competition and by the striving of a number of states to increase their influence on global politics, including by creating weapons of mass destruction. The significance of the military and security aspects of international relations continues to remain substantial.

Russia is one of the world’s major countries, with a centuries-old history and rich cultural traditions. Despite the complicated international situation and difficulties of a domestic nature, Russia objectively continues to play an important role in global processes by virtue of its great economic, science-technological and military potential and its unique strategic location on the Eurasian continent.

152 Section containing the formal introduction has been omitted.
There are prospects for the Russian Federation’s broader integration into the world economy and for expanded cooperation with international economic and financial institutions. Objectively, the commonality of interests between Russia and other states persists with regard to many international security problems, particularly opposing the proliferation of mass destruction weapons, settling and preventing regional conflicts, fighting international terrorism and the drug business, and resolving acute ecological problems of a global nature, including nuclear and radiation safety.

At the same time, a number of states are stepping up efforts to weaken Russia politically, economically, militarily and in other ways. Attempts to ignore Russia’s interests when resolving major issues in international relations, including conflict situations, are capable of undermining international security and stability and of inhibiting the positive changes occurring in international relations.

In many countries, including the Russian Federation, the acuteness of the problem of terrorism, having a transnational character and threatening world stability, has sharply increased, which calls for the unification of efforts by the entire international community, increased effectiveness of existing forms and methods of countering this threat, and urgent action to neutralize it.

III. Threats to the Russian Federation’s national security

The main threats in the international sphere are due to the following factors:

– the striving of particular states and intergovernmental associations to belittle the role of existing mechanisms for ensuring international security, above all the United Nations and the OSCE;
– the danger of a weakening of Russia’s political, economic and military influence in the world;
– the strengthening of military-political blocs and alliances, above all NATO’s eastward expansion;
– possible appearance of foreign military bases and large troop contingents in direct proximity to Russia’s borders;
– proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles;

\[153\] Section on Russian national interests has been omitted.
\[154\] Section on internal threats has been omitted.
a weakening of the integration processes in the Commonwealth of Independent States;
- outbreak and escalation of conflicts near the state border of the Russian Federation and the external borders of the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States;
- territorial claims against Russia.

Internationally, threats to Russian national security are manifested in attempts by other states to counteract its strengthening as one of the centres of influence in a multipolar world, to hinder realization of its national interests and to weaken its positions in Europe, the Middle East, Transcaucasia, Central Asia and the Asia-Pacific Region.

Terrorism represents a serious threat to Russian national security. International terrorism has unleashed the overt campaign aimed at destabilizing the situation in Russia.

There is an increasing threat to national security in the information sphere. The striving of a number of countries to dominate the global information space and oust Russia from the external and internal information market poses a serious danger, as do the elaboration by a number of states of a concept of information wars that envisages creation of means of dangerous influence on the information spheres of other countries of the world; disruption of the normal functioning of information and telecommunication systems and of storage reliability for information resources; and gaining of unsanctioned access to them.

The level and scope of threats in the military sphere are growing. Elevated to the rank of strategic doctrine, NATO’s shift to the practice of using military force outside its zone of responsibility and without UN Security Council authorization is fraught with the danger of destabilizing the entire strategic situation in the world.

The growing technological edge of a number of leading powers and the buildup of their capabilities to develop new-generation weapons and military equipment create the prerequisites for a qualitatively new phase of the arms race and for a radical alteration of the forms and methods of warfare.

Foreign special services and the organizations they use are increasingly active on the territory of the Russian Federation.

Adding to the negative tendencies in the military domain is the protracted reform process in the Russian military organization and defence industrial complex, along with inadequate funding for national defence and the imperfections of the legal and regulatory base. This currently shows itself in the critically low level of operational and
combat training in the Russian Armed Forces and in other forces, troop units and agencies, in the impermissible drop in the level of provision of modern weapons, military and special equipment for the troops (forces), in the extreme acuteness of social problems and leads to a weakening of the military security of the Russian Federation as a whole.

Threats to the national security and interests of the Russian Federation in the border sphere are due to the following causes:

- adjacent states’ economic, demographic and cultural-religious expansion into Russian territory;
- stepped-up activity by transfrontier organized crime as well as by foreign terrorist organizations.

The threat of a deteriorating environmental situation in the country and depletion of its natural resources hinges directly on the state of the economy and society’s willingness to grasp the globality and importance of these issues. For Russia, this threat is particularly great because of the preferential development of fuel and energy industries, the lack of development in legislative framework for environmental activities, the absence or limited use of resource conservation technologies, and low environmental awareness. There is a tendency for Russia to be used as a place for reprocessing and burying environmentally dangerous materials and substances.

In these circumstances, the erosion of state oversight and the insufficient effectiveness of the legal and economic mechanisms for averting and relieving emergencies are bound to increase the risk of man-made disasters in all sectors of economic activity.

[...]\(^{155}\)


\(^{155}\) Sections on methods to ensure national security and the conclusion have been omitted.
43.

Interview of the acting President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin for BBC on March 5, 2000

[...]

David Frost: Tell me about your views on NATO if you would. Do you see NATO as a potential partner, or a rival or an enemy?

Vladimir Putin: Russia is part of the European culture and I cannot imagine my country in isolation from Europe and its—as we often call it—the civilised world. So I find it difficult to think of NATO as an enemy. I think that even posing a question in this way will not do any good to either Russia or the world—such an approach to the problem may itself cause some harm. Russia wants an equal and trust-based relationship with its partners. The problem for us is the attempts to change the decision-making instruments previously arranged at the international level, mainly in the area of solving international security problems. As we know, these instruments are the responsibility of the United Nations and the UN Security Council. We have the impression that these instruments are being replaced by other mechanisms. Perhaps this makes sense, but on condition that Russia has the opportunity to participate in the development of these decisions. A situation in which a decision is taken in one place and it is relevant to our interests or it affects them, and is taken without our involvement, is by no means satisfactory, and this does not only concern Russia but also the United Kingdom or other European countries. I think that communicating with Russia in such a way is not very promising. It is harmful to the international community, Europe, NATO, and Russia. We strive for cooperation on equal terms and partnership. We assume that we can talk about the higher level of integration with NATO, but only if—I repeat—Russia is an equal partner. As you know, we are constantly declaring our negative attitude towards NATO’s enlargement to the east.

David Frost: Is it possible Russia could join NATO?

Vladimir Putin: Why not? Why not? So…I do not exclude this possibility—I repeat—if Russia’s interests are taken into account, if

156 Questions and answers that do not relate to European security problems have been omitted.
it is a partner on equal terms. I want to emphasise this in particular. After all, this situation, which shaped the fundamental principles of the United Nations was the world situation after the Second World War. Let’s assume that this situation has changed, let’s assume that those who see this also want to change the tools for maintaining international peace and security. Pretending or assuming, however, that Russia has nothing to do with it, and trying to exclude it from the process, is by no means possible. What are the possible options here? Removing, fully removing Russia from the international scene—I’m not sure it is possible nowadays, I think it is totally unrealistic. And if so, then we should all take these problems seriously. No one should be under the illusion of having an advantage that could be used to the detriment of their partners. We are concerned about this approach. So when we express our opposition to NATO enlargement, we do not mean our aspirations in relation to some regions. By the way, we have never declared any region of the world a zone of our national interest, I prefer to refer it as a strategic partnership. A zone of strategic interests of a particular region is primarily the interests of the people who live in that region. So when we oppose the eastward enlargement of NATO, we do not say that we have any particular interests there. We consider, above all, the position that our country occupies today and in the future in the world. And if one tries to exclude us from the decision-making process, we feel anxious and irritated. But it does not mean we are ready to slam the door and become closed, to fall into isolationism. Of course not. We propose a partnership in all aspects of joint activities, including the area of security.

**David Frost:** Could you tell who in practice, today is Russia’s ally?

**Vladimir Putin:** I have already said that Russia is a country of European culture. Therefore, we would very much like to be able to consider the countries that are close to us both geographically and mentally and culturally as our serious partners, who see Russia as their strategic partner and treat us as such. However, Russia is not only a European country, it is also an Asian country. It is a Eurasian country. We have long borders with no less powerful neighbours in the east. That is why we have pursued and will continue to pursue a sustainable foreign policy and pay equal attention to our partners, not only in Europe but also in other regions of the world. We believe that such an approach by Russia to defining its partnership is a sufficient guarantee of stability in the world in general. We will stick to this tactic and
strategy for developing our international relations in the near future. And we actually have a joke that Russia’s most important allies are the army and the navy. But it is a joke, of course.

[...]

Translated by Mirosław Łukawski. Verified with the Russian original by Marek Menkiszak.


Questions and answers that do not relate to European security problems have been omitted.
I. Military-Political Principles

Military-Political Situation

1. The state of and prospects for the development of the present-day military-political situation are determined by the qualitative improvement in the means, forms, and methods of military conflict, by the increase in its reach and the severity of its consequences, and by its spread to new spheres. The possibility of achieving military-political goals through indirect, non-close-quarter operations predetermines the particular danger of modern wars and armed conflicts for peoples and states and for preserving international stability and peace, and makes it vitally necessary to take exhaustive measures to prevent them and to achieve a peaceful settlement of differences at early stages of their emergence and development.

2. The military-political situation is determined by the following main factors:
   – a decline in the threat of the unleashing of a large-scale war, including a nuclear war;
   – the shaping and strengthening of regional power centres; the strengthening of national, ethnic, and religious extremism; the rise in separatism;
   – the spread of local wars and armed conflicts; an increase in the regional arms race;
   – the spread of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems; the exacerbation of information confrontation.

3. A destabilizing impact on the military-political situation is exerted by:

158 Preface has been omitted.
– attempts to weaken (ignore) the existing mechanism for safeguarding international security (primarily the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe);
– the utilization of military-force actions as a means of “humanitarian intervention” without the sanction of the UN Security Council, in circumvention of the generally accepted principles and norms of international law;
– the violation by certain states of international treaties and agreements in the sphere of arms limitation and disarmament;
– the utilization by entities in international relations of information and other (including non-traditional) means and technologies for aggressive (expansionist) purposes;
– the activities of extremist nationalist, religious, separatist, and terrorist movements, organizations, and structures;
– the expansion of the scale of organized crime, terrorism, and weapons and drug trafficking, and the multinational nature of these activities.

The Main Threats to Military Security

4. Under present-day conditions the threat of direct military aggression in traditional forms against the Russian Federation and its allies has declined thanks to positive changes in the international situation, the implementation of an active peace-loving foreign-policy course by our country, and the maintenance of Russia’s military potential—primarily its nuclear deterrent potential—at an adequate level.

At the same time, external and internal threats to the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies persist and in certain areas are increasing.

5. The main external threats are:
– territorial claims against the Russian Federation; interference in the Russian Federation’s internal affairs;
– attempts to ignore (infringe) the Russian Federation’s interests in resolving international security problems, and to oppose its strengthening as one influential centre in a multipolar world;
– the existence of seats of armed conflict, primarily close to the Russian Federation’s state border and the borders of its allies;
– the creation (buildup) of groups of troops (forces) leading to the violation of the existing balance of forces, close to the Russian Federation’s state border and the borders of its allies or on the seas adjoining their territories;
– the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the Russian Federation’s military security;
– the introduction of foreign troops in violation of the UN Charter on the territory of friendly states adjoining the Russian Federation;
– the creation, equipping, and training on other states’ territories of armed formations and groups with a view to transferring them for operations on the territory of the Russian Federation and its allies;
– attacks (armed provocations) on Russian Federation military installations located on the territory of foreign states, as well as on installations and facilities on the Russian Federation’s state border, the borders of its allies, or the high seas,\textsuperscript{159}
– actions aimed at undermining global and regional stability, not least by hampering the work of Russian systems of state and military rule, or at disrupting the functioning of strategic nuclear forces, missile-attack early warning, antимissile defence, and space monitoring systems and systems for ensuring their combat stability, nuclear munition storage facilities, nuclear power generation, the nuclear and chemical industries, and other potentially dangerous installations;
– hostile information (information-technical, information-psychological) operations that damage the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies;
– discrimination and the suppression of the rights, freedoms, and legitimate interests of the citizens of the Russian Federation in foreign states;
– international terrorism.

[...]\textsuperscript{160}


\textsuperscript{159} The “world ocean” (rus. \textit{mirovoy okean})—all open sea areas.

\textsuperscript{160} Sections concerning basic internal threats, military security, military system of the state, military and strategic assumptions and military and economic assumptions have been omitted.
45.

The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation
approved by the Decree of the President
of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin
of June 28, 2000

[...]161

I. The modern world and the foreign policy of the Russian Federation

The modern world is going through fundamental and dynamic changes that profoundly affect the interests of the Russian Federation and its citizens. Russia is an active participant in this process. Being a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, possessing a substantial potential and resources in all spheres of vital activity and maintaining intensive relations with the leading states of the world, Russia exerts significant influence on the formation of a new world order.

The transformation of international relations, the end of confrontation, steady elimination of the consequences of the “Cold War,” and the advancement of Russian reforms have substantially broadened the possibilities for cooperation in the world arena. The threat of a global nuclear conflict has been reduced to a minimum. While the military power still retains significance in relations among states, an ever greater role is being played by economic, political, scientific and technological, ecological, and information factors. Coming to the fore as the main components of the national might of the Russian Federation are its intellectual, information and communications capabilities, the well-being and education level of the population, the degree of combining of scientific and production resources, and concentration of financial capital and diversification of economic ties. The overwhelming majority of states are firmly set on pursuing market methods of managing the economy and democratic values. The major breakthrough in a number of key areas of scientific and technological progress leading to the formation of a single, worldwide information environment, the deepening and diversification of international economic ties add a global nature to interdependence of states. Prerequisites are being created for build a more stable and crisis-resistant world structure.

161 Preface and general assumptions have been omitted.
At the same time, new challenges and threats to the national interests of Russia are emerging in the international sphere. There is a growing trend towards the establishment of a unipolar structure of the world with the economic and power domination of the United States. In solving principal questions of international security, the stakes are being placed on western institutions and forums of limited composition, and on weakening the role of the U.N. Security Council.

The strategy of unilateral actions can destabilize the international situation, provoke tensions and the arms race, aggravate interstate contradictions, national and religious strife. The use of power methods bypassing existing international legal mechanisms cannot remove the deep socio-economic, inter-ethnic and other contradictions that underlie conflicts, and can only undermine the foundations of law and order.

Russia shall seek to achieve a multi-polar system of international relations that really reflects the diversity of the modern world with its great variety of interests.

Taking into account mutual interests is the guarantee of effectiveness and reliability of such a world order. The world order of the XXI century must be based on mechanisms of collective resolution of key problems, on the priority of law and broad democratization of international relations.

Russia’s interests are directly related to other tendencies as well, such as:

- Globalization of the world economy. Along with additional possibilities for socio-economic progress, the expansion of human contacts, this tendency gives rise to new dangers, especially for economically weak states, and increases the probability of large-scale financial and economic crises. There is a growing risk of dependence of the economic system and information environment of the Russian Federation on outside impact;

- Intensification of the role of international institutions and mechanisms in world economics and politics (“Group of 8,” the IMF, the World Bank and others), caused by an objective growth of interdependence of states, and the need to enhance management of the world financial-economic system in contemporary conditions;

- Development of regional and sub-regional integration in Europe, the Asia-Pacific region, Africa and Latin America. Integrated associations are acquiring an ever greater importance in the world economy, and are becoming a significant factor of regional and sub-regional security and peace-making;
Military-political rivalry among regional powers, growth of separatism, ethnic-national and religious extremism. Integration processes, in particular, in the Euro-Atlantic region are quite often pursued on a selective and limited basis. Attempts to belittle the role of a sovereign state as the fundamental element of international relations generate a threat of arbitrary interference in internal affairs. The problem of proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery is acquiring serious dimensions. Unregulated or potential regional and local armed conflicts pose a threat to international peace and security. The growth of international terrorism, transnational organized crime, as well as illegal trafficking in drugs and weapons are beginning to exert significant influence on global and regional stability.

The threats related to these tendencies are aggravated by the limited resource support for the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, making it difficult to uphold its foreign economic interests and narrowing down the framework of its information and cultural influence abroad.

Yet the Russian Federation has a real potential for ensuring itself a worthy place in the world. Further strengthening of Russia’s statehood, consolidation of civil society and the rapid transition to stable economic growth are of decisive importance in this respect.

In the past decade Russia has been able to utilize additional possibilities of international cooperation that are opening up as a result of radical transformations in the country; Russia has advanced significantly along the road of integrating in the system of world economic ties; it has joined a number of influential international organizations and institutions. Through its intensive efforts, Russia has managed to strengthen its positions in a number of principal areas in the world arena.

The Russian Federation is pursuing an independent and constructive foreign policy. It is based on consistency and predictability, on mutually advantageous pragmatism. This policy is maximally transparent; it takes into consideration the legitimate interests of other states and is aimed at seeking joint decisions.

Russia is a reliable partner in international relations. Its constructive role in resolving acute international problems has been generally acknowledged.

A distinguishing feature of Russia’s foreign policy is that it is a balanced one. This has been predetermined by the geopolitical position of Russia as one of the largest Eurasian powers, requiring an
optimal combination of efforts along all vectors. Such an approach predetermines Russia’s responsibility for maintaining security in the world both on a global and regional level, and presupposes the development and mutual complementarity of foreign policy activity both bilaterally and multilaterally.

II. Priorities of the Russian Federation in resolving global problems

A successful foreign policy of the Russian Federation must be based on maintaining observance of a reasonable balance between its objectives and possibilities for attaining these objectives. Concentration of politico-diplomatic, military, economic, financial and other means on resolving foreign political tasks must be commensurate with their real significance for Russia’s national interests, while the scope of participation in international affairs must be adequate to the actual contribution to strengthening the country’s positions. The diversity and complexity of international problems, and the existence of crisis situations assume a timely evaluation of the priorities of each of them in the foreign political activity of the Russian Federation. There is a need for enhancing the efficiency of political, legal, foreign economic and other instruments for protecting the state sovereignty of Russia and its national economy in conditions of globalization.

1. Forming a new world order

Russia is interested in a stable system of international relations based on principles of justice, mutual respect and mutually advantageous cooperation. Such a system is called upon to ensure reliable security for each member of the world community in political, military, economic, humanitarian and other areas.

The United Nations must remain the main centre for regulating international relations in the XXI century. The Russian Federation shall resolutely oppose attempts to belittle the role of the United Nations and its Security Council in world affairs.

Intensification of the consolidating role of the United Nations in the world presupposes:

Strict observance of the fundamental principles in the U.N. Charter, including the preservation of the status of the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council;

A rational reform of the United Nations Organization seeking to develop a mechanism of rapidly reacting to world developments,
including the enhancement of its potential for averting and settling crises and conflicts.

Further enhancing the efficiency of the U.N. Security Council which bears the main responsibility for maintaining international peace and security and, giving that body broader representation by including new permanent members in its composition, first of all, authoritative developing countries. The reform of the United Nations must be based on the immutable right of veto by all permanent members of the U.N. Security Council.

Russia attaches great importance to its participation in the Group of 8 of the most industrially developed states. Regarding the mechanism of consultations and coordinating positions on the most important problems of the day as one of the important means of upholding and advancing its foreign political interests, the Russian Federation intends to build up its cooperation with partners in this forum.

2. Strengthening international security

Russia calls supports for further decrease of the role of the power factor in international relations, along with the simultaneous enhancement of strategic and regional stability. Toward this end, the Russian Federation shall: unswervingly fulfil the commitments it has taken upon itself in compliance with treaties and agreements in the spheres of limiting and reducing armaments, and its participation in negotiating working out and concluding new accords consistent both with its national interests and the security interests of other states;

Russia is prepared to consent for a further reduction of its nuclear potential on the basis of bilateral agreements with the United States of America, and in a multilateral format—with the participation of other nuclear powers on condition that strategic stability in the nuclear sphere will not be upset. Russia shall seek preservation and observance of the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems—the cornerstone of strategic stability. The implementation of the plans of the United States to create a national missile defence system will inevitably compel the Russian Federation to adopt adequate measures for maintaining its national security at a proper level;

Russia reaffirms its unswerving course toward participating jointly with other states in averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery, as well as relevant materials and technologies. The Russian Federation is an ardent supporter of strengthening and developing relevant international regimes, including the creation of a Global system of
control over non-proliferation of missiles and missile technologies. The Russian Federation to firmly adheres to its commitments under the Treaty on a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests, and urges all countries of the world to join it;

Russia attaches special attention to such an aspect of consolidating strategic stability as ensuring information security;

Russia intends to further promote the strengthening of regional stability by participating in the processes of reducing and limiting conventional armed forces, as well as adopting confidence-building measures in the military sphere;

Russia regards international peace-making as an effective instrument for resolving armed conflicts, and calls for the strengthening of its legal foundation in strict accordance with the principles in the U.N. Charter. Supporting the measures to build up and modernize the potential of the United Nations’ anti-crisis rapid response, the Russian Federation intends to continue its active participation in peacekeeping operations conducted both under the auspices of the United Nations, as well as in specific cases of regional and sub-regional organizations. The need for and degree of such participation shall be measured against the national interests and international commitments of our country. Russia proceeds from the premise that only the U.N. Security Council has the authority to sanction use of force for the purpose of achieving peace;

Russia proceeds from the premise that the use of force in violation of the U.N. Charter is unlawful and poses a threat to the stabilization of the entire system of international relations. Attempts to introduce into the international parlance such concepts as “humanitarian intervention” and “limited sovereignty” in order to justify unilateral power actions bypassing the U.N. Security Council are not acceptable. Being prepared for a constructive dialogue on upgrading the legal aspects of employing force in international relations in conditions of globalization, the Russian Federation proceeds from the fact that the search for concrete forms of response on the part of the international community in different acute situations, including humanitarian crises, must be conducted collectively on the basis of strict observance of the norms of international law and the U.N. Charter;

Russia shall participate in activities conducted under the auspices of the United Nations and other international organizations to eliminate natural and man-made disasters, other emergency situations, as well as in rendering humanitarian aid to the suffering countries;
Russia regards as its most important foreign policy task to combat international terrorism which is capable of destabilizing the situation not only in individual states, but in entire regions.

The Russian Federation calls for the further measures to intensify cooperation among states in this area. It is the direct duty of every state to protect its citizens against terrorist encroachments, to prevent any activity on its territory aimed at organizing such acts against citizens and interests of other countries, and not to provide asylum to terrorists;

Russia shall purposefully combat illegal drug trafficking and the growth of organized crime; it shall collaborate with other states in a multilateral format, first of all, within the framework of specialized international agencies, and on a bilateral level.

III. Regional priorities

Relations with European states is Russia’s traditional foreign policy priority. The main aim of Russian foreign policy in Europe is the creation of a stable and democratic system of European security and cooperation. Russia is interested in the further balanced development of the multi-functional character of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and will make efforts in this direction.

It is important to fully use the rule-making potential which continues to be fully valid, that this organization has accumulated after the adoption in 1975 of the Helsinki Final Act. Russia will strongly oppose the narrowing down of the OSCE functions, specifically the attempts to redirect its specialized activities to the post-Soviet space and the Balkans.

Russia will work for making the adapted Treaty on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe into an effective means of European security and for imparting a comprehensive nature to confidence-building measures, including, specifically, coalition activities and naval activities.

Proceeding from its own requirements to the building of a civic society, Russia intends to continue its participation in the activities of the Council of Europe.

\[162\] Sections on economic relations, human rights and international relations, and information have been omitted.

\[163\] Sections referring to the countries of the post-Soviet area have been omitted.
Of key importance are relations with the European Union (EU). The ongoing processes within the EU are having a growing impact on the dynamic of the situation in Europe. These are the EU expansion, transition to a common currency, the institutional reform, and emergence of a joint foreign policy and a policy in the area of security, as well as a defence identity. Regarding these processes as an objective component of European development, Russia will seek due respect for its interests, including in the sphere of bilateral relations with individual EU member countries.

The Russian Federation views the EU as one of its main political and economic partners and will strive to develop with it an intensive, stable and long-term cooperation devoid of expediency fluctuations.

The character of relations with the EU is determined by the framework of the June 24, 1994 Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation, establishing partnership between the Russian Federation, on the one hand, and the European communities and their member states on the other, which is yet to achieve its full effectiveness. Concrete problems, primarily the problem of an adequate respect for the interests of the Russian side in the process of the EU expansion and reform, will be dealt with on the basis of the Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union, approved in 1999. The EU's emerging military-political dimension should become an object of particular attention.

Realistically assessing the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Russia proceeds from the importance of cooperation with it in the interests of maintaining security and stability in the continent and is open to constructive interaction. The necessary basis for that was laid in the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of May 27, 1997. The intensity of cooperation with NATO will depend on its compliance with key clauses of this document, primarily those concerning non-use or threat of force, and non-deployment of conventional armed forces groupings, nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles in the territories of the new members.

At the same time, on a number of parameters, NATO’s present-day political and military guidelines do not coincide with security interests of the Russian Federation and occasionally directly contradict them. This primarily concerns the provisions of NATO’s new strategic concept, which do not exclude the conduct of use-of-force operations outside of the zone of application of the Washington Treaty without
the sanction of the UN Security Council. Russia retains its negative attitude towards the expansion of NATO.

Substantive and constructive cooperation between Russia and NATO is only possible if it is based on the foundation of a due respect for the interests of the sides and an unconditional fulfilment of mutual obligations assumed.

Interaction with states of Western Europe, primarily with such influential ones as Britain, Germany, Italy and France, represents an important resource for Russia’s defence of its national interests in European and world affairs, and for the stabilization and growth of the Russian economy.

A topical task in relations with the states of Central and Eastern Europe is, as before, the preservation of the existing human, economic, and cultural ties, the overcoming of the crisis phenomena, and providing an additional impetus to cooperation in accordance with the new conditions and the Russian interests.

There are good prospects for the development of the Russian Federation’s relations with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Russia stands for putting these relation onto the track of good neighbourliness and mutual cooperation. An indispensable condition here is respect by those states of the Russian interests, including in the key question of respect for the rights of the Russian-speaking population.

Russia will give an all-out assistance to the attainment of a just settlement of the situation in the Balkans, one based on the coordinated decisions of the world community. It is of fundamental importance to preserve the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and to oppose the partition of this State, something that is fraught with the threat of emergence of a pan-Balkan conflict with unpredictable consequences.

The Russian Federation is prepared to overcome considerable latter-day difficulties in relations with the U.S., and to preserve the infrastructure of Russian–American cooperation, which has been created over almost 10 years. Despite the presence of serious, and in a number of cases, fundamental differences, Russian–American interaction is the necessary condition for the amelioration of the international situation and achievement of global strategic stability.

Above all, this concerns problems of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as prevention and settlement of the more dangerous regional conflicts. It is only through an active dialogue with the U.S. that the issues of limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear weapons may be resolved.
It is in our mutual interests to maintain regular bilateral contacts at all levels, not allowing pauses in relations and setback in the negotiating processes on the main political, military and economic matters.

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164 Sections referring to the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, as well as one on shaping and implementing the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, have been omitted.
Question: You have spoken against NATO expansion more than once, and I don’t think you need to reiterate your position, we have heard it many times. But we don’t understand what exactly you mean by “adequate response”? We have heard many times that Russia will have an adequate response if NATO takes that step. Can you be more specific about how Russia can react to the enlargement?

Vladimir Putin: I personally have never spoken of an adequate response to a possible NATO expansion. Why don’t you put this point-blank question to those who formulated the Russian position in that way? I have never formulated it that way.

I can merely say that we do not see NATO as a hostile organisation and we do not regard its existence as a tragedy, although we don’t see why it should exist. It was born as an antipode to the Warsaw Pact, as an antipode to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. Today there is no Warsaw Pact, no Soviet Union, but NATO exists and is growing successfully. And when we are told that it is a political organisation, that it is transforming itself from a military bloc into a political organisation, the question naturally suggests itself: why did it bomb Yugoslavia? Is that the job of a political organisation? Who did it? A military organisation did it and it does not make us feel happy.

Another thesis. We constantly hear that everybody wants to bring down some kind of barriers and borders in Europe. We are all for it. But let us take a closer look at the implications. What does it mean to bring down borders and barriers? Let us think about it. And if it means pushing that barrier closer to the Russian borders, we are not very amused. Yes, those who are included in the common space will have no borders, but the borders are springing up in front of us. It results in different security levels on the continent and, in my opinion, it does not match the present-day realities and has not been prompted by any political or military exigencies.

Moreover, I can tell you with confidence that we will not achieve unity in Europe unless we create a common security and defence

165 Questions and answers on non-NATO related topics have been omitted.
space. One can go about it in different ways. The simplest way is to disband NATO. But that is not on the agenda.

There is a second way. And by the way, I am not suggesting that we are in favour of that way, I am merely musing. The second possible variant is to admit Russia to NATO. That too creates a common defence and security space.

And the third variant is to create a new organisation that would perform these functions and in which Russia would be incorporated. That is a possible variant. And that is the task that was set before the OSCE. But today those who don’t seem to be too keen on seeing a common space and common security in Europe are giving a different tilt to the OSCE, directing it towards Central Asia and the North Caucasus or some other places, as long as it prevents it from building up the capacity and the potential for the sake of which it was created. But unless we do it someday, we will continue to have varying-level security in Europe and we will continue to mistrust each other. Having said that, I think it is clear to everyone that Russia is not threatening anyone and is not going to threaten anyone. Russia needs the rest of the civilised world and Europe, incidentally, just like Europe needs Russia. When we realise it and create corresponding structures, then the situation on the continent will change cardinally.

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166 Questions and answers on non-NATO related topics have been omitted.
47.

Address by the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin
in the German Bundestag,
Berlin, September 25, 2001

Distinguished Mr President,
Distinguished ladies and gentlemen,

I am sincerely grateful for this opportunity to speak in the Bundestag. This is the first such opportunity for a Russian head of state in the entire history of Russian-German relations. And this honour granted to me today only reaffirms the mutual interest of Russia and Germany in dialogue.

I am moved by this chance to discuss Russian-German relations, the development of ties between my country and united Europe and international security problems here, in Berlin, a city with a difficult fate, a city which happened to become the focus of confrontation with almost the entire world on more than one occasion in the modern history of humanity, but also a city in which never, even in the darkest periods, did anyone succeed in stifling the spirit of freedom and humanism that had been nurtured way back by Wilhelm von Humboldt and Lessing.

Nor was that done in the grim years of Hitler tyranny. Our country deeply reveres the memory of heroic anti-Nazi fighters.

Russia has always had special sentiments for Germany, and regarded your country as one of the major centres of European culture—a culture, to the development of which Russia has also made a significant contribution, a culture which has known no borders and has always been our common asset and a factor of bringing peoples together.

That is why today I will take the liberty of delivering the main part of my message in the language of Goethe, Schiller and Kant, in the German language.

Distinguished ladies and gentlemen,

I have just talked about the unity of European culture. However, in the past that unity did not prevent two horrible wars from being unleashed on the continent, two world wars within one century. Nor did it prevent the building of the Berlin Wall, the formidable symbol of the deep division of Europe.

The Berlin Wall is no longer. It was destroyed. And today it would be relevant to recall why that became possible.
It is my conviction that the dramatic change in the world, in Europe and on the expanses of the former Soviet Union would have been impossible without the main preconditions, namely, without the events that took place in Russia ten years ago. These events are important to understanding what precisely took place in our country and what could be expected from Russia in the future.

The answer is simple, as a matter of fact. Under the impact of the laws governing the development of information society, Stalinist totalitarian ideology could no longer oppose the ideas of freedom and democracy. The spirit of these ideas was taking hold of the overwhelming majority of Russian citizens.

It was the political choice of the people of Russia that enabled the then leaders of the USSR to take decisions that eventually led to the razing of the Berlin Wall. It was that choice that infinitely broadened the boundaries of European humanism and that enables us to say that no one will ever be able to return Russia back into the past.

As for European integration, we not just support these processes, but we are looking to them with hope. We view them as a people who have learned the lesson of the Cold War and the peril of the ideology of occupation very well. But here, I think, it would be pertinent to add that Europe did not gain from that division either.

It is my firm conviction that in today’s rapidly changing world, in a world witnessing truly dramatic demographic changes and an exceptionally high economic growth in some regions, Europe also has an immediate interest in promoting relations with Russia.

No one calls in question the great value of Europe’s relations with the United States. I am just of the opinion that Europe will reinforce its reputation of a strong and truly independent centre of world politics soundly and for a long time if it succeeds in bringing together its own potential and that of Russia, including its human, territorial and natural resources and its economic, cultural and defence potential.

Together we have already taken the first steps in that direction. The time has now come to think about what should be done to make sure that a united and secure Europe becomes the harbinger of a united and secure world.

Distinguished ladies and gentlemen,

We have done a great deal in the security sphere over the past few years. The security system that we have built over the previous decades has been improved. One of the achievements of the past decade is the unprecedentedly low concentration of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe and the Baltic. Russia is a friendly European nation.
Stable peace on the continent is a paramount goal for our country, which lived through a century of military catastrophes.

As everyone knows, we have ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Tests Ban Treaty, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, and also the START-2 Treaty. Regrettably, not all the NATO countries have followed our example.

But once we, distinguished ladies and gentlemen, have started to discuss security, we should first and foremost understand from whom we are to defend ourselves, and how. In this context I cannot but mention the catastrophe in the United States on September 11. People the world over keep asking how that could have happened and who is to blame. I will give you answers to these questions.

I think we all are to blame for what happened, and first and foremost we, politicians, to whom the ordinary citizens of our nations have entrusted their security. And this happens first and foremost because we have so far failed to recognize the changes that have happened in our world over the past ten years and continue to live in the old system of values: we are talking about partnership, but in reality we have not yet learned to trust each other.

In spite of a plethora of sweet words, we are still surreptitiously opposed to each other. Now we demand loyalty to NATO, now argue about the rationale behind its enlargement. And we are still unable to agree on the problems of a missile defence system.

Over long decades of the 20th century the world was indeed living under conditions of confrontation between the two systems, confrontation that pushed humanity to the brink of annihilation on more than one occasion.

That was so fearsome and we grew so accustomed to live with that anticipation of catastrophe that we are still unable to understand and appreciate the changes taking place in today’s world. We seem to be missing the fact that the world is no longer divided into two hostile camps.

The world has become far more complex, distinguished ladies and gentlemen.

We do not want or are unable to understand that the security structure built over the previous decades that was effective in neutralizing former threats is no longer able to cope with new threats of today. Too often we continue to argue over issues which we think are still important. They probably still are.
But at the same time we do not recognize new real threats and turn out to be unable to foresee terrorist attacks—and so ruthless terrorist attacks at that!

Hundreds of innocent civilians died in the bombing of residential houses in Moscow and other large Russian cities. Religious fanatics, having captured power in Chechnya and having turned ordinary citizens into their hostages, mounted a brazen large-scale armed attack against the neighbouring Republic of Dagestan. International terrorists have openly—quite openly—declared their intention to establish a fundamentalist state on the territory between the Black and the Caspian Sea—the so-called khalifate, or the United States of Islam.

I would like to stress right away that talking about any “war between civilizations” is inadmissible. It would be a mistake to put the equation mark between Moslems in general and religious fanatics. In our country, for example, the defeat of the aggressors in 1999 was predetermined by the courageous and tough rebuff of the residents of Dagestan, a Russian republic the population of which is virtually 100 percent Moslem.

Shortly before my departure for Berlin I met with the religious leaders of Russia’s Moslems. They came up with the initiative of convening an international conference on “Islam Against Terrorism” in Moscow. I think we should support this initiative.

Today we are coming up against not so much the aggravation of the well-known international problems as the rise of new threats. Russia is taking practical steps to put up, together with some CIS nations, a real barrier in the way of the traffic of drugs, organized crime and fundamentalism from Afghanistan via Central Asia and the Caucasus into Europe. Terrorism, national intolerance, separatism and religious extremism everywhere have the same roots and bear the same poisonous fruit. That is why the methods of fighting these problems should be universal as well.

But first agreement needs to be reached on the fundamental matter: we should not be afraid of calling a spade a spade. And it is extremely important to understand that evil deeds cannot be used to achieve political objectives, however noble such objectives may seem.

Naturally, evil must be punished, and I agree with that. But we should also understand that no retaliatory strikes will replace comprehensive, purposeful and well-coordinated struggle against terrorism. I absolutely agree with the US President on that.

I think our partners’ readiness to joint efforts in countering real rather than illusory threats will demonstrate how serious and reliable
they are as partners. These threats are quite capable of spilling over from the distant frontiers of our continent to the very heart of Europe. I talked about that on more than one occasion, but after what happened in the US there is no need to prove anything.

But what are we lacking today for cooperation to be efficient?

In spite of all the positive achievements of the past decades, we have not yet developed an efficient mechanism for working together.

The coordinating agencies set up so far do not offer Russia real opportunities for taking part in drafting and taking decision. Today decisions are often taken, in principle, without our participation, and we are only urged afterwards to support such decisions. After that they talk again about loyalty to NATO. They even say that such decisions cannot be implemented without Russia. Let us ask ourselves: is this normal? Is this true partnership?

Yes, the assertion of democratic principles in international relations, the ability to find a correct decision and readiness for compromise are a difficult thing. But then, it was the Europeans who were the first to understand how important it is to look for consensus over and above national egoism. We agree with that! All these are good ideas. However, the quality of decisions that are taken, their efficiency and, ultimately, European and international security in general depend on the extent to which we succeed today in translating these obvious principles into practical politics.

It seemed just recently that a truly common home would shortly rise on the continent, a home in which the Europeans would not be divided into eastern or western, northern or southern. However, these divides will remain, primarily because we have never fully shed many of the Cold War stereotypes and cliches.

Today we must say once and for all: the Cold War is done with! We have entered a new stage of development. We understand that without a modern, sound and sustainable security architecture we will never be able to create an atmosphere of trust on the continent, and without that atmosphere of trust there can be no united Greater Europe! Today we must say that we renounce our stereotypes and ambitions and from now on will jointly work for the security of the people of Europe and the world as a whole.

[...]167


167 Sections concerning the economic situation in Russia and the history and perspectives of Russian-German relations have been omitted.
At the start of the 21st century we live in a new, closely interrelated world, in which unprecedented new threats and challenges demand increasingly united responses. Consequently, we, the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation are today opening a new page in our relations, aimed at enhancing our ability to work together in areas of common interest and to stand together against common threats and risks to our security. As participants of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, we reaffirm the goals, principles and commitments set forth therein, in particular our determination to build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy and cooperative security and the principle that the security of all states in the Euro-Atlantic community is indivisible. We are convinced that a qualitatively new relationship between NATO and the Russian Federation will constitute an essential contribution in achieving this goal. In this context, we will observe in good faith our obligations under international law, including the UN Charter, provisions and principles contained in the Helsinki Final Act and the OSCE Charter for European Security.\footnote{Signed by the Member States on 19 November 1999 at the OSCE summit in Istanbul. It contains principles that should guide the security policy of the members of the organisation and its activities towards European stability. It indicates, i.a., that any conflict in Europe is of interest to OSCE Member States, that the organisation must develop capacities for multifunctional peacekeeping operations (including police) and a system of cooperation with other international organisations.}

Building on the Founding Act and taking into account the initiative taken by our Foreign Ministers, as reflected in their statement of 7 December 2001, to bring together NATO member states and Russia to identify and pursue opportunities for joint action at twenty, we hereby establish the NATO-Russia Council. In the framework of the NATO-Russia Council, NATO member states and Russia will work as equal partners in areas of common interest. The NATO-Russia Council will provide a mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision, and joint action for the member
states of NATO and Russia on a wide spectrum of security issues in the Euro-Atlantic region.

The NATO-Russia Council will serve as the principal structure and venue for advancing the relationship between NATO and Russia. It will operate on the principle of consensus. It will work on the basis of a continuous political dialogue on security issues among its members with a view to early identification of emerging problems, determination of optimal common approaches and the conduct of joint actions, as appropriate. The members of the NATO-Russia Council, acting in their national capacities and in a manner consistent with their respective collective commitments and obligations, will take joint decisions and will bear equal responsibility, individually and jointly, for their implementation. Each member may raise in the NATO-Russia Council issues related to the implementation of joint decisions.

The NATO-Russia Council will be chaired by the Secretary General of NATO. It will meet at the level of Foreign Ministers and at the level of Defence Ministers twice annually, and at the level of Heads of State and Government as appropriate. Meetings of the Council at Ambassadorial level will be held at least once a month, with the possibility of more frequent meetings as needed, including extraordinary meetings, which will take place at the request of any Member or the NATO Secretary General.

To support and prepare the meetings of the Council a Preparatory Committee is established, at the level of the NATO Political Committee, with Russian representation at the appropriate level. The Preparatory Committee will meet twice monthly, or more often if necessary. The NATO-Russia Council may also establish committees or working groups for individual subjects or areas of cooperation on an ad hoc or permanent basis, as appropriate. Such committees and working groups will draw upon the resources of existing NATO committees.

Under the auspices of the Council, military representatives and Chiefs of Staff will also meet. Meetings of Chiefs of Staff will take place no less than twice a year, meetings at military representatives level at least once a month, with the possibility of more frequent meetings as needed. Meetings of military experts may be convened as appropriate.

169 It was a working diplomatic level, corresponding, in the structure of diplomatic missions, to the level of political advisor (or head of the political department of the embassy). Nominally, the Political Committee was then hierarchically third in the structure of the NATO decision-making process (below the North Atlantic Council and the Higher Political Committee), responsible for the day-to-day preparation of the decision-making process.
The NATO-Russia Council, replacing the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, will focus on all areas of mutual interest identified in Section III of the Founding Act, including the provision to add other areas by mutual agreement. The work programmes for 2002 agreed in December 2001 for the PJC and its subordinate bodies will continue to be implemented under the auspices and rules of the NATO-Russia Council. NATO member states and Russia will continue to intensify their cooperation in areas including the struggle against terrorism, crisis management, non-proliferation, arms control and confidence-building measures, theatre missile defence, search and rescue at sea, military-to-military cooperation, and civil emergencies. This cooperation may complement cooperation in other fora. As initial steps in this regard, we have today agreed to pursue the following cooperative efforts:

– **Struggle Against Terrorism**: strengthen cooperation through a multi-faceted approach, including joint assessments of the terrorist threat to the Euro-Atlantic area, focused on specific threats, for example, to Russian and NATO forces, to civilian aircraft, or to critical infrastructure; an initial step will be a joint assessment of the terrorist threat to NATO, Russia and Partner peacekeeping forces in the Balkans.

– **Crisis Management**: strengthen cooperation, including through:
  - regular exchanges of views and information on peacekeeping operations, including continuing cooperation and consultations on the situation in the Balkans;
  - promoting interoperability between national peacekeeping contingents, including through joint or coordinated training initiatives;
  - and further development of a generic concept for joint NATO-Russia peacekeeping operations.

**Non-Proliferation**: broaden and strengthen cooperation against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the means of their delivery, and contribute to strengthening existing non-proliferation arrangements through:
  - a structured exchange of views, leading to a joint assessment of global trends in proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical agents; and exchange of experience with the goal of exploring opportunities for intensified practical cooperation on protection from nuclear, biological and chemical agents.

**Arms Control and Confidence-Building Measures**: recalling the contributions of arms control and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and reaffirming adherence to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) as a cornerstone of European security, work
cooperatively toward ratification by all the States Parties and entry into force of the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty, which would permit accession by non-CFE states; continue consultations on the CFE and Open Skies Treaties; and continue the NATO-Russia nuclear experts consultations.

**Theatre Missile Defence:** enhance consultations on theatre missile defence (TMD), in particular on TMD concepts, terminology, systems and system capabilities, to analyse and evaluate possible levels of interoperability among respective TMD systems, and explore opportunities for intensified practical cooperation, including joint training and exercises.

**Search and Rescue at Sea:** monitor the implementation of the NATO-Russia Framework Document on Submarine Crew Rescue, and continue to promote cooperation, transparency and confidence between NATO and Russia in the area of search and rescue at sea.

**Military-to-Military Cooperation and Defence Reform:** pursue enhanced military-to-military cooperation and interoperability through enhanced joint training and exercises and the conduct of joint demonstrations and tests; explore the possibility of establishing an integrated NATO-Russia military training centre for missions to address the challenges of the 21st century; enhance cooperation on defence reform and its economic aspects, including conversion.

**Civil Emergencies:** pursue enhanced mechanisms for future NATO-Russia cooperation in responding to civil emergencies. Initial steps will include the exchange of information on recent disasters and the exchange of WMD consequence management information.

**New Threats and Challenges:** In addition to the areas enumerated above, explore possibilities for confronting new challenges and threats to the Euro-Atlantic area in the framework of the activities of the NATO Committee on Challenges to Modern Society (CCMS); initiate cooperation in the field of civil and military airspace controls; and pursue enhanced scientific cooperation.

The members of the NATO-Russia Council will work with a view to identifying further areas of cooperation.


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NATO-Russia cooperation in this field began in 2000 after the sinking of the Russian nuclear submarine Kursk and the dramatic failure of the Russian rescue operation. The framework document on cooperation was signed by the parties on 8 February 2003.
1. The NATO-Russia Council categorically rejects terrorism in all its manifestations. Terrorist acts pose a direct challenge to our common security, to our shared democratic values, and to basic human rights and freedoms. We agree that there is no cause that can justify such acts, and call for unity of action in the international community in addressing this insidious threat. We will do everything in our power to fight all forms of terrorism, acting in conformity with the UN Charter, international human rights and humanitarian law, as well as other existing commitments. We stand united in support of UN Security Council Resolutions 1368, 1373, 1540, 1566, and all other relevant resolutions, and will spare no efforts in the NRC and other appropriate fora to protect our citizens, to pursue our shared objective of bringing to justice the perpetrators, organisers, instigators and sponsors of terrorist acts, to cut off the channels of financing terrorist activities, and to defeat the scourge of terrorism, including by ratification and effective implementation of international conventions relating to terrorism, including the twelve UN Conventions and Protocols on Counter-Terrorism.

2. We are encouraged by the progress that has been made in developing NRC co-operation in the fight against terrorism, and are determined that the Council can and should make an even more direct and substantial contribution to this global struggle, in cooperation, as appropriate, with partners. NRC co-operation against the terrorist threat should be pragmatic and goal-oriented, complementing and enhancing efforts underway in other fora. As agreed by NRC Heads of State and Government in the 28 May 2002 Rome Declaration, NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality, our co-operation should be “multi-faceted,” as is the terrorist threat itself. At the same time, through this Action Plan, we are determined to ensure its overall co-ordination and strategic direction. Our aim is to enhance our capabilities to act, individually and jointly, in three critical areas: preventing terrorism; combating terrorist activities; and managing the consequences of terrorist acts.
Preventing terrorism

3. We are determined to protect our populations from the terrorist threat by deterring and preventing terrorist acts, particularly those by terrorist groups operating internationally, through defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of forces, individuals and property to terrorism, to include limited response and containment by military forces and relevant specialised civil agencies—and we will work to improve our capabilities in this area. To this end, we will:

– develop improved mechanisms for intelligence sharing, which is crucial to the success of efforts to combat the terrorist threat in order to exchange information on likely terrorist targets and possible counter-measures;

– continue to support ongoing efforts to broaden and strengthen co-operation in evaluating and responding to threats posed by terrorism and by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, including by:

  – strengthening existing non-proliferation arrangements with a view to denying terrorist access to WMD, their means of delivery and related materials, in accordance with UNSCR 1540;
  – addressing chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats posed by terrorist groups; and
  – addressing threats to freight and passenger transport.

– develop enhanced co-operation on armaments and technology aimed at responding to such threats;

– continue to implement relevant elements of the NRC Cooperative Airspace Initiative, in particular a capability to facilitate effective civil-military cooperation with a view to enhancing the ability of NRC member states to combat threats to civil aviation;

– explore possibilities for co-operation in the destruction of excess munitions, small arms and light weapons, as well as in developing effective control over transfers of man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), in order to keep these weapons out of the hands of terrorist groups or their state sponsors;

– explore possibilities for co-operation in enhancing security at storage sites for MANPADS, munitions and small arms and light weapons (SALW); continue to explore technological and scientific co-operation aimed at resolving practical issues of security in the context of anti-terrorist activities (such as development of explosive detection prototypes, protection against (including decontamination of) CBRN agents and materials, countering threats to freight and passenger transport and protection against cyberterrorism);
– organise a conference for first responders, bringing them together with civil and military operational experts, with special emphasis on presentations from Spain, Turkey, the Russian Federation and the United States, to exchange information and compare lessons learned from responses to terrorist attacks, in order to improve understanding of terrorist tactics and methodology;

– contribute to international efforts to promote stability in and around Afghanistan and thus, inter alia, forestall the spread of terrorism in the region, by identifying specific contributions the NRC and its member states can make to complement national and international efforts to address threats posed by illegal trafficking in Afghan narcotics, taking into account commitments undertaken in the framework of the Berlin Declaration on Counter-Narcotics,\textsuperscript{171} such as:

  – enhanced information exchange among NRC member states on the threats posed by the Afghan narcotics industry and trade, and on national and multilateral efforts aimed at addressing those threats;

  – consideration of joint training initiatives in NRC member states, aimed, inter alia, at strengthening the capabilities of Afghan and transit route states’ counter narcotics units and border guards, subject to the request of these states; and

  – organisation of conferences and workshops to explore possible additional cooperative initiatives.

\textbf{Combating terrorist activities}

4. We stand prepared, when necessary, to undertake active measures to disrupt and combat terrorist activity, particularly those by terrorist groups operating internationally, through offensive military action designed to reduce terrorists’ capabilities. We are determined to intensify both the level of our operational co-operation and our technical ability to work together. In this connection:

  – we are determined to intensify our co-operation in the framework of NATO’s Operation Active Endeavour,\textsuperscript{172} which aims to help deter,

\begin{footnote}{171}Declaration adopted on 31 May 2004 on behalf of Afghanistan, China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan at the Berlin conference on Afghanistan. It obliged the signatories to combat the production and smuggling of drugs from Afghan territory. For the text, see: www.ag-frieenforschung.de/regionen/Afghanistan/berlin-antidrogen.html.\end{footnote}

\begin{footnote}{172}The NATO patrol mission around the Strait of Gibraltar and the Mediterranean Sea started, on the basis of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, after the terrorist attacks in the U.S. on 11 September 2001 and ended in October 2016. Its tasks were taken over by a new operation codenamed \textit{Sea Guardian}.\end{footnote}
defend, disrupt and protect against terrorism in the Mediterranean, according to agreed procedures;

– we are determined to improve the capability of our armed forces to work together in combating the terrorist threat, in particular through: Russia’s anticipated accession, prior to the end of 2004, to the Partnership for Peace Status of Forces Agreement (PfP SOFA), and the development of appropriate cooperative arrangements which will greatly enhance the ability of our forces to train, exercise and operate together; and

– full implementation of the NRC-MR Work Plan for 2005 and Beyond, which takes account of the need for enhanced interoperability among our armed forces in areas of cooperation related to the terrorist threat

Managing the consequences of terrorists acts

5. Finally, we are determined to strengthen our ability to manage and mitigate the consequences of terrorist acts, and alleviate the suffering of civilian populations, through reactive measures used to mitigate the destructive effects of attacks, in particular by:

– developing further the Hungarian-Russian initiative on civil emergency planning and response capabilities;

– building upon the lessons learned in exercises “Bogorodsk 2002” and “Kaliningrad 2004” in order to strengthen the interoperability of our civil and military response teams, and pursue further joint training and exercises in this area related to the struggle against terrorism and develop an understanding of the role of the military in emergency response;

– continuing to develop scientific co-operation to address the management of ecological, psychosocial and other consequences of terrorist acts, including in the areas of ecological terrorism and of risk management and minimising the consequences of terrorist attacks; and

– identifying other means of improving our ability to cooperate in managing the consequences of terrorist acts, including: practical co-operation in CBRN decontamination; exchange of experience and expertise in resolving hostage crises; and; organisation of a session, workshop or conference on techniques, technologies, and lessons

173 Multilateral agreement of 19 June 1995 concerning the conditions of entry and stay of troops of the Partnership for Peace countries on their territories—modelled on the similar agreement of 1951 between NATO member states.
learned toward ensuring effective co-ordination among local and national crisis/terrorist responders.

Complementing other international efforts

6. NRC co-operation in the struggle against terrorism shall seek to complement and enhance other efforts underway in the United Nations and elsewhere in the international community, with a view to providing added value and avoiding duplication of efforts. The activities listed in the NRC Action Plan on Terrorism will complement other initiatives in combating terrorism that the member states of the NRC are or may be pursuing with third states in other fora. The member states of the NRC shall contribute actively to the implementation of the Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism (PAP-T), and brief the EAPC periodically on the implementation of the NRC Action Plan on Terrorism. Where appropriate, the NRC may consider opening up its own initiatives for participation by the broader EAPC community.

Implementation

7. NRC Ambassadors, supported by the Preparatory Committee, will monitor closely the implementation of this Plan and ensure the overall co-ordination and strategic direction of the actions contained therein. To this end, the Preparatory Committee will report back to NRC Ambassadors by 1 June 2005, or another appropriate date to be determined, on progress made in implementing this Action Plan, and will provide recommendations to NRC Ambassadors for consolidating and focusing the NRC’s terrorism work plan for the remainder of the year on projects that are resulting or are likely to result in concrete and practical cooperation among NRC member states.

Speech and Q&A of the President of the Russian Federation
Vladimir Putin at the Security Policy Conference in Munich,
February 10, 2007

Thank you very much dear Madam Federal Chancellor, Mr Teltschik, ladies and gentlemen!

I am truly grateful to be invited to such a representative conference that has assembled politicians, military officials, entrepreneurs and experts from more than 40 nations.

This conference's structure allows me to avoid excessive politeness and the need to speak in roundabout, pleasant but empty diplomatic terms. This conference's format will allow me to say what I really think about international security problems. And if my comments seem unduly polemical, pointed or inexact to our colleagues, then I would ask you not to get angry with me. After all, this is only a conference. And I hope that after the first two or three minutes of my speech Mr Teltschik will not turn on the red light over there.

Therefore. It is well known that international security comprises much more than issues relating to military and political stability. It involves the stability of the global economy, overcoming poverty, economic security and developing a dialogue between civilisations.

This universal, indivisible character of security is expressed as the basic principle that “security for one is security for all.” As Franklin D. Roosevelt said during the first few days that the Second World War was breaking out: “When peace has been broken anywhere, the peace of all countries everywhere is in danger.”

These words remain topical today. Incidentally, the theme of our conference—global crises, global responsibility—exemplifies this.

Only two decades ago the world was ideologically and economically divided and it was the huge strategic potential of two superpowers that ensured global security.

This global stand-off pushed the sharpest economic and social problems to the margins of the international community’s and the world’s agenda. And, just like any war, the Cold War left us with live ammunition, figuratively speaking. I am referring to ideological

174 Angela Merkel.
175 Horst Teltschik, German politician and academician, then-Chairman of the Munich Security Policy Conference.
176 Quote from the radio message of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt on 3 September 1939.
stereotypes, double standards and other typical aspects of Cold War bloc thinking.

The unipolar world that had been proposed after the Cold War did not take place either.

The history of humanity certainly has gone through unipolar periods and seen aspirations to world supremacy. And what hasn’t happened in world history?

However, what is a unipolar world? However one might embellish this term, at the end of the day it refers to one type of situation, namely one centre of authority, one centre of force, one centre of decision-making.

It is world in which there is one master, one sovereign. And at the end of the day this is pernicious not only for all those within this system, but also for the sovereign itself because it destroys itself from within.

And this certainly has nothing in common with democracy. Because, as you know, democracy is the power of the majority in light of the interests and opinions of the minority.

Incidentally, Russia—we—are constantly being taught about democracy. But for some reason those who teach us do not want to learn themselves.

I consider that the unipolar model is not only unacceptable but also impossible in today’s world. And this is not only because if there was individual leadership in today’s—and precisely in today’s—world, then the military, political and economic resources would not suffice. What is even more important is that the model itself is flawed because at its basis there is and can be no moral foundations for modern civilisation.

Along with this, what is happening in today’s world—and we just started to discuss this—is a tentative to introduce precisely this concept into international affairs, the concept of a unipolar world.

And with which results?

Unilateral and frequently illegitimate actions have not resolved any problems. Moreover, they have caused new human tragedies and created new centres of tension. Judge for yourselves: wars as well as local and regional conflicts have not diminished. Mr Teltschik mentioned this very gently. And no less people perish in these conflicts—even more are dying than before. Significantly more, significantly more!

Today we are witnessing an almost uncontained hyper use of force—military force—in international relations, force that is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts. As a result we do not
have sufficient strength to find a comprehensive solution to any one of these conflicts. Finding a political settlement also becomes impossible.

We are seeing a greater and greater disdain for the basic principles of international law. And independent legal norms are, as a matter of fact, coming increasingly closer to one state's legal system. One state and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way. This is visible in the economic, political, cultural and educational policies it imposes on other nations. Well, who likes this? Who is happy about this?

In international relations we increasingly see the desire to resolve a given question according to so-called issues of political expediency, based on the current political climate.

And of course this is extremely dangerous. It results in the fact that no one feels safe. I want to emphasise this—no one feels safe! Because no one can feel that international law is like a stone wall that will protect them. Of course such a policy stimulates an arms race.

The force's dominance inevitably encourages a number of countries to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, significantly new threats—though they were also well-known before—have appeared, and today threats such as terrorism have taken on a global character.

I am convinced that we have reached that decisive moment when we must seriously think about the architecture of global security.

And we must proceed by searching for a reasonable balance between the interests of all participants in the international dialogue. Especially since the international landscape is so varied and changes so quickly—changes in light of the dynamic development in a whole number of countries and regions.

Madam Federal Chancellor already mentioned this. The combined GDP measured in purchasing power parity of countries such as India and China is already greater than that of the United States. And a similar calculation with the GDP of the BRIC countries—Brazil, Russia, India and China—surpasses the cumulative GDP of the EU. And according to experts this gap will only increase in the future.

There is no reason to doubt that the economic potential of the new centres of global economic growth will inevitably be converted into political influence and will strengthen multipolarity.

In connection with this the role of multilateral diplomacy is significantly increasing. The need for principles such as openness, transparency and predictability in politics is uncontested and the use of force should be a really exceptional measure, comparable to using the death penalty in the judicial systems of certain states.
However, today we are witnessing the opposite tendency, namely a situation in which countries that forbid the death penalty even for murderers and other, dangerous criminals are airily participating in military operations that are difficult to consider legitimate. And as a matter of fact, these conflicts are killing people—hundreds and thousands of civilians!

But at the same time the question arises of whether we should be indifferent and aloof to various internal conflicts inside countries, to authoritarian regimes, to tyrants, and to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction? As a matter of fact, this was also at the centre of the question that our dear colleague Mr Lieberman asked the Federal Chancellor. If I correctly understood your question [addressing Mr Lieberman], then of course it is a serious one! Can we be indifferent observers in view of what is happening? I will try to answer your question as well: of course not.

But do we have the means to counter these threats? Certainly, we do. It is sufficient to look at recent history. Did not our country have a peaceful transition to democracy? Indeed, we witnessed a peaceful transformation of the Soviet regime—a peaceful transformation! And what a regime! With what a number of weapons, including nuclear weapons! Why should we start bombing and shooting now at every available opportunity? Is it the case when without the threat of mutual destruction we do not have enough political culture, respect for democratic values and for the law?

I am convinced that the only mechanism that can make decisions about using military force as a last resort is the Charter of the United Nations. And in connection with this, either I did not understand what our colleague, the Italian Defence Minister, just said or what he said was inexact. In any case, I understood that the use of force can only be legitimate when the decision is taken by NATO, the EU, or the UN. If he really does think so, then we have different points of view. Or I didn’t hear correctly. The use of force can only be considered legitimate if the decision is sanctioned by the UN. And we do not need to substitute NATO or the EU for the UN. When the UN will truly unite the forces of the international community and can really react to events in various countries, when we will leave behind this disdain for international law, then the situation will be able to change. Otherwise the situation will simply result in a dead end, and the number of

177 It refers to the U.S. Senator from the Democratic Party, Joseph Lieberman, then Chairman of the Senate Committee on Internal Security, a participant in the 2007 Munich Security Conference.
serious mistakes will be multiplied. Along with this, it is necessary to make sure that international law have a universal character both in the conception and application of its norms.

And one must not forget that democratic political actions necessarily go along with discussion and a laborious decision-making process.

Dear ladies and gentlemen!

The potential danger of the destabilisation of international relations is connected with obvious stagnation in the disarmament issue.

Russia supports the renewal of dialogue on this important question.

It is important to conserve the international legal framework relating to weapons destruction and therefore ensure continuity in the process of reducing nuclear weapons.

Together with the United States of America we agreed to reduce our nuclear strategic missile capabilities to up to 1700–2000 nuclear warheads by 31 December 2012. Russia intends to strictly fulfil the obligations it has taken on. We hope that our partners will also act in a transparent way and will refrain from laying aside a couple of hundred superfluous nuclear warheads for a rainy day. And if today the new American Defence Minister declares that the United States will not hide these superfluous weapons in warehouse or, as one might say, under a pillow or under the blanket, then I suggest that we all rise and greet this declaration standing. It would be a very important declaration.

Russia strictly adheres to and intends to further adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as well as the multilateral supervision regime for missile technologies. The principles incorporated in these documents are universal ones.

In connection with this I would like to recall that in the 1980s the USSR and the United States signed an agreement on destroying a whole range of small- and medium-range missiles but these documents do not have a universal character.

Today many other countries have these missiles, including the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, India, Iran, Pakistan and Israel. Many countries are working on these systems and plan to incorporate them as part of their weapons arsenals. And only the United States and Russia bear the responsibility to not create such weapons systems.

It is obvious that in these conditions we must think about ensuring our own security.
At the same time, it is impossible to sanction the appearance of new, destabilising high-tech weapons. Needless to say it refers to measures to prevent a new area of confrontation, especially in outer space. Star wars is no longer a fantasy—it is a reality. In the middle of the 1980s our American partners were already able to intercept their own satellite.

In Russia’s opinion, the militarisation of outer space could have unpredictable consequences for the international community, and provoke nothing less than the beginning of a nuclear era. And we have come forward more than once with initiatives designed to prevent the use of weapons in outer space.

Today I would like to tell you that we have prepared a project for an agreement on the prevention of deploying weapons in outer space. And in the near future it will be sent to our partners as an official proposal. Let’s work on this together.

Plans to expand certain elements of the anti-missile defence system to Europe cannot help but disturb us. Who needs the next step of what would be, in this case, an inevitable arms race? I deeply doubt that Europeans themselves do.

Missile weapons with a range of about five to eight thousand kilometres that really pose a threat to Europe do not exist in any of the so-called problem countries. And in the near future and prospects, this will not happen and is not even foreseeable. And any hypothetical launch of, for example, a North Korean rocket to American territory through western Europe obviously contradicts the laws of ballistics. As we say in Russia, it would be like using the right hand to reach the left ear.

And here in Germany I cannot help but mention the pitiable condition of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

The Adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was signed in 1999. It took into account a new geopolitical reality, namely the elimination of the Warsaw bloc. Seven years have passed and only four states have ratified this document, including the Russian Federation.

NATO countries openly declared that they will not ratify this treaty, including the provisions on flank restrictions (on deploying a certain number of armed forces in the flank zones), until Russia removed its military bases from Georgia and Moldova. Our army is leaving Georgia, even according to an accelerated schedule. We resolved the problems we had with our Georgian colleagues, as everybody knows. There are still 1,500 servicemen in Moldova that
are carrying out peacekeeping operations and protecting warehouses with ammunition left over from Soviet times. We constantly discuss this issue with Mr. Solana and he knows our position. We are ready to further work in this direction.

But what is happening at the same time? Simultaneously the so-called flexible frontline American bases with up to five thousand men in each. It turns out that NATO has put its frontline forces on our borders, and we continue to strictly fulfil the treaty obligations and do not react to these actions at all.

I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernisation of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact? Where are those declarations today? No one even remembers them. But I will allow myself to remind this audience what was said. I would like to quote the speech of NATO General Secretary Mr Woerner in Brussels on 17 May 1990. He said at the time that: “the fact that we are ready not to place a NATO army outside of German territory gives the Soviet Union a firm security guarantee.” Where are these guarantees?

The stones and concrete blocks of the Berlin Wall have long been distributed as souvenirs. But we should not forget that the fall of the Berlin Wall was possible thanks to a historic choice—one that was also made by our people, the people of Russia—a choice in favour of democracy, freedom, openness and a sincere partnership with all the members of the big European family.

And now they are trying to impose new dividing lines and walls on us—these walls may be virtual but they are nevertheless dividing, ones that cut through our continent. And is it possible that we will once again require many years and decades, as well as several generations of politicians, to dissemble and dismantle these new walls?

178 This quotation from Manfred Wörner’s speech, in fact, only concerned non-deployment of NATO forces on Eastern German territory after reunification. This is clearly shown in the more accurate and broader quotation: “This will also be true of a united Germany in NATO. The very fact that we are ready not to deploy NATO troops beyond the territory of the Federal Republic gives the Soviet Union firm security guarantees. Moreover we could conceive of a transitional period during which a reduced number of Soviet forces could remain stationed in the present-day GDR. This will meet Soviet concerns about not changing the overall East-West strategic balance.” For the original text of the speech, see: www.nato.int/docu/speech/1990/s900517a_e.htm (retrieved 08.07.2020).
Dear ladies and gentlemen!

We are unequivocally in favour of strengthening the regime of non-proliferation. The present international legal principles allow us to develop technologies to manufacture nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes. And many countries with all good reasons want to create their own nuclear energy as a basis for their energy independence. But we also understand that these technologies can be quickly transformed into nuclear weapons.

This creates serious international tensions. The situation surrounding the Iranian nuclear programme acts as a clear example. And if the international community does not find a reasonable solution for resolving this conflict of interests, the world will continue to suffer similar, destabilising crises because there are more threshold countries than simply Iran. We both know this. We are going to constantly fight against the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Last year Russia put forward the initiative to establish international centres for the enrichment of uranium. We are open to the possibility that such centres not only be created in Russia, but also in other countries where there is a legitimate basis for using civil nuclear energy. Countries that want to develop their nuclear energy could guarantee that they will receive fuel through direct participation in these centres. And the centres would, of course, operate under strict IAEA supervision.

The latest initiatives put forward by American President George W. Bush are in conformity with the Russian proposals. I consider that Russia and the USA are objectively and equally interested in strengthening the regime of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their deployment. It is precisely our countries, with leading nuclear and missile capabilities, that must act as leaders in developing new, stricter non-proliferation measures. Russia is ready for such work. We are engaged in consultations with our American friends.

In general, we should talk about establishing a whole system of political incentives and economic stimuli whereby it would not be in states’ interests to establish their own capabilities in the nuclear fuel cycle but they would still have the opportunity to develop nuclear energy and strengthen their energy capabilities.

In connection with this I shall talk about international energy cooperation in more detail. Madam Federal Chancellor also spoke about this briefly—she mentioned, touched on this theme. In the energy sector Russia intends to create uniform market principles and
transparent conditions for all. It is obvious that energy prices must be determined by the market instead of being the subject of political speculation, economic pressure or blackmail.

We are open to cooperation. Foreign companies participate in all our major energy projects. According to different estimates, up to 26 percent of the oil extraction in Russia—and please think about this figure—up to 26 percent of the oil extraction in Russia is done by foreign capital. Try, try to find me a similar example where Russian business participates extensively in key economic sectors in western countries. Such examples do not exist! There are no such examples.

I would also recall the parity of foreign investments in Russia and those Russia makes abroad. The parity is about fifteen to one. And here you have an obvious example of the openness and stability of the Russian economy.

Economic security is the sector in which all must adhere to uniform principles. We are ready to compete fairly.

For that reason, more and more opportunities are appearing in the Russian economy. Experts and our western partners are objectively evaluating these changes. As such, Russia’s OECD sovereign credit rating improved and Russia passed from the fourth to the third group. And today in Munich I would like to use this occasion to thank our German colleagues for their help in the above decision.

Furthermore. As you know, the process of Russia joining the WTO has reached its final stages. I would point out that during long, difficult talks we heard words about freedom of speech, free trade, and equal possibilities more than once but, for some reason, exclusively in reference to the Russian market.

And there is still one more important theme that directly affects global security. Today many talk about the struggle against poverty. What is actually happening in this sphere? On the one hand, financial resources are allocated for programmes to help the world’s poorest countries—and at times substantial financial resources. But to be honest—and many here also know this—linked with the development of that same donor country’s companies. And on the other hand, developed countries simultaneously keep their agricultural subsidies and limit some countries’ access to high-tech products.

And let’s say things as they are—one hand distributes charitable help and the other hand not only preserves economic backwardness but also reaps the profits thereof. The increasing social tension in depressed regions inevitably results in the growth of radicalism, extremism, feeds terrorism and local conflicts. And if all this happens
in, shall we say, a region such as the Middle East where there is increasingly the sense that the world at large is unfair, then there is the risk of global destabilisation.

It is obvious that the world’s leading countries should see this threat. And that they should therefore build a more democratic, fairer system of global economic relations, a system that would give everyone the chance and the possibility to develop.

Dear ladies and gentlemen, speaking at the Conference on Security Policy, it is impossible not to mention the activities of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). As is well-known, this organisation was created to examine all—shall emphasise this—all aspects of security: military, political, economic, humanitarian and, especially, the relations between these spheres.

What do we see happening today? We see that this balance is clearly destroyed. People are trying to transform the OSCE into a vulgar instrument designed to promote the foreign policy interests of one or a group of countries. And this task is also being accomplished by the OSCE’s bureaucratic apparatus which is absolutely not connected with the state founders in any way. Decision-making procedures and the involvement of so-called non-governmental organisations are tailored for this task. These organisations are formally independent but they are purposefully financed and therefore under control.

According to the founding documents, in the humanitarian sphere the OSCE is designed to assist country members in observing international human rights norms at their request. This is an important task. We support this. But this does not mean interfering in the internal affairs of other countries, and especially not imposing a regime that determines how these states should live and develop.

It is obvious that such interference does not promote the development of democratic states at all. On the contrary, it makes them dependent and, as a consequence, politically and economically unstable.

We expect that the OSCE be guided by its primary tasks and build relations with sovereign states based on respect, trust and transparency.

Dear ladies and gentlemen!

In conclusion I would like to note the following. We very often—and personally, I very often—hear appeals by our partners, including our European partners, to the effect that Russia should play an increasingly active role in world affairs.

In connection with this I would allow myself to make one small remark. It is hardly necessary to incite us to do so. Russia is a country
with a history that spans more than a thousand years and has practically always used the privilege to carry out an independent foreign policy. We are not going to change this tradition today. At the same time, we are well aware of how the world has changed and we have a realistic sense of our own opportunities and potential. And of course we would like to interact with responsible and independent partners with whom we could work together in constructing a fair and democratic world order that would ensure security and prosperity not only for a select few, but for all.

Thank you for your attention.

[Q&A Session]  
[...][179]

Regarding our perception of NATO’s eastern expansion, I already mentioned the guarantees that were made and that are not being observed today. Do you happen to think that this is normal practice in international affairs? But all right, forget it. Forget these guarantees. With respect to democracy and NATO expansion. NATO is not a universal organisation, as opposed to the UN. It is first and foremost a military and political alliance, military and political! Well, ensuring one’s own security is the right of any sovereign state. We are not arguing against this. Of course we are not objecting to this. But why is it necessary to put military infrastructure on our borders during this expansion? Can someone answer this question? Unless the expansion of military infrastructure is connected with fighting against today’s global threats? Let’s put it this way, what is the most important of these threats for us today—the most important for Russia, for the USA and for Europe—it is terrorism and the fight against it.

Does one need Russia to fight against terrorism? Of course! Does one need India to fight against terrorism! Of course! But we are not members of NATO and other countries aren’t either. But we can only work on this issue effectively by joining our forces. As such, expanding infrastructure, especially military infrastructure, to our borders is not connected in any way with the democratic choices of individual states. And I would ask that we not mix these two concepts. [...] [180]


179 Questions and answers on non-NATO related topics have been omitted.
180 Questions and answers on non-NATO related topics have been omitted.
Decree of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin of July 15, 2007 on Suspension of the CFE Treaty with Explanatory Information

Due to exceptional circumstances, referring to the provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of 19 November 1990 that affect the security of the Russian Federation and require immediate action, I hereby decide:


2. Instruct the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation to notify the depositaries of the international agreements referred to in paragraph 1 of this decree and to the signatory states of the suspension of the application of these agreements.

3. The decree shall enter into force on the day of its signature.

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181 The material consists of two parts: the text of the decree and the text of the explanatory note attached to it as a separate document.

182 See the text of the agreement at: https://fas.org/nuke/control/cfe/text/abudapest.htm.

Information on the Decree “On Suspending the Russian Federation’s Participation in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and Related International Agreements”

January 14, 2007

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) was signed in Paris on 19 November 1990 and came into force on 9 November 1992.

The CFE Treaty served as a viable and effective way to strengthen European security in the early 1990s. It created a balance between the conventional forces of two military and political alliances, the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), by limiting their armaments and also providing for limits to prevent them from deploying conventional weapons in potential areas of conflict.

The Treaty’s objectives included: establishing a secure and stable balance of conventional armed forces in Europe at lower levels than heretofore, eliminating disparities prejudicial to stability and security, and eliminating the capability for launching surprise attacks and for initiating large-scale offensive action in Europe.

However, almost immediately after signing the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, NATO members opted to delay this document’s coming into force.

NATO countries decided that ratification of the Adapted Treaty is contingent upon Russia’s complying with various unsubstantiated conditions. One such condition consists in implementing elements of bilateral agreements between the Russian Federation, Georgia and Moldova, bilateral agreements not linked to the CFE Treaty on withdrawing Russian troops from those countries’ territories. These agreements were concluded in Istanbul before signing the Adapted Treaty in November 1999 (Istanbul Agreements). While Russia is implementing all agreements relating to the CFE Treaty, Russia considers that linking these two matters is wrong.

Exceptional circumstances surrounding the CFE Treaty have led the Russian Federation to consider suspending its participation in the Treaty until NATO members ratify the Adapted Treaty and begin to implement the document in good faith.

The need to suspend the CFE Treaty is a result of the following exceptional circumstances that affect the security of the Russian Federation:

1. The failure of Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and the Czech Republic to make the necessary changes in the composition
of group of states party to the Treaty on the accession of these countries to NATO;

2. The excessive parties to the CFE Treaty that belong to NATO, and the exclusive group that formed among CFE Treaty members as a result of the widening of the alliance;

3. The negative impact of the planned deployment of America’s conventional forces in Bulgaria and Romania because of this exclusive group mentality;

4. The failure of a number of parties of the CFE Treaty to comply with the political obligations contained in the Istanbul Agreements relating to the early ratification of the Adapted Treaty;

5. The failure of Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic to comply with commitments accepted in Istanbul to adjust their territorial ceilings;

6. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania’s failure to participate in the CFE Treaty has adverse effects on Russia’s ability to implement its political commitments to military containment in the northwestern part of the Russian Federation. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania’s actions result in a territory in which there are no restrictions on the deployment of conventional forces, including other countries’ forces.

At an extraordinary meeting of parties to the CFE Treaty, held in Vienna on 12–15 June 2007, the Russian Federation outlined the conditions necessary for restoring the viability of the CFE Treaty:

- the return of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to the negotiating table;
- the reduction of the permissible amounts and stocks of Treaty-limited equipment\textsuperscript{184} for NATO countries in order to compensate for the widening of the NATO alliance;
- arriving at a political settlement concerning the abolition of flank restrictions on Russian territory;
- working out a common understanding of the term “substantial combat forces” and showing cooperation and restraint prior to coming to an agreement;
- the coming into force or at least starting to apply the interim Adapted Treaty no later than 1 July 2008; and,
- working out the terms of accession of new members of the CFE Treaty and the continuous upgrading of the Treaty.

The results of emergency meetings and consultations of the Russia-NATO Council demonstrate that NATO countries continue to link their ratification of the Adapted Treaty with Russia’s fulfilling the

\textsuperscript{184} Treaty Limited Equipment—military equipment limited (in quantity terms) by the provisions of the CFE Treaty.
Istanbul Agreements. They have also ignored Russian suggestions on how to prevent a CFE Treaty crisis in the run-up to the emergency meeting, limiting themselves to promising to discuss the suggestions later, once the Adapted Treaty comes into force.

The resulting situation makes it necessary to take measures to suspend the Treaty.

Suspension of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and parties to the CFE Treaty is in conformity with international law. The operation of the Treaty will be suspended in 150 days as of the date of Russia’s notifying the depositary and other member states of its decision.

In accordance with the federal law “On the International Treaties of the Russian Federation,” the suspension of the CFE Treaty, which was ratified by a decree 3243–1 of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation on 8 July 1992, is subject to federal law. Paragraph 4 of Article 37 of the federal law stipulates that in case of necessity, immediate action to suspend the CFE Treaty can be taken by the President of the Russian Federation, who must instantly inform the Federal Assembly of his actions and submit a draft federal law to this effect to the State Duma.

It is appropriate to suspend related international agreements including the Budapest Agreements and Flank Agreements along with the CFE Treaty. In accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 37 of the federal law “On the International Treaties of the Russian Federation,” this decision is incumbent on the President of the Russian Federation.

52.

Speech of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin
at the NATO Summit in Bucharest,
April 4, 2008

Mr. Secretary General, Dear Colleagues,

First of all, I want to thank you for allowing us to hold this meeting in such a representative group. We had a previous meeting like this six years ago, and it is indeed important and useful to have a personal dialogue on issues that develop positively, but it is even more important to have a dialogue on issues that require additional discussion, where our positions need to be clarified.

We came to the summit convinced that the mechanism of cooperation between Russia and NATO can be both useful and productive. Today, it needs additional, friendly regulation and our meeting is a good opportunity to identify the main obstacles to our cooperation in a frank, honest discussion and to determine ways to further strengthen our partnership.

For Russia, the most important result of our cooperation in the past years is that our country has regained stability, strengthened in almost all spheres. We have become an even more reliable and predictable partner for our colleagues, for the international community. We have managed to achieve high economic indicators, invest and open our economy to seriously interested partners. We actively look for new tools for international cooperation, and in order to further develop in harmony with the outside world, we try to use the diverse experience of our common civilization. We stand firmly on the ground of protection of international law, we persistently strive to develop new agreements in the field of security and disarmament.

We believe that it is in our common interest to increase the stabilising role of Russia in resolving regional conflicts. In recent years, we have recognised that our priority is to focus on ensuring sustainable internal social and economic development in Russia. As a result, Russia has managed to increase its potential both globally and in the Euro-Atlantic dimension. Today, we perceive ourselves as an active and integral part of the emerging new world order. Obviously, we have defended and will defend our priorities and our approaches, but we are always open to cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual respect. We believe that security can only be universal and
indivisible. Other solutions will not work. I think that everyone here shares this logic.

I believe that our meeting is an extremely important opportunity to remove emerging differences of opinion and to give a new positive impulse to relations between Russia and NATO. Let me say right away that we consider the Council’s activities and our cooperation with NATO in general an important element in ensuring stability and security in the system of international relations. Increased confidence, joint projects in various fields have a positive impact on the political and psychological climate, both in Europe and worldwide.

Let us not forget that in its time the destruction of the ideological, bloc confrontation required colossal efforts. At the time, it seemed that a new security architecture was already being developed. That together we lay the foundations for a model of international relations based on openness, trust, uniform standards and consideration of all interests equally. We know very well how conflict-free the German unification process was. We have withdrawn our troops from those countries where other military contingents are now being actively brought. In the 1980s and 1990s, our country did much to support the arms-control process. We have significantly reduced, including unilaterally, I want to stress this, ladies and gentlemen “unilaterally,” our strategic, tactical, conventional arsenals. We have dismantled the radar stations in Skrunda and Krasnoyarsk, we have completely closed down our military bases in Cam Ranh, Vietnam, and, responding to the persistent requests of our American partners, we have closed down our military base in Cuba.

Naturally, we hoped for reciprocity from NATO, however, we did not see it. Some of our partners went even further—they started to demonise of modern Russia in their official politics. I do not think it was appropriate.

Obviously, we will have enough endurance and patience, despite calls from some members of the pact who would like to revive the enemy’s image. I think that’s the rhetoric of the past. We need to get rid of it as soon as possible, rather look for common areas and, based on this common approach, look to the future.

But let’s just take a few aspects. For example, the transition to market prices for energy can hardly be called a revival of imperial ambitions. After all, we all understand this very well—everyone has called on the countries of Eastern Europe and Russia to move as quickly as possible to market relations in every sphere of cooperation, including the energy sector. We have done so, including within the country. We
will continue to diversify our energy supply routes to Europe—but is that wrong? Does it bother anyone? Does it hurt anyone? On the contrary, it seems that everyone should be satisfied. Of course, this has nothing to do with some mythical energy weapon, with energy blackmail—why introduce such phrases and clichés into the practice of international life? It seems that if someone sells their goods at market prices, someone else, not Russia, this is right. But if Russia wants to trade at market prices, selling its products at world prices—then this is an energy weapon. What is this rubbish? What is this nonsense? Who introduces such a thing into the practice of international life? Why? Regulation of energy problems in narrow groups is ineffective, we are not against any new [energy supply] routes, new unions, alliances. But we are surprised when we are disturbed or there are attempts to disturb in doing so. Often against one’s own national interests. Why? The result of taking this approach—we should say it straightforwardly—is that the model of a common European home remains on paper so far. Many other slogans and ideas, for example, the pursuit of a Europe without dividing lines, have also so far been halted and put to the test by introducing other solutions.

Of course, the globalisation of the Alliance’s interests and capabilities that we observe, objectively requires a new approach. What is most important in this respect, however, is that this process should not give rise to new fears and new suspicions, not only from Russia but also from other members of the international community.

Let’s be honest. We, Russia, offered to simply watch the unrestrained enlargement of NATO. We have discussed this many times, and the position, the Russian position, on NATO’s enlargement policy is well known. But, when was NATO established? When there was a confrontation with the Soviet Union. It was a bloc that fought against the “evil empire.” This “evil empire” is gone. Nevertheless, NATO exists. Let’s think in order not to demonise this organisation, not to demonise Russia, to seek a common approach to solving various global problems.

After all, this is a military-political bloc, and the military infrastructure is getting closer and closer to the borders of Russia. Today, it is only a few hundred kilometres away from St. Petersburg. The North Atlantic Alliance is not a golf club and as long as NATO remains a military alliance, measures of balanced military restraint should form the basis of the Alliance’s relations with Russia as well.

I am convinced that decisions on military security that have been agreed upon with such difficulty must not be changed for the sake of the political situation. If it was decided in 1990 that the CFE Treaty was
the cornerstone of the European security, let us do our best to maintain
the regime of the Treaty. If we agreed not to deploy significant combat
forces—this is a quote—this agreement must be respected. These
principles should create a clear and predictable coordinate system for
the development of the whole complex of relations with NATO.

Here is our distinguished colleague Mr. Rasmussen today called
on Russia to return to the CFE treaty. But why do you call us to return
to the CFE if you have not ratified it yourself? The adapted version
[of the CFE] is not being ratified by any of your countries. We’ve been
executing it unilaterally for several years. After all, there are reasonable
people here, no press representatives, whom you’ve expelled. But we
understand what’s happening here. Russia unilaterally dismantled
all its military forces in northwestern Russia, on the border with
Pribaltika and Finland. We have not left behind a single significant
military unit or command of corps level. We took everything out of
the Urals, including heavy equipment. And how have our partners
responded? I mean, the Baltic states, with all due respect, but they
haven’t ratified, not even signed the adapted treaty yet. For us, it’s like
a black hole. Tomorrow, anything could show up there. Here you are,
our Baltic Sea colleagues are entitled to it, but then what do you want
from us? If a new version, an adapted version [of the CFE] is not
signed, then the old one applies, and according to the old version,
ladies and gentlemen, the whole Pribaltika according to the old version
of the CFE refers to the Baltic Military District of the Soviet Union
and I should appoint military district commanders there. If you give
me this right, then let me appoint a commander there!

The situation has changed completely and is contrary to the reality
of life. No one wants to notice it. Everyone just tells us, follow the
CFE! We will not obey any documents unilaterally and please do not
impose it on us. But we don’t mind getting together, thinking and
deciding together how to build security in Europe in the future. I’m
not talking about the fact that according to the CFE treaty we are
the only country that has restricted the movement of its own armed
forces on its territory—Russia. Just think how colonial, in nature, this
document is! I asked George, would you restrict the movement of

\(^{185}\) It concerns the then-Prime Minister of Denmark, Anders Fogh Rasmussen,
NATO Secretary General from 2009 to 2014.

\(^{186}\) Rus. *Pribaltika* (region comprised of Baltic Sea coastline), i.e., Estonia, Lithuania,
and Latvia, as countries of the Baltic Sea coast that were once part of the USSR.
The term used in Russia in Soviet and early post-Soviet times has now a slightly
derogatory meaning.

\(^{187}\) It concerns the then president of the United States, George W. Bush.
American troops from California to Texas, from Texas to Maine and so on? It’s funny to say so. And we’ve agreed to that. We’ve signed, ratified and executed it unilaterally for years! And we don’t see any positive reaction from you. It’s all over! Do not go back to it again! If, on your part, there is no ratification in the near future, we will completely be out of this treaty. That’s a fair, honest and clear position. I’m telling you this honestly. We want to build a security relationship with you, let’s conduct this dialogue fairly. Let’s sit down, have a talk and either amend the current treaty or prepare a new document. But let us do it honestly and openly. We do not mind—we are in favour. Only the dialogue should be open and honest.

So, about Kosovo. Mr. Chairman has said that everybody respects Resolution 1244, but if everybody respected Resolution 1244, there would not be any one-sided declaration of independence. But I do not want to discuss this issue, we have discussed it at the G8, as well as at other forums, and we made a decision that we consider it illegal and able to cause serious consequences. But, if you noticed, we do not force anything. We formulated our position, and our position is open, but we do not go off into hysterics on this issue, and you should have paid attention to how reserved we were in the Caucasus on this issue. Of course, this policy puts us into a very complicated position at the post-Soviet space, because we have there enough situations similar to that with Kosovo—it is Transdniestria, Southern Ossetia, Abkhazia, Karabakh—there are many such situations. And you put us into a very complicated position, but we are trying to wriggle and behave very carefully, without destroying the situation there and without provoking military conflicts. That is why, however sad it may seem, but we here are also ready to look for any consensus, or a way out of the situation. Now I do not specify which exactly situation, I do not want to anticipate anything, in any case, we are ready to hear you, ready to think, ready to work somehow together.

As for the policy of expanding the alliance, we have been attentively watching your discussion yesterday. On the whole, of course, we are satisfied with your decisions, which took place. But If I speak about Georgia and Ukraine, it is clear that the matter concerns not only security issues. For our Georgian friends, of course, it is one of means to restore their territorial integrity, as they believe. Besides, by means of force, under the aegis of NATO. It is an old, many-years, lasting

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188 It concerned UN Security Council Resolution No. 1244 on peace regulations in the Kosovo conflict, i.a., the establishment of the UN interim administration, KFOR international forces, declaring the initiation of the political process leading to a future status settlement of Kosovo.
for more than a hundred years, ethnic conflict between Georgians, between Abkhazians (it is a small ethnic group, it numbers a mere 200 thousand people), between Ossetians, for a hundred years, and more, these conflicts are ethnic. To solve these problems they need not to enter NATO, they should have patience, establish dialog with small ethnic groups. And we have been trying to help them, besides, to help Georgia restore its territorial integrity. And even despite the decisions on Kosovo, we will not recognize the independence of these quasi-public formations, though they have been calling on us since long ago, for decades already. We have been very responsible, very weighted, and call on you to be careful as well.

But in Ukraine, one third are ethnic Russians. Out of forty five million people, in line with the official census, seventeen millions are Russians. There are regions, where only the Russian population lives, for instance, in the Crimea, 90% are Russians. Generally speaking, Ukraine is a very complicated state. Ukraine, in the form it currently exists, was created in the Soviet times, it received its territories from Poland—after the Second World war, from Czechoslovakia, from Romania—and at present not all the problems have been solved as yet in the border region with Romania in the Black Sea. Then, it received huge territories from Russia in the east and south of the country. It is a complicated state formation. If we introduce into it NATO problems, other problems, it may put the state on the verge of its existence. Complicated internal political problems are taking place there. We should act also very-very carefully. We do not have any right to veto, and, probably, we do not pretend to have. But I want that all of us, when deciding such issues, realize that we have there our interests as well. Well, seventeen million Russians currently live in Ukraine. Who may state that we do not have any interests there? South, the south of Ukraine, completely, there are only Russians. The Crimea was merely received by Ukraine with the decision of the KPSS Political Bureau. There were not even any state procedures on transferring this territory. We have been calm and responsible about these problems. We are not trying to provoke anything, we have been acting very carefully, but we ask our partners to act reasonably as well.

Besides, there was a call to act more actively on some directions of collaboration, let's say, on Afghanistan. You know, I have just reminded Mr. Secretary General, when we talked with him tete-a-tete, that if our American friends managed to act rather effectively in Afghanistan and President Bush was very decisive and, on the whole, effective, I think the Afghan direction, without any doubt, is a success of the
foreign policy of USA, in my opinion. But it happened also because we, Russia, have been supporting one-sidedly the so-called Northern Alliance for many years. We supplied them with a hundred millions of dollars of arms. It was the only real political and military force in Afghanistan, which, even pressed by the Taliban to the Tajik border, operated and formed the basis, which began battle actions against the Taliban at the territory. It created a springboard for the international forces to enter this territory. We have been maintaining relations with Afghanistan, helping them restore their armed forces, supplying them with arms, spare parts, rendering humanitarian aid, training, and for a long time we have even provided the thing, which you could hardly imagine before—a transit not only by air, by also by land, for France, for the Federative Republic of Germany, and today Mr. Scheffer\footnote{It concerns the then-NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer.} and our Foreign Minister signed a document on transit for the whole Organization of the North-Atlantic Treaty, about the transit of military cargo through our territory.

Besides, if the discussion on your expansion issues developed differently yesterday, today’s transit agreement would not likely be signed. But, considering that, nevertheless, as we understand, our concerns were heard somehow at last, we made decision for ourselves to not stop the collaboration on Afghanistan, but, to put it honestly, there was such a desire.

Because, if everyone does not seem to care how Russia reacts to these or other problems, why should we help? However, taking into account your discussion yesterday, we have decided not only to continue our cooperation on Afghanistan but also to expand it by offering military cargo transit for the whole organisation. We will also work in other areas in the Mediterranean and so on.

In conclusion, I would like to say the following: The inauguration of the newly elected president of the Russian Federation should take and will take place on 7 May this year. I am finishing my work as president of Russia—it has been hard, intensive work, some things have been successful, others will be left to the new leadership of the Russian Federation to decide. But in international affairs, if something has been successful, it is largely due to our joint efforts and the support of a large number of colleagues who have gathered here. Despite all the difficulties, all the problems we still have, the work was generally productive—with a plus sign and with your considerable, committed help. I say this frankly, openly, it is not just some kind of diplomatic
courtesy. I want to thank you all for working together over these years. Thank you very much. I wish you all the best.

Speech of the President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev
in Berlin, June 5, 2008

Ladies and gentlemen, colleagues,

[...]

The end of the Cold War made it possible to build up genuinely equal cooperation between Russia, the European Union and North America as three branches of European civilisation.

It is my conviction that Atlanticism as a sole historical principle has already had its day. We need to talk today about unity between the whole Euro-Atlantic area from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Life itself dictates the need for this kind of cooperation.

But looking at the future construction of relations between the countries of Europe, we see a worrying tendency to take a selective and politicised approach to our common history.

In this respect I think that normal honest academic debate is needed. The significance of the Russian-German reconciliation is clearly underestimated. It is just as important for the peaceful future of Europe as was, say, the reconciliation between France and Germany.

We especially need to be aware of the consequences of marginalising and isolating countries, creating zones with differentiated levels of security and abandoning the creation of general regional collective security systems. Unfortunately, all this can be found in Europe today.

We also cannot allow ourselves to be stripped of our common spiritual and moral heritage that was the great victory over Nazism. We cannot forget that the preservation of Europe’s material culture during those war years came at the price of many millions of lives sacrificed by the peoples of the Soviet Union and by other European peoples.

Let us take a close look at the situation in Europe today. It is hard to escape the conclusion that Europe’s current architecture still bears the stamp of an ideology inherited from the past. An organisation such as the OSCE could, it would seem, embody European civilisation’s newfound unity, but it is prevented from doing so, prevented from becoming a full-fledged general regional organisation.

The problem is not just in the organisation’s own incomplete institutional development but also in the obstruction created by other groups intent on continuing the old line of bloc politics.

190 Sections of the speech not referring to European security, concerning, i.a., Russian-German relations and general assumptions of Russian policy have been omitted.
NATO has also failed so far to give new purpose to its existence. It is trying to find this purpose today by globalising its missions, including to the detriment of the UN’s prerogatives, which I mentioned just before, and by bringing in new members. But this is clearly still not the solution.

There is talk of exchanging further NATO expansion to the east for ‘something else’, but I think this is just so many illusions. I think that in such a case our relations with NATO would be completely undermined, ruined for a long time to come. There will not be confrontation of course, but the price would nonetheless be high indeed and would cause serious damage.

Afghanistan provides one of the clearest possible examples of how NATO and Russia share the same fundamental security interests. We are actively helping our partners working in this country. At the Russia-NATO summit in Bucharest we took the important step of agreeing on land transit for non-military cargoes via Russian Federation territory. We are completing work on the use of our military-transport aircraft. Russia is expanding training opportunities for Afghan anti-drugs and anti-terrorism personnel. These are all areas where we need to keep working together.

This is all extremely important for reaching the objectives the international community sets through the UN Security Council. Does it make sense to jeopardise this cooperation for the sake of a bloc politics approach that continues by inertia?

I think that only by openly and honestly sharing all our concerns with each other can we make progress in building a genuine greater Europe. Our predecessors during the Cold War years managed to draw up the Helsinki Final Act (which, as the legal foundation for the European system, has withstood the test of time despite all the difficulties encountered), and so why should we not be able to take the next step today? Namely, drafting and signing a legally binding treaty on European security in which the organisations currently working in the Euro-Atlantic area could become parties.

There were attempts to conclude such an agreement in the past. It is enough to recall the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928. But that agreement failed to work and shared the sorry fate of the League of Nations. In today’s world, when no one wants war in Europe and we have all been made wiser by the lessons of the twentieth century, such an agreement has a better hope of success.

We could look at a regional pact based, naturally, on the principles of the UN Charter and clearly defining the role of force as factor in
relations within the Euro-Atlantic community. This pact could achieve a comprehensive resolution of the security indivisibility and arms control issues in Europe that are of such concern to us all.

I also propose that we consider holding a general European summit to start the process of drafting this agreement. Absolutely all European countries should take part in this summit, but as individual countries, leaving aside any allegiances to blocs or other groups. National interests stripped bare of any distorting ideological motivations should be the starting point for all taking part.

[...]¹⁹¹

Ladies and gentlemen, Russia does not need chaos and uncertainty in today’s world. We have no interests that need to be guaranteed through such perverse means.

We often hear calls for Moscow to show restraint. We all need to show restraint in order to prevent escalation on any issue and break the vicious circle of unilateral action and reaction. We need to stop trying to force events and pursuing a fait-accompli policy. We should start by simply taking a little time out to look at where we have come to and what we are now sinking in, whether the issue be Kosovo, NATO expansion or missile defence.

It is highly symptomatic that current differences with Russia are interpreted by many in the West as a need to simply bring Russia’s policies closer into line with those of the West. But we do not want to be ‘embraced’ in this way. We need to look for common solutions. Sometimes we are simply told: stop being so prickly in international affairs and then democratic development and human rights issues will become secondary; that they can close their eyes to them, and they give us examples of other countries that behave in just this way and with whom they get on fine.

But this approach does not suit us, above all because we ourselves think that human rights is one of the most basic and fundamental values. Human rights should not be part of any trade-off. What we welcome therefore is calm and honest discussion on a mutual basis of all the different issues.

[...][¹⁹²


¹⁹¹ Sections of the speech referring to Russia’s economic cooperation with Europe have been omitted.

¹⁹² Sections concerning the internal situation of Russia and Russian-German humanitarian cooperation have been omitted.
Statement on Georgia. Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the Level of Foreign Ministers Held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, August 19, 2008

The North Atlantic Council met in special Ministerial session on 19 August 2008, expressed its grave concern over the situation in Georgia and discussed its wider implications for Euro-Atlantic stability and security. A peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict in Georgia must be based on full respect for the principles of Georgia’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity recognised by international law and UN Security Council resolutions. We deplore all loss of life, civilian casualties, and damage to civilian infrastructure that has resulted from the conflict. We are assisting humanitarian relief efforts. We met with the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Alexander Stubb, to discuss the key issues which he believed needed to be addressed.

We welcome the agreement reached and signed by Georgia and Russia, through the diplomatic efforts of the European Union, the OSCE and the US, to end the hostilities and to bring about a political solution to the conflict. We stand fully behind these efforts. We stress the urgency of swift, complete, and good faith implementation of the agreement, including a new international mechanism to monitor respect for these engagements. Military action must cease definitively and military forces must return to their positions held prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Fully international discussions must begin on the modalities for security and stability in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Economic activity in Georgia, including international aviation and shipping, must not be hindered.

We are gravely concerned by the humanitarian situation. Allied governments are working together, and in concert with international organisations and others in the international community, to ensure that the civilian populations affected by the conflict have the assistance they need to meet immediate and ongoing humanitarian needs. We call on all parties, in accordance with their obligations under international humanitarian law, to ensure access for international humanitarian relief efforts to all affected populations.

We have also agreed today to support Georgia, upon its request, in a number of areas. In addition, we have agreed to task the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session to develop with Georgia
rapidly the modalities for a NATO-Georgia Commission. This Commission will supervise the process set in hand at Bucharest, including the measures of support agreed at today’s meeting. These measures are intended to assist Georgia, a valued and long-standing Partner of NATO, to assess the damage caused by the military action and to help restore critical services necessary for normal public life and economic activity. Georgia’s recovery, security and stability are important to the Alliance. NATO will continue to cooperate with Georgia in the framework of the Partnership for Peace and Georgia’s Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO, and will review any additional Georgian requests for assistance. We also welcomed the fact that a number of our governments have indicated that they will actively support measures to help the economic reconstruction of Georgia.

The conflict between Georgia and Russia has compromised regional stability and security. We deeply deplore the use of force in the conflict between Georgia and Russia. We reiterate that there is no military solution to the unresolved conflicts. We remind all parties that peaceful conflict resolution is a key principle of the Partnership for Peace Framework Document.

We remain concerned by Russia’s actions during this crisis and remind Russia of its responsibility for maintaining security and order in the areas where it exercises control, especially in light of continuing reports of Russia’s deliberate destruction of civilian infrastructure. Russian military action has been disproportionate and inconsistent with its peacekeeping role, as well as incompatible with the principles of peaceful conflict resolution set out in the Helsinki Final Act, the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration. We call on Russia to take immediate action to withdraw its troops from the areas it is supposed to leave under the six-principle agreement signed by President Saakashvili and President Medvedev. The Alliance is considering seriously the implications of Russia’s actions for the

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193 It was finally established in September 2008 as a separate NATO-Georgia partnership. Its main objective is political dialogue, military cooperation, and helping Georgia prepare for implementing the requirements of NATO membership.

194 At the April summit in Bucharest, the NATO countries indicated, i.a., that Georgia would be eligible to become a member of NATO in the future if it fulfilled all the related requirements. This assurance was repeated in declarations of subsequent NATO summits (from 2009 to 2014).

195 As complemented by President Sarkozy’s letter dated 16 August 2008 and subsequent correspondence on this issue.
NATO-Russia relationship. In 2002, we established the NATO-Russia Council, a framework for discussions with Russia, including on issues that divide the Alliance and Russia. We have determined that we cannot continue with business as usual. We call on Moscow to demonstrate—both in word and deed—its continued commitment to the principles upon which we agreed to base our relationship.

We reaffirmed our commitment to the decisions taken by Heads of State and Government at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, including those regarding Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations, and we will continue our intensive engagement with Georgia to address in December the questions pertaining to its Membership Action Plan application, taking into account developments until that time.


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196 As a result, NATO suspended civil and military cooperation with Russia. However, channels of diplomatic dialogue were maintained. In spring 2009, NATO-Russia cooperation was normalised.

197 Georgia has been applying for years for participation in a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) and recognition of its status as an official candidate for membership. For political reasons, this status has not been granted, although bilateral cooperation remains visible.
A. Vernitsky (Channel One): Dmitry Anatolyevich, events in South Ossetia and Abkhazia have been unfolding for 17 long years now. Why was the decision to recognise these territories’ independence taken when Georgia attacked Tskhinvali? Were there other options possible?

Dmitry Medvedev: I think this decision was inevitable in the given situation, and that it has been effective is clear to all now. We really did try throughout these 17 years to hold together a state that was in effect coming apart, and we encouraged all possible settlement efforts. Our peacekeepers were on duty day and night, helping to keep conflict at bay. We prevented large-scale bloodshed in the 1990s. There would probably have been continued chances for achieving a settlement were it not for this idiotic adventure launched by the Georgian leadership, which effectively put an end to hopes that Abkhazians, Ossetians and Georgians could live together. Not only did it put an end to these hopes but it caused a great number of deaths. Civilians, our citizens among them, lost their lives. Peacekeepers, who were trying to keep the conflicting parties apart, lost their lives. That Georgian peacekeepers opened fire on their own colleagues is especially monstrous. All of these things ultimately led to events taking this most dramatic and serious turn. We were left with no choice but to respond to this absolutely insolent and brazen attack, return things to normal and protect the lives and dignity of South Ossetia's people. A separate plan to attack Abkhazia had been prepared. Our General Staff made it public just recently. This plan followed the same scenario. We therefore made our decisions in order to prevent any future genocide and exodus of Abkhazians and Ossetians from their territories. As I said, events have shown that these decisions were evident and necessary.

K. Pozdnyakov (NTV): Dmitry Anatolyevich, our Western partners have responded to Russia's decision as was to be expected, with moderate to very sharp criticism. What kind of reaction can we expect from our closest neighbours, from the CIS countries, for

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198 It concerns the history of the Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhazian conflicts and the origins and development of the separatist para-states—South Ossetia and Abkhazia—since 1991.
example? How important for Russia is it to have other countries follow our example and recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia? How much influence will this have in determining our next steps?

Dmitry Medvedev: Russia has already taken all the main steps that were necessary in this situation. As you should realise, this was not an easy decision, but it was necessary. Reactions in other countries have indeed varied, and this was probably to be expected. Our closest neighbours have been completely objective in their reaction. I met with most of these countries’ leaders at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation\textsuperscript{199} summit. They understand the motivations for the decisions Russia has taken.

Recognition is a separate issue. I want to remind you that each country makes its own individual decision on recognition. There is no collective action in this situation. Take the example of Kosovo. It is clear that in this situation some countries will agree to emergence of new states, while others will consider their emergence untimely. But according to international law, a new state becomes a subject of law, as the lawyers say, from the moment it gains recognition from at least one other country.

From a legal point of view these new states have come into existence now. The process of their gaining recognition might be a long one, but this will not affect our position. We have made our decision and it is irreversible. Our duty is to ensure peace and calm in the region, and this is the basis for our position.

A. Kondrashov (Rossia): What steps will Russia take now in these republics? What form will Russia’s plans take?

Dmitry Medvedev: We will help these republics in every way we can of course. Work is underway on drafting agreements, already international agreements now, between our countries: between the Russian Federation and Abkhazia, and between the Russian Federation and South Ossetia.\textsuperscript{200} These agreements will set out our obligations regarding all forms of support and aid: economic, social

\textsuperscript{199} The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) was formally established in June 2001 as part of the institutionalisation of a forum for dialogue on the regional security of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, which has been ongoing since 1996 (Uzbekistan joined in June 2001). In June 2017, India and Pakistan joined the SCO.

\textsuperscript{200} Russia and separatist Abkhazia and South Ossetia signed a number of agreements, the most important of which were the Strategic Partnership Agreement between Russia and Abkhazia, signed in November 2014, and the Alliance and Integration Agreement between Russia and South Ossetia, signed in March 2015. Indeed, they confirm the \textit{de facto} status of Abkhazia as a Russian protectorate and South Ossetia as \textit{de facto} part of Russia.
and humanitarian aid in the broad sense of the word, and military assistance. We will establish normal full-fledged relations under international law with these republics and build relations as allies with them.

**A.Kondrashov** (Rossia): Dmitry Anatolyevich, everyone realises now that Russia’s place in the world has undergone serious change since the events of August 8. The whole previous system of agreements is changing dramatically before our very eyes. A number of international institutions have already demonstrated their total ineffectiveness in resolving this conflict. But Russia and the West are not ready, as I understand it, to completely break off relations. How do you see the world’s future, the future world order, and Russia’s place in it?

**Dmitry Medvedev**: I will make five principles the foundation for my work in carrying out Russia’s foreign policy.

First, Russia recognises the primacy of the fundamental principles of international law, which define the relations between civilised peoples. We will build our relations with other countries within the framework of these principles and this concept of international law.

Second, the world should be multi-polar. A single-pole world is unacceptable. Domination is something we cannot allow. We cannot accept a world order in which one country makes all the decisions, even as serious and influential a country as the United States of America. Such a world is unstable and threatened by conflict.

Third, Russia does not want confrontation with any other country. Russia has no intention of isolating itself. We will develop friendly relations with Europe, the United States, and other countries, as much as is possible.

Fourth, protecting the lives and dignity of our citizens, wherever they may be, is an unquestionable priority for our country. Our foreign policy decisions will be based on this need. We will also protect the interests of our business community abroad. It should be clear to all that we will respond to any aggressive acts committed against us.

Finally, fifth, as is the case of other countries, there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests. These regions are home to countries with which we share special historical relations and are bound together as friends and good neighbours. We will pay particular attention to our work in these regions and build friendly ties with these countries, our close neighbours. These are the principles I will follow in carrying out our foreign policy.
As for the future, it depends not only on us but also on our friends and partners in the international community. They have a choice.

A. Vernitsky (Channel One): Dmitry Anatolyevich, are the priority regions the territories that border Russia?

Dmitry Medvedev: The countries on our borders are priorities, of course, but our priorities do not end there.

K. Pozdnyakov (NTV): Dmitry Anatolyevich, you said that Russia would respond to any act of aggression committed against it. Do you think our laws give sufficient power to do this? Is this written into our laws?

Dmitry Medvedev: Of course.

K. Pozdnyakov (NTV): Perhaps a separate law is needed?

Dmitry Medvedev: Everything has long since been done. The international community has approved the UN Charter, which states countries’ right to self-defence. We have the Constitution and we have special Russian laws on which we base decisions on counter-measures, including the use of Russia’s Armed Forces. The legal framework is in place and working, and there is no need for adjustments.

A. Vernitsky (Channel One): What about diplomatic and economic sanctions?

Dmitry Medvedev: We are not in favour of sanctions in general and they are something we consider only in extreme cases. But, like other countries, we are sometimes forced to resort to sanctions. A number of countries have special laws regulating the imposition of sanctions, and if needed, we could also adopt similar special laws, but I think this is the most unproductive road.

II. The modern world and the foreign policy of the Russian Federation

The modern world is going through fundamental and dynamic changes that profoundly affect the interests of the Russian Federation and its citizens. Anew Russia, basing on a solid foundation of its national interests, has now acquired a full-fledged role in global affairs.

Differences between domestic and external means of ensuring national interests and security are gradually disappearing.

In this context, our foreign policy becomes one of major instruments of the steady national development and of ensuring its competitiveness in a globalizing world.

Russia, being a permanent member of the UN Security Council, participant in the G8 and other authoritative international and regional organizations, intergovernmental dialogue and cooperation mechanisms, and as a country possessing a major potential and significant resources in all spheres of human activities, vigorously developing relations with leading States and associations throughout the world and integrating consistently into the world economy and politics, exerts a substantial influence upon the development of a new architecture of international relations.

Drastic transformation of international relations, the end of ideological confrontation and steady overcoming of the Cold War legacy and its prejudices and stereotypes, the strengthening of Russia and its international position have all contributed to significant enhancement of global cooperation. The threat of a full-scale war, including a nuclear one, has been diminished.

Today, traditional cumbersome military and political alliances can no longer provide for counteracting the whole range of modern challenges and threats which are transnational in their nature. Bloc approaches to international problems are being replaced by a network

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201 The introductory sections on policy principles have been omitted.
diplomacy based on flexible forms of participation in international structures for the search of joint solutions to common tasks.

Together with the military power of States, economic, scientific and technological, environmental, demographic and informational factors are coming to the fore as major factors of influence of a state on international affairs. Of increasing influence are: the level of protection of interests of the individual, as well as those of society and the state; spiritual and intellectual development of citizens; improved wellbeing of people; balance of educational, scientific and production resources; general level of investments in human capital; efficient use of mechanisms governing global markets of goods and services, diversified economic relations; comparative advantages of States in integration processes. Economic interdependence of States is becoming one of key factors of international stability. Prerequisites are being created for building a more stable and crisis-resistant world order.

At the same time, new challenges and threats (first of all, international terrorism, narcotraffic, organized crime, spread of weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery, regional conflicts, demographic problems, global poverty, including energy poverty, as well as illegal migration and climate change) are global problems that require adequate response of the entire international community and solidarity efforts to overcome them. The ecological factor is playing an increasingly important role, the problem of prevention of and counteracting infectious diseases is becoming ever more urgent. The complex nature of challenges facing the international community requires development of a balanced strategy of their solution, based on the interrelationship of issues of security, social and economic development and human rights protection.

The contradictory trends determining the current state of international relations are a result of the transitional period in their development. Those trends are reflecting differences in understanding of a genuine meaning and consequences of the end of the Cold War. It is for the first time in the contemporary history that global competition is acquiring a civilizational dimension which suggests competition between different value systems and development models within the framework of universal democratic and market economy principles.

As the constraints of the bipolar confrontation are being overcome, the cultural and civilizational diversity of the modern world is increasingly in evidence. A religious factor in shaping the system of contemporary international relations is growing, inter alia, as regards
its moral foundation. This problem cannot be resolved without a common denominator that has always existed in major world religions.

The reaction to the prospect of loss by the historic West of its monopoly in global processes finds its expression, in particular, in the continued political and psychological policy of “containing” Russia, including the use of a selective approach to history, for those purposes, first of all as regards the World War Two and the post-war period.

The need for the international community to develop a common vision of our era is becoming ever more urgent, which could only be achieved through open and honest substantive discussions of the problems confronting the mankind. What is needed is to provide favourable conditions for scientists to carry out their professional work with a view to establishing the historical truth and preventing historical issues from becoming an instrument of practical policy.

The unilateral action strategy leads to destabilization of international situation, provokes tensions and arms race, exacerbates interstate differences, stirs up ethnic and religious strife, endangers security of other States and fuels tensions in inter-civilisational relations. Coercive measures with the use of military force in circumvention of the UN Charter and Security Council cannot overcome deep social, economic, ethnic and other differences underlying conflicts, undermines the basic principles of international law and leads to enlargement of conflict space, including in the geopolitical area around Russia.

The UN is to play a fundamental role in developing full-fledged inter-civilisational dialogue aimed at reaching agreement between representatives of various religions, confessions and cultures.

Russia will continue to seek the strengthening of principles of multilateralism in international affairs, development of an architecture of international relations that would be based on the recognition by the international community of the principles of security indivisibility in the modern world and would reflect its diversity.

The interests of Russia are directly connected to other global tendencies, inter alia:

- globalization of the world economy. This trend along with complementary opportunities for social and economic progress and development of human contacts, is fraught with new dangers, especially for weak economies. The threat of largescale financial and economic crises is growing, as well as development imbalances in various regions of the world which are a result of unequal starting positions and domestic potentials to respond to the modernization
The globalization process confronts the increasing desire of individual States to protect their economic sovereignty, and such kind of protectionism often acquires the forms of economic nationalism when pragmatic interests are substituted with political considerations. The cultural identity of the overwhelming majority of countries and peoples suffers the increasing onslaught of globalization;

growing role, due to objective factors, of multilateral diplomacy, international institutions and mechanisms in global policy and economy, as a result of growing interdependence of States and the need to make global development more manageable;

enhanced economic potential of the emerging global growth centres, inter alia, as a result of a more equal distribution of development resources due to liberalization of global markets. The economic growth in those countries and regions converts into their political influence, the trend to a polycentric world order growing further;

development of regional and subregional integration in the area of the Community of Independent States (CIS), in the Euro-Atlantic and Asia-Pacific regions, in Africa and Latin America. Integration associations are acquiring an ever-growing importance in the global economy and emerge as a major factor of regional and subregional security, including peace-making activities;

military and political rivalry of regional powers; growing separatism, ethno-national and religious extremism. Integration processes, including in the Euro-Atlantic region, are often of selective and restrictive nature. Attempts to lower the role of a sovereign state as a fundamental element of international relations and to divide States into categories with different rights and responsibilities, are fraught with undermining the international rule of law and arbitrary interference in internal affairs of sovereign States;

ignoring by individual States and their groups of major principles of international law. Russia advocates full universality of the generally recognized norms of international law both in their understanding and application.

Strengthening of international position of Russia and solution of the tasks related to the establishment of equal mutually beneficial partnerships with all countries, successful promotion of our foreign economic interests and provision of political, economic, information and cultural influence abroad require the use of all available financial and economic tools of the state and provision of adequate resources for the Russian Federation's foreign policy.
The Russian Federation possesses real capacity to play a well-deserved role globally. In this respect, of fundamental importance are the following factors: strengthened Russian statehood, stable economic growth, further political and economic reforms, resolution of social problems, overcoming of the resource-based economy and its transition to innovations, as well as improved demographic situation. Other important factors include the strengthened civil society institutes and governmental support to national nongovernmental organizations interested in promoting Russia's foreign policy interests.

Russia pursues an open, predictable and pragmatic foreign policy determined by its national interests. Russia develops international cooperation on the basis of equality, mutual respect for interests and mutual benefit.

Balanced and multi-vector character of Russia's foreign policy is its distinguishing feature. This is due to a geopolitical position of Russia as the largest EuroAsian power, its status as one of the leading States of the world and a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Our national interests today make it imperative to actively promote positive agenda covering the whole spectrum of international problems.

Russia fully recognizes its responsibility for maintenance of security both globally and regionally and is prepared to take joint actions with all other States concerned aimed at finding solutions to common problems. Should our partners be unprepared for joint efforts, Russia, in order to protect its national interests, will have to act unilaterally but always on the basis of international law.

Russia is not going to get involved in a costly confrontation, including renewed arms race, destructive for its economy and disastrous for its internal development.

III. Priorities of the Russian Federation for addressing global problems

Diversity and complexity of international problems and crisis situations call for a timely assessment of each of them when implementing the Russian Federation's foreign policy. The use of political and diplomatic, legal, military, economic, financial and other instruments in handling foreign policy tasks should be commensurate with their real value in terms of safeguarding Russia's foreign policy interests; moreover, these instruments should be applied on the basis of adequate coordination among all branches of power as well as appropriate agencies.
1. The emergence of a new world order

Russia looks forward to emergence of a stable system of international relations based on the principles of equality, mutual respect and mutually beneficial cooperation as well as the norms of international law. Such a system aims at ensuring reliable and equal security for every member of the international community in the political, military, economic, information, humanitarian and other areas and employs multilateral diplomacy as its main tool.

The United Nations, an organization for which there is no real alternative and which has a unique legitimacy, should continue to serve as a clearing-house for the coordination of international relations and world politics in the 21st century. Russia supports the efforts aimed at strengthening its central and coordinating role. This implies:

- strict observance of the ends and principles enshrined in the UN Charter;
- rational reform of the UN so that it could gradually adapt itself to changing global political and economic realities;
- further improving the effectiveness of the work of the UN Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and making this body more representative in the course of the reform while keeping its work as expeditious as possible. Any decisions on the enlargement of the Security Council should enjoy the widest agreement of the States Members of the United Nations. The five permanent members of the Security Council shall retain their status.

Russia attaches great importance to improving the manageability of the world development and establishing a self-regulating international system, an effort that requires collective leadership by the leading States, which should be representative in geographical and civilizational terms and fully respect the central and coordinating role of the UN. For these ends, Russia will make itself more fully engaged in such formats as the Group of Eight and its dialogue with its traditional partners, the Troika (Russia, India and China) and the BRIC Four (Brazil, Russia, India and China), as well as by more actively using other informal structures and venues for dialogue.

2. The primacy of law in international relations

Russia consistently supports the strengthening of the legal basis of international relations and complies with its international legal obligations in good faith. The maintenance and strengthening of international rule
of law is among its priorities in the international arena. The rule of law is intended to ensure a peaceful and fruitful cooperation among States while maintaining the balance of their often conflicting interests as well as safeguarding the interests of the world community as a whole. Adherence to international law is important for safeguarding the interests of our country, its nationals and legal entities. Russia intends to:

- ensure compliance by the international stakeholders with their international obligations both to Russia and to the world community as a whole; combat violations of international law by States, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and individuals. The globalization of challenges and threats to security and sustainable development increases the importance of the UN Security Council as a universal instrument for safeguarding international rule of law;
- counter the attempts by individual countries or groups of countries to revise the universally accepted norms of international law enshrined in universal documents such as the UN Charter, the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the UN Charter, as well as in the CSCE Final Act of 1975. Arbitrary and politically motivated interpretation by certain countries of fundamental international legal norms and principles such as non-use of force or threat of force, peaceful settlement of international disputes, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, right of peoples to self-determination, as well as the attempts to portray violations of international law as its “creative” application, are especially detrimental to international peace, law and order. Such actions erode the basis of international law and inflict a lasting damage to its authority;
- promote the codification and progressive development of international law, especially under the UN aegis, universal acceptance of the UN treaties and their uniform interpretation and application and, in general, a careful treatment of these unique legal instruments and the regimes established by them;
- strive to strengthen the international legal basis of cooperation within the CIS and in other regional and subregional forums, put our strategic relations with the European Union on a solid and modern legal basis and establish a legal space under the auspices of the Council of Europe that would span across the entire Europe;
- make efforts to complete the process of legal regulation of the State border of the Russian Federation as well as of boundaries of maritime areas over which it exercises its sovereign rights and jurisdiction.
3. Strengthening international security

Russia consistently calls for diminished role of the force factor in international relations with simultaneous enhancement of strategic and regional stability. Towards these ends, the Russian Federation:

- unswervingly fulfils its international obligations under international treaties in the sphere of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, arms control and disarmament, as well as takes confidence-building measures in military sphere; participates in negotiations to work out and conclude new accords in these fields consistent with its national interests and on the basis of the principles of equality and indivisibility of security;

- reaffirms its unfailing policy of developing multilateral foundations of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery; stands for compliance with the Non-proliferation Treaty, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, as well as the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction; is actively engaged in international endeavours to control traffic of dual-use materials and technologies; promotes the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; supports a global missile non-proliferation regime on the basis of a legally binding agreement;

- is prepared to negotiate with all nuclear powers a reduction of strategic offensive weapons (intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles as well as heavy bombers and warheads they carry) up to a minimum level sufficient to maintain strategic stability;

- promotes the prevention of deployment of weapons in outer space and the establishment of a system of collective response to potential missile threats on an equal basis, and opposes unilateral actions in the field of strategic antimissile defence that are destabilizing international situation;

- considers that the present fundamental development trends, including the emerging multipolarity, and diversification of risks and threats lead to the conclusion that the strategic stability issue cannot anymore be addressed exclusively within the framework of Russia-US relations. Objectively, the time is coming to involve major States in these endeavours, first of all nuclear ones, interested in joint actions to ensure common security. This is the essence of the strategic openness underlying Russian initiatives, in particular those related to collective counteraction
to potential missile threats for Europe and to lending of globalized character to the regime of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of 1987;

consistently speaks for the prevention of the arms race, opposes attempts to develop and deploy destabilizing, including new types, weapons, such as low yield nuclear warheads, nonnuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles, and strategic antimissile systems;

attaches special attention to such an important aspect of consolidating strategic stability as ensuring international information security;

supports international efforts against illegal traffic of light and small arms;

intends to further promote enhanced regional stability in Europe through participation in the processes of conventional armed forces limitation and reduction as well as through confidence-building measures in military sphere on the basis of the principle of equal security for all parties;

regards international peace-making as an effective instrument for settling armed conflicts and resolving post-crisis nation building tasks and intends to increase its participation in international peace-making activities under the auspices of the United Nations and within the framework of collaboration with regional and international organizations; and will actively contribute to improving the United Nations preventive anti-crisis potential;

firmly proceeds from the premise that only the UN Security Council has the authority to sanction the use of force for the purpose of coercion to peace;

regards Article 51 of the UN Charter as an adequate and not subject to revision legal basis for the use of force in self-defence, including in the face of existing threats to peace and security such as international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;

views fighting international terrorism as its most important domestic and foreign policy task taking into account the necessity of systemic and comprehensive use of politico-legal, advocacy, socio-economic and special measures focusing on the preventive aspect of such counteraction; calls for elaboration of further measures aimed at consolidation of the global anti-terrorism coalition under the UN aegis with the participation of regional organizations without resorting to double standards and on the basis of universal anti-terrorism conventions and decisions of the UN Security Council; will
promote the right of every individual regardless of his/her nationality, race, sex or religion for the protection against terrorism and terrorist acts. Russia, in accordance with international law and its legislation, will take all necessary measures to repel and prevent terrorist attacks against itself and its citizens, to protect them against terrorist acts, prohibit activities within its territory aimed at organizing such acts against citizens or interests of other countries, and not give refuge or floor to terrorists and instigators of terrorism;

will seek political and diplomatic settlement of regional conflicts on the basis of collective actions of the international community proceeding from the premise that modern conflicts cannot be solved by the use of force, their settlement should be sought through engagement in dialogue and negotiations of all parties rather than through isolation of one of them;

targeted efforts to counter drug trafficking and organized crime in cooperation with other States both multilaterally, especially within the framework of specialized international bodies, and bilaterally;

supports establishment of effective institutions under the auspices of the United Nations and other international and regional organizations to ensure cooperation in the response to calamities and large-scale man-made disasters, as well as to other emergencies, including mitigation capacity building and enhancement of early warning and forecast systems;

participates in international cooperation aimed at regulating migration processes and ensuring rights of migrant workers;

as a multinational and multi-confessional state facilitates dialogue and partnership between cultures, religions and civilizations, consistently pursues this policy in the United Nations, UNESCO, OSCE and the Council of Europe, as well as other international and regional organizations, including in the context of cooperation with the Organization of the Islamic Conference; supports relevant initiatives of the civil society and actively interacts with the Russian Orthodox Church and other main confessions of the country.

[...]²⁰²

²⁰² Sections on international economic and environmental cooperation, humanitarian and human rights cooperation, foreign policy information support have been omitted.
I. Regional priorities

[...]203

The main objective of the Russian foreign policy on the European track is to create a truly open, democratic system of regional collective security and cooperation ensuring the unity of the Euro-Atlantic region, from Vancouver to Vladivostok, in such a way as not to allow its new fragmentation and reproduction of bloc-based approaches which still persist in the European architecture that took shape during the Cold War period. This is precisely the essence of the initiative aimed at concluding a European security treaty, the elaboration of which could be launched at a pan-European summit.

Russia calls for building a truly unified Europe without divisive lines through equal interaction between Russia, the European Union and the United States. This would strengthen the positions of the Euro-Atlantic States in global competition. Being the biggest European State with multinational and multi-confessional society and centuries-old history, Russia stands ready to play a constructive role in ensuring a civilizational compatibility of Europe, and harmonious integration of religious minorities, including in view of various existing migration trends.

Russia advocates a strengthened role of the Council of Europe as an independent and universal European organization that determines the level of legal standards in all its Member States without applying discriminatory practices against or extending privileges to anyone, as an important instrument of eliminating dividing lines on the continent.

It is in Russia’s interests that the OSCE fulfil in good faith its function of being a forum for an equitable dialogue between the OSCE participating States and for collective consensus decision-making on the basis of a comprehensive approach to military and political, economic and humanitarian aspects of security based on the balance of interests. In order to fully implement this function the whole process of OSCE functioning should be underpinned by a solid regulatory framework ensuring the supremacy of collective intergovernmental bodies’ prerogatives.

In the military and political sphere Russia will seek to fix the imbalances present in the sphere of conventional arms and armed forces reduction and to adopt new confidence-building measures.

203 Sections on CIS countries have been omitted.
The Russian Federation will develop its relations with the European Union, which is a major trade, economic and foreign-policy partner, will promote strengthening in every possible way the interaction mechanisms, including through establishment of common spaces in economy, external and internal security, education, science and culture. From the long-term perspective, it is in the interests of Russia to agree with the European Union on a strategic partnership treaty setting special, most advanced forms of equitable and mutually beneficial cooperation with the European Union in all spheres with a view to establishing a visa-free regime.

The Russian Federation is interested in the strengthening of the European Union, development of its capacity to present agreed positions in trade, economic, humanitarian, foreign policy and security areas.

The development of mutually advantageous bilateral relationships with Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Finland, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway and some other West-European States is an important resource for promoting Russia’s national interests in the European and world affairs, as well as contributing to putting the Russian economy on an innovative track of development. Russia would like the potential for interaction with Great Britain to be used along the same lines.

Russia has been developing onward practical interaction with Nordic countries including the implementation within the framework of multi-lateral mechanisms of joint cooperation projects in the Barents/Euro-Arctic region and the Arctic as a whole with account of the interests of indigenous peoples.

Russia is open for further expansion of pragmatic and mutually respecting cooperation with the States of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe taking into account genuine readiness to do so on the part of each of them.

The Russian Federation is willing to interact with Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia in the spirit of good-neighbourliness and on the basis of reciprocal consideration of interests. Of fundamental importance for Russia are the matters relating to the rights of the Russian-language population in accordance with the principles and norms of European and international law, as well as questions of ensuring sustenance of the Kaliningrad Region.

Proceeding from a realistic assessment of the role of NATO, Russia deems it important to ensure progressive development of interaction within the format of the Russia-NATO Council in the interests of ensuring predictability and stability in the Euro-Atlantic Region, the
utmost utilization of the existing potential for apolitical dialogue and practical cooperation in resolving issues relating to responses to common threats, such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional crises, drug trafficking, natural and man-made disasters.

Russia will build its relationship with NATO taking into consideration the degree of the alliance’s readiness for equal partnership, unswerving compliance with the principles and standards of international law, the implementation by all its members of the obligations, assumed within the framework of the Russia-NATO Council, not to ensure one’s security at the expense of security of the Russian Federation, as well as the obligation to display military restraint. Russia maintains its negative attitude towards the expansion of NATO, notably to the plans of admitting Ukraine and Georgia to the membership in the alliance, as well as to bringing the NATO military infrastructure closer to the Russian borders on the whole, which violates the principle of equal security, leads to new dividing lines in Europe and runs counter to the tasks of increasing the effectiveness of joint work in search for responses to real challenges of our time.

Russia builds its relations with the USA taking into account not only the vast potential of that country for mutually advantageous bilateral trade, economic, scientific, technological and other cooperation, but also its key influence on the state of global strategic stability and international situation as a whole. Russia is interested in making effective use of the existing broad infrastructure for interaction, including a continued dialogue on foreign policy, security and strategical stability issues, which permits to find mutually acceptable solutions on the basis of coinciding interests.

To this end, it is necessary to transform the Russian-US relations into strategic partnership, overcome the barriers of strategic principles of the past and focus on real threats, while working for the resolution of differences between Russia and the USA in the spirit of mutual respects in the areas where they persist.

Russia has been consistently favouring new agreements with the United States on disarmament and arms control in the interests of preserving continuity of this process, strengthening confidence building and transparency measures in space activity and anti-missile defence, as well as on issues of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, secure development of peaceful nuclear energy, broadening cooperation in countering terrorism and other challenges and threats as well as settlement of regional conflicts.
Russia is interested in US actions in the world stage be based on the principles and norms of international law, first of all the UN Charter.

The long-term priorities of the American track in the Russian policy consist in putting the relationship with the USA on a solid economic foundation, ensuring joint development of a culture for resolving differences on the basis of pragmatism and respect for the balance of interests, which will permit to ensure greater stability and predictability in the Russian-US relations.

The relations with Canada, which are traditionally stable and almost immune to the effects of political environment, are an important element of the North American dimension of Russia’s balanced policy. Russia is interested in boosting further the dynamics of bilateral trade, economic links and investment cooperation as well as interaction in the Arctic.

[...]204


204 Sections on Asia, Africa, Latin America and on foreign policy implementation have been omitted.
II. Russia and the modern world: Current conditions and trends of development

8. World development is following the path of globalisation in all spheres of international life, which in turn is characterised by a high degree of dynamism and interdependence of events.

Nation-states have experienced the intensification of conflicts connected to unequal development, as a result of globalising processes, and of the deepening rift between rich and poor countries. Values and models of development have become the subject of global competition.

The vulnerability of all members of the international community to new threats and challenges has grown.

As a result of the rise of new centres of economic growth and political influence, a qualitatively new geopolitical situation is unfolding. There is an increasing tendency to seek resolutions to existing problems and regulate crisis situations on a regional basis, without the participation of non-regional powers.

The inadequacy of the current global and regional architecture, oriented (particularly in the Euro-Atlantic region) towards NATO, and likewise the imperfect nature of legal instruments and mechanisms, create an ever-increasing threat to international security.

9. The transition in the international system from opposing blocs to principles of multi-vector diplomacy, together with Russia’s resource potential and pragmatic policy for its use, have broadened the possibilities for the Russian Federation to reinforce its influence on the world stage.

The Russian Federation has sufficient potential to count on the creation, in the medium-term, of conditions conducive to its entrenchment among the leaders of the world economy, on the basis of effective participation in global division of labour, improved global

[...]²⁰⁵

²⁰⁵ Preface and general assumptions have been omitted.
competitiveness of the national economy, of defence potential, and of the level of state and social security.

10. A negative influence on the assurance of Russia’s national interests will be exerted by the likely recurrence of one-sided use of force in international relations, disagreements between the main participants in world politics, the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their use by terrorists, and likewise the improvement of forms of illicit activity in the cybernetic and biological domains, in the sphere of high technology. The global information struggle will intensify, threats will increase to the stability of industrialised and developing countries, their socio-economic development and democratic institutions. Nationalist sentiments, xenophobia, separatism and violent extremism will grow, including under the banner of religious radicalism. The global demographic situation and environmental problems will become more acute, and threats associated with uncontrolled and illegal migration, drug and human trafficking, and other forms of transnational organised crime, will also increase. Epidemics caused by new, previously unknown viruses are likely to spread. The deficit of fresh water will become more obvious.

11. In the long term, the attention of international politics will be focused on ownership of energy resources, including in the Near East, the Barents Sea shelf and other parts of the Arctic, in the Caspian basin, and in Central Asia.

In the medium term, the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as conflicts in the Near and Middle East, in a number of South Asian and African countries, and on the Korean peninsula, will continue to exert a negative influence on the international situation.

12. The critical condition of physical storage of dangerous materials and objects, especially in countries with unstable political situations, together with the proliferation of regular armaments beyond the control of the state, can lead to the intensification of existing, as well as the creation of new regional and interstate conflicts.

Under conditions of competition for resources, it is not excluded that arising problems may be resolved using military force, and that the current balance of power on the borders of Russia and its allies may be disturbed.

There is an increasing risk that the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons will rise.
The possibility of maintaining global and regional stability will substantially decrease with the placement in Europe of elements of the global missile defence system of the United States of America.

The consequences of global financial-economic crises may become comparable, in terms of overall losses, to the consequences of large-scale application of military force.

13. In the long term, the Russian Federation will seek to construct international relations based on the principles of international law, and on the institution of reliable and equal security of nation-states.

For the defence of its national interests, Russia, while remaining within the boundaries of international law, will implement a rational and pragmatic foreign policy, one which excludes expensive confrontation, including a new arms race.

Russia perceives the United Nations and the Security Council of the United Nations as a central element of a stable system of international relations, at the basis of which lie respect, equal rights and mutually beneficial cooperation among nations, resting on civilised political instruments for the resolution of global and regional crisis situations.

Russia will increase its interaction with multilateral fora such as the G8, G20, RIC (Russia/India/China), BRIC (Brazil/Russia/India/China), and will likewise capitalise on the potential of other informal international institutions.

The development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States is a priority direction of Russian foreign policy. Russia will seek to develop the potential for regional and subregional integration and coordination among member-states of the CIS, first of all within the framework of the Commonwealth, and also the CSTO and EvrAzEs, which exert a stabilising influence on the overall situation in the regions bordering on the CIS.

Moreover, the CSTO is regarded as the main interstate instrument for responding to regional threats and challenges of a military-political

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206 The CSTO was formally established in September 2003 in the process of institutionalisation of the Collective Security Treaty (also known as Tashkent Treaty) of May 1992. Its members are: Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Georgia and Azerbaijan were member states of the Tashkent Treaty between 1993 and 1999 while Uzbekistan was its member in the years 1992–1999 and 2006–2012.

207 The EurAsEC was formally established in January 2001 and operated formally until 2014 when it was incorporated into the emerging Eurasian Economic Community. Its members were: Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan (until 2008).
or military-strategic nature, including the fight with illegal trafficking in narcotic and psychotropic substances.

14. Russia will promote the strengthening of EvrAzEs as the nucleus of economic integration, and instrument of assistance to the realisation of major hydropower, infrastructural, industrial and other joint projects having a primarily regional significance.

15. Of particular significance for Russia will be the reinforcement of the political potential of the SCO, and the stimulation within its framework of practical steps towards the enhancement of mutual trust and partnership in the Central Asian region.

16. The Russian Federation is in favour strengthening the mechanisms of cooperation with the European Union by all possible means, including the continued formation of common spaces in the economic, educational, scientific and cultural spheres, and in terms of internal and external security. The long-term national interests of Russia are served by the creation of an open system of Euro-Atlantic collective security, on a clear legal and treaty basis.

17. A determining aspect of relations with NATO remains the fact that plans to extend the alliance’s military infrastructure to Russia’s borders, and attempts to endow NATO with global functions that go counter to norms of international law, are unacceptable to Russia.

Russia is prepared to develop relations with NATO on the basis of equality and in the interests of strengthening the general security of the Euro-Atlantic region. The content and depth of these relations will be determined by the preparedness of the alliance to recognise Russia’s legal interests when engaging in military-political planning, and to respect norms of international law; and likewise NATO’s readiness to consider the further transformation of these relations and the search for new tasks and functions with a humanist orientation.

18. Russia will strive to build an equitable and valuable strategic partnership with the United States of America, on the basis of shared interests and taking into account the key influence of Russian-American relations on the international situation as a whole. In terms of priorities, these will continue to be the achievement of new agreements in the sphere of disarmament and arms control, the reinforcement of confidence building measures, and likewise the resolution of issues surrounding non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the development of antiterrorist cooperation, and the regulation of regional conflicts.
19. In the sphere of international security, Russia will maintain its adherence to the use of political, legal, economic, military and other instruments to defend state sovereignty and national interests.

The execution of a predictable and open foreign policy is inextricably tied to the realisation of Russia's stable development. The successful integration of Russia into the global economic space and the international division of labour is inhibited by the slow pace of transition of the national economy towards an innovation-based development trajectory.

20. For the prevention of threats to national security, it is essential to guarantee social stability, ethnic and denominational harmony, increase the mobilisation potential and growth of the national economy, as well as improve the quality of work performed by state bodies and formulate effective mechanisms for their interaction with civil society, in order to realise the right of every Russian citizen to life, security, work, housing, health and a healthy way of life, accessible education and cultural development.

[...]


Sections concerning national interests and strategic priorities, methods of ensuring security, organisational, normative, legal and information bases, and security assessment criteria have been omitted.
II. The military dangers and military threats to the Russian Federation

7. World development at the present stage is characterized by a weakening of ideological confrontation, a lowering of the level of economic, political, and military influence of certain states (groups of states) and alliances and an increase in the influence of other states with ambitions for all-embracing domination, multipolarity, and the globalization of diverse processes.

Many regional conflicts remain unresolved. There is a continuing tendency towards a strong-arm resolution of these conflicts, including in regions bordering on the Russian Federation. The existing international security architecture (system), including its international-legal mechanisms, does not ensure equal security for all states.

That said, despite the decline in the likelihood of a large-scale war involving the use of conventional means of attack and nuclear weapons being unleashed against the Russian Federation, in a number of areas military dangers to the Russian Federation are intensifying.

8. The main external military dangers are:
   a) the desire to endow the force potential of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with global functions carried out in violation of the norms of international law and to move the military infrastructure of NATO member countries closer to the borders of the Russian Federation, including by expanding the bloc;
   b) the attempts to destabilize the situation in individual states and regions and to undermine strategic stability;
   c) the deployment (buildup) of troop contingents of foreign states (groups of states) on the territories of states contiguous with the Russian Federation and its allies and also in adjacent waters;
   d) the creation and deployment of strategic missile defence systems undermining global stability and violating the established correlation of forces in the nuclear-missile sphere, and also the militarization of

Formal preface and definitions have been omitted.
outer space and the deployment of strategic nonnuclear precision weapon systems;

e) territorial claims against the Russian Federation and its allies and interference in their internal affairs;

f) the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missiles, and missile technologies, and the increase in the number of states possessing nuclear weapons;

g) the violation of international accords by individual states, and also noncompliance with previously concluded international treaties in the field of arms limitation and reduction;

h) the use of military force on the territories of states contiguous with the Russian Federation in violation of the UN Charter and other norms of international law;

i) the presence (emergence) of seats of armed conflict and the escalation of such conflicts on the territories of states contiguous with the Russian Federation and its allies;

j) the spread of international terrorism;

k) the emergence of seats of interethnic (interfaith) tension, the activity of international armed radical groupings in areas adjacent to the state border of the Russian Federation and the borders of its allies, the presence of territorial contradictions and the growth of separatism and violent (religious) extremism in individual parts of the world.

[...]²¹⁰


²¹⁰ Sections concerning internal threats, defence policy of the RF, military and economic provisions of defence, and the conclusion have been omitted.
On June 5, 2008, the President of Russia put forward an initiative to develop a new pan-European security treaty, the main idea of which is to create—in the context of military and political security in the Euro-Atlantic region—a common undivided space in order to finally do away with the Cold War legacy. In view of this Dmitry Medvedev suggested formalising in the international law the principle of indivisible security as a legal obligation pursuant to which no nation or international organisation operating in the Euro-Atlantic region is entitled to strengthen its own security at the cost of other nations or organisations.

Based on the results of discussions that have taken place in the last year at various venues, Russia has prepared a draft European Security Treaty. The Russian President has sent this draft to the heads of relevant states and to chief executives of international organisations operating in the Euro-Atlantic region such as NATO, the European Union, the CSTO, the CIS, and the OSCE. Dmitry Medvedev emphasised that Russia is open to any proposals on the subject matter of its initiative and counts on the positive response from its partners and the beginning of a substantial discussion on specific elements of the draft treaty, which text is given below.

* * *

European Security Treaty (Unofficial translation)

Draft

The Parties to this Treaty,

Desiring to promote their relations in the spirit of friendship and cooperation in conformity with international law,

Guided by the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (1970), Helsinki Final Act of the

Reminding that the use of force or the threat of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other way inconsistent with the goals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations is inadmissible in their mutual relations, as well as international relations in general,

Acknowledging and supporting the role of the UN Security Council, which bears the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security,

Recognizing the need to join efforts in order to respond effectively to present-day security challenges and threats in the globalized and interdependent world,

Intending to build effective cooperation mechanisms that could be promptly activated with a view to solving issues or differences that might arise, addressing concerns and adequately responding to challenges and threats in the security sphere,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

According to the Treaty, the Parties shall cooperate with each other on the basis of the principles of indivisible, equal and undiminished security. Any security measures taken by a Party to the Treaty individually or together with other Parties, including in the framework of any international organization, military alliance or coalition, shall be implemented with due regard to security interests of all other Parties. The Parties shall act in accordance with the Treaty in order to give effect to these principles and to strengthen security of each other.

Article 2

1. A Party to the Treaty shall not undertake, participate in or support any actions or activities affecting significantly security of any other Party or Parties to the Treaty.

2. A Party to the Treaty which is a member of military alliances, coalitions or organizations shall seek to ensure that such alliances, coalitions or organizations observe principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Helsinki Final Act, Charter for European Security and other documents adopted by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as
in Article 1 of this Treaty, and that decisions taken in the framework of such alliances, coalitions or organizations do not affect significantly security of any Party or Parties to the Treaty.

3. A Party to the Treaty shall not allow the use of its territory and shall not use the territory of any other Party with the purpose of preparing or carrying out an armed attack against any other Party or Parties to the Treaty or any other actions affecting significantly security of any other Party or Parties to the Treaty.

Article 3

1. A Party to the Treaty shall be entitled to request, through diplomatic channels or the Depositary, any other Party to provide information on any significant legislative, administrative or organizational measures taken by that other Party, which, in the opinion of the Requesting Party, might affect its security.

2. Parties shall inform the Depositary of any requests under para. 1 of this Article and of responses to them. The Depositary shall bring that information to the attention of the other Parties.

3. Nothing in this Article prevents the Parties from undertaking any other actions to ensure transparency and mutual trust in their relations.

Article 4

The following mechanism shall be established to address issues related to the substance of this Treaty, and to settle differences or disputes that might arise between the Parties in connection with its interpretation or application:

a) Consultations among the Parties;

b) Conference of the Parties;

c) Extraordinary Conference of the Parties.

Article 5

1. Should a Party to the Treaty determine that there exists a violation or a threat of violation of the Treaty by any other Party or Parties, or should it wish to raise with any other Party or Parties any issue relating to the substance of the Treaty and requiring, in its opinion, to be considered jointly, it may request consultations on the issue with the Party or Parties which, in its opinion, might be interested in such consultations. Information regarding such a request shall be brought by the Requesting Party to the attention of the Depositary which shall inform accordingly all other Parties.
2. Such consultations shall be held as soon as possible, but not later than (…) days from the date of receipt of the request by the relevant Party unless a later date is indicated in the request.

3. Any Party not invited to take part in the consultations shall be entitled to participate on its own initiative.

Article 6

1. Any participant to consultations held under Article 5 of this Treaty shall be entitled, after having held the consultations, to propose the Depositary to convene the Conference of the Parties to consider the issue that was the subject of the consultations.

2. The Depositary shall convene the Conference of the Parties, provided that the relevant proposal is supported by not less than (two) Parties to the Treaty, within (…) days from the date of receipt of the relevant request.

3. The Conference of the Parties shall be effective if it is attended by at least two thirds of the Parties to the Treaty. Decisions of the Conference shall be taken by consensus and shall be binding.

4. The Conference of the Parties shall adopt its own rules of procedure.

Article 7

1. In case of an armed attack or a threat of such attack against a Party to the Treaty, immediate actions shall be undertaken in accordance with Article 8(1) of the Treaty.

2. Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 8 of the Treaty, every Party shall be entitled to consider an armed attack against any other Party an armed attack against itself. In exercising its right of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, it shall be entitled to render the attacked Party, subject to its consent, the necessary assistance, including the military one, until the UN Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Information on measures taken by Parties to the Treaty in exercise of their right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the UN Security Council.

Article 8

1. In cases provided for by Article 7 of this Treaty, the Party which has been attacked or threatened with an armed attack shall bring that to the attention of the Depositary which shall immediately convene an Extraordinary Conference of the Parties to decide on necessary collective measures.
2. If the Party which became subject to an armed attack is not able to bring that to the attention of the Depositary, any other Party shall be entitled to request the Depositary to convene an Extraordinary Conference of the Parties, in which case the procedure provided for in Para.1 of this Article shall be applied.

3. The Extraordinary Conference of the Parties may decide to invite third states, international organizations or other concerned parties to take part in it.

4. The Extraordinary Conference of the Parties shall be effective if it is attended by at least four fifths of the Parties to the Treaty. Decisions of the Extraordinary Conference of the Parties shall be taken by unanimous vote and shall be binding. If an armed attack is carried out by, or a threat of such attack originates from a Party to the Treaty, the vote of that Party shall not be included in the total number of votes of the Parties in adopting a decision.

The Extraordinary Conference of the Parties shall adopt its own rules of procedure.

Article 9

1. This Treaty shall not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for maintaining international peace and security, as well as rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations.

2. The Parties to the Treaty reaffirm that their obligations under other international agreements in the area of security, which are in effect on the date of signing of this Treaty are not incompatible with the Treaty.

3. The Parties to the Treaty shall not assume international obligations incompatible with the Treaty.

4. This Treaty shall not affect the right of any Party to neutrality.

Article 10

This Treaty shall be open for signature by all States of the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space from Vancouver to Vladivostok as well as by the following international organizations: the European Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Collective Security Treaty Organization, North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Community of Independent States in … from … to ….

Article 11

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by the signatory States and to approval or adoption by the signatory international
organizations. The relevant notifications shall be deposited with the government of … which shall be the Depositary.

2. In its notification of the adoption or approval of this Treaty, an international organization shall outline its sphere of competence regarding issues covered by the Treaty.

It shall immediately inform the Depositary of any relevant changes in its sphere of competence.

3. States mentioned in Article 10 of this Treaty which did not sign the Treaty during the period indicated in that Article may accede to this Treaty by depositing the relevant notification with the Depositary.

Article 12

This Treaty shall enter into force ten days after the deposit of the twenty-fifth notification with the Depositary in accordance with Article 11 of the Treaty.

For each State or international organization which ratifies, adopts or approves this Treaty or accedes to it after the deposit of the twenty-fifth notification of ratification, adoption, approval or accession with the Depositary, the Treaty shall enter into force on the tenth day after the deposit by such State or organization of the relevant notification with the Depositary.

Article 13

Any State or international organization may accede to this Treaty after its entry into force, subject to the consent of all Parties to this Treaty, by depositing the relevant notification with the Depositary.

For an acceding State or international organization, this Treaty shall enter into force 180 days after the deposit of the instrument of accession with the Depositary, provided that during the said period no Party notifies the Depositary in writing of its objections against such accession.

Article 14

Each Party shall have the right to withdraw from this Treaty should it determine that extraordinary circumstances pertaining to the substance of the Treaty have endangered its supreme interests. The Party intending to withdraw from the Treaty shall notify the Depositary of such intention at least (…) days in advance of the planned withdrawal. The notification shall include a statement of extraordinary circumstances endangering, in the opinion of that Party, its supreme interests.


Preface

We, the Heads of State and Government of the NATO nations, are determined that NATO will continue to play its unique and essential role in ensuring our common defence and security. This Strategic Concept will guide the next phase in NATO’s evolution, so that it continues to be effective in a changing world, against new threats, with new capabilities and new partners:

– It reconfirms the bond between our nations to defend one another against attack, including against new threats to the safety of our citizens.

– It commits the Alliance to prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilize post-conflict situations, including by working more closely with our international partners, most importantly the United Nations and the European Union.

– It offers our partners around the globe more political engagement with the Alliance, and a substantial role in shaping the NATO-led operations to which they contribute.

– It commits NATO to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons—but reconfirms that, as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance.

– It restates our firm commitment to keep the door to NATO open to all European democracies that meet the standards of membership, because enlargement contributes to our goal of a Europe whole, free and at peace.

– It commits NATO to continuous reform towards a more effective, efficient and flexible Alliance, so that our taxpayers get the most security for the money they invest in defence.

The citizens of our countries rely on NATO to defend Allied nations, to deploy robust military forces where and when required for our security, and to help promote common security with our partners around the globe. While the world is changing, NATO’s essential mission will remain the same: to ensure that the Alliance remains
an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security and shared values.

Core Tasks and Principles

1. NATO’s fundamental and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. Today, the Alliance remains an essential source of stability in an unpredictable world.

2. NATO member states form a unique community of values, committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The Alliance is firmly committed to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and to the Washington Treaty, which affirms the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

3. The political and military bonds between Europe and North America have been forged in NATO since the Alliance was founded in 1949; the transatlantic link remains as strong, and as important to the preservation of Euro-Atlantic peace and security, as ever. The security of NATO members on both sides of the Atlantic is indivisible. We will continue to defend it together, on the basis of solidarity, shared purpose and fair burden-sharing.

4. The modern security environment contains a broad and evolving set of challenges to the security of NATO’s territory and populations. In order to assure their security, the Alliance must and will continue fulfilling effectively three essential core tasks, all of which contribute to safeguarding Alliance members, and always in accordance with international law:

   **Collective defence.** NATO members will always assist each other against attack, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. That commitment remains firm and binding. NATO will deter and defend against any threat of aggression, and against emerging security challenges where they threaten the fundamental security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole.

   **Crisis management.** NATO has a unique and robust set of political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises—before, during and after conflicts. NATO will actively employ an appropriate mix of those political and military tools to help manage developing crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security, before they escalate into conflicts; to stop ongoing conflicts where they affect
Alliance security; and to help consolidate stability in post-conflict situations where that contributes to Euro-Atlantic security.

**Cooperative security.** The Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through partnership with relevant countries and other international organisations; by contributing actively to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament; and by keeping the door to membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies that meet NATO’s standards.

5. NATO remains the unique and essential transatlantic forum for consultations on all matters that affect the territorial integrity, political independence and security of its members, as set out in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty. Any security issue of interest to any Ally can be brought to the NATO table, to share information, exchange views and, where appropriate, forge common approaches.

6. In order to carry out the full range of NATO missions as effectively and efficiently as possible, Allies will engage in a continuous process of reform, modernisation and transformation.

**The Security Environment**

7. Today, the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low. That is an historic success for the policies of robust defence, Euro-Atlantic integration and active partnership that have guided NATO for more than half a century.

8. However, the conventional threat cannot be ignored. Many regions and countries around the world are witnessing the acquisition of substantial, modern military capabilities with consequences for international stability and Euro-Atlantic security that are difficult to predict. This includes the proliferation of ballistic missiles, which poses a real and growing threat to the Euro-Atlantic area.

9. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and their means of delivery, threatens incalculable consequences for global stability and prosperity. During the next decade, proliferation will be most acute in some of the world’s most volatile regions.

10. Terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity more broadly. Extremist groups continue to spread to, and in, areas of strategic importance to the Alliance, and modern technology increases the threat and potential impact of terrorist attacks, in particular if
terrorists were to acquire nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological capabilities.

11. Instability or conflict beyond NATO borders can directly threaten Alliance security, including by fostering extremism, terrorism, and trans-national illegal activities such as trafficking in arms, narcotics and people.

12. Cyber-attacks are becoming more frequent, more organised and more costly in the damage that they inflict on government administrations, businesses, economies and potentially also transportation and supply networks and other critical infrastructure; they can reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security and stability. Foreign militaries and intelligence services, organised criminals, terrorist and/or extremist groups can each be the source of such attacks.

13. All countries are increasingly reliant on the vital communication, transport and transit routes on which international trade, energy security and prosperity depend. They require greater international efforts to ensure their resilience against attack or disruption. Some NATO countries will become more dependent on foreign energy suppliers and in some cases, on foreign energy supply and distribution networks for their energy needs. As a larger share of world consumption is transported across the globe, energy supplies are increasingly exposed to disruption.

14. A number of significant technology-related trends—including the development of laser weapons, electronic warfare and technologies that impede access to space—appear poised to have major global effects that will impact on NATO military planning and operations.

15. Key environmental and resource constraints, including health risks, climate change, water scarcity and increasing energy needs will further shape the future security environment in areas of concern to NATO and have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations.

**Defence and Deterrence**

16. The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territory and our populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The Alliance does not consider any country to be its adversary. However, no one should doubt NATO’s resolve if the security of any of its members were to be threatened.

17. Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of our overall
strategy. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.

18. The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.

19. We will ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of our populations. Therefore, we will:

- maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces;
- maintain the ability to sustain concurrent major joint operations and several smaller operations for collective defence and crisis response, including at strategic distance;
- develop and maintain robust, mobile and deployable conventional forces to carry out both our Article 5 responsibilities and the Alliance’s expeditionary operations, including with the NATO Response Force;
- carry out the necessary training, exercises, contingency planning and information exchange for assuring our defence against the full range of conventional and emerging security challenges, and provide appropriate visible assurance and reinforcement for all Allies;
- ensure the broadest possible participation of Allies in collective defence planning on nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces, and in command, control and consultation arrangements;
- develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective defence, which contributes to the indivisible security of the Alliance. We will actively seek cooperation on missile defence with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners;
- further develop NATO’s capacity to defend against the threat of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction;
- develop further our ability to prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyber-attacks, including by using the NATO planning process to enhance and coordinate national cyber-defence capabilities, bringing all NATO bodies under centralized cyber protection, and better integrating NATO cyber awareness, warning and response with member nations;
- enhance the capacity to detect and defend against international terrorism, including through enhanced analysis of the threat, more
consultations with our partners, and the development of appropriate military capabilities, including to help train local forces to fight terrorism themselves;

– develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, including protection of critical energy infrastructure and transit areas and lines, cooperation with partners, and consultations among Allies on the basis of strategic assessments and contingency planning;

– ensure that the Alliance is at the front edge in assessing the security impact of emerging technologies, and that military planning takes the potential threats into account;

– sustain the necessary levels of defence spending, so that our armed forces are sufficiently resourced;

– continue to review NATO’s overall posture in deterring and defending against the full range of threats to the Alliance, taking into account changes to the evolving international security environment.

Security through Crisis Management

20. Crises and conflicts beyond NATO’s borders can pose a direct threat to the security of Alliance territory and populations. NATO will therefore engage, where possible and when necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises, stabilize post-conflict situations and support reconstruction.

21. The lessons learned from NATO operations, in particular in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, make it clear that a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is necessary for effective crisis management. The Alliance will engage actively with other international actors before, during and after crises to encourage collaborative analysis, planning and conduct of activities on the ground, in order to maximise coherence and effectiveness of the overall international effort.

22. The best way to manage conflicts is to prevent them from happening. NATO will continually monitor and analyse the international environment to anticipate crises and, where appropriate, take active steps to prevent them from becoming larger conflicts.

23. Where conflict prevention proves unsuccessful, NATO will be prepared and capable to manage ongoing hostilities. NATO has unique conflict management capacities, including the unparalleled capability to deploy and sustain robust military forces in the field. NATO-led operations have demonstrated the indispensable contribution the Alliance can make to international conflict management efforts.
24. Even when conflict comes to an end, the international community must often provide continued support, to create the conditions for lasting stability. NATO will be prepared and capable to contribute to stabilisation and reconstruction, in close cooperation and consultation wherever possible with other relevant international actors.

25. To be effective across the crisis management spectrum, we will:
   – enhance intelligence sharing within NATO, to better predict when crises might occur, and how they can best be prevented;
   – further develop doctrine and military capabilities for expeditionary operations, including counterinsurgency, stabilization and reconstruction operations;
   – form an appropriate but modest civilian crisis management capability to interface more effectively with civilian partners, building on the lessons learned from NATO-led operations. This capability may also be used to plan, employ and coordinate civilian activities until conditions allow for the transfer of those responsibilities and tasks to other actors;
   – enhance integrated civilian-military planning throughout the crisis spectrum,
   – develop the capability to train and develop local forces in crisis zones, so that local authorities are able, as quickly as possible, to maintain security without international assistance;
   – identify and train civilian specialists from member states, made available for rapid deployment by Allies for selected missions, able to work alongside our military personnel and civilian specialists from partner countries and institutions;
   – broaden and intensify the political consultations among Allies, and with partners, both on a regular basis and in dealing with all stages of a crisis—before, during and after.

Promoting International Security through Cooperation
Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation

26. NATO seeks its security at the lowest possible level of forces. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation contribute to peace, security and stability, and should ensure undiminished security for all Alliance members. We will continue to play our part in reinforcing arms control and in promoting disarmament of both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, as well as non-proliferation efforts:
– We are resolved to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in a way that promotes international stability, and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all.

– With the changes in the security environment since the end of the Cold War, we have dramatically reduced the number of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and our reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. We will seek to create the conditions for further reductions in the future.

– In any future reductions, our aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase transparency on its nuclear weapons in Europe and relocate these weapons away from the territory of NATO members. Any further steps must take into account the disparity with the greater Russian stockpiles of short-range nuclear weapons.

– We are committed to conventional arms control, which provides predictability, transparency and a means to keep armaments at the lowest possible level for stability. We will work to strengthen the conventional arms control regime in Europe on the basis of reciprocity, transparency and host-nation consent.

– We will explore ways for our political means and military capabilities to contribute to international efforts to fight proliferation.

– National decisions regarding arms control and disarmament may have an impact on the security of all Alliance members. We are committed to maintain, and develop as necessary, appropriate consultations among Allies on these issues.

**Open Door**

27. NATO’s enlargement has contributed substantially to the security of Allies; the prospect of further enlargement and the spirit of cooperative security have advanced stability in Europe more broadly. Our goal of a Europe whole and free, and sharing common values, would be best served by the eventual integration of all European countries that so desire into Euro-Atlantic structures.

– The door to NATO membership remains fully open to all European democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and whose inclusion can contribute to common security and stability.
Partnerships

28. The promotion of Euro-Atlantic security is best assured through a wide network of partner relationships with countries and organisations around the globe. These partnerships make a concrete and valued contribution to the success of NATO’s fundamental tasks.

29. Dialogue and cooperation with partners can make a concrete contribution to enhancing international security, to defending the values on which our Alliance is based, to NATO’s operations, and to preparing interested nations for membership of NATO. These relationships will be based on reciprocity, mutual benefit and mutual respect.

30. We will enhance our partnerships through flexible formats that bring NATO and partners together—across and beyond existing frameworks:
   – We are prepared to develop political dialogue and practical cooperation with any nations and relevant organisations across the globe that share our interest in peaceful international relations.
   – We will be open to consultation with any partner country on security issues of common concern.
   – We will give our operational partners a structural role in shaping strategy and decisions on NATO-led missions to which they contribute.
   – We will further develop our existing partnerships while preserving their specificity.

31. Cooperation between NATO and the United Nations continues to make a substantial contribution to security in operations around the world. The Alliance aims to deepen political dialogue and practical cooperation with the UN, as set out in the UN-NATO Declaration signed in 2008, including through:
   – enhanced liaison between the two Headquarters;
   – more regular political consultation; and
   – enhanced practical cooperation in managing crises where both organisations are engaged.

32. An active and effective European Union contributes to the overall security of the Euro-Atlantic area. Therefore the EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO. The two organisations share a majority of members, and all members of both organisations share common values. NATO recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence. We welcome the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which provides a framework for strengthening the EU’s capacities to address common security challenges. Non-EU Allies make a significant contribution to these efforts. For the strategic partnership
between NATO and the EU, their fullest involvement in these efforts is essential. NATO and the EU can and should play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security. We are determined to make our contribution to create more favourable circumstances through which we will:

– fully strengthen the strategic partnership with the EU, in the spirit of full mutual openness, transparency, complementarity and respect for the autonomy and institutional integrity of both organisations;
– enhance our practical cooperation in operations throughout the crisis spectrum, from coordinated planning to mutual support in the field;
– broaden our political consultations to include all issues of common concern, in order to share assessments and perspectives;
– cooperate more fully in capability development, to minimise duplication and maximise cost-effectiveness.

33. NATO-Russia cooperation is of strategic importance as it contributes to creating a common space of peace, stability and security. NATO poses no threat to Russia. On the contrary: we want to see a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia, and we will act accordingly, with the expectation of reciprocity from Russia.

34. The NATO-Russia relationship is based upon the goals, principles and commitments of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration, especially regarding the respect of democratic principles and the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states in the Euro-Atlantic area. Notwithstanding differences on particular issues, we remain convinced that the security of NATO and Russia is intertwined and that a strong and constructive partnership based on mutual confidence, transparency and predictability can best serve our security. We are determined to:

– enhance the political consultations and practical cooperation with Russia in areas of shared interests, including missile defence, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, counter-piracy and the promotion of wider international security;
– use the full potential of the NATO-Russia Council for dialogue and joint action with Russia.

35. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace are central to our vision of Europe whole, free and in peace. We are firmly committed to the development of friendly and cooperative relations with all countries of the Mediterranean, and we intend to further develop the Mediterranean Dialogue in the coming years. We attach great importance to peace and stability in the Gulf region, and
we intend to strengthen our cooperation in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. We will aim to:

– enhance consultations and practical military cooperation with our partners in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council;
– continue and develop the partnerships with Ukraine and Georgia within the NATO-Ukraine and NATO-Georgia Commissions, based on the NATO decision at the Bucharest summit 2008, and taking into account the Euro-Atlantic orientation or aspiration of each of the countries;
– facilitate the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans, with the aim to ensure lasting peace and stability based on democratic values, regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations;
– deepen the cooperation with current members of the Mediterranean Dialogue and be open to the inclusion in the Mediterranean Dialogue of other countries of the region;
– develop a deeper security partnership with our Gulf partners and remain ready to welcome new partners in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

Reform and Transformation

36. Unique in history, NATO is a security Alliance that fields military forces able to operate together in any environment; that can control operations anywhere through its integrated military command structure; and that has at its disposal core capabilities that few Allies could afford individually.

37. NATO must have sufficient resources—financial, military and human—to carry out its missions, which are essential to the security of Alliance populations and territory. Those resources must, however, be used in the most efficient and effective way possible. We will:

– maximise the deployability of our forces, and their capacity to sustain operations in the field, including by undertaking focused efforts to meet NATO’s usability targets;
– ensure the maximum coherence in defence planning, to reduce unnecessary duplication, and to focus our capability development on modern requirements;
– develop and operate capabilities jointly, for reasons of cost-effectiveness and as a manifestation of solidarity;
– preserve and strengthen the common capabilities, standards, structures and funding that bind us together;
– engage in a process of continual reform, to streamline structures, improve working methods and maximise efficiency.
An Alliance for the 21st Century

38. We, the political leaders of NATO, are determined to continue renewal of our Alliance so that it is fit for purpose in addressing the 21st Century security challenges. We are firmly committed to preserve its effectiveness as the globe’s most successful political-military Alliance. Our Alliance thrives as a source of hope because it is based on common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and because our common essential and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members. These values and objectives are universal and perpetual, and we are determined to defend them through unity, solidarity, strength and resolve.

61.

NATO-Russia Council Joint Statement at the Meeting of the NATO-Russia Council Held in Lisbon on 20 November 2010

We, the Heads of State and Government of the NATO-Russia Council, met today in Lisbon and affirmed that we have embarked on a new stage of cooperation towards a true strategic partnership.

We reaffirmed all the goals, principles and commitments set forth in the Founding Act, the Rome Declaration and the OSCE 1999 Charter for European Security, including the ‘Platform for Cooperative Security’, and recognised that the security of all states in the Euro-Atlantic community is indivisible, and that the security of NATO and Russia is intertwined. We will work towards achieving a true strategic and modernised partnership based on the principles of reciprocal confidence, transparency, and predictability, with the aim of contributing to the creation of a common space of peace, security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. The NRC member states will refrain from the threat or use of force against each other as well as against any other state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence in any manner inconsistent with the United Nations Charter and with the Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States contained in the Helsinki Final Act.

The NRC member states are committed to working as 29 equal partners in order to fulfil the tremendous potential of the NATO-Russia Council through the continued development of their political dialogue and practical cooperation based on their shared interests. We underscore that the NRC is a forum for political dialogue at all times and on all issues, including where we disagree. We are determined to make full use of the NRC mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision and joint action on a wide spectrum of security issues in the Euro-Atlantic region. We all agree that the NRC member states can benefit from visionary and transparent policies aiming at strengthening security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, including through existing institutions and instruments. We strongly support the revitalisation and modernisation of the conventional arms control regime in Europe and are ready to continue dialogue on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation issues of interest to
the NRC. We welcome the conclusion of the New START Treaty\textsuperscript{212} and look forward to its early ratification and entry into force. The NRC member states are resolved to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all.

Today, we have endorsed the Joint Review of 21st Century Common Security Challenges\textsuperscript{213}, which was launched a year ago. We share common important interests and face common challenges. On that basis, we have identified concrete practical cooperation activities.

We agreed to discuss pursuing missile defence cooperation. We agreed on a joint ballistic missile threat assessment and to continue dialogue in this area. The NRC will also resume Theatre Missile Defence Cooperation. We have tasked the NRC to develop a comprehensive Joint Analysis of the future framework for missile defence cooperation. The progress of this Analysis will be assessed at the June 2011 meeting of NRC Defence Ministers.

We underlined the importance of international efforts in support of the Afghan Government and in promoting regional peace and stability. In that context, the revised arrangements aimed at further facilitating railway transit of non-lethal ISAF goods through Russian territory are of particular value. Building on the success generated by the NRC Project on Counter-Narcotics Training, we welcome the inclusion of Pakistan as a participant country along with Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and we have agreed to expand the scope of the Project to provide further direct assistance to institutional capacity-building, in close consultation with the governments providing trainees. Additionally, with the aim of contributing to the ability of the Afghan Air Force to operate its helicopter fleet more efficiently, we have also tasked the development of an NRC Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund in 2011.

\textsuperscript{212} Signed by U.S. and Russia in April 2010. It entered into force on 5 February 2011. It provided for a further reduction of the offensive nuclear weapons systems of both countries within seven years and for appropriate transparency and verification mechanisms.

\textsuperscript{213} Joint threat assessment adopted as an NRC document at the meeting of NATO Heads of State and Governments and the president of the Russian Federation (Dmitry Medvedev) in Lisbon, 20 November 2010.
On counter-terrorism, the NRC will strengthen its cooperation, including through jointly developing technology to detect explosives,\textsuperscript{214} countering terrorist threats to civil aviation\textsuperscript{215} and exchanging information on terrorism. The Russian Federation confirmed its interest in resuming its support to NATO’s counter-terrorist operation “Active Endeavour” in the Mediterranean Sea.

As piracy and armed robbery at sea continue to pose a significant and growing threat to maritime security, the NRC member states will expand existing tactical level co-operation, including through joint training and exercises.

We will build on our improved relations to help solve the issues where our views differ. Based upon our joint cooperation agenda, we, the NRC Heads of State and Government, have agreed to further broaden and deepen NATO-Russia dialogue and practical cooperation and bolster a NATO-Russia partnership that enhances security for all in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond.


\textsuperscript{214} STANDEX (“Stand-off Explosive Detection”).

\textsuperscript{215} CAI (Cooperative Airspace Initiative).
62.

NATO–Russia Action Plan on Terrorism. Executive Summary, 15 April, 2011

NATO-Russia Council (NRC) Foreign Ministers met in Berlin, Germany on 15 April 2011. In an effort to enhance their cooperation in areas of common interest, they approved during the meeting, among others, an updated NRC Action Plan on Terrorism.

Since its initial launch in December 2004, the NATO-Russia Council Action Plan on Terrorism has served as an effective tool in ensuring the overall coordination and strategic direction of NATO-Russia cooperation in the fight against terrorism. The updated NRC Action Plan on Terrorism draws on the NRC Joint Review of 21st Century Common Security Challenges endorsed by NRC Heads of State and Government in Lisbon in November 2010, and expands the scope of cooperation in the fight against terrorism.

The NATO-Russia Council categorically rejects terrorism in all its manifestations. It reconfirms that terrorist acts pose a direct challenge to common security, to shared democratic values and to basic human rights and freedoms. NRC nations agree that there is no cause that can justify such acts, and call for unity of action in the international community in addressing this insidious threat. They will do everything in their power to fight all forms of terrorism, acting in conformity with the UN Charter, international human rights and humanitarian law, as well as other existing commitments. They stand united in support of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, as well as the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

The NRC is encouraged by the progress that has been made in cooperation in the fight against terrorism, and is determined to make an even more direct and substantial contribution to this global struggle. The NRC will enhance its capabilities to act, individually and jointly, in three critical areas: preventing terrorism, combating terrorist activities and managing the consequences of terrorist acts.

Preventing Terrorism

NRC nations are determined to improve their capabilities to deter and prevent terrorist attacks by exchanging information, supporting non-proliferation efforts and developing enhanced cooperation on armaments and technology. They will also continue to implement relevant elements of the NRC Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI),
which aims at developing an information exchange system and fostering cooperation on airspace security issues aimed, in particular, at strengthening the capabilities against terrorist air threats. Furthermore, they will explore areas of technological and scientific cooperation, including on improved explosive detection under the Stand-Off Detection of Explosives (STANDEX) Programme. Finally, NRC nations will contribute to international efforts to promote stability in and around Afghanistan and thus, inter alia, forestall the spread of terrorism in the region.

**Combating Terrorist Activities**

NRC nations are determined to undertake active measures to disrupt and combat terrorist activity. In this respect, they will examine how to resume cooperation in the framework of NATO’s Operation Active Endeavour, according to agreed procedures. They will also improve the capability of their armed forces to work together in combating the terrorist threat.

**Managing the Consequences of Terrorist Acts**

NRC nations are determined to strengthen their ability to manage and mitigate the consequences of terrorist acts by building upon experiences from large scale disasters in the past and lessons learned in exercises. They will also support consultations aimed at strengthening the potential of NRC cooperation in the area of crisis management and response; continue to develop scientific cooperation to address the management of psychosocial and other consequences of terrorist acts; and identify other means of improving their ability to cooperate in managing the consequences of terrorist acts, including through practical cooperation in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) decontamination.

**Complementing Other International Efforts**

Given the transnational character of the terrorist threat, responses to it must be equally international. NRC cooperation in the struggle against terrorism shall seek to complement and enhance other efforts underway in the United Nations and elsewhere in the international community, with a view to providing added value and avoiding duplication of efforts.

Meeting of the NATO-Russia Council at the Level of Foreign Ministers
Held in Brussels on 19 April 2012. Chairman’s Statement

The Foreign Ministers of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) met today in Brussels, fifteen years since the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, and ten years since the Rome Declaration on NATO-Russia Relations, to take stock of progress achieved through continued cooperation and dialogue and to move forward on remaining differences.

Ministers reaffirmed all the principles and commitments contained in the NRC Lisbon Summit Joint Statement, the Rome Declaration and the Founding Act.

NRC nations share important common interests and face common security challenges that can be best addressed jointly. As agreed by the NRC Heads of State and Government in Lisbon, Ministers continued discussions on pursuing missile defence cooperation. They agreed that the stability of Afghanistan remains vital for all of us. They welcomed that the NRC has trained 2,000 counter-narcotics personnel from Afghanistan and its neighbours, and that Afghan helicopter technicians are being trained and spare parts will be provided in support of the Afghan Air Force. The two-way transit arrangements, in accordance with UNSC Resolution 1386, are an important contribution to the ISAF mission. Ministers looked forward to further cooperation on Afghanistan, including by taking into account the activities of relevant regional actors.

Ministers also welcomed the important civilian-military counter-terrorism exercise held last month. The Cooperative Airspace Initiative, a joint system for air traffic coordination, is ready for operations. Interoperability between NATO and Russian ships off the Horn of Africa has improved. With the aim of further building confidence, Ministers agreed to conduct discussions and plan, as appropriate, activities related to defence reform, nuclear doctrines and strategies, and force development and posture. They also exchanged views on improving transparency, including on military exercises. Ministers looked forward to discussions on possible ways for NRC member states to assist each other in case of terrorist attacks, natural and man-made disasters, pirate attacks and other emergency situations. They noted interest expressed in exchanging views on cyber security and in discussing opportunities for military-technical cooperation. Ministers
agreed to continue to work together on an ambitious cooperative agenda and looked forward to exploring new areas of co-operation.

Ministers also discussed existing differences on key issues. They reiterated that they valued the NATO-Russia Council as a forum for political dialogue at all times and on all issues, including those where NRC member states disagree. Ministers agreed to build on their improved relations to reach the full potential of the NRC and underscored that it is through continued dialogue and transparency on all of our concerns that the NATO-Russia relationship will be further strengthened, which would also enhance Euro-Atlantic security as a whole.

II. Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation and the Modern World

5. The current stage of the world development is characterized by profound changes in the geopolitical landscape largely provoked or accelerated by the global financial and economic crisis. International relations are in the process of transition, the essence of which is the creation of a polycentric system of international relations. That process is not an easy one. It is accompanied by increased economic and political turbulence at the global and regional levels. International relations become increasingly complex and unpredictable.

6. The ability of the West to dominate world economy and politics continues to diminish. The global power and development potential is now more dispersed and is shifting to the East, primarily to the Asia-Pacific region. The emergence of new global economic and political actors with Western countries trying to preserve their traditional positions enhances global competition, which is manifested in growing instability in international relations.

7. With the reduced risk of a large-scale war, including a nuclear one, the balance of military power between states and groups of states is changing. Efforts to build up or modernize offensive potentials, to create and deploy new types of weapons erode the global security architecture based on international treaties and agreements in the area of arms control.

8. Global turbulences and growing interdependence of states and peoples frustrate the attempts to build individual “oases of peace and security”; the only reliable insurance against possible shocks is compliance with universal principles of equal and indivisible security in respect of the Euro-Atlantic, Eurasian and Asia-Pacific regions.

9. Today, traditional military and political alliances cannot protect against all the existing transborder challenges and threats. The bloc-based approach to addressing international issues is being gradually replaced by network diplomacy based on flexible participation in

\[\text{The section on general assumptions has been omitted.}\]
multilateral mechanisms aimed at finding effective solutions to common challenges.

10. Economic, legal, scientific, environmental, demographic and IT factors become as important for states in influencing the world politics as the military power. Of increased relevance are issues related to sustainable development, spiritual and intellectual education of population, improving its well-being and promoting investment in human capital. A key factor of international stability is economic interdependence of states.

11. Financial and economic challenges become increasingly evident as negative trends build up in the world economy. Unsolved structural problems and lingering economic depression in the leading countries of the West affect global development in a negative way. Incomplete recovery amidst the European debt crisis and ongoing recession trends in the euro area pose serious risks for the future. International efforts to create a new, more balanced world trade and monetary system meeting the needs of the globalized world gain special significance.

12. Increased competition for strategic resources causes extreme volatility at the commodity markets. Fundamental changes are taking place in the energy sector, which is related, inter alia, to the use of innovative technologies to develop hard-to-recover hydrocarbon reserves. At a time when it becomes increasingly important for the states to diversify their presence in the world markets in order to guarantee their economic security, we are witnessing imposition of various unjustified restrictions and other discriminatory measures.

13. For the first time in modern history, global competition takes place on a civilizational level, whereby various values and models of development based on the universal principles of democracy and market economy start to clash and compete against each other. Cultural and civilizational diversity of the world becomes more and more manifest.

14. The reverse side of the globalization processes is the increased emphasis on civilizational identity. Desire to go back to one's civilizational roots can be clearly seen in recent events in the Middle East and North Africa where political and socioeconomic renewal of society has been frequently carried out under the banner of asserting Islamic values. Similar processes can be observed in other regions as well, which makes it a priority for world politics to prevent civilizational fault line clashes and to intensify efforts to forge partnership of cultures, religions and civilizations in order to ensure a harmonious development of mankind. In these circumstances imposing one's own
hierarchy of values can only provoke a rise in xenophobia, intolerance and tensions in international relations leading eventually to chaos in world affairs. Another factor which negatively affects global stability is the emerging trend towards international relations dominated, as in the past, by ideological factors.

15. Another risk to world peace and stability is presented by attempts to manage crises through unilateral sanctions and other coercive measures, including armed aggression, outside the framework of the UN Security Council. There are instances of blatant neglect of fundamental principles of international law, such as the non-use of force, and of the prerogatives of the UN Security Council when arbitrary interpretation of its resolutions is allowed. Some concepts that are being implemented are aimed at overthrowing legitimate authorities in sovereign states under the pretext of protecting civilian population. The use of coercive measures and military force bypassing the UN Charter and the UN Security Council is unable to eliminate profound socioeconomic, ethnic and other antagonisms that cause conflicts. Such measures only lead to the expansion of the conflict area, provoke tensions and arms race, aggravates interstate controversies and incite ethnic and religious strife.

16. New transborder threats and challenges increasingly dominate the international agenda rising in proportions and becoming more diversified in form and geography. They include, in the first place, the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, international terrorism, uncontrolled traffic in arms and combatants, radicalization of public sentiment giving rise to religious extremism and ethnic and interconfessional tensions, illegal migration, maritime piracy, drug trafficking, corruption, regional and internal conflicts, scarcity of essential resources, demographic problems, global poverty, environmental, sanitary and epidemiological challenges, climate change and threats to information and food security.

17. Globalization processes have also transformed international organized crime which acquired a new, macroeconomic dimension leading to the emergence of new criminal “power poles” that accumulate considerable resources and progressively expand their influence, including by infiltrating government agencies of various countries and financial and economic institutions, as well as by establishing ties with terrorist and extremist organizations.

18. Global challenges and threats require an adequate response and joint efforts of the international community based on the central
coordinating role of the UN and given the clear correlation of the issues of security, sustainable development and human rights.

19. With tendency for decentralization of the global system of governance, regional governance emerges as a basis for the polycentric model of the world (with the UN being another foundation), reflecting the world’s diversity and variety. New centres of economic growth and political power increasingly take responsibility for their respective regions. Regional integration becomes an effective means to increase competitiveness of the participating states. Networks and associations, trade pacts and other economic agreements, as well as regional reserve currencies serve as instruments to enhance security and financial and economic stability.

20. “Soft power,” a comprehensive toolkit for achieving foreign policy objectives building on civil society potential, information, cultural and other methods and technologies alternative to traditional diplomacy, is becoming an indispensable component of modern international relations. At the same time, increasing global competition and the growing crisis potential sometimes creates a risk of destructive and unlawful use of “soft power” and human rights concepts to exert political pressure on sovereign states, interfere in their internal affairs, destabilize their political situation, manipulate public opinion, including under the pretext of financing cultural and human rights projects abroad.

21. A true consolidation of efforts of the international community requires a set of common values as a foundation for joint action, a common moral denominator, which major world religions have always shared, including such principles and concepts as pursuit of peace and justice, dignity, freedom and responsibility, honesty, compassion, and work ethic.

22. Foreign policy is one of the most important tools to ensure the steady development of a country and guarantee its competitiveness in the globalizing world.

23. Being a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a participant in a whole range of influential international organizations, regional structures, and mechanisms for inter-state dialogue and cooperation, having considerable resources in every area, actively developing relations with leading states and alliances throughout the world in line with its multi-vector policy, and consistently integrating into the global economic and political system as a responsible and constructive member of the international community, the Russian Federation contributes to the development of a positive, well-balanced
and unifying international agenda and to the settlement of global and regional problems.

24. Fundamental and rapid changes not only create serious risks but also provide the Russian Federation with new opportunities. Russia pursues an independent foreign policy guided by its national interests and based on unconditional respect for international law.

25. Russia’s foreign policy is transparent, predictable and pragmatic. It is consistent and continuous and reflects the unique role our country has been playing over centuries as a counterbalance in international affairs and the development of global civilization.

26. Russia is fully aware of its special responsibility for maintaining security in the world both on the global and regional levels and is determined to act jointly with all the interested states to address common challenges. Russia will work to anticipate and forestall events and remain prepared for any scenario in global affairs.

[...]

54. Priority is given to relations with the Euro-Atlantic states which, besides geography, economy and history, have common deep-rooted civilizational ties with Russia. In light of the increased importance of combining efforts of all the states in the face of transborder challenges and threats, Russia stands for building up a truly unified region without dividing lines through developing genuine partnership relations between Russia, the European Union and the United States.

55. The Euro-Atlantic dimension of the Russian foreign policy is aimed at creating a common space of peace, security and stability based on the principles of indivisible security, equal cooperation and mutual trust. Russia stands consistently for converting political declarations regarding indivisibility of security into legally binding obligations, irrespective of states’ affiliation with political and military alliances.

[...]

62. Russia views the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as an important instrument for building an equitable and indivisible system of pan-European security, and is interested in strengthening its role and authority. For the relevance of the OSCE to increase, its activities should be focused on truly urgent issues, especially those related to transnational challenges and security threats, and on elaboration of its Charter and reform of its

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217 Sections concerning Russia’s priorities in addressing global issues and regional priorities in the CIS area have been omitted.

218 Sections concerning the European Union and the Council of Europe have been omitted.
executive mechanisms in view to ensure appropriate prerogatives of the collective intergovernmental bodies.

63. Russia will build up its relations with NATO taking into account the degree of its readiness for equitable partnership, strict adherence to the norms and principles of international law, real progress towards a common space of peace, security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region based on the principles of mutual trust, transparency and predictability and compliance with the commitments undertaken by all its members at the Russia-NATO Council meetings not to provide one's security at the expense of the security of others, and with the military restraint obligations. Russia maintains a negative attitude towards NATO’s expansion and to the approaching of NATO military infrastructure to Russia’s borders in general as to actions that violate the principle of equal security and lead to the emergence of new dividing lines in Europe.

64. Russia believes that Russia and all Euro-Atlantic states, including NATO member states, have common strategic goals which consist in maintaining peace and stability, countering common security threats, namely international terrorism, WMD proliferation, maritime piracy, drug trafficking, and natural and man-made disasters.

65. Russia develops progressive practical cooperation with North European countries, including the implementation of joint cooperation projects for the Barents/Euro-Arctic Region and the Arctic as a whole within multilateral structures while taking into consideration the interests of indigenous peoples. Russia’s participation in the activities of the Council of the Baltic Sea States plays an important role. Russia stands for the further fulfilment of the Northern Dimension project potential as well as that of its Partnerships as a platform for regional collaboration in Northern Europe.

66. Russia aims to develop comprehensive pragmatic and equitable cooperation with Southeast European countries. The Balkan region is of great strategic importance to Russia, including its role as a major transportation and infrastructure hub used for supplying gas and oil to European countries.

67. The Russian Federation builds its relations with the USA taking into consideration the vast potential for developing mutually beneficial cooperation in trade, investment, science, technology and other areas as well as the particular responsibility of both states for global strategic stability and international security as a whole.

68. A long-term Russian priority is to provide solid economic foundation for the dialogue with the USA, strengthen ties in all
areas, improve the quality of equitable, non-discriminatory trade and economic cooperation on a permanent basis, work jointly in order to develop a controversy management culture based on pragmatism and observance of the balance of interests, which will help to impart more stability and predictability to the relations between the two countries and to strengthen bilateral interaction based on the principles of equality, non-interference into domestic affairs and respect for each other’s interests.

69. Russia will work actively in order to prevent the USA from imposing unilateral extraterritorial sanctions against Russian citizens and legal entities, and to promote initiatives aimed at further liberalization of the visa regime between the two countries.

70. Russia firmly supports constructive cooperation with the USA in arms control, taking into account, inter alia, an unbreakable link between strategic offensive and defensive warfare and the necessity to transform nuclear disarmament into a multilateral process, and considers that the possibility of further reduction of strategic offensive armaments can only be examined with due account for all factors influencing global strategic stability. In the context of the creation of a global missile defence system by the USA, Russia will consistently seek legal guarantees that it will not be directed against Russian nuclear deterrent forces.

71. Russia expects that US actions in the international arena will be strictly guided by international legal norms, primarily the UN Charter, including the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs of other states.

[...]

Source: Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation Approved by President of the Russian Federation V. Putin on 12 February 2013, hwww.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/122186 (retrieved 05.07.2020).

219 Sections concerning other countries (outside Europe and the U.S.) and regions of the world, and institutions formulating and implementing foreign policy have been omitted.
Address of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin of March 18, 2014

Federation Council members, State Duma deputies, good afternoon. Representatives of the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol are here among us, citizens of Russia, residents of Crimea and Sevastopol!

Dear friends, we have gathered here today in connection with an issue that is of vital, historic significance to all of us. A referendum was held in Crimea on March 16 in full compliance with democratic procedures and international norms. ²²⁰

More than 82 percent of the electorate took part in the vote. Over 96 percent of them spoke out in favour of reuniting with Russia. These numbers speak for themselves.

To understand the reason behind such a choice it is enough to know the history of Crimea and what Russia and Crimea have always meant for each other.

[...] ²²¹

It is also obvious that there is no legitimate executive authority in Ukraine now, nobody to talk to. Many government agencies have been taken over by the impostors, but they do not have any control in the country, while they themselves—and I would like to stress this—are often controlled by radicals. In some cases, you need a special permit from the militants on Maidan to meet with certain ministers of the current government. This is not a joke—this is reality.

Those who opposed the coup were immediately threatened with repression. Naturally, the first in line here was Crimea, the Russian-speaking Crimea. In view of this, the residents of Crimea and Sevastopol turned to Russia for help in defending their rights and lives,

²²⁰ The so-called referendum was announced on the basis of a resolution of the Supreme Council of the Crimean Autonomous Republic, adopted in violation of the Crimean and Ukrainian constitutions, without a quorum. The date of the referendum was changed twice (precipitated). The vote was held on 16 March 2014 in the demonstrative presence of Russian occupying forces and in an atmosphere intimidating Ukrainian supporters. The referendum questions did not include the option to keep Crimea within Ukraine (only joining Russia or independence). On the basis of information from eyewitnesses, it can be concluded that the results of the referendum were falsified, especially the attendance was overstated. This was even confirmed in a report by the Russian presidential human-rights commission, whose delegation was in Crimea.

²²¹ The omitted sections concern mainly Putin’s distorted version of the history of Crimea and Ukraine.
in preventing the events that were unfolding and are still underway in Kiev, Donetsk, Kharkov and other Ukrainian cities.

Naturally, we could not leave this plea unheeded; we could not abandon Crimea and its residents in distress. This would have been betrayal on our part.

First, we had to help create conditions so that the residents of Crimea for the first time in history were able to peacefully express their free will regarding their own future. However, what do we hear from our colleagues in Western Europe and North America? They say we are violating norms of international law. Firstly, it’s a good thing that they at least remember that there exists such a thing as international law—better late than never.

Secondly, and most importantly—what exactly are we violating? True, the President of the Russian Federation received permission from the Upper House of Parliament to use the Armed Forces in Ukraine. However, strictly speaking, nobody has acted on this permission yet. Russia’s Armed Forces never entered Crimea; they were there already in line with an international agreement. True, we did enhance our forces there; however—this is something I would like everyone to hear and know—we did not exceed the personnel limit of our Armed Forces in Crimea, which is set at 25,000, because there was no need to do so.

Next. As it declared independence and decided to hold a referendum, the Supreme Council of Crimea referred to the United Nations Charter, which speaks of the right of nations to self-determination. Incidentally, I would like to remind you that when Ukraine seceded from the USSR it did exactly the same thing, almost word for word. Ukraine used this right, yet the residents of Crimea are denied it. Why is that?

Moreover, the Crimean authorities referred to the well-known Kosovo precedent—a precedent our western colleagues created with their own hands in a very similar situation, when they agreed that the unilateral separation of Kosovo from Serbia, exactly what Crimea is doing now, was legitimate and did not require any permission from the country’s central authorities. Pursuant to Article 2, Chapter 1 of the United Nations Charter, the UN International Court agreed with this approach and made the following comment in its ruling of

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222 During the occupation of Crimea, Russia deployed even several thousand additional troops to the peninsula. The actions of Russian troops, including blocking roads and taking over strategic (civil and military) facilities, violated Russian-Ukrainian agreements on the principles of stationing the forces of the Black Sea Fleet of Russia in Crimea.
July 22, 2010, and I quote: “No general prohibition may be inferred from the practice of the Security Council with regard to declarations of independence,” and “General international law contains no prohibition on declarations of independence.” Crystal clear, as they say.

I do not like to resort to quotes, but in this case, I cannot help it. Here is a quote from another official document: the Written Statement of the United States America of April 17, 2009, submitted to the same UN International Court in connection with the hearings on Kosovo. Again, I quote: “Declarations of independence may, and often do, violate domestic legislation. However, this does not make them violations of international law.” End of quote. They wrote this, disseminated it all over the world, had everyone agree and now they are outraged. Over what? The actions of Crimean people completely fit in with these instructions, as it were. For some reason, things that Kosovo Albanians (and we have full respect for them) were permitted to do, Russians, Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars in Crimea are not allowed. Again, one wonders why.

We keep hearing from the United States and Western Europe that Kosovo is some special case. What makes it so special in the eyes of our colleagues? It turns out that it is the fact that the conflict in Kosovo resulted in so many human casualties. Is this a legal argument? The ruling of the International Court says nothing about this. This is not even double standards; this is amazing, primitive, blunt cynicism. One should not try so crudely to make everything suit their interests, calling the same thing white today and black tomorrow. According to this logic, we have to make sure every conflict leads to human losses.

I will state clearly—if the Crimean local self-defence units had not taken the situation under control, there could have been casualties as well. Fortunately, this did not happen. There was not a single armed confrontation in Crimea and no casualties. Why do you think this was so? The answer is simple: because it is very difficult, practically impossible to fight against the will of the people. Here I would like to thank the Ukrainian military—and this is 22,000 fully armed servicemen. I would like to thank those Ukrainian service members who refrained from bloodshed and did not smear their uniforms in blood.

Other thoughts come to mind in this connection. They keep talking of some Russian intervention in Crimea, some sort of aggression. This is
Colleagues,

Like a mirror, the situation in Ukraine reflects what is going on and what has been happening in the world over the past several decades. After the dissolution of bipolarity on the planet, we no longer have stability. Key international institutions are not getting any stronger; on the contrary, in many cases, they are sadly degrading. Our western partners, led by the United States of America, prefer not to be guided by international law in their practical policies, but by the rule of the gun. They have come to believe in their exclusivity and exceptionalism, that they can decide the destinies of the world, that only they can ever be right. They act as they please: here and there, they use force against sovereign states, building coalitions based on the principle “If you are not with us, you are against us.” To make this aggression look legitimate, they force the necessary resolutions from international organisations, and if for some reason this does not work, they simply ignore the UN Security Council and the UN overall.

This happened in Yugoslavia; we remember 1999 very well. It was hard to believe, even seeing it with my own eyes, that at the end of the 20th century, one of Europe’s capitals, Belgrade, was under missile attack for several weeks, and then came the real intervention. Was there a UN Security Council resolution on this matter, allowing for these actions? Nothing of the sort. And then, they hit Afghanistan, Iraq, and frankly violated the UN Security Council resolution on Libya, when instead of imposing the so-called no-fly zone over it they started bombing it too.

There was a whole series of controlled ‘colour’ revolutions. Clearly, the people in those nations, where these events took place, were sick of tyranny and poverty, of their lack of prospects; but these feelings were taken advantage of cynically. Standards were imposed on these nations that did not in any way correspond to their way of life, traditions, or these peoples’ cultures. As a result, instead of democracy and freedom, there was chaos, outbreaks in violence and a series of upheavals. The Arab Spring turned into the Arab Winter.

A similar situation unfolded in Ukraine. In 2004, to push the necessary candidate through at the presidential elections, they thought

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223 In fact, during the Russian occupation operation in Crimea, occasional clashes and mutual shootouts, as well as political assassinations happened. As a result, multiple people were killed.
up some sort of third round that was not stipulated by the law.\textsuperscript{224} It was absurd and a mockery of the constitution. And now, they have thrown in an organised and well-equipped army of militants.

We understand what is happening; we understand that these actions were aimed against Ukraine and Russia and against Eurasian integration. And all this while Russia strived to engage in dialogue with our colleagues in the West. We are constantly proposing cooperation on all key issues; we want to strengthen our level of trust and for our relations to be equal, open and fair. But we saw no reciprocal steps.

On the contrary, they have lied to us many times, made decisions behind our backs, placed us before an accomplished fact. This happened with NATO’s expansion to the East, as well as the deployment of military infrastructure at our borders. They kept telling us the same thing: “Well, this does not concern you.” That’s easy to say.

It happened with the deployment of a missile defence system. In spite of all our apprehensions, the project is working and moving forward. It happened with the endless foot-dragging in the talks on visa issues, promises of fair competition and free access to global markets.

Today, we are being threatened with sanctions, but we already experience many limitations, ones that are quite significant for us, our economy and our nation. For example, still during the times of the Cold War, the US and subsequently other nations restricted a large list of technologies and equipment from being sold to the USSR, creating the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls list. Today, they have formally been eliminated, but only formally; and in reality, many limitations are still in effect.

In short, we have every reason to assume that the infamous policy of containment, led in the 18\textsuperscript{th}, 19\textsuperscript{th} and 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries, continues today. They are constantly trying to sweep us into a corner because we have an independent position, because we maintain it and because we call things like they are and do not engage in hypocrisy. But there is a limit to everything. And with Ukraine, our western partners have crossed the line, playing the bear and acting irresponsibly and unprofessionally.

After all, they were fully aware that there are millions of Russians living in Ukraine and in Crimea. They must have really lacked political instinct and common sense not to foresee all the consequences of their actions.

\textsuperscript{224} The so-called third round of the presidential elections in Ukraine in January 2004 was, in fact, a repetition of the vote in the second round, the results of which were declared invalid by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine due to their falsification by the authorities. It was also part of the roundtable agreements between the authorities and the opposition.
actions. Russia found itself in a position it could not retreat from. If you compress the spring all the way to its limit, it will snap back hard. You must always remember this.

Today, it is imperative to end this hysteria, to refute the rhetoric of the cold war and to accept the obvious fact: Russia is an independent, active participant in international affairs; like other countries, it has its own national interests that need to be taken into account and respected.

At the same time, we are grateful to all those who understood our actions in Crimea; we are grateful to the people of China, whose leaders have always considered the situation in Ukraine and Crimea taking into account the full historical and political context, and greatly appreciate India’s reserve and objectivity.

Today, I would like to address the people of the United States of America, the people who, since the foundation of their nation and adoption of the Declaration of Independence, have been proud to hold freedom above all else. Isn’t the desire of Crimea’s residents to freely choose their fate such a value? Please understand us.

I believe that the Europeans, first and foremost, the Germans, will also understand me. Let me remind you that in the course of political consultations on the unification of East and West Germany, at the expert, though very high level, some nations that were then and are now Germany’s allies did not support the idea of unification. Our nation, however, unequivocally supported the sincere, unstoppable desire of the Germans for national unity. I am confident that you have not forgotten this, and I expect that the citizens of Germany will also support the aspiration of the Russians, of historical Russia, to restore unity.

I also want to address the people of Ukraine. I sincerely want you to understand us: we do not want to harm you in any way, or to hurt your national feelings. We have always respected the territorial integrity of the Ukrainian state, incidentally, unlike those who sacrificed Ukraine’s

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225 In the original Russian version of the speech—“aspirations of the Russian world.” The “Russian world” (rus. Russkiymir) is an enigmatic idea created around 2004 in the circles of pro-Kremlin spin doctors. The slogan was partly taken over by the Russian Orthodox Church and part of the Russian nationalist circles, and since 2014 it has been used in the rhetoric of the Kremlin. The slogan refers to the alleged existence of a historical, natural civilisational community whose determinants are to be: the use of the Russian language, recognition of Christian Orthodoxy as a cultural basis, as well as loyalty to the Russian state. The boundaries of the Russian world sometimes are identified with the area of the former Russian Empire, the former USSR or, in a narrower sense, the area of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine (possibly also Moldova and northern Kazakhstan).
unity for their political ambitions. They flaunt slogans about Ukraine’s greatness, but they are the ones who did everything to divide the nation. Today’s civil standoff is entirely on their conscience. I want you to hear me, my dear friends. Do not believe those who want you to fear Russia, shouting that other regions will follow Crimea.

We do not want to divide Ukraine; we do not need that. As for Crimea, it was and remains a Russian, Ukrainian, and Crimean-Tatar land.

I repeat, just as it has been for centuries, it will be a home to all the peoples living there. What it will never be and do is follow in Bandera’s footsteps!

Crimea is our common historical legacy and a very important factor in regional stability. And this strategic territory should be part of a strong and stable sovereignty, which today can only be Russian. Otherwise, dear friends (I am addressing both Ukraine and Russia), you and we—the Russians and the Ukrainians—could lose Crimea completely, and that could happen in the near historical perspective. Please think about it.

Let me note too that we have already heard declarations from Kiev about Ukraine soon joining NATO. What would this have meant for Crimea and Sevastopol in the future? It would have meant that NATO’s navy would be right there in this city of Russia’s military glory, and this would create not an illusory but a perfectly real threat to the whole of southern Russia. These are things that could have become reality were it not for the choice the Crimean people made, and I want to say thank you to them for this.

But let me say too that we are not opposed to cooperation with NATO, for this is certainly not the case. For all the internal processes within the organisation, NATO remains a military alliance, and we are against having a military alliance making itself at home right in our backyard or in our historic territory. I simply cannot imagine that we would travel to Sevastopol to visit NATO sailors. Of course, most of them are wonderful guys, but it would be better to have them come and visit us, be our guests, rather than the other way round.

Let me say quite frankly that it pains our hearts to see what is happening in Ukraine at the moment, see the people’s suffering and their uncertainty about how to get through today and what awaits them tomorrow. Our concerns are understandable because we are not

During the speech, the so-called Russian Spring was already under way in the southeastern regions of Ukraine: violent protest actions, coordinated and supported by Russia, against the new authorities in Kyiv. Three weeks later, Russia initiated an armed rebellion in Donbas and supported it militarily, leading to the actual Russian occupation of 40% of the area of this region of eastern Ukraine.
simply close neighbours but, as I have said many times already, we are
one people. Kiev is the mother of Russian cities. Ancient Rus is our
common source and we cannot live without each other.

Let me say one other thing too. Millions of Russians and Russian-
speaking people live in Ukraine and will continue to do so. Russia
will always defend their interests using political, diplomatic and legal
means. But it should be above all in Ukraine’s own interest to ensure
that these people’s rights and interests are fully protected. This is the
guarantee of Ukraine’s state stability and territorial integrity.

We want to be friends with Ukraine and we want Ukraine to be
a strong, sovereign and self-sufficient country. Ukraine is one of our
biggest partners after all. We have many joint projects and I believe in
their success no matter what the current difficulties. Most importantly,
we want peace and harmony to reign in Ukraine, and we are ready
to work together with other countries to do everything possible to
facilitate and support this. But as I said, only Ukraine’s own people can
put their own house in order.

Residents of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, the whole of Russia
admired your courage, dignity and bravery. It was you who decided
Crimea’s future. We were closer than ever over these days, supporting
each other. These were sincere feelings of solidarity. It is at historic
turning points such as these that a nation demonstrates its maturity
and strength of spirit. The Russian people showed this maturity and
strength through their united support for their compatriots.

Russia’s foreign policy position on this matter drew its firmness
from the will of millions of our people, our national unity and the
support of our country’s main political and public forces. I want to
thank everyone for this patriotic spirit, everyone without exception.
Now, we need to continue and maintain this kind of consolidation so
as to resolve the tasks our country faces on its road ahead.

Obviously, we will encounter external opposition, but this is
a decision that we need to make for ourselves. Are we ready to
consistently defend our national interests, or will we forever give in,
retreat to who knows where? Some Western politicians are already
threatening us with not just sanctions but also the prospect of
increasingly serious problems on the domestic front. I would like to
know what it is they have in mind exactly: action by a fifth column,
this disparate bunch of ‘national traitors’, or are they hoping to put
us in a worsening social and economic situation so as to provoke
public discontent? We consider such statements irresponsible and
clearly aggressive in tone, and we will respond to them accordingly.
At the same time, we will never seek confrontation with our partners, whether in the East or the West, but on the contrary, will do everything we can to build civilised and good-neighbourly relations as one is supposed to in the modern world. [...]^{227}

Members of the Federation Council, deputies of the State Duma, citizens of Russia, residents of Crimea and Sevastopol, today, in accordance with the people’s will, I submit to the Federal Assembly a request to consider a Constitutional Law on the creation of two new constituent entities within the Russian Federation: the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, and to ratify the treaty on admitting to the Russian Federation Crimea and Sevastopol, which is already ready for signing. I stand assured of your support.


^{227} The omitted sections concern mainly the alleged will of the peoples of Crimea and Russia, which are to be the main argument for the annexation of Crimea.
Statement by NATO Foreign Ministers,
1 April 2014

1. We, the Foreign Ministers of NATO, are united in our condemnation of Russia’s illegal military intervention in Ukraine and Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. We do not recognize Russia’s illegal and illegitimate attempt to annex Crimea. We urge Russia to take immediate steps, as set out in the statement by the NATO-Ukraine Commission,\(^{228}\) to return to compliance with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities, and to engage immediately in a genuine dialogue towards a political and diplomatic solution that respects international law and Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders. We support the deployment of an OSCE monitoring mission to Ukraine.

2. Our goal of a Euro-Atlantic region whole, free, and at peace has not changed, but has been fundamentally challenged by Russia. We support the sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity of all states within their internationally recognised borders. An independent, sovereign, and stable Ukraine, firmly committed to democracy and respect for human rights, minorities, and the rule of law, is key to Euro-Atlantic security.

3. In order to demonstrate our commitment to Ukraine, we will intensify our cooperation in the framework of our Distinctive Partnership\(^{229}\). Today NATO and Ukraine have agreed, as set out in the statement by the NATO-Ukraine Commission, to implement immediate and longer-term measures in order to strengthen Ukraine’s ability to provide for its own security.

4. We have also today agreed a package of measures aimed at deepening our cooperation with other NATO partners in Eastern Europe, in consultation with them and within our existing bilateral programmes.

5. Over the past twenty years, NATO has consistently worked for closer cooperation and trust with Russia. However, Russia has violated international law and has acted in contradiction with the principles and commitments in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership.

\(^{228}\) Also issued on 1 April 2014. It condemns Russia’s aggression and calls on it to respect international law.

\(^{229}\) A form of NATO–Ukraine cooperation based on the provisions of the Charter on Special NATO-Ukraine Partnership adopted in July 1997.
Council Basic Document, the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and the Rome Declaration. It has gravely breached the trust upon which our cooperation must be based.

6. We have decided to suspend all practical civilian and military cooperation between NATO and Russia. Our political dialogue in the NATO-Russia Council can continue, as necessary, at the Ambassadorial level and above, to allow us to exchange views, first and foremost on this crisis. We will review NATO’s relations with Russia at our next meeting in June.

7. As stated by our Heads of State and Government at the Chicago Summit in 2012, NATO is based on solidarity, Alliance cohesion, and the indivisibility of our security. In the current situation, the Alliance has already taken steps to demonstrate solidarity and strengthen its ability to anticipate and respond quickly to any challenges to Alliance security. We will continue to provide appropriate reinforcement and visible assurance of NATO’s cohesion and commitment to deterrence and collective defence against any threat of aggression to the Alliance.

Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales, 5 September 2014

1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Wales at a pivotal moment in Euro-Atlantic security. Russia’s aggressive actions against Ukraine have fundamentally challenged our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. Growing instability in our southern neighbourhood, from the Middle East to North Africa, as well as transnational and multi-dimensional threats, are also challenging our security. These can all have long-term consequences for peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic region and stability across the globe.

2. Our Alliance remains an essential source of stability in this unpredictable world. Together as strong democracies, we are united in our commitment to the Washington Treaty and the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Based on solidarity, Alliance cohesion, and the indivisibility of our security, NATO remains the transatlantic framework for strong collective defence and the essential forum for security consultations and decisions among Allies. The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territories and our populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. As stated in the Transatlantic Declaration that we issued today, we are committed to further strengthening the transatlantic bond and to providing the resources, capabilities, and political will required to ensure our Alliance remains ready to meet any challenge. We stand ready to act together and decisively to defend freedom and our shared values of individual liberty, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.

3. Today we reaffirm our commitment to fulfil all three core tasks set out in our Strategic Concept: collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security. Here in Wales, we have taken decisions to meet the challenges of today and tomorrow. We are reaffirming our strong commitment to collective defence and to ensuring security and assurance for all Allies; we are adapting our operations, including in Afghanistan, in light of progress made and remaining challenges; and we are strengthening our partnerships with countries and organisations around the globe to better build security together.
4. Every day, our troops deliver the security that is the foundation of our prosperity and our way of life. We pay tribute to all the brave men and women from Allied and partner nations who have served, and continue to serve, in NATO-led operations and missions. We owe an eternal debt of gratitude to all those who have lost their lives or been injured, and we extend our profound sympathy to their families and loved ones.

5. In order to ensure that our Alliance is ready to respond swiftly and firmly to the new security challenges, today we have approved the NATO Readiness Action Plan. It provides a coherent and comprehensive package of necessary measures to respond to the changes in the security environment on NATO's borders and further afield that are of concern to Allies. It responds to the challenges posed by Russia and their strategic implications. It also responds to the risks and threats emanating from our southern neighbourhood, the Middle East and North Africa. The Plan strengthens NATO’s collective defence. It also strengthens our crisis management capability. The Plan will contribute to ensuring that NATO remains a strong, ready, robust, and responsive Alliance capable of meeting current and future challenges from wherever they may arise.

6. The elements of the Plan include measures that address both the continuing need for assurance of Allies and the adaptation of the Alliance’s military strategic posture.

7. The assurance measures include continuous air, land, and maritime presence and meaningful military activity in the eastern part of the Alliance, both on a rotational basis. They will provide the fundamental baseline requirement for assurance and deterrence, and are flexible and scalable in response to the evolving security situation.

8. Adaptation measures include the components required to ensure that the Alliance can fully address the security challenges it might face. We will significantly enhance the responsiveness of our NATO Response Force (NRF) by developing force packages that are able to move rapidly and respond to potential challenges and threats. As part of it, we will establish a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), a new Allied joint force that will be able to deploy within a few days to respond to challenges that arise, particularly at the periphery of NATO’s territory. This force should consist of a land component with appropriate air, maritime, and special operations forces available. Readiness of elements of the VJTF will be tested through short-notice exercises. We will also establish an appropriate command and control presence and some in-place force enablers on the territories of eastern
Allies at all times, with contributions from Allies on a rotational basis, focusing on planning and exercising collective defence scenarios. If required, they will also facilitate reinforcement of Allies located at NATO’s periphery for deterrence and collective defence. We will further enhance NATO’s ability to quickly and effectively reinforce those Allies, including through preparation of infrastructure, prepositioning of equipment and supplies, and designation of specific bases. Adequate host nation support will be critical in this respect. We will also ensure that our Allied forces maintain the adequate readiness and coherence needed to conduct NATO’s full range of missions, including deterring aggression against NATO Allies and demonstrating preparedness to defend NATO territory. We will enhance our Standing Naval Forces to support maritime situational awareness and to conduct the full spectrum of conventional maritime operations.

9. We will ensure that the current NATO Command Structure remains robust, agile, and able to undertake all elements of effective command and control for simultaneous challenges; this includes a regional focus to exploit regional expertise and enhance situational awareness. Contributing Allies will raise the readiness and capabilities of the Headquarters Multinational Corps Northeast and will also enhance its role as a hub for regional cooperation. We will enhance our intelligence and strategic awareness and we will place renewed emphasis on advance planning.

10. We will establish an enhanced exercise programme with an increased focus on exercising collective defence including practising comprehensive responses to complex civil-military scenarios. The Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) we agreed in Chicago will be instrumental in ensuring full coherence of the training and exercise elements of the Readiness Action Plan.

11. Development and implementation of the adaptation measures will be done on the basis of the evolving strategic environment in the regions of concern, including in the eastern and southern peripheries of the Alliance, which will be closely monitored, assessed, and prepared for.

12. We have tasked our Defence Ministers to oversee the expeditious implementation of the Readiness Action Plan, which will begin immediately.

13. We will ensure that NATO is able to effectively address the specific challenges posed by hybrid warfare threats, where a wide range of overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures are employed in a highly integrated design. It is essential that the Alliance
possesses the necessary tools and procedures required to deter and respond effectively to hybrid warfare threats, and the capabilities to reinforce national forces. This will also include enhancing strategic communications, developing exercise scenarios in light of hybrid threats, and strengthening coordination between NATO and other organisations, in line with relevant decisions taken, with a view to improving information sharing, political consultations, and staff-to-staff coordination. We welcome the establishment of the NATO-accredited Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Latvia as a meaningful contribution to NATO’s efforts in this area. We have tasked the work on hybrid warfare to be reviewed alongside the implementation of the Readiness Action Plan.

14. We agree to reverse the trend of declining defence budgets, to make the most effective use of our funds and to further a more balanced sharing of costs and responsibilities. Our overall security and defence depend both on how much we spend and how we spend it. Increased investments should be directed towards meeting our capability priorities, and Allies also need to display the political will to provide required capabilities and deploy forces when they are needed. A strong defence industry across the Alliance, including a stronger defence industry in Europe and greater defence industrial cooperation within Europe and across the Atlantic, remains essential for delivering the required capabilities. NATO and EU efforts to strengthen defence capabilities are complementary. Taking current commitments into account, we are guided by the following considerations:

- Allies currently meeting the NATO guideline to spend a minimum of 2% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence will aim to continue to do so. Likewise, Allies spending more than 20% of their defence budgets on major equipment, including related Research & Development, will continue to do so.

- Allies whose current proportion of GDP spent on defence is below this level will:
  - halt any decline in defence expenditure;
  - aim to increase defence expenditure in real terms as GDP grows;
  - aim to move towards the 2% guideline within a decade with a view to meeting their NATO Capability Targets and filling NATO’s capability shortfalls.

- Allies who currently spend less than 20% of their annual defence spending on major new equipment, including related Research & Development, will aim, within a decade, to increase their annual investments to 20% or more of total defence expenditures.
– All Allies will:
– ensure that their land, air and maritime forces meet NATO agreed guidelines for deployability and sustainability and other agreed output metrics;
– ensure that their armed forces can operate together effectively, including through the implementation of agreed NATO standards and doctrines.

15. Allies will review national progress annually. This will be discussed at future Defence Ministerial meetings and reviewed by Heads of State and Government at future Summits.

16. We condemn in the strongest terms Russia's escalating and illegal military intervention in Ukraine and demand that Russia stop and withdraw its forces from inside Ukraine and along the Ukrainian border. This violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity is a serious breach of international law and a major challenge to Euro-Atlantic security. We do not and will not recognise Russia's illegal and illegitimate ‘annexation’ of Crimea. We demand that Russia comply with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities; end its illegitimate occupation of Crimea; refrain from aggressive actions against Ukraine; withdraw its troops; halt the flow of weapons, equipment, people and money across the border to the separatists; and stop fomenting tension along and across the Ukrainian border. Russia must use its influence with the separatists to de-escalate the situation and take concrete steps to allow for a political and a diplomatic solution which respects Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and internationally recognised borders.

17. We are deeply concerned that the violence and insecurity in the region caused by Russia and the Russian-backed separatists are resulting in a deteriorating humanitarian situation and material destruction in eastern Ukraine. We are concerned about discrimination against the native Crimean Tatars and other members of local communities in the Crimean peninsula. We demand that Russia take the necessary measures to ensure the safety, rights and freedoms of everyone living on the peninsula. This violence and insecurity also led to the tragic downing of Malaysia Airlines passenger flight MH17 on 17 July 2014. Recalling United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2166, Allies call upon all states and actors in the region to ensure immediate, safe, and unrestricted access to the crash site of MH17 to allow resumption of the investigation and the repatriation of the remains and belongings of the victims still present at the site. Those directly
and indirectly responsible for the downing of MH17 should be held accountable and brought to justice as soon as possible.

18. We are also concerned by Russia’s pattern of disregard for international law, including the UN Charter; its behaviour towards Georgia and the Republic of Moldova; its violation of fundamental European security arrangements and commitments, including those in the Helsinki Final Act; its long-standing non-implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE); and its use of military and other instruments to coerce neighbours. This threatens the rules-based international order and challenges Euro-Atlantic security. In addition, these developments may potentially have long-term effects on stability in the Black Sea region, which remains an important component of Euro-Atlantic security. Russia’s current actions are contrary to the principles on which the established confidence building mechanisms in the Black Sea were built. We will continue to support, as appropriate, regional efforts by Black Sea littoral states aimed at ensuring security and stability.

19. While Russia continues to intervene militarily, arm separatists, and foment instability in Ukraine, we support the sanctions imposed by the European Union (EU), the G7, and others, which are an essential part of the overall international effort to address the destabilizing behaviour of Russia, bring it to deescalate, and arrive at a political solution to the crisis created by its actions. Amongst these are measures taken by Allies including Canada, Norway and the United States, as well as the EU decisions to limit access to capital markets for Russian state-owned financial institutions, restrict trade in arms, establish restrictions for export of dual use goods for military end uses, curtail Russian access to sensitive defence and energy sector technologies, and other measures.

20. Allies have had, and will continue in the course of our ongoing work, a strategic discussion regarding Euro-Atlantic security and Russia. This discussion provides the basis for NATO’s vision regarding our approach to, and the mechanisms of the Alliance’s relations with, Russia in the future.

21. For more than two decades, NATO has strived to build a partnership with Russia, including through the mechanism of the NATO-Russia Council, based upon the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration. Russia has breached its commitments, as well as violated international law, thus breaking the trust at the core of our cooperation. The decisions we have taken at the Summit
demonstrate our respect for the rules-based European security architecture.

22. We continue to believe that a partnership between NATO and Russia based on respect for international law would be of strategic value. We continue to aspire to a cooperative, constructive relationship with Russia, including reciprocal confidence building and transparency measures and increased mutual understanding of NATO’s and Russia’s non-strategic nuclear force postures in Europe, based on our common security concerns and interests, in a Europe where each country freely chooses its future. We regret that the conditions for that relationship do not currently exist. As a result, NATO’s decision to suspend all practical civilian and military cooperation between NATO and Russia remains in place. Political channels of communication, however, remain open.

23. The Alliance does not seek confrontation and poses no threat to Russia. But we cannot and will not compromise on the principles on which our Alliance and security in Europe and North America rest. NATO is both transparent and predictable, and we are resolved to display endurance and resilience, as we have done since the founding of our Alliance. The nature of the Alliance’s relations with Russia and our aspiration for partnership will be contingent on our seeing a clear, constructive change in Russia’s actions which demonstrates compliance with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities.

24. An independent, sovereign, and stable Ukraine, firmly committed to democracy and the rule of law, is key to Euro-Atlantic security. At a time when Ukraine’s security is being undermined, the Alliance continues its full support for Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders. The broad support for United Nations General Assembly Resolution 68/262 on the Territorial Integrity of Ukraine, demonstrates the international rejection of Russia’s illegal and illegitimate ‘annexation’ of Crimea. We are extremely concerned by the further escalation of aggressive actions in eastern Ukraine. We see a concerted campaign of violence by Russia and Russian-backed separatists aimed at destabilising Ukraine as a sovereign state.

25. We commend the people of Ukraine for their commitment to freedom and democracy and their determination to decide their own future and foreign policy course free from outside interference. We welcome the holding of free and fair Presidential elections on 25 May 2014 under difficult conditions and the signature of the Association
Agreement with the European Union on 27 June 2014, which testify to the consolidation of Ukraine's democracy and its European aspiration. In this context, we look forward to the elections to the Verkhovna Rada in October 2014.

26. We encourage Ukraine to further promote an inclusive political process, based on democratic values and respect for human rights, minorities, and the rule of law. We welcome President Poroshenko’s Peace Plan and call on all parties to meet their commitments, including those made in Geneva and Berlin. We call on Russia to engage in a constructive dialogue with the Ukrainian government. We actively support ongoing diplomatic efforts towards a sustainable political solution to the conflict which respects Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders.

27. We commend and fully support the actions of other international organisations that are contributing to de-escalation and pursuing a peaceful solution to the crisis, in particular the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the EU. We welcome the swift deployment of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission, which must be able to operate unhindered and have access to all regions of Ukraine in order to fulfil its mandate. We also welcome the decision by the EU to launch a Common Security and Defence Policy mission to assist Ukraine in the field of civilian security sector reform, including police and the rule of law.

28. Recognising the right of Ukraine to restore peace and order and to defend its people and territory, we encourage the Ukrainian armed forces and security services to continue to exercise the utmost restraint in their ongoing operation so as to avoid casualties among the local civilian population.

29. Ukraine is a long-standing and distinctive partner of the Alliance. At our meeting here in Wales, we met with President Poroshenko and issued a joint statement. We highly value Ukraine’s past and present contributions to all current Allied operations as well as to the NATO Response Force. We encourage and will continue to support Ukraine’s implementation of wide-ranging reforms through the Annual National Programme, in the framework of our Distinctive Partnership. We have launched additional efforts to support the reform and transformation of the security and defence sectors and promote greater interoperability between Ukraine’s and NATO forces. These efforts are designed to enhance Ukraine’s ability to provide for its own security. We welcome Ukraine’s participation in the Partnership
Interoperability Initiative and Ukraine’s interest in the enhanced opportunities within the Initiative, and look forward to its future participation.

30. Russia’s illegitimate occupation of Crimea and military intervention in eastern Ukraine have raised legitimate concerns among several of NATO’s other partners in Eastern Europe. Allies will continue to support the right of partners to make independent and sovereign choices on foreign and security policy, free from external pressure and coercion. Allies also remain committed in their support to the territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova.

31. In this context, we will continue to support efforts towards a peaceful settlement of the conflicts in the south Caucasus, as well as in the Republic of Moldova, based upon these principles and the norms of international law, the UN Charter, and the Helsinki Final Act. The persistence of these protracted conflicts continues to be a matter of particular concern, undermining the opportunities for citizens in the region to reach their full potential as members of the Euro-Atlantic community. We urge all parties to engage constructively and with reinforced political will in peaceful conflict resolution, within the established negotiation frameworks.

32. We are deeply concerned by the growing instability and mounting transnational and multi-dimensional threats across the Middle East and North Africa region. These threats directly affect the security of the people living there, as well as our own security. Peace and stability in this region are essential for the Alliance. Therefore, we emphasise the need for lasting calm and an end to violence. We continue to support the legitimate aspirations of the peoples in this region for peace, security, democracy, justice, prosperity, and the preservation of their identity. We will continue to closely monitor the situation and explore options for possible NATO assistance to bilateral and international efforts to promote stability and contribute to the response to the growing crisis in, and threats from, the Middle East region.

33. The so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) poses a grave threat to the Iraqi people, to the Syrian people, to the wider region, and to our nations. We are outraged by ISIL’s recent barbaric attacks against all civilian populations, in particular the systematic and deliberate targeting of entire religious and ethnic communities. We condemn in the strongest terms ISIL’s violent and cowardly acts. If the security of any Ally is threatened, we will not hesitate to
take all necessary steps to ensure our collective defence. The rapid deterioration of the security situation in Iraq and ISIL’s expanding threat underline the necessity for a political solution based upon an inclusive Iraqi government with cross-sectarian representation. Additionally, in light of the dramatic humanitarian consequences of this crisis and its repercussions on regional stability and security, many Allies have already provided, and are offering, security and humanitarian assistance to Iraq on a bilateral basis.

34. We re-affirm NATO’s continued commitment to the NATO-Iraq partnership, through which we will revitalise our effort to help Iraq build more effective security forces. That partnership encompasses, within the existing Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme, cooperation in the areas of: political dialogue; education and training; response to terrorism; defence institution building; border security; and communications strategy. Allies and partners should continue to help coordinate humanitarian assistance to Iraq through the appropriate channels. We welcome the role that the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre is playing. We have also agreed that NATO will help coordinate among Allies and partners security assistance support to Iraq; this could also include helping coordinate the provision of lift to deliver assistance. Should the Iraqi government request it, NATO will stand ready to consider measures in the framework of NATO’s Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative with an eye to launching such an effort in the near term. NATO will support ongoing bilateral efforts of Allies and partners by soliciting and coordinating, on a voluntary basis, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance assets. Additionally, Allies will seek to enhance their cooperation in exchanging information on returning foreign fighters.

35. We continue to follow the ongoing crisis in Syria with grave concern. We condemn in the strongest terms the campaign of violence against the Syrian people by the Assad regime, which caused the current chaos and devastation in this country. We call on the Syrian government to fully comply with the provisions of all relevant UNSCRs and to immediately commit to a genuine political transition in accordance with the 30 June 2012 Geneva Communiqué. We believe a negotiated political transition is essential to bring an end to the bloodshed. We highlight the important role of the moderate opposition to protect communities against the dual threats of the Syrian regime’s tyranny and ISIL’s extremism. More than three years of fighting have had dramatic humanitarian consequences
and a growing impact on the security of regional countries. Despite possible destabilising effects on their economies and societies, NATO member Turkey, our regional partner Jordan, as well as neighbouring Lebanon, are generously hosting millions of refugees and displaced Syrians. The deployment of Patriot missiles to defend the population and territory of Turkey is a strong demonstration of NATO’s resolve and ability to defend and deter any potential threat against any Ally.

36. We welcome the successful completion by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)-United Nations Joint Mission and Allies of the removal and elimination of Syria’s declared chemical weapons, as called for in UNSCR 2118 and OPCW Executive Council decisions. NATO Allies played a key role in ensuring this success as well as in the destruction of the chemical materials themselves. We remain highly concerned by continuing reports of the use of chemicals as weapons in Syria. Twelve chemical weapon production facilities are still awaiting destruction and questions remain concerning the completeness and accuracy of Syria’s chemical weapons declaration. We urge the Assad government to answer all outstanding questions regarding its declaration to the OPCW, to address all remaining issues, and to take action to ensure full compliance with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention, UNSCR 2118, and OPCW Executive Council decisions.

37. ISIL has, with its recent advance into Iraq, become a transnational threat. The Assad regime has contributed to the emergence of ISIL in Syria and its expansion beyond. ISIL’s presence in both Syria and Iraq is a threat to regional stability. It has become a key obstacle to political settlement in Syria and a serious risk to the stability and territorial integrity of Iraq. The people of Syria and Iraq and elsewhere in the region need the support of the international community to counter this threat. A coordinated international approach is required.

38. We are deeply concerned by the ongoing violence and the deteriorating security situation in Libya, which threaten to undermine the goals for which the Libyan people have suffered so much and which pose a threat to the wider region. We urge all parties to cease all violence and engage without delay in constructive efforts aimed at fostering an inclusive political dialogue in the interest of the entire Libyan people, as part of the democratic process. Recognising the central role of the UN in coordinating international efforts in Libya, we strongly support the ongoing efforts of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to achieve an immediate ceasefire, scale down tensions, and contribute to national reconciliation. Our
Operation Unified Protector demonstrated NATO’s determination, together with regional Arab partners, to protect the Libyan people. On the basis of NATO’s decision in October 2013, following a request by the Libyan authorities, we continue to stand ready to support Libya with advice on defence and security institution building and to develop a long-term partnership, possibly leading to Libya’s membership in the Mediterranean Dialogue, which would be a natural framework for our cooperation.

39. While Mali has re-established a constitutional order, we recognise that terrorist acts and the trafficking of arms, drugs, and people across the Sahel-Sahara region threaten regional and our own security. We welcome the efforts of the UN and underscore the importance of a strong commitment by the international community to address the complex security and political challenges in this region. In this respect, we welcome the comprehensive Sahel strategies of the African Union and the EU. We also welcome the robust and credible military commitment of Allies in the Sahel-Sahara region, which contributes to the reaffirmation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the African countries concerned, and to the security of the Alliance. NATO is prepared to explore, upon request by the countries concerned, where it can contribute to address these challenges, in full coordination with UN, EU, regional and bilateral efforts.

40. In the strategically important Western Balkans region, democratic values, the rule of law, and good neighbourly relations continue to play a pivotal role in maintaining lasting peace and stability. The Alliance remains fully committed to the stability and security of the region, and we will continue to actively support the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of countries in this region. Allies and their Western Balkans partners actively contribute to the maintenance of regional and international peace, including through regional cooperation formats.

We welcome Serbia’s progress in building a stronger partnership with NATO and encourage Belgrade to continue on this path. We also welcome the progress achieved in Kosovo and encourage further efforts to strengthen democratic institutions and the rule of law throughout a multi-ethnic Kosovo. The 8 June 2014 parliamentary elections were largely in line with international standards and an important milestone. We look forward to the expeditious formation of a representative and inclusive government, committed to the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue. We welcome the improvement of the security situation and the progress achieved through the dialogue.
We commend both parties for their commitment to the Belgrade-Pristina agreement of 19 April 2013 and encourage continued work on its full implementation.

41. We met yesterday in an expanded meeting on Afghanistan and, together with our International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) partners, we issued a Wales Summit Declaration on Afghanistan.

42. For over a decade, NATO Allies and partner nations from across the world have stood shoulder to shoulder with Afghanistan in the largest operation in the history of the Alliance. This unprecedented effort has enhanced global security and contributed to a better future for Afghan men, women, and children. We honour the Afghan and international personnel who have lost their lives or been injured in this endeavour.

43. With the end of ISAF in December 2014, the nature and scope of our engagement with Afghanistan will change. We envisage three parallel, mutually reinforcing strands of activity: in the short term, NATO Allies and partner nations stand ready to continue to train, advise, and assist the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) after 2014 through the non-combat Resolute Support Mission; in the medium term, we reaffirm our commitment to contribute to the financial sustainment of the ANSF; in the long term, we remain committed to strengthening NATO’s partnership with Afghanistan. We count on Afghanistan’s commitment and cooperation.

44. We recognise the particular importance of advancing regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations for the security and stability of Afghanistan. We remain determined to support the Afghan people in their efforts to build a stable, sovereign, democratic, and united country, where rule of law and good governance prevail, and in which human rights for all, especially the rights of women, including their full participation in decision making, and those of children, are fully protected. Working with the Government of Afghanistan and the wider international community, our goal remains to never again be threatened by terrorists from within Afghanistan. Our commitment to Afghanistan will endure.

45. We commend the Kosovo Force (KFOR) for the successful conduct of its mission over the past 15 years, in accordance with UNSCR 1244. KFOR will continue to contribute to a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement in Kosovo in close cooperation with the Kosovo authorities and the EU, as agreed. KFOR will also continue to support the development of a peaceful, stable and multi-ethnic Kosovo. The Alliance will continue to assist the Kosovo
Security Force with advice on the ground and will keep the nature of further support under review.

46. We will continue to maintain KFOR’s robust and credible capability to carry out its mission. Sustained improvement in the security situation and the successful implementation of agreements reached in the EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina will allow NATO to consider a possible change in its force posture. Any reduction of our troop presence will be measured against clear benchmarks and indicators, and will remain conditions-based and not calendar-driven.

47. Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean will continue to adapt to meet evolving security risks in an area of essential strategic interest to the Alliance. Somalia-based piracy has not been eradicated. NATO has contributed to a steady reduction in pirate activity off the coast of Somalia through Operation Ocean Shield, working in coordination with the relevant international actors, including the EU and other nations, in line with the relevant decisions taken. We have agreed to continue NATO’s counter piracy involvement off the coast of Somalia until the end of 2016, utilising a focused presence to optimise the use of NATO assets. Both of these operations contribute to enhancing the Alliance’s maritime situational awareness, interoperability, and engagement with partners.

48. The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territory and our populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. No one should doubt NATO’s resolve if the security of any of its members were to be threatened. NATO will maintain the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of our populations, wherever it should arise.

49. Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defence capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy.

50. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. The strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States, are the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies. The independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France have a deterrent role of their own and contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Alliance. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote.
51. The Allies’ conventional forces make essential contributions to the deterrence of a broad range of threats. They contribute to providing visible assurance of NATO’s cohesion as well as the Alliance’s ability and commitment to respond to the security concerns of each and every Ally.

52. Missile defence can complement the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence; it cannot substitute for them. The capability is purely defensive.

53. Arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation continue to play an important role in the achievement of the Alliance’s security objectives. Both the success and failure of these efforts can have a direct impact on the threat environment of NATO. In this context, it is of paramount importance that disarmament and non-proliferation commitments under existing treaties are honoured, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which is a crucial element of Euro-Atlantic security. In that regard, Allies call on Russia to preserve the viability of the INF Treaty through ensuring full and verifiable compliance.

54. The threat to NATO populations, territory, and forces posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles continues to increase and missile defence forms part of a broader response to counter it. At our Summit in Lisbon in 2010 we decided to develop a NATO Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) capability to pursue our core task of collective defence. Missile defence will become an integral part of the Alliance’s overall defence posture and contribute to the indivisible security of the Alliance.

55. The aim of this capability is to provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory, and forces against the increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles, based on the principles of indivisibility of Allies’ security and NATO solidarity, equitable sharing of risks and burdens, as well as reasonable challenge, taking into account the level of threat, affordability, and technical feasibility, and in accordance with the latest common threat assessments agreed by the Alliance. Should international efforts reduce the threats posed by ballistic missile proliferation, NATO missile defence can and will adapt accordingly.

56. At our Summit in Chicago in 2012, we declared the achievement of an Interim NATO BMD Capability as an operationally significant first step, offering maximum coverage, within available means, to defend our populations, territory, and forces across southern NATO
Europe against a ballistic missile attack. NATO Interim BMD is operationally capable.

57. Today we are pleased to note that the deployment of Aegis Ashore in Deveselu, Romania is on track to be completed in the 2015 timeframe. Aegis Ashore will be offered to NATO and will provide a significant increase in NATO BMD capability. We are also pleased to note the forward deployment of BMD-capable Aegis ships to Rota, Spain. Building on the Interim Capability, the additional Aegis BMD-capable ships could be made available to NATO.

58. Today we are also pleased to note that additional voluntary national contributions have been offered, and that several Allies are developing, including through multinational cooperation, or are acquiring further BMD capabilities that could become available to the Alliance. Our aim remains to provide the Alliance with a NATO operational BMD that can provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory, and forces, based on voluntary national contributions, including nationally funded interceptors and sensors, hosting arrangements, and on the expansion of the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) capability. Only the command and control systems of ALTBMD and their expansion to territorial defence are eligible for common funding.

59. We note the potential opportunities for cooperation on missile defence, and encourage Allies to explore possible additional voluntary national contributions, including through multinational cooperation, to provide relevant capabilities, as well as to use potential synergies in planning, development, procurement, and deployment. We also note that BMD features in two Smart Defence projects.

60. As with all of NATO’s operations, full political control by Allies over military actions undertaken pursuant to this capability will be ensured. To this end, we will continue to deepen political oversight of NATO BMD as the capability develops. We welcome the completion of the Alliance’s review of the arrangements for NATO Interim BMD Capability and note that the Alliance will be ready to make use of additional Allied contributions as they are made available to the Alliance. We also task the Council to regularly review the implementation of the NATO BMD capability, including before the Foreign and Defence Ministers’ meetings, and prepare a comprehensive report on progress and issues to be addressed for its future development by our next Summit.

61. We remain prepared to engage with third states, on a case-by-case basis, to enhance transparency and confidence and to increase
ballistic missile defence effectiveness. Initial steps have been made and could lead to various forms of engagement with third states on missile defence. As we did in Chicago in 2012, we reaffirm that NATO missile defence is not directed against Russia and will not undermine Russia’s strategic deterrence capabilities. NATO missile defence is intended to defend against potential threats emanating from outside the Euro-Atlantic area.

62. The Alliance reaffirms its long-standing commitment to conventional arms control as a key element of Euro-Atlantic security and emphasises the importance of full implementation and compliance to rebuild trust and confidence. Russia’s unilateral military activity in and around Ukraine has undermined peace, security, and stability across the region, and its selective implementation of the Vienna Document and Open Skies Treaty and long-standing non-implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) have eroded the positive contributions of these arms control instruments. Allies call on Russia to fully adhere to its commitments. Allies are determined to preserve, strengthen, and modernise conventional arms control in Europe, based on key principles and commitments, including reciprocity, transparency, and host nation consent.

63. At our last Summit in Chicago we set ourselves the ambitious goal of NATO Forces 2020: modern, tightly connected forces equipped, trained, exercised, and commanded so as to be able to meet NATO’s Level of Ambition and so that they can operate together and with partners in any environment. We judge that the goal remains valid and reaffirm our commitment to delivering it. The Readiness Action Plan complements and reinforces NATO Forces 2020 by improving our overall readiness and responsiveness.

64. NATO needs, now more than ever, modern, robust, and capable forces at high readiness, in the air, on land and at sea, in order to meet current and future challenges. We are committed to further enhancing our capabilities. To this end, today we have agreed a Defence Planning Package with a number of priorities, such as enhancing and reinforcing training and exercises; command and control, including for demanding air operations; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; NATO’s ballistic missile defence capability, in accordance with the decisions taken at the 2010 Lisbon and 2012 Chicago Summits, including the voluntary nature of national contributions; cyber defence; as well as improving the robustness and readiness of our land forces for both collective defence and crisis response. Fulfilment of these priorities
will increase the Alliance’s collective capabilities and better prepare NATO to address current and future threats and challenges. We have agreed this Package in order to inform our defence investments and to improve the capabilities that Allies have in national inventories. In this context, NATO joint air power capabilities require longer-term consideration.

65. We continue to emphasise multinational cooperation. Following the Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) initiative launched at our Chicago Summit, work is on track to deliver an initial operational capability to support NATO operations and NATO Response Force rotations from 2016 onwards. In this context, we note the progress in the development of the Alliance Ground Surveillance capability that will become available for operational deployment in 2017. Furthermore, NATO’s Airborne Early Warning and Control Force will continue to be modernised to maintain its full operational capability. JISR exemplifies the advantages of multinational cooperation in capability development and employment among Allies, which allow for significant operational and cost benefits. In this spirit, several Allies are establishing a multinational MQ-9 remotely-piloted air system users group, in particular to enhance interoperability and reduce overall costs.

66. In a similar vein, we highlight the fact that, since we launched the Smart Defence initiative at our Chicago Summit, an ever growing number of multinational projects have been set up to help Allies harmonise requirements, pool resources, and achieve tangible benefits in terms of operational effectiveness as well as cost efficiency. We are building on this positive momentum, in particular to address Alliance priority capability requirements. Specifically, two groups of Allies have agreed to work on, respectively, increasing the availability of air-to-ground Precision Guided Munitions, and on the provision of a deployable airbase capability, and have signed Letters of Intent to this effect. A further two groups of Allies have decided to establish concrete projects for improving JISR information exchange in operations and ballistic missile defence, including naval training.

67. Today we have also endorsed the NATO Framework Nations Concept. It focuses on groups of Allies coming together to work multinationally for the joint development of forces and capabilities required by the Alliance, facilitated by a framework nation. Its implementation will contribute to providing the Alliance with coherent sets of forces and capabilities, particularly in Europe. It will help demonstrate European Allies’ willingness to do more for our
common security and also improve the balance of the provision of capabilities between the United States and European Allies as well as among European Allies themselves. To implement this concept, today, a group of ten Allies, facilitated by Germany as a framework nation and focusing on capability development, have, through a joint letter, committed to working systematically together, deepening and intensifying their cooperation in the long term, to create, in various configurations, a number of multinational projects to address Alliance priority areas across a broad spectrum of capabilities. They will initially concentrate on creating coherent sets of capabilities in the areas of logistics support; chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear protection; delivering fire-power from land, air, and sea; and deployable headquarters. Another group of seven Allies, facilitated by the United Kingdom as a framework nation, have also agreed today to establish the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), a rapidly deployable force capable of conducting the full spectrum of operations, including high intensity operations. The JEF will facilitate the efficient deployment of existing and emerging military capabilities and units. Additionally, a group of six Allies, facilitated by Italy as a framework nation and based on regional ties, will focus on improving a number of Alliance capability areas, such as stabilisation and reconstruction, provision of enablers, usability of land formations, and command and control. Other groupings are being developed in line with the Framework Nations Concept.

68. Two Allies have announced their intention to establish a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force, to be delivered from 2016 and to be available for the full spectrum of operations, including at high intensity.

69. We continue to build on the experience gained in recent operations and improve our interoperability through the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI). Today we have endorsed a substantial CFI Package consisting of six key deliverables, including the high-visibility exercise Trident Juncture 2015, with 25,000 personnel to be hosted by Spain, Portugal, and Italy; a broader and more demanding exercise programme from 2016 onwards; and a deployable Special Operations Component Command headquarters. As a key component in delivering NATO Forces 2020, the CFI addresses the full range of missions, including the most demanding, thereby demonstrating the continued cohesion and resolve of the Alliance. It provides the structure for Allies to train and exercise coherently; reinforces full-spectrum joint and combined training; promotes interoperability,
including with partners; and leverages advances in technology, such as the Federated Mission Networking framework, which will enhance information sharing in the Alliance and with partners in support of training, exercises and operations.

70. In this context, NATO will continue to work closely with the EU, as agreed, to ensure that our Smart Defence and the EU’s Pooling and Sharing initiatives are complementary and mutually reinforcing, and to support capability development and interoperability with a view to avoiding unnecessary duplication and maximising cost-effectiveness. We welcome the efforts of NATO nations and EU member states, in particular in the areas of strategic airlift and air-to-air refuelling, medical support, maritime surveillance, satellite communication, and training, as well as efforts of several nations in the area of remotely piloted aircraft systems. We also welcome the national efforts in these and other areas by European Allies and partners, which will benefit both organisations. The success of our efforts will continue to depend on mutual transparency and openness between the two organisations. We encourage making the fullest use of existing NATO-EU mechanisms to this effect.

71. The geopolitical and economic importance of the maritime domain in the 21st century continues to grow. NATO needs to adapt to a complex, more crowded, rapidly evolving, and increasingly unpredictable maritime security environment. This necessitates a strengthening of the Alliance’s maritime capabilities, which should not be seen in isolation but as an integral part of NATO’s larger toolbox to safeguard the Alliance’s interests. We will therefore continue to intensify and expand our implementation of the Alliance Maritime Strategy, further enhancing the Alliance’s effectiveness in the maritime domain and its contributions to deterrence and collective defence, crisis management, cooperative security, and maritime security. We will reinvigorate NATO’s Standing Naval Forces by making their composition and the duration of national contributions more flexible and, in principle, no longer using them for protracted operations or for operations with low-end tasks. In addition, we will enhance their education, training, and exercise value, especially at the high end of the spectrum. We will also investigate ways to enhance further the effectiveness of the full range of Alliance maritime capabilities. Greater co-ordination, cooperation, and complementarity with relevant international organisations, including the EU, in line with the relevant decisions taken, as well as work with partner and non-partner nations, will be an important element of the implementation of the Alliance
Maritime Strategy. We welcome the adoption of the EU’s Maritime Security Strategy in June 2014, which will potentially contribute to the security of all Allies.

72. As the Alliance looks to the future, cyber threats and attacks will continue to become more common, sophisticated, and potentially damaging. To face this evolving challenge, we have endorsed an Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy, contributing to the fulfilment of the Alliance’s core tasks. The policy reaffirms the principles of the indivisibility of Allied security and of prevention, detection, resilience, recovery, and defence. It recalls that the fundamental cyber defence responsibility of NATO is to defend its own networks, and that assistance to Allies should be addressed in accordance with the spirit of solidarity, emphasizing the responsibility of Allies to develop the relevant capabilities for the protection of national networks. Our policy also recognises that international law, including international humanitarian law and the UN Charter, applies in cyberspace. Cyber-attacks can reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security, and stability. Their impact could be as harmful to modern societies as a conventional attack. We affirm therefore that cyber defence is part of NATO’s core task of collective defence. A decision as to when a cyber-attack would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis.

73. We are committed to developing further our national cyber defence capabilities, and we will enhance the cyber security of national networks upon which NATO depends for its core tasks, in order to help make the Alliance resilient and fully protected. Close bilateral and multinational cooperation plays a key role in enhancing the cyber defence capabilities of the Alliance. We will continue to integrate cyber defence into NATO operations and operational and contingency planning, and enhance information sharing and situational awareness among Allies. Strong partnerships play a key role in addressing cyber threats and risks. We will therefore continue to engage actively on cyber issues with relevant partner nations on a case-by-case basis and with other international organisations, including the EU, as agreed, and will intensify our cooperation with industry through a NATO Industry Cyber Partnership. Technological innovations and expertise from the private sector are crucial to enable NATO and Allies to achieve the Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy’s objectives. We will improve the level of NATO’s cyber defence education, training, and exercise activities. We will develop the NATO cyber range capability,
building, as a first step, on the Estonian cyber range capability, while taking into consideration the capabilities and requirements of the NATO CIS School and other NATO training and education bodies.

74. NATO recognises the importance of inclusive, sustainable, innovative, and globally competitive defence industries, which include small and medium-sized enterprises, to develop and sustain national defence capabilities and the defence technological and industrial base in the whole of Europe and in North America.

75. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as well as their means of delivery, by states and non-state actors continues to present a threat to our populations, territory, and forces. The Alliance is resolved to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in a way that promotes international stability and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all. Addressing serious proliferation challenges remains an urgent international priority.

76. We call on Iran to seize the opportunity of the extension of the Joint Plan of Action until 24 November 2014 to make the strategic choices that will restore confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. We continue to call on Iran to comply fully with all its international obligations, including all relevant Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors. We also underscore the importance of Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA to resolve all outstanding issues, in particular those related to possible military dimensions of its nuclear programme.

77. We are deeply concerned by the nuclear and ballistic missiles programmes and proliferation activities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and call on it to comply fully with all relevant UNSCRs and the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks. We call on the DPRK to abandon all its existing nuclear and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner and immediately cease all related activities. We strongly condemn the DPRK’s December 2012 launch, which used ballistic missile technology, the nuclear test carried out by the DPRK in February 2013, and the various launches of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles since February 2014. We call on the DPRK to refrain from any further nuclear tests, launches using ballistic missile technology, or other provocations.
78. The upcoming 2015 NPT Review Conference is an opportunity for parties to reaffirm support for this Treaty and for its non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses pillars. Allies support efforts towards the success of this conference. We call for universal adherence to, and compliance with, the NPT and the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement and call for full implementation of UNSCR 1540 and welcome further work under UNSCR 1977. We call on all states to commit to combating effectively the proliferation of WMD through the universalisation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and through the Proliferation Security Initiative. We also call on all States to continue strengthening the security of nuclear materials and of radioactive sources within their borders, as they were called on to do by the Nuclear Security Summits of 2010 (Washington), 2012 (Seoul), and 2014 (The Hague). We will also ensure that NATO is postured to counter Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) threats, including through the Combined Joint CBRN Defence Task Force.

79. Terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries and to international stability and prosperity more broadly, and will remain a threat for the foreseeable future. It is a global threat that knows no border, nationality, or religion—a challenge that the international community must fight and tackle together. We reaffirm our commitment to fight terrorism with unwavering resolve in accordance with international law and the principles of the UN Charter. NATO Allies are exposed to a wide range of terrorist threats. NATO has a role to play, including through our military cooperation with partners to build their capacity to face such threats, and through enhanced information sharing. Without prejudice to national legislation or responsibilities, the Alliance strives at all times to remain aware of the evolving threat from terrorism; to ensure that it has adequate capabilities to prevent, protect against, and respond to terrorist threats; and to engage with partners and other international organisations, as appropriate, promoting common understanding and practical cooperation in support of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, including in areas such as Explosive Risk Management.

230 Initiative of former U.S. President Barack Obama for international cooperation in securing fissile materials and nuclear installations.
231 Adopted by the UN in 2006 as an overall strategy combining national, regional, and global efforts to combat terrorism. It consists of actions divided into four pillars: 1) Actions in areas conducive to the development of terrorism, 2) Preventing and
Building on our Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work, we will continue to improve our capabilities and technologies, including to defend against Improvised Explosive Devices and CBRN threats. We will keep terrorism and related threats high on NATO’s security agenda.

80. NATO Allies form a unique community of values, committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. The Alliance is convinced that these shared values and our security are strengthened when we work with our wide network of partners around the globe. We will continue to engage actively to enhance international security through partnership with relevant countries and other international organisations, in accordance with our Berlin Partnership Policy.

81. Partnerships are, and will continue to be, essential to the way NATO works. Partners have served with us in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and other operations, sacrificing alongside Alliance troops, and work with us in combating terrorism and piracy. Partners make significant contributions to our practical cooperation activities in a number of different areas, including Trust Funds. Together with our partners, we have built a broad cooperative security network. Allies are resolved to maintain and build on this legacy, as our partnerships play a crucial role in the promotion of international peace and security. At this Summit, we therefore collectively pledge to strengthen the political dialogue and practical cooperation with our partners who share our vision for cooperative security in an international order based on the rule of law. We will continue to build defence capacity and interoperability through such initiatives as the Defence Education Enhancement Programme and the Professional Development Programme. We will also continue to promote transparency, accountability, and integrity in the defence sectors of interested nations through the Building Integrity programme.

82. This year we celebrate twenty years of the Partnership for Peace (PfP). PfP and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council are, and will continue to be, a part of our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. They have forged political ties across Europe, through the Caucasus and into Central Asia; they have also been the foundation for practical cooperation to address common threats to our shared security, including in the field of human security. This cooperation combating terrorism, 3) Developing the capacity of States to fight and prevent terrorism and strengthening the role of the UN, 4) Strengthening the human rights system and the rule of law.
was driven, at heart, by the common values and principles to which Allies and partners have all committed in the PfP founding documents. They include the promise to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, to respect internationally recognised borders, and to settle disputes by peaceful means. These principles are as important as ever today and must be upheld unequivocally across the Euro-Atlantic community.

83. We reaffirm our commitment to the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) and the principles that underpin them; MD and ICI remain two complementary yet distinct partnership frameworks. We look forward to deepening our political dialogue and practical cooperation in both fora, building on many years of steady progress. We remain open to welcoming new members from the Mediterranean and the broader Middle East region to these frameworks.

84. This year we also celebrate twenty years of the Mediterranean Dialogue. Today, as the Mediterranean region faces huge security challenges with wide-ranging implications for Euro-Atlantic security, the importance of this forum, which brings together key countries from NATO’s southern border, is clearer than ever. Enhancing the political dimension of MD will help to address the challenges of the region. We stand ready to continue working with our MD partners to make the most of the opportunities offered by their partnership with NATO, including individual partnership and cooperation programmes.

85. We also celebrate ten years of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, which has helped to promote understanding and security cooperation with our partners in the Gulf region. We encourage our ICI partner countries to be proactive in taking full advantage of the opportunities offered by their partnership with NATO, including individual partnership and cooperation programmes.

86. We will also intensify efforts to engage with and reach out to those partners across the globe that can contribute significantly to addressing shared security concerns. The Berlin Partnership Policy has created increased opportunities for these countries to work individually with NATO at the political and practical level. We welcome that some of our partners across the globe have seized these opportunities by providing support to operations and engaging in security cooperation and dialogue to enhance common understanding of our shared security interests.
87. We will likewise look to further develop relations with relevant regional international organisations, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League, and be open to engaging with others, including in the context of regional crisis situations.

88. As combat operations end in Afghanistan, we will ensure that the bonds forged between Allied and partner nations’ armed forces remain as strong as ever. We have fought together. Now we will focus on preparing and training together. We have therefore adopted a comprehensive Partnership Interoperability Initiative to enhance our ability to tackle security challenges together with our partners. Here in Wales, our Defence Ministers launched the Interoperability Platform, meeting with 24 partners\textsuperscript{232} that have demonstrated their commitment to reinforce their interoperability with NATO. These partners have been invited to work with us to take forward dialogue and practical cooperation on interoperability issues. Defence Ministers also met with five partners\textsuperscript{233} that make particularly significant contributions to NATO operations to discuss further deepening dialogue and practical cooperation as part of the enhanced opportunities within the Partnership Interoperability Initiative. We stand ready to consider the addition of other partners as their contributions and interests warrant.

89. Today we have decided to launch a Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative to reinforce our commitment to partner nations and to help the Alliance to project stability without deploying large combat forces, as part of the Alliance’s overall contribution to international security and stability and conflict prevention. The Initiative builds upon NATO’s extensive expertise in supporting, advising and assisting nations with defence and related security capacity building. Building on our close cooperation and following their requests, we have agreed to extend this initiative to Georgia, Jordan, and the Republic of Moldova. We are also ready to consider requests from interested partners and non-partners, as well as to engage with international and regional organisations, with an interest in building their defence and related security capacity through this demand-driven initiative. We reaffirm NATO’s readiness to provide defence and related security capacity advisory support for Libya when

\textsuperscript{232} Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, New Zealand, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine, and the United Arab Emirates.

\textsuperscript{233} Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan, and Sweden.
conditions permit. We will pursue these efforts in complementarity and close cooperation with other international organisations, in particular the UN, the EU, and the OSCE, as appropriate. Some partner nations themselves can bring unique partner insight and contributions to NATO capacity building efforts. We welcome the appointment of NATO’s Deputy Secretary General as Special Coordinator for Defence Capacity Building, as well as the establishment of a military hub in the NATO Command Structure, to help ensure a timely, coherent and effective NATO response, taking into account efforts by partners and individual Allies, on a voluntary basis.

90. We attach great importance to ensuring women’s full and active participation in the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts, as well as in post-conflict efforts and cooperation. We remain committed to preventing conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence. Since our last Summit in Chicago, we have made significant progress in implementing UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and related resolutions. We are now implementing the results of the Review of the Practical Implications of UNSCR 1325 for the Conduct of Operations. A revised Policy and Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security have been developed with our partners in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and with other partners. The establishment of a permanent position of NATO Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security underscores the Alliance’s active engagement and commitment to this agenda. NATO's cooperation with partner nations, international organisations, and civil society has been strengthened and should be further enhanced. Our ongoing efforts to integrate gender perspectives into Alliance activities throughout NATO’s three core tasks will contribute to a more modern, ready, and responsive NATO. We have directed the Council to submit a progress report on NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions for our next Summit.

91. We recall NATO's firm commitment to the implementation of UNSCR 1612 and related resolutions on the protection of children affected by armed conflict and remain deeply concerned about the damaging effects of armed conflicts on children. NATO will continue to carry out its responsibilities as part of the wider international effort and to build on initiatives already taken to properly integrate this issue into the planning and conduct of its operations and missions, as well as its training, monitoring, and reporting. Therefore, in close cooperation with the UN, NATO will assess how to ensure it is

234 Afghanistan, Australia, Japan, Jordan, New Zealand and the United Arab Emirates.
sufficiently prepared whenever and wherever the issue of Children and Armed Conflict is likely to be encountered.

92. The Open Door Policy under Article 10 of the Washington Treaty is one of the Alliance's great successes. Successive rounds of NATO enlargement have enhanced the security and stability of all our nations. The steady progress of Euro-Atlantic integration fosters reform, strengthens collective security, and ensures the stability necessary for prosperity. NATO's door will remain open to all European democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, which are in a position to further the principles of the Treaty, and whose inclusion will contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. We reaffirm our strong commitment to the Euro-Atlantic integration of the partners that aspire to join the Alliance, judging each on its own merits. Decisions on enlargement are for NATO itself. We encourage partners to continue to implement the necessary reforms and decisions to advance their aspirations and prepare for membership, and we will continue to offer political and practical support to their efforts. Today we have endorsed decisions that take forward our Open Door Policy based on progress by individual partners that aspire to join the Alliance.

93. NATO recognises Georgia's significant efforts to strengthen its democracy and to modernise its military forces and defence institutions. We welcome the democratic development of Georgia, including through the peaceful transfer of power following parliamentary and presidential elections in 2012 and 2013, respectively. We encourage Georgia to continue implementation of reforms, including consolidating democratic institutions, taking forward judicial reforms, and ensuring full respect for the rule of law. NATO highly appreciates Georgia's sizeable contribution to the ISAF operation and recognises the sacrifices Georgian troops have made in Afghanistan. Together with Georgia's offer to participate in the NATO Response Force, these contributions demonstrate Georgia's role as a contributor to our shared security. At the 2008 Bucharest Summit we agreed that Georgia will become a member of NATO and we reaffirm all elements of that decision, as well as subsequent decisions. Since then, Georgia has made significant progress and has come closer to NATO by implementing ambitious reforms and making good use of the NATO-Georgia Commission and Annual National Programme. We note that Georgia's relationship with the Alliance contains the tools necessary to continue moving Georgia forward towards eventual membership.
Today we have endorsed a substantial package for Georgia that includes defence capacity building, training, exercises, strengthened liaison, and enhanced interoperability opportunities. These measures aim to strengthen Georgia’s defence and interoperability capabilities with the Alliance, which will help Georgia advance in its preparations towards membership in the Alliance.

94. We reiterate our continued support to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia within its internationally recognised borders. We welcome Georgia’s full compliance with the EU-mediated cease-fire agreement and other multilateral measures to build confidence. We welcome Georgia’s commitment not to use force and call on Russia to reciprocate. We continue to call on Russia to reverse its recognition of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia as independent states and to withdraw its forces from Georgia. We encourage all participants in the Geneva talks to play a constructive role as well as to continue working closely with the OSCE, the UN, and the EU to pursue peaceful conflict resolution in the internationally recognised territory of Georgia.

95. We welcome the significant progress made by Montenegro in its reforms, its constructive role in the Western Balkans region and the contribution that it makes to international security, including its contribution to our engagement in Afghanistan. In recognition of Montenegro’s progress towards NATO membership, the Alliance has agreed to open intensified and focused talks with Montenegro, and agreed that Foreign Ministers will assess Montenegro’s progress no later than by the end of 2015 with a view to deciding on whether to invite Montenegro to join the Alliance. These talks will be conducted in conjunction with the Membership Action Plan (MAP) process. In the meantime, we look to Montenegro to continue its efforts to address the remaining challenges, particularly with respect to rule of law and completing security sector reform. We also welcome the increase in public support in Montenegro for NATO membership and encourage continued efforts in this area.

96. We reiterate the agreement at our 2008 Bucharest Summit, as we did at subsequent Summits, to extend an invitation to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to join the Alliance as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached within the framework of the UN, and strongly urge intensified efforts towards that end. An early solution, and subsequent membership, will contribute to security and stability in the region. We encourage

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235 Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
and support the continuation of reform efforts within the country, particularly with a view to ensuring effective democratic dialogue, media freedom, judicial independence, and a fully-functioning multi-ethnic society based on full implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. We also encourage further efforts to develop good neighbourly relations. We appreciate the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's long-standing contribution to our operations and its active role in regional cooperation. We value the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's long-standing commitment to the NATO accession process.

97. We continue to fully support the membership aspirations of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We look forward to free and fair general elections in October, which we hope will lead to an efficient and effective government coalition, ready to address the issues related to the country’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations. We acknowledge the efforts undertaken since 2012 to come to a political agreement on registering the immovable defence property to the state. We remain concerned that little progress has been achieved to comply with the condition set by NATO Foreign Ministers in Tallinn in April 2010. As Allied Foreign Ministers will keep developments under active review, we encourage the leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina to take the necessary steps in that regard so that its first MAP cycle can be activated as soon as possible. We appreciate Bosnia and Herzegovina’s contributions to NATO-led operations, and we commend its constructive role in regional dialogue and security.

98. Here in Wales, our Foreign Ministers have met their counterparts from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Montenegro, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Ministers discussed the progress made by these countries, the Euro-Atlantic integration process, and other key Summit issues, including the international security situation. NATO is grateful to these partners for the significant contributions that they continue to make to NATO’s objectives and to international security and stability.

99. In light of NATO’s operational experiences and the evolving complex security environment, a comprehensive political, civilian, and military approach is essential in crisis management and cooperative security. Furthermore, it contributes to the effectiveness of our common security and defence, without prejudice to Alliance collective defence commitments. Today we reaffirm our decisions taken at the Lisbon and Chicago Summits. The comprehensive approach is conducive to more coherence within NATO’s own structures and activities.
Furthermore, NATO has developed a modest but appropriate civilian capability in line with Lisbon Summit decisions. As part of NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach by the international community, we will enhance cooperation with partner nations and other actors, including other international organisations, such as the UN, the EU and the OSCE, as well as non-governmental organisations, in line with decisions taken. We will ensure that comprehensive approach-related lessons learned, including from ISAF, will be carried forward and applied in various strands of work and new initiatives, including, as appropriate, the Readiness Action Plan, the Connected Forces Initiative, the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative, and the Partnership Interoperability Initiative.

100. In the spirit of the comprehensive approach and in light of a changing security environment in Europe, our Foreign Ministers met with the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office and the Secretary General of the Council of Europe to discuss closer cooperation. At a time when the values and principles that underpin the major institutions in the Euro-Atlantic area are being challenged, Allies emphasised the need to work together to ensure our shared goal of a Europe whole, free and at peace. We look forward to continuing the dialogue to advance this further.

101. NATO’s cooperation with the United Nations (UN) strengthens international security. We welcome our regular political dialogue on areas of common interest. We are encouraged by the growing practical cooperation between the staffs of our organisations, including exchanges of best practices and lessons learned in operations, training and exercises, and sharing of expertise. We are committed to exploring ways to reinforce our practical support to UN peace operations, including by enhancing cooperation between NATO and the UN in building defence and related security capacity.

102. The European Union (EU) remains a unique and essential partner for NATO. The two organisations share common values and strategic interests. In a spirit of full mutual openness, transparency, complementarity, and respect for the autonomy and institutional integrity of both NATO and the EU, and as agreed by the two organisations, we will continue to work side-by-side in crisis management operations, broaden political consultations, and promote complementarity of the two organisations to enhance common security and stability. The current strategic environment has highlighted the need for further strengthening our strategic
partnership and reinforcing our joint efforts and our common message.

103. NATO recognises the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence, which will lead to a stronger NATO, help enhance the security of all Allies and foster an equitable sharing of the burden, benefits and responsibilities of Alliance membership. In this context, we welcome the EU member states’ decisions to strengthen European defence and crisis management, including at the European Council in December 2013.

104. We look forward to continued dialogue and cooperation between NATO and the EU. Our consultations have broadened to address issues of common concern, including security challenges like cyber defence, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, counter-terrorism, and energy security. We will also seek to work more closely together in several other areas, including maritime security, defence and related security capacity building, and addressing hybrid threats, in line with decisions taken.

105. Non-EU Allies continue to make significant contributions to the EU’s efforts to strengthen its capacities to address common security challenges. For the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, non-EU Allies’ fullest involvement in these efforts is essential. We encourage further mutual steps in this area to support a strengthened strategic partnership.

106. We welcome the Secretary General’s report on NATO-EU relations. We encourage him to continue to work closely with the EU High Representative and the leaders of other EU institutions across the broad spectrum of the NATO-EU strategic partnership and provide a report to the Council in time for the next Summit.

107. As demonstrated most recently by its activities in the framework of the Russia-Ukraine crisis, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) plays an important role in addressing the security challenges in the Euro-Atlantic area. We fully support efforts undertaken by the OSCE and continue to work closely with the OSCE in areas such as conflict prevention and resolution, post conflict rehabilitation and in addressing new security threats. We are committed to further enhancing our cooperation, both at the political and operational level, in all areas of common interest.

108. We welcome the increasing emphasis by the African Union (AU) on addressing transnational security threats, and its growing efforts to build the African capacity to rapidly respond to emerging conflicts. We encourage deeper political and practical cooperation
between NATO and the AU to support the African Union in establishing a more robust African peace and security capacity. Based on the AU’s request, NATO will continue to provide technical support and stands ready to explore, in consultation with the AU, opportunities to expand our logistical, training, and planning assistance in support of African peacekeepers. We welcome the recent progress in establishing a sound legal framework for NATO-AU cooperation.

109. A stable and reliable energy supply, the diversification of routes, suppliers and energy resources, and the interconnectivity of energy networks remain of critical importance. While these issues are primarily the responsibility of national governments and other international organisations, NATO closely follows relevant developments in energy security, including in relation to the Russia-Ukraine crisis and the growing instability in the Middle East and North Africa region. We will continue to consult on and further develop our capacity to contribute to energy security, concentrating on areas where NATO can add value. In particular, we will enhance our awareness of energy developments with security implications for Allies and the Alliance; further develop NATO’s competence in supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure; and continue to work towards significantly improving the energy efficiency of our military forces, and in this regard we note the Green Defence Framework. We will also enhance training and education efforts, continue to engage with partner countries, on a case-by-case basis, and consult with relevant international organisations, including the EU, as appropriate. Today we have noted a progress report on NATO’s role in energy security and we task the Council to continue to refine NATO’s role in energy security in accordance with the principles and guidelines agreed at the Bucharest Summit and the direction provided by subsequent Summits and the Strategic Concept. We task the Council to produce a further progress report for our next Summit.

110. Key environmental and resource constraints, including health risks, climate change, water scarcity, and increasing energy needs will further shape the future security environment in areas of concern to NATO and have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations.

111. At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, Allies agreed on an ambitious reform programme, encompassing reviews of the Agencies and NATO Command Structure; resource reform; Headquarters reform; and an end-to-end review of all structures engaged in NATO capability development. Heads of State and Government took stock of progress
at the 2012 Chicago Summit. Since then, NATO has continued to reform by instituting new policies, overhauling its structures, and streamlining procedures to improve efficiency and to ensure our Alliance is responsive and agile against the diverse challenges and threats it faces.

112. NATO has adapted to drive further financial reform, harnessed the best efforts of our International Staff and International Military Staff, developed its NATO Command Structure, and achieved a greater level of coherence between its Agencies. While significant progress has been made in the reform of the Alliance, ongoing initiatives still need to be fully delivered and further efforts will be required. We have tasked further work in the areas of delivery of common funded capabilities, reform governance and transparency and accountability, especially in the management of NATO’s financial resources. We look forward to a further report on progress on these reforms by the time of our next Summit.

113. We express our appreciation for the generous hospitality extended to us by the Government of the United Kingdom and the people of Wales. The decisions we have taken at our Summit will help to keep our nations and populations safe, the bond between Europe and North America strong, and our region and the world stable. We will meet again in Poland in 2016.

II. Military risks and military threats encountered by the Russian Federation

9. World development at the present stage is characterized by the strengthening of global competition, tensions in various areas of inter-state and interregional interaction, rivalry of proclaimed values and models of development, instability of the processes of economic and political development at the global and regional levels against a background of general complication of international relations. There is a stage-by-stage redistribution of influence in favour of new centres of economic growth and political attraction.

10. Many regional conflicts remain unresolved. There is a continuing tendency towards their resolution with the use of force, including in regions bordering the Russian Federation. The existing international security architecture (system) does not ensure equal security for all states.

11. There is a tendency towards shifting the military risks and military threats to the information space and the internal sphere of the Russian Federation. At the same time, despite the fact that unleashing of a large-scale war against the Russian Federation becomes less probable, in a number of areas the military risks encountered by the Russian Federation are increasing.

12. The main external military risks are:
   a) build-up of the power potential of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and vesting NATO with global functions carried out in violation of the rules of international law, bringing the military infrastructure of NATO member countries near the borders of the Russian Federation, including by further expansion of the alliance;
   b) destabilization of the situation in individual states and regions and undermining of global and regional stability;
   c) deployment (build-up) of military contingents of foreign states (groups of states) in the territories of states contiguous with the Russian Federation and its allies, as well as in adjacent waters.

[...]

236 Formal preface and definitions have been omitted.

237 In other words, a shift of power.
including for exerting political and military pressure on the Russian Federation;

d) establishment and deployment of strategic missile defence systems undermining global stability and violating the established balance of forces related to nuclear missiles, implementation of the global strike concept, intention to place weapons in outer space, as well as deployment of strategic non-nuclear systems of high-precision weapons;

e) territorial claims against the Russian Federation and its allies and interference in their internal affairs;

f) proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missiles and missile technologies;

g) violation of international agreements by individual states, as well as non-compliance with previously concluded international treaties in the field of arms prohibition, limitation and reduction;

h) use of military force in the territories of states contiguous with the Russian Federation and its allies in violation of the UN Charter and other norms of international law;

i) existence (emergence) of seats of armed conflict and escalation of such conflicts in the territories of states contiguous with the Russian Federation and its allies;

j) growing threat of global extremism (terrorism) and its new manifestations under the conditions of insufficiently effective international anti-terrorist cooperation, real threat of terrorist acts with use of radioactive and toxic chemical agents, expansion of transnational organized crime, primarily of illicit arms and drugs trafficking;

k) existence (emergence) of seats of inter-ethnic and inter-confessional tensions, activities of radical international armed groupings and international private military companies in areas adjacent to the state border of the Russian Federation and the borders of its allies, as well as territorial contradictions and upsurge in separatism and extremism in some regions of the world;

l) use of information and communication technologies for the military-political purposes to take actions which run counter to international law, being aimed against sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity of states and posing threat to the international peace, security, global and regional stability;

m) establishment of regimes, which policies threaten the interests of the Russian Federation in the states contiguous with the Russian Federation, including by overthrowing legitimate state administration bodies;
n) subversive operations of special services and organizations of foreign states and their coalitions against the Russian Federation.

13. The main internal military risks are:
   a) activities aimed at changing by force the constitutional system of the Russian Federation; destabilizing domestic political and social situation in the country; disrupting the functioning of state administration bodies, important state and military facilities, and information infrastructure of the Russian Federation;
   b) activities of terrorist organizations and individuals aimed at undermining the sovereignty and violating the unity and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation;
   c) subversive information activities against the population, especially young citizens of the State, aimed at undermining historical, spiritual and patriotic traditions related to the defence of the Motherland;
   d) provoking inter-ethnic and social tensions, extremism, stirring up ethnic and religious hatred or enmity.

14. The main military threats are:
   a) drastic aggravation of the military-political situation (interstate relations) and creation of conditions for using military force;
   b) impeding the operation of systems of state governance and military command and control of the Russian Federation, disruption the functioning of its strategic nuclear forces, missile warning systems, systems of outer space monitoring, nuclear munitions storage facilities, nuclear energy facilities, nuclear, chemical, pharmaceutical and medical industry facilities and other potentially dangerous facilities;
   c) creation and training of illegal armed formations and their activities in the territory of the Russian Federation or in the territories of its allies;
   d) demonstration of military force in the course of exercises in the territories of states contiguous with the Russian Federation or its allies;
   e) intensification of activities of the armed forces of individual states (groups of states) involving partial or full mobilization and shifting the governance and military command and control bodies of these states to functioning as in wartime conditions.

[...]238


238 Sections concerning RF defence policy, military and economic provisions of defence, and the conclusion have been omitted.
II. Russia in the Modern World

7. State policy in the sphere of the safeguarding of national security and the socioeconomic development of the Russian Federation contributes to the implementation of the strategic national priorities and the effective protection of national interests. A solid basis has been created at this time for further increasing the Russian Federation's economic, political, military, and spiritual potentials and for enhancing its role in shaping a polycentric world.

8. Russia has demonstrated the ability to safeguard sovereignty, independence, and state and territorial integrity and to protect the rights of compatriots abroad. There has been an increase in the Russian Federation's role in resolving the most important international problems, settling military conflicts, and ensuring strategic stability and the supremacy of international law in interstate relations.

9. Russia's economy has demonstrated the ability to maintain and strengthen its potential in conditions of world economic instability and the application of the restrictive economic measures introduced against the Russian Federation by a number of countries.

10. Positive trends have been observed in resolving tasks relating to the strengthening of citizens' health. Natural population growth and an increase in average life expectancy can be seen.

11. Traditional Russian spiritual and moral values are being revived. A proper attitude toward Russia's history is being shaped in the rising generation. We are seeing the consolidation of civil society around the common values that shape the foundations of statehood such as Russia's freedom and independence, humanism, interethnic peace and accord, the unity of the cultures of the Russian Federation's multiethnic people, respect for family and faith traditions, and patriotism.

12. The strengthening of Russia is taking place against a backdrop of new threats to national security that are of a multifarious and interconnected nature. The Russian Federation's implementation of an
independent foreign and domestic policy is giving rise to opposition from the United States and its allies, who are seeking to retain their dominance in world affairs. The policy of containing Russia that they are implementing envisions the exertion of political, economic, military, and informational pressure on it.

13. The process of shaping a new polycentric model of the world order is being accompanied by an increase in global and regional instability. We are seeing an exacerbation of contradictions linked to the unevenness of world development, the deepening of the gap between countries’ levels of prosperity, the struggle for resources, access to markets, and control over transportation arteries. The competition between states is increasingly encompassing social development values and models and human, scientific, and technological potentials. Leadership in exploiting the resources of the world’s oceans and the Arctic is acquiring particular significance in this process. An entire spectrum of political, financial-economic, and informational instruments have been set in motion in the struggle for influence in the international arena. Increasingly active use is being made of special services’ potential.

14. The role of force as a factor in international relations is not declining. The aspiration to build up and modernize offensive weaponry and develop and deploy new types of it is weakening the system of global security and also the system of treaties and agreements in the arms control sphere. The principles of equal and indivisible security are not being observed in the Euro-Atlantic, Eurasian, and Asia-Pacific regions. Militarization and arms-race processes are developing in regions adjacent to Russia.

15. The buildup of the military potential of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the endowment of it with global functions pursued in violation of the norms of international law, the galvanization of the bloc countries’ military activity, the further expansion of the alliance, and the location of its military infrastructure closer to Russian borders are creating a threat to national security.

The opportunities for maintaining global and regional stability are shrinking significantly with the siting in Europe, the Asia-Pacific region, and the Near East of components of the US missile defence system in the conditions of the practical implementation of the “global strike” concept and the deployment of strategic nonnuclear precision weapon systems and also in the event that weapons are deployed in space.
16. The persisting bloc approach to solving international problems is not helping to counter the entire range of present-day challenges and threats. The increase in migration flows from African and Near Eastern countries to Europe has demonstrated the non-viability of the regional security system in the Euro-Atlantic Region based on NATO and the European Union.

17. The West’s stance aimed at countering integration processes and creating seats of tension in the Eurasian region is exerting a negative influence on the realization of Russian national interests. The support of the United States and the European Union for the anti-constitutional coup d’état in Ukraine led to a deep split in Ukrainian society and the emergence of an armed conflict. The strengthening of far right nationalist ideology, the deliberate shaping in the Ukrainian population of an image of Russia as an enemy, the undisguised gamble on the forcible resolution of intrastate contradictions, and the deep socioeconomic crisis are turning Ukraine into a chronic seat of instability in Europe and in the immediate vicinity of Russia’s borders.

18. The practice of overthrowing legitimate political regimes and provoking intrastate instability and conflicts is becoming increasingly widespread. In addition to the persisting seats of tension in the Near and Middle East, Africa, South Asia, and the Korean peninsula, new “hot spots” are emerging, and zones that are not controlled by any states’ authorities are expanding. Territories affected by armed conflicts are becoming the basis for the spread of terrorism, interethnic strife, religious enmity, and other manifestations of extremism. The emergence of the terrorist organization calling itself Islamic State and the strengthening of its influence is the result of the policy of double standards to which some states adhere in the sphere of the fight against terrorism.

19. There is a continuing risk of an increase in the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons and of the proliferation and utilization of chemical weapons, and also uncertainty about instances of foreign states’ possession of biological weapons and their potential for developing and producing them. The network of US military-biological laboratories on the territory of states adjacent to Russia is being expanded.

20. The critical condition of the physical intactness of dangerous facilities and materials, particularly in states with an unstable domestic political situation, and the uncontrolled proliferation of conventional weapons are increasing the likelihood of them falling into terrorists’ hands.
21. The intensifying confrontation in the global information arena caused by some countries’ aspiration to utilize informational and communication technologies to achieve their geopolitical objectives, including by manipulating public awareness and falsifying history, is exerting an increasing influence on the nature of the international situation.

22. New forms of unlawful activity are emerging, particularly those involving the utilization of informational, communications, and high technologies. Threats linked to uncontrolled and illegal migration, human trafficking, drug trafficking, and other manifestations of transnational organized crime are intensifying.

23. The world's demographic situation and problems relating to the environment and food security are becoming more complex. The shortage of fresh water and the consequences of climate change are becoming more tangible. Epidemics are becoming widespread, many of them caused by new and previously unknown viruses.

24. The growing influence of political factors on economic processes and also attempts by individual states to utilize economic methods and instruments of financial, trade, investment, and technological policy to resolve their own geopolitical tasks are weakening the stability of the system of international economic relations. A high risk of a repetition of large-scale financial and economic crises persists against the backdrop of structural imbalances in the world economy and financial system, growing sovereign debt, and volatility in the energy market.

25. In response to the growth of international instability, states are increasingly frequently assuming responsibility for matters in their regions. Regional and sub-regional trade and other economic agreements are becoming one of the most important means of protection against crisis phenomena. There is a growing interest in the utilization of regional currencies.

26. In order to avert threats to national security the Russian Federation is focusing efforts on strengthening the internal unity of Russian society, ensuring social stability, interethnic accord, and religious tolerance, eliminating structural imbalances and modernizing the economy, and improving the country’s defence capability.

27. With a view to protecting its national interests Russia is pursuing an open, rational, and pragmatic foreign policy ruling out costly confrontation (including a new arms race).

28. The Russian Federation builds its international relations on the principles of international law, the ensuring of states’ reliable and
equal security, peoples’ mutual respect, and the preservation of the
diversity of their cultures, traditions, and interests. Russia is interested
in developing mutually advantageous and equal trade and economic
cooperation with foreign states and is a responsible participant in the
system of multilateral trade. The Russian Federation’s objective is to
acquire as many equal partners as possible in various parts of the
world.

29. In the sphere of international security Russia remains committed
to the utilization of primarily political and legal instruments and
diplomatic and peacekeeping mechanisms. The utilization of military
force to protect national interests is possible only if all adopted
measures of a nonviolent nature have proved ineffective.

[...]

Source: Russian National Security Strategy, December 2015—Full-text Translation,
www.russiamatters.org/sites/default/files/media/files/2015%20National%20Security

240 Sections concerning national interests and strategic priorities, methods of
ensuring security, organisational, legal and information bases, and security
assessment criteria have been omitted.
Warsaw Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8–9 July 2016

1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Warsaw at a defining moment for the security of our nations and populations. We are pleased to have been joined by Montenegro, which we have invited to become the 29th member of our Alliance.

2. NATO’s essential mission is unchanged: to ensure that the Alliance remains an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security, and shared values, including individual liberty, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. We are united in our commitment to the Washington Treaty, the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations (UN), and the vital transatlantic bond. To protect and defend our indivisible security and our common values, the Alliance must and will continue fulfilling effectively all three core tasks as set out in the Strategic Concept: collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security. These tasks remain fully relevant, are complementary, and contribute to safeguarding the freedom and security of all Allies.

3. We owe a deep debt of gratitude to all the brave men and women from Allied and partner nations who have served or are serving in NATO-led missions and operations and in Allies’ missions and operations that contribute to the security of the Alliance. We honour all those who have been wounded or paid the ultimate sacrifice while serving our common purposes and values.

4. Since our last Summit in Wales in 2014, we have taken a range of steps to reinforce our collective defence, enhance our capabilities, and strengthen our resilience. We have committed to providing our armed forces with sufficient and sustained resources. Today, faced with an increasingly diverse, unpredictable, and demanding security environment, we have taken further action to defend our territory and protect our populations, project stability beyond our borders, and continue the political, military, and institutional adaptation of our Alliance.

5. There is an arc of insecurity and instability along NATO’s periphery and beyond. The Alliance faces a range of security
challenges and threats that originate both from the east and from the south; from state and non-state actors; from military forces and from terrorist, cyber, or hybrid attacks. Russia’s aggressive actions, including provocative military activities in the periphery of NATO territory and its demonstrated willingness to attain political goals by the threat and use of force, are a source of regional instability, fundamentally challenge the Alliance, have damaged Euro-Atlantic security, and threaten our long-standing goal of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. Our security is also deeply affected by the security situation in the Middle East and North Africa, which has deteriorated significantly across the whole region. Terrorism, particularly as perpetrated by the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Da’esh, has risen to an unprecedented level of intensity, reaches into all of Allied territory, and now represents an immediate and direct threat to our nations and the international community. Instability in the Middle East and North Africa also contributes to the refugee and migrant crisis.

6. The changed and evolving security environment demands the ability to meet challenges and threats of any kind and from any direction. Based on solidarity, Alliance cohesion, and the indivisibility of our security, NATO remains the transatlantic framework for strong collective defence and the essential forum for security consultations and decisions among Allies. The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territory and our populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. And so renewed emphasis has been placed on deterrence and collective defence. At the same time, NATO must retain its ability to respond to crises beyond its borders, and remain actively engaged in projecting stability and enhancing international security through working with partners and other international organisations.

7. Allies confront a wide range of terrorist challenges that pose a direct threat to the security of our populations, and to international stability and prosperity more broadly. In the past months, we have faced terrible terrorist attacks on our soils and in our cities. In particular, ISIL/Da’esh poses a grave threat to the wider Middle East and North Africa region and to our own nations. In response, all NATO Allies and many NATO partners are contributing to the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. Thanks to that determined action, the Global Coalition campaign has made considerable progress, building on our experience in working together and with partners in NATO-led operations, training, and exercises. ISIL/Da’esh is losing territory,
control of strategic supply routes and resources, as well as its leaders, fighters, and followers. To ensure ISIL/Da'esh’s lasting defeat, our nations remain committed to sustaining the momentum and work of the Global Coalition. In this context, it is important for the Iraqi authorities to continue to promote policies to ensure inclusivity at all levels of government, including the defence and security forces. We also recognise that an effective and enduring fight against ISIL/Da'esh in Syria will only be possible with a legitimate government in place, and stress the need for an immediate and genuine political transition in this country. We condemn ISIL/Da'esh’s unrelenting barbaric attacks against all civilian populations, in particular the systematic and deliberate targeting of entire religious and ethnic communities. We also condemn in the strongest terms ISIL/Da'esh’s violent and cowardly acts in Allied territory. If the security of any Ally is threatened, we will not hesitate to take all necessary steps to ensure our collective defence. In light of the dramatic humanitarian consequences of this crisis and its repercussions on regional stability and security, Allies are offering security and humanitarian assistance across the region.

8. The global threat of terrorism knows no border, nationality, or religion. We will continue to fight this threat in accordance with international law and the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, with determination, and in solidarity with those Allies and partners that have been victims of terrorist attacks. We are ready to do more to counter this threat, including by helping our partners provide for their own security, defend against terrorism, and build resilience against attack. While we enhance our cooperation to prevent, mitigate, and respond effectively to terrorist attacks, including through our efforts to project stability, we are also mindful of the need to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism.

9. For over two decades, NATO has striven to build a partnership with Russia, including through the mechanism of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). Russia’s recent activities and policies have reduced stability and security, increased unpredictability, and changed the security environment. While NATO stands by its international commitments, Russia has breached the values, principles and commitments which underpin the NATO-Russia relationship, as outlined in the 1997 Basic Document of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, and 2002 Rome Declaration, broken the trust at the core of our cooperation, and challenged the fundamental principles of the global and Euro-Atlantic
security architecture. Decisions we have taken, including here at our Summit, are fully consistent with our international commitments, and therefore cannot be regarded by anyone as contradicting the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

10. Russia’s destabilising actions and policies include: the ongoing illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea, which we do not and will not recognise and which we call on Russia to reverse; the violation of sovereign borders by force; the deliberate destabilisation of eastern Ukraine; large-scale snap exercises contrary to the spirit of the Vienna Document, and provocative military activities near NATO borders, including in the Baltic and Black Sea regions and the Eastern Mediterranean; its irresponsible and aggressive nuclear rhetoric, military concept and underlying posture; and its repeated violations of NATO Allied airspace. In addition, Russia’s military intervention, significant military presence and support for the regime in Syria, and its use of its military presence in the Black Sea to project power into the Eastern Mediterranean have posed further risks and challenges for the security of Allies and others.

11. NATO has responded to this changed security environment by enhancing its deterrence and defence posture, including by a forward presence in the eastern part of the Alliance, and by suspending all practical civilian and military cooperation between NATO and Russia, while remaining open to political dialogue with Russia. We reaffirm these decisions.

12. As we agreed, talking to Russia allows us to communicate clearly our positions, with the crisis in and around Ukraine being, in current circumstances, the first topic on our agenda. We remain open to a periodic, focused and meaningful dialogue with a Russia willing to engage on the basis of reciprocity in the NRC, with a view to avoiding misunderstanding, miscalculation, and unintended escalation, and to increase transparency and predictability. We also have military lines of communication. We have agreed to continue to use all these channels to address the critical issues we face, and call on Russia to make good use of all lines of communication.

13. Reciprocal military transparency and risk reduction has the potential to improve stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. In this context, we call on Russia to constructively engage in the ongoing discussions in the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to modernise the Vienna Document, to help close the loopholes that reduce military transparency.
14. The Alliance does not seek confrontation and poses no threat to Russia. But we cannot and will not compromise on the principles on which our Alliance and security in Europe and North America rest. NATO will continue to be transparent, predictable and resolute.

15. As we agreed at our Wales Summit, we will continue our strategic discussion on Euro-Atlantic security and our approach to Russia. As we also agreed at Wales, we continue to believe that a partnership between NATO and Russia, based on respect for international law and commitments, including as reflected in the NATO-Russia Founding Act and Rome Declaration, would be of strategic value. We regret that despite repeated calls by Allies and the international community since 2014 for Russia to change course, the conditions for that relationship do not currently exist. The nature of the Alliance’s relations with Russia and aspirations for partnership will be contingent on a clear, constructive change in Russia’s actions that demonstrates compliance with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities. Until then, we cannot return to “business as usual.”

16. An independent, sovereign, and stable Ukraine, firmly committed to democracy and the rule of law, is key to Euro-Atlantic security. We stand firm in our support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders and Ukraine’s right to decide its own future and foreign policy course free from outside interference, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act. We strongly condemn Russia’s aggressive actions against Ukraine and its continued violation of international law and its international obligations, which have serious implications for the stability and security of the entire Euro-Atlantic area.

17. Russia bears full responsibility for the serious deterioration of the human rights situation on the Crimean peninsula, in particular the discrimination against the Crimean Tatars and other members of local communities. We demand that the Russian de facto authorities take the necessary measures to ensure the safety, rights, and freedoms of everyone living on the peninsula. International monitoring structures must be allowed to carry out their essential work in view of the protection of human rights. We condemn Russia’s ongoing and wide-ranging military build-up in Crimea, and are concerned by Russia’s efforts and stated plans for further military build-up in the Black Sea region.

18. We are committed to a peaceful solution to the conflict in eastern Ukraine, which has claimed nearly 10,000 lives, and reintegration of the areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions controlled by the
Russian-backed militants. This will require full implementation of the Minsk Agreements based on a comprehensive ceasefire and an internationally verified withdrawal of weapons. We urge all signatories to fully comply with the commitments they signed up to.

19. Russia, as a signatory to the Minsk Agreements, bears significant responsibility in this regard. Despite its declared commitment to the Minsk Agreements, Russia continues its deliberate destabilisation of eastern Ukraine, in violation of international law. Russia continues to provide weapons, equipment, and personnel, as well as financial and other assistance to militant groups, and to intervene militarily in the conflict. We are extremely concerned by the destabilisation and deteriorating security situation in eastern Ukraine. We call on Russia to desist from aggressive actions and to use its considerable influence over the militants to meet their commitments in full, especially to allow for the observation of the ceasefire regime, implementation of confidence-building measures, and disarmament.

20. We fully support the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM), which has a key role in helping to de-escalate the conflict and stress the importance of full and unhindered access by the OSCE monitors. Impediments to the SMM’s work, which continue to occur overwhelmingly in areas under the control of the Russian-backed militants, represent a violation of the Minsk Agreements and seriously hamper the monitoring function of the SMM. We call on those responsible to stop any attacks against OSCE observers, and for the perpetrators to be held accountable. We also commend the work of the EU Advisory Mission to assist Ukraine in the field of civilian security sector reform, including police and the rule of law.

21. We welcome the efforts of the Normandy format and the Trilateral Contact Group to advance the implementation of the Minsk Agreements to open the way to the full reintegration of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including passing a local election law for eastern Ukraine; carrying out local elections, when the security situation allows, in accordance with Ukrainian law and relevant OSCE standards and with a strong presence of international observers; implementation of special status and amnesty; withdrawal of foreign forces; and restoration of Ukraine’s control over its side of the international border. We condemn the militants’ use of residential areas to launch heavy weapons. We urge all parties to take concrete steps to reduce civilian casualties and to adhere strictly to the requirements of international humanitarian law.
22. We remain committed to a continued coherent international approach, in particular between NATO and the European Union (EU). NATO’s response is in support of this overall effort, which includes sanctions as decided by the EU, the G7 and others, to promote a peaceful solution to the conflict and to address Russia’s actions.

23. We face evolving challenges in the Baltic and Black Sea regions, the North Atlantic, as well as in the Mediterranean, which are of strategic importance to the Alliance and to our partners. Russia continues to strengthen its military posture, increase its military activities, deploy new high-end capabilities, and challenge regional security. These developments have resulted in increased unpredictability that could be mitigated through reciprocal transparency and risk reduction measures. Recognising the indivisibility of Allied security, we will continue to closely monitor the situation in these regions. Our response will be tailored to specific circumstances in each region. We will also work with interested partners to enhance our situational awareness and to develop common approaches to evolving challenges.

In the Baltic Sea region, where the security situation has deteriorated since 2014, the Alliance has developed mutually beneficial partnership relations with Finland and Sweden on a broad range of issues. We appreciate the significant contributions of Finland and Sweden to NATO-led operations. We are dedicated to the continuous process of further strengthening our cooperation with these enhanced opportunities partners, including through regular political consultations, shared situational awareness, and joint exercises, in order to respond to common challenges in a timely and effective manner.

In the Black Sea region, the security situation has also deteriorated in recent years. We will continue to address the implications for NATO of developments in the region and take them into account in the Alliance’s approaches and policies. We will continue to support, as appropriate, regional efforts by the Black Sea littoral states aimed at ensuring security and stability. We will also strengthen our dialogue and cooperation with Georgia and Ukraine in this regard.

In the North Atlantic, as elsewhere, the Alliance will be ready to deter and defend against any potential threats, including against sea lines of communication and maritime approaches of NATO territory. In this context, we will further strengthen our maritime posture and comprehensive situational awareness.

24. We continue to support the right of all our partners to make independent and sovereign choices on foreign and security policy, free
from external pressure and coercion. We remain committed in our support for the territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Republic of Moldova. In this context, we continue to support efforts towards a peaceful settlement of the conflicts in the South Caucasus, as well as in the Republic of Moldova, based upon these principles and the norms of international law, the UN Charter, and the Helsinki Final Act. We urge all parties to engage constructively and with reinforced political will in peaceful conflict resolution, within the established negotiation frameworks.

25. The continuing crises and instability across the Middle East and North Africa region, in particular in Syria, Iraq and Libya, as well as the threat of terrorism and violent extremism across the region and beyond, demonstrate that the security of the region has direct implications for the security of NATO. In addition to the spill-over of conflict from failing and failed states, terrorism and violent extremism, we face other common transnational security threats and challenges, including trafficking of small arms and light weapons, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, and threats against maritime security and energy supply. Criminal trafficking gangs have exploited this situation at the expense of displaced people. Peace and stability in this region are essential for the Alliance. Therefore, we emphasise the need to do more to achieve lasting calm and an end to violence.

26. We are adapting our defence and deterrence posture to respond to threats and challenges, including from the south. At the same time, we are continuing to draw on our cooperative security network to enhance political dialogue, to foster constructive relationships in the region, and to increase our support for partners through practical cooperation, as well as defence capacity building and crisis management. We are also exploring options for possible NATO contributions to international efforts to bring stability in the region, building on decisions taken by our Foreign Ministers in May.

27. We remain concerned and vigilant towards the ongoing crisis in Syria, which has direct ramifications for regional stability and for the security of NATO’s south-eastern border. The dynamics of this conflict—including terrorism and violent extremism in all their forms and manifestations, the humanitarian tragedy it has caused, and the massive flow of migrants—present challenges and threats for international stability, security, and prosperity. We reiterate our full commitment and determination to defend NATO territory and borders against any threats and address challenges emanating from
the Syrian conflict. We condemn all kinds of indiscriminate violence against civilians and civilian infrastructure. We also condemn in the strongest terms the unabated and indiscriminate campaign of bombardment, including the use of incendiary weapons, and violence by the Assad regime and its supporters deliberately targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure. We also condemn indiscriminate violence against civilians, in particular by ISIL/Da’esh, the Al Nusra Front, and other groups designated as terrorist organisations by the UN.

28. We call on the Syrian regime to fully comply with the provisions of all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs), and to immediately take steps for a genuine political transition in accordance with UNSCR 2254 and the 30 June 2012 Geneva Communiqué. We underline that stability and security cannot be reinstated in Syria without a genuine political transition to a new, representative leadership, based on an inclusive and Syrian-led political process. In this vein, we support the political process under the auspices of the UN and the efforts of the International Syria Support Group to assist the political process. We call for full implementation of the humanitarian provisions of the UNSCR 2254 and the Cessation of Hostilities (CoH) agreement. We strongly condemn the violations of the CoH, in particular by the regime and its supporters. These violations constitute a serious hindrance for the political process. We call upon the parties to the CoH to remain committed to the agreement and its full implementation.

29. We stand in support of Iraq in its efforts to build institutions that could restore stability and security in the country. We commend the success to date of the Iraqi security forces in pushing back and reclaiming key territories from ISIL/Da’esh. The participation of all Iraqis through national reconciliation and inclusive governance is crucial, and we therefore encourage the Iraqi authorities to continue to implement policies to bridge ethnic, sectarian, and religious divisions, and ensure inclusive representation in all governmental institutions, and to develop the country’s security forces.

30. We welcome the political developments that have taken place in Libya since December 2015: we support the UN and Libyan-led efforts, which have led to the Libyan political agreement, and recognise the Government of National Accord as the sole legitimate government of Libya. We encourage full implementation of the political agreement, and we express support to efforts by the Prime Minister and Chairman of the Presidency Council towards an inclusive political process aimed at promoting national reconciliation in order to establish functioning
state structures. These efforts mark an important step to strengthen Libya’s democratic transition. The unification of all Libyan forces under the authority of the Presidency Council will be key for Libya’s ability to fight terrorism.

31. Terrorist acts and the trafficking of arms, drugs, and human beings across the Sahel-Sahara region continue to threaten regional and our own security. We welcome the efforts of the UN and the EU, and underscore the importance of a strong commitment by the international community to address the complex security and political challenges in this region. In Mali, we welcome the endorsement of the peace agreement, the steps taken in its implementation, and the support of the international community to the stabilisation of the country. We also welcome the robust military commitment of Allies in the Sahel-Sahara region, in support of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the countries in the region, and of the security of the Alliance. We commend our African partners’ action to deepen regional cooperation to confront security issues in the Sahel.

32. The Alliance military posture is defensive in nature. Deterrence and defence are at the heart of the Alliance’s mission and purpose—as the fundamental means of preventing conflict, protecting Allied territories and populations, and maintaining the Alliance’s freedom of decision and action at any time, as well as upholding the principles and values enshrined in the North Atlantic Treaty. We will ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against potential adversaries and the full spectrum of threats that could confront the Alliance from any direction.

33. All of the actions that we have taken to strengthen our deterrence and defence posture require appropriate investment in capabilities and the development of highly-capable and deployable forces. Our overall security and defence depend both on how much we spend and how we spend it. Increased investments should be directed towards meeting our capability priorities. It is essential that Allies display the political will to provide required capabilities and deploy forces when they are needed. Allies also need to ensure forces are deployable, sustainable, and interoperable. The Defence Investment Pledge we agreed at the Wales Summit is an important step in this direction and today we reaffirm its importance. Through this Pledge we agreed to reverse the trend of declining defence budgets, to make the most effective use of our funds, and to further a more balanced sharing of the costs and responsibilities.
34. Since Wales, we have turned a corner. Collectively, Allies’ defence expenditures have increased in 2016 for the first time since 2009. In just two years, a majority of Allies have halted or reversed declines in defence spending in real terms. Today, five Allies meet the NATO guideline to spend a minimum of 2% of their Gross Domestic Product on defence. Ten Allies meet the NATO guideline to spend more than 20% of their defence budgets on major equipment, including related Research & Development. Output is also important, in particular deployability and sustainability of Allied forces. Allies continue to make important contributions to NATO operations, missions, and activities, as well as the NATO Command and Force Structures. Allies invest considerable resources in preparing their forces, capabilities, and infrastructure for Alliance activities and Allies’ operations that contribute to our collective security. There is still much work to be done. Efforts to achieve a more balanced sharing of the costs and responsibilities continue. Defence Ministers will continue to review progress annually.

35. In Wales, we approved our Readiness Action Plan (RAP) to respond swiftly to the fundamental changes in the security environment on NATO’s borders and further afield that are of concern to Allies. It responds to the challenges posed by Russia and their strategic implications. It also responds to the risks and threats emanating from our southern neighbourhood, the Middle East and North Africa. Less than two years later, it has already contributed to a substantial adaptation of NATO’s military posture. The RAP has significantly enhanced our readiness, responsiveness, and flexibility required to deal with the changed security environment. We welcome the Plan’s implementation.

36. The Readiness Action Plan Assurance Measures have provided continuous military presence and meaningful activity in the eastern part of the Alliance, on a rotational basis, for the past two years. These defensive measures demonstrate our collective solidarity and resolve to protect all Allies. Assurance Measures provide the fundamental baseline requirement for assurance and deterrence. In addition, tailored assurance measures for Turkey to respond to the growing security challenges from the south contribute to the security of the Alliance as a whole, and will be fully implemented. Assurance Measures are flexible and scalable in response to the evolving security situation, and will be kept under annual review by the Council.

37. Through the longer term Adaptation Measures of the Readiness Action Plan, we have:
a. Enhanced the NATO Response Force (NRF), increasing its readiness and substantially enlarging its size, making it a more capable and flexible joint force comprised of a division-size land element with air, maritime, and special operations forces components.

b. Created a new Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), able to begin deployment within two to three days. It has been certified, exercised at short notice, and on stand-by since 2015. Seven VJTF framework nations\(^{241}\) have been identified and a VJTF rotation plan established through 2022.

c. Established eight multinational NATO Force Integration Units on the territory of Allies in the eastern part of the Alliance to assist in training of Alliance forces and in the reception of reinforcements when needed.

d. Taken the necessary steps to increase NATO’s ability to reinforce through new infrastructure projects and increased flexibility in the rapid movement of forces across national territory.

e. As part of the NATO Force Structure, made the Headquarters of a Multinational Corps Northeast in Poland fully operational, and established the Headquarters of a Multinational Division Southeast in Romania to take command of the NATO Force Integration Units and to provide flexible command and control options in their regions.

f. Decided to enhance NATO Standing Naval Forces with additional capabilities.

g. Delivered a more ambitious NATO exercise programme. National exercises are an important part of this effort. In 2015 alone, NATO and Allies conducted 300 exercises, including NATO’s largest and most complex exercise in over a decade—Trident Juncture 2015 in Italy, Portugal, and Spain.

h. Enhanced advance planning and enabled accelerated decision-making to ensure both military and political responsiveness.

i. Agreed a strategy on NATO’s role in Countering Hybrid Warfare, which is being implemented in coordination with the EU.

j. Established a framework for NATO’s adaptation in response to growing challenges and threats from the south.

These Adaptation Measures will remain a major driver of NATO’s military adaptation and need to be sustained over time.

38. In light of the changed and evolving security environment, further adaptation is needed. Therefore, we have decided to further strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence and defence posture. Building on the success of the Readiness Action Plan, today we are adopting

\(^{241}\) France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom.
a broad approach to deterrence and defence which draws upon all of the tools at NATO’s disposal. This will provide the Alliance with a range of options to be able to respond to any threats from wherever they arise. Given the different nature, types and origins of threats, we will tailor our response to specific circumstances. Taken together, the measures we are approving at this Summit will enhance the security of all Allies and ensure protection of Alliance territory, populations, airspace and sealines of communication, including across the Atlantic, against all threats from wherever they arise. In this context, our response is united and adequate to the new security environment, demonstrating our ability and willingness to defend one another. As part of the Alliance posture, these measures are defensive in nature, proportionate, consistent with our international commitments and demonstrate our respect for the rules-based European security architecture.

39. As a means to prevent conflict and war, credible deterrence and defence is essential. At the same time, as part of the Alliance’s overall approach to providing security for NATO populations and territory, deterrence has to be complemented by meaningful dialogue and engagement with Russia, to seek reciprocal transparency and risk reduction. Those efforts will not come at the expense of ensuring NATO’s credible deterrence and defence.

40. We have decided to establish an enhanced forward presence in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland to unambiguously demonstrate, as part of our overall posture, Allies’ solidarity, determination, and ability to act by triggering an immediate Allied response to any aggression. Beginning in early 2017, enhanced forward presence will comprise multinational forces provided by framework nations and other contributing Allies on a voluntary, sustainable, and rotational basis. They will be based on four battalion-sized battlegroups that can operate in concert with national forces, present at all times in these countries, underpinned by a viable reinforcement strategy. We welcome the offers of Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States to serve as framework nations for the robust multinational presence in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Poland, respectively. We have also accepted the Polish offer to provide an existing division headquarters as a basis for the establishment of a multinational division headquarters, pending agreement on the modalities by the Council. We recognise the integral role host nations will play in enhanced forward presence. We further welcome additional contributions from
across the Alliance to support this important endeavour. We recognise the significant resource commitments of Allies.

41. We will also develop tailored forward presence in the southeast part of the Alliance territory. Appropriate measures, tailored to the Black Sea region and including the Romanian initiative to establish a multinational framework brigade to help improve integrated training of Allied units under Headquarters Multinational Division Southeast, will contribute to the Alliance's strengthened deterrence and defence posture, situational awareness, and peacetime demonstration of NATO's intent to operate without constraint. It will also provide a strong signal of support to regional security. Options for a strengthened NATO air and maritime presence will be assessed.

42. As part of the Readiness Action Plan and as a contribution to our deterrence and defence posture, we have established a framework for NATO's adaptation in response to growing challenges and threats emanating from the south. The framework focuses on better regional understanding and situational awareness, the ability to anticipate and respond to crises emanating from the south, improved capabilities for expeditionary operations, and enhancing NATO's ability to project stability through regional partnerships and capacity building efforts. We will proceed with the implementation of this framework.

43. As part of a broader approach and the concerted efforts of the international community, we also need to deter and defend against non-state actors that have state-like aspirations, capabilities, and resources, and that threaten or affect the security of Allied populations and the integrity of Allied territory. We have agreed a series of measures to respond to this threat, including ensuring that it is appropriately monitored and assessed and that relevant plans will be updated as necessary.

44. We will not accept to be constrained by any potential adversary as regards the freedom of movement of Allied forces by land, air, or sea to and within any part of Alliance territory. Alliance capabilities, training, and exercises contribute to our ability to operate freely. We remain ready to rapidly reinforce any Ally that comes under threat, when needed, to counter all contingencies.

45. We will ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to fulfil the whole range of Alliance missions, including to deter and defend against potential adversaries, and the full spectrum of threats that could confront the Alliance from any direction. In line with our defence planning priorities, we are committed to delivering heavier and more high-end forces and capabilities, as well as more
forces at higher readiness. The primary responsibility for achieving this remains with Allies, individually. Multinational approaches are valuable in meeting these vital needs.

46. We will ensure that the NATO Command Structure remains robust and agile, and able to undertake all elements of effective command and control for simultaneous challenges across the full spectrum of missions. In light of the changed and evolving security environment and the increased overall requirements, we will conduct a functional assessment of the current structure.

47. We will further improve our strategic anticipation by enhancing our situational awareness, particularly in the east and south and in the North Atlantic. Our ability to understand, track and, ultimately, anticipate, the actions of potential adversaries through Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and comprehensive intelligence arrangements is increasingly important. These are essential to enable timely and informed political and military decisions. We have established the capabilities necessary to ensure our responsiveness is commensurate with our highest readiness forces.

48. The Alliance maritime posture supports the four roles consisting of collective defence and deterrence, crisis management, cooperative security, and maritime security, and thus also contributes to projecting stability. The Standing Naval Forces are a core maritime capability of the Alliance and are the centrepiece of NATO's maritime posture. They are being enhanced and will be aligned with NATO's enhanced NATO Response Force to provide NATO's highest readiness maritime forces. We will continue to reinforce our maritime posture by exploiting the full potential of the Alliance's overall maritime power. Work is under way on the operationalisation of the Alliance Maritime Strategy, as well as on the future of NATO's maritime operations, which are key to NATO's maritime posture. Allies are also considering complementary maritime governance initiatives to contribute to this endeavour.

49. Interoperability of our armed forces is fundamental to our success and an important added value of our Alliance. Through training and exercises, the development of NATO standards and common technical solutions, the NATO Response Force, Assurance Measures, forward presence in the eastern part of the Alliance, and joint operations in Afghanistan, Kosovo and the Mediterranean, all Allies are also reinforcing their interoperability within NATO as well as with partners, as appropriate. This enables our armed forces to work together successfully, be it in NATO operations or in national,
coalition, EU or UN formats, which contributes to our common security.

50. We welcome the many concrete multinational and national initiatives, carried out independently or under the auspices of Smart Defence or the Framework Nations Concept, which strengthen the Alliance. They contribute directly to capability development and to our strengthened deterrence and defence posture. We will ensure overall coherence and unity of effort across all elements of Allied capability development and military presence, including between forward presence and Allies’ multinational and national military activities and initiatives.

51. The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territory and our populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. No one should doubt NATO’s resolve if the security of any of its members were to be threatened. NATO will maintain the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of our populations, wherever it should arise.

52. As a means to prevent conflict and war, credible deterrence and defence is essential. Therefore, deterrence and defence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defence capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy. A robust deterrence and defence posture strengthens Alliance cohesion, including the transatlantic link, through an equitable and sustainable distribution of roles, responsibilities, and burdens. NATO must continue to adapt its strategy in line with trends in the security environment—including with respect to capabilities and other measures required—to ensure that NATO’s overall deterrence and defence posture is capable of addressing potential adversaries’ doctrine and capabilities, and that it remains credible, flexible, resilient, and adaptable.

53. Allies’ goal is to bolster deterrence as a core element of our collective defence and to contribute to the indivisible security of the Alliance. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. The strategic forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States, are the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies. The independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France have a deterrent role of their own and contribute to the overall security of the Alliance. These Allies’ separate centres of decision-making contribute to deterrence by complicating the calculations of potential adversaries. NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture also relies, in part, on United States’ nuclear weapons forward-deployed
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in Europe and on capabilities and infrastructure provided by Allies concerned. These Allies will ensure that all components of NATO’s nuclear deterrent remain safe, secure, and effective. That requires sustained leadership focus and institutional excellence for the nuclear deterrence mission and planning guidance aligned with 21st century requirements. The Alliance will ensure the broadest possible participation of Allies concerned in their agreed nuclear burden-sharing arrangements.

54. The fundamental purpose of NATO’s nuclear capability is to preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter aggression. Nuclear weapons are unique. Any employment of nuclear weapons against NATO would fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict. The circumstances in which NATO might have to use nuclear weapons are extremely remote. If the fundamental security of any of its members were to be threatened however, NATO has the capabilities and resolve to impose costs on an adversary that would be unacceptable and far outweigh the benefits that an adversary could hope to achieve.

55. Missile defence can complement the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence; it cannot substitute for them. The capability is purely defensive. The threat to NATO populations, territory, and forces posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles continues to increase, and missile defence forms part of a broader response to counter it.

56. At our Summit in Lisbon in 2010, we decided to develop a NATO Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) capability to pursue our core task of collective defence. The aim of this capability is to provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory, and forces against the increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles, based on the principles of indivisibility of Allies’ security and NATO solidarity, equitable sharing of risks and burdens, as well as reasonable challenge, taking into account the level of threat, affordability, and technical feasibility, and in accordance with the latest common threat assessments agreed by the Alliance. Should international efforts reduce the threats posed by ballistic missile proliferation, NATO missile defence can and will adapt accordingly.

57. At our Summit in Chicago in 2012, we declared the achievement of an Interim NATO BMD Capability as an operationally significant first step. At the Wales Summit, we welcomed the forward deployment of BMD-capable Aegis ships to Rota, Spain that could be made available to NATO. Today a new milestone in the development of NATO BMD has been reached and we are pleased to declare the achievement of the NATO BMD Initial Operational Capability. This is a significant
step toward the aim of NATO BMD that offers a stronger capability to defend our populations, territory, and forces across southern NATO Europe against a potential ballistic missile attack. The Aegis Ashore site in Deveselu, Romania, represents a significant portion of this increase in capability, and the command and control (C2) of the Aegis Ashore site is being transferred to NATO. We also welcome that Turkey hosts a forward-based early-warning BMD radar at Kürecik and that Poland will be hosting an Aegis Ashore site at the Redzikowo military base. We are also pleased that additional voluntary national contributions have been offered by Allies, and we encourage further voluntary contributions, all of which will add robustness to the capability.

58. As with all of NATO’s operations, full political control by Allies is essential and will be ensured over the BMD capability. We will continue to deepen political oversight of NATO BMD as the capability develops. It is essential that the functionality of the Alliance C2 network for BMD matches that development. In this context, the next necessary major milestone for NATO BMD capability will be the completion of the next core element of the NATO BMD C2. Overall completion of the NATO BMD C2 will then provide the additional functionalities required for the BMD system to reach maturity.

59. We will develop further our engagement with third states, on a case-by-case basis, to enhance transparency and confidence and to increase ballistic missile defence effectiveness. This could involve information exchange, consultation, and cooperation. NATO missile defence is not directed against Russia and will not undermine Russia’s strategic deterrence capabilities. NATO missile defence is intended to defend against potential threats emanating from outside the Euro-Atlantic area. We have explained to Russia many times that the BMD system is not capable against Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent and there is no intention to redesign this system to have such a capability in the future. Hence, Russian statements threatening to target Allies because of NATO BMD are unacceptable and counterproductive. Should Russia be ready to discuss BMD with NATO, and subject to Alliance agreement, NATO remains open to discussion.

60. NATO BMD is based on voluntary national contributions, including nationally funded interceptors and sensors, hosting arrangements, and on the expansion of the BMD capability. The command and control systems for NATO BMD are the only portion for NATO BMD that is eligible for common funding.

61. We also task the Council to regularly review the implementation of the NATO BMD capability, including before the Foreign and
Defence Ministers’ meetings, and prepare a comprehensive report on progress and issues to be addressed for its future development by our next Summit.

62. Arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation continue to play an important role in the achievement of the Alliance’s security objectives. Both the success and failure of these efforts can have a direct impact on the threat environment of NATO. In this context, it is of paramount importance that disarmament and non-proliferation commitments under existing treaties are honoured, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, crucial to Euro-Atlantic security. Allies therefore continue to call on Russia to preserve the viability of the INF Treaty through ensuring full and verifiable compliance.

63. We remain deeply concerned by the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as well as their means of delivery, by states and non-state actors, which continues to present a threat to our populations, territory, and forces. Addressing serious proliferation challenges remains an urgent international priority.

64. Allies emphasise their strong commitment to full implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The Alliance reaffirms its resolve to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in full accordance with all provisions of the NPT, including Article VI, in a step-by-step and verifiable way that promotes international stability, and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all. Allies reiterate their commitment to progress towards the goals and objectives of the NPT in its mutually reinforcing three pillars: nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

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242 The reason why the INF treaty was evoked in the declaration of the Warsaw summit was confirmed by official U.S. sources that Russia violated or circumvented the provisions of this document.

243 Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed on 1 July 1968 (entered into force in 1970) for an initial period of 25 years; in 1995, it was extended indefinitely. It is the most universal document in this field of security. It is signed by 191 countries (exceptions: Cuba, India, Israel, Pakistan, South Sudan; North Korea is in breach of the Treaty and announced its withdrawal in 2003). The document prohibits the possession of nuclear weapons by states other than China, France, Russia (f. USSR), the U.S., and the United Kingdom and obliges all signatories to cooperate in preventing the proliferation of such weapons and grants them the right to peaceful development and use of nuclear energy. Article VI of the NPT mentioned in the Warsaw Declaration concerns cooperation for nuclear disarmament.
65. After the end of the Cold War, NATO dramatically reduced the number of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and its reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. We remain committed to contribute to creating the conditions for further reductions in the future on the basis of reciprocity, recognising that progress on arms control and disarmament must take into account the prevailing international security environment. We regret that the conditions for achieving disarmament are not favourable today.

66. We call on all states to commit to combatting effectively the proliferation of WMD through the universalisation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, negotiation of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and through the Proliferation Security Initiative. Continued use of chemical weapons in Iraq and Syria, which we condemn, further underscores the evolving and increasing WMD threat to the Alliance.

67. We are deeply concerned about the persistent provocative behaviour by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and we strongly condemn the DPRK’s nuclear test of 6 January 2016, the 7 February 2016 launch using ballistic missile technologies, and multiple tests of ballistic missiles since then. We urge rigorous implementation of UNSCR 2270 and other relevant Security Council resolutions. We call on Pyongyang to immediately cease and abandon all its existing nuclear and ballistic missile activities in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner and re-engage in international talks.

68. We commend the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between the E3/EU+3 and Iran, signed on 14 July 2015, and its ongoing implementation since 16 January 2016. We also underscore the importance for Iran to fully cooperate in a timely manner with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in implementation of the JCPOA. However, we remain seriously

244 Signed in January 1993 (entered into force in 1997). Prohibits the use, development, production, trade, or storage of nuclear weapons. The signatories are obliged to destroy their stocks.

245 Signed on 24 September 1996. Prohibits nuclear weapons tests anywhere: on the ground, underground, underwater, in the atmosphere, or in space. It was signed by 183 states and ratified by 164. It has not entered into force due to prolonged ratification by some states (listed in the document).

246 The debate at the UN on the ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosives has been ongoing since the 1980s. It did not take the form of negotiations or a draft treaty.

247 European Union (EU), France, Germany, the UK (E3), China, Russia, the U.S. (+3).
concerned by the development of Iran's ballistic missile programme and continuing missile tests that are inconsistent with UNSCR 2231.

69. We remain committed to conventional arms control as a key element of Euro-Atlantic security. Full implementation and compliance with these commitments is essential to rebuild trust and confidence in the Euro-Atlantic region. Russia's unilateral military activity in and around Ukraine continues to undermine peace, security, and stability across the region, and its selective implementation of the Vienna Document and Open Skies Treaty and long-standing non-implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty have eroded the positive contributions of these arms control instruments. Allies call on Russia to fully adhere to its commitments. Allies are determined to preserve, strengthen, and modernise conventional arms control in Europe, based on key principles and commitments, including reciprocity, transparency, and host nation consent. We underscore the importance of modernising the Vienna Document to ensure its continued relevance in the evolving security environment, including through its substantive update in 2016.

70. Cyber-attacks present a clear challenge to the security of the Alliance and could be as harmful to modern societies as a conventional attack. We agreed in Wales that cyber defence is part of NATO's core task of collective defence. Now, in Warsaw, we reaffirm NATO's defensive mandate, and recognise cyberspace as a domain of operations in which NATO must defend itself as effectively as it does in the air, on land, and at sea. This will improve NATO's ability to protect and conduct operations across these domains and maintain our freedom of action and decision, in all circumstances. It will support NATO's broader deterrence and defence: cyber defence will continue to be integrated into operational planning and Alliance operations and missions, and we will work together to contribute to their success. Furthermore, it will ensure more effective organisation of NATO's cyber defence and better management of resources, skills, and capabilities. This forms part of NATO's long term adaptation. We continue to implement NATO's Enhanced Policy on Cyber Defence and strengthen NATO's cyber defence capabilities, benefiting from the latest cutting edge technologies. We reaffirm our commitment to act in accordance with international law, including the UN Charter, international humanitarian law, and human rights law, as applicable. We will continue to follow the principle of restraint and support maintaining international peace, security, and stability in cyberspace. We welcome the work on voluntary international norms
of responsible state behaviour and confidence-building measures regarding cyberspace.

71. We will ensure that Allies are equipped for, and meet requirements tailored to, the 21st century. Today, through our Cyber Defence Pledge, we have committed to enhance the cyber defences of our national networks and infrastructures, as a matter of priority. Each Ally will honour its responsibility to improve its resilience and ability to respond quickly and effectively to cyber-attacks, including in hybrid contexts. Together with the continuous adaptation of NATO’s cyber defence capabilities, this will reinforce the Alliance’s cyber defence. We are expanding the capabilities and scope of the NATO Cyber Range, where Allies can build skills, enhance expertise, and exchange best practices. We remain committed to close bilateral and multilateral cyber defence cooperation, including on information sharing and situational awareness, education, training, and exercises. Strong partnerships play a key role in effectively addressing cyber challenges. We will continue to deepen cooperation with the EU, as agreed, including through the on-going implementation of the Technical Arrangement that contributes to better prevention and response to cyber-attacks. We will further enhance our partnerships with other international organisations and partner nations, as well as with industry and academia through the NATO Industry Cyber Partnership.

72. We have taken steps to ensure our ability to effectively address the challenges posed by hybrid warfare, where a broad, complex, and adaptive combination of conventional and non-conventional means, and overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures, are employed in a highly integrated design by state and non-state actors to achieve their objectives. Responding to this challenge, we have adopted a strategy and actionable implementation plans on NATO’s role in countering hybrid warfare. The primary responsibility to respond to hybrid threats or attacks rests with the targeted nation. NATO is prepared to assist an Ally at any stage of a hybrid campaign. The Alliance and Allies will be prepared to counter hybrid warfare as part of collective defence. The Council could decide to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The Alliance is committed to effective cooperation and coordination with partners and relevant international organisations, in particular the EU, as agreed, in efforts to counter hybrid warfare.

73. Today we have made a commitment to continue to enhance our resilience and to maintain and further develop our individual and
collective capacity to resist any form of armed attack. Civil preparedness is a central pillar of Allies’ resilience and a critical enabler for Alliance collective defence. While this remains a national responsibility, NATO can support Allies in assessing and, upon request, enhancing their civil preparedness. We will improve civil preparedness by achieving the NATO Baseline Requirements for National Resilience, which focus on continuity of government, continuity of essential services, security of critical civilian infrastructure, and support to military forces with civilian means. In this context, we welcome the Resilience Guidelines approved by Defence Ministers in June 2016.

74. We will ensure that NATO continues to be both strategically and operationally prepared with policies, plans, and capabilities to counter a wide range of state and non-state Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) threats, based on NATO’s Comprehensive Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of WMD and Defending Against CBRN Threats that we endorsed in 2009, and look forward to a report on its continued implementation at our next Summit.

75. At Chicago in 2012, we launched the Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) initiative. JISR is a high-value, complex, and wide-reaching capability area. Following up on our commitments, we welcome the February 2016 declaration of the initial operational JISR capability, centred upon enhancing the situational awareness of the NATO Response Force through heightened proficiency in collecting and exchanging information and intelligence. Allies also intend to work together to promote intelligence-sharing, as appropriate, by using NATO platforms and networks and optimising use of multilateral platforms and networks to enhance overall JISR efforts, including but not limited to the JISR Smart Defence project.

76. Moving forward, we will sustain these achievements and support future NATO Response Force rotations with the necessary JISR capabilities. We will also expand the scope of our JISR initiative, making the most effective use of Allies’ complementary JISR contributions to enhance both strategic anticipation and awareness. It is within this context that we also note the significant progress made on NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS). This capability will become operational in 2017 as planned, and will be complemented in some cases by Allies’ contributions in kind.

77. NATO’s Airborne Early Warning and Control Force (AWACS) continues to prove itself instrumental not only to monitoring our airspace, but also as a critical part of NATO’s command and control
NATO AWACS will continue to be modernised and extended in service until 2035. By 2035, the Alliance needs to have a follow-on capability to the E-3 AWACS\textsuperscript{248}. Based on high-level military requirements, we have decided to collectively start the process of defining options for future NATO surveillance and control capabilities.

78. Multinational and national initiatives provide an important contribution to capability development and our strengthened posture. NATO will continue to work closely with the EU, as agreed, to ensure that our Smart Defence and the EU’s Pooling and Sharing initiatives are complementary and mutually reinforcing, and to support capability development and interoperability with a view to avoiding unnecessary duplication and maximizing cost-effectiveness. At the Wales Summit, six Allies launched a multinational effort, led by Denmark, to address their requirements for air-to-ground Precision Guided Munitions. We welcome the progress achieved in this group since then, including its expansion by two Allies and the processing of its first multinational acquisition employing the US Lead Nation Procurement Initiative. We welcome the progress made in implementing NATO’s Framework Nations Concept. A group of 16 Allies, led by Germany, is working on establishing larger formations to deliver usable forces and capabilities. Another group, led by Italy and composed of six nations, is developing programmes and activities aimed at supporting the Alliance’s operational commitments. We welcome the United States’ European Reassurance Initiative, including the rotational Armoured Brigade Combat Team and US Army prepositioned stocks. We welcome the Transatlantic Capability Enhancement and Training Initiative (TACET), which will promote capability development, interoperability, and training, and will enhance NATO resilience in response to the challenges in the Baltic region. We also welcome the Combined Joint Enhanced Training Initiative (CJET), which provides similar engagement with Romania and Bulgaria. We welcome progress on delivering the United Kingdom-led Joint Expeditionary Force, made up of high readiness, flexible, integrated forces from seven Allies. We also welcome the validation, through an exercise in 2016, of the UK-France Combined Joint Expeditionary Force, which will enhance the Alliance’s ability to respond rapidly to any challenge. We welcome the decision of the Visegrad Group to provide rotational presence in the

\textsuperscript{248} It concerns an upgrade of the air platform currently used as a carrier for the AWACS system—Boeing E-Sentry reconnaissance and early warning aircraft based on the Boeing-707 aircraft.
Baltic states in 2017 to conduct exercises in support of Allied activities. We further welcome the Letter of Intent on multinational cooperation for the provision of Airborne Electronic Attack. We welcome Allied efforts to address, as appropriate, existing dependencies on Russian-sourced legacy military equipment.

79. To position the Alliance in responding to evolving threats, NATO intelligence reform must be an ongoing, dynamic process. The importance of intelligence in informing our planning, operations, and decision-making continues to increase. To improve NATO’s ability to draw on a wide range of intelligence resources, we have agreed to establish a new Joint Intelligence and Security Division to be led by an Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Security. The new Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Security will direct NATO’s intelligence and security activities, ensuring better use of existing personnel and resources, while maximizing the efficient use of intelligence provided by Allies.

80. Against the background of an increasingly unstable, global security environment, and based on a broad and strengthened deterrence and defence posture, we seek to contribute more to the efforts of the international community in projecting stability and strengthening security outside our territory, thereby contributing to Alliance security overall.

81. Our efforts to enhance the Alliance’s role in projecting stability will be guided by enduring principles, including a 360-degree approach\(^{249}\), commitment to democracy, human rights and the rule of law, complementarity with international actors, in particular with the UN, EU, and the OSCE and focusing on NATO’s added value, local ownership and buy-in, partner involvement, inclusiveness, tailored cooperation, long-term commitment, prioritisation and sustainability, and overall coherence.

82. The Alliance is already responding to these challenges and will continue to do so, building on its recognised experience and its crisis management and cooperative security toolkit. NATO’s added-value in contributing to the international community’s efforts includes its ability to offer defence reform assistance and advice in a coherent way, its recognised track record in the training and development of local forces, including in more difficult circumstances, and defence education. The Defence and Related Security Capacity Building

\(^{249}\) Jargon definition of NATO’s political premise, including the readiness to undertake global missions and the full range of activities related to the fulfilment of allied missions and the security of Member States.
(DCB) Initiative that we adopted in Wales has proven a particularly important tool to help project stability, providing support to Georgia, Iraq, Jordan, and the Republic of Moldova. We are committed to further develop and adequately resource our capacity building efforts.

83. While retaining our ability to respond to crises beyond our borders, NATO will continue to pursue cooperative security through partnership with relevant countries and other international organisations, and investing in capacity building and training efforts enabling countries to enhance their resilience and to provide for their own security.

84. NATO will continue to enhance its role in projecting stability, including through enhancing regional understanding and situational awareness, further adapting to the challenges and threats from all directions, reinforcing its maritime dimension, and developing a more strategic, more coherent, and more effective approach to partnerships. These efforts will draw upon the important contributions that partners can bring. The Alliance, including with partners where appropriate, will continue to help manage challenges—before, during, and after conflict—where they affect Alliance security. The implementation of the agreed Alliance policies and initiatives must also continue. At the same time, we will continue to consider the political implications of our effort.

85. We are facing long-term challenges, and we are committed to ensure that NATO has a long-term and sustainable approach to projecting stability with adequate and sustainable resources and structures, making best use of existing funding mechanisms. We task the Council to evaluate progress made regarding the implementation of our efforts to project stability, including the specific areas put forward by Foreign Ministers in May 2016, emphasising how efforts can become sustainable, better organised and supported, and to report by the time of the meeting of our Foreign Ministers in December 2016.

86. In a separate declaration issued today, together with Afghanistan and our Resolute Support operational partners, we have reaffirmed our mutual commitment to ensure long-term security and stability in Afghanistan. NATO and its operational partners have committed to sustain the Resolute Support mission beyond 2016 through a flexible, regional model, to continue to deliver training, advice, and assistance to the Afghan security institutions and forces; continue national contributions to the financial sustainment of the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces, including until the end of 2020;
and strengthen and enhance the long-term Enduring Partnership. Afghanistan has made a significant set of commitments. NATO and its operational partners will continue to play an important supporting role in their delivery.

87. Together with the rest of the international community, our aim remains that Afghanistan will never again become a safe haven for terrorists who can pose a threat to our security, and that it is able to sustain its own security, governance, and economic and social development, while respecting human rights for all of its citizens, notably those of women and children. We remain resolute and united in our commitment to a secure and stable Afghanistan.

88. Good neighbourly relations, and regional cooperation and support to a secure and stable Afghanistan, remain essential. The pathway to a sustainable resolution of the conflict is an inclusive Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace and reconciliation process, which respects the Afghan constitution and human rights, including notably the rights of women. The region and the international community at large must respect and support such a process and its outcome.

89. In accordance with UNSCR 1244, the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) will continue to contribute to a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement in Kosovo, working in close cooperation with the Kosovo authorities and the EU. While we welcome the progress achieved through the EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, the security situation in Kosovo is broadly stable, though challenges remain. Changes in our troop presence will remain conditions-based and not calendar-driven. Furthermore, the Alliance will continue to support the development of the security organisations in Kosovo, including through the NATO advisory team on the ground and in accordance with Allied decisions, and will keep the nature of further support under review. We note Kosovo’s request for an enhanced relationship with NATO and will respond no later than the December Foreign Ministerial on ways to further develop our support.

90. NATO has made an important contribution to international efforts to fight piracy off the coast of Somalia through Operation Ocean Shield, which has achieved its military strategic objectives. We note that the last successful pirate attack in the Indian Ocean took place in May 2012. While we have agreed to terminate the Operation at the end of 2016, NATO will remain engaged in the fight against
piracy by maintaining maritime situational awareness and continuing close links with other international counter-piracy actors.

91. We have transitioned Operation Active Endeavour, our Article 5 maritime operation in the Mediterranean, which has contributed to the fight against terrorism, to a non-Article 5 Maritime Security Operation, Operation Sea Guardian, able to perform the full range of Maritime Security Operation tasks, as needed.

92. Following decisions by our Defence Ministers in February 2016, Allies have swiftly contributed maritime assets to international efforts to stem the flow of irregular migration in the Aegean Sea in the context of the refugee and migrant crisis. The NATO activity has added value by providing real time information on irregular migrant flows to Turkey, Greece, and the EU’s Border Management Agency, FRONTEX. The activity is being conducted in cooperation with relevant national authorities and through the establishment of direct links between Maritime Command (MARCOM) and FRONTEX at the operational level. It is an effective contribution to existing efforts in controlling irregular migration in the area, and has also offered new opportunities for enhanced cooperation with the EU at tactical and operational levels in the context of stemming irregular migration. This activity will be evaluated in September and reviewed in time for the meeting of our Defence Ministers in October.

93. We have agreed, in principle, on a possible NATO role in the Central Mediterranean, to complement and/or, upon European Union request, support, as appropriate, the EU’s Operation Sophia through the provision of a range of capabilities including Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, and logistics support; through contribution to capacity building of the Libyan coastguard and navy, if requested by the legitimate Libyan authorities and/or the EU; and in the context of the implementation of UNSCR 2292 on the situation in Libya, in close coordination with the EU.

94. We reaffirm our commitment to a long-term partnership with Iraq, as well as to assisting the country through the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) Initiative agreed in Wales. We are committed to strengthening Iraq’s defence forces and institutions through the defence capacity building assistance measures agreed in August 2015, on the basis of Iraq’s request. We have made progress in implementing the tailored package of DCB assistance for Iraq as agreed, taking advantage of the availability of the King Abdullah II Special Operation Forces Centre in Jordan and of training and education centres in Turkey.
95. Through DCB activities being implemented in Jordan, which include counter-improvised explosive devices, explosive ordnance disposal and demining, as well as civilian-military planning and advice on security sector reform in Iraq, NATO is training Iraqis in selected areas. Building on this effort, we have decided to respond positively to the 5 May 2016 request of the Prime Minister of Iraq and agree to provide in-country NATO training to Iraqi security and military forces, in agreed areas, including, as part of the DCB programme, to continue to support institutional capacity building, in order to contribute to effective and efficient structures and policies to sustain advancement in Iraqi training capacity over the medium- and long-term. This NATO effort in Iraq will continue to be conducted so as to ensure complementarity and added value; inclusiveness; local ownership; sustainability and prioritisation; overall coherence; and tailored cooperation. The continued inclusivity of the Iraqi government and defence and security forces, will be of key importance. The initial planning for implementing these activities in country should be completed in time for Defence Ministers’ review in October, which will enable the training and capacity building to start in Iraq by January 2017.

96. Bearing in mind the threat that ISIL/Da’esh poses to all our nations and populations, we have agreed in principle to enhance the Alliance’s contribution to the efforts of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL by providing direct NATO AWACS support to increase the coalition’s situational awareness. This support is planned to start in the autumn, pending national approval procedures, and the NATO Military Authorities are now developing the details. By providing such support, we reaffirm our resolve to help tackle the security challenges coming from the south, including terrorism. This contribution to the Global Coalition does not make NATO a member of this coalition.

97. In accordance with our Wales decision, we are ready to provide Libya with advice in the field of defence and security institution building, following a request by the Government of National Accord, and to develop a long-term partnership, possibly leading to Libya’s membership in the Mediterranean Dialogue, which would be a natural framework for our cooperation. Any NATO assistance to Libya would be provided in full complementarity and in close coordination with other international efforts, including those of the UN and the EU, in line with decisions taken. Libyan ownership will be essential.

98. NATO’s partnerships are, and will continue to be, essential to the way NATO works. The success of NATO partnerships is demonstrated
by their strategic contribution to Alliance and international security. Over the last decades, the Alliance has developed structured partnerships—Partnership for Peace, Mediterranean Dialogue, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, and partners across the globe—with countries interested in pursuing political dialogue and practical cooperation, and engaging actively with other international actors and organisations on a wide range of political and security-related issues. Together we have built a broad cooperative security network. The complexity and volatility of the security environment underscore the need for a more tailor-made, individual, and flexible approach to make our partnership cooperation more strategic, coherent, and effective. We reaffirm our commitment, based on the objectives, priorities, and principles of the Berlin Partnership Policy, to expand political dialogue and practical cooperation with any nation that shares the Alliance’s values and interest in international peace and security. We will further develop our partnerships so that they continue to meet the interests of both Allies and partners.

99. We salute the ongoing and substantial contributions that our partners make by deploying together with Allies in operations and missions, and contributing to practical cooperation activities, including Trust Funds and capacity building efforts. Partners are also serving alongside the armed forces of several Allies outside existing formats, in particular to combat terrorism. This has increased our interoperability and strengthened resilience in a changed security environment.

100. At Wales, we endorsed the Partnership Interoperability Initiative, launching the Interoperability Platform, which has become a key format for working with partners on the broad range of issues related to interoperability and preparedness for future crisis management. Since then, the number of partner units certified and evaluated to NATO standards has increased, new partners have joined interoperability programmes, and opportunities for partner participation in NATO exercises have been widened. Here at Warsaw, Interoperability Platform Defence Ministers endorsed a roadmap to guide our joint work on preparing for crisis management for the coming year and discussed future opportunities for NATO-partner cooperation to project stability.

101. As part of the Partnership Interoperability Initiative, at Wales we also agreed to offer enhanced opportunities for cooperation to Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan and Sweden, in recognition of their significant operational contributions to NATO. These partners
have been increasingly involved into NATO’s work on our common security challenges. Their participation at this Summit testifies to the deep links we have built with them. We engage with each of them individually, according to our and their needs, circumstances, and ambitions, and in line with NATO’s own security interests. We have developed our practical cooperation to varying degrees and in different formats: enhanced opportunities partners are now pre-approved for a range of NATO exercises; they are also engaged in NATO defence capacity building work, participating in the enhanced NATO Response Force and developing joint threat assessments with us. We stand ready to consider offering enhanced opportunities to other partners as their contributions and interests warrant.

102. We welcome the opening of diplomatic missions to NATO Headquarters by several of our partners as an important step in our cooperation. In line with our Berlin Partnership Policy and the Brussels Agreement, we encourage other partners to follow the same path.

103. We will continue to develop our partnership with countries of the Middle East and North Africa region through deeper political dialogue and enhanced practical cooperation. The Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) remain complementary and yet distinct partnership frameworks. We remain open to welcoming new members in both partnership frameworks. We are providing assistance to 11 partner countries in the region to help them modernise their defence establishments and military forces, through the MD and the ICI.

104. MD and ICI are unique frameworks that bring together key NATO partners: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, and Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, respectively. Regular political consultations improve our mutual understanding and our situational awareness. We have also developed tailor-made Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programmes with all our MD and ICI partners. We will continue to enhance practical cooperation, including through further support in the areas of counter-terrorism, small arms and light weapons, counter-improvised explosive devices, and military border security.

105. Bearing in mind the strategic importance of the Gulf region, we look forward to the establishment of regular working-level ties between the international secretariats of NATO and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and to the launch of practical cooperation with the GCC as well as with its member states. Increased
information exchange to promote a better mutual understanding of our functions and policies would be a solid basis for more regular political dialogue and possible practical cooperation regarding our shared security challenges. We task the Council to report on progress to Foreign Ministers at their December meeting.

106. We welcome the long-standing partnership with Jordan, a key partner in the Middle East, and the success of NATO's existing Defence and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) assistance to Jordan. Our efforts are in seven priority areas: information protection; cyber defence; military exercises; counter-improvised explosive devices; communication, command and control; harbour protection; and border security. We remain committed to strengthening NATO-Jordan relations through enhanced political dialogue and practical cooperation in the framework of the Mediterranean Dialogue, as well as through the DCB Initiative and the Interoperability Platform, including the enhanced opportunities. We are grateful to our partner Jordan for its contributions to NATO-led operations over many years, and for hosting our DCB training activities for Iraq.

107. The Western Balkans is a region of strategic importance, as demonstrated by our long history of cooperation and operations in the region. We remain fully committed to the stability and security of the Western Balkans, as well as to supporting the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of countries in the region. Democratic values, rule of law, domestic reforms, and good neighbourly relations are vital for regional cooperation and for the Euro-Atlantic integration process. We welcome recent progress on border demarcation in the region. The Alliance will continue to work closely with the Western Balkans to maintain and promote regional and international peace and security. We task the Council to prepare a report on NATO's activities and relations in the region for submission to Foreign Ministers in December.

108. Strengthening NATO-Serbia relations are of benefit to the Alliance, to Serbia, and to the whole region. We welcome the continued progress made in building the NATO-Serbia partnership and support further political dialogue and practical cooperation to this end. We also welcome the progress achieved in the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue and encourage both parties to implement the agreements reached and to sustain continued progress. We welcome Kosovo's aspirations to improve its ability to ensure safety and security for all its inhabitants, as well as to contribute to security in the Western Balkans.
109. The invitation to Montenegro in December 2015 to join our Alliance and the subsequent signature of the Accession Protocol in May 2016 recognise the reforms Montenegro has undertaken, the commitment it has shown to our common values, and its contribution to international security. Montenegro now has Invitee status and is integrating into NATO activities. We look forward to the expeditious conclusion of the ratification of the Accession Protocol, and to Montenegro’s continued progress on reform, before and after accession, in order to enhance its contribution to the Alliance. We appreciate the significant contribution Montenegro makes to NATO-led operations.

110. Today we reaffirm our commitment to the Open Door Policy, a founding principle of the Washington Treaty and one of the Alliance’s great successes. Montenegro’s presence with us today is a tangible demonstration of this, and we look forward to welcoming the country as our next member as soon as possible. Euro-Atlantic integration advances democratic values, reform, and respect for the rule of law. The freedom and prosperity of our societies are built on these foundations. Euro-Atlantic integration also provides a path to stability and strengthens collective security. Successive rounds of enlargement have enhanced our security and the security of the entire Euro-Atlantic region. NATO’s door is open to all European democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, which are in a position to further the principles of the Treaty, and whose inclusion can contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. Decisions on enlargement are for NATO itself. We remain fully committed to the integration of those countries that aspire to join the Alliance, judging each on its own merits. We encourage those partners who aspire to join the Alliance—Georgia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina—to continue to implement the necessary reforms and decisions to prepare for membership. We will continue to offer support to their efforts and look to them to take the steps necessary to advance their aspirations.

111. At the 2008 Bucharest Summit we agreed that Georgia will become a member of NATO with MAP as an integral part of the process; today we reaffirm all elements of that decision, as well as subsequent decisions. We welcome the significant progress realised since 2008. Georgia’s relationship with the Alliance contains all the practical tools to prepare for eventual membership. This year’s parliamentary elections will be another key step towards the

250 Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
consolidation of democratic institutions. We encourage Georgia to continue making full use of all the opportunities for coming closer to the Alliance offered by the NATO-Georgia Commission, the Annual National Programme, its role as an enhanced opportunities partner, its participation in our Defence Capacity Building Initiative, and the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package. NATO highly appreciates Georgia’s significant and continuous contributions to the NATO Response Force and the Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan and recognises the sacrifices and contributions the Georgian people have made to our shared security.

112. We welcome the important progress made in implementing the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package, which we initiated at the Wales Summit. More than 30 experts from Allied and partner countries are now supporting Georgia across various areas of cooperation. Georgia is doing its part in allocating significant resources to this effort. The Joint Training and Evaluation Centre, which helps strengthen Georgia’s self-defence and resilience capabilities, is up and running. We will continue to provide the resources needed to implement the Substantial Package, which aims to strengthen Georgia’s capabilities and, thereby, helps Georgia advance in its preparations for membership in the Alliance. We have agreed additional practical ways to intensify efforts, including support to Georgia’s crisis management capabilities, training and exercises, and improvements in strategic communications. Allies will provide support to the development of Georgia’s air defence and air surveillance. We will also deepen our focus on security in the Black Sea region.

113. We reiterate our support to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia within its internationally recognised borders. We welcome Georgia’s commitment not to use force and call on Russia to reciprocate. We call on Russia to reverse its recognition of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia as independent states, to stop its construction of border-like obstacles along the administrative boundary lines, and to withdraw its forces from Georgia. NATO does not recognise the so-called treaties signed between the Abkhazia region of Georgia and Russia in November 2014, and the South Ossetia region of Georgia and Russia in March 2015. These violate Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and blatantly contradict the principles of international law, OSCE principles and Russia’s international commitments. We encourage all participants in the Geneva talks to play a constructive role, as well as to continue working
closely with the OSCE, the UN, and the EU to pursue peaceful conflict resolution in the internationally recognised territory of Georgia.

114. We reiterate our decision made at the 2008 Bucharest Summit and reiterated at subsequent Summits that NATO will extend an invitation to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to join the Alliance as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached within the framework of the UN. We therefore strongly urge intensified efforts to find a solution to the name issue. We encourage further efforts to develop good neighbourly relations. We also encourage the building of a fully functioning multi-ethnic society based on full implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Given concerns over political developments in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which have taken the country further away from NATO values, we urge all political leaders in the country to fully implement their commitments under the Przino Agreement of June/July 2015, as the framework for a sustainable solution to the political crisis. Acknowledging initial steps on implementation, we renew our call to all parties to engage in effective democratic dialogue and to put in place the conditions for credible elections, strengthening the rule of law, media freedom, and judicial independence. We will continue to follow closely Skopje's progress in these areas, which reflect NATO's core values. We appreciate the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's commitment to international security, as demonstrated by its steadfast contribution to our operations, its participation in fora and organisations for regional dialogue and cooperation, and its commitment to the NATO accession process.

115. We reaffirm our commitment to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of a stable and secure Bosnia and Herzegovina and our full support for its membership aspirations. We encourage the leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina to continue demonstrating political will and to work constructively for the benefit of all its citizens in pursuit of reforms. We will offer our continued support to defence reform efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We welcome the recent agreement by the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina on principles for the defence review and urge its completion as soon as possible. We welcome the progress made on registration of immovable defence property to the state, but we look to the leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina to accelerate efforts toward meeting the requirements set by NATO Foreign Ministers in Tallinn in April 2010 so that its first Membership Action Plan cycle can be activated as soon as possible, which remains our goal. Allies will keep developments under active
review. We commend Bosnia and Herzegovina for its contributions to NATO-led operations and for its commitment to regional dialogue, cooperation, and security.

116. In Wales, we extended the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative to the Republic of Moldova. Since then, Allies and partners have provided expertise and advice in support of the ongoing defence reform process to strengthen the capabilities of the Moldovan armed forces and the defence sector. Allies remain committed to this work so that the country can enjoy a stable, secure and prosperous future in accordance with the values shared by European democracies. In order to realise such a future, it is important that the Republic of Moldova remains committed to the implementation of reforms that benefit all its citizens. We thank the Republic of Moldova for its contribution to NATO-led operations.

117. Ukraine is a long-standing and distinctive partner of the Alliance. At our Summit here in Warsaw, we are meeting with President Poroshenko and issuing a joint statement. An independent, sovereign and stable Ukraine, firmly committed to democracy and the rule of law, is key to Euro-Atlantic security. We stand firm in our support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders and Ukraine's right to decide its own future and foreign policy course free from outside interference, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act. Russia continues to violate Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence. Despite these challenging circumstances, Ukraine's government is making progress in implementing wide-ranging reforms towards European and Euro-Atlantic standards, based on democratic values, respect for human rights, minorities and the rule of law, which will be essential in promoting prosperity and long-term stability. We welcome the steps Ukraine has taken to fight corruption, maintain International Monetary Fund conditionality, reform the judiciary, and move towards decentralisation, but substantial challenges remain and continued efforts are required. We strongly encourage Ukraine to remain committed to the full implementation of these and other necessary reforms and to ensuring their sustainability. Recalling our previous Summit decisions, NATO will continue to support Ukraine in carrying out its reform agenda, including through the Annual National Programme in the framework of our Distinctive Partnership.

118. NATO-Ukraine cooperation is an important part of the Alliance's contribution to the international community's efforts to project stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. We welcome
Ukraine's intent to further deepen its Distinctive Partnership with NATO, as well as its past and present contributions to NATO-led operations and the NATO Response Force even while it has been defending itself against Russia's aggressive actions. Ukraine's choice to adopt and implement NATO principles and standards, for which its Strategic Defence Bulletin provides a roadmap, will promote greater interoperability between our forces. The Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian Brigade is an important element of this effort. It will also enhance Ukraine's ability to better provide for its own security, through functioning security and defence institutions under civilian democratic control that are accountable, sustainable, and effective. Ukraine's participation in the Defence Education Enhancement Programme is an important effort in this respect. NATO will continue to provide strategic advice and practical support to the reform of Ukraine's security and defence sector, including as set out in the Comprehensive Assistance Package which we are endorsing together with President Poroshenko at today's meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission. The Comprehensive Assistance Package is aimed at consolidating and enhancing NATO's support to Ukraine, including by tailored capability and capacity building measures for the security and defence sector, which will contribute to enhance Ukraine's resilience against a wide array of threats, including hybrid threats.

119. In light of NATO's operational experiences and the evolving complex security environment, a comprehensive political, civilian, and military approach is essential in crisis management and cooperative security. Furthermore, it contributes to the effectiveness of our common security and defence, without prejudice to Alliance collective defence commitments. NATO has developed a modest but appropriate civilian capability in line with Lisbon Summit decisions. We will continue to pursue coherence within NATO's own tools and strands of work, concerted approaches with partner nations and organisations such as the UN, the EU, and the OSCE, as well as further dialogue with non-governmental organisations. We look forward to a review of the 2011 Comprehensive Approach Action Plan for consideration by our Foreign Ministers in 2017.

120. As challenges to international peace and security multiply, cooperation between NATO and the United Nations is increasingly important. We welcome the continued growth in political dialogue and practical cooperation between NATO and the UN, covering a broad range of areas of mutual interest. At last year's Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping, NATO pledged to enhance its support to
UN peace operations, including in the areas of counter-improvised explosive devices, training and preparedness, improving the UN’s ability to deploy more rapidly into the field, and through cooperation on building defence capacity in countries at risk. We stand by this commitment and remain ready to further deepen our interaction in these and other fields, including through NATO’s participation in the follow-up conference to be held in London in September of this year.

121. The European Union remains a unique and essential partner for NATO. Enhanced consultations at all levels and practical cooperation in operations and capability development have brought concrete results. The security challenges in our shared eastern and southern neighbourhoods make it more important than ever before to reinforce our strategic partnership in a spirit of full mutual openness, transparency, and complementarity, while respecting the organisations’ different mandates, decision-making autonomy and institutional integrity, and as agreed by the two organisations.

122. We welcome the joint declaration issued here in Warsaw by the NATO Secretary General, the President of the European Council, and the President of the European Commission, which outlines a series of actions the two organisations intend to take together in concrete areas, including countering hybrid threats, enhancing resilience, defence capacity building, cyber defence, maritime security, and exercises. We task the Council to review the implementation of these proposals and to report to Foreign Ministers by December 2016.

123. We welcome the European Council Conclusions of June 2016, calling for further enhancement of the relationship between NATO and the EU. We also welcome the presentation of the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy.

124. NATO recognises the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence, which will lead to a stronger NATO, help enhance the security of all Allies, and foster an equitable sharing of the burden, benefits and responsibilities of Alliance membership. In this context, we welcome the strengthening of European defence and crisis management as we have seen over the past few years.

125. Non-EU Allies continue to make significant contributions to the EU’s efforts to strengthen its capacities to address common security challenges. For the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, non-EU Allies’ fullest involvement in these efforts is essential. We encourage further mutual steps in this area to support a strengthened strategic partnership.
126. We welcome the Secretary General’s report on NATO-EU relations. We encourage him to continue to work closely with the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the High Representative, on all aspects of the NATO-EU strategic partnership and provide a report to the Council for the next Summit.

127. NATO and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe both play important roles in maintaining stability and addressing security challenges in the Euro-Atlantic area. We appreciate the OSCE’s comprehensive approach to security, covering the political-military, economic-environmental, and human dimensions. We also value the OSCE’s important role in trying to bring an end to several protracted conflicts in the Euro-Atlantic area. The crisis in Ukraine has once again highlighted the significance of the OSCE for international efforts to support the peaceful resolution of conflicts, confidence- and security-building, and as a platform for cooperation and inclusive dialogue on security in Europe. We also underline the value of confidence- and security-building and transparency measures within the framework of the OSCE. We are committed to further enhancing our cooperation, at both the political and operational level, in all areas of common interest, including through the newly appointed Secretary General’s Representative for the OSCE.

128. NATO’s cooperation with the African Union (AU) encompasses operational, logistic and capacity building support, as well as support for the operationalisation of the African Standby Force, including through exercises, and tailor-made training, in accordance with the AU’s requests to NATO. We look forward to further strengthening and expanding our political and practical partnership with the AU, so we are better able to respond together to common threats and challenges.

129. NATO is an alliance of values, including individual liberty, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. These shared values are essential to what NATO is and what it does. Further incorporating them into all areas of our work will make NATO stronger.

130. Corruption and poor governance are security challenges which undermine democracy, the rule of law and economic development. The importance of implementing measures to improve integrity building, anti-corruption and good governance applies to NATO, Allies, and partners alike. To further our work in this area, today we endorsed a new NATO Building Integrity Policy which reaffirms our conviction that transparent and accountable defence institutions
under democratic control are fundamental to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and essential for international security cooperation.

131. Empowerment of women at NATO and in our militaries makes our Alliance stronger. We attach great importance to ensuring women's full and active participation in the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts, as well as in post-conflict efforts and cooperation. Since our last Summit in Wales, we have made good progress in implementing UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) and related resolutions. Yet, more work is to be done, which requires enduring leadership, transparency, and accountability. We welcome recent high-level appointments in both NATO’s civilian and military structures. However, there are still shortfalls in the representation of women at NATO that need to be addressed. We will implement the updated WPS Action Plan, which has been developed with many of our partners and in consultation with the newly established civil society advisory panel. NATO’s efforts to project stability are further bolstered by the comprehensive NATO Gender Education and Training Package now available to all. Our Strategic Commands are now operationalising the approved Military Guidelines on the Prevention of and Response to Conflict-Related Sexual and Gender-Based Violence. We affirm the critical importance of robust training and accountability measures in regards to prevention of misconduct, including sexual misconduct and abuse. Our ongoing efforts and commitment to integrate gender perspectives into Alliance activities throughout NATO’s three core tasks will contribute to a more modern, ready, and responsive Alliance.

132. Driven by our values and international law, we recognise the imperative to protect civilians from the effects of armed conflict. That is why we have today endorsed the NATO Policy on the Protection of Civilians, developed with our partners and in consultation with the UN and other international organisations. In this Policy, protection of civilians includes all efforts taken to avoid, minimise, and mitigate the negative effects on civilians arising from NATO and NATO-led military operations and, when applicable, to protect civilians from conflict-related physical violence or threats of physical violence by other actors. The Policy complements NATO’s existing efforts in related areas and it includes a stability policing dimension. We will implement this Policy through a concrete action plan, which will be reviewed regularly by the Council.

133. We remain deeply concerned that children continue to be the victims of grave violations, especially the six practices identified by the
UN Secretary General: the killing or maiming of children; recruitment or using child soldiers; attacks against schools or hospitals; rape or other grave sexual violence; abduction; and denial of humanitarian access. Since our Summit in Wales, NATO has established a robust policy, in consultation with the UN, to enhance our implementation of UNSCR 1612 and related resolutions. The Policy directs our troops, when deployed in NATO-led operations and missions, to monitor and report violations against children and to engage with local authorities. In our Resolute Support mission we have appointed, for the first time, a Children and Armed Conflict Adviser to contribute to the training of the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces. In cooperation with the UN, NATO will also further expand its relevant training, exercise and education opportunities. The Council will regularly assess the implementation of our Policy.

134. In the fight against terrorism, NATO adds value and has a role to play, without prejudice to national legislation and responsibilities, in coherence with the EU, and in particular through our military cooperation with partners to build their capacity to face terrorist threats. NATO will continue to reach out to partners and other international organisations, as appropriate, to promote common understanding and practical cooperation in support of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Building on our Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work and our Biometrics Programme of Work, we will continue to improve our capabilities and technologies, including to defend against improvised explosive devices and CBRN threats. As terrorism and related threats remain high on NATO’s security agenda, Allies intend to work together, in accordance with national and international law, as well as established NATO procedures, to promote information-sharing through the optimised use of multilateral platforms, such as NATO’s Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System (BICES). Allies will continue to seek to enhance their cooperation in exchanging information on returning foreign fighters. The Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Security, acting within the agreed Terms of Reference, could serve as a facilitator to enhance the exchange of information.

135. Energy developments can have significant political and security implications for Allies and the Alliance, as demonstrated by the crises to NATO’s east and south. A stable and reliable energy supply, the diversification of import routes, suppliers and energy resources, and the interconnectivity of energy networks are of critical importance and increase our resilience against political and
economic pressure. While these issues are primarily the responsibility of national governments and other international organisations, NATO closely follows the security implications of relevant energy developments and attaches particular importance to diversification of energy supply in the Euro-Atlantic region. We will therefore further enhance our strategic awareness in this regard, including through sharing intelligence and through expanding our links with other international organisations such as the International Energy Agency and the EU, as appropriate. We will consult and share information on energy security issues of particular concern to Allies and the Alliance, with a view to providing a comprehensive picture of the evolving energy landscape, concentrating on areas where NATO can add value. We will also continue to develop NATO’s capacity to support national authorities in protecting critical infrastructure, as well as enhancing their resilience against energy supply disruptions that could affect national and collective defence, including hybrid and cyber threats. In this context, we will include energy security considerations in training, exercises, and advance planning. We will continue to engage with our partner countries where appropriate. We will further improve the energy efficiency of our military forces through establishing common standards, reducing dependence on fossil fuels, and demonstrating energy-efficient solutions for the military. Today we have noted a progress report on NATO’s role in energy security. We task the Council to further refine NATO’s role in accordance with established principles and guidelines, and to produce a progress report for our next Summit.

136. A stronger defence industry across the Alliance, which includes small- and medium-sized enterprises, greater defence industrial and technological cooperation across the Atlantic and within Europe, and a robust industrial base in the whole of Europe and North America, remain essential for acquiring needed Alliance capabilities. For the Alliance to keep its technological edge, it is of particular importance to support innovation with the aim to identify advanced and emerging technologies, evaluate their applicability in the military domain, and implement them through innovative solutions. In this regard, NATO welcomes initiatives from both sides of the Atlantic to maintain and advance the military and technological advantage of Allied capabilities through innovation and encourages nations to ensure such initiatives will lead to increased cooperation within the Alliance and among Allies.
137. Institutional adaptation underpins NATO’s political and military adaptation. The objective is an Alliance adaptable by design, where the capacity to anticipate, and react to, change is integral to how we operate. Reforms since 2010 have contributed to improved effectiveness and efficiency, adapting NATO towards greater readiness and responsiveness. There has been reform of the Headquarters, Agencies and Command Structure. We have introduced greater transparency by publishing financial audits. We have improved our strategic communications. To take forward these efforts we will develop a stronger and more consistent approach to prioritisation, better linking our political and military priorities with resource requirements, in particular through a more efficient use of the common-funded capability delivery process. We will continue improving accountability, governance and transparency. We task the Council to pursue these efforts, building on recent achievements and taking advantage of the move to the new NATO Headquarters, to ensure we remain ready and able to face the challenges of the future as a confident, committed, adaptable Alliance, and report on progress by our next Summit.

138. We welcome the role of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in complementing NATO’s efforts to promote stability throughout Europe. We also appreciate the contribution made by the Atlantic Treaty Association in promoting a better understanding of the Alliance among our nations.

139. We express our appreciation for the generous hospitality extended to us by the Government and the people of Poland. With key decisions to reinforce our deterrence and defence, project stability beyond our borders, and promote our values, our Warsaw Summit has demonstrated our unity, solidarity, and strength. We look forward to meeting again in 2017 at our new NATO Headquarters in Brussels.

Evelina Zakamskaya: How would you comment on the outcome of the concluded NATO Summit in Warsaw?

Aleksandr Grushko: You know. You can comment on the results, but I’d like to focus on those decisions that were taken directly at the summit, and in fact their number is quite limited. In Warsaw, the NATO countries agreed, firstly, to initiate a joint naval operation off the coast of Libya, to be called Sea Guardian. Its mandate is not entirely understandable, so I cannot go into it because this issue will be discussed with NATO partners and I think they themselves are still at the beginning of the road to working this mandate out.

The second point worth noting is that the EU-NATO declaration on cooperation was adopted. However, it is clear that the European Union was given crutches in Warsaw after [UK Prime Minister David] Cameron amputated a part of the European Union. Now, NATO and the EU will join forces in the fight against “hybrid threats,” cyber defence, strategic communication—in Western language that is what counter-propaganda and agitation is called. They will try to revive cooperation in the military industry, and so on. These are basically all the outcomes of the summit. Perhaps it is also worth mentioning that NATO will now pass on to the coalition against the Islamic State, led by the U.S., the data it obtains during the operation in Turkey’s airspace—by the U.S. AWACS aircraft from the NATO package. This is actually a whole package of military decisions.

Evelina Zakamskaya: Aleksandr Viktorovich, the decision to deploy battalions in the Baltic States and Poland, like all other decisions, do you think they fall under the framework of the Russia-NATO Founding Act or they are in conflict with it?

Aleksandr Grushko: Of course, we primarily look at all this activity in context. We don’t consider four battalions or three battalions, there have been company rotations so far, but we look at it comprehensively,

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251 The introduction has been omitted.
252 It refers to the then-Prime Minister of the United Kingdom David Cameron and the Brexit.
to what extent all of NATO’s activities, including the defence planning that is being carried out, have an impact on the security situation, both regionally and Europe-wide of course, and how this directly affects our interests looking at the need to maintain an appropriate level of defence capability.

But for us to get it right, let me start by saying that these four battalions are only part of NATO’s efforts. The first step is to add a programme that is being implemented by the U.S. It is called the European Reassurance Initiative. This initiative was announced a long time ago and additional money has been allocated for it now, four and a half times as much as last year. Almost $4 billion. The U.S. will deploy another brigade in Europe, so it will not be two brigades—as it is now—but three brigades, with subunits and brigade level units constantly rotating in Eastern European countries. Although in Western Europe, the U.S. will deploy another set of equipment for another reinforced brigade in depots (these are storage facilities left over from the Cold War). Thus, the U.S. is creating the potential for the permanent deployment in Europe of not two brigades—as now—but four of them. In addition, it has been announced that such depots will be set up on the territory of Eastern European countries, where weapons and military equipment will also be deployed. Their number is still unknown, but this will be another element in this whole NATO equation, the formula for military presence. Permanent exercises should also be added. By the way, Warsaw has shown an innovative sophistication in describing what NATO is going to do. Previously, there was discussion of a continuous, rotational presence; today, it sounds like a persistent rotation.

Returning to your question, a different question naturally arises: what is the difference between persistent rotation and permanent deployment? Military exercises must also be mentioned. We have already mentioned that the largest ones were held recently, in June, around the date of the Warsaw summit. They were called Anaconda. They were attended by 31,000 troops, including 14,000 Americans. This is no longer a brigade level, it is two, if not three divisions. Moreover, the Baltops exercises were held during the same period, with 40 ships, over 100 aircraft, including planes and combat helicopters. And so it can go on and on. It was announced that one Romanian brigade would be transformed into a multinational brigade. Improvements are being made to the command structures. The creation of six so-called command cells is coming to an end. The command structures will be increased in Bucharest and Poland, etc. It has also been announced
that NATO’s naval groupings will be strengthened, particularly in the Baltic Sea. NATO declares that it will start to think about how to strengthen itself in the Black Sea region, too. In general, security in maritime areas will now become one of the Alliance’s priorities, including in cooperation with the European Union.

Therefore, whether or not this is in line with the Founding Act—and these actions are obviously not in line with the Act—we are dealing with a major change in military-political realities and with a situation that we always associate with military balance. There is no balance as it had existed before all of NATO’s preparations started, and I even brought an interview with [General] Pavel, the head of the Military Committee—very interesting. In it, Pavel explains the logic of NATO’s reinforcements. He says: we have discovered that there is a helicopter brigade at 25 km distance from the Baltic countries’ border, there is the town of Pskov at 75 km distance, which also has military potential, so NATO must balance and take some balancing measures. Above all, the very logic of such an approach is shocking, because we haven’t really moved anywhere. This brigade, I’m not sure, has been there for decades, and Pskov has already been there for a thousand years and its military potential has always been deployed there. But NATO has decided to accept Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into its ranks. Then suddenly, it discovers that there is no potential there and starts to “balance” it. What do they expect from us? That we will breathe easy and bring it all over the Urals? Of course not. That is why, in NATO, they should understand very well that this whole “balancing out” operation will lead us to rebuild the balance that had existed before NATO’s decisions to create counter-capabilities at the borders, which have now, unfortunately, become NATO’s borders. I say all this because there were no threats from these countries before. There was no Russian interest from the point of view of military planning, no military interest at all. We had an absolutely normal agenda in our relations—economic, social. Of course, we had problems with the situation of the Russian-speaking population and we said that in modern Europe it is a disgraceful phenomenon when 600,000 Russians and the Russian-speaking population have so far been deprived of the elementary right to citizenship. We talked about the danger of glorifying Nazism, about falsifying history. But all these problems had no military dimension at all. And today, NATO, through its efforts, through its military preparations, has introduced a military component both into our relations with these countries, and into our relations with Europe, as well as with the transatlantic community as
a whole. This is absolutely not our choice, but in this case it’s about using military means to create new dividing lines in Europe, to deepen them and prevent implementation of the Greater Europe project from Lisbon to Vladivostok as we have proposed and continue to propose.

Therefore, the deployment of four battalions is clearly a step that fits in this line, a line that is not only military but also political, geopolitical, and this, of course, will require specific efforts from us to safeguard our interests.

Evelina Zakamskaya: Yes. But you can imagine, Alexander Viktorovich, what it will look like now: every action on our part, every action to protect our own interests will be understood as if all their concerns were right. Look, the Russians are arming themselves, just as we have been warning.

Aleksandr Grushko: I think we should approach this calmly, because we have already announced—and they know this very well—that all these steps are forced and, in fact, over the decades, the configuration of our forces in this region has not changed for the reasons I have already said and explained. Because there was no need to build some serious military potential in a region where security is in no way threatened. It is no secret to NATO that our attention was focused on the South. The South was the victim of a terrorist attack and our armed forces were primarily aimed, both in terms of organisation and training, not at preparing some regular operations but at carrying out very specific tasks relating to immediate threats affecting the security of our country. Today, however, attempts are being made to draw us into some kind of confrontation pattern adapted from the Cold War. We do not need this. And whether NATO does, I think it is a serious question, because NATO should understand that having Russia as a potential opponent, not even in the political sense, but in the sense of maintaining military capabilities, is a dead end.

[...]²⁵³

Translated by Mirosław Łukawski. Verified with the Russian original by Marek Menkiszak.


²⁵³ Questions and answers on relations with the U.S., Ukraine, military incidents, and relations with Turkey have been omitted.
II. Modern World and Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation

4. The world is currently going through fundamental changes related to the emergence of a multipolar international system. The structure of international relations is becoming increasingly complex. Globalization has led to the formation of new centres of economic and political power. Global power and development potential is becoming decentralized, and is shifting towards the Asia-Pacific Region, eroding the global economic and political dominance of the traditional western powers. Cultural and civilizational diversity of the world and the existence of multiple development models have been clearer than ever.

5. Tensions are rising due to disparities in global development, the widening prosperity gap between States and growing competition for resources, access to markets and control over transport arteries. This competition involves not only human, research and technological capabilities, but has been increasingly gaining a civilizational dimension in the form of duelling values. Against this backdrop, attempts to impose values on others can stoke xenophobia, intolerance and conflict in international affairs, leading ultimately to chaos and an uncontrolled situation in international relations. Consequently, preventing fault lines from emerging in relations between civilizations and promoting partnerships across cultures, religions and civilizations are regarded as priorities for a harmonious development of humankind. The attempts made by western powers to maintain their positions in the world, including by imposing their point of view on global processes and conducting a policy to contain alternative centres of power, leads to a greater instability in international relations and growing turbulence on the global and regional levels. The struggle for dominance in shaping the key principles of the future international system has become a key trend at the current stage of international development.

254 Introduction has been omitted.
6. Force is becoming an increasingly important factor in international relations amid escalating political, social and economic contradictions and growing uncertainty in the global political system and economy. Efforts to expand and upgrade military capabilities and to create and deploy new types of weapons undermine strategic stability and pose a threat to global security which is underwritten by a system of arms control treaties and agreements. Although a large-scale war, including nuclear war, between major powers remains unlikely, they face increased risks of being drawn into regional conflicts and escalating crises.

7. Existing military and political alliances are not capable of countering the full range of challenges and threats the world is currently facing. As people and States become increasingly interconnected, attempts to ensure stability and security within a single territory are doomed to fail. The universal principle of equal and indivisible security has special significance and relevance for the Euro-Atlantic, Eurasian and Asia-Pacific regions, among others. Network diplomacy has gained prominence as a flexible approach to participating in multilateral mechanisms for the sake of finding effective solutions to common issues.

8. Alongside military might, other important factors allowing States to influence international politics are taking centre stage, including economic, legal, technological and IT capabilities. Using these capabilities to pursue geopolitical interests is detrimental to efforts to find ways to settle disputes and resolve the existing international issues by peaceful means on the basis of the norms of international law.

9. In addition to traditional methods of diplomacy, “soft power” has become an integral part of efforts to achieve foreign policy objectives. This primarily includes the tools offered by civil society, as well as various methods and technologies—from information and communication, to humanitarian and other types.

[...]

14. The growing threat of international terrorism is one of the most dangerous realities in today’s world. The spread of extremist ideology and the activity of terrorist groups in a number of regions (primarily, in the Middle East and North Africa) are the result of systemic development problems that globalization processes have laid bare. External interference has also played a major role. Combined, these two factors have led to the destruction of traditional governance

255 Section concerning economic problems has been omitted.
and security mechanisms and the illegal spread of weapons and ammunition at an even larger scale. The ideological values and prescriptions imposed from outside these countries in an attempt to modernize their political systems have exacerbated the negative response of their societies to current challenges. Extremist forces have exploited these trends using distorted interpretations of religious values to promote violence in pursuit of their goals in the political, interethnic and interreligious rivalry they are engaged in.

15. The global terrorist threat has reached a new high with the emergence of the Islamic State international terrorist organization and similar groups that have descended to an unprecedented level of cruelty in their violence. They aspire to create their own state and seek to consolidate their influence on a territory stretching from the shores of the Atlantic Ocean to Pakistan. The main effort in combating terrorism should be aimed at creating a broad international counter-terrorist coalition with a solid legal foundation, one that is based on effective and consistent inter-State cooperation without any political considerations or double standards, above all to prevent terrorism and extremism and counter the spread of radical ideas.

21. Russia conducts an assertive and independent foreign policy guided by its national interests and based on unconditional respect for international law. Russia is fully aware of its responsibility to support peace and security in the world both at the global and regional levels and is committed to working with all interested States to address common challenges.

22. Russia’s foreign policy is open and predictable. It is characterized by consistency and continuity and reflects the unique role Russia has played for centuries as a counterbalance in international affairs and the development of global civilization.

IV. Regional Foreign Policy Priorities of the Russian Federation

61. Systemic problems in the Euro-Atlantic region that have accumulated over the last quarter century are manifested in the geopolitical expansion pursued by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) along with their

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256 Section concerning cross-border problems has been omitted.
257 Section on general foreign policy priorities has been omitted.
258 Section concerning CIS territory has been omitted.
refusal to begin implementation of political statements regarding the creation of a common European security and cooperation framework, have resulted in a serious crisis in the relations between Russia and the Western States. The containment policy adopted by the United States and its allies against Russia, and political, economic, information and other pressure Russia is facing from them undermine regional and global stability, are detrimental to the long-term interests of all sides and run counter to the growing need for cooperation and addressing transnational challenges and threats in today’s world.

62. Russia’s long-term Euro-Atlantic policy is aimed at building a common space of peace, security and stability based on the principles of indivisible security, equal cooperation and mutual trust. Russia is a consistent advocate of transforming political declarations regarding indivisibility of security irrespective of States’ affiliation with political and military alliances into legally binding obligations.

63. The EU remains an important trade and economic and foreign policy partner for Russia. The Russian Federation is interested in constructive, stable and predictable cooperation with EU countries based on the principles of equality and respect for each other’s interests. Further development of relations with the EU implies improving the legal contractual framework, as well as institutional cooperation mechanisms so as to ensure mutual benefit and the best possible configuration of partnership ties, including in the energy segment. Russia’s strategic priority in its relations with the EU is to establish a common economic and humanitarian space from the Atlantic to the Pacific by harmonizing and aligning interests of European and Eurasian integration processes, which is expected to prevent the emergence of dividing lines on the European continent.

64. The Russian Federation is committed to maintaining intensive and mutually beneficial dialogue with the EU on key items on the foreign policy agenda, as well as further promoting practical cooperation on foreign policy, military and political issues. There is potential for Russia and the EU to step up combined efforts to counter terrorism, uncontrolled and illegal migration, as well as organized crime, including human trafficking, illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and their precursors, arms and explosives, and cybercrime.

65. The visa regime remains one of the main barriers to expanding contacts between Russia and the EU. Reciprocal removal of visa requirements on a stage-by-stage basis is expected to give strong
impetus for strengthening Russia-EU economic, humanitarian, cultural and educational cooperation and ties in other areas.

66. Stepping up mutually beneficial bilateral ties with the Federal Republic of Germany, the French Republic, the Italian Republic, the Kingdom of Spain and other European countries has substantial potential in terms of promoting Russia’s national interests in European and world affairs.

67. Russia will continue its work within the Council of Europe as an independent universal European organization with a mandate to provide for a single legal and humanitarian space on the continent through its unique convention mechanisms.

68. Russia views the OSCE as an important mechanism for building an equitable and indivisible system of pan-European security, and is interested in strengthening its role and authority. Setting clear priorities, primarily regarding countering transnational challenges and threats, as well as drafting the OSCE Charter and reforming its executive bodies with a view to ensuring appropriate prerogatives of the collective intergovernmental bodies, are the prerequisites for making the OSCE even more relevant.

69. Russia respects the choice of European States that are not members of any military alliances. These States are making a genuine contribution to ensuring stability and security in Europe. Russia is ready to engage in constructive multi-faceted cooperation with them.

70. Russia will build its relations with NATO taking into account the degree to which the Alliance is ready to engage in equitable partnership, strictly adhere to the norms and principles of international law, take real steps towards a common space of peace, security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region based on the principles of mutual trust, transparency and predictability, to ensure the compliance by all its members with the commitment undertaken within the Russia-NATO Council to refrain from seeking to ensure one’s security at the expense of the security of other States, as well as with military restraint obligations as per the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of May 27, 1997. The Russian Federation maintains its negative perspective towards NATO’s expansion, the Alliance’s military infrastructure approaching Russian borders, and its growing military activity in regions neighbouring Russia, viewing them as a violation of the principle of equal and indivisible security and leading to the deepening of old dividing lines in Europe and to the emergence of new ones.
71. Russia stands for maintaining in the north of Europe an area of trust and stability based on the principle of equal and indivisible security. To these ends, Russia develops practical cooperation with North European countries, including by implementing joint projects within multilateral frameworks, with due consideration of environmental aspects and interests of indigenous peoples. Russia’s participation in the activities of the Council of the Baltic Sea States plays an important role. Russia advocates the further unleashing of the project potential of the Northern Dimension and its partnerships as a platform for regional cooperation in Northern Europe.

72. The Russian Federation is interested in building mutually beneficial relations with the United States of America, taking into consideration that the two States bear special responsibility for global strategic stability and international security in general, as well as vast potential in trade and investment, scientific and technical and other types of cooperation. Russia believes that dialogue with the US on bilateral as well as international issues can advance in a steady and predictable manner only when conducted on equal footing, based on mutual trust, respect of each other’s interests and non-interference in each other’s domestic affairs. Russia does not recognize the US policy of extraterritorial jurisdiction beyond the boundaries of international law and finds unacceptable attempts to exercise military, political, economic or any other pressure, while reserving the right to firmly respond to hostile actions, including the bolstering of national defence and taking retaliatory or asymmetrical measures.

73. Russia advocates constructive cooperation with the US in arms control, with due consideration of the inextricable link between strategic offensive and defensive warfare, and the imperative to make nuclear disarmament a multilateral process. The Russian Federation believes that talks on the further reduction of strategic offensive arms are only possible when taking into account all factors affecting global strategic stability, without exception. Russia views the creation of the global missile-defence system by the US as a threat to its national security and reserves the right to take adequate retaliatory measures.

74. Russia expects the US to strictly abide by the norms of international law, primarily those held in the UN Charter, in its actions on the international stage.

75. The Russian Federation is open to building relations with Canada based on respect for mutual interests and the experience amassed in the course of cooperation, including in the Arctic.
76. Russia pursues a policy aimed at preserving peace, stability and constructive international cooperation in the Arctic. The Russian Federation believes that the existing international legal framework is sufficient to successfully settle any regional issues through negotiation, including the issue of defining the outer limits of the continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean. Russia considers that the Arctic States bear special responsibility for the sustainable development of the region, and in this connection advocates enhanced cooperation in the Arctic Council, the coastal Arctic Five and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council. Russia will be firm in countering any attempts to introduce elements of political or military confrontation in the Arctic, and, in general, politicize international cooperation in the region. Using the Northern Sea Route as Russia’s national transport route in the Arctic, as well as for transit shipments between Europe and Asia is significant for the region development.

77. The Russian Federation will continue its efforts to preserve and expand its presence in Antarctica, including through the effective use of mechanisms and procedures envisaged in the Antarctic Treaty of December 1, 1959.

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259 Sections concerning other countries (outside Europe and the U.S.) and regions of the world, and institutions formulating and implementing foreign policy have been omitted.
CNBC News: Russia isn’t directly on this agenda. Why is that?

Secretary General: Russia is on NATO’s agenda always and Russia will be discussed during the meeting later on today. Also as part of our discussions related to the transatlantic bond and burden sharing. Because one of the reasons why we are investing more in our collective defence, why we are increasing our military presence in the eastern part of the Alliance is of course as a response to the aggressive actions of Russia we have seen in Ukraine. So Russia is on NATO’s agenda. We have a strong and clear message. And that is that we need both credible deterrence, defence and dialogue. And NATO has a long-standing policy and that is that we need both dialogue and credible deterrence and defence in our approach to Russia. That will be addressed during the meeting later on today.
Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, March 26, 2018

We express our strong protest in the wake of the decision taken by a number of EU and NATO member countries to expel Russian diplomats.

We consider this as an unfriendly step that is not consistent with the goals and interests of establishing the underlying reasons and searching for the perpetrators of the incident that occurred in the town of Salisbury on March 4. The provocative gesture of the so-called solidarity of these countries with London, which blindly followed the British authorities in the so-called “Skripal case” and which never got around to sort out the circumstances of the incident, is a continuation of the confrontational policy to escalate the situation.

Presenting unfounded charges against Russia in the absence of explanations of what happened and refusing to engage in meaningful interaction, the British authorities have de facto adopted a prejudiced, biased as well as hypocritical stance.

This is an attempt on the lives of Russian citizens on the territory of Great Britain. Despite our repeated requests for information addressed to London, Russia does not have any information in this regard. British allies don’t have any objective and exhaustive data and blindly follow the principle of Euro-Atlantic unity at the expense of common sense, the rules of civilised state-to-state dialogue and the principles of international law. It goes without saying that this unfriendly move by this group of countries will not go unnoticed, and we will respond to it.

1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the 29 member nations of the North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Brussels at a time when the security of our nations and the rules-based international order are being challenged. NATO will continue to strive for peace, security, and stability in the whole of the Euro-Atlantic area. We are united in our commitment to the Washington Treaty, the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations (UN), and the vital transatlantic bond. We are determined to protect and defend our indivisible security, our freedom, and our common values, including individual liberty, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. NATO remains the foundation for strong collective defence and the essential transatlantic forum for security consultations and decisions among Allies. The Alliance will continue to pursue a 360-degree approach to security and to fulfil effectively all three core tasks as set out in the Strategic Concept: collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security. NATO is a defensive Alliance. NATO’s greatest responsibility is to protect and defend our territory and our populations against attack. Any attack against one Ally will be regarded as an attack against us all, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. We will continue to stand together and act together, on the basis of solidarity, shared purpose, and fair burden-sharing.

2. We face a dangerous, unpredictable, and fluid security environment, with enduring challenges and threats from all strategic directions; from state and non-state actors; from military forces; and from terrorist, cyber, and hybrid attacks. Russia’s aggressive actions, including the threat and use of force to attain political goals, challenge the Alliance and are undermining Euro-Atlantic security and the rules-based international order. Instability and continuing crises across the Middle East and North Africa are fuelling terrorism. They also contribute to irregular migration and human trafficking. The ongoing crisis in Syria has a direct effect on the stability of the region and the security of the Alliance as a whole. We face hybrid challenges, including disinformation campaigns and malicious cyber activities. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and advanced missile technology also continues to threaten the security of our
nations. In light of all this, our unity and solidarity are stronger than ever; we will take all necessary steps to ensure our collective defence.

3. We reaffirm our unwavering commitment to all aspects of the Defence Investment Pledge agreed at the 2014 Wales Summit, and to submit credible national plans on its implementation, including the spending guidelines for 2024, planned capabilities, and contributions. Fair burden sharing underpins the Alliance's cohesion, solidarity, credibility, and ability to fulfil our Article 3 and Article 5 commitments. We welcome the considerable progress made since the Wales Summit with four consecutive years of real growth in non-US defence expenditure. All Allies have started to increase the amount they spend on defence in real terms and some two-thirds of Allies have national plans in place to spend 2% of their Gross Domestic Product on defence by 2024. More than half of Allies are spending more than 20% of their defence expenditures on major equipment, including related research and development, and, according to their national plans, 24 Allies will meet the 20% guideline by 2024. Allies are delivering more of the heavier, high-end capabilities we require and are improving the readiness, deployability, sustainability, and interoperability of their forces. The number of activities in which we are engaged has increased, and Allies continue to make valuable force and capability contributions that benefit the security of the Euro-Atlantic area through NATO’s operations, missions, and other activities, as well as through the operations and missions conducted under national authority and the authority of other organisations. As we take stock of the national plans that exist today, we appreciate the unprecedented progress and recognise that much work still remains. We are committed to improving the balance of sharing the costs and responsibilities of Alliance membership.

4. For over two decades, NATO has worked to build a partnership with Russia, including through the mechanism of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). Russia’s recent activities and policies have reduced stability and security, increased unpredictability, and changed the security environment. While NATO stands by its international commitments, Russia has breached the values, principles and commitments which underpin the NATO-Russia relationship, as outlined in the 1997 Basic Document of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, and 2002 Rome Declaration, broken the trust at the core of our cooperation, and challenged the fundamental principles of the global and Euro-Atlantic security architecture. Decisions we have taken are fully consistent with
our international commitments, and therefore cannot be regarded by anyone as contradicting the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

5. We reaffirm our decisions towards Russia agreed at the Wales and Warsaw Summits. We continue to respond to the deteriorated security environment by enhancing our deterrence and defence posture, including by a forward presence in the eastern part of the Alliance. We have also suspended all practical civilian and military cooperation between NATO and Russia, while remaining open to political dialogue. NATO does not seek confrontation and poses no threat to Russia.

6. The Euro-Atlantic security environment has become less stable and predictable as a result of Russia’s illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea and ongoing destabilisation of eastern Ukraine; its military posture and provocative military activities, including near NATO borders, such as the deployment of modern dual-capable missiles in Kaliningrad, repeated violation of NATO Allied airspace, and the continued military build-up in Crimea; its significant investments in the modernisation of its strategic forces; its irresponsible and aggressive nuclear rhetoric; its large-scale, no-notice snap exercises; and the growing number of its exercises with a nuclear dimension. This is compounded by Russia’s continued violation, non-implementation, and circumvention of numerous obligations and commitments in the realm of arms control and confidence- and security-building measures. Russia is also challenging Euro-Atlantic security and stability through hybrid actions, including attempted interference in the election processes, and the sovereignty of our nations, as was the case in Montenegro, widespread disinformation campaigns, and malicious cyber activities. We condemn the attack using a military-grade nerve agent in Salisbury, United Kingdom and note the independent confirmation by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) of the nerve agent used. The UK assesses that it is highly likely that the Russian Federation was responsible for the attack and that there is no plausible alternative explanation. We stand in solidarity with the UK in its assessment.

7. We reiterate our support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, Georgia, and the Republic of Moldova within their internationally recognised borders. In accordance with its international commitments, we call on Russia to withdraw the forces it has stationed in all three countries without their consent. We strongly condemn Russia’s illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea, which we do not and will not recognise. The discrimination
against the Crimean Tatars and members of other local communities must end. International monitoring structures must be allowed to carry out their essential work in view of the protection of human rights. We call for the full implementation of the Minsk Agreements by all sides, and support the efforts of the Normandy format and the Trilateral Contact Group. NATO's response is in support of this overall effort, which includes sanctions as decided by the European Union (EU), the G7, and others, to promote a peaceful solution to the conflict and to address Russia's actions. We urge Russia to cease all political, financial, and military support to militant groups and stop intervening militarily in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and to withdraw troops, equipment, and mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine, and return to the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination. We are deeply concerned by the use of torture and the transfer of Ukrainian citizens to prisons in Russia. We stress the importance of the safety and full and unhindered access for the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission, up to and including the Russia-Ukraine border. We call on Russia to reverse its recognition of the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions of Georgia as independent states; to implement the EU-mediated 12 August 2008 ceasefire, particularly the withdrawal of Russian forces from the territory of Georgia; to end its militarisation of these regions; and to stop the construction of border-like obstacles. We also call on Russia to withdraw its troops from the territory of the Republic of Moldova, and to continue to engage constructively in the Transnistria Settlement Process. We are committed to supporting the Republic of Moldova's democratic reforms and defence capacity building efforts.

8. We remain open to a periodic, focused, and meaningful dialogue with a Russia willing to engage on the basis of reciprocity in the NRC, with a view to avoiding misunderstanding, miscalculation, and unintended escalation, and to increase transparency and predictability. We will continue to seek to substantiate our dialogue with Russia to address the critical issues that we face. Since 2016, we have held seven NRC meetings at Ambassadorial level that helped us communicate clearly our positions. The conflict in and around Ukraine is, in current circumstances, the first topic on our agenda. We remain committed to the current practice of reciprocal briefings in the NRC on military exercises before they take place, as well as on posture. However, while welcome, voluntary transparency provided in the course of such briefings does not substitute for mandatory transparency under
existing arms control agreements, in particular the Vienna Document in the OSCE framework. We welcome that Russia is again using the military lines of communication with NATO. We remain committed to making good use of these channels to promote predictability and transparency and reduce risks, and call on Russia to do so as well.

9. We continue to believe that a partnership between NATO and Russia, based on respect for international law and commitments, including as reflected in the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration, would be of strategic value. But we cannot and will not compromise on the principles on which our Alliance and security in Europe and North America rest. Under current circumstances, we regret that despite repeated calls by Allies and the international community for Russia to change course, the conditions for that relationship do not exist. There can be no return to “business as usual” until there is a clear, constructive change in Russia’s actions that demonstrates compliance with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities. We will continue our strategic discussion on Euro-Atlantic security and our approach to Russia. NATO will continue to be transparent, predictable, and resolute.

10. Terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, continues to pose a direct threat to the security of our populations, and to international stability and prosperity more broadly. We categorically reject terrorism as it directly challenges the values that unite the Alliance. Our solidarity and determination will prevail. We are committed to continue the fight against terrorism, which has to be tackled through a coherent, significant, long-term effort by the international community as a whole, involving a wide range of instruments and actors. While nations retain the primary responsibility for their domestic security and their own resilience, NATO adds value and has a role to play, in complementarity with wider international efforts and in accordance with international law and the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. Cooperation within the Alliance can enhance Allies’ national efforts and capacity to prevent, mitigate, respond to, and be resilient against acts of terrorism. We condemn all financial support of terrorism. We are also mindful of the need to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. NATO’s role in the fight against terrorism is an integral part of the Alliance’s 360-degree approach to deterrence and defence and projecting stability; as such, it contributes to all three core tasks: collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security. Our approach to terrorism,
and its causes, upholds all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) on the fight against terrorism.

11. We are committed to NATO’s enhanced role in the international community’s fight against terrorism, including through awareness and analysis, preparedness and responsiveness, capabilities, capacity building and partnerships, and operations. We will fully implement the Action Plan we agreed at our meeting in May 2017 and will update it by the end of 2018 to adapt to evolving priorities and to counter emerging terrorist threats. NATO’s enhanced contribution to fighting terrorism must continue to be supported by adequate and sustainable human and financial resources, as agreed. Building on our Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work, we will continue to improve our capabilities and technologies, including to defend against improvised explosive devices and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats, and to counter terrorist misuse of technology. We have agreed a new biometric data policy which, consistent with applicable national and international law and subject to national requirements and restrictions, will further support our ability to identify returning foreign terrorist fighters and other threat actors, and to comply with UNSCR 2396. NATO is part of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS/Da’esh, and has enhanced its AWACS and air-to-air refuelling support. NATO will also continue to engage, as appropriate, with partner countries and other international actors, in particular the EU and the UN, to ensure added value and complementarity. In this regard, our capacity building and other partnership activities help partner countries fight terrorism themselves and deny terrorists safe haven, which in turn strengthens NATO’s own security. NATO can also complement international efforts by drawing on Allied expertise. Mapping of counter-terrorism capacity building activities in partner countries, in cooperation with the partner country concerned, would help NATO to better determine where it can best add value.

12. We welcome the considerable progress made in strengthening our posture, delivering on Wales and Warsaw commitments. While we have placed renewed emphasis on deterrence and collective defence, we have also ensured that NATO retains its ability to project stability and fight against terrorism. We are united and resolute in our ability and willingness to defend one another, and are determined to maintain the full range of capabilities necessary to provide the Alliance with a range of options to be able to continue to tailor our response to specific circumstances and to respond to any threats from wherever they arise, potentially from multiple directions in more than
one region. As we continue to ensure that the Alliance’s deterrence and defence posture remains credible, coherent, and resilient, and that the Alliance can continue to safeguard the freedom and security of all Allies, it is of strategic importance to increase responsiveness, heighten readiness, and improve reinforcement. We will continue to assess the relevant military elements of the Alliance’s strengthened deterrence and defence posture to ensure its effectiveness.

13. We continue to ensure the Alliance’s political and military responsiveness, including through more regular exercises. To this end, we will continue to actively and coherently manage the Alliance’s overall posture, and to enhance our intelligence, strategic awareness, advance planning, and decision-making. To face evolving security challenges, we have taken steps to ensure that NATO can continue to act at the speed required. We welcome the progress in intelligence reform made since our decision in Warsaw to create an Assistant Secretary General position and a NATO Intelligence Division. We will continue to optimise NATO intelligence to facilitate timely and relevant support to Allied decision-making and operations, including through improved warning and intelligence sharing, particularly on terrorism, hybrid, and cyber.

14. We also continue to reinvigorate our culture of readiness. As part of our efforts, Allies continue to ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities and forces that are trained, interoperable, deployable, and ready to meet all Alliance requirements. Furthermore, today, we have agreed to launch a NATO Readiness Initiative. It will ensure that more high-quality, combat-capable national forces at high readiness can be made available to NATO. From within the overall pool of forces, Allies will offer an additional 30 major naval combatants, 30 heavy or medium manoeuvre battalions, and 30 kinetic air squadrons, with enabling forces, at 30 days’ readiness or less. They will be organised and trained as elements of larger combat formations, in support of NATO’s overall deterrence and defence posture. The NATO Readiness Initiative will further enhance the Alliance’s rapid response capability, either for reinforcement of Allies in support of deterrence or collective defence, including for high-intensity warfighting, or for rapid military crisis intervention, if required. It will also promote the importance of effective combined arms and joint operations.

15. Our deterrence and defence posture is underpinned by viable military reinforcement, including from across the Atlantic. Looking in all directions and at all potential challenges and threats, we will continue to strengthen and regularly exercise the Alliance’s ability to
rapidly reinforce any Ally that comes under threat. We will not accept to be constrained by any potential adversary as regards the freedom of movement of Allied forces by land, air, or sea to and within any part of Alliance territory. Alliance capabilities, training, and exercises contribute to our ability to operate freely.

16. Since Warsaw, we have taken a number of steps to support the deployment and sustainment of Allied forces and their equipment into, from, and within the entire Alliance territory. To that end, we welcome the Enablement Plan for SACEUR’s Area of Responsibility and we will give its implementation the highest priority at the national level. We have agreed to improve the necessary legislation and procedures, enhance command and control, and increase transport capabilities, and we have also recognised the need to upgrade infrastructure in Europe. In addition, today we have declared the initial operational capability of Rapid Air Mobility aimed at allowing short notice, cross-border air movement in Europe.

17. We are committed to strengthening our ability to deploy and sustain our forces and their equipment, throughout the Alliance and beyond, and aim to improve military mobility by land, air, or sea as soon as possible, but no later than 2024. This requires a whole-of-government approach, including through national plans, with cross-government cooperation of civil and military actors, in peacetime, in crisis, and in conflict. Defence Ministers will review progress annually. As a priority, we aim to:

- Shorten border crossing times and, to that end, provide diplomatic clearances for land, sea, and air movement within five days by the end of 2019, and will consider bringing this period further down for rapid reinforcement;
- Identify main and alternative supply routes capable of handling military transport by the end of 2018;
- Use suitable existing exercises to practise more regularly military mobility;
- Set up a network between NATO, national entities, civil and military, including the single National Points of Contact, by the end of 2019, to facilitate and speed up communications and coordination with regard to border crossing.

18. We reiterate that NATO’s efforts to ensure a coherent approach and synergies with the EU in the area of military mobility should be pursued, including with regard to military mobility related procedures that should apply to all Allies equally.
19. We have agreed to strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence and defence posture in all domains. We are reinforcing our maritime posture and have taken concrete steps to improve our overall maritime situational awareness. We have prepared strategic assessments on the Baltic and Black Seas, the North Atlantic, and the Mediterranean. Through an enhanced exercise programme, we will reinvigorate our collective maritime warfighting skills in key areas, including anti-submarine warfare, amphibious operations, and protection of sea lines of communications. The posture will also ensure support to reinforcement by and from the sea, including the transatlantic dimension with the North Atlantic being a line of communication for strategic reinforcement. In the air domain, we have agreed a Joint Air Power Strategy, which is a key enabler for NATO’s peacetime Air Policing and Ballistic Missile Defence missions. It will strengthen our Integrated Air and Missile Defence, and guide our aerospace capabilities to operate together jointly, more swiftly, and effectively in peacetime, crisis, and conflict. We also face new threats from cruise missiles and the proliferation of related technology as well as from new challenges, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, and will monitor developments that could affect Alliance security. Recognising that space is a highly dynamic and rapidly evolving area, which is essential to a coherent Alliance deterrence and defence posture, we have agreed to develop an overarching NATO Space Policy.

20. Cyber threats to the security of the Alliance are becoming more frequent, complex, destructive, and coercive. NATO will continue to adapt to the evolving cyber threat landscape, which is affected by both state and non-state actors, including state-sponsored. Cyber defence is part of NATO’s core task of collective defence. We must be able to operate as effectively in cyberspace as we do in the air, on land, and at sea to strengthen and support the Alliance’s overall deterrence and defence posture. We therefore continue to implement cyberspace as a domain of operations. We have agreed how to integrate sovereign cyber effects, provided voluntarily by Allies, into Alliance operations and missions, in the framework of strong political oversight. Reaffirming NATO’s defensive mandate, we are determined to employ the full range of capabilities, including cyber, to deter, defend against, and to counter the full spectrum of cyber threats, including those conducted as part of a hybrid campaign. We need to bolster our intelligence-led situational awareness to support NATO’s decision-making and action. We continue to work together to develop measures which would enable us to impose costs on those
who harm us. Individual Allies may consider, when appropriate, attributing malicious cyber activity and responding in a coordinated manner, recognising attribution is a sovereign national prerogative. We are determined to deliver strong national cyber defences through full implementation of the Cyber Defence Pledge, which is central to enhancing cyber resilience and raising the costs of a cyber-attack. We reaffirm our commitment to act in accordance with international law, including the UN Charter, international humanitarian law, and human rights law, as applicable. We also support work to maintain international peace and security in cyberspace and to promote stability and reduce the risk of conflict, recognising that we all stand to benefit from a norms-based, predictable, and secure cyberspace. We will further develop our partnership with industry and academia from all Allies to keep pace with technological advances through innovation.

21. Our nations have come under increasing challenge from both state and non-state actors who use hybrid activities that aim to create ambiguity and blur the lines between peace, crisis, and conflict. While the primary responsibility for responding to hybrid threats rests with the targeted nation, NATO is ready, upon Council decision, to assist an Ally at any stage of a hybrid campaign. In cases of hybrid warfare, the Council could decide to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, as in the case of armed attack. We are enhancing our resilience, improving our situational awareness, and strengthening our deterrence and defence posture. We are also expanding the tools at our disposal to address hostile hybrid activities. We announce the establishment of Counter Hybrid Support Teams, which provide tailored, targeted assistance to Allies, upon their request, in preparing for and responding to hybrid activities. We will continue to support our partners as they strengthen their resilience in the face of hybrid challenges.

22. We fully support UNSCR 2166 concerning the downing of civilian flight MH-17 and call on the Russian Federation to accept its responsibility and to fully cooperate with all efforts to establish truth, justice, and accountability.

23. Assurance measures continue to provide the fundamental baseline requirement for assurance and deterrence. In addition, tailored assurance measures for Turkey to respond to the growing security challenges from the south contribute to the security of the Alliance as a whole, and will be fully implemented. We have increased
the strength of the NATO Response Force, and the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) is ready to deploy on short notice.

24. We have established a forward presence in the eastern part of the Alliance which is now operational and its full implementation will continue.

25. As part of this, in line with our decision at Warsaw, the enhanced Forward Presence of four multinational combat-ready battalion-sized battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland includes altogether over 4,500 troops from across the Alliance, able to operate alongside national home defence forces. The Multinational Division North East Headquarters has been established and will achieve full capability by December 2018.

26. We have also developed tailored Forward Presence in the Black Sea region. In Romania, a multinational framework brigade for training Allies’ land forces is now in place, and work is underway to further develop the brigade’s capacity to contribute to the Alliance’s strengthened deterrence and defence posture. A number of air and maritime measures in the Black Sea region have led to a substantial increase in NATO’s presence and maritime activity in the Black Sea. We welcome progress towards the full implementation of the agreed measures, and particularly in the maritime domain, while noting that further work is required.

27. We are determined to complete, including through the full capability of the Regional Hub for the South, the additional work required to implement all elements of our Framework for the South, namely the ability to anticipate and respond to crises emanating from the south, improved capabilities for expeditionary operations, and enhancing NATO’s ability to project stability through regional partnerships and capacity building efforts. These efforts include advance planning and conducting more exercises with scenarios reflecting the strategic environment in the south. In this vein, we are committed to NATO’s cooperation with selected partners requesting our support, by enhancing our ability to provide training, advising, and mentoring activities. National forces and headquarters will be offered by Allies to conduct and coordinate these activities. This will consolidate NATO’s contribution to the international community’s efforts to project stability beyond our borders.

28. As part of a broader approach and the concerted efforts of the international community, we will continue to deter and defend against non-state actors that have state-like aspirations, capabilities,
and resources, and that threaten or affect the security of Allied populations and the integrity of Allied territory.

29. We have also taken far-reaching decisions to adapt and strengthen the NATO Command Structure, the military backbone of the Alliance. It will enable our Supreme Commanders to command and control forces to deal with any military challenge or security threat at any time, from any direction, including large-scale operations for collective defence, as well as ensure adequate transformation and preparation for the future, in particular through capability development, education, and training. We will establish a Cyberspace Operations Centre in Belgium to provide situational awareness and coordination of NATO operational activity within cyberspace, a Joint Force Command Norfolk headquarters in the United States to focus on protecting the transatlantic lines of communication, and a Joint Support and Enabling Command in Germany to ensure freedom of operation and sustainment in the rear area in support of the rapid movement of troops and equipment into, across, and from Europe. We look forward to establishing the two multi-corps capable Land Component Commands as soon as possible. The adapted NATO Command Structure enhances and strengthens the relationship to the NATO Force Structure headquarters and national headquarters, and this also improves the Alliance’s regional understanding. We have agreed an implementation plan, and we will substantially increase our military personnel contribution to set up the adapted NATO Command Structure.

30. Allied contributions to command and control through the NATO Force Structure remain essential. We note offers by Romania to develop land command and control capacity at corps-level on its territory to contribute to reinforcement planning in the region, as well as by Denmark, Estonia, and Latvia to further strengthen the command and control in the Baltic region through the establishment of a complementary Multinational Divisional Headquarters. We note the Italian offer, on a rotational basis, of a Divisional Headquarters in support of activities envisaged by the enhanced Framework for the South.

31. Our ability to meet the challenges of a changing security environment is underpinned by an array of robust, sophisticated, and evolving capabilities across all domains, including heavier, more high-end, fully-supported and deployable, sustainable, and interoperable forces and capabilities that are held at high readiness to perform the whole range of Alliance tasks and missions. We will ensure the availability of these forces and capabilities through
the full and timely implementation of the requirements identified by NATO. In delivering these capabilities, we are committed to: Alliance and multinational cooperation to address our shared needs; necessary increases in defence spending, including on research and development; maximising the effective use of resources; increasing our interoperability; and working to address, as appropriate, existing dependencies on Russian-sourced legacy military equipment through national efforts and multinational cooperation. We will continue to foster innovation to maintain our technological edge.

32. We welcome the many concrete multinational, bilateral, and national initiatives, which contribute to our strengthened posture. By signing Letters of Intent and Memoranda of Understanding for multinational and bilateral cooperation in capability domains, Allies also demonstrate in concrete terms their intent to contribute to fair burden sharing.

33. The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territory and our populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. No one should doubt NATO's resolve if the security of any of its members were to be threatened. Faced with a highly diverse, complex, and demanding international security environment, NATO is determined to maintain the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of our populations, wherever it should arise.

34. As a means to prevent conflict and war, credible deterrence and defence is essential and will continue to be based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defence capabilities. A robust deterrence and defence posture strengthens Alliance cohesion and provides an essential political and military transatlantic link, through an equitable and sustainable distribution of roles, responsibilities, and burdens. NATO continues to adapt in order to ensure that its deterrence and defence posture remains credible, coherent, resilient, and adaptable to a changing security environment. This includes an effective response to changes in the posture and doctrine of potential adversaries, and their significant investments to modernise and expand capabilities.

35. Allies' goal is to continue to bolster deterrence as a core element of our collective defence and to contribute to the indivisible security of the Alliance. Following changes in the security environment, NATO has taken steps to ensure its nuclear deterrent capabilities remain safe, secure, and effective. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. The strategic forces of the Alliance,
particularly those of the United States, are the supreme guarantee of the security of Allies. The independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France have a deterrent role of their own and contribute significantly to the overall security of the Alliance. These Allies’ separate centres of decision-making contribute to deterrence by complicating the calculations of potential adversaries. NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture also relies on United States’ nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe and the capabilities and infrastructure provided by Allies concerned. National contributions of dual-capable aircraft to NATO’s nuclear deterrence mission remain central to this effort. Supporting contributions by Allies concerned to ensure the broadest possible participation in the agreed nuclear burden-sharing arrangements further enhance this mission. Allies concerned will continue to take steps to ensure sustained leadership focus and institutional excellence for the nuclear deterrence mission, coherence between conventional and nuclear components of NATO’s deterrence and defence posture, and effective strategic communications.

36. The fundamental purpose of NATO’s nuclear capability is to preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter aggression. Given the deteriorating security environment in Europe, a credible and united nuclear Alliance is essential. Nuclear weapons are unique. The circumstances in which NATO might have to use nuclear weapons are extremely remote. NATO reiterates that any employment of nuclear weapons against NATO would fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict. If the fundamental security of any of its members were to be threatened, however, NATO has the capabilities and resolve to impose costs on an adversary that would be unacceptable and far outweigh the benefits that any adversary could hope to achieve.

37. Missile defence can complement the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence; it cannot substitute for them. At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, we agreed to develop a NATO Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) capability to pursue our core task of collective defence and to provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory, and forces against the increasing threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles. NATO BMD is purely defensive. It is based on aims and political principles that have not changed since 2010, including reasonable challenge, affordability, technical feasibility, and the latest common threat assessment. Should international efforts reduce the threats posed by ballistic missile proliferation, NATO missile defence can and will adapt accordingly. Full Allied political
control and oversight are essential, and full implementation will be ensured and monitored.

38. NATO BMD is based on voluntary national contributions, mainly US European Phased Adaptive Approach assets in Romania, Turkey, Spain, and Poland. Additional voluntary national contributions will provide robustness.

39. NATO BMD Initial Operational Capability was declared in 2016 and the next major milestone is the completion of the core element of the NATO BMD Command and Control, the only component eligible for common funding. We continue to look for opportunities to quickly and effectively improve delivery of NATO’s BMD Command and Control, overall completion of which is necessary to reach system maturity and Full Operational Capability.

40. We will continue to engage with third states on a case-by-case basis to enhance transparency, build mutual confidence, and increase ballistic missile defence effectiveness.

41. NATO BMD is not directed against Russia and will not undermine Russia’s strategic deterrence. NATO BMD is intended to defend against potential threats emanating from outside the Euro-Atlantic area. We have explained to Russia many times that the BMD system is not capable against Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent and there is no intention to redesign this system to have such a capability in the future. Hence, Russian statements threatening to target Allies because of NATO BMD are unacceptable and counterproductive. Should Russia be ready to discuss BMD with NATO, and subject to Alliance agreement, NATO remains open to discussion.

42. Arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation have made and should continue to make an essential contribution to achieving the Alliance’s security objectives and for ensuring strategic stability and our collective security. NATO has a long track record of doing its part on disarmament and non-proliferation. After the end of the Cold War, NATO dramatically reduced the number of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and its reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. We regret that the conditions for achieving disarmament have not become more favourable since the 2016 Warsaw NATO Summit. Allies remain collectively determined to uphold existing disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation agreements and commitments. Allies remain open to further arms control negotiations, with the aim of improving the security of the Alliance, taking into account the prevailing international security environment. We acknowledge the United States’ and Russia’s reductions in strategic nuclear weapons
and applaud their meeting the central limits of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) as of 5 February 2018. The new START Treaty contributes to international stability, and Allies express their strong support for its continued implementation and for early and active dialogue on ways to improve strategic stability.

43. We remain deeply concerned by the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as well as their means of delivery and related materials, by states and non-state actors, which represents a growing threat to our populations, territory, and forces. Addressing this threat remains an urgent international priority. In recent years, the international non-proliferation regime has been challenged, in particular due to the use of chemical weapons in Syria by the Syrian regime and ISIS/Da'esh, intensive development of illicit programmes, and political obstruction to the enforcement of non-proliferation norms. Continued use of chemical weapons in Syria, as well as use in Iraq, Malaysia, and the United Kingdom, which we condemn unreservedly, underscore the evolving and increasing WMD threat to the Alliance. It underlines the importance of effective multilateralism and international cooperation, including through the Chemical Weapons Convention and the OPCW, in addressing WMD threats. In that spirit, we welcome the decision by the June 2018 OPCW Conference of States Parties, in particular to ask the independent experts of the OPCW Technical Secretariat to put in place arrangements to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. We demand that all perpetrators of chemical weapons attacks worldwide be held accountable and we call upon all countries to join the International Partnership Against the Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons. NATO will ensure that Allies can protect their populations, forces, and territories by deterring, defending against, responding to, and mitigating the consequences of the full spectrum of the chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats, including with trained and rapidly-deployable forces.

44. Fifty years since the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) opened for signature, it remains the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and has an essential role in the maintenance of international peace, security and stability. Allies are strongly committed to full implementation of the NPT in all its aspects, including nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. NATO’s nuclear arrangements have always been fully consistent with the NPT. Consistent with the Statement by the North Atlantic Council of 20 September 2017, which we reaffirm,
NATO does not support the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons that is at odds with the existing non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, risks undermining the NPT, is inconsistent with the Alliance’s nuclear deterrence policy and will not enhance any country’s security. This treaty will not change the legal obligations on our countries with respect to nuclear weapons. The Alliance reaffirms its resolve to seek a safer world for all and to take further practical steps and effective measures to create the conditions for further nuclear disarmament negotiations and the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons in full accordance with all provisions of the NPT, including Article VI, in an ever more effective and verifiable way that promotes international stability, and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all.

45. We call on all states to enhance efforts to effectively combat the proliferation of WMD through the universalisation and full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the NPT, and through the Proliferation Security Initiative, the UNSC resolutions 1540 and 2325, and initiatives on nuclear disarmament verification. We call on all states to declare and to maintain a voluntary moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion, pending the potential entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. We welcome the contribution that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission makes to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, in particular through its work to establish the International Monitoring System and the International Data Centre. The Alliance welcomes the soon-to-be-published report adopted by the High-Level Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty Expert Preparatory Group and urges the immediate commencement of treaty negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. In the meantime, the Alliance calls on all states to declare and maintain moratoria on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

46. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty has been crucial to Euro-Atlantic security and we remain fully committed to the preservation of this landmark arms control treaty. Full compliance with the INF Treaty is essential. The United States is in compliance with its obligations under the INF Treaty and continues to provide substantial transparency on its programs while pursuing a diplomatic dialogue with Russia. At the same time, Allies have identified a Russian missile system, the 9M729, which raises serious
concerns. After years of denials and obfuscation, and despite Allies repeatedly raising their concerns, the Russian Federation only recently acknowledged the existence of the missile system without providing the necessary transparency or explanation. A pattern of behaviour and information over many years has led to widespread doubts about Russian compliance. Allies believe that, in the absence of any credible answer from Russia on this new missile, the most plausible assessment would be that Russia is in violation of the Treaty. NATO urges Russia to address these concerns in a substantial and transparent way, and actively engage in a technical dialogue with the United States. Allies will continue their efforts to engage Russia on this issue in bilateral and multilateral formats.

47. We remain committed to conventional arms control as a key element of Euro-Atlantic security. Russia’s ongoing selective implementation of the Vienna Document and Open Skies Treaty, and its long-standing non-implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, combined with its aggressive military posture, have undermined our security. Allies call on Russia to return to full implementation and compliance with the letter and spirit of all of its commitments, which is essential to rebuild military transparency and increase predictability in the Euro-Atlantic region. Allies are determined to preserve, strengthen, and modernise conventional arms control in Europe, based on key principles and commitments, including reciprocity, transparency, and host nation consent. Allies underscore the importance of modernising the Vienna Document, maintaining and strengthening the Open Skies Treaty, and actively supporting ongoing discussions at the OSCE, including the Structured Dialogue on the current and future challenges and risks to security in the OSCE area. We call on Russia to engage constructively in these efforts in Vienna.

48. We reiterate the Alliance’s full support to the goal of complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. We welcome the recent meetings and declarations between the leaders of the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and between the leaders of the United States and the DPRK, as a contribution towards reaching the final fully verified denuclearisation of the DPRK in a peaceful manner. We strongly condemn the DPRK’s nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches in violation of numerous United Nations Security Council resolutions, and call upon the DPRK to suspend such tests, consistent with its commitment and international obligations. We also condemn the
DPRK’s use of the VX nerve agent in an assassination in Malaysia. We call upon the DPRK to fully implement its international obligations; to eliminate its nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare capabilities and ballistic missiles, and abandon all related programmes; to return to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); to comply with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC); and to accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). We call on all nations to maintain decisive pressure on the DPRK, including by fully implementing existing UN sanctions. We reiterate our full solidarity with our partners in the region—Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea—with whom we have had multiple consultations on this issue.

49. We are concerned by Iran’s intensified missile tests and the range and precision of its ballistic missiles and by Iran’s destabilising activities in the wider Middle East region. We call upon Iran to refrain from all activities which are inconsistent with UNSCR 2231—including all annexes. We are committed to permanently ensuring that Iran’s nuclear programme remains peaceful, in line with its international obligations and commitments to never seek, develop, or acquire a nuclear weapon. We underscore the importance for Iran to continue to fully cooperate in a timely manner with the IAEA. We condemn all financial support of terrorism, including Iran’s support to a variety of armed non-state actors. We also call upon Iran to play a constructive role by contributing to efforts to counter terrorism and achieve political solutions, reconciliation and peace in the region.

Syria has a significant inventory of short range ballistic missiles whose range covers part of NATO’s territory and some of our partners’ territories. Syria has used these missiles extensively against its own population. We remain concerned that Turkey has been hit three times in the last four years by missiles launched from Syria. We continue to monitor and assess the ballistic missile threat from Syria.

The increasing threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles in the vicinity of the south-east border of the Alliance has been, and remains a driver in NATO’s development and deployment of a ballistic missile defence system, which is configured to counter threats from outside the Euro-Atlantic area.

50. Today, the Alliance remains an essential source of stability in an increasingly unpredictable world. The Alliance’s long-standing efforts at ensuring security for its members and contributing to stability beyond its borders are related to its three essential core tasks and its
360-degree approach. Based on a broad and strengthened deterrence and defence posture, the Alliance seeks to contribute to projecting stability and strengthening security outside its territory, thereby contributing to Alliance security overall. We will continue to strengthen NATO’s role in this regard, helping partners, upon request, to build stronger defence institutions, improve good governance, enhance their resilience, provide for their own security, and more effectively contribute to the fight against terrorism. This investment in partners’ security contributes to our security. We, including with partners where appropriate, will continue to help manage challenges—before, during, and after conflict—where they affect Alliance security, in accordance with NATO policies and procedures and with consideration of political implications.

51. NATO’s partnerships are, and will continue to be, essential to the way NATO works. The success of NATO’s partnerships is demonstrated by their strategic contribution to Alliance and international security. Through our structured partnerships and engagement with other international actors and organisations, including the UN, the EU, the OSCE, and the African Union (AU), we maintain a broad cooperative security network, deepen political dialogue, and foster practical cooperation. Partners have made and continue to make substantial contributions to Alliance operations, missions, and practical cooperation activities. We reaffirm our commitment to expand political dialogue and practical cooperation with any nation that shares the Alliance’s values and interest in international peace and security and will further develop our partnerships so that they continue to meet the interests of both Allies and partners.

52. The Alliance has developed mutually beneficial security cooperation with Finland and Sweden on a broad range of issues. We remain dedicated to further strengthening our cooperation, including through close political consultations, shared situational awareness, and joint exercises, in order to respond to common challenges in a timely and effective manner.

53. We reaffirm our commitment to ensure long-term security and stability in Afghanistan. Our Resolute Support Mission is achieving success in training, advising, and assisting the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces. As the Afghan government continues to work towards peace and reconciliation, we will continue our assistance by extending our financial sustainment of the Afghan forces through 2024 and by pledging to fill staffing shortfalls, especially in priority areas. Regional actors have an important role to play in support of peace
and stabilisation in Afghanistan, and we call on them to cooperate more closely on fighting terrorism, to improve the conditions for economic development, to support the Afghan government’s peace and reconciliation efforts, and to prevent any form of support to the insurgency. In this regard, we encourage Pakistan, Iran, and Russia to contribute to regional stability by fully supporting an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process.

54. We commend the Iraqi security forces and the Government of Iraq for their recent success against ISIS/Da’esh and the restoration of sovereign control over all Iraqi territory. We are launching a non-combat training and capacity building mission in Iraq, at the request of the Government of Iraq for additional support in its efforts to stabilise the country and fight terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. Building upon our current training activities, NATO will advise relevant Iraqi officials, primarily in the Ministry of Defence and the Office of the National Security Advisor, and train and advise instructors at professional military education institutions to help Iraq develop its capacity to build more effective national security structures and professional military education institutions. A professional and accountable security sector is key to the stability of the country and the wider region, as well as our own security. The continued inclusivity of the Iraqi Security Forces and Iraqi security institutions will remain of key importance. Without prejudice to NATO’s decision-making autonomy, and in close concert with the overall framework of the efforts of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS/Da’esh, the NATO mission will maintain a modest and scalable footprint, and complement the ongoing and future efforts of the Coalition and other relevant international actors, such as the UN and the EU, as appropriate. The NATO mission in Iraq will rely primarily on Coalition enabler support, within means and capabilities. We thank Australia, Finland, and Sweden for their early commitments as operational partners in this mission. NATO’s support to Iraq’s efforts will be founded on a basis of partnership and inclusivity, and with full respect for the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of the Republic of Iraq.

55. We have today endorsed a Package on the South, which includes a range of political and practical cooperation initiatives towards a more strategic, focused, and coherent approach to the Middle East and North Africa, a region facing a multitude of complex threats and challenges, which in turn affect our security. Within that overall strategic aim, we are pursuing three main objectives: to strengthen
NATO’s deterrence and defence against threats emanating from the south; to contribute to international crisis management efforts in the region; and to help our regional partners build resilience against security threats, including in the fight against terrorism. We are committed to building a stronger and more dynamic relationship with our Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative partners, including to help them modernise their defence and security institutions. Today, we declared Full Capability of our Regional Hub for the South in Naples. The Hub will contribute to our situational awareness and understanding of regional challenges, threats, and opportunities; support the collection, management, and sharing of information; coordinate NATO’s activities in the south; and reach out to partners. Enhanced planning and exercises will help improve our ability to anticipate and respond to crises in the region. The NATO-ICI Regional Centre in Kuwait allows us to work more closely with partners in the Gulf region to enhance regional security and counter shared threats. We are also working to further develop our relations with the League of Arab States and the Gulf Cooperation Council, and look forward to strengthening our cooperation with the AU, so we are better able to respond to common threats and challenges.

56. We remain committed to our longstanding partnership with Jordan in the framework of the Mediterranean Dialogue. We look forward to building on the successful implementation of our Defence and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) assistance to Jordan in such priority areas as cyber defence; counter-improvised explosive devices; and civil preparedness and crisis management. We are grateful to Jordan, an enhanced opportunities partner, for its valuable contributions to NATO-led operations and for hosting our DCB training activities for Iraq.

57. Tunisia is another key partner in the framework of the Mediterranean Dialogue. We are committed to further developing our cooperation with Tunisia. We have today approved new DCB assistance measures designed to help the Tunisian authorities to further develop their defence capacities, in response to their request. Our support will complement existing international efforts and will include cyber defence, counter-improvised explosive devices, and the promotion of transparency in resource management. This DCB package will be implemented mainly through education and training activities and the exchange of expertise and best practices, in line with NATO standards.
58. We support a Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process, aimed at promoting national political reconciliation and strengthening state institutions. In line with the statement made by the President of the UN Security Council on 6 June 2018, we welcome the commitment made by the Libyan parties to work constructively with the UN to hold inclusive, secure, and credible elections, most recently at the 29 May 2018 Paris Conference. In accordance with our Wales and Warsaw Summit decisions, we remain committed to providing advice to Libya in the area of defence and security institution building, in response to the request by the Prime Minister of the Government of National Accord to assist the GNA to strengthen its security institutions. NATO’s support will take account of political and security conditions. Any assistance to Libya would be provided in full complementarity and in close coordination with other international efforts, including those of the UN and the EU, as appropriate. We also stand ready to develop a long-term partnership, possibly leading to Libya’s membership in the Mediterranean Dialogue.

59. The Western Balkans is a region of strategic importance, as demonstrated by our long history of cooperation and operations in the region. We remain fully committed to the stability and security of the Western Balkans, as well as to supporting the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of countries in the region. We will continue to work closely with the Western Balkans to maintain and promote regional and international peace and security. Democratic values, rule of law, domestic reforms, and good neighbourly relations are vital for regional cooperation and for the Euro-Atlantic integration process, and we welcome progress in this regard. We also welcome recent progress on border demarcation in the region.

60. NATO’s presence in Kosovo, mainly through the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), contributes to a safe and secure environment, working in close cooperation with the Kosovo authorities and the EU. It also contributes to wider stability in the Western Balkans. Any changes to NATO’s force posture will remain conditions-based and not calendar-driven. We will continue to support the development of the security organisations in Kosovo through the NATO Advisory and Liaison Team within the current mandate. The implementation of the enhanced interaction with Kosovo is progressing well in terms of dialogue and practical cooperation. We welcome Kosovo’s aspirations to improve its ability to ensure safety and security for all its inhabitants, as well as to contribute to security in the Western Balkans.
61. Strengthening NATO-Serbia relations are of benefit to the Alliance, to Serbia, and to the whole region. We welcome the continued progress made in building the NATO-Serbia partnership and support further political dialogue and practical cooperation to this end. We reiterate the need for continued progress in the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, which should lead towards a comprehensive normalisation of relations, including in the form of a legally binding agreement. We encourage both parties to accelerate efforts to normalise relations and fully implement prior agreements.

62. We reaffirm our commitment to the Alliance’s Open Door Policy under Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, which is one of the Alliance’s great successes. Montenegro’s accession last year and our invitation today to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are a tangible demonstration of this commitment. Successive rounds of enlargement have enhanced our collective security and the security of the entire Euro-Atlantic region. Euro-Atlantic integration advances democratic values, reform, and respect for the rule of law. NATO’s door is open to all European democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, which are in a position to further the principles of the Treaty, and whose inclusion can contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. Decisions on enlargement are for NATO itself; no third party has a say in that process. We remain fully committed to the integration of those countries that aspire to join the Alliance, judging each on its own merits. We encourage those partners who aspire to join the Alliance to continue to implement the necessary reforms and decisions to prepare for membership. We will continue to offer support to their efforts and look to them to take the steps necessary to advance their aspirations.

63. At our 2008 Bucharest Summit, we decided that NATO will extend an invitation to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to join the Alliance as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached within the framework of the UN. We welcome the historic agreement between Athens and Skopje on the solution of the name issue. In line with our policy, we have decided to invite the government in Skopje to begin accession talks to join our Alliance. Full implementation of all prescribed internal procedures with respect to the agreement on the solution of the name issue is a condition for a successful conclusion of the accession process. We commend the government for significantly strengthening good neighbourly

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263 Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
relations, including the entry into force of the Treaty on Friendship, Good Neighbourliness, and Cooperation with Bulgaria. We welcome the determined efforts by the new government over the past year and the substantial progress that has been achieved on a number of urgently needed reforms and encourage further efforts on reform before and after accession in order to enhance the country’s contribution to the Alliance. We also note continued efforts to build a functional multi-ethnic society based on full implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement and encourage further efforts in this area. We call upon all political leaders in the country to play a constructive role in these processes and in the speedy implementation of the agreement on a solution to the name issue. We appreciate Skopje’s steadfast support for NATO’s operations and missions and ongoing contributions to international security.

64. We fully support Bosnia and Herzegovina’s NATO membership aspiration, and are committed to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of a stable and secure Bosnia and Herzegovina. We commend Bosnia and Herzegovina for its contributions to NATO-led operations and for its commitment to regional cooperation and security. We call upon the country’s leaders to work constructively and demonstrate political will for the benefit of all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina in pursuit of political, economic, and defence reforms. We look forward to the general elections in October to be held fully in line with international standards. We welcome the substantial progress in the registration of immovable defence property made by the state authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina to meet the requirements, set by NATO Foreign Ministers in Tallinn in April 2010, for submitting the first Annual National Programme. Since then, Bosnia and Herzegovina constitutional and state court decisions have made clear that all former Yugoslav defence properties in the country are property of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore, the registration of immovable defence property located in the entity of Republika Srpska should proceed without delay. We are committed to maintaining strong political dialogue with Bosnia and Herzegovina and offer our continued support to the implementation of the Defence Review and other reform efforts, including through NATO HQ Sarajevo. We encourage the leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina to take full advantage of the breadth of NATO cooperative security tools.

65. We reiterate the decision made at the 2008 Bucharest Summit that Georgia will become a member of the Alliance, with MAP as an integral part of the process; we reaffirm all elements of that decision,
as well as subsequent decisions. We welcome the significant progress realised since 2008. We welcome the central role played by the NATO-Georgia Commission and the Annual National Programme over the past decade in deepening political dialogue and cooperation between NATO and Georgia. We recognise the significant progress on reforms which Georgia has made and must continue, which are helping Georgia, an aspirant country, progress in its preparations towards membership, and which strengthen Georgia’s defence and interoperability capabilities with the Alliance. Georgia’s relationship with the Alliance contains all the practical tools to prepare for eventual membership. We welcome the developing cooperation between NATO and Georgia, an enhanced opportunities partner, on Black Sea security, and the considerable progress in implementing a number of initiatives under the umbrella of the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package. We highly appreciate Georgia’s significant and steadfast contributions to the NATO Response Force and the Resolute Support mission. These efforts, along with Georgia’s participation in EU-led operations, demonstrate Georgia’s commitment and capability to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security. We stand ready to enhance further our support to Georgia, including in the areas of counter-mobility, training and exercises, and secure communications, and we look forward to the next NATO-Georgia exercise in 2019.

66. An independent, sovereign and stable Ukraine, firmly committed to democracy and the rule of law is key for Euro-Atlantic security. We stand firm in our support for Ukraine’s right to decide its own future and foreign policy course free from outside interference. In light of Ukraine’s restated aspirations for NATO membership, we stand by our decisions taken at the Bucharest Summit and subsequent Summits. The success of wide-ranging reforms, including combatting corruption and promoting an inclusive electoral process, based on democratic values, respect for human rights, minorities and the rule of law, will be crucial in laying the groundwork for a prosperous and peaceful Ukraine firmly anchored among European democracies committed to common values. We welcome significant reform progress already made, in particular with the recent adoption of the Law on the High anti-Corruption Court and the Law on National Security. At the same time, we look forward to further progress in Ukraine’s efforts to overcome significant remaining challenges and ensure the full implementation and sustainability of ambitious but necessary reforms, which should be fully in line with Ukraine’s international obligations and commitments. With regard to the Law on Education adopted by
the Rada in September 2017, Allies urge Ukraine to fully implement
the recommendations and conclusions of the Opinion of the Venice
Commission. Ukraine should make full use of all instruments
available to it under the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC), in
particular the Annual National Programme, to reach its objective of
implementing NATO principles and standards. We remain committed
to providing continued support to Ukraine’s reform agenda in the
security and defence sector, including through the Comprehensive
Assistance Package, so that Ukraine can better provide for its own
security. We welcome the developing cooperation between NATO
and Ukraine on Black Sea security. We will also support Ukraine’s
efforts to strengthen its resilience against hybrid threats, including
through intensifying activities under the NATO-Ukraine Platform
on Countering Hybrid Warfare. We highly value Ukraine’s significant
contributions to Allied operations, the NATO Response Force, and
NATO exercises, and welcome the contribution made by the NATO-
Ukraine partnership to providing security and stability in the Euro-
Atlantic area and beyond. Those contributions increase the level of
 interoperability of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with NATO. We
acknowledge Ukraine’s interest in the enhanced opportunities within
the Partnership Interoperability Initiative. NATO will consider this
in view of the decisions taken at the Wales and the Warsaw Summits.
We will continue to work with Ukraine, a longstanding partner of the
Alliance, based on the principles and values enshrined in the Charter
on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine.

67. We continue to support the right of all our partners to make
independent and sovereign choices on foreign and security policy, free
from external pressure and coercion. We remain committed in our
support for the territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty of
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Republic of Moldova. In this
context, we continue to support efforts towards a peaceful settlement
of the conflicts in the South Caucasus, as well as in the Republic of
Moldova, based upon these principles and the norms of international
law, the UN Charter, and the Helsinki Final Act. We urge all parties
to engage constructively and with reinforced political will in peaceful
conflict resolution, within the established negotiation frameworks.

68. In light of NATO’s operational experiences and the evolving
complex security environment, a comprehensive political, civilian, and
military approach is essential in crisis management and cooperative
security. Furthermore, it contributes to the effectiveness of our
common security and defence, without prejudice to Alliance collective
defence commitments. In line with our Comprehensive Approach Action Plan, we will continue to pursue coherence within NATO’s own tools and strands of work, concerted approaches with partner nations and organisations such as the UN, the EU, and the OSCE, as well as further dialogue with non-governmental organisations.

69. The European Union remains a unique and essential partner for NATO. The cooperation between NATO and the EU has substantially developed and is particularly important in the face of common security challenges in our shared eastern and southern neighbourhoods. We reaffirm in their entirety all the decisions, principles, and commitments with regard to NATO and EU cooperation. We will continue to further strengthen our strategic partnership in a spirit of full mutual openness, transparency, complementarity, and respect for the organisations’ different mandates, decision-making autonomy and institutional integrity, and as agreed by the two organisations. This cooperation will serve to enhance the security of our citizens and promote peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond.

70. We have achieved tangible results in a range of areas, including countering hybrid threats, operational cooperation including maritime issues, cyber security and defence, defence capabilities, defence industry and research, exercises, and defence and security capacity building. Political dialogue between NATO and EU remains essential to advance this cooperation. We also welcome the commitments of both organisations to improve military mobility. We will continue to develop and deepen our cooperation by fully implementing the common set of 74 proposals, which contribute to the coherence and complementarity of our efforts.

71. NATO recognises the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence. The development of coherent, complementary and interoperable defence capabilities, avoiding unnecessary duplication, is key in our joint efforts to make the Euro-Atlantic area safer. Such efforts, including recent developments, will lead to a stronger NATO, help enhance our common security, contribute to transatlantic burden sharing, help deliver needed capabilities, and support an overall increase in defence spending. We welcome the call for further deepening of NATO-EU cooperation in the European Council Conclusions of June 2018. We note the EU is considering the conditions for like-minded third state participation in its new initiatives where appropriate and would encourage potential further steps in this regard.

72. Non-EU Allies continue to make significant contributions to the EU’s efforts to strengthen its capacities to address common security
challenges. For the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, non-EU Allies’ fullest involvement in these efforts is essential. We look forward to mutual steps, representing tangible progress, in this area to support a strengthened strategic partnership.

73. We welcome the recent signature of the Brussels Joint Declaration by the NATO Secretary General, the President of the European Council, and the President of the European Commission.

74. NATO leads by example in upholding the principles of democracy and human rights; doing so increases our operational effectiveness. We continue to promote robust policies to advance the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, and in the areas of Children and Armed Conflict and Protection of Civilians. We remain committed to good governance of the defence sector and promoting transparent and accountable defence institutions under democratic control, including through our Building Integrity Policy. In these areas, we value civil society’s important role as a forum for dialogue, advice, and ideas, as well as our cooperation with international organisations.

75. NATO and its partners are committed to showing the leadership required to promote the full implementation of UNSCR 1325 and the subsequent WPS resolutions. Today we have endorsed our renewed WPS policy and action plan, which are integral to NATO’s three core tasks. Gender mainstreaming and increased representation of women in NATO civilian and military structures and in Allied and partner forces improve our effectiveness and contribute to a more modern, agile, ready, and responsive Alliance.

76. NATO’s robust framework for the protection of children in armed conflict directs troops deployed in NATO-led operations and missions to strengthen the implementation of UNSCR 1612 and other relevant resolutions. The Alliance will continue to update its policy and broaden its operationalisation, taking into account best practices of the Resolute Support Mission.

77. NATO and partners are committed to ensuring that all efforts are made to avoid, minimise, and mitigate the negative effects on civilians arising from NATO and NATO-led military operations and missions, as underscored in our new military concept for the Protection of Civilians.

78. Energy security plays an important role in our common security. A stable and reliable energy supply, the diversification of routes, suppliers and energy resources, and the interconnectivity of energy networks are of critical importance and increase our resilience against political and economic pressure. While these
issues are primarily the responsibility of national authorities, energy developments can have significant political and security implications for Allies and also affect our partners. Consequently, we will continue regular Allied consultations on issues related to energy security. We believe it is essential to ensure that the members of the Alliance are not vulnerable to political or coercive manipulation of energy, which constitutes a potential threat. Allies will therefore continue to seek diversification of their energy supplies, in line with their needs and conditions. We will refine NATO’s role in energy security in accordance with established principles and guidelines, and continue to develop NATO’s capacity to support national authorities in protecting critical infrastructure, including against malicious hybrid and cyber activity. We will continue to enhance our strategic awareness, including through sharing intelligence and expanding our links with relevant international organisations, such as the International Energy Agency, the International Renewable Energy Agency, and the European Union, as appropriate. We will also further improve the energy efficiency of our military forces, including through the use of sustainable energy sources, when appropriate.

79. NATO is an alliance that constantly modernises and adapts to new threats and challenges. Today, we have taken important decisions to further adapt NATO to the more challenging security environment. We have agreed a new, strengthened NATO Command Structure that meets the requirements of today and tomorrow. As part of our ongoing institutional adaptation, we have also agreed a new model to deliver shared NATO capabilities faster. We also continue to improve our strategic communications. We are pleased to meet in NATO’s new headquarters building and are grateful for the hospitality extended to us by Belgium. We look forward to the Secretary General’s Functional Review of the Headquarters to ensure it has the structures, expertise, effectiveness, and efficiency to be even more responsive and adaptable to changing circumstances. All the decisions we have taken today demonstrate our unity, solidarity, and strength. We have decided to meet again next year to review progress and to mark the 70th anniversary of our enduring Alliance.

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Statement on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty Issued by the NATO Foreign Ministers, Brussels, 4 December 2018

1. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty has been crucial in upholding NATO’s security for over 30 years.

2. Allies have concluded that Russia has developed and fielded a missile system, the 9M729, which violates the INF Treaty and poses significant risks to Euro-Atlantic security. We strongly support the finding of the United States that Russia is in material breach of its obligations under the INF Treaty.

3. For over five years, Allies and the United States in particular, have repeatedly raised their concerns with the Russian Federation, both bilaterally and multilaterally. As we stated in the Brussels Summit Declaration in July, Russia has responded to our concerns with denials and obfuscation. Russia only recently acknowledged the existence of the missile system, but without providing the necessary transparency or explanation.

4. The United States has remained in full compliance with its obligations under the INF Treaty since it entered into force. Allies have emphasized that the situation whereby the United States and other parties fully abide by the Treaty and Russia does not, is not sustainable.

5. Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty erodes the foundations of effective arms control and undermines Allied security. This is part of Russia’s broader pattern of behaviour that is intended to weaken the overall Euro-Atlantic security architecture.

6. Allies are committed to preserving strategic stability and Euro-Atlantic security. NATO will continue to ensure the credibility and effectiveness of the Alliance’s overall deterrence and defence posture.

7. We will continue to consult each other regularly with a view to ensuring our collective security. We will continue to keep the fielding of Russian intermediate-range missiles under close review.

8. Allies are firmly committed to the preservation of effective international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. Therefore, we will continue to uphold, support, and further strengthen arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, as a key element of Euro-Atlantic security, taking into account the prevailing security environment.
9. We continue to aspire to a constructive relationship with Russia, when Russia’s actions make that possible. As most recently confirmed at the Brussels Summit, we remain open to dialogue with Russia, including in the NATO-Russia Council.

10. We call on Russia to return urgently to full and verifiable compliance. It is now up to Russia to preserve the INF Treaty.

Statement by the North Atlantic Council
on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty,
2 August 2019

Russia today remains in violation of the INF Treaty, despite years of U.S. and Allied engagement, including a final opportunity over six months to honour its Treaty obligations. As a result, the United States decision to withdraw from the Treaty, a decision fully supported by NATO Allies, is now taking effect.

Russia bears sole responsibility for the demise of the Treaty. We regret that Russia has shown no willingness and taken no demonstrable steps to return to compliance with its international obligations. A situation whereby the United States fully abides by the Treaty, and Russia does not, is not sustainable.

NATO will respond in a measured and responsible way to the significant risks posed by the Russian 9M729 missile to Allied security. We have agreed a balanced, coordinated and defensive package of measures to ensure NATO’s deterrence and defence posture remains credible and effective.

Allies are firmly committed to the preservation of effective international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. Therefore, we will continue to uphold, support, and further strengthen arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation, as a key element of Euro-Atlantic security, taking into account the prevailing security environment. NATO also continues to aspire to a constructive relationship with Russia, when Russia’s actions make that possible.

Interview with the Defence Minister of the Russian Federation
Sergey Shoigu for the Moskovskiy Komsomolets Daily,
September 22, 2019

MK: How likely do you consider Russia will participate in any large-scale armed conflict in the near future? And in what strategic directions does Russia, in your opinion, face the greatest threat in the near future?

Minister Shoigu: You asked a difficult question. Perhaps this question is not for an interview like ours. But I will try to answer it anyway. I hope that there is currently no question of a large-scale war. And all the risks and consequences that such a war would entail are clear to everyone. There are many different opinions on a third world war. The most accurate and appropriate perhaps is this: “I do not know what the Third World War will actually be like. But I do know for sure that it will be the last.” But when it comes to the number of threats to our country nowadays, it has not been reduced. The U.S. has already come out of two important arms-control agreements. So far, there is still the START-3 agreement, which is also under discussion in the U.S.: whether to prolong it or not? As a result of this approach, the world is becoming increasingly unpredictable and less secure. At the current level of computerisation and automation, the probability of an error in the arms-management system is high. This is why the issue of ensuring information security has recently come to the fore. When you become aware of your weaknesses and are interested in maintaining a balance and universal equal security, you have to engage your thinking. And when you consider, as they continue to do in the U.S. by force of inertia, that the balance of power has worked in your favour, various ideas can come to mind, including not very sensible ones. That is where I can see the main threat today, and not just to Russia.

MK: In Kiev you can hear threats from time to time “to triumphantly enter Moscow with armoured weapons.” Is there a threat of a direct military conflict between Russian and Ukrainian armies?

Minister Shoigu: I do not even want to think about it. I strongly hope that the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian authorities will

264 Questions and answers that do not relate to European security have been omitted.
have enough will, strength, and resources to cool down those hotheads that call for such nonsense. One day, the extremists will finally have to be stopped in Ukraine. Too bad it didn’t happen sooner. But to get back to the point. The Ukrainians are a brotherly nation. My relatives on my mother’s side are from Ukraine. My grandfather is buried there. During the Great Patriotic War, my mother survived the occupation there. From Ukraine, my mother’s brothers went to the front. By the way, I was baptised at the age of five in one of the churches in the town of Stakhanov in the Luhansk region. And I am absolutely convinced that we will live in peace and good neighbourliness with the Ukrainian people. There will be time for that, I am sure.

**MK:** Can the process of transformation in our Armed Forces be regarded as completed? Or does the concept of “military reform” still apply to our country?

**Minister Shoygu:** The concept of “military reform” should always be valid for Russia. The world around us is constantly changing, and we should sense these changes very carefully and change ourselves. What happens if we don’t do it—we can find out based on the example of our recent history. At the beginning of our conversation, you rightly pointed out that not long ago, the Russian army was in a state of collapse. Why did this happen? There are direct causes, of which everyone knows. The deep crisis of the whole of society and the state in the 1980s and 1990s. The hasty withdrawal of troops and military equipment from Eastern Europe to absolutely un-equipped deployment sites. Lack of accommodation. The moral suffering and humiliation of those who had been preparing all their lives to defend their homeland and suddenly faced the total collapse of their plans and prospects. They felt useless, with a lack of state protection. What happened had other, deeper causes. We did not understand quickly enough and for a very long time we did not understand the essence of what was happening around us. But let me make it even more clear. If the West continued to behave as it did during the period of Gorbachev’s rule, it would have fulfilled all its promises, it would not have started to move NATO closer and closer to our borders, it would not have expanded its influence in our near abroad, it would not have interfered in the internal affairs of our country—I think they would have succeeded in accomplishing the task they set themselves—the task of destroying and enslaving our country. As it actually did happen with the “young Europeans” 265 and the former Soviet republics.

265 Minister Shoygu uses this phrase with contemptuous intent to refer to the new NATO and EU Member States from Central Europe.
MK: So, from your point of view, we were lucky that the West revealed its true, not at all “vegetarian,” intentions in time?

Minister Shoygu: We were lucky, however, that we managed to stop in time. As I said, in 1999, the process of returning to common sense began. Since then, we have, with some difficulty, made it happen that the world is no longer unipolar today. And this, of course, does not please the West, which makes every effort to restore its influence in the world. Some people believe that the open confrontation of the West against Russia only began five years ago, with Ukraine and Crimea. But that is a mistake. One may recall what exactly happened in the 1990s, 2008, and 2013. What nonsense they said or wrote about us during the preparations for the Sochi Olympic games! And this was not only a manifestation of an information war. I do not want to go into details. But, in my opinion, the essence of what we are dealing with is this: in the West, models and algorithms have long been created to overthrow any inconvenient legal authority in any country. Of course, all this is done under the slogan of promoting democracy. But in what country to which they “brought democracy,” has this democracy been adopted: Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya? In the former Yugoslavia, which they forcibly dismembered into six countries with their “democratic” bombings in 1999? And after every American intervention, sovereignty and independence can simply be forgotten. And is anyone surprised that most of the oil deposits in Libya are owned by American or U.S.-controlled companies? Our western colleagues like to accuse Russia of waging alleged “hybrid wars.” But I have to say that real hybrid wars are being waged by the West itself. Now, for example, by leaving Afghanistan half destroyed, the Americans are organising unrest in Venezuela—also, it is understood, for the “victory of democracy”!

MK: The American military budget is dozens of times higher than the Russian one. Can Russia effectively oppose America under such conditions?

Minister Shoygu: Our Commander-in-Chief has already answered this question in a comprehensive and well-argued manner. Not only can it, Russia is already fully effective in opposing America. It is doing so because of our science, our industry, our new inventions. Besides, we are not trying to compete with them on all fronts. If you break down the American budget into the first factors, you will understand that huge expenditure goes to different bases, scattered around the world.

266 It concerns Russian President Vladimir Putin, the head of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
America has 170 such bases, and the U.S. spending on the operation in Afghanistan alone equals almost our entire annual defence budget. Giant money is being spent on private military companies, aircraft carrier groups. But does Russia need 5-10 of its own aircraft carrier groups if we are not going to attack anyone? We need resources that can potentially be used against such enemy carrier groups in case of aggression against our country. And that is incomparably cheaper and more effective!

I have just mentioned to you a few individual facts. But even they clearly show that we have no reason to compare our defence budgets with those of the U.S. In terms of the size of our defence budgets, we are only seventh in the world. In this respect, Saudi Arabia and Japan are ahead of us. The most important thing is that our military expenditure is fully effective. It is spent according to requirements and is under the strict supervision of our Commander-in-Chief.

[...]

Translated by Mirosław Łukawski. Verified with the Russian original by Marek Menkiszak.


267 Questions and answers not related to European security have been omitted.
DSG [NATO Deputy Secretary General Rose Gottemoeller]: Today is my last day. You’re getting me in my last hours.

Elena [Elena Chernenko, “Kommersant”]: I’m so honoured. I see lots of touching posts on social media. On a less humorous note, on the NATO-Russia track, what feelings do you have as you leave your post? How do you see the future of this relationship?

DSG: First of all, I leave my current position with a feeling of respect for the many conversations I’ve had on the NATO-Russia track—not only with your former Ambassador here, but the Charge d’affaires. I think we have a hard-hitting, but productive discussion when we get together. I think it’s important that we keep talking to each other and deliver our tough messages. We also need to look for ways to develop better mutual understanding to avoid accidents and incidents. I’ve found it a useful dialogue. I express my regard for my counterparts. The NRC is an important forum, but I also want to say how much the SG appreciates his interactions with Minister Lavrov. We have good mil-mil dialogue. I think it’s a dialogue that is paying some dividends.

Elena: No plans for next NRC?

DSG: We are certainly discussing when the NATO-Russia Council meeting could be held, but I don’t have any news for you on that.

Elena: Not long ago you visited Georgia and reaffirmed that this country will join NATO in future. How soon do you envisage this happening?

DSG: We have emphasized all along with aspiring countries the importance of proceeding along the reform path. We continue to work with Georgia and Ukraine, and frankly we never put a date or deadline on anything because you know the way Allies agree to bring new countries into the Alliance has to do with Allied agreement and consensus.

The interview conducted on 17 October, was published on 21 October 2019 in the Russian language in the daily newspaper Kommersant. In the published version, there were abbreviations and editorial changes, but they do not distort the key content. See: “Kogda strana vstupayet v NATO, yeyo ekonomika rastet,” Kommersant, 21.10.2019, www.kommersant.ru/doc/4132838 (retrieved 11.07.2020).
Elena: Rasmussen proposal on Georgia.

DSG: This is not being discussed at NATO. But I want to say one thing for a Russian audience—important to understand that where NATO comes, comes better stability, economic growth, and development. We saw an example with Montenegro—economic growth has improved since they joined NATO. I want to reassure your readers in Russia that NATO is a defensive Alliance and what we do with countries as they come into the Alliance is in the service of security and stability. And that’s in Russia’s interest as well. So I know the normal Russian line is that ‘NATO is a threat,’ but that is not how we see it. In fact, we see that when new members join, they gain enhanced security and a better ability to contribute to peace and security in the world.

Elena: Another NATO aspiring country is Ukraine. Don’t you think that the situation in Ukraine would be much more calmer if it came back to neutrality? Russian officials often use the example of Finland, saying ‘look how that worked’.

DSG: I think it must be up to every country to decide on their own security arrangements. It cannot be done by outsiders. It can’t be done by experts or govs in other capitals. That’s a basic principle. Finland makes one decision, Ukraine makes another. We respect those decisions.

Elena: Vladimir Putin sent Jens Stoltenberg a letter with the proposition of a moratorium on INF and suggested verification measures. When will NATO react?

DSG: I will not talk about private communications and how they will unfold. By the way, from my experience as a diplomat, when there are real initiatives underway, it’s much better that they be conducted quietly, rather than in the glare of media lights. But we have seen the proposal. We have seen the proposal for verification measures. I had some basic questions about it myself. First of all, since Russia doesn’t acknowledge that the 9M729 missile is in violation of the INF Treaty, what exactly is being proposed? Doesn’t make sense to have a one-sided moratorium. Russia is already deploying these missiles, including in Europe. What is going to be verified? Is Russia proposing that only US missiles would be verified. It doesn't make any sense to me. From the NATO perspective, the basis of the proposal is not there, because of the fact that NATO Allies are all in agreement that the SSC-8 missile is in violation of the Treaty and Russia is already deploying them. By the way, it makes good sense to look back to 1982 and the time of the dual-track decision in NATO—because Russia was
proposing something very similar back then but already deploying the SS-20 missiles.

**Elena:** Is NATO ready to have conversation on this proposal or is it something you reject?

**DSG:** Well we always stand for dialogue, since the Harmel report in the late 1960s. We’ve stood for dialogue as well as defence and deterrence.

**Elena:** So that’s an issue that can be discussed?

**DSG:** What I can say is that we always stand for dialogue, but I want to be very clear that we feel that there’s no basis for this moratorium because Russia is already deploying missiles that fly to intermediate-range from ground-launchers.

**Elena:** If Russia would be ready for inspections of their deployed weapons, would there be interest for NATO?

**DSG:** I think we would have to see what kind of details would be on offer, because quite honestly we had the so-called demonstration back in January and, from a NATO perspective, it did not provide any information that was going to be useful.

**Elena:** Moscow was critical of Jens Stoltenberg’s words that NATO has no plans of deploying nuclear INF range weapons in Europe because Russia says it can’t be seen which missile is flying in (nuclear or conventional). Is NATO ready to do more to reassure Moscow on this?

**DSG:** You know, this is a question I can address to Russian colleagues because missiles like the Iskander missiles that are already deployed within range of NATO targets, including in Kaliningrad, are also dual-capable and they fly at even faster speeds to target. So if you ask this question from a Russian perspective, NATO can also ask it from its perspective.

**Elena:** Big manoeuvres are coming. Are there sufficient measures to prevent incidents? Would it not make sense to re-establish regular dialogue on military level?

**DSG:** We have welcomed the briefings on exercises that we have had in the NRC so far. It’s been useful. Most useful are the measures under the Vienna Document. I just note that Russia has never notified exercises under the Vienna Document because the numbers are always kept under the 13,000 threshold. So we’ve seen very big exercises in Russia during my time at NATO but none of them have been notified under the Vienna Document. But I do think it’s useful to exchange
exercise information and have discussions. By the way, I would also note that Russia has just finished a major series of exercises (Tsentr included) and I understand now is starting its big nuclear exercise. So the degree to which we share information on exercises is important.

Elena: So we saw last year, during one of NATO’s exercises, when a Spanish fighter jet lost one of its missiles over Estonia. Imagine if that had happened closer to Russia? Do you have enough mechanisms to prevent escalation?

DSG: I don’t want to comment on any hypothetical scenarios, but I do want to underscore that we do have good mil-mil communications and it’s not only between NATO (CMC and SACEUR) and Moscow, but also individual NATO Allies have good lines of communication with the Russian MoD and General Staff. So it’s important to reassure your readers that there are forms of communication out there that provide for exchange of information and incident response.

Elena: On Defender Europe who is the potential enemy?

DSG: We never have ‘enemies’ written into our exercises. The exercises are conducted in hypothetical scenarios and are to test our readiness. I do understand that Defender 2020 is a US exercise, not a NATO exercise. I believe the US, as they do, will be briefing before the exercise begins, providing information publicly and including to military counterparts.

Elena: When will NATO answer to the numerous requests for dialogue and cooperation from the CSTO?

DSG: Well we have a good NATO-Russia line of comms open already in NRC. We see no reason to open up another organizational link.

Elena: You don’t think the CSTO is serious enough?

DSG: We’ve got our focus on our NATO-Russia interactions.

Elena: Since there is not only the concept of deterrence but also dialogue, does NATO plan to allow the Russian delegation to bring back more staff?

DSG: Well this is a funny question for me because when we talk to our Russian counterparts about bringing an Ambassador here, they say there’s not enough going on for us to have an Ambassador. So why are they talking about having more delegation staff back? Who’s asking for more interaction?

Elena: They’re saying they’re not allowed to go places they were previously allowed?
DSG: Well first of all, I want to stress, as having spent many years in Moscow, never have I been allowed to wander around Ministries in Moscow! They have a meeting room where the foreigners go. I’m not saying that is the situation for our Russian counterparts at NATO HQ. We are extending them all the protocol courtesies, while ensuring that security requirements are also fulfilled.

Elena: What is your general view of where NATO is going and what its goals will be in future? From Moscow, we hear that NATO still sees Russia as a threat.

DSG: Well I wouldn’t sign up to the description you’ve just given me. Clearly, in the years following the end of the Cold War, we were keen to have a strong partnership with Russia and engaged in productive cooperation. Our current environment, we see as down to the Russian seizure of Crimea in 2014 and destabilization of the Donbas. From our perspective, we have real security concerns about Russia and we regret that the good partnership that had begun to take shape in the 90’s has not been able to continue. At the same time, I do want to say that we will be keen to continue our dual-track approach—continue dialogue and continue our deterrence and defence. As I look forward, I see that NATO will need to be thinking about other important areas, such as peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan. We will want to be working with partners in the Mediterranean and the Gulf to see what we can do to enhance security.

Elena: Do you see room for cooperation with Russia?

DSG: There’s room for cooperation with Russia and I think the first area to concentrate on is keeping good lines of communication open and building mutual confidence to avoid accidents and incidents, and ensure that our mutual predictability continues to grow.

Source: Read-out, NATO Public Diplomacy Division For the Russian language version see: footnote 268.
London Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in London 3–4 December 2019

1. Today, we gather in London, NATO’s first home, to celebrate seventy years of the strongest and most successful Alliance in history, and mark the thirtieth anniversary of the fall of the Iron Curtain. NATO guarantees the security of our territory and our one billion citizens, our freedom, and the values we share, including democracy, individual liberty, human rights, and the rule of law. Solidarity, unity, and cohesion are cornerstone principles of our Alliance. As we work together to prevent conflict and preserve peace, NATO remains the foundation for our collective defence and the essential forum for security consultations and decisions among Allies. We reaffirm the enduring transatlantic bond between Europe and North America, our adherence to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, and our solemn commitment as enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty that an attack against one Ally shall be considered an attack against us all.

2. We are determined to share the costs and responsibilities of our indivisible security. Through our Defence Investment Pledge, we are increasing our defence investment in line with its 2% and 20% guidelines, investing in new capabilities, and contributing more forces to missions and operations. Non-US defence expenditure has grown for five consecutive years; over 130 billion US dollars more is being invested in defence. In line with our commitment as enshrined in Article 3 of the Washington Treaty, we continue to strengthen our individual and collective capacity to resist all forms of attack. We are making good progress. We must and will do more.

3. We, as an Alliance, are facing distinct threats and challenges emanating from all strategic directions. Russia’s aggressive actions constitute a threat to Euro-Atlantic security; terrorism in all its forms and manifestations remains a persistent threat to us all. State and non-state actors challenge the rules-based international order. Instability beyond our borders is also contributing to irregular migration. We face cyber and hybrid threats.

4. NATO is a defensive Alliance and poses no threat to any country. We are adapting our military capabilities, strategy, and plans across the Alliance in line with our 360-degree approach to security. We have
taken decisions to improve the readiness of our forces to respond to any threat, at any time, from any direction. We stand firm in our commitment to the fight against terrorism and are taking stronger action together to defeat it. We are addressing and will continue to address in a measured and responsible way Russia’s deployment of new intermediate-range missiles, which brought about the demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and which pose significant risks to Euro-Atlantic security. We are increasing action to protect our freedoms at sea and in the air. We are further strengthening our ability to deter and defend with an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defence capabilities, which we continue to adapt. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. We are fully committed to the preservation and strengthening of effective arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation, taking into account the prevailing security environment. Allies are strongly committed to full implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in all its aspects, including nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We remain open for dialogue, and to a constructive relationship with Russia when Russia’s actions make that possible.

5. We work to increase security for all. We have strengthened partnerships in our neighbourhood and beyond, deepening political dialogue, support, and engagement with partner countries and international organisations. We reaffirm our commitment to long-term security and stability in Afghanistan. We are increasing our cooperation with the United Nations; there is unprecedented progress in NATO-EU cooperation. We are committed to NATO’s Open Door policy, which strengthens the Alliance and has brought security to millions of Europeans. North Macedonia is here with us today and will soon be our newest Ally. We are committed to the success of all our operations and missions. We pay tribute to all the men and women who have served for NATO, and honour all those who have sacrificed their lives to keep us safe.

6. To stay secure, we must look to the future together. We are addressing the breadth and scale of new technologies to maintain our technological edge, while preserving our values and norms. We will continue to increase the resilience of our societies, as well as of our critical infrastructure and our energy security. NATO and Allies, within their respective authority, are committed to ensuring the security of our communications, including 5G, recognising the need to rely on secure and resilient systems. We have declared space an operational
domain for NATO, recognising its importance in keeping us safe and tackling security challenges, while upholding international law. We are increasing our tools to respond to cyber-attacks, and strengthening our ability to prepare for, deter, and defend against hybrid tactics that seek to undermine our security and societies. We are stepping up NATO’s role in human security. We recognise that China’s growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance.

7. Taking into account the evolving strategic environment, we invite the Secretary General to present to Foreign Ministers a Council-agreed proposal for a forward-looking reflection process under his auspices, drawing on relevant expertise, to further strengthen NATO’s political dimension including consultation.

8. We express our appreciation for the generous hospitality extended to us by the United Kingdom. We will meet again in 2021.

9. In challenging times, we are stronger as an Alliance, and our people safer. Our bond and mutual commitment have guaranteed our freedoms, our values, and our security for seventy years. We act today to ensure that NATO guarantees those freedoms, values, and security for generations to come.

Speeches of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation Sergey Shoygu at the Defence Ministry Board Meeting, December 24, 2019

[...]

Speech at the expanded meeting of the Defence Ministry Board

President of Russia Vladimir Putin:

[...]

Colleagues,

A general review of the Armed Forces shows that it demonstrates high operational efficiency. All services and branches within the Armed Forces can deliver on their objectives, guaranteeing peace and security for Russia. This is a matter of principle and has critical importance in today’s international environment and considering the related risks.

Tension persists in the Middle East, in Afghanistan and on the Korean Peninsula. NATO is expanding its military infrastructure close to our borders.

The arms control regime is disintegrating, which causes serious concern. This is not limited to the dismantling of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) by the United States under a pretext that is clearly far-fetched and absolutely groundless.

Since November 2019, Washington has been creating uncertainty regarding its engagement under the Treaty on Open Skies. The prospects of extending the New START are equally vague. And all this is taking place while the United States is expanding the capability of its global missile defence system. We see this, and we are aware of these developments.

In this context we must continue to strengthen and develop the Army and Navy, as well as to focus on the following key objectives in 2020.

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Footnotes:

269 Formal preface has been omitted.

270 Sections concerning assessments of the development of the armed forces have been omitted.
First of all, the share of modern weapons and equipment in the Army and Navy must reach at least 70 percent by the end of 2020. This goal has been already achieved in some arms and services, but others must continue working, for example, the Ground Forces.

This goal—70 percent of modern equipment—must be attained and subsequently maintained. As I mentioned, our goal is not a one-time rearmament, after which we can forget about the Army and Navy for decades. The Army and Navy must always have the best equipment and technology. Just now I visited an exhibition, where some people reported proudly that some of our equipment and technology are up to world standards. But in fact, as I have told our defence representatives more than once, it must be even better; our equipment must be better than the world’s best if we want to come out as the winners. This is not a game of chess where we can sometimes accept a tie. It concerns the military organisation of the nation. Our equipment must be better. We can do it and we are doing it in the key spheres. But we must also do it in all spheres.

Second, the drafting of the national defence plan for 2021–2025 will be completed next year. While working on it, we must take into account the military and political changes that have happened in the world and try to forecast future developments, as well as to comprehensively analyse potential military threats and formulate measures for the use and improvement of the Armed Forces.

Third, I have said that this year the United States has actually destroyed the INF Treaty, which is why we must monitor the potential deployment of US missiles of this class around the world, but first of all in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region.

We are ready to work out new arms control agreements. But until this process is launched we will continue to strengthen our nuclear forces. I am referring to the delivery of cutting-edge Avangard and Yars systems to the Strategic Missile Forces and Borei-A missile submarines to the naval nuclear forces.

And lastly, we will continue to create other promising missile systems that can ensure guaranteed deterrence of aggression against Russia and its allies.

Fourth, operational and combat training should serve to develop innovative and more effective ways of using troops, units and subunits, and positive results should be immediately incorporated into combat training programmes.

During the upcoming Caucasus 2020 exercise, special attention should be paid to the training of command post staff to lead coalition
forces and troops, and drill military personnel in acting in difficult geographical and climatic conditions.

[...]271

Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu: Supreme Commander-in-Chief,
The military and political situation this year was characterised by the further building up of military capability. In 2020, the US military budget will reach almost $750 billion for the first time. This is almost equal to the total annual military budget of all the countries in the world and is 16 times larger than the Russian military budget.

NATO is implementing the Four for 30 anti-Russian initiative of the US, which envisages having 30 motorised battalions, 30 air squadron and 30 military ships ready in 30 days. As of December 1, the land component is completely set, the air component stands at 76 percent and the naval at 93 percent. According to our estimates, this concept can be fully implemented by 2022. It is expected that nuclear weapon carrier preparation times will be cut from 10 days to 24 hours.

US aircraft control and warning groups are deployed in the Baltics, which will allow controlling our air space as far as 450 kilometres in.

Every year the NATO bloc in Europe holds up to 40 large military exercises, which are clearly anti-Russian in nature. The intensity of air and naval intelligence near our borders has increased 33 and 24 percent, respectively, compared to last year.

The tests of intermediate range missiles carried out by the Pentagon in August and December confirm that the US is working on missile systems that were prohibited under the INF Treaty when it was in effect. The deployment of such systems in Europe and in the East will be the next logical step. The US is also not clear about the future of New START and the Treaty on Open Skies.

Without dragging ourselves in an arms race but with due regard to these threats, the Defence Ministry and the defence industry have continued to fulfil the reequipment of the Armed Forces and improving their quality.

Reequipping the Army and Navy. All Defence Ministry Action Plan items and the state defence order for 2019 have been fulfilled. We have achieved the highest rate of weapon and vehicle deliveries in the past four years. Providing the army with over 6,500 units of new and upgraded weapons increased the share of modern weaponry to 68.2 percent.

The Presidential instruction to equip the Strategic Nuclear Forces with fundamentally new strike systems is being fulfilled. The upgrade

271 Sections concerning social issues and commemorations have been omitted.
level for the Strategic Missile Forces is over 76 percent and is at 82 percent for the “nuclear triad.”

This week, the first missile regiment armed with the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicles will enter combat duty. Three more missile regiments were reequipped with the Yars road-mobile missile systems. The deployment of the Peresvet laser systems has been completed. Since December 1 they have been in service in missile deployment areas of five missile divisions of the Strategic Missile Forces.

The Strategic Nuclear Aviation acquired five upgraded missile carriers. Tests of the Knyaz Vladimir ballistic missile submarine and lead ship of the Borei-A class have been successfully completed.

This year, the Armed Forces received 624 tanks and other armoured vehicles, 143 modern planes and helicopters, 13 spacecraft, one submarine, eight surface ships, 17 boats and support ships, four Bal and Bastion coastal missile systems, and more than 10,000 units of modern communication technology.

Extensive work to reequip all Ground Forces’ missile brigades with Iskander systems has been completed. The third Kupol spacecraft for the Unified Space System was launched. The system is successfully fulfilling test and combat alert missions.

Practical test flights of the Okhotnik UAV, experimental long-range drone for reconnaissance and combat strike purposes, which surpasses its foreign counterparts, have been completed. On December 1, a unique over-the-horizon radar station went online. It is able to identify mass airborne aviation units and cruise missile launches, including hypersonic.

Long-term contracts were signed to deliver 76 Sukhoi Su-57 fighter jets and over 200 modern combat helicopters to the Aerospace Forces, and this allowed us to reduce purchase prices by 20 percent and ensure workload for defence industry enterprises until 2028.

For the first time in Russia’s modern history, 22 open ocean vessels are being built simultaneously for the Navy. Five ships were laid down this year, and eight more will be laid down next year. Efforts are being made to build them faster and equip them with high-precision weapons, including Zircon hypersonic missiles.

Mi-28NM helicopters, attack version of the Inokhodets (Ambler) UAV, and new versions of missile and bomb weapons for the Su-57 fighter jet were tested in battle in Syria.

Reequipping the Army and Navy, along with periodic servicing of military equipment, made it possible to increase the level of technical operability in the Armed Forces to 95 percent. At the same time, there
is a problem with operational readiness of training aircraft which is currently 58 percent, and 56 percent for Yak-130 aircraft. We are working actively to improve the situation.

The transfer of 107 repair facilities to the defence industry and Rostec state corporation was completed in full.

Brand new technology and weapons developed in the Era military innovative technopolis are already being used in daily military activities. Four research and production companies have proven their efficiency. We consider it necessary to spread this practice to all defence industry enterprises.

Service personnel from 17 scientific companies are engaged in unique research in the defence sector. They have implemented 1,584 designs and registered 135 inventions. Having finished their service, 912 of them have become officers or have been employed by defence industry enterprises.

Over the past five years that the National Defence Control Centre has been in operation, the aggregate productivity of its computing power has increased eight-fold, and the volume of stored protected data has grown by 16 times which makes it possible to manage all Armed Forces activities, from everyday operation to combat control. The centre also conducts round-the-clock monitoring of state defence order implementation.

To improve the efficiency of fulfilling state defence order as part of the Unified Information System of Payments under the State Defence Order, the results of financial and economic activities of the state defence order contractors are accounted for separately. This made it possible to cut accounts receivable by 2.5 times, lower the prices for weaponry and equipment, and increase deliveries to the troops.

Your decisions, Supreme Commander-in-Chief, on reequipping the Army and Navy, made at the meetings in Sochi, are being fulfilled without interruption. Models of weaponry and equipment have been specified, procurement prices have been lowered, and the Unified Information System to control the state defence order is up and running.

At the same time, Russia's military budget has remained at the same level for several years compared with the constantly growing expenses of the US and other countries. If last year we had the seventh largest military spending among leading countries, this year we are eighth and next year it will be ninth.
At the same time, the speed of reequipping the Army, establishing advanced military infrastructure and the plans for the social protection of military personnel are maintained.

Now to increasing the troops’ readiness to perform their designated duties. The level of field, air and naval training of military personnel has increased. In total, over 18,500 exercises and drills of various levels have been held in the Armed Forces; the goal to increase the time spent in the air or at sea has been fulfilled; two snap complex inspections of combat readiness involving military districts, services and branches of the Armed Forces have been carried out.

The Centre 2019 strategic command-and-staff exercise was the largest military training effort, with military units from seven CSTO and SCO countries taking part.

The Navy carried out the Ocean Shield joint drills. The group demonstrated its ability to effectively fulfil tasks related to the protection of our national interests in the Baltic and North seas and in the north-eastern Atlantic Ocean.

Every year the interest of foreign countries in the International Army Games, which have become an important element of military training, is growing. Competitions and games have been held in ten countries featuring teams from 39 states, and for the first time in India, Uzbekistan and Mongolia.

In order to increase the level of military skill of troops and to hold the games, 82 ranges have been upgraded and 42 exercises with our foreign colleagues have been carried out over the period of five years. The Russian-Chinese drills Naval Interaction 2019 and the Russian-Indian drills Indra 2019 were the most significant.

We continue to form a professional army. Along with new technically sophisticated equipment, the number of service personnel that are trained to operate and use it is growing. And at the same time, fewer conscripts are needed.

This year all contract soldiers had to pass an evaluation which identified professionally unfit applicants who were then dismissed. We continue to raise the selection requirements and the level of competence for contract soldiers. Today, over 70 percent have a professional education. At the same time they are financially motivated and the conditions for service have improved.

In 2019, over 14,000 officers graduated from military academies and joined the military. This is the second full-scale graduation from our military academies. The system of military education has reached
the required volume of training capacity and is capable of providing for the Army’s needs in terms of qualified military personnel.

The officer manning level has been raised to 95 percent with an average age of 35. The officer corps displays high morale and willpower, and professionalism. Combat experience was acquired by all commanders of the military districts, all-arms armies, the Air Force and the Air Defence armies, divisions, brigades and regiments, 90 percent of air forces personnel, 56 percent of air defence specialists, 61 percent of Navy officers, 98 percent of military police, and 78 percent of the engineering corps.

Comrade Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the Armed Forces have achieved all the goals that were set for 2019, increasing their combat capability by 14 percent and maintaining national defences at the required level. Some problems have been uncovered, and ways to deal with them have been added to the ministry’s plans for 2019–2025.

In 2020, the ministry will have several priorities: 22 launchers with Yars and Avangard ballistic missiles are to be put on combat duty at the Strategic Missile Forces; the modernisation of six Tu-95MS strategic bombers is to be completed; and the first of seven Borei-A class nuclear-powered submarine cruisers, Knyaz Oleg, armed with Bulava ballistic missiles is to be delivered to the navy.

As for the general purpose forces, 565 modern armoured vehicles, 436 standard artillery systems and two battalions of the Buk-M3 air defence systems are to be delivered to the Army and the Coast Guard of the Navy, plus 11 new formations and military units are to be established.

The Aerospace Forces and the Navy will receive 106 new and modernised aircraft plus four regiments of the S-400 Triumf and six battalions of the Pantsir air defence missile systems. The fourth spacecraft of the Unified Space System is to be launched and the technical operability standards of aircraft are to be raised to 80 percent through the signing of state contracts regarding cost per flight hour and transition to an advanced system of aircraft maintenance support.

The Navy is to receive 14 surface ships and boats, three submarines, 18 auxiliary ships and boats and one Bal coastal defence system. The construction of infrastructure facilities for strategic submarines is to be completed on the Northern and Pacific fleets; a project-oriented system of designing, building and modernising naval ships will be

272 Sections concerning, i.a., social issues, investments, and the operation in Syria have been omitted.
introduced; and the share of modern weapons and equipment in the Armed Forces will be increased to 70 percent, as per the instructions set out in the May 2012 Presidential Executive Orders. We will maintain the operability of weapon systems and equipment at the current level, hold 19,200 exercises and drills, including the Caucasus 2020 command post exercises, and make sure that 3,200 buildings are ready by the time the planned delivery of weapons and equipment takes place, as well as continue to implement the Effective Army programme.

Comrade Supreme Commander-in-Chief, as per your instructions, we will continue the progressive development of the Armed Forces and enhance their quality standards next year. We will speak about the details during the restricted part of this meeting.

This concludes my report.

Thank you.

Vladimir Putin: Colleagues,

In conclusion, I would like to say a few words about issues not directly related to the topics we discuss today but concerning them in one way or another.

Let me begin with a story. You may have noticed that recently I met with my colleagues, the CIS heads of state—the heads of the countries that not so long ago were part of our common motherland, our common state, which faced Nazi Germany in World War II and won the Great Patriotic War.

I said there (and we have noted this many times) that some countries—our neighbours in Europe and on the other side of the ocean—often try to distort history and make up unbelievable scenarios of how the situation in the world and Europe developed on the eve of World War II. And recently, as a logical conclusion to this process, the European Parliament adopted a resolution that almost puts Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union on the same level, implying or even saying directly that the Soviet Union was also responsible for the beginning of World War II. Of course, this is complete nonsense.

I asked my colleagues to search for some materials in the archives and I looked them through. I presented an incomplete list of those documents to my colleagues who are present here today, and to the CIS heads of state. I mentioned this in passing at that meeting, we had no time really, and even now there's no occasion yet to talk about it in detail. Nevertheless, I will still talk a bit about it, and later, as you might have noticed, I will write an article on this, just as I promised.
The USSR was the last country in Europe to sign the Treaty of Non-aggression with Germany. The last. All the other leading European countries did this before the Soviet Union. Yes, the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact (let me remind you that Ribbentrop was Germany’s foreign minister, and Molotov was the foreign minister and chairman of the Council of Ministers) was signed, and there was also a secret protocol which defined the spheres of influence. But what have the European countries been doing before that? The same. They had all done the same thing, starting in 1938, when Hitler claimed part of Czechoslovakia, and Great Britain and France turned their backs on their ally, although France had a treaty of mutual assistance with Czechoslovakia. Thus Hitler got a chance to seize part of the country.

But what did the other countries do, Poland, for example? They actually conspired with Hitler. This much is directly evident from the documents—from archive documents. Another question is whether there were any secret annexes or not—but it doesn’t matter. It is important how they acted. They acted in collusion for certain—just from the documents on how they negotiated. And at the so-called Munich Conference, Hitler directly represented the interests of Poland, and partly of Hungary. He directly represented their interests, and then he said to the Poles: It was so difficult to defend your interests, you know. We have it all in the documents. Thank God, we have enough archival documents that we attained as trophies from the European countries after World War II.

But that’s not all. What really hit me hard, I’m telling you honestly, was how Hitler and the official representatives of Poland discussed the so-called Jewish problem. Hitler told the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and later bluntly said to the Polish Ambassador to Germany that he had a plan to send the Jewish population to Africa, to the colonies. Imagine, in 1938, to expel Jews from Europe to Africa. Sending them to their extermination. And here is what the Polish ambassador wrote to the Polish Foreign Minister, Mr Beck: When I heard this, he wrote, I responded (to Hitler, he means), that if this happens and this issue is resolved, we will build a beautiful monument to him (to Hitler) in Warsaw. That bastard! That anti-Semitic pig—I have no other words. He was in complete solidarity with Hitler in his anti-Jewish, anti-Semitic sentiment and, moreover, he proposed erecting a monument to Hitler in Warsaw for persecuting the Jewish people. And he wrote to his patron, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, apparently hoping for understanding and approval. He would not have written this without a reason.
I won’t go into more detail now, but in any case, I want to emphasise again: we have enough materials to prevent anyone from corrupting the memory of our fathers, our grandfathers, and all those who gave their lives for the victory over Nazism.

I just want to note that this kind of people, people like the ones who were negotiating with Hitler back then, they now deface monuments to the liberator soldiers, Red Army soldiers who liberated the countries of Europe and the European peoples from Nazism. These are their followers. In this sense, unfortunately, little has changed. And we must keep this in mind, also with regard to the development of our Armed Forces.

Here is what I would like to say in this regard, which I think is critically important. Please note: neither the Soviet Union, nor Russia have ever tried to create a threat to other countries. We were always catching up in this regard. The United States created the atomic bomb, and the Soviet Union caught up with it. We did not have nuclear weapon delivery vehicles or carriers. There was no such thing as strategic aviation, and the Soviet Union was catching up in this area, as well. The first intercontinental missiles actually were not built here, and the Soviet Union was trying to catch up.

Today, we have a unique situation in our new and recent history. They try to catch up with us. Not a single country possesses hypersonic weapons, let alone continental-range hypersonic weapons. We already have Kinzhal (Dagger) hypersonic missile systems in the field, and Peresvet laser combat systems have already been deployed with the troops as well.

The Minister just told us that we have begun to equip the first regiment of the Strategic Missile Forces with the latest Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle. Work on other systems is underway, including Sarmat boosted intercontinental ballistic missile; Zircon ground- and sea-based hypersonic rockets; the Poseidon UUV; and the Burevestnik nuclear-armed cruise missile.

Other systems have been fielded as well, including the ones that were tested during various exercises and in combat conditions in Syria, such as Kalibr cruise missiles.

There are also other technologies. They are not covered much in the media, but they do exist, are sent to the army and are operational.

In this regard, I would like to say that even though we spend much less than other countries (we rank 7th at this point, the Minister said, and could even slide to the 9th), this does not mean that we are ready
to compromise our combat readiness. No. All we are doing we are doing according to a plan.

At one of the board meetings I deliberately said, and maybe someone in the audience remembers it; I would like to repeat what I said back then. I didn’t say it accidentally. I said it because it represents our competitive advantage and it is about our ability to maintain the defence capability we need. What exactly will help us move forward? I said then literally the following: brains, intelligence, better organisation of work, minimising theft and negligence, and concentrating efforts on key areas will lead us to a high state of defence capability.

Please build your work in this way in the new year. Happy New Year! I wish you every success. Thank you.

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Answers to Media Questions
Following the 56th Munich Security Conference,
Munich, February 17, 2020

The Munich Security Conference is over. You have seen all the speeches. Our media have already made assessments. I will be glad to answer your questions.

Question: Did you discuss with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo President Donald Trump’s participation in the meeting of the UN Security Council permanent members proposed by Russia? Is the US position now clear? Did you discuss extending the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)? Did you manage to reach any agreement?

Sergey Lavrov: We discussed an entire range of issues. You can find this in the materials circulated by the press services of the Russian Foreign Ministry and the US State Department. We touched upon all the problems on the agenda of our strategic dialogue, including those in the competence of the UN Security Council permanent members and arms control issues. We agreed to continue an in-depth, professional conversation on them.

I had a feeling that there was certain movement towards a more constructive approach from our US partners.

Question: President of France Emmanuel Macron has said many times that it is necessary to involve Russia in European security and to change the strategy towards Russia. Are there any real proposals in the area of European security for Russia, including from France?

Sergey Lavrov: In fact, there are proposals from France. I would say that France demonstrates true political and geopolitical vision, pragmatism and readiness for a dialogue, given all the reservations made by President of France Emmanuel Macron regarding his view on the sanctions and Russia. He called on everyone to accept reality. Russia exists and influences a lot of processes in the world. Moreover, Russia is right next to Europe. This sounded off key, considering that most of the European and American speakers spoke about a decline in the West’s influence, some with concern, some with regret. But the conference’s motto, Westlessness, was reflected in several facts: first, our Western partners started to look for culprits inside the Western camp and pointed at Washington, accusing it of forgetting about Europe’s interests, carrying out its own policy and ignoring the
Europeans’ problems and its responsibilities to them; on the other hand, fingers were also pointed at Russia and China. At China, above all. Perhaps this was something new for such large discussions: that China has firmly taken the top place in the list of main threats our Western colleagues voiced.

In fact, it turns out that 99 percent of the conference was about who is to blame and who will be the best at presenting their accusations to everyone else, be it Europe, China or Russia. Of course, in a situation like this President Macron’s speech was absolutely sensible and aimed at searching for solutions instead of culprits, or making excuses for idleness and inactivity.

You have mentioned his proposal to launch a dialogue on security architecture with Russia. Yes, there are concrete proposals. By the way, after the US destroyed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) and it ceased to exist, President of Russia Vladimir Putin sent detailed messages to all the leaders of Western and other major countries with Russia’s view of the situation and called on them to save the last agreements on this type of nuclear arms from disappearing. He noted that Russia had introduced a moratorium until US-produced missiles of the corresponding class were operational and deployed anywhere in the world—and then reciprocal measures would follow. However, until then Vladimir Putin has announced a moratorium.

In his message to the leaders of the Western world, he called for the same moratorium, which most Western colleagues either ignored or replied that Russia had deployed prohibited missiles in the Kaliningrad Region and now called for joining the moratorium when others do not have anything deployed. So nobody except Mr Macron noticed that in his message Vladimir Putin expressed his readiness to discuss possible measures to verify such a mutual moratorium. Mr Macron noticed this and said he was interested in such a dialogue. France and Russia will discuss these topics, but to make concrete decisions we need multilateral talks, as well as consultations involving the US, which, after destroying the INF Treaty, is now laying the groundwork to deploy these once prohibited armaments both in Europe and Asia. The US does not hide this. Japan, Korea and islands in the Pacific Ocean are mentioned.

Since Mr Macron proposed a multilateral dialogue—between NATO and Russia—it was interesting to read the interview that NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg granted to the French newspaper Le Figaro. Asked about his attitude to President Macron’s call to start a dialogue with Russia, Mr Stoltenberg said that there was a dialogue,
an institutional one, and that all the issues, including arms control and transparency, were being discussed. In all evidence, he meant the Russia-NATO Council by the institutional dialogue. It exists formally and met several times over the past years, but each time the proceedings were reduced to a dialogue made up of monologues. At least, Russia made proposals to begin a detailed discussion on issues that might promote and strengthen trust as well as transparency. All that NATO replied were slogans like “Ukraine,” or “Let’s consolidate the Vienna Document 2011,” which was adopted in a completely different military and political situation, when there was not so much NATO infrastructure near the Russian borders, and so on. Over these years, they have advanced in our direction and pumped their “military muscle.” They organise military exercises involving over 40,000 personnel and 35,000 units of equipment, with half of them being American, which has been unprecedented for decades.

Today, when the 2010 balance has been dramatically disrupted, they suggest that we start talks on how to calm the situation. This will not do. What is more important is that our NATO colleagues and Mr Stoltenberg are being sly when saying that they are open to a dialogue with Russia. They are open, but to a dialogue that they understand as an opportunity for airing their grievances against Russia, primarily over Ukraine. Despite their current propaganda for the NATO-Russia Council, there was not a single NATO-Russia Council meeting that took place without an attempt, in the form of an ultimatum, to impose on us a discussion of the Ukrainian problems in this format. We always answer (and I said so to Mr Stoltenberg during our meeting here in Munich) that NATO has nothing to do with Ukraine. We have dialogue with those Western countries that are engaged in Ukrainian settlement, first of all the participants in the Normandy format, France and Germany. We also stay in touch with the Americans, because they would also periodically join the Ukraine conversations over the last couple of years. But NATO as such has no relation to the Ukrainian problems. NATO can only aggravate these by its constant incantations to the effect that they are expecting Ukraine, with their arms open, to join the alliance. This can only aggravate the crisis and undermine efforts aimed at implementing the Minsk Agreements.

Speaking about other things, let us not forget (I also reminded Mr Stoltenberg about this) that it was NATO that discontinued all practical forms of our collaboration, including in what it concerns the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan, equipment supplies to the
Afghan security forces, counterterrorism on a more general, global scale, as well as other practical areas of our erstwhile cooperation.

Perhaps it is no longer professional to pretend that NATO still maintains a constructive approach for the sole reason that they occasionally condescend to suggest convening the Russia-NATO Council for yet another round of discussions. By and large, there is emptiness behind all their talk that NATO has conducted with us a dialogue on arms control, transparency measures or trust building.

Several days ago, when I reminded NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg here in Munich that Russia was still expecting replies to our detailed proposals, he only got away with some awkward remarks that all of these would be considered later. The proposals were made by the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces about a year ago, and they are utterly specific. First, to come to terms on pushing both Russian and NATO exercises back from the line of contact to an agreed specific depth. Let us sit down and arrange it. Silence!

Second, ensuring security over the Baltic Sea and in the Baltic region as a whole has been neglected for quite long. The Russian military have suggested that we negotiate for military aircraft using transponders in the Baltic airspace, like civilian planes do now. And the second most important measure is to coordinate the minimum admissible approach distance for both Russian and NATO warships and military aircraft. Silence again! Of course, the circumstances being what they are, we would look forward to the ideas reiterated by President Emmanuel Macron more than once getting into NATO’s head, so that we can understand, if it is sick or otherwise.

[...] 273


273 Questions and answers not related to European security have been omitted.
Comment by the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on North Macedonia Joining NATO, March 31, 2020

On March 27, after depositing its instrument of accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in Washington, North Macedonia officially became NATO’s 30th member. By necessity the event had a lower profile and less pomp than previous waves of the alliance’s expansion due to ongoing concerns over the coronavirus.

Despite the emergency declaration in North Macedonia, its leaders still took time out to rhapsodise on the historic nature of the country’s accession to NATO, which supposedly will ensure stability and security of Skopje. Foreign Minister Nikola Dimitrov even called the country’s NATO membership “the testament of our fathers and grandfathers.” What was not mentioned, however, was how close the formal date of accession was to the anniversary of the start of NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia.

From the moment the Prespa Agreement was signed with Greece in June 2018, the process of North Macedonia’s integration into NATO—the self-proclaimed “alliance of democracies”—has been marked by a great many procedural and legislative irregularities. According to national law, turnout for the referendum on EU and NATO membership on September 30, 2018 was too low for the result to be valid. Various cases of interference in North Macedonia’s domestic affairs, even blackmail and intimidation, became known to the public. All of this went unnoticed by our Western partners, who are usually such sticklers for detail when it comes to legislative procedure.

It is evident that Skopje’s membership in the alliance yields no added value to European, regional or national security. This step certainly will not make it any easier to join efforts to counter common threats and challenges, including the coronavirus pandemic. It will only create new lines of separation.274

274 It is worth noting the similarly negative, but rhetorically tougher, reaction of Russia to the process of Montenegro’s accession to NATO: “We perceive the decision of foreign ministers, participants in the December 1–2 North Atlantic Council meeting in Brussels, to launch NATO accession talks with Montenegro as an openly confrontationist move which is fraught with additional destabilising consequences for the system of Euro-Atlantic security. Contrary to the objective need to pool collective efforts for combating the increasingly numerous current threats and challenges and
A clear rationale for North Macedonia joining NATO has still yet to be given. Its people are promised economic growth, increased foreign investment and greater rule of law. But it is not necessary to join a military-political alliance for this. Now Skopje is required to immediately increase spending on defence and purchases of Western, primarily American, arms and equipment. This is the price the Macedonian nation will have to pay for ceding its sovereignty on military-political and other matters.

Regarding the promised security dividends, the alliance is not always able to reliably protect its members or even put an end to old disputes between them, instead mastering the art of sweeping such things under the rug.

According to procedure, Skopje is expected to confirm acceptance of its NATO obligations under documents signed with Russia, in particular the 1997 Founding Act and the 2002 Rome Declaration.

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Statement and Answers to Media Questions at a News Conference Following a Ministerial Video Session of the Council of the Baltic Sea States, Moscow, May 19, 2020

[...]

Question: US President Donald Trump has recently announced the development of a ‘super-duper’ missile that would be the fastest hypersonic missile, three times faster than Russian or Chinese missiles, and 17 times faster than what the US has right now. Donald Trump said that the US had no choice and had to face up to strong adversaries. What do you think about statements of this kind and missile development during the pandemic?

Sergey Lavrov: I am not particularly versed in technical questions to measure hypersonic speeds and their number for any given device. Professional experts who have a far better understanding of the subject have already commented on the suggestion that the missile will travel 17 times the speed of sound.

I will not get into this discussion. My job is to make sure that there are no new problems in our relations with the United States. It is quite clear that we need to substantially improve our relations on matters like the strategic stability dialogue and arms controls. Our US colleagues have been consistently dismantling all the treaties and restrictions that existed in this sphere, starting with the ABM Treaty. The INF Treaty has recently ceased to exist. We have been trying to revive talks and to agree on a moratorium, but our efforts have not yielded any results, which is due to NATO’s position. The Open Skies Treaty is now under threat. The United States has officially refused to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. All there is left is the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START). We want it to remain in force for at least another five-year term so that we can review all the new ideas on today’s strategic stability without haste and involving all those who are ready to take part in these talks.

During a telephone conversation back in early April, President of Russia Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump discussed the need to fight the coronavirus, the situation on the global oil market, our bilateral affairs, as well as strategic stability talks. They

Questions and answers not related to European security have been omitted.
instructed US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and the Russian Foreign Minister to agree on ways to revive the strategic stability dialogue. Mike Pompeo and I had a conversation on this topic. We agreed that Marshall Billingslea, who will be the US point of contact on this matter, will contact Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov, who is in charge of these questions within the Foreign Ministry. The two had a preliminary, introductory telephone conversation on May 8. The Americans promised to offer a specific timeframe for arranging a videoconference to have a meaningful conversation on strategic stability matters in an inter-agency format (including ‘super-duper’ matters, and everything relating to nuclear arms control), with the participation of the corresponding representatives from defence ministries and security services. We are still waiting for the proposal on the timeframe for our consultations via videoconference.

You have mentioned US President Donald Trump saying that Washington had “no choice” and referred to strong “adversaries” to justify the need to develop the missile. The very notion of “strategic stability” is disappearing from the vocabulary of the current US administration. Instead of strategic stability as the desired objective in our relations and in relations between all major powers, they use the new notion of “strategic competition” among major powers. This means that they now emphasise competition rather than efforts to bring about stability. This could be a subject for a philosophical debate. In order to understand the true causes of this conceptual shift, we need direct dialogue, but unfortunately we do not have it so far.

Question: Could you please comment on the statement made by US Ambassador to Poland Georgette Mosbacher that considered the possibility of the deployment of US nuclear weapons in Poland instead of Germany. The Foreign Ministry already said this would be a violation of the Russia-NATO Founding Act. Do you think this hypothetical step would have any practical consequences?

A clarifier on security—some time ago, Russia proposed to countries in the Baltic region to reduce the number and scale of military exercises. Have you had any response from the states on the other side of the line?

Sergey Lavrov: Regarding the statements made by US Ambassador to Poland Georgette Mosbacher, indeed, our Ministry has made a detailed comment. As you understand, we are talking about US nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of European countries including Germany (one of the five host countries of such weapons). This in itself does little to stabilise the situation, because stabilisation
would require moving the nuclear weapons to their national territories, as the Russian Federation has long done.

The United States not only keeps its weapons deployed in the five NATO countries, but it is vigorously implementing the so-called NATO nuclear sharing arrangements. Under those arrangements, service members from the armies of non-nuclear states are being trained in handling nuclear weapons. This is a direct violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the one that marks its anniversary this year.

As for the possibility of transferring American nuclear weapons from Germany to Poland, as you rightly noted, this would be a direct violation of the Russia-NATO Founding Act, whereby NATO pledged not to deploy nuclear weapons on the territories of its new members either at that moment or in the future.

I doubt that these procedures will be actually launched. For me, what warrants attention in this story is not exactly nuclear weapons, but the way the US ambassadors to European countries unreservedly spell out their country’s position and even dictate their position to the host country. Everyone knows that US Ambassador to Germany Richard Grenell is never at a loss for words, nor does he hesitate to use a microphone to publicly lecture German officials and the German government.

When this topic came up in the context of a proposal to stop hosting American nuclear weapons in Germany, made by one of the parties on Germany’s coalition Government, US Ambassador to Poland Georgette Mosbacher immediately said, in that case, Poland would take it. It sounds like two large European countries—Germany and Poland, are the subject of discussion of further steps that actually concern the sovereign competence of these countries. US ambassadors are openly discussing these and other possible steps in real time through public statements. This fact is more eloquent in showing what is happening with strategic stability than the hypothetical probability of some relocation of US nuclear weapons from Germany to Poland.

Question: What do you think of the proposal to cut the military exercises?

Sergey Lavrov: This proposal was made last year when Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Valery Gerasimov met with his NATO counterpart. He presented a draft package of confidence-building measures including the proposal to move the exercises away from the line of contact between NATO countries and the Russian Federation. An additional confidence-building measure was also
proposed, to agree on the minimum distance for rapprochement of military aircraft and warships.

Following up on the initiative of Finnish President Sauli Niinisto on aviation security in the Baltic, we proposed an agreement for military aircraft to fly with their transponders on. So far, no clear answer has been given to these proposals (a year after they were made). Valery Gerasimov not so long ago met with General Tod Walters in Baku and reminded him that we are still waiting for an answer. There has been no response either.

Our military said they are reducing the scale of their exercises and are not planning any exercises close to the line of contact with the North Atlantic Alliance for the period of the coronavirus infection that we are all going through. But the main problem is a lack of former useful and effective mechanisms for direct contact between the military of Russia and NATO. Our NATO colleagues only agree to meetings at the Chief of the General Staff level, but the former mechanisms for practical cooperation between members of the military are completely frozen, to our utmost regret.

Source: Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statement and answers to media questions at a news conference following a ministerial video session of the Council of the Baltic Sea States, Moscow, May 19, 2020, www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/meropriyatiya_s_uchastiem_ministra/-/asset_publisher/xK1BhB2bUjd3/content/id/4133375 (retrieved 01.06.2020).
Statement by the NATO Secretary General on the Open Skies Treaty, 22 May, 2020

NATO Allies met today to discuss the Open Skies Treaty. We are firmly committed to the preservation of effective international arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation. We all agree that all states party to the Open Skies Treaty must fully implement their commitments and obligations. All NATO Allies are in full compliance with all provisions of the Treaty.

Russia has for many years imposed flight restrictions inconsistent with the Treaty, including flight limitations over Kaliningrad, and restricting flights in Russia near its border with Georgia. Russia’s ongoing selective implementation of its obligations under the Open Skies Treaty has undermined the contribution of this important Treaty to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region.

Allies have called on Russia to return to full compliance of the Treaty since the Wales Summit in 2014, and repeated that call at the Warsaw Summit in 2016 and again at the Brussels Summit in 2018. The United States has declared Russia in violation of the Treaty, and has now announced its intention to withdraw from the Treaty in six months, consistent with Treaty provisions. The US has declared that it may, however, reconsider its withdrawal should Russia return to full compliance with the Treaty.

NATO Allies and partner nations have engaged with Russia, both in capitals and at the OSCE in Vienna, to seek Russia’s return to compliance at the earliest date possible. Russia’s return to compliance is the best way to preserve the benefits of the Treaty.

NATO Allies will continue to uphold, support, and further strengthen arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation, as a key element of Euro-Atlantic security, taking into account the prevailing security environment. Allies also remain open to dialogue in the NATO-Russia Council on risk reduction and transparency. We continue to aspire to a constructive relationship with Russia, when Russia’s actions make that possible.

Deputy Foreign Minister Alexandr Grushko's interview with the TASS News Agency, June 6, 2020

**Question:** By withdrawing from the Open Skies Treaty the United States is closing its air space to Russia’s control but will be able to monitor Russian air space via its NATO allies. Does Russia need this treaty without US participation? What can be done to save it without hurting our security interests?

**Alexander Grushko:** The withdrawal of one participant from the multilateral treaty does not mean complete termination. At the same time, it is clear that withdrawing US air space from monitoring substantially affects one of the treaty’s main foundations—its coverage and, hence, upsets the balance of interests that it established.

But for all the importance of the Russian-US dimension, there are 34 participants in the treaty, and their security interests, including those of the US’ allies, will also be affected. Based on the treaty’s comprehensive character, the participants agreed that if one country walks away from the treaty, the rest will convene to review the consequences of this for the treaty. The depository states, Hungary and Canada must hold this conference within 30-60 days of being notified about a withdrawal. As for the withdrawal as such, it will become legally valid six months after notification about this intention.

Few analysts believe the US will suddenly change its mind and remain in the treaty. The argument to justify withdrawal is far-fetched. Dozens of technical issues related to this monitoring are continuously discussed by the Open Skies Consultative Commission (OSCC). It was created for this purpose. Many of them are not yet fully settled. This applies, for instance, to the issues of establishing range limits of flights, determining the conditions for crew rest, establishing airfields for refuelling and flight plans over exclaves and insular territories, to name a few. We have serious grievances about the implementation of the treaty by some states, including the US but it has not occurred to anyone to withdraw from it. Georgia is violating one of the treaty’s key provisions—the right of each participant to make observation flights over the territory of any other participant—by denying us this opportunity.

This problem is different—Washington has adopted a course of consistent withdrawal from all agreements on strategic stability and
arms control with a view to gaining military supremacy. The US has undermined the foundations of European security by avoiding the ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty, and walking away from the INF Treaty. Now it is withdrawing from the Open Skies Treaty.

As for our next step, we are reviewing all options. Let’s wait for the outcome of the conference. We are not going to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for anyone. In any event, we will give priority to our own and our allies’ security interests. I would like to remind you at this point that Russia and Belarus form one group of participants to the treaty.

**Question:** Have the participants decided when to convene the conference? Will it be held as a meeting or via video conference?

**Alexander Grushko:** Not yet, but according to contractual requirements it must be held no later than the end of July. We don’t know yet in what format it will be held but all those who are interested in the treaty’s future must be interested in convening it as a meeting rather than online. There are plenty of issues to discuss.

**Question:** Has it been decided who will represent Russia at the conference?

**Alexander Grushko:** It is too early to talk about this yet.

**Question:** NATO Spokesperson Oana Lungescu said the alliance has not received Russia’s response to its proposal for a Russia-NATO Council meeting. What do you think about this and what are the chances for holding this meeting in the near future? What urgent issues could be discussed in this format?

**Alexander Grushko:** A Russia-NATO Council meeting is not held when it is proposed but when all the council participants agree to it. This is not the case now. The NATO countries propose discussing the situation in Ukraine with us. Since NATO does not play any role in the Ukrainian domestic conflict, it makes no sense to discuss this at a council meeting. NATO members take part in the weekly discussions of this issue at the OSCE Permanent Council. Moreover, France and Germany are members of the Normandy format and are bound to inform their allies of what is taking place there. We believe it is necessary to convene the council meetings when they can really promote military security in Europe. We have a number of proposals on what can be done under the current conditions: de-escalation by pulling back the area for military exercises from the Russia-NATO contact line, improving the mechanisms for preventing dangerous military incidents and avoidance of a misunderstanding of each
other’s intentions. However, we have not yet received any meaningful response to our proposals. Moreover, today there is an urgent need for restoring normal military contact that has been completely broken by NATO. There is no progress in this regard so far. Nor is there any positive general agenda for the council because NATO has suspended any practical cooperation with Russia.

**Question:** Is NATO ready to offer a constructive response to the decision by the Russian Armed Forces Command to not hold large military exercises near the borders of alliance members?

**Alexander Grushko:** We have yet to see any willingness to do this.

**Question:** Is there any concern that NATO might initiate a provocation during the Victory parade on June 24?

**Alexander Grushko:** We would like to hope that common sense will prevail, but we cannot be completely confident about this judging by how NATO planned the peak of its military activity on May 9.

**Question:** Have you discussed potential updates to the Vienna Document on confidence- and security-building measures?

**Alexander Grushko:** We have not talked about this because there are no conditions for it. NATO must make up its mind—either build up its security by increasing its military potential and creating a military threat to Russia or enhance its security by developing arms control instruments. It is impossible to have it both ways.

This suggests a different question: how can NATO talk about updating the Vienna Document that is aimed at ensuring the transparency of military activity when the US, the main holder of the controlling interest, plans to withdraw from the Open Skies Treaty that is designed exactly to ensure this transparency?

[...]²⁷⁶


²⁷⁶ Questions and answers concerning contacts with the EU and other diplomatic contacts, on Turkey and on cooperation with the European Court of Human Rights have been omitted.
Statement by the North Atlantic Council Concerning Malicious Cyber Activities, 3 June, 2020

1. We stand united as we face this unprecedented coronavirus pandemic. We condemn destabilising and malicious cyber activities directed against those whose work is critical to the response against the pandemic, including healthcare services, hospitals and research institutes. These deplorable activities and attacks endanger the lives of our citizens at a time when these critical sectors are needed most, and jeopardise our ability to overcome the pandemic as quickly as possible.

2. NATO continues to play its part in responding to the pandemic. Allies as well as partners are supporting each other, including through providing and transporting medical supplies, deploying medical personnel and helping to deliver innovative responses.

3. We stand in solidarity with those who have been affected by malicious cyber activities and remain ready to assist Allies, including by continuing to share information, as they respond to cyber incidents that affect essential services.

4. In line with their national responsibilities and competences, Allies are committed to protecting their critical infrastructure, building resilience and bolstering cyber defences, including through full implementation of NATO’s Cyber Defence Pledge.

5. As stated at the 2018 NATO Summit in Brussels, cyber defence is part of NATO’s core task of collective defence. Reaffirming NATO’s defensive mandate, we are determined to employ the full range of capabilities, including cyber, to deter, defend against and counter the full spectrum of cyber threats. NATO will continue to adapt to the evolving cyber threat landscape, which is affected by both state and non-state actors, including state-sponsored.

6. We all stand to benefit from a rules-based, predictable, open, free, and secure cyberspace. NATO reiterates that international law applies in cyberspace and must be respected. All states have an important role to play in promoting and upholding voluntary norms of responsible state behaviour and in countering destabilising and malicious cyber activities.

Statement by the North Atlantic Council on the Poisoning of Alexei Navalny,
4 September, 2020

Allies condemn in the strongest possible terms the attack on Alexei Navalny, a Russian opposition figure, with the use of a nerve agent from the banned Novichok group. Any use of chemical weapons, under any circumstances, is a clear breach of international law and contrary to the Chemical Weapons Convention, which prohibits the use of all chemical weapons.

We are united in our call on Russia, as a matter of urgency, to be fully transparent and to bring those responsible to justice, bearing in mind Russia’s commitments under the Chemical Weapons Convention. In this context, as part of a joint international response, Allies support the important role of the OPCW and urge Russia to immediately disclose any information relevant for its work.

Allies thank Germany for hosting Mr Navalny and the Charité hospital in Berlin for his treatment. Our thoughts are with him and his family. We wish him a swift and full recovery.

Annex

NRC Practical Cooperation Fact Sheet (October 2013)

Introduction

In 1997 NATO and Russia signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, which provided the formal basis for NATO-Russia relations and led to the development of a bilateral programme of consultation and cooperation under the Permanent Joint Council (PJC).

In 2002 the relationship was given new impetus and substance with the signature of the Rome Declaration on “NATO-Russia relations: A New Quality,” which established the NATO-Russia Council. At that time NRC Heads of State and Government agreed to enhance their ability to work together in areas of common interest and to stand together against common threats and risks to their countries’ security. The 2010 NRC Summit in Lisbon was another important step towards a closer cooperation between NATO Allies and Russia by initiating new projects on areas of mutual concern.

In 2012 we marked the 15th anniversary of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the 10th anniversary of the NATO-Russia Council. Over those years, the NATO-Russia Council has developed a number of practical cooperation projects in the following areas of common interest.

In 2013, political dialogue has continued with the April 2013 NRC Foreign Ministers meeting, the October 2013 NRC Defence Ministers’ meeting which constituted the first meeting since 2011, as well as a number of NRC Ambassadors’ meetings. Practical cooperation has also increased, across a range of areas.

Counter-narcotics training of Afghan, Central Asian and Pakistani personnel

Launched by NRC Foreign Ministers in December 2005 the NRC Project for Counter-Narcotics training addresses the threats posed by the trafficking of Afghan narcotics. In cooperation with the United

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277 It is a joint endeavour of many NRC nations—Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States—as well as non-NRC contributing nations—Finland (since 2007) and Ukraine (since 2012), together with the project’s beneficiary countries.
Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) it seeks to build local capacities and to promote regional networking and cooperation by sharing the combined expertise of NRC nations with mid-level officers from seven beneficiary countries: Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Fixed training takes place in institutes located in Russia (Domodedovo Training Institute, North Western Institute and Siberian Law Institute), Turkey (Turkish International Academy Against Drugs and Organised Crime) or the United States (Quantico). Moreover, mobile courses are being conducted in each of the beneficiary countries. At the Lisbon Summit NRC leaders agreed to expand the scope of the project to provide further direct assistance to institutional capacity-building in the future. To date around 3000 officers have been trained under this NRC project, with 30 courses being held so far in 2013 and 466 counter narcotics officers trained. 2013, specialised training has taken place in areas such as clandestine laboratories and forensic investigations. The project has also begun training, which fosters cross border counter narcotics cooperation.

**Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund**

At the Lisbon summit NRC leaders agreed to establish an NRC Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund to enable the Afghan Armed Forces to operate their helicopter fleet. The project was officially launched at the NRC Ministerial meeting in Berlin in April 2011 with Germany as lead nation and NATO Support Agency (NSPA–formerly NAMSA) serving as the project’s executing agent. The goal of the NRC Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund is to contribute to the ability of the Afghan Air Force (AAF) to operate its fleet of Mi-17 and Mi-35 helicopters more efficiently, by providing training for the Afghan maintenance technicians and required helicopter spare parts. Donor nations\(^{278}\) have contributed to the Trust Fund project, providing maintenance and repair capacities, including spare parts and technical training. Tailored training for Afghan Air Force helicopter maintenance staff started in April 2012 at the Novosibirsk Aircraft Repair Plant in Russia. So far three training courses have been successfully completed with 30 trainees completing the training being reintegrated back into the Afghan National Army Air Corps as of September 2013. A train-the-trainers course for the two best students is also due to take place at the Croatian Air Force base in Zadar. Phase

\(^{278}\) Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Russia, Turkey and United States.
II of the Trust Fund started in May 2013 and is currently providing helicopter repair and maintenance training for another 10 Afghan helicopter technicians, as well as support for developing the Afghan Air Force’s Medical Evacuation capability.

**Support for ISAF and the Afghan Armed Forces**

In spring 2008, NATO asked the Russian Federation to allow the land transit of non-military equipment for ISAF contributors across Russian territory in support of the NATO-led, UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. At the Lisbon Summit, NRC leaders agreed on amendments to the 2008 arrangements allowing land transit of non-lethal cargo both to and from Afghanistan. In July 2012, the arrangement on a multi-modal transit (air, rail, road) was signed making use of Ulyanovsk airport in Russia. In December 2012, a first cargo for the British contingent in Afghanistan passed through the Ulyanovsk transit hub which was then recognized operational.

**Combating terrorism**

In December 2004, NRC foreign ministers launched an NRC Action Plan on Terrorism to improve overall coordination and provide strategic direction for cooperation in this area. At Lisbon, NRC leaders underlined the continued importance of cooperation in the fight against terrorism. In April 2011, NRC foreign ministers approved an updated Action Plan in Berlin. A first NRC civilian-military counter-terrorism tabletop exercise was conducted at NATO Headquarters in March 2012. The NRC provides several platforms for regular exchanges of information and in-depth consultations on various aspects of combating terrorism such as the Cooperative Airspace Initiative (see below) or the STANDEX project, which will enable the stand-off detection of explosive devices in mass transport environments. The STANDEX Big City Trial took place in May 2013 and a follow-on project is currently in preparation. Another important focus of ongoing work is countering improvised explosive devices (C-IED). In 2012 a conference on was held at the C-IED Centre of Excellence in Hoyo de Manzanares, Spain. In 2013 the 66th Training Centre of the Russian Ministry of Defence gave a briefing on its training activities, and options are being explored for potential practical cooperation in this area. The NRC also held a seminar in 2012 as well as a follow-up meeting in 2013 to share experiences in hosting high visibility events.
Over the years, several Russian ships have been deployed in support of Operation Active Endeavour, NATO’s maritime operation against terrorism in the Mediterranean.

**Cooperative Airspace Initiative**

On this project significant progress has been made, providing early notification of suspicious air activities and air-traffic transparency by facilitating predictability and interoperability in airspace management. Based on a feasibility study completed in 2005, detailed system requirements and a project plan were agreed to enable the reciprocal exchange of air traffic data between centres in participating NATO countries and in Russia. The operational readiness of the CAI system was demonstrated during counter-terrorism exercise Vigilant Skies 2011. It was the first such joint live-flying, real-time counter-terrorism exercise, during which Polish, Russian and Turkish fighter jets intervened in response to the simulated hijacking of a passenger aircraft by terrorists. Subsequently the system was declared operational in December 2011. A follow on simulated computer-based exercise took place in November 2012 to test and consolidate CAI processes, procedures and capabilities. The second live exercise Vigilant Skies 2013 further tested the CAI capabilities under a similar scenario to the one used in 2011, and confirmed the operational value of CAI. The CAI system consists of two coordination centres, in Moscow and in Warsaw, and local coordination sites in Russia (Murmansk, Kaliningrad, Rostov-on-Don) and in NATO member countries (Bodo, Norway; Warsaw, Poland; and Ankara, Turkey).

**Countering piracy**

Piracy is one of the common security challenges identified in the Joint Review of 21st Century Common Security Challenges approved at Lisbon. Cooperation at the tactical level between NATO and Russian ships off the Horn of Africa started in 2008. This cooperation has intensified with the start of NATO’s counter piracy operation OCEAN SHIELD. Not only is cooperation at the tactical level between the maritime forces in theatre taking place through actions and exercises, but also at the operational level where regular meetings between staffs take place to enhance NATO—Russia maritime cooperation. A document formalizing this tactical maritime cooperation has been signed by NATO Maritime Command and Russian Navy in December 2012 in St Petersburg. On a case-by-case basis Russian
ships use the training facilities of the NATO Maritime Interdiction Training Centre in Crete in their preparation for the Counter Piracy mission. To enhance further cooperation, NRC nations are seeking other ways to strengthen information exchange and coordination and are working on agreements on standards for mutual support, such as replenishment at sea and medical assistance. The next counter-piracy meeting with Russian Navy has been agreed to take place on November 5-6 at NATO Maritime Command HQ. To date in 2013, there have been five meetings at sea between NATO and Russian ships involved in counter piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. This includes a meeting between the USS Nicholas and RFS Severomorsk in April 2013, where the two ships engaged in a series of joint training exercises.

**Missile Defence / Theatre Missile Defence**

NRC theatre missile defence (TMD) cooperation has been ongoing since 2002. In accordance with the Rome declaration “NATO-Russia relations: A New Quality,” adopted on May 28th, 2002, work to assess the interoperability of relevant TMD systems of the parties was begun and a number of TMD exercises were conducted—in the USA (2004), in the Netherlands (2005), in Russia (2006) and in Germany (2008), but in August 2008 TMD cooperation was suspended. At the NRC Lisbon summit on November 20, 2010 heads of state and government agreed to resume TMD cooperation and to develop a Comprehensive Joint Analysis of the future framework for missile defence cooperation.

The format of TMD exercises was changed. While the 2004–2008 exercises focused on hypothetical crisis response operations, the 2012 computer-assisted exercise (CAX) held in Germany, March 2012, aimed at developing, exploring and assessing various options for conducting missile defence in Europe. The results of the exercise were meant to inform the work on the Joint Analysis of the future framework for Russia-NATO missile defence cooperation.

At the moment there are differences in Russian and NATO approaches towards the aims and objectives of building a missile defence in Europe. As a result, progress on the TMD CAX After Action Report and the Joint Analysis of the future framework for Russia-NATO missile defence cooperation, has been limited so far.

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279 In accordance with the decisions of the North Atlantic Council in the context of the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008.
Non-proliferation and arms control

Dialogue on a growing range of issues related to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has developed under the NRC. In this field a number of substantive meetings, discussions and expert presentations have been held to build mutual understanding as well as to explore opportunities for practical cooperation. At the Lisbon Summit, NRC leaders emphasised their strong support for the revitalisation and modernisation of the conventional arms control regime in Europe and their readiness to continue dialogue on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. The NRC Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (ADN) Working Group was designated as an appropriate forum to address most of these issues. Meetings of this Group contribute to confidence-building, future cooperation and bilateral NATO-Russia dialogue touching upon a wide range of topics related to multilateral WMD non-proliferation regimes, mechanisms and initiatives, disarmament efforts, small arms and light weapons proliferation, WMD terrorism, smuggling, space security and others. The Joint NRC Statement was agreed ahead of the 7th Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in December 2011 in support of the Convention. On January 2013, the NRC(ADN)WG held a plenary meeting with senior (department director and higher) level officials from the Capitals to discuss important non-proliferation developments in 2012. A broad range of issues related to state of play in the disarmament and non-proliferation field were discussed as well as their national policy priorities in this area in 2013.

Defence transparency, strategy and reform

With a view to building mutual confidence, trust, transparency and predictability, dialogue is ongoing on military exercises, other military activities and developments, doctrinal issues, strategy and policy, including their relation to defence reform, force development and posture. In this framework NRC nations exchange substantive briefings, hold high-level and expert discussions, and consider corresponding initiatives.

Defence industrial cooperation

A broad-based “Study on NATO-Russia Defence Industrial and Research and Technological Cooperation,” launched in January 2005 and completed in 2007, concluded that there is potential in combining
scientific and technological capabilities to address global threats. The defence and security industry is an area with potential for cooperation within the NRC, where further opportunities can be identified.

**Logistics**

Various initiatives are pursuing logistic cooperation on both the civilian and military side. Meetings and seminars have focused on establishing a sound foundation of mutual understanding by promoting information-sharing in areas such as logistic policies, doctrine, structures and lessons learned. Opportunities for practical cooperation are being explored in areas such as air transport, fuels interoperability, water generation and handling, medical services, and camp building. Cooperation is being extended through the publication of a joint NATO-Russia framework document on fuels interoperability.

**Nuclear weapons issues**

NATO and Russia have an established record of cooperation. To support future dialogue, experts have developed a glossary of nuclear terms and definitions. Joint exercises and discussions were held between 2004 and 2007 to increase transparency, develop a common understanding of nuclear weapons safety procedures, and build confidence on the full range of capabilities to respond effectively to emergencies involving nuclear weapons. Expert seminars have also been held to discuss nuclear doctrine and strategy (2005, 2009, 2011 and 2013), nuclear weapons incident/accident lessons learned (2007) and potential responses to the detection of improvised nuclear or radiological devices (2010).

**Military-to-military cooperation**

Since the NRC was established, military liaison arrangements have been enhanced, at the Allied Commands for Operations and for Transformation, as well as in Moscow. A key objective of military-to-military cooperation is to build trust, confidence and transparency, and to improve the ability of NATO and Russian forces to work together in preparation for possible future joint military operations. A “Political-Military Guidance Towards Enhanced Interoperability Between Forces of Russia and NATO Nations” was approved by NRC Defence Ministers in June 2005. NATO-Russia military-to-military cooperation currently focuses on six areas: Logistics, Combating Terrorism, Search and Rescue at Sea, Counter Piracy, Military
Academic Exchanges and Theatre Missile Defence/Missile Defence. Regular reciprocal military visits are conducted, focusing on practical operator-to-operator contacts.

**Search and Rescue at Sea**

Work in the area of submarine-crew search and rescue at sea intensified following the signing of a framework agreement in February 2003. Russia took part in NATO’s exercise Sorbet Royal, in June 2005. The experience and networks developed during the exercise contributed to the success of an actual rescue operation in August 2005 off the coast of Kamchatka peninsula. Russia also participated already in the exercise Bold Monarch 2008. During the search-and-rescue exercise Bold Monarch 2011 a Russian navy submarine, supported by three Russian ships, for the first time was fully integrated into a NATO-led exercise off the coast of southern Spain. In 2013 a sea survival course for aircrews will take place in Germany in December. The main planning conference for Dynamic Monarch 2014 (submarine rescue exercise) will take place in Poland in November 2013.

**Crisis management**

NATO and Russia have a long history of cooperation in crisis management. In fact, between 1996 and 2003, Russia was the largest non-NATO troop contributor to NATO-led peacekeeping operations. Since 2002, the NRC has taken steps to prepare for possible future cooperation in this area, notably through the approval in September 2002 of political aspects of joint NATO-Russia peacekeeping operations. Tested in a procedural exercise between 2003 and 2004, the aim is to explore common approaches, establish a framework for consultation, planning and decision-making during emerging crises, and define issues related to joint training and exercises.

**Civil emergencies**

NATO and Russia have been cooperating since 1996 to develop a capacity for joint action in response to civil emergencies, such as earthquakes and floods, and to coordinate detection and prevention of disasters before they occur. Moreover, it was a Russian proposal that led to the establishment in 1998 of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre, which coordinates responses to disasters among all partner countries (the 28 NATO members and all
partner countries). The NRC has a key focus on cooperation in this area to develop capabilities to manage the consequences of terrorist attacks. Two disaster-response exercises held in Russia (Bogorodsk, 2002, and Kaliningrad, 2004) and another in Italy, in 2006, have resulted in concrete recommendations for consequence management. Another table-top consequence-management exercise was hosted by Norway in 2010. Current work is focused on risk reduction, capacity-building and cooperation in the area of civil preparedness, consequence management related to high visibility events as well as aero medical evacuation.

**Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme**

Since 1992, scientific and technological cooperation between NATO and Russia was developed in the framework of the Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme. This Programme fosters collaboration among scientists from NATO and Partner Nations. Under the NRC Science for Peace and Security Committee, promising work is taking place on confronting new threats and challenges such as cooperation in counter-terrorism through the STANDEX project, a jointly-developed technology to detect concealed explosives from a distance, or ensuring environmental security through the multiyear project to detect Baltic Sea oil spills. Recently, a series of two workshops on telemedicine resulted with a joint application for a multi-year project by Russia and Romania with the aim of developing a multi-national telemedicine system to render medical services to population after natural/man-made disasters.

**Expert Group on Terminology**

Glossaries on the entire spectrum of NATO-Russia cooperation have been developed. These are aimed at facilitating better understanding of terms and concepts used by NATO and Russia. In June 2011, an NRC Consolidated Glossary of Cooperation was published containing 760 pages and covering some 8,000 terms. Additional glossaries have since been developed (such as on missile defence, helicopter maintenance, counter piracy). In 2013, a new glossary on Ammunition Demilitarization was published and NRC linguistic experts are working on a new Counter-Narcotics glossary. In late 2011, language training cooperation between NATO and Russia started, with the aim of facilitating cooperation and harmonizing language training for Russian Ministry of Defence
military and civilian experts engaged in cooperation with NATO, based on the Russian Ministry of Defence language training standards coherent with NATO STANAG 6001.

**Raising public awareness of the NRC**

The NRC website (www.nato-russia-council.info/) was launched in June 2007 to increase public awareness of NRC activities. All NRC nations have stated their commitment to explaining the merits of NATO-Russia cooperation to the public. A more user-friendly and interactive NRC website was re-launched in September 2012. In 2011 a foundation was laid for holding regular joint PR experts seminars between PDD/IS and Russian Ministry of Defence Press Service and Information Department.

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Regardless of the adopted perspective of an observer or analyst, and optimism/pessimism related to NATO-Russia relations, they will remain a key aspect of international security. This necessitates the search for "source knowledge" and "decoding" numerous stereotypes and simplifications that these relations have overgrown for the last quarter century. One must not forget the calculated and deliberate disinformation that Russia has been practising regarding its relations with the Alliance. It consistently uses the myth of "betrayal of the West", blaming NATO nations for being the primary cause of the current state of NATO-Russia relations.

It is not our task in this volume to explain the nature of these problems exhaustively, nor to discuss the structure of modern Russian political mythology. However, the significant dispersion of "first-hand" sources raises the bar of problems confronting researchers of NATO-Russia relations. Therefore, this volume attempts at gathering key open-source documents produced by both sides and arranging them into a representative whole to provide a better understanding of the "big picture" (…) The emerging picture of political thinking and policy justifications offers the power of beating back many stereotypical opinions (…).